TOWARDS A LESS SIMPLE BUT SOUNDER (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PRAGMATICS, & IV: A model for performance processes[a]

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ABSTRACT: This final part of the essay begins by exploring some linguistic resources that organize the overall structure of utterances and longer stretches of discourse. Then specific study of emission is broached: after touching upon some further constraints and patterns of interpersonal behavior, the previously developed general sketch of (action-like) activities' inception is applied to several types of speech (soliloquy, full other-addressed speech and an intermediate type); the section ends with an assessment of results. Study of linguistic reception is prefaced by a general sketch of processes occurring in perception-like activities, which is then specified for linguistic reception; on this basis alternative preferential interpretations of an example are delved into. After an appraisal of results and perspectives and a section on general (mainly methodological) conclusions, the essay comes to a close with several Appendixes.

1. Introduction

In Part III of present essay (Sánchez de Zavala, 1995b; from now on P.III) several notions introduced in Part I (Sánchez de Zavala, 1994c, i.e. P.I) and Part II (Sánchez de Zavala, 1995a; P.II) were somewhat developed.

For convenience, sub-indexes added to abbreviated names for *meant items* are listed below. After the "M" mnemonic for *meant*, an "I" sub-index marks an *intended* value, while "L0" indicates a value retrievable by relying on linguistic competence only, and "L1", "L2", ..., values derivable by successive 'enrichments' of the 'L0' value. (So we have now M_IPST, M_{L0}PST, M_{L1}PST, M_{L2}PST, and so on.) Sub-index "h" (as in $MACT_h$, $IMBST_h$, $IMAGT_h$, etc) reveals association to an expression -e.g. a clause- occurring at the *highest structural level* (as opposed to being *embedded*) in the linguistic make-up of an utterance. A numeral, or a variable such as 'i' ranging over numerals, after 'h' refers to the *first*, *second*, ... *i-th*, ... highest level expression -e.g. clause- in an utterance (e.g. M_I PST_{h1}, $M_I PST_{h2}$, $IM_{L0}AGT_{hi}$, etc).

Some notions specified 'basic moves', i.e. values assigned to different parameters of a *meaning activity* (MNGACT) performed while paying attention to a *focussed* (part of a speaker's) *current situation* (F_{CST}).[1]

The 'ontological' facet in MACT may have either a double range of 'values', i.e. *commitments to acknowledged 'reality'* (AKN), or a forced *maximally positive*

'value' (FOR). Both kinds relate to any of the following 'values' of the 'ontological' relation between IMBST and F_{CST}: *identity* (ID), equal *'ontological' status* but without identity (EQ), and *non-'reality'* of IMBST (NR). (These 'values' also describe the 'ontological' status of MPST relative to items of its category in F_{CST}.) The facet *subjective appraisal* in MACT may have the 'values' *null appraisal* (NULL) or *subjective slant* (SLNT). IMAGT has either the *straightforward* 'value' (STRGHT), i.e. the speaker himself/herself, or the *otherwise* 'value' (OTHERW). As to the 'minor' parameter IMADDR, when applicable its two possible 'values' are a *specific* (SPECIFC) and an *unspecified* (UNSPECF) addressee.

The timing of EFFs stemming from (an ORITM in) F_{CST} was also pored over in P.III. The alternatives considered were also marked with an abbreviation.

An effect may be perceived as *currently* occurring (EFF_c), or anticipated to occur at a *later time* (EFF_l); anyway, it may be grasped as *extending* for some noticeable time (EFF_{ec} and EFF_{el} respectively) or as virtually *unceasing* (EFF_{uc} and EFF_{ul} respectively) -otherwise it bears no mark. Again, a non-unceasing EFF may occur once (no special mark) or be anticipated as *repeated* a number of times ($EFF_{r.c}$, $EFF_{r.l}$, $EFF_{r.ec}$, and $EFF_{r.el}$, respectively). A non-current EFF may be anticipated as occurring in a *non-definite time* ($EFF_{n.r.c}$, $EFF_{n.l}$, $EFF_{n.r.l}$, ($EFF_{n.r.ec}$, $EFF_{n.el}$, $EFF_{n.ul}$, and $EFF_{n.r.el}$); otherwise it bears no mark. And EFFs having noticeable duration (even if only due to their being repeated) may be anticipated as generally *increasing* or *decreasing* in intensity ($EFF_{I.ec}$, $EFF_{D.ec}$, $EFF_{I.el}$, $EFF_{I.uc}$, $EFF_{D.r.c}$, and so on). Finally, different EFFs may combine (e.g. $EFF_{D.uc+n.r.el}$).

In the present, final Part of the essay, both emission and reception linguistic activities will be successively addressed from a processual standpoint after a short exploration of a general issue not yet touched upon.

Section 2 examines how linguistic items that 'build' complex sentences, and other resources (mainly so-called discourse markers) that combine independent sentences into extensive arrays, are to be incorporated in the advanced framework. It is shown that introduction of a simple and quite intuitive notion preserves every distinction made; and, when building on some recent theories, it even allows to improve some previously accepted conceptualizations.

Section 3 is devoted to emission activity. Its first Subsection takes up previously introduced concepts (such as constraints associated to different timings of anticipated EFFs), developing them for this kind of linguistic activities. After showing in Subsection 3.2 how the previously developed general scheme for inception of an (action-like) activity should be applied to language emission, the issue of accounting for speech activity is finally tackled. Subsection 3.3 is concerned with soliloquial language; in Subsection 3.4 an as yet unacknowledged, so to say imperfect, fashion of addressing someone else is first identified and then probed (in §3.4.1), while §3.4.2 briefly delves into different possibilities of fully addressing someone else. The final Subsection 3.5 assesses the internal consistency of the proposal and its potential for future development into genuinely empirical theories.

Section 4 broaches the study of reception activity by addressing some preliminary, unavoidable tasks resulting from the primacy bestowed on emission: in Subsection 4.1 the general problem is first discussed, and then (§4.1.2) an abstract processual scheme for activities of a sort befitting linguistic reception, namely for

perception-like activities, is developed. In Subsection 4.2 the abstract 'blueprint' is again applied to language activities, ensuing in a general processual scheme for linguistic reception where different alternatives open to a hearer are rapidly examined. Such a sequential sketch is expanded and improved in Subsection 4.3, where a few selected issues are examined; their application to an example (§4.3.3) allows derivation of a manifold of interpretations (and other hearer's responses) associated to different 'initial conditions'. Subsection 4.4 surveys how the proposed theoretical scheme stands as regards theoretical and empirical tasks for theories of reception.

Finally, general conclusions on aims and methodology of the investigation, its present state, and presumable developments are offered in Section 5. This is followed by a number of Appendixes, where specific issues are dealt with that, while bearing on key points, would have interfered with the discussion.

2. A final general issue

As acknowledged in P.II §2.1.2, several $MPST_h$s (and several different $MACT_h$s, $IMBST_h$s, $IMAGT_h$s, etc, matching them) may be associated to a single utterance. This trivial fact raises a question about how these $MPST_h$s combine or link together. Present Section addresses the issue and its consequences for our theoretical framework.

2.1. On combining-'linking' meant items

In P.III §2.1.2 it was submitted that a specific MACT is responsible for each combination of this sort occurring in a MNGACT. As to expressions that may be used to this end, they were also identified: most if not all *discourse markers*, as well as the *non-positive (linguistic) connectives* -from which, it should be ept in mind, "and" was excluded. Now, irrespective of whether the the latter disclaimer is accurate or not, the hypothesis as a whole amounts to say that these linguistic items display or expound the specific ways in which several M_IPST_hs occurring -i.e. being meant- in a single utterance are combined or linked to each other. (In our terms: not only there are combinatorial or expounding M_IACT_hs; there are also specific $M_{LO}ACT_h$s associated to them.)

The precise nature of the ***expounding*** items is, however, not clear at first blush. Are they a different kind of MACTs, or should they be merely included in a new, additional facet of the familiar MACTs? Or, trying a different tack, are they not in effect *meant items* ensuing from a new, specific sort of MNGACT? For notice that spells of MNGACT yielding the familiar MPSTs and spells yielding whatever combines or links $MPST_h$s together seem to alternate in time without mixing (for the just alluded linguistic items apparently have a single function: to express such links, or such linking activity). The issue may hardly be decided on the limited evidence presently available; three quite obvious remarks, though, might help on this problem.

2.1.1. Features of expounding meant items

To begin with, there does not seem possible for a *subjective slant* to escort *expounding items*: *"This is a difficult matter; therefore!, I will refrain from further speculation"* and *"If! you are not persuaded, then! try by yourself"*, e.g., sound highly unplausible as

serious utterances, to say the least. This negative result is apparently connected to these *links'* behavior (as shown by 'ontological statuses') regarding the 'ontological' facet in MACT; for the *links*, whatever their actual nature, seem to invariably inhabit the 'bottom rock' F_{CST}, i.e. CST -how could they have an EQ, or a NR, status?

Admittedly, when a whole utterance recedes from overt 'reality' as a result of an OTHERW 'basic move' (refer to P.III §3.3.6.2), the 'ontological statuses' of the *links* or *expounding* items it may include also *recede*. (It is not the actor who muses about metaphysical and mortal questions; Hamlet is represented doing it.) But this fact does not oppose the present suggestion, namely, that a *link* is not on its own associated either to the 'ontological' or to the *subjective appraisal* facets in MACT. It only shows that, not less than a MPST, an *expounding meant item* is related to an IMAGT.

Second, *expounding* activity is no doubt a second order activity. For $MPST_h$s, i.e. terms of the meant relation we called ('ordinary') $MACT_h$, are the 'stuff' that an *expounding* spell of activity combines or links. They must be 'there' for the latter activity (or whatever) to grab them and link them together.

Finally, consider a limit case: sentential "and". If the arguments advanced in P.III §2.1.2 are roughly correct, it may be seen as in effect sharing all basic properties of *non-positive (linguistic) connectives*. For the (somewhat incorporeal, or virtual) new, encompassing MPST it brings forth links in a sense the $MPST_h$s associated to the sentences it joins, in that such a MPST includes them as different aspects -so to say, perceived aspects- of that new, scarcely visible MPST. (In other words, the sharp cleavage between "and" and other *linguistic connectives* posited in that passage of P.III may not cut much ice.)

Putting together all these threads it may be suggested that an IMAGT has the capability to perform a second order *activity*; this 'handles' the terms to which our familiar MACTs relate, i.e. MPSTs -or more specifically $MPST_h$s. But this new activity, if assumed to be again a MACT, or a new facet in a familiar MACT, must apparently fuse or somehow blend with its own term, with the *meant item* it relates to IMAGT -i.e. with the *meant expounder* or link brought forth to 'handle' the concerned $MPST_h$s. Or else it is a MACT having a constant 'value' (apparently a positive AKN one) that makes it hardly discernible, almost thoroughly unapparent. Both possibilities seem rather unpalatable.

Alternatively, the *activity* at issue might be a quite specific *meaning activity* different from our familiar MNGACT, in that its outcome would **not** include a MACT -and so it would have no parallel (or so it seems) in pretense play. Perhaps the fact of not 'having to' build -i.e. mean- any MPST, since it borrows them from ordinary MNGACTs, is responsible for its not building -meaning- any relation to such MPSTs (i.e. for not building -meaning- any MACT). On the other hand, although this hypothesis is apparently free from the conceptual confusion the previous one seemed to be plunged in, the new MNGACT sensitivity to 'values' of the parameter IMAGT, i.e. to the other term of the 'enacted' -meant- relation MACT, seems somewhat problematic. But the biting edge of this problem may be blunted quite easily.

What a speaker unquestionably does, and cannot be attributed to anyone else, is to generate the sounds of an utterance. But, as previously pointed out (P.III Note 42), performing a MNGACT is **not necessarily** accomplished by the entity where that

physical process occurs: a record player cannot perform any *meaning activity*, no matter what sounds it may generate. Abiding by Ockhamian standards, this implies that ordinary MNGACT is not less anchored to an IMAGT than MACT is.

Summarily: an ordinary MNGACT is related to its originator, i.e to an agent that may be, but not necessarily is, the speaker -an agent showing every feature of an IMAGT. If so, there does not seem to be anything objectionable about the claim that the above suggested new MNGACT, namely ***2nd order meaning activity*** ensuing in ***meant expounders*** or *links* (of $MPST_h$s), is similarly anchored. For convenience, let us denote the new kind by 2ndA-MEXP(MPSTs), or by its abridgement 2A-ME.

2.1.2. A taxonomy of expounding meaning activities

Assume the proposal is acceptable. The basic nature common to "and" and the other *(linguistic) connectives* plus most if not all *discourse markers*, as well as their undeniable differences, may be succintly mirrored in the following claim. 2A-MEs come in two classes: one, associated to sentential "and", brings forth a ***virtual meant partial situation*** encompassing the *expounded*, or *'linked'*, $MPST_h$s; it may be specifically denoted by 2nd-MEXP-VRTPST(MPST), or by 2-MEVPS for short. The other class is associated to *non-positive linguistic connectives* and to discourse markers; a member of this class brings forth a ***meant expounding link*** and could be specifically denoted by 2nd-MEXP(MPST), or by the shorter form 2-MEX.[2] Nevertheless, since connectives and discourse markers look *prima facie* rather different, it may be wise to keep them tidily distinguished by using different symbols for them; 2-MEXC and 2-MEXD may be used, respectively, for this purpose.

Most if not all 2-MEXCs combine, i.e. link to each other, two successive $MPST_{hi}$s in an utterance, say $MPST_{hm}$ and $MPST_{hm+1}$. Notice that this simplifying assumption only minimally restricts the desirable generality if a 2-MEXC is permitted to 'link' a regular $MPST_{hi}$ to a null one. Alternatively it may be assumed that a 2-MEXC *links'* a $MPST_{hi}$ to some or other $MPST_{hj}$ that complies with specified conditions (presumably regarding its being related to a specific 2-MEXC), the particular case where i=j being also allowed.

So, it may be claimed that *"if"* standardly sets a condition on the $IMBST_h$ associated to the sentence preceded by next *"then"*, namely that the $MPST_h$ associated to the sentence preceded by that *if* token must obtain. This whole complex condition may be attributed to a *meant expounding link* associated to *"if"* (which, as a supplementary, syntactic condition requires that next highest sentence be preceded by *"then"*). This could be compactly symbolized by $2\text{-}MEXC_{\text{-.then}}$ -where, admittedly, only the syntactical condition surfaces. (Alternatively, *"then"* could be asumed to enforce the converse conditions, both syntactic and on *meant items*. The associated *meant expounding 'link'* could self-explanatorily be denoted by $2\text{-}MEXC_{if..}$) Similarly, an apparently sensible construal of (some uses of) *"either"* is that the $MPST_h$ associated to the sentence it precedes must obtain in F_{CST} if the $MPST_h$ associated to the sentence preceded by next *"or"* does not obtain there, and vice versa.

Harking back to the celebrated Gricean example previously quoted (in P.III Note 4), arguably *"therefore"* shows the $MPST_h$ involved by the sentence it is associated with as definitely following from the $MPST_h$ indicated by some previous

sentence, possibly (or perhaps: preferently) the immediately preceding one. Now a suitable symbol for the appropriate *meant expounding link* could simply be 2-MEXD$_{-}$.

Concerning Horn's ideas about 'metalinguistic negation', let us tentatively accept their generalization to the effect that sentential *"not"* is **always** a pragmatic operator.[3] If we ignore how it bears on items other than *meant items*, so that we dismiss what may be called its strictly Hornian uses (i.e. those involving rejection of the very uttering act, its phonetic or syntactic correctness, its social fitness, etc), then *"not"* may be construed as expressing a category of the kind here discussed; in other words, it would be regarded as expressing a *meant expounding link* -which, inasmuch as it standardly bears on the 'contents' of a single sentence, might be symbolized by 2-MEXC$_{-}$, or else by 2-MEXC$_{i.i}$.[4]

As to how such a *meant expounding link* operates, this might be described as follows. (1) A MPST$_h$ associated to a sentence where sentential *"not"* occurs bears a specific relationship to the MPST -let us call it MPST$_{h^*}$- associated to its matching 'positive' sentence (i.e. that derived from the original one not only by deleting "not", but also by eliminating any syntactic feature determined by its occurrence). (2) The relationship between MPST$_h$ and MPST$_{h^*}$ is: both have the very same IMBST$_h$, but the former MPST amounts to whatever results if the latter's obtaining is excluded.[5]

It may be also suggested that sometimes several *meant expounding 'links'* combine into a complex one. So, a number of specific 2-MEX$_i$s occurring in a single utterance, say r+1 of them indexed by i=k, i=k+1, ...i=k+r, may combine resulting in a ***complex meant expounding link***, to be schematically symbolized by C2-MEX$_{(k.+r)}$.[6]

Clearly, *"if ...then"* might be construed as associated to one such C2-MEXC$_{\text{if-then}(k.+1)}$ -so evading a choice between two redundant conditions (those associated to *"if"* and *"then"*) and an arbitrary selection of one of them. A similar construal, i.e. one relying on a single condition operative on the whole 'contents' of the relevant pair of sentences could be suggested for *"either ...or"*.

Were *"not"* to be construed as expressing a *complex meant expounding link*, then: (a) it obviously operates on a single MPST$_{hi}$ of the utterance at issue, which we may mark by fixing i=k; (b) a condition similar to (1) above, but where MPST$_{hk}$ substitutes for MPST$_h$ and MPST$_{hk^*}$ for MPST$_{h^*}$, is now obtaining; and (c) a condition similar to (2) above, but for these very same sunbstitutions, is now obtaining. (A plausible symbol: C2-MEXC$_{\text{not}(k.-^*)}$.)[7]

2.1.3. Revising the taxonomy

How is *2nd order meaning activity* cum either *virtual meant partial situation* or *meant expounding link* to be incorporated in the outlined picture of 'basic moves' and combinations of them? A few preliminary remarks may help draft a tentative sketch of an answer.

As above intimated, there are substantial distinctions between different kinds of the *2nd order meaning activities*. Linguistic 'connectives' bring about a **shift** to that activity no more than **local**, in that the enforced conditions are 'internal' to the

$MPST_h$s involved -as our suggestions for *"if ...then"*, *"either ...or"*, and *"not"* clearly show.

This is even more true of sentential *"and"*. For now there is no genuine *meant expounding link*, **no** semantic 'content' **accruing** to the operated on $MPST_h$s -the latter are just seen as 'parts' of a non-specified, embracing MPST.

This ***local shift*** property common to 2-MEVPS and 2-MEXCs may be acknowledged by a common symbol for them all -say, by LS-2MNA. (In the familiar way, LS_{Li}-2MNA, may denote a linguistic item associated to this class after its i-th elaboration by a hearer, and LS_I-2MNA a LS-2MNA intended by a speaker.)

Things happen differently in a *discourse marker*; this brings forth an **extended shift** to *2nd order meaning activity*, where real semantic content accrues to that provided by the concerned $MPST_h$(s) in the utterance and links it with that of some MPST(s) outside the latter. An ***extended shift*** indeed, because a domain is reached that is **external** to the $MPST_h$(s) associated to the linguistic items responsible for the *shift*. (The domain is often only required to comply with very general formal conditions -such as e.g. being an argument.) In a similar way to the *local shifters*, an *extended shifter*, in spite of having been previously denoted by 2-MEXD, might be more revealingly denoted by ES-2MNA. (Again, ES_{Li}-2MNA, where *i* ranges from 0 to *n*, and ES_I-2MNA would contrast in the familiar way.)

As shown in the *"therefore"* example borrowed from Grice, the condition specifying the domain reached may be lacking, or be entirely vacuous; which opens the way to a *link* potentially reaching any previous sentence in discourse. In fact, an ES-2MNA may reach even 'further': the 'initial' $MPST_h$ may end up 'linked' to a PST **not** yet **linguistically expressed**. So, if your spouse accidentally watches your elastic jumps and gambols on the lawn in early morning, you might be affectionately scolded by the following surprised cry,

(1) Therefore you begun again to train for Olimpic Games!

although, since no one said a word previously, there is no linguistically meant partial situation to which *"therefore"* may 'link' that associated to its own sentence. (Admittedly, it may be contented that such a MPST is 'mentally' expressed by the speaker of (1). But there is nothing obvious about the hypothesis, which should be supported by empirical -preferably psycholinguistic- evidence.)[8]

A final notational proposal. For consistency and convenience, an abbreviation may be used to symbolize any kind of *shift to 2nd order meaning activity*, irrespective of whether it is a LS-2MNA or an ES-2MNA (i.e. as a replacement fo the old 2A-ME). It is submitted that a symbol such as S-2MNA be used to that end.

Unnecessary to say, the above contrast is a natural language conterpart to the contrast between logical connectives and deduction rules (and so between object language and metalanguage). Uunsurprisingly the latter, yes-no contrast is bridged by a host of natural language expressions associated to S-2MNAs.

Consider e.g. non-temporal *"then"*. We saw above its strictly *linguistic connective* role when associated to *"if"*; but the following dialogue seems to be entirely 'natural'

(2) *Terry*: a. I think my lab's computer would still be quite skillful with the blocks 'world' -the program is still there.

George: b. Then I'll be forced to review my old ideas on hedges.

(no matter what the connection between programs written in LISP and linguistic 'hedges' might turn out to be). Not only so: ignoring shades of meaning, *"then"* can substitute for *"therefore"* in (1) and so play a full *discourse marker* role.[9] In fact, in a similar situation to that assumed for (1), a less loving spouse might have sarcastically exclaimed as follows;

(3) And do you hope to win a Bronze Medal?

if (3) is really 'natural' here, even the apparently unique LS-2MNA *"and"* may reach the 'furthest' realm open to an *extended shifter*.[10]

A relationship between $MPST_h$s, nearby or distant, can also be represented (meant), not by *discourse markers*, but in an **explicit** way. It is then spoken of, though, **as any other** relationship -witness the example (P.III Note 4) that Grice contrasted with the use of *"therefore"*.[11] In other words, explicit mention of such a relationship is not accomplished by means of a full changeover to 2nd order, but through use of 'higher order' descriptions (so that the involved $MPST_h$s are **not** events, processes, etc nor 'regular' objects, but abstract items such as facts, propositions and the like). From a linguistic standpoint we are then **back** to ordinary, i.e. **first order** meaning activities.

2.2. Significance of 2nd order meaning activity

If the proposals above are essentially correct, we face a new query: How to incorporate the new linguistic activities suggested into present framework? More specifically: Do they lead to new 'basic moves'?; do their interspersing 'ordinary', first order meaning activities result in a disruption of the familiar combinations of such 'moves'?; etc.

A first realization that simplifies arriving at a preliminary, tentative answer to these questions is as follows. The *local* nature of the *shift to 2nd order stance* involved in the use of *linguistic connectives*, as well as the inert character of these LS-2MNAs regarding most parameters of ordinary emission activity, apparently ensure that the changes they might originate in 'basic moves', etc, if at all occur, may be rather safely ignored (at least for the time being).

This is not the case, however, with *extended shifters*. Here the discourse is actually shifted to a different level, where ordinary $MPST_h$s are the elementary items being 'handled'. And the ability of these ES-2MNAs to determine, through suitable *expounding* or *'linking'*, how other items of similar sort are accepted, ignored, modified, or whatever, ensues in ways of being arranged together that go essentially beyond what 'basic moves' are able to contribute by themselves.

To say this, though, is not enough, in that the different roles that the involved $MPST_h$s play (either singly or in groups) shape up a new, emergent property that is not anywhere mentioned -although a number of such roles were hinted at a few paragraphs back. There is no need (nor possibility) to delve here into the matter, which is the subject of different kinds of studies of discourse and argumentation. But it cannot either be altogether ignored, for the *shift* resulting from a ES-2MNA is certainly a significant 'move'. As a convenient makeshift to temporarily fill the gap caused by the lack of a suitable theory regarding such 'moves', everything will be here lumped together into a ***heightening move*** -as, somewhat arbitrarily, it may be called.

3. A theoretical outline of emission

As required by specific trait (i) of linguistic activities (see P.I §§4.2 and 4.3), emission and reception must be tackled separately. And rejection of common assumption (c) (P.I §2.2) suggests that emission should be addressed first. As a preliminary task, some general issues will be probed, so that the final, detailed study of emission performance is expedited.

3.1. On some ways of acting as a speaker

In addition to several aspects of linguistic activity central to emission performance (*driving agencies*, 'basic moves', *general ways of acting*, and timing of anticipated EFFs), some other notions also bearing on linguistic emission have been introduced, such as constraints between items belonging to these different categories. In order to specify more closely avenues open to a speaker, other potential constraints should be explored; and it may be also useful to offer a few suggestions on how these avenues relate to different kinds of circumstances.

3.1.1. Constraints

In P.III §2.2.2 constraints (i) through (iv) were advanced in connection with timing of anticipated EFFs. A few other constraints may be listed that, while being generally applicable, are nonetheless specific to linguistic emission activities (a feature that will be accordingly labelled by an E sub-index).

Keeping to the policy (PII §4.2) that, irrespective of ontological beliefs cherished by pragmatic theorists, Pragmatics must accept at face value any attempt to change the world by means of uttering a suitable expression, the first new general constraint (in fact, a counter-constraint) may be phrased as follows,

(i_E) No matter what general way is chosen, there are in principle FOR-** utterances that (if actually performed by a speaker) might be assumed to ensue in changes fit to cope with the anticipated or perceived EFFs.

or in some similar fashion. (Obviously implementation of this stopgap may be blocked in many ways, such as lack of knowledge of an institutional procedure required, or no prospect of 'enlisting' suitable Powers to effect the needed changes: see P.III §3.3.4.) A second general constraint

(ii_E) *General way* [a] cannot be used -barring direct application of the potential in counter-constraint (i_E)- in order to cope with an EFF_{-c-}, unless it is solely an $siEFF_{-c-}$

has the following rationale: no utterance (barring FOR-** ones) may in no time move the speaker to a different F_{CST}, nor change the latter into a different one; so, any external EFF_{-c-} would keep unchanged. A third constraint is (iii_E)

(iii_E) *General ways* [c]-[c'] can only be followed, for EFF_{-I-}, by means of an appropriate sequence of NR and ID/EQ utterances; specifically, by an appropriate inference ending in a self-addressed injunction to have the anticipated EFF appraised as more 'favourabe' (or less 'unfavourable') than before.

-where only an EFF_{-I-} is considered because constraint (iv) already excludes cases having EFF_{-C-}. (Admittedly, it is questionable that this exercise in self-persuasion should be included within **direct** linguistic activities.)

We turn now to constraints where a restriction concerning a specific 'permanent' goal or attractor/aversor (refer to P.I Appendix 3) is included. (For simplicity, arguments warranting them will be worded as if only 'unfavourable' EFFs were at issue.) We find here two thoroughly parallel constraints. The case for the first one

(G1-i_E) *General ways* [b.1]-[b'.1] look unlikely to be effective for a *driving agency* associated to G1.

may be worded as follows: barring again use of counter-constraint (i_E), it seems to be a sheer impossibility, by merely issuing an utterance, to change general properties of F_{CST} in such a way that an ORITM's unchanged operation does not any more ensue in a (correctly perceived or anticipated) pain or injury to bodily well-being. As to the second constraint in this class,

(G2-i_E) *General ways* [b.1]-[b'.1] are unlikely to have any effectiveness for a *driving agency* associated to G2.

it may be argued for in a thoroughly parallel way to the first one: dismissing again counter-constraint (i_E) potential, to change, by merely issuing an utterance, general properties of F_{CST} so that an ORITM unchanged operation does not any more ensue in (correctly perceived or anticipated) lack of satisfaction of bodily needs seems to be a sheer impossibility.

(G2-i_E) seems to deserve being couched in more general terms, so that *general ways* [b.2]-[b'.2] are also covered; for How could we counter the operation of the source (ORITM) of a bodily need by just speaking? Nevertheless, some needs (sleep, rest, and others concerning bodily relaxation) may be satisfied through action (or inhibition of action) not directed outside the subject. Then, a subject, by uttering suitable expressions (taken from a lullabiy, say) may conceivably cope in these cases.

On the other hand, an indirect use of language seems to be ideally suited to allay even bodily needs that require to get outer items (such as food, etc). For a subject may, by way of persuasion, gain the befitting items from a fellow-being already having them (as chimpanzees and bonobos do through gestures that effectively promote sharing of food). I return below to indirect emission activity.

The following, third constraint on a specific 'permanent' goal or attractor/aversor regards the extension of constraint (iv) to *general ways* [b.1]-[b'.1] and [b.2]-[b'.2] when G3 is considered.

(G3-i_E) The distinction between *general ways* [b.1] and [b.2] vanishes when the effect at issue is an EFF_{-C-} whose 'unfavourability' comes from too small a stimulation (especially if it is exceedingly smal).

(In the alluded circumstances every item in F_{CST} may be considered as an ORITM, for none is origin to a sufficiently strong stimulation. Now, the distinction between the *general ways* at issue is built on the notion of an ORITM, or a set of them, as opposed to all other items in F_{CST}; so, since the opposition is missing the indistinguishability of

these *ways* follows.) Certainly it is not a very encompassing nor strong constraint, but it is interesting in that it cuts somewhat the variety of options available to a speaker.

There do not seem to be obvious specific constraints paralleling ($G1\text{-}i_E$)-($G3\text{-}i_E$) as regards the other, 'higher' permanent goals. This may be related to the fact that the latter, being more abstract, can be instanced in a variety of fashions that elude any general constriction.

We turn now to constraints operative in indirect language activities. As indicated in P.III §2.2.2, perhaps the most interesting cases arise where a direct linguistic activity is unlikely to solve the problem posed by the perceived or anticipated EFFs (i.e. the ***global problem***, as it was called in P.I Appendix 2). Let us review the constraints above listed.

In P.III §2.2.2 it was pointed out that, if we ignore the case where the speaker himself/herself is the envisioned final agent, a speaker, by choosing an indirect use of language, is entirely **free from constraints (i)-(iii)**. But, on the other hand, the ability and/or disposition to eventually overcome them must be **created in the envisioned final agent** if he or she does not have them/it already.

E.g. (refer to example (22a) in P.III §2.2.2) Johnny may have his elder sister Mary to pick him up to stay overnight with his cousins; but he must either persuade her not to force him to take the nauseating pill, or maneouvre so cunningly that she does not even become aware of the doctor's prescription. Or else he may ask his brother Pete for some of his extra-sweet syrup chewing-gum, a repeteadly tested means to entirely offset any bitter taste. Or finally -refer to (22b)- Johnny might try and persuade his classmate Rosie that he loves her very much and that, if only she agrees to walk home with him when school-time is over, his protection from Tom's nasty words will be magnificently gallant and chivalrous.

On the other hand, **constraint (iv)** is definitely **critical** in indirect uses of language; even more so that in its direct uses.

If -refer to example (19a) in P.III §2.2.2- Maggie knows that her little friend Johnny hates sweets and so never has any about him, hardly can she confidently expect to dispel her disppointment and frustration by asking Johnny to let her know, say, how happy he is eating bitter and sour morsels of strange-looking and strange-named food.

As regards the other constraints listed, the first one, i.e. **'counter-constraint' (i_E)**, is obviously still **valid**. For, in principle, a speaker confronting a *global problem* may engage in any of the following two courses of action. First, he or she may offset the associated *ancillary, preliminary* problem by launching a *preparatory* linguistic emission made up by a suitable FOR-** utterance. Or else, what may be solved (by whatever kind of utterance is apt to succed in the task) is the following specific *preliminary problem*: the envisioned final agent is apparently not able and/or prepared to carry out the *(pre-)final activity* of issuing an appropriate and effective FOR-** utterance that will have the world become free of the *global*, initially anticipated or perceived EFF.

On the other hand, **(ii_E) is not valid** now, since there is no in principle impossibility that somebody else (which would then be the *final agent*) manages to effect, by whatever means, the required change in the original F_{CST}.

So, by crying for help you may alarm some passer-by so that he or she takes you out of the dangerously full of fumes cellar.

Constraint **(iii$_E$)** is clearly **not applicable** for indirect use of language. Even more, as already noted, the considered cases may anyway require such a kind of uses.

Consider the difference between the machine-gun man (refer to P.I §3.2 and Appendix 2) asking himself whether it is so unendurable to be made a war prisoner and consequently engaging in a re-appraisal of that eventuality, and his asking over the walkie-talkie the man in next fortified position about his ideas on the matter and again re-appraising such an eventuality. Is there really a great difference as regards indirectness (in our sense)?

Turning now to constraints concerning specific 'permanent' goals or attractors/aversors, **(G1-i$_E$)**, for one, is also apparently **not valid**. For someone else may be so located (or so strong or dexterous, say) as to be able to divert from you the impending menace to your physical integrity; and maybe he or she would be willing to do it if you urge him/her to do so. It was shown a few paragraphs back that a quite similar reasoning shows that it would be again **incorrect** to deem **(G2-i$_E$) valid** as regards indirect use of language. As to **(G3-i$_E$)**, it does **not** seem to be **operative** for indirect use, since a subject may well deem some specific member of his/her linguistic community being in F_{CST} to be the item on which a suitable utterance of his/her may be most effective as an indirect source of additional stimuli -either he or she might be in some or other way coaxed into providing such stimuli, or changed into an effective instigator of some other item(s) becoming source(a) of additional stimuli.

Let us finally come to a specific interaction between the posited inception process of linguistic activities and this manner of using language. As it was repeatedly pointed out in P.III §§3.1.1-3.1.2, the *early processing stage* is defined by a prompt, almost automatic activity that excludes taking on an actual 'means-ends' stance. But indirect use of language seems to imply just this stance, so that *preparatory* linguistic activities are a dubious proposition in this *stage*.

3.1.2. Tactical choices

A seemingly sensible starting point to explore these choices is to establish a schematic but complete chart of combinatorial alternatives linking to each other the different notions mentioned in §3.1. Then all developed constraints should be applied, in order to trim off the impossible, or highly unlikely, combinations. Finally, the remaining possibilities would be compared with a processual scheme of speech inception; an operation that would allow to derive specific predictions (presumably most of them negative) regarding where to look for evidence on inception of different parts and aspects of an utterance.

But not only is this a far shot ahead, in all likelihood a vast enterprise. Arguably it would be of no great significance. For apparently, from the huge manifold of theoretically possible alternatives, a culture/society ignores most of them and plays the others over and over again. If this is correct, then a theoretical investigation in Pragmatics could safely forget about all these alternatives and focus instead on the comparatively small number of them that, *modulo* minor variations, are used once and again. This implies that, whatever these alternatives are, they are liable to provide

evidence replicable (almost) at will; and so they are presumably highly significant regarding the empirical status of a psychological Pragmatics.

What are these empirically crucial alternatives? Obviously, the ones allocated to socially acknowledged roles in socially defined situations and ways of interaction. In Schank & Abelson's (1976) conceptualization, they are those matching the roles in (the main *tracks* in) *scripts*. The suggestion is, then, that well-known *scripts* be chosen, and the main roles in (the main *tracks* in) them be probed regarding: *driving agencies* (duly timed as to EFFs) typically operating in them, likely *general ways of (simply) acting* that may be presumed to be preferentially taken, and main combinations of *basic moves* liable to be used (in attempts to meet the 'needs' defined by the previous two notions' specific values).

The investigation might be then completed in two main directions. First, by considering other, secondary *basic moves* likely to be used by a subject in order to effectively perform one of the roles already sounded. Second, by exploring other, less typical alternatives open to subjects engaged in these *scripts*.

This is no lightweight assigment, certainly. To see how one should proceed in a specific case, a greatly stylized (in fact, almost caricatured) example may be rapidly surveyed.

Consider a (highly simplified) *script* for (conventional) university-level education. Think of a *track* thereof where no handling of instruments, pieces of apparatus nor other equipment is involved (say, education in theoretical linguistics, ethics, or higher mathematics). Let us concentrate on the *role* of a person who teaches introductory courses in one of these disciplines. In a first *sub-track* to be considered, in each lecture the lecturer's main goal is to change the current mental state of the students' into one of being sufficiently familiar with the specific subject the lecture is about (EFF_{uc} = relevant information is lacking in students' minds). If so, the obvious *general way* to take on is [b.3], or in other words, to provide that information. Finally, the central *basic move* involved will mainly result in ID utterances, since even hypothesis and theories are regular items 'in the world' (the theoretical or the academic world, to be sure), and these utterances are just meant to disclose how is in fact the world.

A modicum of detail to slightly flesh out such a skeletal picture. Very likely some NR utterances (injunctions to accept, maybe to memorize, offered information) will also occur; and other kinds of *-NR utterances, such as expository and rethorical question (arguably OTHERW-NR utterances), may as well be interspersed in the discourse. Still other kinds may occur; e.g. a few EQ utterances (such as short glimpses on how the lecturer came to learn about the matter currently being presented) might be used to alleviate dryness and boredom. Etc.

In a different *sub-track*, it may be hypothesised, the lecturer's main goal is to interest the students in the current subject and to have them involved in an active attempt to find out how the discussed parts/aspects of the world are in fact. (Perhaps not only the theoretical, academic world of hypotheses, evidence, etc that the lecturer thinks the students should know. More importantly, the actual phenomena/facts these theoretical items 'are about'.) Now the main *driving agency* centrally involves EFF_{uc} = students' lack of an urge to learn about the domain of phenomena/facts at issue and about theoretical efforts to model it; so, only in an ancillary manner is an EFF_{uc}

identical to the main one operating in previous *sub-track* also operative. This implies that inasmuch as a [b.3] *general way* is embraced, it is not so much information about the domain at issue and its theoretical representations what ID utterances would offer, but partial, incomplete or even incorrect 'information'.

This may be implemented in two different ways. On one hand, such bits and pieces of information may be advanced, in seemingly 'higher order' descriptions (cp. §2.1.3) implemented in ID utterances, as following from possibly inadequate hypoteses, theories and/or data (here mainly offered in OTHERW-ID utterances). On the other hand, they may be linked, by suitable discourse markers, to 'actual', tentatively advanced conjectures and hypotheses (accordingly issued in NR utterances); and the conjectures may be interspersed with questions about the domain and about its relationship to possible hypoteses (no doubt, either NR or OTHERW-NR utterances), as well as with injunctions to articulate new and more adequate hypoteses (i.e. with utterances belonging to the second main class of NR utterances).

Alternatively, it may be claimed that for a lecturer the main EFF_{uc} is quite similar to that assumed in previous *sub-track* (perhaps only more general), but that now the [b.2] *general way* is embraced (the ORITM being the students' stances). This hypothesis scarcely calls for any change in the analysis just offered. As to how to complete the minimal results so obtained, no doubt suggestions very similar to those advanced for previous *sub-track* would be apposite here.

The point of the above example is not to show that stereotypical ways of speaking as a role player in standard situation can be translated into our terminological conventions; it is rather to lend some credence to a different claim. Assume that 'translations' of this sort are combined with a full, detailed processual study of emission. Then, it is claimed, specific predictions can plausibly be derived about likely and unlikely utterances in specific contexts; which implies that the theoretical framework here advanced shows promise of being able to be put on a sound empirical foothold.

Note, by the way, that the facts about (universal, or nearly universal) institutions governing linguistic action that speech-acts theory cares for, and that were studiously expunged from our notion *basic move* (cp. P.III §3.3), find their natural place, jointly with any other conventions governing uses that language is put to, as (roles in *tracks* in) *scripts*.[12] For instance, the class of *declarations*, including its sub-classes *commisives* and *expressives*, can in principle be obtained quite easily by 'adding' conditions supplied by appropriate kinds of *scripts* to FOR-ID utterances -see P.III §3.3.6.2. (I cannot delve into the matter here.)

3.2. A forthright processual 'blueprint' for language

As we know (P.II Section 5), it may be safely assumed that in *initial phase* there is neither linguistic emission nor any activity specifically conducive to it.

For a subject, upon off-hand perceiving a F_{CST} and appraising its likely, more or less impending EFFs, may well, say, turn nonchalantly to a different F_{CST}, keep trying to get more perceptual information on (an ORITM relevant to that EFFs in) the original F_{CST}, or directly launch some external action.

This agrees with the sketch of the elicitation process of emotions offered in P.I §3.1 and its generalization (P.I §§3.2-3.3) to a blueprint for inception of an activity. So the blueprint will be applied below to language emission.

The processual scheme assumes as starting point an *initial phase* displaying the just referred to features. Beyond it there is an *early processing stage* from which an (almost) automatic linguistic activity may spring. The general policy of ignoring emotions will be again complied with -even though it seems quite likely that emotions associate with some cases of a SLNT 'basic move' (especially in SLNT-ID and SLNT-EQ utterances, i.e. in exclamations).

Two preliminary reminders on a *driving agency* effective in this *stage*. First, it is much more likely for it to involve either attractive/aversive 'qualities' or standards of behavior than goals (see P.I §§3.2 and 3.3). Again (cp. P.III §3.1), even a main *agency* may be very weak and still be operative. (The observation, in fact, also applies to *late processing stage*.)

As to the *general ways* of (simply) acting, ignoring the problems attendant to their distinction (P.I §4.3), they were assumed to be in this *stage* a slightly reduced version of those occurring in *late processing stage*. This implies that their discussion as regards the latter *stage* provides a background for their examination in present *stage*.

Since an utterance originating in this *stage* comes forth (almost) automatically, hardly may it be used in a proper means-ends fashion, i.e. with a view to counter (enhance) 'unfavourable' ('favourable') EFFs. From this several properties follow. First, no linguistic indirectness is here possible, for performance of a (*preparatory*) emission is a means to the end that an anticipated *final activity* is eventually carried out. Second, no 'basic move' where the specific means-ends relation figures prominently should possibly contribute, but accidentally, to the utterance build.

A prime candidate for this category is FOR-** 'basic move', since to use the *extra-high* 'ontological' *value* of $MACT_h$ seems to require being intent on bringing off a change in the world (cp. P.III §§3.3.1, 3.3.5, and P.II §4.2). Nevertheless, even a FOR utterance may become a verbal habit if successfully used once and again in a specific kind of situation. (Arguably, most common greetings are in the category.) So, although use of 'counter-constraint' (i_E) to sidestep the limitations imposed by other constraints is now standardly impossible, if a suitable FOR utterance has become a verbal habit, dodging the relevant limitation is again feasible.

This leads to a third property: constraints relevant here cannot be eluded (if in principle possible) through indirect use of language. As a consequence, all constraints (not only those also valid for this use) are in full force in the *early processing stage*. One outcome of these consequences of the blocking of indirectness is that some *general ways of (simply) acting* are highly dubious, if not downright impossible in this *stage*.

Assuming that *general way* [a] were to be accepted here (a moot issue), constraints (i) and (ii_E) would be unconditionally valid. Regarding *general ways* [b.1]-[b'.1]: constraints (G1-i_E), and (G2-i_E) are now in full force. Ignoring the questionability of [b.2] as a real alternative in this stage, the indistinguishability of *general ways* [b.1] and [b.2] referred to in (G2-i_E) is again not to be evaded now. Also in full force for [b.3]-[b'.3] is constraint (ii), and similarly for [b.3.c]-[b'.3.c] as

occurring in (iii). Finally, [c]-[c'], if actually possible in this *stage*, are again unrestrictedly submitted to constraint (iii_E), for the known reasons.

Irrespective of whether any utterance does originate in the *early stage*, if EFFs are appraised as 'unfavourable', then the subject enters in *late processing stage* -where, in probing the feasibility of countering that EFFs, the familiar *general ways of (simply) acting* fully offer their alternative routes. In fact, even 'favourably' appraised EFFs may prompt launching this second processing *stage* -where a slightly reduced set (refer to P.I Appendix 2) of the *ways* will be available to probe the feasability of fostering these EFFs. (For easier exposition, only the 'unfavourability' cases will most times be referred to.)

If the probing ushers in negative results, the process is ended and the subject comes back to (a new) *initial phase*, where in the 'initial activity it is included the linguistic emission originated (if any) in the *early processing stage* and where the new F_{CST} is appraised. Assume that, on the contrary, a positive outcome is reached; this may be the final result of two different routes, one associated to direct use of language, and the other to its indirect use.

The first route searches for utterances presumably able to offset the 'unfavourable' EFFs at issue. A subject engages in the second one (cp. P.I Appendix 2) when the following three conditions obtain. (1) The subject estimates that the (*global*) problem posed by such EFFs has an obvious solution through performance of a specific activity (*final activity*) -be it linguistic or otherwise, and either anticipated as to be executed by the subject himself/herself or by some other agent. (2) The *final activity* requires as a precondition that F_{CST} shows a specific feature, and the subject sees it as missing -the subject is faced with a new 'unfavourable' EFF. (3) Tackling by the subject of the new, dependent, *preliminary problem* (i.e. to offset the new EFF) ensues in evoking a (*preparatory*) linguistic activity, assumed to solve it when actually performed.

In other words, condition (2) calls for a return to (a new) *initial phase* having identical properties to the one the subject might have returned (see above) just after completion of the *early processing stage*. (On how to avoid assuming several 'turns', i.e. going repeatedly through the sequence of processual steps of linguistic emission, see §3.4.2 below.)

Irrespective of how a subject envisions using language (i.e. directly or indirectly) to cope with the original EFFs, the devised emission activity will eventually be launched -obviously, assuming no external blockage.

Notice that any resource or 'move' available in *early processing stage* is also available in *late stage*. This implies that it may be difficult, or even impossible, to tell utterances that although originating in the latter *stage* could also have originated in the former one, from those in fact originating in it -i.e. in the *early processing stage*. (Hopefully, mental chronometry techniques may prove up to the task.)

A few final remarks, mainly on what is not included in present Subsection. As per the requirements of trait (ii) (P.I §4.3), speech addressed to someone else will be examined separatedly from speech that is not so used.[13] Note that, however undeniable it is the lack of a theory about how an utterance originates in *early processing stage*, we may to some extent conceive of its general structure and 'boundary conditions'.

The very definitional property of the *stage*, i.e. the (almost) automatic nature of whatever utterances originates in it, implies that the *stage* is a sort of **grabbing device** having access to a repository of ready-made expressions and schematic constructions, each tagged with specific (combinations of) features of the appraised F_{CST} (potentially including an ORITM), as well as of the perceived or anticipated EFFs. (The process by which a specific utterance is 'chosen' may be thought of as an activation of esentially sub-psychological routines, quite comparable to those responsible for triggering, say, a conditional response, or an unlearned behavioral pattern.) Regarding 'boundary conditions' that a theory of this *stage* must comply with: it certainly must interface in a theoretically adequate fashion with the best available theories about (complex) features extraction, about lexical access, and about sentence generation (an enumeration that should be continued, no doubt).

Lack of a proper processual theory about *late processing stage* is a more serious matter, though. True, we know which notions must prominently occur in it.

Central notions such as those listed in P.III §3.1.1 (*driving agencies*, accessing and combinatorial routines, grammatical and otherwise, *general ways of simply acting*, etc.), as well as other notions that, because of their critical role in the presumed workings of the *stage*, should also be included: from *'basic move'* (cp. P.III §3.1.3) to *scripts* -duly completed in several directions (see §3.1.2 above)- and other socially patterned ways of behaving.

We are, however, in pitch-black darkness about how it should be tackled the central task that a genuine theory regarding this *stage* must perform. Namely, to show in an explicit, unambiguous way the 'mechanisms' through whose operation the sundry collection of the real, psychological counterparts to the above notions eventually ensues in whatever is the input to the psycholinguistic devices responsible for actual articulation of utterances. (An assignment that clearly is the central one for a theory to qualify as endeavouring to explain linguistic emission.) This is ultimately the reason why the eventual produce of present essay is always referred to as a theoretical framework rather than a theory.

3.3. Non-other-addressed speech

But for the restrictions implied by the above indicated properties of *early processing stage*, there should be no restrictions on this *stage* as it occurs in soliloquial) use of language

Obviously an utterance that changes interpersonal, e.g. social relations should be impossible to originate in the soliloquial conditions here prevalent. For, even assuming that the speaker notices other people nearby, a setting apt to automatically elicit utterances regarding interpersonal relations must be interpersonal, and by hypotesis the speaker ignores these aspects. Clearly, no specific manoeuvre is needed to block an utterance of this kind, since it would be a FOR utterance, and so it would be excluded along with all others in this class.[14]

A rapid survey of combinations of 'basic moves' seems to show that, while ID utterances may be rare, as evidenced by examples (29b)-(31b) in P.III §3.2.6.1, their emotive counterparts, i.e. (a significant class of) SLNT-ID utterances matching them, seem quite ordinary (cp. also examples (62)-(64) in P.II Appendix). Again,

since EQ utterances are virtually indistinguishable from ID ones but for what is specifically represented in them (i.e. their M_IPST_hs), a similar difference is to be expected regarding their SLNT-EQ emotive matches. (The implication is borne out by expostulations such as *"That was fun!"* or *"An awful time (then)!"*.) As to NR utterances, hypoteses, conjectures and so on seem definitely out here, while injunctions of all kinds, including questions, seem to be quite natural.

Think e.g. of a 'command' like *"Stop!"* delivered at a sudden realization that snowflakes begin to cover the ground and so to imperil your projected walk, or a 'question' like *"Here again?"* when feeling a recurrent pain in a limb.

Once more the non-null 'value' of the *subjective appraisal* facet in $MACT_h$ looks especially fit here, at least as far as SLNT-NR optative utterances fare -see e.g. example (45) in P.III §3.3.6.2.

Some combinations of 'basic moves' seem especially germane to this *stage*. E.g. (cp. P.III §2.2.2) a subject that at the anticipation of future mishaps becomes quite distressed, i.e. that experiences an 'unfavourable' $siEFF_{-c-}$, may nonetheless find immediate alleviation by emitting an utterance that directly counters that feeling; in other words, along [b.3.c] *way* of acting.

The utterance may apparently rely either on an ID or (if a request-command) on an NR 'move'. So, the reality of the anticipated event may be denied, or else urged to annihilate, by a *"No!"* (Alternatively, this may be an optative utterance.) If an item that is thought of more or less as a person is identified, either as the antagonistic event itself, or as the agent responsible for it, such an item may be verbally abused. (Notice, by the way, that a proviso in constraint (iii) exempts an EFF_{-c-} from it.)

The only 'basic move' still to be reviewed is the OTHERW option for $IMAGT_h$. It might seem that OTHERW utterances are somewhat difficult to issue in this *stage*. Nevertheless, ironical expostulations such as *"Wonderful!"* or *"Fine!"* look like good candidates for utterances originating in this stage. The one sensible policy right now is apparently to leave the matter open.

Turning to *late processing stage*, there seem to be no peculiar features but those obviouly linked to lack of an addressee. So, indirect uses of language such as requests (including questions) must be self-addressed.

This only requires that the reference of "x" in schematic formulae (41) and (46), and of "somebody" in (42) (all in P.III §3.3.6.2), is the speaker himself/herself. A fixation of reference that might involve a 'value' included in OTHERW for the fourth parameter.[15]

Apparently, everything else comes out in the general fashion. A subject may make explicit for himself/herself how the world is, urge himself/herself to do whatever is needed so that the world becomes as desired, (assumedly) have the world change in specific ways by his/her uttwering a suitable expression, etc.

As remarked in P.III §2.2.2 (when constraint (iii) was discussed), a speaker may assuage negative feelings stemming from anticipation of future blows, i.e. thwart a siEFF, by uttering, perhaps under his/her breath, a description of one of the following: a recalled better time ('basic move' used: an EQ), favourable aspects of either his/her current situation or his/her own personality (using an ID 'basic move'), or even (by using an NR 'basic move') more 'favourable' possibilities that might be in store for him/her.[16]

It may be asked how the advanced theoretical frame stands as regards incorporation in it of the specific traits of language discussed in P.I §§4.2-4.3. Obviously, traits (iv) and (v) are by now incorporated as far as non-other-addressed speech is concerned. As to the last trait relevant to emission activity, i.e. trait (vi), it was elaborated at length in P.III §§3.1-3.1.3. That discussion, when combined with the just shown fact that in soliloquial speech queries are not less possible than claims, clearly embodies a strong version of that trait -and also accounts for such a significant, major use of soliloquy as reflective enquiry (cp. P.I §§2.1-2.2).

3.4. Other-addressed speech

Here again, as per the general blueprint, the *initial phase* will be followed by an *early processing stage* (needless to say, potentially followed in turn by a *late processing stage*). A deadlock is immediately apparent, however, as regards the *early stage*. In other-addressed speech the familiar *general ways* cannot be -or so it seems- but *preparatory*, since apparently a speaker must perforce engage in an indirect enterprise -his/her linguistic action is launched in an attempt to respond to some or other EFFs **through** a fellow member of the relevant linguistic community. In other words, the *final activity* is seen as an action to be performed by the addressee, and the speaker's emission is only an **indirect**, *preparatory* activity. The claim, though, clashes with the known impossibility (cp. §3.2 above) for a preparatory linguistic activity to originate in *early processing stage.*

An easy way out of the dilemma, though, is to accept its second horn and realize that speaking to someone does **not necessarily** imply that a move is being made towards achieving a result **through** some or other **activity** performed by the addressee. The outcome of the addressor's activity, i.e. his/her issuing an utterance, may well, independently of what the addressee may or may not do, be in itself, or ensue in, an improvement of 'favourability' -i.e. a hampering (fostering) of 'unfavourable' ('favourable') EFFs.

A few examples. An utterance may (be expected to) ensue in emergence **in the addressee** of an ultimately desired state or attribute (say, to have a specific mind on a particular subject, or to feel at ease about the speaker). Or else a similar emergence is anticipated to occur **in the speaker** himself/herself: even ignoring that speaking may be pleasurable in itself (P.III §3.1.1), a sufficient condition for it might be to address (in a suitable way) somebody else, or the specific individual in fact addressed.

In our technical terms. An 'unfavourable' EFF_{-c-} strictly relative to the would-be addressee's (assumed) current state, or to a state in the subject himself/herself, may in principle be countered by issuing a suitable utterance -which, if not a FOR utterance zeroing in on the addressee'state, the latter should be able to perceive and understand.[17] Notice that the 'unfavourable' effect at issue may be a $siEFF_{-c-}$, while there is in fact a 'real', main 'unfavourable' effect, possibly remote in space and time (perhaps e.g. an $EFF_{-r.nl-}$), and possibly stemming from as ORITM different from both addressee and speaker. (Obviously in these cases the improvement due to the utterance must be assumed not to extend to that 'main' EFF -otherwise the utterance would not belong to the category at issue here.)

This allows to predict, as per the demands of intuition, that some other-addressed utterances are (almost) automatically issued, and that others, while not so issued, neither are the outcome of a *preparatory activity*. (The former originate in *early processing stage*, and the latter in *late stage*.)

This raises the question of what is really to **address** somebody else; the issue is briefly tackled in Appendix 1. It should be noted that the approach there offered implies a claim to the effect that there is a graded transition from really *minimal, non-preparatory* cases (where the speaker fully and happily ignores how the 'addressee' may interpret his/her utterance) to most thoroughly *full, unrestricted* ones, involving (as it is conventionally assumed) fully symmetrical *mutual beliefs* (or *shared beliefs*, or whatnot) in addressor and addressee.[18] This in turn provides leeway enough to account for some specific kinds of linguistic communication rather hard to accomodate in prevalent pragmatic theories.

As already hinted at, the advanced framework does not bar there being definitely asymmetrical so-called *mutual beliefs* where the asymmetry is not due to any communication failure. In this category should be included situations where a speaker entertains at the same time two different beliefs about what is meant by his/her utterance; one representing his/her own assessment, and the other (perhaps quite hazily identified) that attributed to his/her addressee. In other words, cases of what may be dubbed a Panofskyan strategy (see P.I §2.2, dicussion of assumption (c) and Note 5); and obviously one may find as many instances of this 'strategy' as one cares to look for. (The subject will be again slightly touched upon in §4.3.)

A different point. Inasmuch as the assumedly *mutually-shared* state of mind, (1) includes the 'contents' of the utterance at issue, i.e. its *meant items*, and (2) is not fully *post hoc*, i.e. it does not emerge even in the speaker as a result of that utterance having been actually issued, such 'contents' are, in general, under-specified in that *mutually-shared* state of mind. For, as argued in P.III §§3.1.2-3.1.3, in general an intention in action, not to mention one directed to the future, does **not** include full specification of such 'contents'. In other words, generally there is no full representation, conscious or otherwise, of these 'contents' other than that packed in the utterance itself, even though, of course, some or other (perhaps rather dim) notion of the effect to which it is issued must be in the mind of the speaker.

3.4.1. No preparatory activity cases

In this kind of speech no use is made of an addressee's capabilities as an active being. It might be said that, rather than involving an *intentional stance* (cp. P.III §3.2), here what the speaker takes is a *half-intentional stance*, in that he or she ignores the central 'contents' of the addressee's intentions, i.e. whatever actions (or more generally, activities) the addressee may intend to perform.

As we know, utterances originating in *early processing stage* are (almost) automatically prompted by features in F_{CST}. This seems to be likely to occur mainly in two kinds of cases: when the features elicit an emotion, and when social conventions compel to some specific kind of linguistic emission. (Obviously two categories by no means mutually exclusive.) In other words, emotives (SLNT-ID/EQ utterances) and what standard speech-act theory calls *expressives* (a subclass of FOR-ID utterances)

are mainly to emerge, and be other-addressed, in this *stage*. So, a range of brief apostrophes and calls relieving a speaker's feelings towards his/her addressee (from maligning to rapturous) are to be expected on one hand; on the other, highly automated *expressives*, such as e.g. routine greetings.

Since no matter what the *stage* everything is to aim at current aspects of F_{CST}, utterances originating in *late processing stage* must apparently display only slight differences relative to those originating in *early stage*. An obvious extension the latter class of utterances is as follows: To begin with, more elaborated forms of relieving one's feelings, especially utterances used to (amply) 'let off steam' -a kind of speech where information transmission, if it occurs at all, has only an ancillary significance.

Notice that it may be 'addressed' to uncorcerned and patently inattentive people, to pets, or even -mainly if deemed responsible for our misfortunes- to inanimate items (in addition, of course, to its use in strictly soliloquial language). This is interesting, in that this quite common kind of language use is definitely beyond the purview of conventional, informationally committed Pragmatics (cp. assumption (e) in P.I §2.1).[19]

In our terms, 'letting off steam' speech is (along *general way* [b.3.c]) a thwarting of an 'unfavourable' $siEFF_{-c-}$ arisen secondarily in association with other, primary or main 'unfavourable' EFFs (be they current or anticipated). As suggested in P.III §2.2.2, the association may flow from the fact that (assumed) realization of 'unfavourability' interferes with G9' -and maybe also with other 'permanent' goals-attractors, such as G5'. (Apparently, either abusing the offending agency, or just letting some or other being to 'learn' how unfair that agency is, partially restores a subject's nearness to his/her optimal being -and his/her moral autonomy.)

The second sub-type of utterances likely to originate in *late stage* may be called 'altruistic' utterances. That is to say that the 'unfavourable' ('favourable') effect to be hampered (fostered) is **not** a $siEFF_{-c-}$, but a *bona fide* EFF_{-c-} occurring **in** the would-be addressee -he or she has the wrong (or a correct but not the optimum) turn of mind, or else is in an undesirable (or not in the most desirable) shape.[20]

Here "altruistic" does **not** involve the notions *good* or *useful* (for the target person); the key feature is that the speaker's gain stops at the addressee's changig in the meant direction. So, gratuitous evil-doers, and most prominently the Evil One of fame, are thoroughly 'altruistic' in this sense.

In the latter (i.e. the non-mental shape) case, the 'altruistic' intervention would undoubtely involve a FOR utterance. This is possible because, as previously noted, an utterance of this kind does not even require a *minimal other-addreessing* behavior (refer to Appendix 1): on the other hand, when this is the case, the utterance is obviously an instance of non-other-addressed speech.

3.4.2. Unrestricted other-addressed speech

Note first of all that, as implied by the discussion that lead to postulation of *non-preparatory* speech, the kind presently to be tackled, i.e. speech that plays a *preparatory* role, **cannot ensue from** *early processing stage*. A fact, though, **not** implying that the latter *stage* **must be 'quiet'**: even ignoring emotion elicitation, nothing so far said or implied precludes that, before emergence of unrestricted other-

addressed speech from *late processing stage*, in *early stage* either non-other-addressed or non-preparatory other-addressed speech is originated.

So, curses, blurts of surprise, joy, anger, etc, and even 'mechanical', almost automatic greetings etc. may well emerge from *early processing stage* immediately before a *preparatory* linguistic spell originates in *late stage*.

In order to discuss this kind of speech, previous presentations (in P.I Appendix 2 and §3.2 above) must be slightly elaborated and made referable through a convenient symbolism. First of all, the initial, *original* notions involved in the initial, *original* current situation as grasped by a subject (where a so-called *global problem* was noticed), should be distinguish by a suitable mark from their counterparts after the possible intervention by a would-be addressee is anticipated as a means to cope. The symbolic names, or abbreviations, denoting items in the first, original set of notions will be preceded by an "o"; those denoting their conterparts in the second set will bear no mark (but for the *general ways of acting*, which, as per the practice introduced in P.I Appendix 2, will sport the prefix "pr-").

So, a subject appraises oF_{CST} as being such that ensues, or is anticipated to ensue, in an 'unfavourable' oEFF (possibly perceived as originating in an oORITM).[21] The subject realizes in *late processing stage* that, were some (or a specific) member of his/her linguistic community to perform a certain activity, this would be instrumental in checking or blocking such an oEFF -and so that member would be a 'collaborator' to his/her own attempt to overcome the original, *global problem*.

If the so-called preparatory activity is a necessary direct factor in the checking, then it (as *preparatory segment*) and the activity by the fellow-member of the community (*final segment*) would concur to the *compound final* one. Otherwise the *final* activity would not merely contribute to that checking -it would be the only one directly responsible for it.

(Nothing is assumed as to the nature, linguistic or otherwise, of the activity devolved to the fellow-member at issue. And similarly regarding its being an **actual** activity or -as per the observation in P.I Appendix 2- a **stifling** of it.)

The subject confronts then a new problem, for he or she deems his/her possible 'collaborator' to lack a disposition to perform (his/her contribution to) the relevant *(compound) final* activity, at least within appropriate time. (Obviously, to appraise such a lack of disposition to act requires attribution of interests, beliefs, intentions, etc -so that these attributed mental items must be 'active' items in the subject's F_{CST}.)

Arguably, this is carried out in a **second** 'turn' through *initial phase* resources -where the new *initial activity* would presumably be directed towards identification of any further factor responsible for the new 'unfavorable' effect. Since multiple 'turns' are by no means (introspectively) apparent, they are better shaved off under an Ockhamian policy. In fact, the extra 'turn' may be dispelled at almost no cost in a highly plausible fashion: assume the subject did notice for some time oEFF, so that its suppression is already a current main attractor (or goal, if you prefer). Then so-called second 'turn' *initial activity* (which in some previous time identified both a suitable *final* activity and a fellow-being able to perform it) is a **plain *initial activity***, included in a **plain *initial phase***, and we are back to single-'turn' case.[22]

In other words, the subject perceives, in (a new) F_{CST} virtually shrinked to the would-be collaborator, that lack of disposition as a new 'unfavorable' effect (EFF); and this is presumably regarded to have as ORITM that person's current total mental state (or perhaps whatever caused it). Then the subject addresses the associated (*preliminary*, ancillary) problem in the familiar way; i.e. by making, in (a new) late processing stage, the familiar choices: along which *general way* of simply acting his/her (*preparatory*) linguistic activity will proceed, what 'basic moves' are to be selected, etc.

3.4.2.1. How to (linguistically) act indirectly

What are now, though, the different *general ways*? In other words, how a subject is to be plausibly assumed to construe the alternatives [a] through [c] now open to him/her? A parsimonious, and so methodologically advantageous, policy should abide by the following suggestion: a subject conceives of his/her linguistic 'collaborator' (i.e. partner) in a way roughly matching the very psychological sketch that underlies our 'general blueprint' for inception of activities -specifically, as regards his/her *initial phase* (refer to P.I §3.3).

An apparently quite 'natural', suggestion-complying set of answers to the above question is, I submit, as follows. A [pr-a] activity is anticipated to shift F_{CST}s through substitution of a different (and supposedly more compliant) partner for the old one. A [pr-b.1] activity, being keyed to globally modify F_{CST}, aims at establishing a new, different setting for addressee's activities.[23] By performing a [pr-b.2] activity, a speaker attempts to counter the anticipated operation of the ORITM through elicitation in that person of new or changed perceptions (as to the current situation), systems of goals, attractors/aversors, etc, so that the new *driving agencies* associated to them have enough power to overcome the old ones. Apparently, a [pr-b.3] activity cannot be but something that presumedly elicits in a direct fashion the disposition previously lacking, i.e. an assumedly suitable FOR-ID or FOR-NR utterance.

In other words, here the speaker anticipates **causing** his/her addressee to carry out the foreseen *final* activity, rather than **inducing** him/her to perform it. (As to the induction, it requires to have the addressee realize that by so acting he or she may hamper (promote) an effect 'unfavorable' ('favorable') to himself/herself that would ensue were he or she not to act in that way.)

The two remaining *ways* must apparently be discarded. As regards [pr-c], it is excluded by constraint (iv) -see §3.1.1 above. On the other hand, [pr-b.3.c] ensues in a somewhat paradoxical outcome: if (through his/her *preparatory* linguistic activity) a speaker succeeds in changing a siEFF associated to EFF, then the addressee non-disposition may well keep unchanged; if so, (the latter's part in) the *final activity* will not be performed, and then the so-called *preliminary* utterance will not be *preparatory* to anything (i.e. to anything of the kind at issue). See Appendix 2.

A final remark on the other parameters defining linguistic activity, i.e. the *driving agencies* involved (including timing of the perceived or anticipated oEFFs and the constraints related to timing), as well as the combinations of 'basic moves' to be chosen. But for the pre-established indirectness and whatever immediately follows from it, we find here the general case: every (indirect) linguistic emission is possible

-unless it ensues from a *'half-intentional' stance* and is so included amongst the non-preparatory cases discussed in §3.4.1 above. No attempt will be made in this paper to review this vast manifold.

3.4.2.2. Indirect activity and dialogue

It is in dialogue -or so common lore instils us- where the fullest use of language is found. This seemingly paramount case of collective action (as regards language use) accordingly fascinates much present-day investigation. The advanced standpoint, though, forces on us a more sobering position. Three considerations are befitting in this connection.

First, as pointed out above, even in unrestricted other-addressed speech, and so even in speech that aims at prompting the addressee to provide (his/her own contribution to) the *final activity* that presumedly will allow the speaker to reach the desired final goal, the addressee may well not be aware that he or she is in fact addressed -he or she may be only *minimally addressed* in our sense (cp.Appendix 1).

Second, to assert that in every conversation there is (at every moment of its development) a (temporary) goal or aim common to the partners is a highly dubious claim, irrespective of the fact that the assertion is assumed without argument by many pragmatic theorists.[24]

Consider first non-linguistic cases. To assert e.g. that both a man that kills his lover and his victim have (necessarily, or even in most instances) a coomon goal seems unwarranted unless detailed, adequate evidence and argumentation are offered. It is a trivial task to point to examples of dialogues displaying similar features: stereotypical exams are a case in point, rejections of offers or invitations are another; and so on. Even not so clearly opposing linguistic partners often have quite disparate goals; so the aim of a journalist interviewing a well-known author may be to squeeze out of the interviewee lively, unexpected or unheard-of information regarding the latter's life and literary views, while the writer may well only try to whet a desire to read his/her latest book.

Now, a collective action with no common aim or goal, an aim mutually (or, at the very least, universally) accepted by all participants, seems a contradiction in terms. Admittedly, there is a commonly acknowledged interpersonal or social 'script'; but playing a role in a to some extent known 'script' is a quite different thing from having a common goal with other participantas in it.

Even the killer and his victim both participate, playing the main roles, in a scenario that may be described as a Schank-Abelsonian *script*: *killing one's lover in spite of her efforts to flee*. Have they a common goal?

More seriously: to drive a car and to ride (even to free-ride) a car are indeed pre-established roles in a 'script', but a hitch-hicker and the man that picked him up may have absolutely no goal in common. In spite of their following pre-established, and in a sense meshing, patterns of behavior, they may use them to pursue their own, entirely independent goals. (The free-rider is in search of speed-induced dizziness, say. The driver may only try to relieve the boredom and loneliness caused by fast highway driving.)

Third, as just intimated, a dialogue is certainly a form of social behavior known in advance by every participant. A form that gives rise to certain expectations and (in a rather lax way indeed) imposes certain 'duties' or guidelines -all of which may vary as a funcion of the specific variety of dialogue. But this is a common property with any behavior performed not in strict isolation; in social settings you may not do anything that you physically could do and would be quite suitable for your purposes at hand. This is true even as regards behavior not directly involving other people. (An individual entering a city bus is expected to step into its platform, rather than crawl through an open window or enter the driver's cab and then somehow go into one of the passengers' seats.)

> Ortega y Gasset's notion of **shared knowledge** (in an ordinary sense of the expression, not in its technical, recent sense), and more specifically, Searle's notion of a Background of human **practices** (cp. P.III §3.2), may illuminate the distinction between merely engaging in behavior that meshes with other people's behavior, and acting in a joint fashion with others, i.e. engaging in a multiple action that aims at a unified, common goal.[25]

In other words, the fact that in dialogues there are such expectations and guidelines, while undisputable, is hardly interesting, in that this is common to every piece of human behavior -ignoring Crusoe's endeavours. The fact does **not** imply that linguistic partners do have a common goal, and so that their action is genuinely *collective* or *'teamed-up'* (see P.III §3.2).

True, what is mainly insisted upon is the presumed fact that dialogue involves *mutual beliefs*, *shared beliefs*, or other similar mental attitudes or states. This might be generally true when the 'contents' of such *beliefs* is confined to the sheer fact of there currently being linguistic interaction -although in instances of really *minimal addressing* even this condition scarcelt, if at all, obtains. Beyond this, i.e. as regards more specific 'contents', there is no general guarantee of occurrence, as demonstrated by some of the examples above pointed out. At the other extreme, and unsurprisingly, these notions are apparently necessary, or at least highly convenient, for the task of describing some kinds of human communication (such as e.g. idle talk, as above hinted at).[26]

In sum, notions such as *mutual belief*, and others devised to supersede it, should not be taken for granted as regards studies in human linguistic communication, even if the linguistic exchanges rely on unrestricted other-addressed speech. In addtion, such studies often show uncritical acceptance of conventional speech-act theory, and virtually without exception do not acknowledge the basic *innovative* potential of emission performance (refer to P.III §§3.1.2-3.1.3). Each of these features seriously detract from any descriptive capability of actual human use of language that most current approaches might provide -not to mention their explanatory capabilities.

3.5. Final notes on emission

The topic will be the advanced assumptions and suggestions, as well as some of their methodological implications. First of all, let us see how we stand as to incorporation of specific traits of language (refer to P.I §4.3). Undoubtedly incorporation of traits (iv) and (v) is by now completed, both for speech not addressed to anyone else and for

other-addressed speech; and since the latter kind does not apparently establish a separate type relative to trait (vi), everything that was said before about its incorporation in present theoretical frame is equally valid now. In other words, we may be satisfied that there seem to be moderately strong evidence that this trait has been also duly incorporated as regards linguistic emission activity, no matter what its specific variety.

On the other hand, a vast number of complications have been ignored; not only those specifically pointed out in passing, but also many others. Observe e.g. that speaking 'for two reasons' (two or more, of course) is a quite common development.

> You may try to appease your spouse while providing information about your recent whereabouts and re-asserting your right to have a life of your own; and at the same time you may more or less consciously attempt to boost your own confidence in your ability to cope.

A multiplicity that not unusually results in different linguistic activities being packaged in a single utterance; and this in turn necessitates that these activities (partial activities, in fact) be compatible with each other. Exactly what kind of consistency is required between parameters' 'values' assigned to ('basic moves' chosen for) each of the partial activities involved is not an obvious matter. (Several alternatives come readily to mind, but presently it does not seem possible to decide on them in a non-arbitrary fashion.) Be it as it may, any constraint showing up in this area would obviously imply a general prediction -and so, would in principle lead to empirical testing of the theory.

Beyond all this, a fully developed emission theory accepting the present framework should ideally predict, in a fashion measuring up to the usual practice in current pragmatic theories of reception, what utterance a subject will issue when in a specific *initial phase;* and it should also predict in which *processing stage* the utterance will originate. Or perhaps, because of the potential for indeterminacies in 'semantic content' brfore an expression is actually uttered (cp. feature (iii) in P.I §4.2 and P.III §§3.1.1-3.1.3, as well as §3.4.2.2 above), one should aim only at a range of utterances associated to a kind of *initial phases* relative to a type of situations. But presently these predictions, needless to say, are thoroughly beyond reach.

Unfortunately, even discarding for the time being these hopes as to 'direct' empirical testability, many obstructions encumber the route to a truly empirical theory of linguistic emission such as it was postulated in §3.2. A few of them were already pointed out (in P.III §3.1.3, at the end); and were it now feasible to solve or dodge such problems, other, not-to-be-slighted quandaries remain untouched. Some relate to uncertainties involving the empirical counterparts to the key notions operative in present framework (*general way of simply acting, 'basic move'*, etc) -for the indications offered in P.III §§3.3.6.1-3.3.6.2 are no doubt anything but clear-cut and crisp. Other obstacles are likely to prove still harder; think about reliable identification of empirically tractable matches to the parameters defining an *initial phase*, from *initial activity* or *focussed current situation* to *strength of a driving agency*. Summarizing: in spite of present effort to make headway towards genuine empirical content, a host of difficulties threaten to keep a theory of the sort in a limbo of empirical untestability for some, hardly to be unticipated time.

4. A theoretical sketch of reception

Let us first of all briefly inspect an unanticipated implication of our self-imposed restiction to spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective linguistic activity. For this so to say salient **initial** feature of present stand does additional service regarding reception: it provides a simple, quite natural solution to what might be called 'the Holmes' understanding quandary'.[27] This arises when one considers the question, Is there any limit to 'depth' of utterance interpretation to be accounted for in (psychological) Pragmatics?

Undoubtedly, interpretation of an utterance that is not plain in context can go to considerable lengths; and matching this fact, current pragmatic theories apparently do not see it necessary to impose any bounds on this process. So, the key step ("he could not be doing this [i.e. saying that *p* - V.S.Z.] unless he thought that *q*") in Grice's (1967) suggested "general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature" conspicuously lacks any constraint on *p*, *q*, or their relationship (this fact is viewed from a different angle in §4.3.3.2 below). As to Sperber and Wilson's (1986) theory, consider what would happen according to it whenever the usual temporal urging is slackened; e.g in very relaxed conversation, or when the hearer (knows that he or she) is not an addressee. Here the similarly unconstrained selection of *[doxastic] context* to derive a relevant interpretation implies that, after having derived by means of a *context* of that sort a relevant interpretation, nothing prevents a hearer from deriving a further, richer, also relevant interpretation through use of a more complex *[doxastic] context* (the only condition being that increases in processing cost are balanced by matching increases in cognitive effect). So, in these prominent theoruies there seems to be no natural limit to 'depth' of re-interpretation. Indeed they better do not include such a limitation, which would be obviously earned at the price of introducing an *ad hoc* stipulation -a methodologically undesirable strategy.

Such a policy, though, leads to hardly acceptable consequences; these may be clearly seen by means of a celebrated, half-facetiously suggested paragon of what is to **really understand** an utterance. For the policy implies that an adequate pragmatic theory should account for Sherlock Holmes' whole train of thought which led him, upon hearing the dying man utter *"Pole ... up there ... big ... gait"*, to grasp the really intended message, namely: "The man that killed me was the thinnest and tallest one I've ever seen in my life. He wore a big moustache, flamboyant like a red pennant, and sported a funny limping gait". And similarly for as many bizarre instances of cerebration as one might care to construct.

> Let us assume, say, that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle flashed upon him as the true, hidden meaning of some closing remark of Bohr's in a lecture, and that upon hearing it he (Heisenberg), without saying anything to anyone, ran to his Copenhaguen boarding house and stayed there for a week working out the real import of Bohr's apparently casual remark. Assuming also that such a bout of frantic intellectual activity resulted in what we know as Heisenberg's theory of quantum uncertainty, then we are bound to confess that an adequate pragmatic theory **must account** for such a creation process (certainly the import of the outcome more tan balanced the effort required). And similarly for any significant theoretical

breakthrough, were the origination circumstances comparable to those described. But this scarcely makes sense.

Now, the quandary simply vanishes in a theory only concerned with impromptu, unreflective activities. For in each of the considered cases it occurs an 'internal' discourse (a *reflective enquiry*, referred to repeatedly above), so that there is a sequence of spells of linguistic activity, mostly emission ones, after an initial stretch of reception activity. Assuming provided a suitable set of 'boundary conditions' (specific goals, attractors, etc operative in the subject at current time, topic-specific knowledge/assumptions then active in his/her mental *encyclopedia*, and so on), each of these spells should be pragmatically accountable. But the whole sequence is definitely not an object that (the advocated kind of processual) Pragmatics is directly able to account for.

We are now in a position to broach a survey of a number of aspects relative to linguistic reception activity.

4.1. Some general issues in reception

There is a dearth of evidence on the role of a spectator-player in a pretense play (cp. P.III §2.1.2). This results in lack of heuristic guidance on the study of reception, which in turn forces one to rely as much as possible on the resources suggested in P.II and P.III, in an effort to make up for that lack. On the other hand, any attempt to develop a general sketch of the processes underlying linguistic reception stumbles on an initial obstacle: the 'general blueprint' previously devised, and used for emission activities' study, is quite unfit regarding reception -as briefly discussed in P.II Section 5. So a new, modified blueprint suitable for perception-like activities must be developed as a preliminary task.

4.1.1. General conditions on reception activity models

Turning back to the specific traits of linguistic activity previously identified (P.I §§4.2-4.3), if we ignore those that just distinguish emission from reception, only (iii), (iv), (v), (vii), and (viii) have a bearing on present task.

Take first trait (v). Succinctly worded as it is on reception, it implies that a hearer's central task is to retrieve the whole set of *meant items* -specifically, their M_I 'values'.[28] In keeping with our general policy of shunning psycholinguistic issues (P.I Section 1), it will be assumed that, after M_{L0} 'values' are retrieved, they are successively elaborated to M_{L1}s, M_{L2}s, ... until some M_{Ln}s are reached the hearer feels satisfied that are identical to the original M_Is, or sufficiently close to them for the his/her current purposes.

Nothing in the advanced theoretical framework implies, contrary to intuition, that in a specific spell of reception activity n is the same number for all *meant items.* In other words, elaboration may end at, say, n=4 as regards MPSTs, or a certain $MPST_h$ (other $MPST_h$s in the utterance showing different values), while possibly n=1 concerning the *subjective appraisal* facet in MACT, or in the relevant $MACT_h$. Again, different values may well also occur regarding the other matching *meant items.*

In addition to relevant evidence abour F_{CST}, a hearer relies also -as licensed by trait (vii)- on assumptions about the speaker's (pragmatic) competence. (Notice the intimation in trait (v) that there is some kind of re-construction of the speaker's activity inception process, a re-construcion based on expected, default features of emission activity in the appraised circumstances.) Finally, trait (viii) allows for use of any (presumed) knowledge a hearer may command about the individual being currently the speaker.

The most parsimonious assumption in this area is that (presumedly 'folk') psychologic and pragmatic knowledge used by a hearer is in agreement with the relevant hypotheses here advanced regarding the inception process of linguistic emission. (Parsimony and plausibility may be hoped to go hand-in-hand here, since these hypotheses are but an elaboration of 'folk' notions about this process.)

The parsimonious stance also suggests, as regards trait (iii) claim about (almost) automatic launching of reception activity, that the most generally applicable, default pieces of such (presumed) knowledge are used first. And a related suggestion, almost continuous with the previous one, is that the 'deeper' in the mental innards of a speaker are the 'contents' of a presumed kanowledge, the later are the latter resorted to in the interpretation process. (These ideas are developed in §§4.2 and 4.3.1 below.)

Obviously, the compressed enumeration in trait (iv) concerning what is to be identified in an utterance must be enriched. First of all, as already mentioned, by the *meant items* later developed. And then by other resources germane to the task, from the ('ontological') relationhips defined on (some of) them to the 'basic moves' and their combinations (plus the *heightening move*). Two questions may now be raised. First, On what specific properties, both of the utterance itself and its setting, as well as related to general and specific (presumed) knowledge about the speaker, relies a hearer for each identification regarding that features and parameters? Second, What processes ensue in these identifications?

The first question cannot be properly addressed at present juncture, although some suggestions will be offered in §4.2, where the new processual blueprint from §4.1.2 below will be applied to language reception. As to the second question, it cannot by any means find an answer in present essay, since the issues it raises do not belong to establishment of a general pragmatic framework, but to a different, not addressed task, namely to building specific theories in (psychological) Pragmatics. Nonetheless, a few remarks about general matters bearing on the subject will be found in §4.3.

4.1.2. Developing a new, flow 'blueprint'

As we know, two central conditions are to be met. On one hand, the looked for processual scheme must accommodate the remarks in P.II Section 5; on the other, the key condition of allowing for the 'timing reversal' phenomenon must be observed.[29] The requirements may be complied with in two main, opposed fashions.

The first one relies on sketching a general blueprint of the processes through which a perceptual or perception-like activity 'flows' enabling a subject to gain better and better information about his/her environment.[30] Obviously a blueprint at least roughly parallel to our familiar one (for action-like activities' inception) is a

desideratum; a second condition is to include some account of the perception-like activity's two-way relationship to other activities (this will be obeyed only implicitly). The second line aims at turning the old blueprint into a truly general, abstract processual description of a spell of a specific activity, irrespective of whether it is perception-like or otherwise. (The abstract description at issue, conceivably to be arrived at by tinkering with the main notions in the old blueprint, must obviously have a potential to be specified either way.)

Only the first option, which seems to be slightly simpler, will be explored here. This option directly mirrors the acknowledged fact that in the blueprint for 'regular' (i.e. action-like) activities perception was quietly assumed -I think, correctly- as already playing a subservient but essential task. (It enabled, or assisted to enable, identification of F_{CST} in general, and the ORITM(s) in particular.)

Note that *driving agencies* guide perception in its 'attempt' to improve perceptual information already gained; see directly below. This implies that *driving agencies* are **not** first operative when an inception process reaches its *early processing stage*; in general they are **'already there'** -the very rationale for postulation of an initial activity, presumably arisen in response to such previous or 'initial' *driving agencies*.

First of all, a couple of examples (the machine-gun operator and the person attending a party: P.I §3.2), where a subject engages in a fully perceptual activity aimed at gaining fuller knowledge about a certain part or aspect of the environment, will be considered. (For convenience, they will be labelled with technical terms regarding the sequential steps in the process, to be somewhat formally offered in the subsequent blueprint -which is abstracted from these examples.)

(4) a. The machine-gun operator, being interested (initial *driving agency*) in learning as soon as possible about anything that might develop regarding his fortified post, routinely surveys (*initial phase*, *background survey*) by eyesight and hearing, say, his surroundings. Upon noticing some unusual, suspect motion in the fields in front of him,

b. he (*primary processing stage*) tries to identify what is really moving, so that he may be able to learn whether or not there is any approaching danger. If he eventually realizes that there is a group of people moving among the bushes,

c. he (*middle processing stage*) will make an effort -perhaps using his binoculars- to distinctly see whether they are enemy soldiers, where they are heading for, who is their chief, what weapons do they carry, etc; these identifications will enable him to learn the real facts of the matter, and so to ascertain the real extent of the menace. Finally, after having identified the whole enemy platoon, the commander with a walkie-talkie, and so on,

d. the machine-gunner (*late processing stage*) will proceed, in the familiar manner, to consider ways of countering the enemy's foray (refer to P.I: Appendix 2 example (3), and §3.2).

(5) a. Motivated by initial *driving agencies* such as to establish/strengthen good personal relationships with new acquaintances/old friends and colleagues, while not causing any damage/smashing to the furniture/china,

etc, you carry out a *background survey* (in the *initial phase*); the survey gives way to next *stage* when you notice the unsteady auxiliary table with the brass paperweight, which may easily fall; then

b. you (*primary processing stage*) instantly inspect both pieces of furniture with a view to learn whether the paperweight can really fall at any time; when you see your colleague exuberantly engaged in verbal and gestural behavior,

c. you (*middle processing stage*) try to determine whether he, or any of his enthusiastic hearers, is in fact likely to approach the table in any brisk or bouncy way, and what the probable landing point of the paperweight will be; a realization that your colleague is about to hit the table, probably resulting in some toe of yours getting crushed, leads to

d. your (*late processing stage*) launching any of the familiar activities aimed at ducking the anticipated noxious EFFs (refer again to P.I: Appendix 2 example (4), and §3.2).

A consequential preliminary remark. The **single** 'unfavorable' EFF that can be **directly** countered by a perception-like activity is lack of the kind of information that this activity may provide (which, being **intrinsic** to the activity at issue may be written $\mathbf{EFF_i}$).

This is true irrespective of what *potential drivers* (P.I §3.2) might be currently activated (so becoming *driving agencies*) in the subject at issue, i.e. independently of other perceived of anticipated EFFs, which for distinctness may be labelled ***ultimate*** EFFs/*driving agencies* -and *potential drivers*. (Still, the information felt missing is likely to concern whatever in F_{CST} is presumed to be potentially related to *ultimate* EFFs.)

And there is only **one way** of opposing EFFi: to gain such (quasi-)perceptual information by increasing the attention paid to its likely sources. (A spell of perception-like activity elicited in an effort to *directly* counter EFF_i may be dubbed **reactive activity**; see Appendix 3.)

Consider a subject in his/her ***initial phase***. In the familiar fashion, he or she will be assumed to be in an initial affective state, to be performing an initial activity (in response to some initial *driving agencies*), as well as having some *(ultimate) potential drivers* -entertained goals, etc. As a part of his/her *initial activity*, the subject keeps surveying (***background survey***) his/her F_{CST} and its potential developments; this is assumed to be partially performed by means of a designated perception-like kind of activity.[31]

If the labels "[A]", "[B.1]", "[B.2]" ... "[C]" are used for the matches in perception-like activities of the familiar *general ways of (simply) acting* (cp. Appendix 3), it may be asserted that a *background survey* is a specific kind of [B.1] *reactive activity*. It occurs when the potential *ultimate* EFFs are anticipated to be related to eventualities that might come up almost anywhere in current setting (and might be coped with if noticed as early as possible).

The activity is carried out by incorporating, in a continuous, (almost) automatic, potentially self-correcting fashion, new pieces of information. As long as no *(ultimate) potential driver* is felt to be involved, attention drifts from each discerned

item to other areas in the surveyed field. As soon as an item is perceived as potentially involving a *potential driver* (i.e. as likely to ensue in non-negligible *ultimate* EFFs), the subject enters the first *processing stage*, described directly below.

In ***primary processing stage*** a subject, partially using the perception-like activity at issue, tentatively identifies some item that he or she appraises as an ORITM (having some or other specific nature). The subject derives the kind and general gravity of the (*ultimate*) EFFs likely to be associated to that ORITM from his/her expectations regarding its specific nature and F_{CST}.

Certainly an emotion may emerge as well. Abiding by the same policy than for the original 'general' blueprint (P.I §3.3), elicitation of emotions will be at most mentioned -and thoroughly ignored, as in §3.2 above regarding emission activity, when (in §4.2 below) a specific blueprint for language reception is developed.

As a result the relevant EFF_i becomes specified, which in turn ensues in a detailed inspection, and possible modification, of the tentative ORITM as pre-condition for an adequate evaluation of its *ultimate* EFFs; these are also assigned weights -which completes the revision of the old initial *driving agencies*. In other words: the inspection aims at ***sufficiently identifying*** both the ORITM and the (*ultimate*) EFFs anticipated to likely ensue from it.

Obviously, *sufficient* is a function of expectancies associated with the perceived item (the ORITM) and with its estimated potential to usher in *ultimate* EFFs. So, where a 'regular' sentinel may think sufficiently identified a group of men, another one having had a nasty experience with enemy troops disguised as members of his army may know better, and be satisfied only after individually recognising the men as his comrades.

Regarding how the perception-like activity at issue is performed in this *stage*, it obviously may be considered a [B.2] *reactive activity*. This, as noted, may zero in on any item having a potential to be deemed an ORITM -from which a causal chain might lead to associated (*ultimate*) EFFs.

If a subject is not able to *sufficiently identify* either the involved ORITM or the EFFs assumedly ensuing from it (or both), and/or if the EFFs are appraised as rather significant, the subject enters next *stage*. (Otherwise this is skipped, and the subsequent stage entered instead.)

In ***middle processing stage*** a subject explores the whole causal chain where the item previously deemed to be the ORITM occurred. In other words, the exploration (assumed to be partially done by means of the activity at issue) has a two-pronged aim. On one hand, the subject tries to identify (trace back) the 'real source' ORITM, an item able to account for the occurrence of the old ORITM, which proved to some extent delusive in that either it or its presumed EFFs (or both) were not *sufficiently identified*. In different terms, what is looked for in this respect is a causal chain originating in the new ORITM that includes amongst its links the old ORITM.

This may be considered an **intrinsic goal** of the activity being performed in this *stage*, since it is in effect but an extension and new grounding of the activity that in the *primary processing stage* was directed at offsetting the *intrinsic* EFF (EFF_i) for that *stage*.

On the other hand, the exploration is aimed at finding out the full potential of the new ORITM and its causal chain(s) regarding the kind of EFFs that might be relevant to the

subject; i.e. attention moves down from that ORITM to other links in the chain, until it eventually reaches *ultimate* EFFs.

Such a two-pronged exploration is clearly a [B.3.C] *reactive activity*, where the second construal of "level at a siEFF" mentioned in Appendix 3 (specifically in Note 66) is the one suited.[32] This [B.3.C] activity, however, necessarily involves [B.3], [B.2], and in a sense even [B.1] activities.

Whenever the final appraisal ensuing from the *middle processing stage* (or, if this is skipped, from the *primary stage*) shows a significant (i.e. not negligible) 'unfavorable' (*ultimate*) EFF, the subject enters next *processing stage*. (Otherwise he or she returns to *background surveying* activities.)

The next *stage* that may emerge is a ***late processing stage*** of the familiar type (refer to P.I §3.3).

Clearly, there is no reason for the activity ensuing from this *stage* to be of the specific, designated kind concerning us -on the contrary, it may be argued that a different kind is more likely to occur. Being the final response of a human to something 'unfavorable' to him/her, it may also be a combination of activities of different kinds. (In such instances its study is, needless to say, beyond Pragmatics' scope and methods.)

Whenever there is no shift to a new kind of activity, it is apparently necessary to shift to a different, obviously preceding point in the whole process; in other words, to cycle. In §4.3.2 below cycling in language reception is briefly examined, but the results arrived at seem to be generalizable with no essential change. If so, when launching anew the designated activity from this *stage* it is possible to use again different *ways of (simply) acting* -apparently [C], [B.1], or [B.3].

Note that the *primary* and the *middle stages* combined are in effect our familiar *early stage* in a different mien (that accords prime rank to a perception-like activity). So, the present form of the blueprint does no more than unpack the perceptual activities that were quietly assumed in the *early processing stage* of the original blueprint. In this specific fashion does our new blueprint mirror, as above stated, the following fact: perceptual activities play in the inception of an action-like activity, from its very beginning, the essential role of enabling identification of critical items in F_{CST}.

4.2. A modified, flow 'blueprint' for language

The specifications for linguistic activity suggested in §4.1.1 above must be introduced into the just sketched general blueprint. But, as there intimated, in order to attain any explanatory power the introduction must be combined with an assumption to the effect that distinctions and choices embodied in the different notions above referred to should be identifiable in principle by a hearer (in actual cases, **conjectured/guessed** by him/her).

This applies to the notions argued for in P.I Section 5, plus their elaborations in P.II and P.III (especially Section 2 and §§3.3.1-3.3.4), from 'basic moves' such as ID, EQ, and NR to timing of the relevant anticipated EFFs, as well as to the further suggestions in §§3.1.1-3.1.2 above.

Specifically: at least the 'basic moves' chosen by a speaker must be key targets for conjecture/guess by a hearer in order to find out what is *meant* beyond a combination of (schematically) 'depicted' *partial situations* strung together by specific *signals* mostly indicating current speaker's attitudes.[33]

Consider accepting, for methodological reasons, the strongest possible hypothesis regarding goals to be pursued by a hearer, i.e. that what traits (iv) and (v) describe applies everywhere. Then, even the routinely noticing utterances obviously to be postulated regarding the *initial phase* should enable a hearer to grasp what is spoken about (including its assigned 'reality' status) and how it is spoken of (including what kind of commitment is displayed to that status). The hypothesis will be accepted in its weak construal phrased directly below.

In the ***initial phase*** a hearer, with his/her familiar complement of beliefs, goals, attractors/aversors, etc, *background-surveys* spoken language in an automatic, inattentive fashion such that he or she may **at best** gain the following information: who is the speaker, and what are the complete $MPST_h$ -e.g. propositional contents- of the utterance at issue (including any LS-2MNA it might contain) plus their 'ontological' statuses. In other words, only if each of these M_{L0}s does not seem in need of any significant elaboration, and so may be grasped as the matching M_I, may the strong methodological hypothesis above be taken at face value (regarding these parameters).

If this is correct, talk of *coktail party effect* does no more than highlight the distinction between the simple, in a sense 'only psycholinguistic', prcessing performed in *initial phase*, and 'deeper', pragmatic and otherwise enriching forms of processing that occur in later *stages*.[34]

Coming now to ***primary processing stage***, it should be first remarked that from this stage onwards the relevant, original ORITM is MNGACT, as previously suggested (P.I §4.3 and P.II Section 5).

In fact, were it not so also in the *initial phase* (to the extent that such items may be perceptually isolated from each other there), hardly could it be accepted the above description of its operation.

The central assumption regarding this *stage* is that a hearer may retrieve here, to a sufficient level of approximation, the **overtly intended** *meant items*. In other words, if the notion *retrieval of literal meaning* (of an utterance) is construed in an appropriately precise fashion, the assumption is that here the *literal meaning is retrieved*. The definition that follows may provide enough detail for our purposes: to ***retrieve the literal meaning*** of an utterance is to conjecture/guess what 'moves' were made in building it, i.e. what were the employed 'basic moves' plus associated 'local shifts to 2nd order activity', if any, as well as the 'heightening move' (plus its associated 'extended shifts') if at all occurred.

Obviously such conjectured/guessed 'values' may well not be identical to, and should be distinguished from, those actually meant by the speaker. The former 'values', accessible through the prompt, presumably simple operations performed in *primary stage*, may for convenience be dubbed ***promptly retrievable/retrieved*** ones. And if prefix "***pr***" is used to tag them, these may be listed as follows: $prM_I PST_h(s)$, $prIM_I BST_h(s)$, $prLS_I$-2MNAs (if any), $prM_I ACT_h(s)$ (both as regards its 'ontological' and its *subjective appraisal* facets), $prIM_I$AGT, and

$prIM_{I}ADDR$ (if any), as well as any occurring $prES_{I}$-2MNA (as opposed to just $M_{I}PST_{h}(s)$, ...).[35]

What resources are deployed by a linguistic hearer in *primary stage*? We may reject off-hand the hypothesis that there is no need to use any resource beyond one's linguistic competence. For, as it is commonly accepted at least since the middle eighties, a hearer not able to use further resources could not in many cases retrieve even the 'literal meaning'.[36]

Were the hypothesis accepted, then further linguistic activity would be needed, presumably in *middle processing stage* -an overburdening of this stage. Such an undesirable result might be shirked by postulating a new *stage* between *primary* and *middle stages*. But this salvaging *ad hoc* hypothesis is hardly consistent with the well-known fact that heard expressions are incrementally interpreted. (Unless a new *ad hoc* hypothesis is introduced, to the effect that the non-distinction as to timing between *initial phase* and *primary processing stage* covers all three steps now at issue.)

We are then led to a different hypothesis: a hearer uses, in addition to that competence, other presumed knowledge and expectations about F_{CST} (specifically including its ORITM -the MNGACT at issue). Now, an ORITM has no sense without its counterpart, some perceived or anticipated (*ultimate*) EFFs; so a hearer must also be able to access in this *stage* such EFFs. In other words, the EFF_{i} here operative is for a hearer to miss the *literal meaning* of the utterance at issue and what derives from it down to some *ultimate* EFFs that are to be anticipated afresh (see Appendix 4). This may be re-phrased by saying that in *primary processing stage* a hearer's specific or (for obvious reasons) ***intrinsic*** *driving agency* is an urge to access, on the basis of the above mentioned data, not only the *literal meaning* of the utterance, but also its ***circumstantial consequences*** (eventually reaching some *ultimate* EFFs).[37] (Notice that this final conclusion about this *stage* operation is quite compatible with assumption of an incremental interpretation of utterances.)

As to what pieces of evidence and (presumed) knowledge uses a hearer to identify the *literal meaning* of the utterance at issue, an obvious suggestion is: regularities in linguistic expression of 'basic moves' such as those pointed out in P.III §§3.3.6.1-3.3.6.2, as well as his/her familiarity with *scripts* and other social patterns of behavior (involving linguistic action) of the sort alluded to in §3.1.2 above. Identifications so reached are usually construed as regarding speech-acts performed, but a hearer may also in a similar way identify many other culturally defined modifications of the relationship between speaker, addressee, and 'part' of the world spoken about; even some soliloquial patterns of behavior may also be so identified (for a few suggestions see §3.3 above).

Consider now what occurs when the *literal meaning* of an utterance and/or its *circumstantial consequences* are **not *sufficiently identified***, a situation that may stem from an assortment of causes.

For instance, some necessary piece of information is missing -it is not immediately accessible nor consistently assumable. Or a number of *literal meanings* are derivable, whereas in current F_{CST} only some of them (or just one) are (is) consistent with expectations. Or else the single derivable *literal meaning* proves

inconsistent with some evidence or expectations based on the hearer's assumptions about other 'parts' of F_{CST}.[38]

If this is the case, or else if, these items being *sufficiently identified*, the anticipated EFFs are deemed to be rather significant, then the hearer enters next *processing stage*. (Otherwise, as we know, processing activity skips next *stage*, advancing to the subsequent one.)

Ignoring that a *broad comprehensive* interpretation (see §4.3.1 below) might perhaps require a shift to *late stage*, a hearer may directly engage in the latter if, so to say, he or she does not care for a re-interpretation of the utterance -which in turn may stem from a number of conditions. The *literal meaning* arrived at strikes the hearer as exceedingly far from sufficiently identified; or the intended message is in advance accorded a minor significance; or else recourse might be had to *middle stage* in a non-standard manner -by passing control to *late stage* after the former's failure. In any of these cases next *stage* may be in effect skipped.

In ***middle processing stage*** a hearer explores, both the presumed whole causal chain where the previously secured approximation to *literal meaning* belongs, and the EFFs that such a causal chain is likely to result in. In other words, in this *stage* the hearer first traces back the perceived MNGACT (i.e. the original ORITM) to its sources in the speaker. Then, as first step in his/her task of ascertaining what EFFs, if any, are likely to result from the newly identified ORITM, the hearer works out how the speaker (presumably) brought forth the utterance at issue (having such-and-such, apparently non-sufficiently identifiable, *literal meaning*) -a re-construction, then, of its inception process.

The just described task may be construed as 'implementing' the requirement in trait (vii) that the speaker be considered in his/her specific role of utterance-emitter.[39] On the other hand, this very proposal fully squares with the intimation in trait (v) (cp. §4.1.1 above) that a hearer conducts a re-construction of the process that ensued in the speaker's wording the utterance at issue.[40]

The parsimonious policy advocated in §3.4.2.1 (cp. also §4.1.1 above) leads to assume that a hearer conjectures/guesses what contents had the speaker's *initial phase* and thinks of these contents as the basis on which selection of MNGACT was performed. In other words, we assume that these contents are now considered as a new, deeper ORITM.

The utterance will be assumed to be re-interpreted so that it might usher in a ***comprehensive interpretation*** (perhaps a mainly intended message) accounting for the old *literal meaning(s)* -assumed to be carried over into this *stage* to that end. (This goal embodies in the linguistic domain the abstract ***intrinsic goal*** postulated for perception-like activities generally.)[41] Note that the new, *comprehensive interpretation* (or: re-interpretation) may well **not** be an interpretation in the **ordinary**, conventional sense. If at the moment of your leaving home in a hurry for an important Conference your spouse ends his/her farewell by issuing (6),

(6) It's difficult to understand why, but we both deny it.

not only you may be unable to guess what is being talked about (insufficiently identified *literal meaning*); your deep, time-proven understanding of the ways of your spouse may not be enough for you to arrive either at a clear notion of its

intended sense. No matter. Your spouse, whose mood and disposition you clearly perceived, delivered (6), and the fact that a sentence having such an unrecoverable *literal meaning* was then issued results in an 'interpretation' belonging to a (murky) class that might be dubbed ***uncracked meanings.***

The 'interpretation', irrespective of its weird nature, results in EFFs like any other, regular (or even crystal-clear) *middle stage* interpretation. First, you failed in your effort to attain the *intrinsic goal* of this *stage* -so, this 'unfavourable' EFF_i is in full force. This turns also obtrusively real a (perhaps dimly anticipated) *ultimate* EFF: communication with your spouse is becoming difficult. (As a consequence, driven by your desire to keep in good terms with him/her, say, you may at once decide to scrap your trip -so you enter home again to dispel any potential misunderatanding. If the relationship was lately taking a bad turn, the final effects may be 'favourable', in that you may feel that the murkiness warrants your not having to bother about what your spouse really meant. Etc.)

As above stated, after having found a re-interpretation deemed adequate, a hearer estimates successive links in one or several alternative chains of plausible results/consequences of the so redefined F_{CST} -that having as its key item the new ORITM. A search that presumably keeps 'moving down' a chain until an *(ultimate) driving agency* is contacted -either one already established or one that becomes so, in the familiar fashion, out of an *(ultimate) potential driver*. (Or else, of course, until time and/or effort ordinarily devoted to such a task are exhausted.)

Admittedly, we know nothing about the 'content' of the new, *comprehensive* interpretation, since no hint was offered regarding how a hearer comes to a (*preferential*, or most 'natural') re-interpretation of an utterance. This fact seems to compare poorly with (alleged) capabilities of currently widely accepted pragmatic theories -such as Grice's conversation theory or Sperber and Wilson's Theory of Relevance. The fact is, however, fully consistent with the general approach underlying present theoretical enterprise -that, when motivations, goals, desires, etc, are not known, even if one assumes (see in this connection Appendix 4) that there is no obstacle to predict the outcome of the processes of 'automatic' retrieval of (quasi-)perceptual features, it is impossible to go beyond such a narrow interpretation.

More specifically, it is claimed that a hearer unable to conjecture/guess the *driving agencies* prompting a speaker's utterance will be at most able to *retrieve the literal meaning* of the latter. So, if there is any problem with it, its real sense will remain uncracked. This implies that a theorist not knowing, or not postulating, a speaker's specific *potential drivers* (and other items in his/her *initial phase*) as critical items conjectured/guessed by a hearer, hardly can attribute the latter any specific interpretation of an utterance that in the circumstances is problematic as to its *literal meaning*.[42] By a similar token a theorist must also either know or postulate *potential drivers*, etc, operating in the hearer.[43]

Arguably, when a theorist advances no specific suggestions about *potential drivers* (and eventually, *driving agencies*) operative in a hearer, and similarly for those that the latter attributes to the speaker, they are in effect quietly assumed. (They may be -perhaps inadvertently- derived from the assumed theoretical approach, or from

'obvious' facts about the linguistic exchange situation considered, or from both sources combined.)

Consider e.g. an approach that apparently keeps at bay any factor extraneous to exchanges centered on information conmmunication, and so seemingly unobjectionable for studies in this area. When doing such studies, in order to account for the interpretation of a specific utterance in a specific setting, a theorist needs to attribute a hearer no other goal than the following one: to get hold of whatever information is (most readily) accessible from the total body of information that, taking account of that setting, could be derived from the utterance.[44] The approach, being roughly equivalent to that embraced in the Theory of Relevance, should be enough to access every prediction about interpretation of specific utterances based in that Theory.[45]

However, as the rapid probing of an example offered in §§4.3.3.1-4.3.3.2 below will illustrate, interpretations of that sort offered by the originators of Relevance Theory quietly assume extra goals and interests (perhaps difficult to notice, for they are quite 'obvious'). And if a wider variety of goals, etc. (in our jargon: *driving agencies*) is openly acknowledged, it puts at once within reach for theoretical account a tallying assortment of reception activities -including rather different interpretations. (A catalogue of 'permanent' goals and attractive or aversive 'qualities' such as that offered in P.I Appendix 3 may again be useful in helping to hedge a theorist's penchant to arbitrarily posit, when faced with a specific instance of reception activity, just those items -e.g. goals- that allow the intuitively right interpretations to be derived in his/her favourite theory.)

After *middle processing stage* ends, if no 'unfavorable' EFFs are anticipated (re-interpretation discloses no risk to the subject), there is a return to *initial phase*, i.e. to a mere *background surveying*. If, on the other hand, perception of such a risk occurs, or if for any reason *middle stage* was effectively skipped, the subject enters next stage.

In ***late processing stage***, first of all an activity aimed at forestalling the anticipated EFFs is devised -as it may be assumed, in the fashion described in P.I §3.3, i.e. by first surveying different alternatives that can be classified by our *general ways of (simply, directly) acting*. Then a specific activity, presumably belonging to the *general way* showing more promise, is chosen. As we know, this activity may be of any kind, linguistic or otherwise, and its being 'launched' can even be in effect a stifling of an activity currently being performed.

What exactly means in this context "of any kind"? From this unbounded range, just three main kinds of outcomes have significance for us. A hearer gets ready to speak in his/her turn; he or she decides to keep listening; or none of the above is the case. The first choice may be most simply tackled by referring back to Section 3 above (albeit obviously only the *late processing stage* is now relevant). The second case seems to necessitate a return to a previous point in the sequence of speech-understanding activities (a move addressed in §4.3.2 below). Regarding the final one (as well as any of the other two cases if it occurs in cooperation with a non-linguistic activity), it is obviously beyond Pragmatics' compass.[46]

This completes the survey of successive *processing stages* in linguistic reception. It may be asked why there is not in reception a distinction paralleling *other-addressed*

vs. *non other-addressed* speech in emission, irrespective of the fact that no such distinction was made in P.I §4.2; for *addressee* vs. *non-addressed hearer* makes indeed perfect sense. As a matter of fact, though, even in pretense play *spectator-player* vs. *onlooker (of the play)* is a sensible distinction (as pointed out in P.III §2.1.2); and it is implicit in traits (i)-(ii). Nevertheless, the point is that in present (and perhaps in any) state of investigation, establishing the distinction *addressee* vs. *non-addressed hearer* does not seem to serve any useful theoretical purpose. For it is not apparent that there is any substantial difference between a mere hearer and an *addressee* regarding the processes occurring in them. (Unnecessary to say, commands e.g. can only be complied with or ignored by an addressee, so **there are** differences. But this is only relevant for the final operations taking place in *late processing stage*, just those that go beyond the reaches of Pragmatics.) So for the moment being no probing will be done on the matter.

4.3. A few topics in language reception

As previously pointed out, the blueprint just submitted is a mere sketch, where no actual hypotheses are advanced regarding the processes taking place in the successive steps posited. Before making a few comments on this matter in §4.3.4, some issues left dangling in the blueprint will be addressed below.

4.3.1. Kinds of 'comprehensive' interpretations

Notice that a *comprehensive interpretation* emerging from *middle processing stage* need not be a full linguistic expression presumed to forthrightly represent the message really (or mainly) intended by the speaker. Consider again example (6) in §4.2 above. Your efforts to re-interpret this utterance may eventually usher in a realization that what your spouse 'actually meant' is (as worded in) (7).

(7) It's difficult for other people to understand why we deny that departing from each other is so hard on us, but we both know why -in this way farewells are easier and being far away more endurable.

But perhaps you only arrive at a re-interpretation that might be represented in words by (8)

(8) a. S is rather distressed, but doesn't like to show as highly emotional.
b. S tries very hard not to disturb me or impair my career.
c. But S deems best not to leave entirely unmentioned how we feel for each other.
d. In [(6)] S encodes our attitudes under an almost playful way of speaking and a somewhat ironical allusion to other people's sentiments.

(or something such), and nevertheless feel quite satisfied that the puzzle of your spouse's having uttered (6) is now fully solved. If so, you have built a genuine re-interpretation, which might be called a ***broad comprehensive*** interpretation, in spite of your not having built a linguistic representation of what was assumedly meant in issuing that utterance.[47]

Apparently only an adamant 'propositionalist' tenet regarding human *encyclopaedia* may lead to insist instead on the need for a single (set of) proposition(s), where the different aspects of what was (assumedly) meant by the speaker are straightforwardly represented. For instance, propositions that would match 'transparent' versions of those parts of (8) not unavoidably '3rd person observations' -i.e. (8b) and perhaps even (8c). (An alternative 'propositionalist' proposal: to understand (6) as shown in (8) is **necessarily** a result of having built 'families' of kindred but fully meaning-representing interpretations, which would provide so-called *weak implicatures*.)[48] In sum: apparently the outcome of the re-interptetation process may be a linguistic re-phrasing of the assumedly intended message or (irreductibly) otherwise.

Think of cases where there is substantial *cognitive innovation* (cp. P.III §2.1.2); clearly the latter kind of interpretation is apt to be more true to the speaker's actual intent than the former one. Consider use of a 'Panofskyan strategy' with disclosing tag (§3.4 above and P.I Note 5); the tag's *literal meaning* suggests an 'interpretation' (of the previous part of the utterance) that belongs to the class *uncracked meanings* (see §4.2 above), but it also clearly hints to the speaker's *initial phase* relative to that part -so expediting a (particular kind of) *broad comprehensive* interpretation of it.

Obviously, building a ***full-blown linguistic*** re-interpretation is closely similar to (part of) setting up un utterance for emission, so that a **shift to** a non-other-addressed **emission sub-task** may be posited as a simple, strong hypothesis about that building activity. Also, under a parsimonious policy, the processes suggested in §3.3 above should be responsible for it. In other words, the *middle processing stage* standard operation may be assumed to be punctuated by an episode of (non other-addressed) emission -specifically, a case of OTHERW-* where the following extra conditions are complied with. (1) *"OTHERW"* labels here a specific 'value': the speaker in the presumed *initial phase*. (2) The actual agent (i.e. the so-called hearer) has a minimum *open non-involvement* (is highly involved) in what the *represented* agent (that speaker) does, i.e. in the speaker's relation to his/her $M_lPST_h(s)$; in other words, the hearer-agent is 'impersonating' the speaker; cp. P.III §3.3.4.[49] (3) The only operating *driving agency* is the *intrinsic driving agency* of *primary stage* -not that associated to the *intrinsic goal* of present *stage*; refer to §4.2 above. (Obviously, as soon as the re-interpretation is reached, that *intrinsic goal* resumes operation.)[50]

On the other hand, Where is a *broad comprehensive* interpretation eventually attained? Apparently, either it emerges in *middle stage*, or this *stage*, being dedicated to the kind of processing already described, does not contribute to the new interpretation, which is then derived somewhere else; say, in *late processing stage*.[51]

If the former is the case and example (6) plus (8) is representative, then no significant change in *middle processing stage* operation is apparently needed. For in (8) we find no more than some specific pieces of the presumed 'contents' of the speaker's *initial phase*, plus a few of the roles they presumedly played in the issuing of (6). Then one should only assume in this *stage* the following additional operations: (a) to 'take hold' of these selected *initial phase* items, and perhaps of the utterance *literal meaning*; (b) to join them in a 'bundle', i.e. to tag the outcome as a re-interpretation; and (c) to have the results available for possible use in *late processing stage*.

4.3.2. Cycling in utterance interpretation

There does not seem to be anything objectionable in the suggestion that a hearer may return from *late processing stage* to a previous step, including the *initial phase*. On the other hand, theoretical consistency demands that these shifts be classified by our *general ways of (simply, directly) acting* (if not actually guided by a previous survey grounded on these ways). Somewhat surprisingly, only a small number of combinations of these two 'variables' is allowable.

Since the *initial phase* 'background survey' requires a modicum of psychologically involvement (due to its associated no-significance assessment), if we ignore sudden changes that might occur in F_{CST} at that very moment (say, turning an 'unfavorable' EFF to nil), the only way to shift to that assessment is through a changeover of the old one. In other words (cp. P.I Appendix 2 and §4.1.2 above), by adoption of *general way* [C].

In every other case, both [A] and [C] seem minor, or unplausible, alternatives (as observed in Appendix 3). So they will be ignored from now on.

As to [B.2], it is difficult to see how reception, i.e. activities ranging from perception to re-interpretation, could directly hinder the operation of an item (either MNGACT or a 'deeper' ORITM spottted in *middle stage*) anticipated to result in 'unfavorable' EFFs. Being unable to conjure up any useful scheme to do the trick, I will for the time being discard also this *general way*. The only *ways* that remain open are then [B.1] and [B.3].

Apparently the only manner to bring off a global change in F_{CST} by perception ... re-interpretation of an utterance, as demanded by [B.1], is by shifting to a different utterance.[52] A strategy that calls for a subject's returning to *primary processing stage* -clearly, it is not possible to begin processing an utterance in later *stages*, which require previous processing. Contrariwise, [B.3], because of its not allowing any change as to ORITM, cannot ensue in a shift to a new utterance; but from the fact that (at least when an oral language is involved) perception of the original utterance is, at this point in time, no more possible, it follows that the subject can at most re-interpret such an utterance. In other words, [B.3] necessitates going back to *middle processing stage*.

4.3.3. 'Middle stage' interpretation -an example

As we know, past the *intrinsic driving agency* of *primary processing stage* there are other *driving agencies* involved by anticipated (potential) *ultimate* EFFs -of which some are so to say prime movers of the whole process (see Appendix 4). It seems reasonable to assume that, if *middle stage* is not skipped, these *ultimate agencies* somehow combine with that associated to the *intrinsic goal*. If this is correct, one should spell out how a *driving agency* of this kind influences the processes occurring in *middle processing stage*?

Only the roughest of sketches will be offered, built on the fact that this influence may apparently be critical in three main fashions -at three loci in the process. First, fixation of *initial phase* attributed to the speaker. Second, guessing of successive links in the chain of its (assumed) results -including the insufficiently identified *literal*

meaning(s). Finally, specific kinds of EFFs to be preferentially anticipated. (Obviously, nothing militates against their combination.) An example may ease the survey.

Our example is inspired by a number of kindred examples offered in Sperber & Wilson (1986: Ch.3, §§3-5) and was already probed elsewhere (Sánchez de Zavala, 1990a: §1.2.3.2). Assume Mary comes home from work in the evening and upon entering she asks (9)

(9) What did you prepare for dinner to-night?

to her boyfriend; an amiable, almost complimentary question, she thinks, since Peter, who usually is back at home earlier than she is, has been lately surprising her with fancy, sometimes a bit lavish, often very tasty dishes. Assume that Peter's answer, issued with no particularly revealing sound pattern nor overtones, is some or other of the utterances in (10)

(10) a. I had a terrible day. I'm very tired.
b. (Never mind.) At *Luigi's* they serve an excellent osso-bucco.
c. There are still plenty of delicatessen.
d. The freezer is still full of food.
e. Never mind, the freezer is full of food.
f. I sliced/You'll have half a loaf of your favourite bread.
g. You'll have your favourite entree -onions.
h. You'll have your favourite dessert -custard.

-although, for simplicity only (10a), (10e), and (10h) will be discussed, ignoring the other potential answers. Two more simplifying assumptions: the allusions to Mary's favourites correctly point to her tastes; and neither Peter tries to mislead Mary (at least as to the gist of his answer), nor does she believe that it is otherwise.

4.3.3.1. Some combinations of driving agencies

Assume first that Peter's answer is (10a). This utterance may be rather naturally re-interpreted by Mary -or so it seems- as basically meaning, i.e. as centrally conveying the message represented by, the propositions in (11)-(12).[53]

(11) Peter did not prepare anything for (Mary's) dinner.
(12) (If Mary whishes to,) she may prepare a meal (for her) in her taste.

Now, in order for (11)-(12) to be a 'natural' comprehensive interpretation of (10a) -and also of (10e), but not of (10h)- the following must be assumed: Mary assumes that in the *initial phase* preceding this utterance, (a) Peter was concerned about Mary's quickly learning the facts involving how it was possible (for her) to have dinner that night; and (b) Peter was perhaps even more concerned about Mary's opinion regarding his own behavior as to alleviation of Mary's home chores, specifically cooking (her) meals. Clearly, Mary will only attribute Peter such an attitude if she is to some extent concerned about such matters -even if this is so out of her sheer interest in Peter's happiness, well-being, or whatnot.

That is to say that the assumption enabling to derive such a *comprehensive* interpretation was as follows. In addition to the *intrinsic driving agency*, which was already operating in *primary processing stage*, there are in Mary some *ultimate*

driving agencies that (no matter what their precise content) combine with the former to specify the newly accessed ORITM, i.e. the *initial phase* attributed to the speaker.

Alternatively, assume that, because of some or other specifics in Peter's gestures or for any other reason (she heard in her office about men suddenly growing an inordinate passion for cuisine, say), Mary's notion about said *initial phase* includes as a main component: (c) Peter was concerned about Mary's possible doubts regarding his own commitment to fancy cooking. (And on the other hand neither (a) nor (b) is included in that notion.) Again, it seems highly unlikely that Mary will attribute Peter this attitude unless she is to some extent concerned about whether or not he does have it -no matter what the origin of this concern of her. If so, while (10a) may still be 'naturally' re-interpreted by Mary as including a proposition to the effect that (11) is the case, apparently this is not the most likely option, for (13)

(13) Peter prepared a meal (for Mary) not in any way as savoury as it would have been in normal circumstances.

may strike one as a similarly plausible alternative. On the other hand, there doesn't seem to be any reason to claim that (12), or something such, is a part in the *comprehensive* interpretation at issue. What about (10e) re-interpretations? Neither (11) nor (13) seem to be possibly included in a 'natural' *comprehensive* interpretation of it; it looks like (14)

(14) Peter prepared a really exotic, but not exceedingly lavish dinner (for Mary).

or a similar proposition is now to be substituted for any of them, while (12) certainly **may**, but also **may not** be included in the re-interpretation. Concerning (10h), as intimated, the first assumption seems to lead to a 'natural' *comprehensive* interpretation positively excluding (11), and this is also the case for the alternative assumption considered (although some shades of meaning are indeed likely to distinguish them).

Notice that each of the two hypotheses successively assessed may be construed as providing a **particular, specific** cognitive goal that specifies a hearer's abstract cognitive goal of the kind posited in Relevance Theory.

According to the first hypothesis, Mary desires to acquire (with a modicum of processing effort as much) information (as possible) regarding how interested Peter is in preventing her from believing that he doesn't care about her -or about her well-being, or perhaps about her having to cook (her) dinner upon coming back home from work. In a parallel fashion, the second hypothesis may be re-phrased as follows: Mary desires ... regarding how interested Peter is in dissipating her possible doubts about how earnest he is -or about how earnest he is in his commitments (even when not explicitly declared), or perhaps about how earnestly he is committed to fancy cooking.

In other words: apparently, even when communication centered on information is at issue, different specifications of a hearer' cognitive goal result in different *preferential* or most 'natural' interpretations. This claim, already advanced in Sánchez de Zavala (1990a: §1.2.3.2) and (1990b: §4.1) and closely related to arguments offered in §4.2 above, might also be backed up by evidence to be offered below; but

since it is most distinctly supported by differences stemming from cognitive goals involving *initial phase* attributions, it was submittd at present juncture.

Let us turn to the second locus considered: that part of the (presumed) re-constructed causal chain that links the newly conjectured ORITM, i.e. the assumed *initial phase* of the speaker, with the old, insufficiently identified *literal meaning(s)* of the utterance at issue. The *ultimate driving agencies* will be now assumed to operate at this point.

Coming back to our example, it will not be accepted any more a so to say regular relationship between the assumed (main) 'contents' of the *initial phase* and the *literal meaning* of Peter's utterance -as it was tacitly done up to the moment. Rather, Mary's having recently grown very touchy about scorn, say, or her current dismay at the devious ways of men, or whatever, might drive her to presume a quietly ironical fashion of speaking in her boyfriend. Assuming that this is the case, we will rapidly review, for simplicity, only one of the two options previously characterized by means of Mary's assumptions as to the 'new' ORITM, i.e. as to Peter's *initial phase* preceding his utterance. Namely, the option where Mary's assumptions on this subject are the ones first considered.

Then, while (10a) may well ensue in a 'natural' *comprehensive* interpretation amounting to a flat denial of (11), i.e. in a proposition that might be directly represented by (15),

(15) Peter carefully prepared a bountiful dinner (for Mary).

if (10a) iself is identical, or quite similar, to an utterance often used by Mary when she returns home from work, Mary may feel at a loss as to how to re-interpret it -no specific propositional content may strike her as its *preferential* or most 'natural' re-interpretation. Similarly, while (10e) might now lead Mary to an interpretation including both (15) and (16),

(16) Peter almost exhausted the food that was in the freezer.

if (10e) virtually duplicates a frequent utterance by Mary's, then no specific re-interpretation of (10e) might be salient as the most 'natural' one.

In each of these cases, obviously an *uncracked* 'interpretation' results, even though the relevant utterance shows no *uncracked literal meaning.* As it was the case with example (6) as dealt with in §4.2, this 'interpretation' may nonetheless lead Mary to an anticipation of comparatively specific EFFs, and so to some specific action (or inhibition of it). Alternatively, a *broad comprehensive* interpretation of the utterance at issue is gained in *middle procesasing stage* (for obviously up to now we were only considering potential *full-blown linguistic* re-interpretations in this *stage*). If so, such a re-interpretation would include, in a fashion similar to (8), both Mary's relevant assumptions regarding Peter's *initial phase* and her assumptions as to his ironical attitude, etc.

Finally, if Peter answered issuing (10h), a 'natural' *comprehensive* interpretation may be represented by something similar to (15) -if the irony is assumed to apply to Mary's near addiction to custard. Or, in a parallel way to the results with (10a) and (10e), by (15) and a contradiction of the literal meaning of (10h) such as (17).

(17) Peter prepared (for Mary) a different dessert than custard.

Or else, if a frequent observation/request by Mary was (18),

(18) I'll have my favourite dessert -custard.

it seems likely that, as against what we have seen concerning (10a) and (10e), a confirmation of (10h) such as e.g. (19)

(19) Never mind, you'll have custard for dessert.

might be a quite 'natural' *comprehensive* interpretation of (10h).

Let us finally examine how a hearer's *(ultimate) potential drivers* may influence the third locus above indicated; i.e. how they may bias identification of presumed EFFs resulting from the speaker's activity. It should be first noted that, by its very nature, such presumed identification does not directly affect utterance re-interpretation in *middle processing stage*. It impinges instead on what consequences are anticipated to derive from the (assumed) fact that such-and-such a speaker, being in such-and-such *initial phase*, uttered words having such-and-such (insufficiently identified) *literal meaning(s)*, which should be completed/replaced by such-and-such *comprehensive* interpretation(s).[54]

In other terms, the immediate result of such biases will show either in *late processing stage* or in the sheer fact that this stage is circumvented (because of the non-'unfavourable' character of the so selected EFFs) and the hearer returns to *background surveying* in (a new) *initial phase*. (On the other hand, if the hearer enters *late processing stage*, cycling to previous *stages* is also possible, as indicated in §4.3.2 above.)

Let us for convenience keep to example (8). At the time of re-interpreting whatever answer out of (10a)-(10h) Peter did if fact utter, Mary may be, say, very ticklish, or, on the contrary, highly bent to accept and enjoy her boyfriend's answer, whatever this may be. The first hypothesis amounts to say that Mary's *potential drivers* associated to her being loved, respected, etc (cp. G8 in P.I Appendix 3) become *ultimate driver agencies* as soon as any of these goals and attractors seems to be put even in the slightest jeopardy. Regarding the second hypothesis, it may be re-phrased as an inclusion of almost anything said by Peter in the category of *optimal stimulators* (see G3 in P.I Appendix 3).

Assume the former hypothesis. If Peter's answer is (10a) and Mary re-interprets it as per (11)-(12), even if she was not hungry and was planning not to eat anything that night, she may become quite upset; and a similar state is likely to ensue from its interpretation along (13).

To review the possibilities pointed out in §4.2 above, we may imagine the following courses of action then taken by Mary. She may vehemently charge Peter with being highly inconsiderate with her, say. Or she may irately (or sullenly) stare at him, waiting for a better explanation of his behavior (or for a full apology). Or else e.g. she may retire in a dignified way, or conspicuously start preparing in silence a copious dinner (in spite of her lack of appetite); etc.

If on the other hand Mary's *comprehensive* interpretation of (10a) is along (15) lines, she may become mollified; while an indeterminate 'interpretation' due to Peter's replication of previous utterances by Mary's might ensue in responses of the kinds just sugested, but more extreme -and perhaps in a serious rift of the couple.

If Peter answers Mary by uttering (10e) and she again interprets it as meaning in effect (11)-(12), everything said above regarding this interpretation applies here. If, on the other hand, (10e) is interpreted as per (14), it does not seem that Mary's feelings may be hurt, so that none of her above listed potential reactions seems likely to occur; an outcome that doesn't seem to be readily changed if (12) is also included in that interpretation.

Finally, if Peter's answer is (10h), in case his irony is grasped as applying to Mary's craving for custard, so that this utterance is interpreted as 'really meaning' (15), it doesn't seem very likely that she feels affronted or slighted; and perhaps even less so if the interpretation includes also (17). As to the case where the *comprehensive* interpretation may be represented by (19), it seems to me that the likelihood of Mary's feeling artfully abused might be greater (since the irony is then assumed to play so directly on a verbal habit of her that it would be near to plain mockery).

Let us now contrariwise accept the second hypothesis suggested. Then apparently only a *comprehensive* interpretation involving (11)-(12), if any, might make Mary feel somewhat deceived. In other words, only if Peter's answer was (10a) and this utterance is interpreted as just indicated, might these feelings arise in Mary; otherwise, irrespective of whether Peter's answer was (10a), (10e), or (10h), no negative sentiment is apparently likely to develop in his girlfriend.

A final remark. The point that the above little sketches about a couple's everyday life try to stress, and similarly for all previous talk about feelings likely to be elicited, is that no amount of detail in rendition of a conversation is likely to provide a sufficient basis for its explanation; only theories that incorporate how each utterance is interpreted by linguistic partners have a potential to do it. Certainly, much more than allusions and hints such as those offered here are necessary for an adequate description, let alone for an account or a full explanation (where undoubtely sociological and fully psychological theories would be needed). But only if rough sketches in the spirit of those provided here are developed and their implications duly worked out may any hope to eventually understand so-called discourse (in effect, conversation) be entertained.

4.3.3.2. Discussion

But for a quick suggestion -immediately after advancing partial interpretation (16)-, attention has been confined to *full-blown linguistic* re-interpretastions, both for simplicity and for easy comparison with results from currently popular, propositionalist pragmatic theories (cp. assumption (b) in P.I §2.1). However, even when a *full-blown linguistic* re-interpretation is derivable, *broad* ones are obviously quite possible, a fact mirrored in the apparently high frequency of the latter in everyday linguistic exchanges. So, *broad comprehensive* interpretations should not be ignored in (psychological) Pragmatics.

The *broad* re-interpretation (8) of example (6), irrespective of its being relative to an utterance apparently intractable from a *full-blown linguistic* interpretation stance, provides a first illustration of the potential of present frame to accomodate

broad comprehensive interpretations. As to frequent occurrence of the latter, an indication may be gained by thinking of the likelihood that an question such as (20)

(20) What did John actually desired?

might be honestly answered by (21)

(21) Oh, never mind. He was quite distressed, and uttered a rather off-key request that shouldn't be taken too seriously.

or a similar intimation that a hearer, even if being the addressee, may judge that the effective import of an utterance is in its *broad comprehensive* interpretation. (See, though, Note 47 on re-interpretations of this kind being attained by processes that present framework is unable to account for.)

From a different standpoint, *broad comprehensive* interpretation seems intuitively to border on appropriate interpretation of an utterance not centered on information communication (whatever the nature of this kind of interpretation may eventually prove to be).

Think of situations where a speaker attempts to affect his/her addressee in ways other than modifying the latter's (cognitive) *encyclopaedia*, even if to that end the speaker only uses language resources that by themselves represent information (i.e. if resort is not had to such vocal features as an alarming shrill pitch, a menacing loudness, a soothing sweetness in pronounciation, and so on). In such instances the information 'communicated' is effectively immaterial or rather marginal, so that the speaker may substitute for it a wide variety of other information while keeping practically constant the aimed at effect (a perlocutionary effect, to be sure).

Now, since a *broad* interpretation may (if not: must) include a representation of the (presumed) intent of the speaker, it certainly **can** be used to grasp such an (attributed) attempt. Which, in cerin cases, it may well aid to the emergence in the hearer of an emotion -perhaps just the one intended. (I drop the issue here for obvious reasons, but it seems to deserve more than passing attention.)

In sum: even when linguistic exchanges centered on information communication are at issue, the notion *broad comprehensive* interpretation makes it possible in present framework, in effect almost unavoidable, to address a clearly **non-strictly-propositional** manner of understanding an utterance. A way of re-interpretation that apparently lies beyond current pragmatic theories (for the potential to do it in Grice's Theory of Conversation seems to be due to an oversight and should be cancelled -see a few paragraphs below.)

Turning to a more general subject, it is apparent that in §4.3.3.1 no account was offered of the specification job alloted to *(ultimate) driving agencies*: only descriptions of (presumedly) plausible outcomes were submitted. What is more, the descriptions, by no means derived in an explicit and stringent theory, but arrived at 'intuitively', may well be biased by theoretical prejudices contaminating present writer's 'intuition.

Nevertheless (cp. §4.2 above), the advanced framework necessitates such outcomes, and also requires them to show the general, definitional properties here assumed: where they do arise in the general process of utterance interpretation, what sorts of *driving agencies* combine in each case to result in them, etc. This sheer fact seems to be non-negligible evidence that this framework does have a potential to embed

specific theories where the outcomes are adequately described and explained -although presently such theories (on which see §4.3.4 below) are neither available nor even -I think- feasible.

Admittedly, every description here offered may quite easily be 'predicted' in most accepted present pragmatic theories that, while paying no heed to extra-cognitive (in fact, extra-informational) goals, interests, or anything of the sort, address the issue of interpretation beyond *literal meaning.*

So, the key step in working out a *conversational implicature* is as follows: "he [i.e. the speaker - *V.S.Z.*] could not be doing this [i.e. saying *p* while observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle - *V.S.Z.*] unless he thought that *q*" (Grice, 1967; 1989 reprint p.31). Since no constraint is put on "*q*", a theorist of Gricean persuasion may 'explain' any interpretation he or she intuitively deems 'natural' in the assumed circumstances -just substitute the interpretation for "*q*". The 'explanation' is guaranteed no matter what the nature or complexity of the intuitive interpretation; and the associated measure of empirical support for the Theory of Conversation seems not less guaranteed. (Even (8) could substitute for "*q*" when p=(6), so that *broad comprehensive* interpretations are apparently within the 'explanatory' compass of Grice's theory.)

As to Relevance Theory, a theorist only needs to solve the appropriate abduction problem, i.e. to postulate a (minimal) *[doxastic] context* that, added to the *literal meaning* of the utterance at issue, forms a set of premises allowing to derive the 'natural' interpretation intuitively identified. (The derivation, of course, must use a logics fit to the task, such as Sperber and Wilson's original *natural logics* without introduction of connectives, or a suitable Gabbay and Kempson's *labelled deduction system.*) The theory is indeed more constrained than Grice's, in that only *full-blown linguistic* interpretations are admissible; but within these stricter confines here also as much empirical 'corroboration' as desired may be provided for the Theory of Relevance.

The point is that, irrespective of their important differences, both these theories lack psychological structure; i.e. they do not enforce real psychological constraints on the processes they posit.[55] This results in their indifferently, uniformly 'predicting' **any** *(full-blown linguistic)* interpretation that, rightly or wrongly, is offered to a theorist as pragmatically plausible in the circumstances at issue. This fact turns any attempt to test their empirical predictions into an *ex post facto* 'corroboration', a task that, as Sperber and Wilson themselves noticed regarding Grice's theory, is too easily accomplished.

A quite different picture is shown by AI studies interested in so-called discourse interpretation, i.e. in interpretation reaching beyond *literal meaning* (often referred to as 'semantic interpretation'). In the systems tackling this task it has proved necessary to incorporate a substantial amount of internal (i.e. processing) structure -and so, inasmuch as such AI systems mirror a human playing the very roles they play, highly complex 'psychological' structure.

A comparatively early interest in plan recognition (Schmidt, Sridharan & Goodson, 1978), and other work on recognition of intentions driving an utterance (Allen & Perrault, 1980), combined with empirical research (Carbonell, 1983) that pointed out the critical role played by recognition of a speaker's (mostly unstated)

goals in understanding, ensued in a pervasive appreciation of the necessity to focus on plans, plan re-construction and plan correction (see e.g. Pollack, 1992, and the historical review Carberry, 1990: Chs.2, 3, and 7). In fact, present AI systems, as a key part of their own 'beliefs', build and constantly update a model of the speaker's beliefs, plans and (linguistic) intentions. So, AI research stance as regards *comprehensive* interpretation is rather similar to that arrived at independently in present approach, and maybe much preferable to the latter, in that AI systems go far beyond offering general suggestions on how this kind of interpretation is done -they accomplish it.

Unfortunately, actual implementation of conversational tasks is bought at the price of a highly restricted field of application. A system only engages in information-providing 'conversations' about a specific domain (such as available flights to different destinations, requirements, schedules, etc of courses offered in a University, or advice on how to develop new technological devices of a certain kind, say).

In other words, not only this research does in effect subscribe to assumptions that from the outset (P.I §§2.1-2.2) were here shown unacceptable and accordingly rejected. It adds extra, exceedingly severe restrictions incompatible with a general investigation of linguistic reception processes.[56]

More generally: both AI and AI-derived work accept also a number of other assumptions (such as those pointed out in P.I §2.3 and P.III §3.1.2). These, when added to those previously mentioned, seriously detract from that work potential usefulness as a source of suggestions for building an adequate (psychological) Pragmatics -a potential, to the present writer's mind, quite considerable indeed anyway (see §4.3.4 and Section 5 below).

To summarize. The advanced theoretical sketch is not associated with any method that would allow its (purposedly general) claims to be put to empirical test -it certainly cannot be considered a genuine theory about the processes responsible for *comprehensive* interpretation. Nevertheless, although regarding empirical status the advanced sketch does not surpass other current efforts in Pragmatics, the fact that in a sense it points by itself to this shortcoming may perhaps be considered as a definite edge over these other approaches.

4.3.4. On providing specific theories of reception

A few comments seem in order regarding the problems attendant any attempt to build specific theories about the processes that underlie linguistic reception, as well as regarding sources that might be tapped were such a task broached. Still, two of the surveyed steps will be excluded: *initial phase* and *late processing stage*.

As to *initial phase*. First, assumptions, goals, attractor/aversors, etc, are not specific to language reception. Second, the specific task of the *phase*, i.e. *background surveying* of language, may be viewed as a mainly psycholinguistically accountable activity, and so (cp. P.I Section 1) to lie outside our field of concern.

Regarding *late stage*, its dismissal may be also condoned. For, if we ignore two facts (that add to the rationale for its omission), it is identical to the *stage* under this very name in emission, and obviously repetitions are not useful. (So, the extent to which the problems that plague the task of building specific theories of **emission**

processes -refer to §3.5- bear on this particular *processing stage* of **emission** activitiesis is the precise extent to which the very same difficulties are to be expected in this *stage* of **reception** activities.) First fact: *late stage* potential to ensue in non-linguistic activities is now a real possibility, and to this extent it lies beyond the reaches of Pragmatics. Second, from this *stage* it may be launched a return to a previous point in the processing sequence, and this was -briefly- addressed in §4.3.2 above.

Consider *primary processing stage*. Observe that, although a copious literature might be summoned on the operations presumed to take place there (filling in deictic gaps, 'bridging', etc.), it is far from clear how these observations could be turned into actual, precise suggestions about the processes at issue. Besides, there appear to be two complicating factors. First, it must be borne in mind that, as repeatedly mentioned in the essay, interpretation is 'normally' incremental (for some suggestions from an AI standpoint see e.g. Pereira & Pollack, 1990). Also, the final checks on *identification sufficiency* of the arrived at *literal meaning(s)* may noticeably increase its all-out processual complexity, since, as noted, the cut-off point presumably involves expectations derived from several estimates.

The processes occurring in *middle processing stage* are no doubt highly complex; and we know next to nothing about the specific mechanisms involved. Nevertheless, it seems possible to go a little bit further than §§4.3.1-4.3.3 did. Consider e.g. the the workhorse of many pragmatic studies, how an addressee (or more generally a hearer) interprets answers to a question issued immediately before -as with (9)-(10) in §4.3.3 above. It may be hypothesised that a hearer, or at least an interested hearer, does not 'stand idle' waiting for an answer to come up; he or she (mentally) puts forth an anticipated, tentative answer, or a family of related answers -albeit it seems likely that this is done only in a sketchy fashion. If the surmise is correct, the outcome of this activity may be dubbed a ***pre-(re-)interpretation*** of the not yet (completely) issued utterance. (Arguably, if the hearer does not have the asked for information -perhaps it was only rethorically asked for-, such an anticipated, possibly multiple answer must include blanks that would match the *gaps* in the question: cp. P.II §4.1.)

The claim is that the 'emission episode' that may punctuate ordinary *middle processing stage* operation (cp. §4.3.1 above) would begin in parallel with, perhaps in advance of, *primary stage* processes. The hypothesis accounts for quick emergence of a *full-blown linguistic* re-interpretation -it was **already there**, no matter what blanks it might have. (An acknowledgement of incremental interpretation may improve the hypothesis, in that it may suggest how, from a more or less vaguely individuated family of anticipated answers, i.e. tentative, sketchy *pre-(re-)interpretations*, all but one -or a few- are discarded quite early.) The hypothesis might be extended to other requests calling for a linguistic response (e.g. *"Promise that you will be here to-morrow at 8 am!"*), since these requests spell out (a part of) what is merely *linguistically signalled* in questions (P.II §4.1).

But certainly this and similar hypotheses, even if correct, only provide very rough, partial pictures of the processes occurring in this *stage*. The theoretical blank regarding it might only be repaired by resorting to psychological theories in neighbouring areas -if available.[57]

A different tack might be followed by trying to tune up results coming from current AI research on so-called discourse interpretation (cp. §4.3.3.2 above). Arguably, this research, in spite of its severe confinements (both as regards domain 'talked about' and envisioned actions), may provide some inklings on plausible psychological processes in humans performing the tasks it studies (although, alas, similarly restricted); at the very least, it has a potential to set up lower limits on the complexity of such processes. Recourse might also be had to theories on the processes undelying attribution of the 'folk-psychology' notions, and maybe others concerned with anticipation of EFFs and their timing.[58]

4.4. Final remarks on reception

Notice that the transition from *prompt* to *comprehensive* interpretation of an utterance, i.e. from processing it in *primary stage* to doing it in *middle stage*, may quite 'naturally' accomodate some phenomena that in other pragmatic frameworks require *ad hoc* mechanisms or changes in basic assumptions. So, jokes and other humorous uses of language (on which several recent reviews are available) may be simply tackled in present framework by assuming a specific kind of links in the causal chain stemming from the new ORITM (as to irony cp. §4.3.3.1 above).

By now, it may be observed, every specific trait of linguistic activity relevant to reception has been incorporated in the suggested theoretical scheme (a parallel result is independently emerging in current AI-inspired studies: see Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1992b). However, as to empirical adequacy matters, it must be acknowledged that unfortunately we are not less in the dark regarding the detailed processes and mechanisms operative in reception than about those related to emission.

5. Conclusions

As shown, it is quite feasible to draw a general pragmatic sketch that may be considered really psychological, in that it simply 'translates' into the domain of language use the sequential development of the processes apparently underlaying, either the emergence of an action-like activity (for language emission), or the growing perceptual grasp of events attained by means of a perception-like actitity (for language reception). The theoretical picture so outlined does, on the other hand, overstep the unargued, most times even unmentioned conventional boundaries that trap most current substantial theories striving to address language use from a psychological standpoint -boundaries that prevent offering any theoretical account of key uses of language for central areas of human mental life.

Critical to the endeavour was a staunch restriction to quite simple activity spells; as a result, we only payed heed to comparatively isolated, rather short utterances -a kind of utterances, though, that anyway provides an overwhelming majority of the examples dealt with in most current pragmatic theories. On the other hand, a few of the initially accepted simplifying restrictions were (at least partially) discarded as the investigation proceeded.

This is true as regards timing of anticipated effects of a critically appraised situation (refer to P.III §2.2.2), and also as to the enclosement within (presumedly) 'objective' speech -so that e.g. its emotional aspects were once in a

while touched upon in passing (see P.II Appendix, P.III §§2.2.1, 3.3.3, and 3.3.6-3.3.6.2, and in present paper §§3.3, 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 4.3.3.2 above).[59]

Even the sbove mentioned central, basic restriction, i.e. to processes occurring in spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective use of language, was occasionaly cast off; a fact apparently showing that, whenever the field the restriction encloses and makes easily accessible is adequately explored, the advanced theoretical framework might in a quite 'natural' fashion be enlarged to cover the wider realm.

Certainly, other approaches were possible. An obvious strategy takes its lead from an imperative feature in AI research, namely its piecemeal but operational simulation of human performances -a strategy that, adapting their own technical term, might be dubbed 'depth-first modelling'.

One might have aimed at developing a detailed, working model of the processes presumably occurring in some quite specific, comparatively simple kind of language performance; say, delivery of the (felt as) most adequate expression from a pre-established set, or identification of an already heard utterance amongst distracting words. A target that would be pursued until a rather adequate, empirically corroborated theoretical model is attained.

The modelling experience gained in the enterprise could perhaps be applied in similar modelling tasks relative to other, also comparatively simple uses of language. Finally, either the results of these investigations would be compared in an effort to build general, adequate models for quite general kinds of language performance (ultimately emission and reception), or the most promising of these studies would be generalized as much as possible, hoping for eventual attainment of adequate general models. (A combination of both methods could also be attempted, no doubt.)

This may be a good strategy; in a rough sense, it is the strategy adopted by AI researchers interested in human cognitive processes. However, it shows properties likely to result in the investigation going thoroughly astray.

As it is well known, 'local', independently reached solutions may be expected in many fields to be incompatible with each other and so lead to an impasse (as documented a *contrario* e.g. by the breakthrough in structural linguistics due to generative grammar's universalist approach). When this is the case, the only way to combine a number of such solutions is to change the structure of each down to levels impossible to anticipate -so that the attempt to attain a combination does in effect fail. A similar situation may be expected to emerge when what it attempted is to generalize from a 'local' solution.[60]

Nonetheless, the approach was successful in AI. Does this fact confutes the above argument? Observe that AI research **main aim** (no matter what the intellectual interests of researchers) is technological; it is to build a working device, a program, a robot, a network, or whatever, that in fact (and most economically) **accomplishes the set task**, irrespective of whether or not it operates in ways similar to those followed by humans doing the same task -if any does. Arguably, this basic difference in aims, when compared with strictly scientific research, makes for the observed difference in outcomes. (Of course, an eventual convergence is by no means precluded, so that AI research may provide highly valuable suggestions. This hope was already voiced in §4.3.3.2.)

Coming back to present investigation: admittedly, the general vista gained is not thoroughly untainted by non duly motivated assumptions. It could not be otherwise, for an effort to include real psychological structure (and the associated constraints) in a theoretical model of language use runs into the fact that at present psychological theories are mostly amiss in the domains where it would be critical to have them available. This condition forces the theorist once and again to swap them for all sorts of tentative or drastically simplifying assumptions. (As most clearly demonstrated by the fact that emotions, in spite of having being used as a model 'activity' to build our processual blueprint, were all but discarded as non-significant in P.I §4.2. See, though, a few paragraphs back.)

Obviously, the mentioned simplifications, and many others that have not been alluded, cannot be but temporary makeshifts. As to methodological stance, the angle from which present theoretical endeavour most sharply differs from previous pragmatic theories, the preliminary probing accomplished, in spite of all its limitations, may be regarded as offering some foothold for encouragement. For not only the need to usher in specific theories having real empirical content is emphasised galore; it apparently shows promise (by now only a promissory note indeed) of having capability to be 'naturally' developed into theories of just that sort.

APPENDIX 1 - On addressing somebody else, minimally or otherwise

What precisely distinguishes speech addressed to somebody else from non-other-addressed speech? In other words, what is 'added' to a speaker's activity when he or she addresses another member of the relevant linguistic community? As hinted at in P.III §3.2, in general a speaker may well not expect from his/her addressee anything beyond an ability to grasp (more or less correctly and fully) the particular build and meaning of his/her utterance.

No more is required if a comprehensive notion of ***other-addressed*** speech is to be used -which seems a desirable policy, since otherwise there would be an inconvenient host of borderline cases.[61] To be specific: think e.g. of a man that, upon realizing that some fellow-being might hear what he is mumbling (to his canary, say) were its sound level slightly heightened, raises in fact that level motivated by that realization. In present construal of *other-addressed* speech, the man is considered to be also addressing the other person (even though in a secondary fashion).[62] In cases such as this, the addressee is in a sense covertly addressed -or, as it will be called, is only ***minimally addressed***.

> Terminological issues may be brushed aside; these cases may be not lined up with clear cases of other-addressed speech. Yet the facts remain -this is not plain soliloquy, but neither is the common kind of full linguistic communication (a specific kind of *teamed-up* behavior, as it was argued in P.III §3.2). And this halfway kind of linguistic interchange must be acknowledged and accounted for.

The distinction *minimally other-addressed* vs. *fully other-addressed* is not co-extensive with the distinction *non-preparatory* cases vs. *unrestricted* cases of other-addressed speech. To begin with, the former distinction is a graded one: the minimality at issue blends with less minimal cases, these, in a continuous way, with others, and so on until regular, full addressing is reached. Contrariwise, the second one (in fact not

more than a convenient taxonomic distinction) is a yes-no one: either preparatory speech is allowed, or not. And it is not hard to find crisscrossing instances.

So, of the four examples of *minimal other-addressing* offered in last Note (Note 62), the first two are definitely *non-preparatory* cases, the third example may be construed both ways, and the last one is clearly a case of *preparatory* use of language.

In sum: a (linguistic) hearer may well do not know that he or she is an addressee, and nevertheless be in effect *(minimally)* addressed. The key conditions to address someone seem to be the following ones: First, a subject's main *driving agency*, or at least some minor *driving agency* having enough strength to modulate the utterance (cp. P.I §3.2 and Appendix 1), involves as ORITM the person to be addressed, and as (part of its) EFF_{-c} that this person is in a mental condition that should be changed. Second, the subjects deems likely to bring about the relevant change by engaging in either a [b.2] or a [b.3] *general way of (simply) acting*; or else, if the effect at issue is in fact a $siEFF_{-c}$, by entering a [b.3.c] *way*. Finally, the means to do it involve that person's perceiving (or understanding, or grasping in its full complexity, or comprehending in all its important implications, or ...) an utterance by the subject, i.e. by the would-be speaker, where the *meant items* are to the effect that so-and-so.[63]

In other words: an addressee is *minimally* assumed to be linguistically competent and is also assumed (by default) to assume in turn (by default) that the speaker does in fact speak -rather than merely emit sounds that happen to be indistinguishable from those that would 'embody' an utterance in the relevant language. No more is needed. In the diametrically opposed cases a notion such as *mutual belief*, *shared belief*, or some other of their ilk, is apparently critical to account for success in communication (even though some qualifications prove necessary to accomodate the general case of under-specification of intentions in action to speak: cp. P.III §§3.1.1.2-3.1.1.3).

APPENDIX 2 - Some mixed *ways* of addressing somebody else

As hinted at in §3.4.2.1, no matter what the purpose of a [pr-b.3.c] utterance, upon hearing it an addressee might change his/her mind (or whatever) and do the desired *final activity*. This fact shows that there is some potential for use of this *general way* -admittedly, a potential mostly relying on a mixture of *ways*. Although for simplicity's sake mixed activities are generally not dealt with in present essay, there is a certain general interest to the case, so that a few examples will be examined of utterances that could initially be sorted as instances of [b.3.c] or of [pr-b.3.c], and where a mixed intention **could** also occur.

Assume that Jones, whose vision is deteriorating rapidly, wants to find his ISARSEMM (Instant, Sharp Automatic Replier to Silly Electronic-Mail Messages). Presumably it is somewhere on his desk (probably under some or other heap of automatically-printed replies) or on the desk of some officemate having borrowed it in Jones' absence. He knows that Smith has an excellent eyesight and could find it in no time. But he also knows that Smith is getting fed up with helping tasks of this sort. In sum, Smith is probably not prepared to look for the gadget (EFF), no matter how conspicuously Jones will try to find it by himself; this realization frustrates Jones

(siEFF); nevertheless, he does not dare to ask Smith to do him once more this small service. By uttering, say, (22)

(22) Such is life!

(perhaps under his breath), Jones may try to 'harden' against these feelings; and he may try to assuage them by mumbling (23)

(23) Pretty soon I'll buy a pocket ISARSEMM. No more problems!

instead (again, possibly in such a low voice that no one can hear it). But there are other (linguistic) avenues also open to Jones. He may address Smith by uttering (24),

(24) Never mind! I'll find my IS' by myself in a moment.

in an attempt to allay his own frustration (by denying it to the very person that originated it, and might perversely gloat on it). Jones may even sort of ask Smith to persuade him that his frustration is of no importance and should vanish by itself, as in (25).

(25) We shouldn't bother with these trifles, should we?

Certainly, there are other (linguistic) routes open to Jones in his plight; but they seem even more remote to implementation of a [pr-b.3.c] *way of (simply) acting*. As to those reviewed, (22) and (23) are instances of non other-addressed speech, (24) is on the face of it not *preparatory* (although it may actually be so), and (25), if issued in full honesty and so not amounting to something similar to (24), is again not *preparatory*. For the activity this utterance is devised to prompt in Smith, even though it might actually help curbing a siEFF, is **not** (the suitable 'part' of) the *final activity* that would counter oEFF. (In addition, in a similar fashion to presumed instances of [pr-c], use of (25) as a [pr-b.3.c] is so circuitous as to raise serious doubts regarding its proper inclusion amongst spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective emission activities.)

APPENDIX 3 - 'General ways of acting' in perception-like activities

As pointed out in §4.1.2, when an activity is perception-like, no matter what the *ultimate* EFFs that prompt a subject to perform it, there is **only one** sort of 'unfavorable' EFF (the *intrinsic* EFF, or EFF_i) that can be **directly** countered by performing the activity at issue. And there is also **only a single** manner of opposing such EFF_i. This fact determines that the *general ways of (simply) acting* do not play in perception-like activities a role as central as that played in (the blueprint for) action-like activities.

In this sense there is no parallel between these two kinds of activities. Still, perception-like ones may zero in on a range of categorized domains/items forming a 'system' that, but for its near truncation (see below), is virtually a perfect counterpart to the familiar 'system' of *general ways* posited for action-like activities, notwithstanding the difference in respective roles.

So, **in order to be better equipped**, i.e. **more knowledgeable about how** to eventually cope with some noticed or anticipated 'unfavourable' *ultimate* EFFs (in the familiar sense), a subject may perform a designated kind of perception-like activities.[64] In other words, in order to offset his/her lack of knowledge, i.e. the

relevant EFF_i, a subject may engage in (a spell of) this activity aimed at providing such missing information -launching to that end what may be called a ***reactive activity***. This can be done, in principle, in any of the following ways (cp. P.I Appendix 2).

A subject may, [A] abandon F_{CST} and begin exploring instead a new, different F_{CST}. He or she may also [B.1] scan globally F_{CST}. A third purpose for his/her activity may be to [B.2] examine a specific item more or less dimly surmised as the originator of that *ultimate* EFF; i.e. a subject may focus on a presumed ORITM -a category in which, because of its vagueness, very often a wide range of different items may be included (refer to P.I §3.2). Fourthly, whenever the estimated *ultimate* EFF at issue is a lack or shortage of information of the kind in principle earnable through the designated activity, a subject may simply [B.3] try to acquire it.[65] Finally, if and only if highly specific conditions obtain, a subject may [B.3.C] focus the perception-like activity at issue on a derived siEFF, or else [C] on his/her own negative appraisal of the perceoved or anticipated *ultimate* EFFs.

The subject may need, or be able to use, the designated activity in order, not only to be in a position to counter the *ultimate* EFFs at issue, but also to (precisely) identify them. Obviously this will be the case if identification of the ORITM itself (or its operation) requires that sort of activity, since in principle a shift as to the item assigned the ORITM role may determine some change in its associated EFFs. Now, inasmuch as this condition obtains, i.e. inasmuch as the subject must or may use the designated activity to identify an *ultimate* EFF, the latter, irrespective of its specific nature and identity, may be said to involve a 'secondary' siEFF (cp. P.III §2.2.2). Specifically, such a siEFF will be strictly cognitive, or more accurately a (quasi-)perceptual siEFF: lack of (precise) identification of some original, main or *ultimate* EFF. This means that to this very extent, a [B.3.C] *reactive activity* of the designated sort (as next described) is possible, or even necessary.

It seems rather unlikely for a spell of perceptio-like activity to be able to help countering 'unfavourable' EFFs by way of that spell being levelled at a siEFF involved in the former, *ultimate effects*. However, this may occur if any one of the following conditions obtains: either the designated activity is *introspection*, or else, as just pointed out, that siEFF is a (partial) ignorance of precisely what *ultimate* EFFs are to be expected.[66] It also seems quite hard to [C] change one's own negative appraisal of perceived or anticipated *ultimate* EFFs by a mere perception-like activity -again, unless the designated activity is either *introspection*, or the *ultimate* EFFs are strictly internal (iEFFs) and were judged 'unfavourable' by some or other ill-founded decision. In sum, as just stated, only under quite specific conditions are the counterparts to [b.3.c] and [c] allowable.

APPENDIX 4 - On motivational items and explanation in Pragmatics

In trait (iii) of language use (P.I §4.2) it is spelled out the everyday fact that understanding/interpretation of utterances is (almost) automatically triggered by their sheer perception. ("Almost" because when already interested in whatever a specific speaker may utter, utterances by other speakers, especially if a number of them are heard at the same time, if the speakers don't use a loud tone of voice, and/or

if they are deemed to likely belong to the genre *small talk*, are only minimally grasped -the prototypical example being the well-known 'cocktail-party effect'.)[67] Why is this so?

In present framework, a linguistic hearer, when not in some or other of the 'exceptional' circumstances just alluded to, is considered to have entered at least a *primary processing stage*, where the EFF_i guarantees that an interpretation process is launched in the manner indicated (refer to §4.2 above). The framework may quite naturally account for the universal occurrence of an EFF_i of this kind in *primary stage* -and it better does, for otherwise its theoretical significance would be highly questionable indeed, since this deep but (almost) automatic quasi-perceptual scrutiny seems to be rather specific to language reception. (The requirement must be firmly enforced irrespective of the fact that -to the best of present writer's knowledge- no current pragmatic theory has ever attempted to offer an account of this sort.)

The universal occurrence at issue may be accounted for in two steps. First: like any EFF_i, this one stems from a (perhaps rather vague) anticipation of potential *ultimate* EFFs -a subject, in order to be able to counter them, must significantly increase the activity at issue. Second step: ordinarily (i.e. aside from 'exceptional' cases such as distractedly overhearing, etc) whatever a human (or perhaps a not excluded human) says is deemed to be potentially significant -it is deemed liable to result in 'unfavourable' EFFs if ignored. A common-sensical assumption indeed, which may be incorporated to present framework by construing it as involving a 'permanent goal' (see P.I Appendix 3).

Perhaps most readily G4, in that a (not previously excluded) human may reveal dispositions, and/or impart information, potentially relevant to the task currently at hand (no matter what this task). If the suggestion is accepted, then the first step in the account could be specifically associated to G4'. The issue, though, deserves heedful consideration.

It may be noticed that a pragmatic theory that **only** acknowledges **cognitive goals** would be barred from accounting for the fact here spoken of unless it succeeds in proving that any goal effectively driving humans (and, as a consequence, any anticipated EFF associated to a fostering or a hampering of its attainment) is actually cognitive. But this seems a highly implausible claim. Alternatively, it might be hypothesised that non-cognitive goals determine, or just activate, asumptions that (may be suitably used to) prompt the interpretation process of an utterance.

Say, if your more grievous competitor suddenly enters your office and begins to speak in an amiable manner, you might instantly build the assumption *"It is not less likely that he is going to suggest collaboration instead of fight than he is going to self-complacently announce one of his ugly tricks"*. More likely you might form some assumption of the sort plus what it implicitly suggests: *"I better find out what he means"*.

However, as it is well known, transition from a proposition to an action cannot be accounted for in pure informational terms, so that even a 'practical syllogism' requires an extra-cognitive push to ensue in a subject engaging in new activity.[68] In other words, there is no ersatz for 'conative' factors such as goals, desires, etc.

An obvious reply is simply that (psychological) Pragmatics is concerned with **how** and to **what outcome** language processes occur, **not** with **why** they are launched

in the first place. But the move results in some unpleasant consequences. For, as shown in §§4.3.3.1-4.3.3.2,, absence of such motivations substantially impoverishes the range of interpretations accesssible to a pragmatic theory. In fact, it is there demonstrated that, as stated in §4.2, in order to be able to derive the interpretations usually construed as arrived at when only strictly cognitive goals are allowed, these goals are implicitly specified (or, if you prefer, biased) by interests and concerns thoroughly foreign to purely cognitive purposes -so that a change in these interests ensues in a change in interpretation. Apparently, then, attempts to build a Pragmatics purged of extra cognitive purposes are doomed to failure.

Notes

[a] As indicated in the first Notes of Part I ("Preliminary steps") of this essay, the present paper offers a revised version of the last Sections of a previous essay entitled "How to build a sounder, albeit less simple (psychological) Pragmatics", completed by February, 1994. Concerning the impetus to carry out this final revision task, everything said in the previous instalment (Part III) is equally valid here. *(October, 1995)*

[1] The parameters are: *meant activity* (MACT) -where two facets, one 'ontological' and the other of *subjective appraisal*, are identified-, *implicitly meant background situation* (IMBST), *meant partial situation* (MPST), *implicitly meant agent* (IMAGT), and (when there is any) *implicitly meant addressee* (IMADDR).

[2] For some hints towards a theoretical re-assessment of the difference between the two classes, see Note 10.

[3] The suggestion is but a rephrasing of a claim by García-Murga (1995: Ch.7, §1.2) to this effect. This is an interesting claim, in that it (in combination with other hypotheses, needless to say) allows to set up an unified, fully general theory of presuppositional phenomena.

[4] Note that if the suggestion is accepted in present framework, it necessitates rejecting the construal of sentential negation as linguistic exponent of the maximum negative 'acknowledgement value' for the 'ontological' facet in MACT (cp. P.II Section 2). (Apparently an improvement, for the suggestion there that example (6) be considered as the final, limit case of the sequence (7)-(17) had something odd about it.) Interestingly, incorporation of the 'always pragmatic (sentential) negation' claim does not seem to ensue in any momentuous change in the advanced framework; even the arguments regarding FOR 'values' in MACT (P.II §4.2) would apparently not require the slightest adjustment.

[5] Obviously, the offered description is not valid for so-called external negation (or for 'external negation' uses of *"not"*), in that $IMBST_h$ should be allowed to change in specific, but not easily statable ways. Apparently the best policy would be to accept whole García-Murga's theory of presupppositions (see Note 3), since it would take care by itself of any differences in this area. Strictly Hornian 'metalinguistic' uses of *"not"* would then be devolved to the general part of pragmatic theory dealing with linguistic expressions of refusal -where undoubtely a *subjective slant* is operating. Observe that Espinal's (1992) analysis of Cat. *"no ...pas"* seem to show that it shares key features with 'metalinguistic negation' in Horn's sense, in that *"no ...pas"* also involves a clear SLNT choice regarding the third 'basic move'.

[6] Note that nothing is assumed as to the linear otdering of the *k*, ... *k+r* sentences. Also, some non-successive 2-MEX_is might in principle combine in a C2-$MEX_{(...)}$, and no doubt suitable notational conventions can be quite easily established; nevertheless, it seems here advisable to stick to the simplest case.

[7] Unfortunately, neither Cat. "no ...pas" nor Fr. "ne ...pas" (each pair of lexical items operates on a single $MPST_h$) may be claimed to provide more than a rather tenuous

(morphological) support for the C2-MEXC construal of sentential negation. Understably, I cannot press these issues here.

8 Clearly, not every ES-2MNA is triggered by a lexical item; as it is well known, prosodic contour, changes in pitch, emphatic pauses, etc, are also (and perhaps more often) used to organise discourse. Anyway, for simplicity I will stick to the name *discourse markers* when referring to ES-2MNAs.

9 Arguably, temporal *"then"* does play a similar role, in that it may be construed as establishing a 'link' between the $MPST_h$ spoken of in the *then*-sentence and CST (i.e. current situation).

10 This capability calls for some explanation. Here is one. In (1) the 2nd order MNGACT reaches a partial situation (a PST) included in F_{CST}. In (3) and similar cases *"and"* reaches a PST within an IMBST for the involved $MPST_h$ -an IMBST which is the presumed 'virtual MPST' elicited by *"and"*. (It may be generally hypothesised that sentential *"and"* elicits as 'virtual MPST' an IMBST, which in a regular, sentences-linking case is that where the $MPST_h$s 'linked' by *"and"* are *implicitly meant* to occur.)

The suggestion predicts -correctly, it seems- that an *"and"*-associated IMBST has the same 'ontological' status as the $MPST_h$(s) included in it, while the latter status(es) is (are) involved in the 'value(s)' of the relevant MACTs. And since an $IMAGT_h$ is shared by 'ordinary' and 2nd order MNGACTs, its potential for having all 'ontological' statuses to recede (P.III §3.3.3.4) does not seem to result in undesirable discrepancies. The matter deserves more attention, though.

11 In that example the sentence at issue was declarative. So, it (or its assertion) was to be deemed, in the ordinary fashion, as either true or false -presumably the central feature that Grice, then fully committed to truth-conditional semantics, felt lacking in the *therefore* sentence and motivated his claim that the latter didn't mean ("say") as the former.

12 The evidence offered in Scheuer (1994), if correct, independently requires some such abandonment of a through-and-through universalist stand.

13 The distinction does not extensionally agree with the opposition *indirect vs direct* uses of language, in that 'no preparatory activity' manner of addressing other people (see §3.4.1 below) is a direct use.

14 A problem seems to arises, though, for commitments issued and accepted while alone; here it does not seem to be intended any change in interpersonal relations, but nonetheless the commitment would be excluded as a FOR utterance. Now, notice that the commitment should be issued in an (almost) automatic way, and this is blatantly inconsistent with the very notion 'assume a commitment'. So, even if the linguistic form of a frequently issued commitment is triggered by current setting (an unlikely event, to say the least), apparently no commitment is actually issued, and so the problem vanishes.

15 This would undoubtely necessitate theoretical development of a 'fine structure' for the rough spectrum STRGHT - OTHERW over which this parameter (i.e. $IMAGT_h$) presently ranges.

16 It would be unfair to malign these uses of *general way* [b.3.c]. In addition to providing instant relief, they are likely to help coping: by improving the subject's spirits, they may well facilitate his/her overcoming the main EFF when it eventually occurs.

17 As regards a FOR utterance intended to change a person's state, obviously there is no need for it to be understood, nor even heard, by that person -who, not less than a sesame seed, say, is then a target, not a genuine addressee. (Contrariwise, if what is to change is the social relatioship between speaker and hearer, the latter must be at least *minimally* other-addressed -see a few paragraphs below and Appendix 1.)

18 For reasons hinted at in P.III §3.2, no attempt will be made to review the different but closely related notions *mutual belief, shared belief*, etc. For purposes of the brief discussion below it does not matter which one is or should be adopted.

19 The careful historical and systematic survey of attempts to study emotion in language offered in Caffi & Janney (1994) is unfortunately marred by its being only concerned

with emotion in (linguistic) communication -in other words, the prevalent assumption (d) (refer again to P.I §2.1) is in effect endorsed. This basic feature prevents these writers from discussing 'letting off steam' speech and other emotive uses of language in which whether or not the speaker is addressing anyone is in many instances a negligible issue.

20 Some mixed cases do not go beyond the bounds established for non-preparatory cases. So, both an effect of this sort and either a derived $siEFF_{-c-}$ or a comparatively independent $iEFF_{-c-}$ may occur at the same time and be dealt with through the very same utterance.

21 For simplicity, here and everywhere (aside from a few places where plurality will be explicitly pointed out) I will keep to the convention of mentioning just **one addressee**, even though obviously several addressees are possible.

22 The word "almost" occurring a couple of sentences back in the text hinted at a certain cost. For one has to assume that the *early processing stage* is skipped; this implies that, if some other utterance was (almost) automatically issued before that emerging in *late stage*, then the former utterance must have been originated in a non-'quiet' *early stage*. So, this *stage* must belong to a different, somehow independently occurred, ordinary 'turn'.

23 When precisely does a spell of linguistic activity change the setting for an addressee's envisioned activity? A rather 'natural' answer, I think, sets the threshold at introduction of some item (specifically, a MPST) definitely new, non-existent before the speaker's words are uttered; and a prime candidate to this capability is any utterance that states its very nature (i.e how it does operate). In other words, a FOR-EQ utterance -although the requirement might necessitate being slightly relaxed (a matter on which I cannot dwell right now: see §3.4.2.2-3.5 below.)

24 Let us disregard idle talk, where certainly **there is** a common aim, namely to keep talking with each other. (In each participant such a common aim may be subordinated to a different goal, as it is sometimes acknowledged. This undeniable fact, though, is here irrelevant.)

25 Airenti, Bara & Colombetti's (1992a, 1992b) use of *behavior games*, where a Wittgensteinian inspiration and the notion *script* sort of merge, is clearly comparable to the more magmatic, less elaborated Searlian notion *Background of practices*.

26 Obviously, inasmuch as in a conversation there is an idle-talk component, i.e. inasmuch as the partners are **also** interested in its sheer going on, these notions may be useful in describing **this aspect** of the interaction.

27 "Additional" in that the feature did already allow present theoretical framework to sidestep several apparent impasses.

28 Aside from MPST and (the 'ontological' facet in) MACT, plus any S-2MNA (§2.1.3 above) that may occur, all of these *items* specify the old notion 'way of enactment' (of the relation to the primarily *meant item*, i.e. to MPST) spoken of in P.I Note 14. The distinction between these two classes of *meant items* is warranted by trait (iv) -if suitably revised to include S-2MNAs in the first category there mentioned (where they obviously belong).

29 For comparatively recent relevant research see e.g., concerning vision, Tanaka (1993), and concerning non-linguistic audition, Bregman (1990: chs.2-4).

30 The blueprint must represent ways of running or flowing, not inception, since a perceptual activity is obviously always '**already there**' -as remarked immediately below.

31 A warranted assumption, since the blueprint presently being developed will offer a processual sketch of **perception-like activities** of a designated kind. Notice that, while here and henceforth every qualification to the effect that an influence, result, etc is *partial* should be construed as including the limit case where the relevant *part* is '**improper**' (i.e. identical with the whole), in this particular passage it should be construed as also including the case where the 'part' is **null**. (A sentinel may doze, be alerted by sudden noises and/or shocks, and then -effectively entering a *primary processing stage*- begin to visually keep track of some suspect shapes moving across the field it was his responsability to keep visually watching. The here undeniably occurring

background survey was not performed by eye, the sense-organ of the designated activity.)

32 It may be asked what are the main 'unfavourable' effects relative to which the just mentioned siEFF (i.e. the target of the *intrinsic goal*) is 'secondary'. Clearly, they are none other than the so-called *ultimate* EFFs.

33 Needless to say, other (ideally, all) parameters definitional of the speaker's *initial phase* might in principle, if correctly conjectured/guessed, provide evidence on the meaning intended by the speaker. (This is a trivial consequence of traits (vii)-(viii) of language activity; refer to P.I §4.2.)

Note, however, that the so in principle attainable **maximal** comprehension of the uttered **expressions** does **not necessarily** equals their **best possible** comprehension. For, as emphasized in P.III §§3.1.2-3.1.3, in the general case a speaker's linguistic intention in action is underspecified when compared with the utterance it ensues in -a *cognitive innovation* is incorporated, ushering in 'values' for the (implemented) parameters that make them, so to say, untrue to the involved M_Is. (Although, ignoring chance factors, a fuller, perhaps complete knowledge of the speaker's mind would allow recovering that *innovation*; see P.III Note 15.)

34 It should be observed that what trait (iii) of language activity requires is by now incorporated. For it claims an (almost) automatic triggering of a linguistic hearer's activity, and this is effectively taken care of as soon as a 'background survey' activity is posited in the *initial phase*.

35 The systematic ambiguity in 'prefix' "pr" is a convenience in that what a hearer finds out is a **promptly retrieved** 'value', while what he or she must conjecture/guess is a **promptly retrievable** one (close enough for his/her current purposes to the matching 'value' with no "pr" prefix).

36 In the ordinary sense of the term, of course. Anyway, if this is correct, it follows that neither can it be assumed that in such circumstances a hearer *retrieves the literal meaning* in our sense.

37 Observe that it does not seem a plausible assumption that the *intrinsic driving agency* operates in complete independence from the *driving agencies* associated to the the *ultimate* EFFs: the natural assumption is apparently that they combine somehow. The remark will be taken up again regarding next *stage* and developed in §§4.3.3-4.3.3.2 below.

38 Notice the critical role that expectations again play, as per the role accorded them in this *stage*'s description (offered in §3.1.2 above).

39 Clearly, as soon as conditions for incorporation of (vii) are complied with, (viii) is also incorporated -in the Pickwickian sense in which it can be so (namely, that conditions for occurrence of the behavior it describes actually obtain).

40 A second 'bridging category' (in addition to MNGACT) suggested regarding trait (v) (see P.I Note 14) is, on independent grounds, resorted to directly below.

41 Obviouly, the urge to reach the *intrinsic goal* may be considered an 'adaptation' (to present stage) and expansion of the *intrinsic driving agency* operative in *primary processing stage*. (The remark bears on the issues adressed in §4.3.3.1 below.)

42 It should be recalled that a factor important enough to render problematic a *literal meaning* is inconsistency between it and expected range of meanings of utterances likely to have been issued by the speaker.

43 For one thing, in order to be able to unravel how the *(ultimate) driving agencies* involved are combined (as suggested in Note 37) with the *intrinsic driving agency*, one must know what the former *driving agencies* were; a requirement rendered more pressing because the *intrinsic agency* is associated to present *stage intrinsic goal*. An intuitive derivation of a few combinations will be found in §4.3.2.1 below.

44 Needless to say, a theorist must assume that some other conditions obtain. E.g. that the hearer assumes both that this goal is attributed to him/her by the speaker, and that the latter's linguistic behavior is 'guided' by such an attribution.

45 Obviously, this claim is predicated on some simplifications. At the very least, those that result from ignoring that the cognitive goal just described should be considered as (partially) included in the *'intrinsic'* one introduced a few paragraphs back. So, it is not accurate to suggest that it is a goal wholly additional to and superimposed on the *processing stages* posited by present theoretical frame. As to the Principle of Relevance itself, which might be found missing in the offered replica, I think it is but a particular case of a general 'principle' valid in many a -if not any- domain of 'higher' animals activities (see e.g. Sánchez de Zavala, 1990a: §1.2.3.1 and Addendum 3; 1990b: §4.4).

46 We should take exception to this sweeping claim if, concerning cases where no *sufficient identification* is achieved of MNGACT's *literal meaning* in the *primary processing stage*, and where in adition a new interpretation not of the kind 'full-blown linguistic re-interpretation' is looked for (see §4.3.1 below), the hypothesis is accepted that *middle stage* does **not** take care of building such re-interpretations. For since, as pointed out when discussing this hypothesis (i.e. in §4.3.2 below), the new interpretation should apparently be built in present *stage*, it belongs in the third class distinguished in the text; but nonetheless it seems apposite for Pragmatics to be concerned with its building process. I cannot press the issue here.

47 Admittedly, it wouldn't be surprising if you **eventually** came to such an explicit phrasing of what the speaker 'really meant'. But this is quite a different matter; for there is a tendency to put in words any global impression elicited in a situation we feel deeply involved in; a tendency understably more strong when it is an utterance-elicited impression.

From a different standpoint it should be noticed that a *broad* re-interpretation may be so complex as to be hardly attainable through processes included in a spell of spontaneous, impromptu, unreflective activity. Obviously, whenever this is the case present framework, if unextended (cp. P.III §3.1.1), will be unable to account for such a *comprehensive interpretation*.

48 Pace Sperber and Wilson. I don't wish to deny that such *implicatures* **may** exist; I only claim that if they are used to 'propositionalize' interpretations of the sort here discussed, they are -like everything else- just unfit for the job.

49 No doubt much detail is missing in this description. But this rough sketch seems to be enough in present context.

50 As concerns interaction of several, simultaneous d*riving agencies*, refer to the indeed exceedingly sketchy indications in P.I (§3.2 and Appendix 1) and to the specific example discussed in §§4.3.3-4.3.3.2 below.

51 Obviously, in addition to mixed cases (which trivially are always possible) there is a third possibility: *middle processing stage* may only procure a linguistically full-blown result, but this is not necessarily a representation of a presumedly intended message. In other words: (1)-(2) are preserved. (3) is replaced by the broader (3'): the only operating *driving agency* is that associated to the *intrinsic goal* of present *stage*. A final (closure) condition is added requiring for the output of this *stage* to be of a linguistic nature. Simplicity strongly advises keeping to just two alternatives; and lacking any evidence as to empirical plausibilities, I chose the extreme cases.

52 It seems to be required that the anticipated *ultimate* EFF be internal to the subject (a psychological one, say), since only on this condition could apparently the EFF vanish by turning attention elsewhere -see §3.3 above on 'unfavourable' siEFFs. But again (cp. P.II Note 14) the plausibility of such a contention, being a matter of accepted ontology, does not warrant its assertion as part and parcel of a pragmatic theory.

53 Certainly, this 'message' does not abrogate the literal interpretation of (10a), so that the latter should be included (as a minor, comparatively uninteresting component) in its complete *comprehensive interpretation*; and a similar remark applies to the other answers. However, for simplicity no comment will be henceforth made on non-discarded *literal meanings*.

54 As pointed out in §4.3.4, regarding a single utterance it is quite possible for a hearer to build in *middle processing stage* both a *full-blown linguistic* re-interpretation and a *broad* one.

55 The constraint that a 'natural' or preferred interpretation must attain maximum -or optimum- relevance, in Sperber and Wilson's sense of this term, was emptied of empirical import in Wilson & Sperber (1988). For, apparently in order to sidestep serious objections concerning feasibility of the processes envisioned, these writers settled there on the notion that the most relevant interpretation is just the first one that emerges in the mind of the hearer -putting no independent condition on it.

56 The assumptions at issue are (c), (d), and (e), since (f) is obviously less central. A few comments on general drawbacks shown by the domain-restricted approach characteristic of AI research are advanced in Section 5 below.

57 Arguably there is some evidence for the *pre-(re-)interpretation* case, since the (tentative) answers that not too infrequently people gives to their own questions before the addressee had any time to answer seem to be nothing but instances of overtly aired *pre-(re-)interpretations*. (Of course, in many cases they would be more appropriately labelled "pre-answers" or "pre-utterances".)

58 An obvious remark on how any relevant theory may be used to illuminate the processes we are interested in (both those presumed to occur in this *stage* and in the previous one). Apparently non-monotonic sequences of processes should be assumed throughout -as the trend in the AI research just referred to in the text most clearly seems to indicate.

59 A review of work on emotion-signalling acoustic properties of speech is Pittam & Scherer (1992). The views put forth in the historical and systematic survey Caffi & Janney (1994) are apparently quite compatible with present framework. E.g. the role that these writers ascribe, regarding emotion, to divergencies from 'contextual anticipatory schemata' is identical to the role that, in line with the critical significance devolved to expectations (see §3.1.2 above), is assigned in present framework to inconsistencies "with (...) expectations based on the hearer's assumptions about other 'parts' of F_{CST}" (§4.2 above) -a role ultimately based on Gricean ideas about conversation. So, the survey might be useful as a starting point to broach full acknowledgement, within this framework, of the effects of emotion on use of language. See, though, Note 19 on an important bias in their approach.

60 Using AI jargon, it could be said that local maxima may be separated by deep troughs that make it unfeasible to reach the global maximum.

61 Unfortunately, borderline cases keep cropping up. For e.g. talking to one's pet, especially to one that discriminates between different tones of voice (or so its master believes) is definitely not identical to talking to oneself. For simplicity I will ignore these complications -which in fact can be accomodated in our theoretical frame at no cost.

62 The speaker may well not have anything specific in mind about how the would-be hearer might take up his words: he may just like to be heard, because this gives him a sense of importance, say (as per the 'permanent' attractor in G8: see P.I Appendix 3). Alternatively, the speaker's action may have a specific purpose; e.g. to amaze the hearer with his wonderful bass voice, to let him/her know and admire the cute observations he mumbles under his breath (or addresses to his pet), or to stimulate him/her so that he or she begins pondering upon the very matters he (the speaker) often ruminates about; etc.

63 All four examples offered in Note 62 are instances of mere (acoustic) modulation of an utterance being issued as a result of some other, previously operating *driving agency*. (Although, of course, the *driving agency* associated to the new, human addressee might grow more and more important and even turn the previous one into utterly ineffective.)

64 Admittedly, the anticipated 'unfavourable' EFF in the usual sense may also be an EFF_i: since you are not able to recognize (by looking at him) who is the man suddenly greeting you by your nickname, i.e. since you do not identify his face nor gestures as those of an old acquaintance of yours, you may make an effort to perceive the subtlest nuances in his voice and his linguistic mannerisms, hoping for eventual cues, and resulting insight, about his identity. The point of the distinction spoken of in the text is that the EFF that prompts to the (quasi-)perceptual behavior at issue is in general **not** an EFF_i regarding **this kind** of activity, though it may actually be an EFF_i relative to **some other** perception-like activity. (In fact, so to say by happenstance, it even may be relative to

that very kind of activity: you may focus your attention on how the suddenly greeting msn is dressed, or in the people -apparently his wife and children- that follow him, etc. This is the case acknowledged in *way* [B.3]: see directly below in the text.)

65 Clearly, in this case the assumed *ultimate* EFF has the nature of just the *intrinsic 'unfavourable' effect* of the activity at issue; i.e. it is an EFF_i .

66 Admittedly, "level at" as just used in the text involves an equivocation. If, as just suggested, the designated activity is introspective in nature, the expression may be construed in its usual sense (implying that such a siEFF is inspected, scrutinized, or whatnot). If, on the other hand, the siEFF is at least partially an ignorance of what are precisely the *ultimate* EFFs to be expected, "*to level* (a perception-like activity) *at a siEFF*" should be construed as: to explore, examine, probe, etc whatever items and relationships are necessary in order to dispel the ignorance on which the siEFF label was put. I don't think it likely that any serious misleading ensues from this double-meaning usage.

67 I ignore the general phenomenon that being deeply engrossed in some other activity usually prevents interpretation of an utterance that otherwise would be fully interpreted. (The rationale for the exclusion is that this is apparently due to an increase in perceptual thresholds, since other, non-linguistic sounds may not be perceived either.)

68 Pointing to the fact that in the cases that interest us in Pragmatics the activity at issue is not action-like will not do, since not every perceptual phenomenon, even if acoustic, is so diligently processed.

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