Forward-looking Pairwise Stability in Networks with Externalities

Abstract

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called a forward-looking network formation scheme if, first, the probability that a link is created is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive, and if, second, the probability that a link is eliminated is positive if the discounted, expected gains to at least one of its two participants are positive. The main result is the existence, for all discount factors and all value functions, of a forward-looking network formation scheme. Furthermore, we can always nd a forward-looking network formation scheme such that (i) the allocation rule is component balanced and (ii) the transition probabilities increase in the di erence in payo s for the corresponding players responsible for the transition. We use this dynamic solution concept to explore the tension between e ciency and stability.