A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules

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Date
2006-07
Author
Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID
Luquin, Paloma
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  Estadisticas en RECOLECTA
(LA Referencia)

URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6372
Abstract
This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while the egalitarian allocation is just one of the Nash outcomes.
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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported