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Universidad
del País Vasco

Euskal Herriko
Unibertsitatea

**ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ AND ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ:
HUMAN BEING AND THE
SEARCH FOR THE ABODE**

Tesis doctoral

GEORGIOS SOTIRIOS KARAKASIS

Director: JAVIER AGUIRRE SANTOS

Departamento de Filosofía

Facultad de Filosofía y Educación
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“πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδέν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”

Σοφοκλής

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RESÚMEN

La presente tesis doctoral tiene por objeto explicar el concepto de Πόλεμος desde un punto de vista filosófico. Su pretensión no es elaborar un análisis político o social del fenómeno del Πόλεμος, sino ofrecer una interpretación óntica y ontológica de dicho evento. En concreto, la tesis parte de una disertación acerca del ser humano en sí, el ser humano cuya necesidad más profunda y existencial reside en encontrar un hogar en este mundo, un sitio al que poder llamar “casa”, y en el que poder entender su rol en el mundo. Argumentamos que el Πόλεμος no se limita a un campo de batalla, a un territorio en el que el ser humano deja libre su capacidad de poder destructivo; por el contrario, desde el primer momento el Πόλεμος tiene lugar en el interior del ser humano, al percatarse éste del hecho de que tiene que transformar el mundo para poder realizar su propia idea de lo que debería ser el mundo y que éste se convierta en su hogar. Nuestro trabajo intenta ofrecer un esquema de los senderos que transita el ser humano en esta crucial actividad por hallar su *casa*. Dicha actividad encuentra su punto de partida en la sensación de ausencia de un hogar, para adoptar, posteriormente, una forma más óntica y violenta, cuando el ser humano decide que, para encontrar su lugar, tiene que cambiar el mundo. Esta forma más violenta de la *praxis* humana constituye la expresión óntica del Πόλεμος, la guerra, una actividad cuyo objetivo es reestablecer el orden del mundo de tal manera que le sea posible reconocerlo como propio, a saber, como un espacio en el que poder habitar, una vez que ha encontrado su rol y lugar dentro de este nuevo esquema creado por él mismo.

El núcleo de este trabajo de investigación reside en el pensamiento de Heráclito de Éfeso. Le hemos prestado especial atención a este filósofo presocrático por el hecho de que su pensamiento, y sobre todo sus ideas sobre la Φύσις, el Λόγος y el Πόλεμος, nos pueden brindar una ayuda fundamental no sólo a la hora de entender los problemas filosóficos de su época, sino también los de la sociedad moderna. Su concepción de la guerra en tanto que cambio y de la relación entre la Φύσις y el ocultamiento, y, especialmente, su

convicción de la necesidad de encontrar la armonía entre el ser humano y el Λόγος, demuestran que el pensamiento original del Heráclito –original porque se encuentra en el origen del pensamiento occidental– ofrece herramientas y puntos de vista capitales con los que analizar la sociedad moderna desde una perspectiva que, si bien es temporalmente lejana, esencialmente resulta muy próxima a los problemas que debemos afrontar en nuestra contemporaneidad.

En lo concerniente a esta tarea, hemos encontrado una valiosa inspiración en las interpretaciones de los fragmentos y del pensamiento de Heraclito realizadas por Miroslav Marcovich y Martin Heidegger. Ambos, si bien cada cual a su manera, nos ofrecen una amplia y valiosa variedad de herramientas conceptuales para entender el pensamiento heraclíteo en su profundidad. Pese a que trazan caminos muy diferentes a la hora de iluminar los textos del *filósofo oscuro*, sus exégesis han sido de máxima relevancia para encontrar una vía propia mediante la que esclarecer el pensamiento del de Éfeso.

Tras haber expuesto la idea principal de nuestra tesis, procedemos a continuación a presentar de manera sucinta la estructura y contenido de sus capítulos y partes. La tesis se divide en tres partes:

- A) FROM HUMAN BEING TO ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ
- B) ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ IN ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ
- C) TOWARDS THE EVENTUATION OF ΛΟΓΟΣ

La primera parte se desarrolla en tres capítulos:

- I. HUMAN BEING AS THE POSSIBILITY FOR POTENTIALITY:
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΙ AND *ΠΟΛΛΟΙ* IN THE THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS
- II. HUMAN BEING AS ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ: THE SOPHOCLEAN
APPROACH AS VIEWED BY HEIDEGGER

III. ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ AND THE ESSENCE OF TRAGIC: ΑΙΑΣ AS THE VIOLENT ACTING OF ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ

En el primer capítulo se presenta la distinción que hace Heráclito entre los ἄριστοι y los πολλοί. El objetivo no es analizar el pensamiento del efesio desde un punto de vista socio-político, sino enseñar cuáles son las características que tienen los ἄριστοι, características que hacen que para Heráclito, y para nosotros también, aquéllos tuviesen una especial relevancia. Su relación con el Λόγος, su actitud ante la muerte y su lucha para distinguirse de las masas constituyen elementos necesarios a la hora de entender mejor el ser humano en tanto que δεινότατον, es decir, como un ser cuyas capacidades son casi infinitas.

En el segundo capítulo se examina la definición que, en su obra *Antígona*, Sófocles ofreció acerca del humano:

“πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”

El capítulo rinde cuenta de por qué esta definición es la que más nos ayuda a concebir al ser humano como potencialidad de un rango infinito de capacidades; además, gracias a la interpretación de Heidegger, señalamos por qué el ser humano como δεινότατον se define por su sensación de ausencia de hogar en ese mundo y por su lucha contra la Δίκη.

En el tercer capítulo, basándonos en la tragedia *Áyax* de Sófocles, se explica por qué la esencia de ser humano es trágica. Lo que se pretende demostrar es que el ser humano como δεινότατον, en la búsqueda de su hogar y en su intento de transformar el mundo, se niega a rendirse, aunque sabe que, a partir de cierto límite sus ideas, su manera de ver el mundo y sus acciones tratan de cruzar las fronteras de la Δίκη, cometiendo así los que los griegos llamaban ὕβρις. Este acto de ὕβρις se percibe, según nuestra exégesis de *Áyax*, como el lanzamiento absoluto de la actividad violenta del δεινότατον, una actividad que, pese a que su resultado sea inevitablemente fallido, evidencia con claridad la esencia trágica del ser humano, la cual puede generar actos grandiosos, pero también horribles, en su lucha por cambiar el mundo.

La segunda parte de nuestra tesis consiste en cuatro capítulos:

- IV. IN SEARCH OF AN ABODE
- V. ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ AS THE WORLD UNCONCEALING LIGHTNING
- VI. ABSTRACTION AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DISTANCE
- VII. ALL IS WAR: THE USE OF THE MILITARY DRONES IN
MODERN WARFARE- ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

El cuarto capítulo esclarece cómo se ha entendido el concepto de Πόλεμος en nuestra investigación. En concreto, se analiza el Πόλεμος en tanto que la actividad con la que el ser humano, δεινότατον, busca de una manera ontológica y óptica su hogar en el mundo. En esta búsqueda, δεινότατον, inevitablemente hace frente a los límites que le impone la Δίκη; su manera de actuar y reaccionar contra estos límites se puede apreciar claramente en el evento del Πόλεμος. Dada la importancia de la Δίκη en esta búsqueda del ser humano, en este capítulo intentamos dilucidar cuál es su función en la vida del δεινότατον, basando para ello nuestra interpretación en los fragmentos de Heráclito y en la explicación filosófica acerca de la Δίκη ofrecida por Martin Heidegger.

El quinto capítulo da continuidad y profundiza en el análisis del evento del Πόλεμος. Partiendo de la base de algunos de los fragmentos más relevantes del oscuro filósofo de Éfeso y con la ayuda de la interpretación de Heidegger, el Πόλεμος se presenta como el relámpago del fragmento que reproducimos a continuación:

“Τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός”

La disertación se centra en dos características, cuya importancia esclarece el motivo de que hayamos escogido el rayo como la imagen del Πόλεμος. El

Πόλεμος, en tanto que rayo, por un lado *timonea* el mundo y los seres, y por el otro lado es el evento del *desocultamiento* del mundo.

En el sexto capítulo se examina una de las características más importantes, según nuestro parecer, de la guerra moderna, a saber, la abstracción del enemigo. Basándonos en la interpretación ontológica del filósofo Glenn Gray y su obra *The Warriors*, tratamos de evidenciar el peligro que implica ser clausurado en un esquema en el que el enemigo se convierte en “enemigo absoluto”, puesto que en una situación tal queda callada la llamada de nuestra conciencia, la cual nos urge a reconocer en el enemigo nuestra misma esencia, esto es, nuestra misma humanidad.

El séptimo capítulo trata de ofrecer una elaboración un tanto más minuciosa del problema de la abstracción, fijando nuestra atención en el uso de drones militares. El propósito es demostrar que la posibilidad de la distancia óptica ofrecida por los drones puede conducir a la creación de un hueco ontológico, en el que el enemigo se encuentra privado de su derecho a reaccionar y, finalmente, se convierte a una mera presa.

Por último, la tercera y última parte de nuestra tesis consta de dos capítulos:

VIII. A PREPARATION FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ΛΟΓΟΣ: ΦΥΣΙΣ IN THE THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS

IX. GATHERING THE PIECES: THE EMERGENCE OF ΛΟΓΟΣ IN ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ

En el octavo capítulo se analiza el concepto de Φύσις en el pensamiento heraclíteo y, más concretamente, en el siguiente fragmento:

“φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ”

Teniendo como herramienta básica la interpretación de Heidegger, constatamos que la φύσις no es ni la totalidad ni el conjunto de todos los seres del mundo, sino el mismo Ser que se nos aparece a través de la emergencia de las cosas y que se esconde en el propio acto de emerger. Es de gran importancia entender lo que constituye la Φύσις en el pensamiento del filósofo efesio,

porque sólo una vez que hayamos entendido la manera en la que la Φύσις emerge y cómo se nos da a nosotros a través de su presencia, es posible percatarse de que nuestra misma presencia es la emergencia de la Φύσις dentro de nosotros, y únicamente de esta manera podemos comprender correctamente la aparición y la emergencia del Λόγος en nuestra vida y en nuestra lucha.

Finalmente, en el último capítulo se trata de ofrecer luz acerca de lo que el Λόγος significa en el pensamiento de Heráclito. Siguiendo la vía hermenéutica y el análisis etimológico de los filósofos Richard Capobianco, William Richardson y Martin Heidegger, argumentamos que el Λόγος se puede entender también como la “recolección primordial (primordial fore-gathering)”, una recolección que permite mantener la conciencia y la humanidad vivas incluso en el momento de la dispersión radical y violenta que supone la guerra. Sólo a través del Λόγος somos capaces de entender que incluso en la expresión óptica del Πόλεμος, la guerra, el ser humano puede convertirse en el lugar de la aparición del Λόγος. Resulta crucial captar la capital relevancia de dicha conversión, pues es la que puede ponernos en sintonía con el Λόγος, una sintonía que se expresa en el ὁμολογεῖν, en nuestro vivir dentro de la emergencia del Λόγος.

PREFACE

Before making our first attempt at elaborating the plan of this Thesis, the idea prevailing in the mind was to look into the unfolding of the Πόλις's concept in the thought of Heraclitus and the Stoics along with thoroughly searching for the right way to go over with the purpose of our attaining, if possible, the Κοσμόπολις. There was an abundance of material centered mainly on the idea of Πόλις itself, which is still persistent in intriguing us, especially these days- in the era of a globalized world whose frontiers seem to be in a process towards radical reduction, if not elimination. To deal with this issue becomes even more interesting if we take into account that Πόλις apparently shares the same root with the verb πέλειν. This similarity, and the weight it carries, were highlighted by Heidegger in his analysis of Parmenides:

“This word πόλις is, in its root, identical with the ancient greek word for “to be”, πέλειν: “to emerge, to rise up into the unconcealed”..... The πόλις is the essence of the place[Ort], or, as we say, it is the settlement [Ort-Schaft] of the historical dwelling of Greek humanity. Because the πόλις lets the totality of beings come in this or that way into the unconcealedness of its condition, the πόλις is therefore essentially related to the Being of beings”

(Heidegger, 1998a, p. 90)

This distinctive relation of Πόλις with Being, as insightfully approached by Heidegger, is the reason for our having decided to reorient this research and- instead of the Πόλις as a place- to focus our inquiry on the agent in the place, directly linked up with the searching of the Being, namely, the human being. More specifically, our objective was- when somewhat narrowing the scope of the research, while, at the same time, diving more profoundly into it- to lay emphasis on the relation of the human being with Being, as witnessed in the process of the unconcealment of the world; an unconcealment taking place as a letting show of the world so that the human being may be capable of perceiving it, living in it and trying to understand it. The unconcealment would not be the outcome of an intensive effort of a subject to uncover the object, world, by imposing its dominance over everything that is not already subjected to the subject. Since we are living in the world, we are acting in the world. Hence, there is a world to act on, a world which is bringing forth a great variety of possibilities enabling us to reach an attunement to it, an attunement, which could eventually let us establish a real relationship with it; a relationship whose foundation is not the thirst for dominance over what is resisting to our acting, but an unconcealment bringing us to the homecoming of the human being in the clearing of the Being in the world- a clearing where the human being could be sheltered in the unconcealment, a sheltering energized by the letting come of the Being into our wor(l)d, into our thought.

In this Thesis, thus, we have aimed at presenting one of the ways the world may be unconcealed; this way is going to be Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος, through both aspects- ontical and ontological- is to be considered as the violent acting of the human being to uncover the world, to find his place in it and to live in accordance with it. If this is feasible or not, remains to be seen; what, however, must be clearly said is that Being cannot be excluded from Πόλεμος- either as an effort of ontologically unconcealing what we suppose to be hidden, or ontically, as a military struggle, in which people take and give their lives on the battlefield. No matter the tragedy, the pain and the shed blood, the reaching of Being, or at least a glimpse of it, could not be excluded from Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος should not be considered as one facet of the human being, while the others are hidden or standby so as to be used under other conditions. Human being cannot be shattered into pieces so that one part of him might reach Being, while the other doing its every day work, or struggling and killing during the war, unaffected by the seeking of its other part. If Being is to be sought for, it will be totally; if the letting come of it and the letting become of us in it is to happen, it will take place totally and thoroughly.

Thus, the title of the Thesis had to be changed, not as result of a retreat due to the difficulty of analyzing what Πόλις is, but, rather, as the thinking of Πόλις, as the place where Being πέλει, a thinking, though, which obliges us to start from the human being itself as being in the Πόλις; the human being as the one who clears up the place for the rising of Being and of the unconcealment. Accordingly, the importance of this role of the human being makes really worthy the effort to centralize our analysis over it, viz on the human being and on Πόλεμος as the violent acting directed to the unconcealment of the world.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of our Thesis is to set forth a different approach towards the idea/event of Πόλεμος. Namely, starting from the human being himself, we will try to get fresh light on how, through his own venturing in the world, is also accomplishing a venture into himself. This venture, of course, considering the complex way Being is eventuating into us, is not an easy task to carry through. This search cannot be copied or repeated, becoming, thus, product for a possible reproduction and then ready to be sold in the market of ideas of the modern society. The struggle is a personal one, an answering to the call of distress, a call, though, which may be lost in the same lack of distress so as to be able to answer to the call of distress. As Heidegger, in a somewhat apocalyptic tone, put it:

“so that the greatest plight, the lack of a sense of plight in the midst of this plight, might break through and might make resound for the first time the most remote nearness to the absconding of the gods”

(Heidegger, 2012, p. 90)

This call of distress, this plight is what first makes human being realize his lack of abode in the world, his being alone while being with others; life, when this plight is to be heard and answered, is not a mere life experience, a gathering of experiences and moments like if there existed a magic number, or an amount of experiences that would

finally make us aware of the location of our abode, of our home in the feeling of unhomeliness and uncanniness. On the contrary, this plight is going to be answered as a radical acceptance of the refutation of what was supposed to be accepted, a breakthrough into the seemingly normal so as to find out what is quintessential for us. Quoting Heidegger, once again:

“The astounding is for the Greeks the simple, the insignificant, Being itself. The astounding, visible in the astonishing, is the uncanny, and it pertains so immediately to the ordinary that it can never be explained on the basis of the ordinary”

(Heidegger, 1998a, p. 101)

The search for the emergence of Being, the effort of unconcealing what is veiled in this world, is to be our main concern in this Thesis. Conscious that what we are seeking for is going to be neither easy, nor simple and taking into consideration the spirit of modern society, which lets the calculation dominate everyone and whatever, a society in the bosom of which everything could, thus, get translated into numbers, the latter remaining no longer tools but becoming the way our living is explained and presented. In this society, thus, the quest for Being might sound strange, even senseless, sometimes, given the oblivion into which the word of Being is concealed. Nonetheless, the call of Being is stronger than ever today, when our remoteness from it seems to be the most excessive one. But it is in this remoteness that the nearness is brought into light, the nearness as the greatest effort of hearkening the speechless voice of the call of distress.

To fall within this scope, we will start out our Thesis presenting the views of Heraclitus as regards the few and the many. Our interest in presenting those ideas lies in the necessity of having the person himself set up again, namely, where he deserves to be, not only as a member of a larger social group, which he always is, but as a

person who takes up the challenge of finding himself an abode, even if this would mean the redefinition of what he thinks of himself, of the world and of his place in it. The presentation of the characteristics and of the point of view of the few is the first important step to open the same possibility of redefinition. What the few are, is going to be our compass in the next chapter, a compass showing the way the human being attains to the extremes of his potentiality, first in the act of defining himself as uncanny, and then in the violent acting as expressed in his need to change the world so as to find his abode in it.

In the next two chapters we will expound the reason to adopt, for the needs of our research, the definition of the human being given in the choral ode in *Antigone*; namely human being as δεινότατον, “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδέν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει”, is going to be preferred due to its thorough analysis of the capacities and the limitations of the human being. In our research we will be referring quite often to Heidegger, whose analysis of the choral ode has been essential for our own understanding of human being as δεινότατον and of the role of δεινότατον in the world. In addition to the above, we will also set off the tragic essence of δεινότατον, without having recourse, of course, to the modern use of the word since everything can become tragic from one moment to another- an artificial way of interpreting tragic which deprives it of its essence. On the contrary, we will be guided, once again, by Sophocles especially in his tragedy *ΑΙΑΣ* (*AJAX*); the example of Ajax, the fierce warrior who did not give up his will, not even in front of the rage of the goddess Athena, is to be conceived as a clear example of the tragic essence of δεινότατον and of his ceaseless struggle to find/impose his abode in the world. A struggle though which is turning very often the violent activity of δεινότατον against Δίκη itself; Δίκη not interpreted as justice in legal terms, but as “Being as fittingness that enjoins (Heidegger, 2014, p. 179)”. In this schema of the struggle of δεινότατον against Δίκη, Πόλεμος is going to emerge both as an ontological and ontical struggle, a fierce violent activity of δεινότατον so as to reestablish the world order according to his own will.

This phenomenon of Πόλεμος, ontically and ontologically, is going to be explained in the next two chapters. Πόλεμος, far from being a mere military activity is to be seen as the violent acting of δεινότατον, in his anxious endeavour to feel at home in a world where he considers himself unhomely. This necessity of finding his home will be perceived through Πόλεμος, just where Πόλεμος will be tied to the act of unconcealing the world, an unconcealment which could only take place in the limits set by Δίκη, even though δεινότατον may try to trespass them. It is this violent activity that makes of δεινότατον a truly powerful and fierce in the world, a might which guided by his necessity of fulfilling his will won't consider set his own proper limits. This confrontation between δεινότατον and Δίκη will be further developed in these two chapters.

Having, thus, presented the act of the unconcealing of the world through Πόλεμος, we will try to analyze, in the following two chapters, a crucial characteristic of understanding Πόλεμος in modern society, that is, the abstraction in war: an abstraction which is to be seen both ontologically and ontically. Ontologically, through the abstractive "creation" of the enemy- the enemy is dehumanized and turned into an abstract entity which has to be eradicated. The abstraction machinated will deprive the enemy of his most basic human characteristics; consequently he will be seen as the "personification of evil", a transformation which could make easier the muting of the voice of conscience, when trying to make a call to us, recognizing the enemy as another human being, with no essential differences from us. Ontically, the abstraction is to be analyzed, through the use of drones in modern warfare; a characteristic which could easily create an ontical and ontological distance between the attacker and the attacked, or better said between the predator and the prey. We will, also, refer quite often to Glenn Gray, especially in his work *The Warriors*, a text of specific import, more particularly its extracts related to the understanding of the being of the soldiers in war and as warriors.

The penultimate chapter is a philosophical analysis of the concept of Φύσις in the ancient greek thought- especially, in the thought of Heraclitus. Following the way paved by Heidegger we will try to approach once again Φύσις as an emergence of being from the concealed sheltering, an emergence which enables beings to be what they are. This interplay between concealment and emergence is of outmost significance for our better understanding Λόγος, as the “primordial fore-gathering (Cappobianco, 2014, p. 90)” of the beings by δεινότητα.

Finally, in the last chapter, we will focus on Πόλεμος as manifested in the military struggle and we will essay to set forth a different approach towards the enemy and the acting of the soldier in war. Even in the most difficult and chaotic situations such as war, δεινότητα, human being, can gather his shattered pieces and stay mentally united through a different understanding of what war is. Through the suffering of killing and the nobility of sacrificing his life, human being will be given the possibility to develop a philosophical approach towards war and the enemy, an approach which is based on the mutual recognition of the humanity of each, a recognition which will shatter the abstractive attempts to dehumanize the enemy by bringing into light what the enemy really is, another fellow human being set against us. This recognition in the carnage of the slaughterhouse of war is not going to be easy, not easy at all, but it is at those most critical moments when everything is at stake that the Being is given the possibility to emerge, to come forth from the unconcealment and to be grasped and sheltered in its constant presence, through Λόγος. Λόγος, at those moments, is much more than a simple philosophical idea/concept; Λόγος is the deliverance of δεινότητα, is the way through which the abode sought for horizontally, through the expansive violent acting, is to be found vertically, through a diving into the concealment of δεινότητα; a sheltering concealedness, though, which is sheltering the place where the eventuation of Λόγος will take place as a bringing into light the gathering of the dispersion of the beings. In the chaos of war, Λόγος will be the order that can only be brought by the gathering, which does not let δεινότητα get dispersed and scattered in the aftermath of his own violent acting.

SOME ISSUES CONCERNING METHODOLOGY

Before entering into the process of carrying out our research, some methodological issues should be clarified, at this point, concerning, first, the thinkers that we are going to refer to, and, secondly, the idea/concept that plays a crucial role in our research, namely Πόλεμος.

Thus, our research is originating from the thought of Heraclitus, Sophocles and the way Heidegger interprets them. A question that could rise here is what Heraclitus and Sophocles, who lived thousand years ago, may provide to the thought that makes indispensable, at least in this research, their use. The question whether the ancient philosophers and their thought can be considered as interlocutors for issues of interest to us, or whether we should be limited to an analysis of their thoughts in their specific spatiotemporal context, has been analyzed by many thinkers, (Rorty, 1969, Sorell, 2005, MacIntyre, 1986 among others) each one providing his own arguments about that important issue. Our approach towards it is mainly influenced by Heidegger and his distinction between historical and “historiographical”¹:

“Thinking does not mean here the course of psychologically represented acts of thought but the historical process in which a thinker arises, says his word, and so provides to truth a place within a historical community. As for time, it signifies here

¹ 1 Concerning the different use (s) and meaning(s) of History in Heidegger, see: Inwood, M. (2000). *A Heidegger dictionary* (1st ed.). Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.p. 90-95

less the point of time calculated according to year and day than it means “age”, the situation of human beings and man’s dwelling place therein”

(Heidegger 1998, p. 7)

“The connection among the kinds of concealedness is a historical one, and the historical must be kept distinct from the “historiographical”. The latter is information about and acquaintance with the historical, and indeed in a purely technical sense, i.e., it calculates by balancing the past against the present and viceversa. Everything historiographical takes distinction from the historical. History, on the contrary, has no need of the historiographical. The historiographer is always just a technician, a journalist; the thinker of history is always quite distinct

(ibid. p. 64)”

From the above we can deduce that history is to be understood not as a mere recording and archiving of facts and events; on the contrary, connections between truth as unconcealment and concealment are in the thought of the human being. In this scope we should discern the way Heidegger interprets history and historical events. The main question behind the research of Heidegger is the Being of the beings and the relation of human beings to it; the unconcealment of Being and our being appropriated, or not, by Being. Quoting Galzacorta:

“however, a peculiarity of the work of Heidegger with the important texts of philosophy resides in the fact that, along with the conscience of the historical distance which places every essential thinker of the history of being in a singular moment, different from every other, there is also, at the same time, a recognition that all those, at the core, they all answer the same and unique question: the question for the being of the being as the fundamental question of metaphysics”

(Galzacorta, 2016, p. 68)

In consequence we do believe that the thought both of Heraclitus and Sophocles, still has a lot to proffer to the modern thought if taken into the context of the

search of Being by the human being. When Sophocles in *Antigone*, defines human being as δεινότατον, and Heraclitus speaks about Λόγος, Πόλεμος and Φύσις, these words are not to be confined to a specific spatial and temporal matrix where they simply acquire an exhibition artifact like significance. The issues brought forth into light should greatly concern us and our modern society, since the core of their thought, especially as regards Heraclitus, lies in the human being's getting appropriated by Being. Λόγος as gatherdness, Φύσις as the emerging sway, Πόλεμος as constant change, and the human being as ὑψίπολις/ἄπολις, are not analyses that once made could be achieved and then forsaken as obsolete only because the modern thought asserts that they belong to another society, of old type and time. On the contrary, we are still looking for, and we will probably not stop looking for what the human being is, for which his essence is and for our relation with the others and the world itself. The search of an abode, as presented in the thought of Sophocles, is a matter that will never lose its importance for us since we are always trying to find our place in an ever changing world. We cannot believe that issues and thoughts reaching deep inside our own being can be circumscribed only to a specific temporal context. Our search for Being and the Being's search for us is an ongoing activity, a struggle of unconcealing what is concealed by bringing it forth into light, through its emergence- an emergence whose part we all of us are.

Finally, with regard to the use of Πόλεμος in our research, we have to say that even though heavily influenced by the analysis and interpretation of Heidegger, it is not, however, limited there since it tries, in parallel, to combine the ontological and the ontical aspects of Πόλεμος, as well. Surely Heidegger when referring to Πόλεμος, is perceiving it through an ontological point of view- if we are allowed to employ this distinction. Nevertheless, in our research, we essay to scan Πόλεμος though the ontological and the ontical perspectives, as a military struggle in the battlefield; we consider that Πόλεμος ontically perceived is without any doubt the bringing of the human being's capacities to their most violent extreme, viz a situation in which we are getting lost and scattered due to the extreme violence that we vitalize and that is forced upon us. In those moments of pain, bloodshed and trembling we attempt to show the

appearance of Λόγος, not as a mere philosophical thought, but as a pure eventuation of the human being by Λόγος. It is only through this “primordial fore-gathering” that can be avoided the total scattering and fragmentation of the human being in such critical moments. Whether this approach is going to bear fruits or not remains to be seen, but what we cannot do is let Λόγος and Being slip away from the human being when he is exposed to the direst need to find his essence and to protect it from the maelstrom of Πόλεμος. What we are in necessity of is not an impersonal account of Λόγος, but the appropriation of the human being by Λόγος when the former has finally responded to the distress call of his own urgent exigency to find his abode in the world, in a world which can reach the extremes of uncanniness as in the case of an ontic Πόλεμος

FROM HUMAN BEING TO ΔΕΙΝΌΤΑΤΟΝ

I. HUMAN BEING AS THE POSSIBILITY FOR POTENTIALITY: *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΙ* AND *ΠΟΛΛΟΙ* IN THE THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS

I.I Heraclitus through the approach of Heidegger and Marcovich

In this chapter we are going to consider the distinction made between the *ἄριστοι* and the *πολλοί* in the thought of Heraclitus following the most helpful commentaries of Heidegger and Marcovich. Before embarking upon a further elaboration on how this distinction might assist us in our research, we should, first, explain why we have chosen the above mentioned thinkers for an analysis of the Ephesian philosopher's reasoning power. To start with Marcovich, even though there are many good analysts of the Heraclitean thought, he is the one who, in our opinion, manages to gather and order in a very rational way the fragments, his commentaries and the abundant resources he is providing, facilitating, thus, our effort to develop a clear methodological and epistemological standpoint of the above mentioned fragments. Even though his conception and analysis are very pertinent, there are cases where we adopt the comments and analysis of other thinkers, such as Charles Kahn, so as to shed more light on passages that may be enigmatic or open to more than one interpretations.

Concerning Heidegger, his analysis of Heraclitus proves to be very ambiguous in some parts and could be misinterpreted. In the seminars with Eugene Fink²,

² For an enlightening review of the book see: Krell, D. (1971). The Heraclitus Seminar. *Research in Phenomenology*, 1, 137-146. For a more detailed analysis of the relation of Heidegger with the Presocratic philosophers, Heraclitus included, see: Jacobs, D. (1999). *The presocratics after Heidegger*. 1st ed. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Heidegger is opening many different ways of approaching Heraclitus, which, don't seem to lead to a clear understanding of what is really intended in the fragment or even in the analysis made of it. The fact is that Heidegger and Fink give us interpretations which are out of the ordinary point of view. They open ways which, sometimes at least, may be obscure; they constitute, nonetheless, (good) food for thought as regards our research and remind us that there can be no expertise when coming to analyze the thought of Heraclitus. The only thing that could be done is to respect the context, the etymological roots and the use of the words in the fragments endeavouring to see whether there is a secure trail to follow, a trail leading to a more profound understanding of the fragments. Thus, even though Heidegger's commentaries are not to be taken as a crystal clear path leading to a mistakeless understanding of Heraclitus, they, nevertheless, thanks to the deep knowledge of the Hellenic language by the German philosopher, aid us to meditate on Heraclitus' thought through a more penetrating insight which, even though, at first, seems to be vague, always guides to a fitting interpretation.

I.II The distinction between ἄριστοι and πολλοί as an introduction to the potential of the human being and to the idea of Πόλεμος

To start our research with a comparison between ἄριστοι and πολλοί in the thought of Heraclitus derives from our intention to set forth an image of the human being as the bearer of the possibility of fulfilment of his own possibilities. More specifically: the relation that the human being develops in the perspective of his own death and sacrifice, the human being as immersed in the battlefield of military struggle, a struggle which fully represents one of the most violent manifestations of Πόλεμος and, finally, the relation of the human being with Λόγος, a relation of decisive importance as we will see in later chapters.

All the above characteristics will pave the way for our better understanding of what the human being is able to do when realizing his potential and the matrix of his

almost endless possibilities. However, our goal is not to set forth a political point of view deduced from the distinction made by Heraclitus³. Our approach is a philosophical and ontological one, fundamentally based on our anxiety to comprehend what the human being is able to do when caught in the whirlwind of war. Since Πόλεμος and many of its expressions in our life, are so significant for our research, we will take Heraclitus thought as a philosophical compass to orientate us towards what can be sought for by the human being. We are not planning to present a society of ἄριστοι where the few will impose their “enlightened” ideas on the masses which are unable to grasp the “Reason” that rules everything; on the contrary, through the analysis of the ἄριστοι, we will show what each human being is capable of doing and becoming. We are not interested in the numbers, but in the potentiality of what each single person can fruitfully potentialize. This approach will be the first step, a step whose consequence and interest will be made much more diaphanous in the next chapter where human being's essence as δεινότατον, will be brought forth through the thought of Sophocles and the analysis of Martin Heidegger.

We don't believe that by the moment we write this research, everyone would perceive himself as the bearer of the potentialities of δεινότατον. It can also be said that, probably, such a concept as taken by Sophocles is no longer able to tackle the modern problems the society is facing. We are, however, more than willing to take our chances by adopting this definition because we don't believe that the essence of human being is changing. His behaviour, the way he expresses himself and his reactions towards the world are of course differentiated. All this change, anyhow, should not be seen as a transfiguration of his essence, but as a ceaseless effort to remain rooted in a world where, everyday, there is progressively less fertile ground for seeds of authenticity and primordiality.

³ For a brief summary of the political fragments of Heraclitus see: Rohatyn, D. (1973). Heraclitus: Some Remarks on the Political Fragments. *The Classical Journal*, 68(3), 271-273.

I.III Analysis of the relevant fragments of Heraclitus(Marcovich): 103,23,2,104,98,105

Having seen the way we are going to proceed we can now see the relevant fragments of the Ephesian philosopher:

Fr. 103 (44 DK)

“μάχεσθαι χρή τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ γε τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος”

“The people must fight for their city law as though for their city wall”

As it has already been mentioned, our main concern with regard to this chapter is how to adequately project the political thought, or better said, our political interpretation of some of the fragments of Heraclitus. Our starting point in this fragment is a really important idea, the idea of Νόμος (Nomos). The Νόμος is to be protected like the city walls. This fragment brings in our mind the answer of Lycurgus when asked why Sparta didn't have any walls: “Οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀτείχιστος πόλις ἄτις ἄνδρεςσι, καὶ οὐ πλίνθοις ἐστεφάνωται⁴”, which means that a city is fortified by its men and not by its defensive walls. So, in the case of the fragment under analysis we see the importance of the Νόμος in Πόλις. Another fragment too is precious in clearly putting forward the importance of Νόμος.

Fr. 23 (114;2 DK)

“ξὺν νόφῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρή τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. Τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκέει πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. διὸ δεῖ ἔπεσθαι τῷ (ξυνῶ, τουτέστι) τῷ κοινῷ· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός· τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.”

⁴ Plutarchus, *Lycurgus*, 19.4

“Those who will speak with [i.e act] with sense must rely on what is common to all as a city relies on its law, and much more firmly: for all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it extends its powers as far as it will and is sufficient for all [human laws] and still is left over. Therefore, one ought to follow what is common. But although the Logos is common the many live as if they had a religious wisdom of their own.”

What we can perceive now from the content of these two fragments is that human Νόμος is not to be interpreted like many others decreed just for effectively ministering practical needs of a society. On the contrary, it is nourished by the Divine law -endowed with the high duty of accomplishing the transcendence of the Divine law into human society⁵. Therefore it can play a crucial role both in Πόλις' governing and well being. The Divine law is at an unreachable level, surpassing the matrix of humanity. This difference between the Divine and the Human will be shown in many fragments later on. Coming back to our analysis, now we look at the rising of Νόμος as the continuity of Πόλις, as the non phenomenal aspect of the city walls. The walls are the phenomenal aspects, physical and material· the protection, we could say, of Πόλις from its external enemies. Νόμος, however, is providing something that the walls cannot. Νόμος is the inner limitation of the citizens. It sets the bounds which cannot be trespassed by the citizens of Πόλις. With the purpose of further clarifying the Heraclitus' thought, it would be helpful to present the Heideggerian analysis of Δικη, Justice.

In our mind, laws and Justice are connected. Justice is the abstract institution-idea, in accordance with the thinking of our days, which has been long struggling against bureaucratic mechanisms and procedures. People always want Justice: Social Justice, Justice in the economy, Political Justice, a just society, a just world. Everything must be just. It's a pity though that we usually adjust our idea of just. We all want justice, although it remains questionable what we all understand when we ask for Justice. Justice is blind, they say, and unfortunately many of us

⁵ For a brief analysis of Νόμος In Heraclitus see also: Kahn, C. (1964). A New Look at Heraclitus. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1(3), 189-203.

Fr. 2 (34 DK)

“ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκόασι

“People who remain uncomprehending (even) when they have heard [sc. the teaching of the Logos] are like deaf”

So Justice is blind and many of us are deaf. It seems that Post Modernity has finally reached its peak. Even though the subject concerning Justice seems to be really interesting it is not our goal to dive deeply into its hidden or concealed essence. What we will do though is to show the way Heidegger analyzes Justice/Δίκη. This contribution of the great German Hellenically thinking philosopher will help us make more understandable some concepts and ideas of the fragments.

Thus, according to Heidegger Δίκη is to be translated as fittingness (Heidegger, 2014a). Δίκη, following the approach of Heidegger, is το δεινόν, as an overwhelming violent sway which collects everything in the world. We could say that it represents the order in the world, an ontological order, which sets the confines of the beings in the world, the limitation of the violence-acting of human beings, and not only, in their journey of unconcealing, of bringing forth the Being of the beings. Thus, Δίκη, arises as an enclosing ontical and ontological limitation, setting the “battleground” in which the violence-acting of beings is to energize. Seen in the perspective of this interpretation, the meaning of the above mentioned fragments, could, now, be better understood.

In accordance with the interpretation given to Δίκη as fittingness, we can shed more light on the primordially of the Νόμος in Πόλις. Just like a river overflows when its banks can no longer control and limit the flow of the water, the same happens in Πόλις when Νόμος is not respected. Νόμος, in the thought of Heraclitus, in contrast with some contemporary theories which mostly emphasize its repressive character, is the rhythm, in its Aeschylusian meaning, “ ἀλλὰ νηλεῶς ᾧδ’ ἐρρόθμισμαι⁶”. In this case rhythm has the meaning of enchained. In a similar way, but in a different context, we should understand the relation between Νόμος and Πόλις. Νόμος may be considered

⁶ Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 242-243

as that continuity of the chains which circumscribes the acting, and the way of being of the citizens. But chains can either be repressive, as in the case of the punishment of Prometheus, or offer salvation just like in the case of a climber in the mountains. Most of the aspects of our life may be twofold, as we can see in many of the Heraclitean fragments. That's why we should try to avoid a partial contemporary interpretation which might find the ideas of Heraclitus oppressive and obscure.

From what we have seen so far we can assume that the importance of the Νόμος in Πόλις lies in the fact that it is a non phenomenal wall "fitting" the actions of the citizens in the broader order of Δίκη. In addition, Νόμος is granted its importance by the fact that it is nourished by a higher Divine law. Let us here make clear once again that the Divine law is not the human Νόμος "for it extends its powers as far as its will and is sufficient for all [human laws] and still is left over". The question arising now is whether, always according to Heraclitus, we could find or not an example of Νόμος in Πόλις. We find it in the Fragment 104:

Fr. 104 (33 DK)

"νόμος καὶ βουλῆι πείθεσθαι ενός"

"It is law, too, to obey the will of the one"

In this fragment we see the rising of the One and his relation with Νόμος. Law, as well to obey the will of the one. Surely, this seems a bit contradictory and even provocative to the political correctness of contemporary political ideas, but, once again it has to be said that Heraclitus, all the Pre-Socratic philosophers alike is not familiar with a fragmented reality where each domain of our life is separable from the others. For Pre-Socratic philosophers everything was an organic unity, whereas, today, our way of thinking and living resembles much more a mechanistic approach according to which, each part of the machine fulfills its part, isolated and many times breathlessly. Hence, in the thought of Heraclitus, politics, laws, religion and the entire world are not shattered and isolated domains of everyday life. On the contrary, Λόγος is unifying

and everything is included in the eternal gathering of Λόγος as we will see later on. Thus, having read the fragment, one could possibly ask why should law follow the will of the one? Isn't democracy "καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται"? If this is democracy, then why is the One so important?

Fr. 98 (49 DK)

“Εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾖ”

“One man is as ten thousand for me, if he be the best”

Against the current quantitative foolishness of our neoliberal era, Heraclitus plunged deeply into the essence of the political Being. One can be ten thousands if he is ἀριστος. Here we have one of the most semantic distinctions in the political thinking of Heraclitus: The rising of ἀριστος against the masses, “the many”. Quality is shining and bringing into light the superficiality of the world of the masses. The fact that Heraclitus was not that confident or trustful concerning the potential of the masses, can also be seen in Fragment 105:

Fr. 105 (121 DK)

“ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἠβηδὸν ἀπάγξασθαι πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἐρμόδωρον ἄνδρα ἐωυτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον φάντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήιστος ἔστω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων⁸”.

“The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to unfledged boys; for they have banished Ermodorus, the most useful

⁷ Thucydides, *Historicus*, 2.37.1

⁸ Quoting Marcovich: The saying is void of any philosophical meaning, but is a masterpiece as evidence of Heraclitus' political standpoint

(or ablest) man among them saying: “Let no one of us be MOST useful [i.e let no one of us excel the rest]; otherwise, (or if he does), be it elsewhere and among others”.

Without having to enter into details as regards Ermodorus, in this chapter we can see crystal clear the political beliefs of Heraclitus and his attitude towards the many and the masses. From the one side we have τους ἀρίστους and from the other the masses, the many. After reading into those fragments one could probably ask two very logical questions:

A. Why is the one, or οι ἄριστοι so important?

B. Why are the masses or the many bad?

The answers to these questions will open the way for a thorough examination of the political ideas and beliefs of Heraclitus and will also guide us to one, according to our opinion, of the core subjects of the philosophy of Heraclitus, which is War. As to these two questions, let us begin by the second one. Instead of showing and highlighting the defects of the masses it would be much easier to detect the importance of the few. First we will try to shed light on the darkness of the political ignorance of the masses so as to trace much more safely the brilliance of the Political and Philosophical Aristocracy.

Fr. 101 (39 DK)

“τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δῆμων ἀοιδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρείωνται
ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι “οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί”

“What intelligence or (at least) what mind have they? They put their trust in (wandering) country-bards (or folk-teachers) and take the mob for their teacher, knowing not that “most men are bad, and (only) few are good”

I.IV The ἄριστοι against the masses (Correlated fragments: 109,22)

In this fragment we can easily trace the rising of the distinction between the many and the few. Concerning ἀντῶν we stick to the interpretation of Marcovich who is translating it as “the leading statesmen or authorities of Ephesus”⁹ So those “leaders” take the mob, the masses as their leader and they trust wandering αἰδοί. We can deduce from this fragment that the opinion of the masses is an unstable one, an untrustworthy one which is misguided by the country-bards. Following this deduction we could arrive at the conclusion that their leaders trust them as well as their misguidance and embrace their ideas and beliefs. Thus, if we restrict the fragment in the political context of Ephesus, we see some leaders who are let to be misguided by masses who are misguided by folk-teachers. In this labyrinth of political dead ends people do not know that “most men are bad and few are good”. It’s clear that Heraclitus is harshly criticizing the mass society and his criticism rings like a warning bell in our era, as well.

The mass society is not a unique phenomenon of the epoch of Heraclitus. Even though today we don’t have αἰδοί, it’s more than certain that we have other means, even institutions which are more than willing to play the role of our guides. One of the main critical comments concerning politics is that either politicians trick us and many times misguide us, or Mass Media manipulate our crystal clear thoughts and lead us to wrong conclusions. It seems that the contemporary citizen is the one who is always the victim of the dark forces of manipulation. Despite his persistent criticism of the Media he is always there to watch or hear them, believe them, most of the times get misguided and then accuse them.

In our days is apparent that people are trying to unburden their shoulders of the responsibility for the political results in their countries. Thus, we most often hear

⁹ Fr. 101 M

people complaining about corruption of governments' politicians, but afterwards we usually see the same people voting in favor of those whom previously were blaming or the same political parties being winners in the elections. The question then is very simple: which is the relation between people and the governments? What we can observe in modern parliamentary society is that casting a vote means simultaneously for each one of us to expect in exchange everything from the party, which, came out victorious in the elections. If everything goes fine we are happy and proud of our decisions, if not, we tend to stay away from the political consequences of our vote and we sometimes excuse ourselves by proclaiming that one vote does not have the power to change anything(sic).

In all the above mentioned there is no intention of our proceeding to a moral critique of people's political culture, opinions and behaviour. We are convinced that especially now, during the crisis we are met with, there is an abundance of moral and ethical critiques speaking about fatal errors and attitudes that have driven us here. How important would it be if these theories could transform into conscious action and change of attitude. So our main goal is to try to enter into the scope and the point of view of the Ephesian philosopher and show that even though thousands of years have passed his thought has not been taken over by modern theories or whatsoever. How could that be possible, since Heraclitus, as all the Pre-Socratics alike, unconceals the organic whole and the inner continuity of the human nature while contemporary philosophy and science are fragmenting the already fragmented knowledge of the human essence and nature?

Going back to our analysis of the fragment we see that the masses, and their leaders, are not to be trusted due to their lack of clarity in their opinions and beliefs. As a confirmation of what has already been stated above we present here another fragment of Heraclitus concerning the attitude of the masses:

Fr. 109 (87 DK)

“βλάξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ”

“A stupid man is wont to get astounded at every (new) word (or teaching) that is said.”

In this fragment we see the reaction of a “stupid man”-one of the πολλοί, according to Marcovich- towards things that are new to them or that they do not know. In this case, following Marcovich, we could assume that people are reluctant to hear or try to understand the teachings of Heraclitus. Thus, while on the one hand we see people following and accepting the ideas and the sayings of αοιδοί, of folk-singers, on the other hand these same people do not accept the teachings of the philosopher.

Fr. 22 (97 DK)

“κύνες γὰρ καταβαῦζουσιν ὧν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι”

“Dogs only (and not men) are accustomed to bark at everyone they do not know.”

Those two fragments as compared with the fragment 101 reveal to us one really basic distinction between the teachings of Heraclitus and the “teachings” of αοιδοί. What we can understand is that people prefer to hear things the way it pleases them to know, which they believe as an affirmation of the ideas they already have. Thus, the Ephesian politicians, are following them and accept the mob as their leader. Quite the opposite happens with the teachings of Heraclitus. Heraclitus, and the few, as we are going to see later on, does not endeavor to take the citizens by his side. His goal is not to manipulate their thoughts, or glorify their way of thinking. His teachings are radical, ground breaking, non-conforming with the ideas of his compatriots, who react like dogs when they see a stranger. We could remark here that the masses seek for the affirmation of their own ideas in their being recognized by the other. They feel safe only when they hear things the way they want to hear them. It’s difficult for them to

accept something radically different from what they already know. Politicians in their turn try to explain to the masses not what is true but what the latter would like to believe as true. The modern politics also needs the masses to remain what and as they are with the purpose of assuring its “eternal return”. If, just like Heraclitus did, politicians had the courage to educate the masses by making them understand that they have to think as people, each one for his own account, both as a person and as a unique entity, but not behind the veil of the massive ignorance, then the results could be to the detriment of the politicians. Masses think massively and people think as people. Mass is an invention, while each person is a bearer of Being; we, nevertheless, often close our eyes in the search of our essence and most of the times we search the artificial protection of the mass. The mass is the region where a man becomes a barking dog and the politician his desperate shepherd.

I.V Fragments 111 and 15; the approaching to Λόγος

In order though to better understand the way the mass works, it would be helpful to go back to the fragment 23 and highlight the part: “τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνουῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν”. An appearance of the idea of the individual could be deduced from this part. People, even though their essence, Λόγος, is the same, they all act as if they had a wisdom of their own. But this does not happen when they are guided by the folk-singers. This is a really interesting point differentiating the masses from the few. The mass is constituted by a sum of individuals. Each individual has his own point of view, his own wisdom, which he shares with other different views and ideas in the mass. While he does that, though, he is not aware of what is really common between him and the others, namely Λόγος. Speaking metaphorically we could say that most of the people consider progress horizontally, as an expansion in quantity, as a sum of more and more individuals who are every time incessantly misguided by those exploiting their blindness. People prefer to do that instead of following the hardest track, the footpath which leads to Λόγος. The vertical diving into what is most common and familiar to all of us, into Λόγος.

The fact, however, that Λόγος is common to all of us does not mean that it is easy to find out it or that it's a way accessible to all. On the contrary, as we are going to see in the following fragments the reaching of Λόγος can be considered as one basic distinction between ἄριστοι και πολλοί. Furthermore, what is common to all of us demands a personal sacrifice or full dedication to our inner searching, whilst the recognition of other individuals into the impersonal schema of the masses is not required. If Λόγος is to be found it's going to unconceal itself during our approaching it and won't become a simple abstract moral value imposed upon people and governments as if it were a moralistic exhibition show.

Fr. 111 (122 DK)

“ἄγχιβασίην”

“Coming near to (or Approaching)”

This is a fragment whose interpretation has begotten a lot of problems and either there is just an effort of a strictly etymologically interpretation or a citing as a dubious fragment with no other analysis (ex. Kahn).

Our approach will be different since we will try to reach its depth; in case we fall short of our goal, anyhow it will be pleasant to the eyes and the thought to have other philosophers proving us to be wrong in taking seriously the matter of this fragment's interpretation.

Thus, ἄγχιβασίην is divided into two parts

Ἄγχι and βασίην

Ἄγχι may have as its etymology:

The verb ἄγχω which means hang, (latin ango, german angst)

The verb ἄγχιστεύω: to be close or to have a close familial relationship, from which comes the noun ἄγχιστεία,

The adverb ἄγχι which means close to.

The βασίην comes from the verb βαίνω, walk to, head towards

As we have seen above the translation given by Marcovich is :

“Coming near to (or Approaching)”

We believe that this translation is giving us a correct sign concerning the direction we have to follow in order to analyze this fragment. Hence, there is an approaching but where are we approaching? Following the etymological analysis made before we have to approach the bonding of a familial relationship. But with whom? If we take into account the only thing that is common between all of us, then we could deduce that our approaching is stepping towards the forging of bonds with Λόγος. Since Λόγος is common, then by doing so we bond a familial relationship with the rest of our compatriots. In comparison with the individual approach developed in the masses, which serves as a hiding in seek of protection in the mass, the attitude proposed by Heraclitus is ἀγχιβασίην, the always getting nearer to what is familial to us, the effort and the struggle, as we will see later on, to unconceal the primordial core of our own being which is Λόγος. But as we can easily understand from the etymology of the word, this approaching, this unconcealment won't be easy. This approaching, this doing violence of the human being in Φύσις so as to find his essence¹⁰ either leads to the unconcealment of his being by the confirmation of his correct oriented doing-violence or to the defeat as expressed in the άγχος of life, in the existential anxiety of the unaccomplished approaching.

Summarizing we could say that the individuals, the mass needing people are not willing to set off for this approaching because they believe that the mass society, the Pantheon of the individualistic expression, is granting them reasons and will to live. It's offering a life through the other, through the necessity of the confirmation and recognition of one's way of life from the other, even though he has not firstly found himself. There is no dialectic in the masses, only a misleading monologue of an uncritical acceptance of the alienation of what is most familial to us, Λόγος. The personal journey is postponed because of the discovery of the illusion of completeness in the mass, even though this mass, as we have already seen, is more than eager to get (mis) guided according to the willing of those exploiting and manipulating it.

¹⁰ We will analyze it more thoroughly in the chapters of Πόλεμος and Φύσις

Fr. 15 (101 DK)

“Ἐδιζήσάμην ἐμῶτον”

“ I asked myself”

In this fragment as well we can find traces of controversy. Marcovich is translating as “ I asked myself” with the comment that Heraclitus' meaning is that he would only ask himself and not anyone else when it comes to Λόγος. According to most of the researchers (Kirk, Raven, Sleiermacher, Gigon) the meaning of this fragment would rather be something like “ I searched for myself” “I sought myself”. In pursuing the efforts to clarify a bit the understanding of the fragment we will focus on analyzing the meaning of Ἐδιζήσάμην. According to the dictionary of Liddell- Scott:

δίζημαι, Hdt.7.103, Anacr.4, Theoc.16.68: 2sg. δίζηαι Od.11.100: 3pl. δίζηνται B.1.67, once in Trag., A.Supp.821 (lyr.); part. διζήμενος Od.16.391, al., Hdt.7.142, al.: impf. ἐδίζητο Id.3.41, Phoen.1.4: fut. διζήσομαι Od.16.239, Lyc.682; 2sg. διζήσῃ P arm. 8.6: aor. ἐδιζήσάμην Heraclit.101. (Ep., Ion., Lyr., = Att. ζητέω (which occurs only once in Hom.); cf. δίζω II):—*seek out, look for among many, Πάνδαρον . . διζημένη εἶ που ἐφεύροι* Il.4.88, cf. 5.168, Anacr.4; *ἐδιζήσάμην ἐμῶτον* Heraclit. l. c.

II. *seek for*, ἢ καὶ διζησόμεθ' ἄλλους Od.16.239; νόστον δίζηαι; 11.100; νόστον ἑταίροισιν διζήμενος ἢδ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῶ *devising means for a return*, 23.253; μνάσθω ἔδνοισιν διζήμενος *seeking to win her by gifts*, 16.391; γύην . . κατ' ὄρος δ. ἢ κατ' ἄρουραν Hes.Op.428; δ. τὸ μαντήιον *to seek out, seek the meaning of*; Hdt.7.142; ἀγγέλους δ. εἰ . . *to inquire of them whether . .*, Id.4.151; δ. ἐπ' ᾧ ἂν . . Id.3.41; ὅτινι . . Theoc.16.68; abs., Democr.108.

III. c. inf., *seek, desire to do*, πλέον δ. ἔχειν Hdt.2.147, cf. A.l.c., B.l.c., and later Ep., Tryph.525, etc.: c. acc. et inf., *demand, require that . .*, σὲ δ. εἴκοσι εἶναι ἀντάξιον Hdt.7.103. (Perh. redupl. fr. root of ζητέω.)

We see that each one of the researchers of Heraclitus made his own choice for translating terms used by Heraclitus following the different possible meanings. In our

approach we would rather prefer to relate this fragment to the one analyzed above in order to show that the translation of “I seek myself” fits well into our interpretation¹¹.

If you seek something it means that you know, or you believe that there is something to be found. Several times we get lost in the way or we give up believing that we are seeking chimeras or missed causes. It may be the case, but this does not exclude the possibility that there is still something to be sought for. Probably during our breakthrough in the world we risk not to find it or to lose our way. But that’s the only way we can go on. Once out of the track, we know that there is a track. That’s why this fragment could be interpreted as the effort of the human being to unconceal things he knows about that are hidden, misconceived or even ignored. And this seeking leads us, as always in the thought of the Ephesian philosopher, to Λόγος.

We have seen before that there is an approaching towards Λόγος, an approaching which is crucial but which may end up in existential and essential dead-end. The individual, as strictly individual but not as a person- which is the quintessence of our Being- is not aware of the importance of this approaching and seeks for protection and relief in the masses. On the contrary, Heraclitus, is proposing the seeking of oneself, the diving into the progressive unconcealment of our own self. Just like when the Sun “dives” into the sea in the sunset shedding light on the sea, the same goes for the process of Heraclitus. Since Λόγος is common to all it seems sensible that by tracing it inside us we will then be able to recognize it and the rest of the compatriots as well.

Today many people believe that we have to be openminded, to expand our view into other countries’ cultures, to visit these countries, see their customs and traditions and by travelling become aware that finally we are all the same just living in different ways. It’s such a pity to know that people who don’t have the money to travel will always believe that in other countries live different uncomprehended entities. If only by moving to different countries and studying their own cultures we are able to find out which the essence of our Being is, then it seems as if we have restrained our approaching into a tourist office. Different cultures are different ways of expressing the

¹¹ For an interpretation of this fragment seen in terms of “self-transcendence” see: Long, A. (1992). FINDING ONESELF IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY. *Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie*, 54(2), 255-279.

way we live, different expressions of our Being. But our Being is still the same even if it's expressed in different cultural and social aspects. That may be the point of the fragment of Heraclitus. Λόγος is already inside us and by trying to externalize it, making it a possible object of our cultural and social perception then we are losing the quintessence of the meaning of Λόγος which lies exclusively inside us.

I.VI The superiority of the ἄριστοι to the many (Correlated fragments: 95,99,106,97)

The reason why we have to analyze those two fragments is that, in our opinion, they are highlighting one main difference between the few and the many, ἄριστοι και πολλοί. The few are not letting themselves get misguided by the masses because what they consider as the most important, that which is essential for them has to be found in their inner nature, in their own approaching towards that which is common to all. On the other hand inside the mass, individuals are willingly finding the reassurance of their existence in the affirmation from the other, avoiding the seeking of themselves. The sum of individuals is leading into the creation of the mass since there can be no merging of their wills, as Rousseau imagined in the General Will. There can be no merging because the individual won't immolate what goes against his interest for the sake of something more elevated. If everything is superficial, limited into a simple materialistic approach then the idea of sacrifice cannot have any value. Sacrifice and true offering can only take place if there is something higher at stake, something which though being common to all of us, as we are going to see in the next chapter, only οι ἄριστοι are willing to fight for it unconditionally. In order to be able to sacrifice ourselves we must find a noble cause worthy of such sacrifice. The modern and ancient individual cannot rationally accept this because the sacrifice itself breaks the limited boundaries of the utilitarian approach of merely pure exchanges.

In the last part we dealt with the attitude of the individuals in the masses and the reason why Heraclitus harshly criticized them. During this process we have seen

the rising of a special kind of aristocracy not necessarily limited in the political context but entering into philosophical and moral fields. This aristocracy compared with the masses presents some elements, as we are going to see in this part, which place the ἄριστοι not only above the individualized mass but at the same time into a special relation with what is common to all, namely Λόγος.

Fr. 95 (29 DK)

“αἰρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντι ἀπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
κεκόρηται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα”

“The best choose one thing in place of all others: everlasting glory in place of mortal things; while the majority(or the multitude) are gluttoned (or stuff themselves) like cattle”

In order to more accurately explain the fragment it would be useful to provide the translation given by Martin Heidegger:

“For the noblest choose one thing above all others: glory, which constantly persists, in contrast to what dies; but the many are sated like cattle”

(Heidegger, 2014a, p. 113)

For a better understanding of the meaning of κλέος in this fragment we could see the other word having the same meaning, which is Δόξα. According to Heidegger, Δόξα has two meanings:

“Doxa means aspect, namely, the respect in which one stands. If the aspect, corresponding to what emerges in it, is an eminent one, then doxa means brilliance and glory.”

(ibid. p. 112-113)

“We construct an opinion for ourselves about it. Thus, it can happen that the view that we adopt has no support in the thing itself. It is then a mere view, an assumption. We assume a thing to be thus or thus. Then we are only opining. To assume or accept, in

Greek, is δεχέσθαι. [Accepting remains related to the offer of appearing] Δόξα, as what is assumed to be thus or thus, is opinion.”

(ibid. p. 114)

“What is experienced here mainly in terms of vision and the visage, the respect in which someone stands, is grasped more in terms of hearing and callin<Rufen> by the other word for glory: kleos”

(ibid. p. 113)

We have presented those passages so as to make more lucid the notion of Glory in the thought of Heraclitus. Thus, οἱ ἄριστοι, choose the everlasting glory, because they differ from the masses by the fact that they are able to trace and perceive the true nature of the things, the way things really are- probably in reference to Λόγος. They choose, as we have seen before that which constantly persists and not that which dies. If we try to see this fragment through the scope of the analysis of Heidegger we could say that mere opinions, mere ideas about the nature of the things are not going to last long since they simply constitute a wrong projection of our personal beliefs about the world: a weak and useless violence-doing in the world, unable to change it and understand it. Masses have opinions which may be misguided by the folk-singers as we saw before, but ἄριστοι, on the contrary, perceive things in the brilliance of their everlasting glory since they do not impose to the reality their own thinking or point of view but they let things be brought into light, making thus accessible to us, the rising and standing of the nature (Φύσις). So we have the clear distinction between ἄριστοι και κτήνη, the best and the cattle.

A question rising here after the analysis made is what could then this everlasting glory be. What does it make τοὺς ἀρίστους so special, so different from the masses?

Fr. 99 (20 DK)

“γενόμενοι ζῶειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ’ ἔχειν (μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι) καὶ παῖδας
καταλείπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι”

“Once born, they [the multitude] wish to live and to meet their dooms; and they leave
children behind them so that (new) dooms become.”

According to Marcovich, in his analysis of the fragment, “the many choose the mundane life filled with pleasures, which means only death and loss of immortality”. This is the life of the many. A simple repetition of everyday life, a very limited spatiotemporally speaking idea of life and a clear perception of life as what takes place in the ordinary passing of the day. Immortality and everlasting glory have no place in the life of the many. On the contrary οἱ ἄριστοι don’t see life as if they were enclosed in it but strive for the clear sight of the everlasting glory. Their concern is not the reproduction of the social norms and the everydayness of the many, but they seek something different, that which really is and that which is truly the φαίνεσθαι of the Being. Φαίνεσθαι not as the pure seeming created by mere opinions and projected onto the beings as if it were a decisive and enclosing label. On the contrary, φαίνεσθαι as the pure perception of what really is and of its way of presenting itself to us in its full glory, in its Δόξα.

In addition to the afore mentioned fragment we could say that this materialistic approach of the society Heraclitus presented above- which is strikingly similar with what do portray many “developed” societies in our era- could be resumed in the following fragment:

Fr. 106 (125a DK)

“μὴ ἐπιλίποι ὑμᾶς πλοῦτος, Ἐφέσιοι, ἵν’ ἐξελέγχοισθε πονηρευόμενοι.”

“May wealth never fail you, men of Ephesus, so that you can be (manifestly) proved of
being wicked.”

In this criticism towards his compatriots, we could deduce that Heraclitus is turning against a way of life dominated by the social norms of a materialistic approach whose only concern is the glorification of money and wealthy, in material, life. According to this fragment, people that have a lot of material wealth won't stop being who they really are. There are no pretexts since there is no need for them. They already have everything they want and this is the way that they are leading their life. Seen in this scope what Lycurgus did in Sparta -where the coins were heavy and big, preventing thus people from carrying them and collecting them- is really intelligent. Wealth seen in this perspective would be more a burden than a treasure. Thus, Heraclitus, in this fragment probably means what Marcovich explains: "The higher in wealth men stay, the lower in ἡθος they fall". What Marcovich very intelligently states here is that when wealth becomes a goal of life and people start gathering more and more, they get attached to life via materialistic bonds. Their fear is not connected with the loss of the meaning of life and their living in mere opinions but it rather lies in the idea of eventually losing what they have gathered. Life has become their wealth. Their only concern is how to stay attached to the material they have gathered so far. The individual thus comes to be a rich individual more and more attached to what he starts to consider as the essence of his life. How then could those people sacrifice all they have so as to reach the eternal glory of ἄριστοι? How are those people going to face death when their time comes?

Since Heraclitus is criticizing in this case the way masses live and die, this means that he probably holds the view that ἄριστοι live and die in a different way. Other reasons motivate their actions and thought. Death rises as an element of primary importance for the moral evaluation of peoples' lives and paves the way for our preparation for the idea of loss in the military struggle of Πόλεμος¹².

It is in this scope that we should understand the following fragment:

¹² For a different approach concerning death in the war and its impact on the soul see: Kirk, G. (1949). Heraclitus and Death in Battle (FR. 24D). *The American Journal of Philology*, 70(4), 384-393; for a different interesting point of view comparing the "foolish"(the many) and death see: Granger, H. (2000). Death's Other Kingdom: Heraclitus on the Life of the Foolish and the Wise. *Classical Philology*, 95(3), 260-281.

Fr. 97 (25 DK)

“μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι”

“Greater deaths greater portions (lots)”

We do understand, thus, that for Heraclitus there are deaths which are of greater significance than others. Death, loss and sacrifice in war, in the military aspect of Πόλεμος, are a matter of essential importance which will be further developed in following chapters. Nevertheless, this chapter concerning ἄριστοι, as we have already said in the beginning, is the first substantial step, a step which will open the way for a thorough analysis of the human being in Πόλεμος; of his own inner and outer struggle, as we will start seeing in the next chapter. In this upcoming presentation, the way Heraclitus thinks of the ἄριστοι is going to be really determinant for the needs of our research since it will bring into light the map of the infinite possibilities of the human being, especially in the most violent release of his will, during the ontic violent expression of Πόλεμος, namely in war.

II. HUMAN BEING AS ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ: THE SOPHOCLEAN APPROACH AS VIEWED BY HEIDEGGER

II.I Human being as δεινόν in the Choral Ode of Antigone; definitions and interpretations

In this chapter we will endeavour to bring into focus-to the extent we can, of course- what we conceive, under the original greek term ἄνθρωπος (anthropos), of human being's very essence, described by Sophocles as δεινόν (deinon) in Antigone's famous choral ode

“πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἄνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει¹³”

The reason for choosing this description/definition of ἄνθρωπος as δεινόν (or vice versa) is that it reveals the quintessence of the human being as a violent-acting creator whose quest for the innermost homeliness never lets him put a stop to his interminable pursuit of both creating and destroying, finding out and losing, hoping and despairing.

Ἄνθρωπος, thus, in his historicity, proves to be at the same time, creator/demiurge and demolisher of paths. Even though his capacities are numberless, ἄνθρωπος always finds ways and means to limit his own self to the dead ends he himself has already machinated in this perpetual search in the hearth of his essence-a place he would call ἐστία.

During the above mentioned pursuit ἄνθρωπος, willingly or not is changing

¹³ Sophocles, *Antigone*, 332-333

the world in the attempt to make the latter (world) meet his demands even when affronting the risk of an unavoidably upcoming absolute loss and fragmentation.

The chapter starts off with varying versions of definitions/translations-from the greek original text of the word δεινόν. This process would further enable us to more safely identify the proper pathway leading to the essence and to some, at least, of δεινόν's cardinal characteristics. Our preference for the specific definition of άνθρωπος as δεινόν, deprived of any intent to underestimate the importance of other definitions, has mainly to do with our Heraclitean approach towards humanity. As previously said, άνθρωπος, is a violent acting, being always in interaction with his environment and desirous of going forward in the search of his own essence no matter the obstacles to be overcome.

In this schema, the ideas of Πόλεμος (Polemos), Δίκη (Dike) and Λόγος (Logos) reach up to the apogee of their significance, since they can shed light on the human nature and his endless struggle for his self recognition and his attaining, as close as possible, what he could call home.

Our perception of the human being as δεινόν, will initially be based on the thought of Martin Heidegger, since his ontological analysis of Antigone has elucidated our understanding of the human being in his ceaseless quest of finding out himself through his own continuous auto-repelling¹⁴. Before proceeding, though, to a more elaborated analysis of άνθρωπος' definition as δεινόν, it might be useful to add, at this point, some other versions-perceptions in translating the term δεινόν, as given by Liddell-Scott in their lexicon:

δεινός, ή, όν, (δέος, cf. Pl.La.198b) *fearful, terrible*; in Hom., of persons and things, Χάρυβδις Od.12.260; κλαγγή Il.1.49; όπλα 10.254: freq. in neut., δεινόν άύσαι 11.10; βροντάν 20.56; δεινόν δέρεσθαι 3.342; παπταίνειν Od.11.608; δεινά δ' ύπόδρα ιδών Il. 15.13; δ. ιδέσθαι *fearful* to behold, Od.22.405; δ. μέν όράν, δ. δέ

¹⁴ Even though preference is given to the interpretation made by Heidegger, there are other different interesting approaches of the Choral Ode of Sophocles: Crane, G. (1989). Creon and the "Ode to Man" in Sophocles' Antigone. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 92, 103-116, Staley, G. (1985). The Literary Ancestry of Sophocles' "Ode to Man" *The Classical World*, 78(6), 561-570, Segal, C. (1964). Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the "Antigone" *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, 3(2), 46-66.

κλύειν S.OC141; εἰ καὶ δεινὸν τῷ ἀκοῦσαι Th.1.122; δεινὴ παρὰ τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἢ βάσανος And.1.30; in milder sense, *awful*, δεινὴ τε καὶ αἰδοίη θεός Il.18.394, cf. 3.172, Od.8.22, etc.; τὸ δεινὸν *danger, suffering, horror*, A.Ch.634, etc.; *awe, terror*, Id.Eu.517; ὅπου τὸ δ. ἐλπίς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ S.Fr.196; πρὸς τὸ δ. ἔρχεσθαι ib.351: in pl., ἐκτὸς ὄντα πημάτων τὰ δειν' ὄρᾶν Id.Ph.504; εἰ δειν' ἔδρασας, δεινὰ καὶ παθεῖν σε δεῖ Id.Fr.962, etc.; δεινὸν γίγνεται μὴ . . there is *danger* that . ., Hdt.7.157; οὐδὲν δεινοὶ ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσιν *no fear of their revolting*, Id.1.155, etc.; δεινότατον μὴ . . the *greatest danger* lest . ., And.3.1; δεινὸν ἔστι, c. inf., it is *dangerous* to do, Lys.12.87; δεινὸν ποιῆσθαι *take ill, complain of, be indignant at* a thing: abs., Th.1.102, etc.: c. inf., ὑπὸ Μήδων ἄρχεσθαι Hdt.1.127, etc.; also δεινὰ ποιεῖν *make complaints*, Id.3.14,5.41; ἐν δεινῷ τίθεσθαι J.AJ18.9.8; δεινὸν τι ἔσχε αὐτὸν ἀτιμάζεσθαι Hdt.1.61; δεινὸν οἱ δεινὰ παθεῖν *suffer illegal, arbitrary treatment*, Ar.Ra.252, cf. Pl.Prt.317b, etc.; δεινότερα π. Th.3.13; τὸ δ. τὸ πείσομαι Hdt.7.11: in Oratt., δεινὸν ἂν εἶη εἰ . . And.1.30, Lys.12.88, etc. Adv. δεινῶς, φέρειν Hdt.2.121. γ'; δ. καὶ ἀπόρως ἔχει μοι I am in *dire* straits, Antipho 1.1; δ. ἔχειν τῇ ἐνδείᾳ X.An.6.4.23; δ. διατεθῆναι τυπτόμενος Lys.3.27.

II. marvellously strong, powerful: δ. σάκος the *mighty* shield, Il.7.245; simply, *wondrous, marvellous, strange*, τὸ συγγενές τοι δεινὸν ἢ θ' ὀμιλία kin and social ties *have strange power*, A.Pr.39; δ. τὸ κοινὸν σπλάγχχνον Id.Th.1036; δ. τὸ τίκτειν S.El.770; πολλὰ τὰ δ. κοῦδὲν ἀνθρώπου -ότερον πέλει. Id.Ant.333; δ. ἴμερος, ἔρως, Hdt.9.3, Pl.Tht.169c; οἶκτος S.Tr.298, etc.; δ. λέγεις πρᾶγμα Pl.Euthd. 298c; δ. γ' εἶπας, εἰ καὶ ζῆς θανῶν S.Aj.1127; freq. δεινὸν ἂν εἶη εἰ . . it were *strange* that . ., as E.Hec.592. Adv. δει-νῶς *marvellously, exceedingly*, δ. μέλαινα, ἄνυδρος, Hdt.2.76,149; δ. ἐν φυλακῇσι εἶναι Id.3.152; δ. πῶς εἰμ' ἐπιλήσμων Metag.2, etc.: Comp. -οτέρως Sch. Min.II.7.97.

III. clever, skilful, first in Hdt.5.23 ἀνήρ δ. τε καὶ σοφός; of Odysseus, γλώσση . . δεινοῦ καὶ σοφοῦ S.Ph.440, cf. OC806, Antipho 2.2.3, Lys.7.12; σοφὸς καὶ δ. Pl.Prt.341a; opp. σοφός, of *practical ability*, Id.Phdr.245c, Tht.164d; opp. ιδιότης, D.4.35: c. inf., δεινὸς εὐρεῖν A.Pr.59; δεινοὶ πλέκειν τοι μηχανὰς Αἰγύπτου Id.Fr.373; δ. λέγειν *clever* at speaking, S.OT545, etc.; δ. εἰπεῖν is rare, D.20.150; νόσος δ. φαγεῖν Ar.Nu.243; δ. πρᾶγμασι χρῆσθαι D.1.3; αἰ εὐπραξίαι δ. συγκρούψαι τὰ ὀνειδή are *wonderfully liable* to . ., Id.2.20: c. acc., δ. τὴν τέχνην Ar.Ec.364; δ. περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια Pl.Euthd.304d; ἐς τὰ πάντα Ar.Ra.968; δ. περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, περὶ Ὀμήρου, Pl.R.405c, Ion531a; δ. ἀμφὶ τι Arr.Tact.9.5; δ. κατὰ χειρουργίαν Ael.VH3.1; ἐν λόγοισι δ. Ὑπερείδης Timocl.4.7 (but also of the *forcible, vehement*, style in oratory, Demetr.Eloc.240, al.); in bad sense, *over-clever*, Pl.Euthphr.3c; δ. ὑπὸ πανουργίας Id.Tht.176d, cf. Arist.EN1144a27. (For δφεινός, cf. Δφενία, gen. of pr.n. Δεινίας, IG4.858.)

After the presentation of the above different versions of perceiving δεινόν, we consider that, for the sake of more clarity, it is also of adequate interest to mention

below some other meanings:

Wonders are many, yet of all
Things is Man the most wonderful
(Kitto and Hall, 1994)

Many the forms of life,
Fearful and strange to see,
But man supreme stands out,
For strangeness and for fear.
(Eliot, 2010)

Many things cause terror and wonder, yet nothing
is more terrifying and wonderful than man.
(Tyrrell and Bennett, 1998)

Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing
Uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him
(Martin Heidegger¹⁵, 2014a)

II.II Heidegger's analysis of the δεινόν

It's obvious from the above that to define the human being is not easy and that it would be naive to expect anything less than that. The human being is wonderful and monstrous, terrifying and strange, supreme in his strangeness and fear, fearful and uncanny. The human being wavers between the extreme expressions of his essence. His way of being is manifold and his tragic beauty lies in manifold expressions of his same

¹⁵This translation is made both by Gregory Fried-Richard Polt in *Introductions to Metaphysics* and William McNeil-Julia Davis in *the Ister*

essence which vary so much that make us all assign to it so many and contradictory attributes. One element that really stands out, and eventually is going to be the compass for our philosophical analysis of the human being, is the uncanny. The uncanny is to be understood here as “that which throws one out of the “canny” that is, the homely, the accustomed, the unendangered (Heidegger, 2014a, p.168)”. What is so special about the uncanny which characterizes so profoundly the human being?¹⁶

Following the translation given by Heidegger: “Manifold is the uncanny yet nothing more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being(ibid.)”. Thus, δεινόν, should not be considered separately, depending only on its forms. On the contrary, it is to be viewed as one thing which is manifold, having many different expressions and whose highest, most tragic form is the human being. Thus, the human being is to be regarded as the “uncanniest” being in comparison with all the other forms- expressions of δεινόν. Before been immersed into our approach towards the δεινόν it would be worthy at this point to center on some of the basic characteristics of the δεινόν as presented and analyzed by Heidegger. Thus, δεινόν could be approached in the perspective of its main three elements:

- 1) Δεινόν as the fearful.
 - A) Fearful as something provoking fear like our everyday fears, the habitual fear
 - B) Fearful as something provoking awe (δέος) and as something that calls for reverence
- 2) Δεινόν as powerful
 - a) Powerful as something that looms over us, close to us and at the same time threatening, making it thus worthy of honor

¹⁶ For an interesting comparison between the Heideggerian “anthropology” and the biblical revelation and theology see: Bartlett, A. (2003). A Flight of God: M. Heidegger and R. Girard. *Revista Portuguesa De Filosofia*, 59(4), 1101-1120.

- b) Powerful as actively violent, frightful
- 3) Δεινόν as inhabitual
 - a) Inhabitual as beyond the habitual, as someone skilled in everything
 - b) Inhabitual as extraordinary, as unhomely

From this brief sketch of his main elements, we see that the way Heidegger defines the uncanny and the different expressions of his essence is in accord with almost all of the above mentioned definitions, and still, is paving the path for a deeper understanding of the human being. So, human being as δεινόν can engender fear but it can also rise awe (δέος). Through his power he can waken respect in the heart of the others but can also be an active assaulter either against himself or against the others. Finally, the human being is inhabitual: on the one hand, as being able to master every skill that could make of him a person (surpassing the common treads of behaviour) not common in everyday life; on the other hand, as extraordinary, unhomely which is one of his most important elements. Being unhomely means that there is a home, *ἑστία*, one is searching for. Unhomely is the need to go back to where one feels that he belongs, making it one of the strongest instincts we have, since during our search for what is homely we face/overcome obstacles, we assume risks, *τολμᾶν*, we get victorious or we encounter the total defeat. Glorious and tragic is, thus, the human being; glorious in his power, tragic in his essence.

His essence is tragic if we take into account what δεινόν connotes in the thought of the German philosopher. Heidegger thinks of the uncanny as:

“terrible in the sense of the overwhelming sway, which induces panicked fear, true anxiety, as well as collected inwardly reverberating, reticent awe. The violent, the overwhelming, is the essential character of the sway itself (ibid. p. 166)”

This definition, is crucial for our comprehending the inward relationship between the man and the world. The overwhelming sway is one of the most salient traits of the human being because “when the sway breaks in, it can keep its overwhelming power

to itself (ibid. p. 166)”. The human being is caught in the sway of his own Being, the overwhelming, but not in such a way as to protect the rest from it, or just to have it limited. This inner holding of the sway renders him more “terrible and distant”. But then the human being “gathers what holds sway and lets it enter into an openness (ibid p. 167)”. In this case we have the δεινόν as an attacker. Violent-acting in the “midst of the overwhelming (ibid p.167)” but against the overwhelming as well. The inmost meaning of the tragic essence of the δεινόν arises in this struggle of the human being with the sway of his own essence.

II.III The choral ode and the translation/interpretation of Heidegger

All those briefly analyzed characteristics once seen in their proper context, will throw their light on, enabling us to grasp the most profound and radical of the Sophoclean tragedy, Antigone:

Χορός

πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδ' ἐν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει.

τοῦτο καὶ πολιοῦ πέραν πόντου χειμερίῳ νότῳ 335

χωρεῖ, περιβρυχίοισιν

περῶν ὑπ' οἴδμασιν.

θεῶν τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν

ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν, ἀποτρύεται

ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος

ἵππειῳ γένει πολεύων. 340

κουφονόων τε φῦλον ὀρνίθων ἀμφιβαλῶν ἄγει

καὶ θηρῶν ἀγρίων ἔθνη πόντου τ' εἰναλίαν φύσιν 345

σπεύουσι δικτυοκλώστοις,

περιφραδῆς ἀνήρ·

κρατεῖ δὲ μηχαναῖς ἀγραύλου

θηρὸς ὀρεσσιβάτα, λασιούχενά θ' 350

ἵππον ὀχμάζεται ἀμφὶ λόφον ζυγῶν

οὐρειόν τ' ἀκμῆτα ταῦρον.
 καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἀνεμόεν φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους 355
 ὄργας ἐδιδάξατο καὶ δυσαύλων
 πάγων ὑπαίθρεια καὶ δύσομβρα φεύγειν βέλη
 παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται
 τὸ μέλλον· Ἄϊδα μόνον φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται· 360
 νόσων δ' ἀμηχάνων φυγὰς συμπέφρασται.
 σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων 365
 τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει,
 νόμους γεραίων χθονὸς θεῶν τ' ἔνορκον δίκαν,
 ὑψίπολις· ἄπολις ὅτῳ τὸ μὴ καλὸν 370
 ξύνεστι τόλμας χάριν. μήτ' ἐμοὶ παρέστιος
 γένοιτο μήτ' ἴσον φρονῶν ὅς τάδ' ἔρδει.

Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing
 Uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him.
 He fares forth upon the foaming tide
 Amid winter's southerly tempest
 And cruises through the summits
 Of the raging, clefted swells.
 The noblest of gods, as well, the earth,
 The indestructibly untiring, he wearies,
 Overturning her from year to year,
 Driving the plows this way and that
 With his steeds.
 Even the lightly gliding flock of birds
 He snares, and he hunts
 The beast folk of the wilderness
 And the brood whose home is the sea,
 The man who studies wherever he goes.
 With ruses he overwhelms the beast

That spends its nights on mountains and roams,
And clasping with wood
The rough-maned neck of the steed
And the unvanquished bull
He forces them into the yoke.
Into the sounding of the world, as well,
And into wind-swift all understanding
He found his way, and into the mettle
To rule over cities.
He has considered, too, how he might flee
Exposure to the arrows
Of unpropitious weather and its frosts.
Everywhere trying out, underway; untried, with no way out
He comes to Nothing.
A single onslaught, death, he was unable
Ever to resist by any flight,
Even if in the face of dire illness
Deft escape should be granted him.
Clever indeed, for he masters
Skill's devices beyond expectation,
Now he falls prey to wickedness,
Yet again valor succeeds for him.
Between the ordinance of the earth and the
God's sworn fittingness he fares.
Rising high over the site, losing the site
Is he for whom what is not, is, always,
For the sake of daring.
(Heidegger, 2014a)

In this passage of the choral ode figures out the rising of the human being as the manifold expression of the uncanny, as the uncanniest of the beings. This passage may be also interpreted as the development of the human knowledge-civilization, albeit in our case the approach will be different laying emphasis on the philosophical-ontological aspect of the human being, and not that much on his cultural-political achievements. These achievements will be better perceived in the struggle of the human being to find his homeliness.

The human being in this search for his *ἑστία* crosses winterly windy seas, fighting back all of the waves that are affronting him. The human being is always in strive although in the sea he is struggling against forces which cannot be tamed. To wield the winterly sea is not in the power of the human being. The *δεινόν* nonetheless manages how to survive, manages not to be destroyed in the sea. He follows his way till he finds the indestructibly untiring earth. This is the earth that the *δεινόν* is trying to wear out, to control; with the never tiring earth the human being lets free his self-devouring overwhelming sway. While attempting to control the earth the human being is trying, at the same time, to find his world by violently-acting, creating, reformulating what is already there, what is in his vicinity. Even though everything is close to him, the sea, the earth, even though everything is in his vicinity, the human being feels being far away from his home. We, human beings, as *δεινόν*,

“Rather, the sea and the land and the wilderness are those realms that human beings transform with all their skillfulness, use and make their own so that they may find their own vicinity through such realms. The homely is sought after and striven for in the violent activity of passing through that which inhabits with respect to sea and earth, and yet in such passage the homely is precisely not attained”

(Heidegger, 1996, p. 73)

What a paradox is it though, to feel alienated in the vicinity, to feel uncanny in the already given home which the human being changes after his own matter in order to see it as home. The *δεινόν* is always searching for a home, for a place where his essence would rise and remain constant in his unconcealment. But this happens through

struggle and through violent activity. The human being as δεινόν, being uncanny, he feels that he has been stripped away his only possibility, his only way of feeling homely, which is the possibility of possessing what he believes to be home in his vicinity. In this search, thus, for what he believes to be his home he is setting free the inner overwhelming sway as an effort to create, as a violent activity against the outer overwhelming sway which is depriving the human being of his home. Everything that matters to the δεινόν is related to his ἐστία¹⁷, even though many times άνθρωπος is blocking the ways that he himself has got under in his effort to treat his homeliness.

II.IV Δεινόν as παντοπόρος/ἄπορος; the limit of Death

The struggling activity of the human being continues with the exploitation of the animals so as to manage to control, except for the earth and the hunting on the ground, in the sea and in the air. The human being περιφραδής και μηχαναίς manages to control and to transform the whole environment, that is his vicinity. He is learning how to use instruments and tools so as to achieve his proper goals. He is also developing skills in order to be well protected by the unwelcoming weather. But his effort to reach the homely is not limited in combating for the control of the environment and the use of tools. He also develops speech and understanding (φθεγμα και φρονημα) as well as the ability to rule the Cities¹⁸. His skills can even surpass the most dire illnesses thanks to the progress of the medicine.

The human being has managed so far to overcome every obstacle he has faced. He has survived from the sea's risks and he learnt how to navigate. He learnt how to cultivate the earth making it provide what he is in need of and he also put the animals under his use. He developed language, thought, the art of governing apprehending how to protect himself from illnesses and the bad weather. But this ever increasing power of the δεινόν is limited and every moment that passes brings it closer to the

¹⁷ ¹⁷ For a critique towards Heidegger's (non) approach to the idea of οἶκος in Antigone, and for the relation of οἶκος with the uncanny see: Reed, V. (2008). BRINGING ANTIGONE HOME? *Comparative Literature Studies*, 45(3), 316-340.

¹⁸ The word used in the text is αστυνομους: ἄστυ-νόμος, ὄ, (νέμω) *protecting the city*, θεοί A.Ag.88; ἀγλαΐαι ἄ. *public festivals*, Pi.N.9.31; ὄργαι ἄ. *the feelings of law-abiding or social life*, S.Ant. 355(lyr.).

unavoidable verity of his own Death. Death is of tremendous importance in our approach of the δεινόν since it arises the frontiers of our existence and of our struggling in this world. Death is not a simple failure in a trial, an error way of living and of approaching reality. Death is, as we all know, the end that will unavoidably come and can either let the brilliance of our Being emerge from ourselves, like in the case of Antigone, or cast shadows of fear and trembling in our everyday life, making our choices pointless movements of useless attempts to escape from what is mostly sure to be coming. The human being, that is, το δεινόν, in his ceaselessly reduced till the end life is able either to glorify its essence or get lost in the failed attempts to breach the hidden homeliness that he is most eager to find¹⁹.

This tragic characteristic of the human being can be clearly seen in the thorough and profound analysis of Sophocles when calling the human being “παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον”. Πορος either as a passage, an opening or as means of achieving is what the human being, is doing in his life. He is trying to open passage towards the homeliness so as to be able to rest in the emergence of his own Being. But those efforts even though they open passages everywhere finally lead to Nothing, because this same human being, the one who is the only responsible for this tremendous work of opening passages and breakthroughs in the world, is always misled, always lost in his search for the center of the existential core of his earthly labyrinth, since he is not aware of that he is already in it. The uncanniest about the human being is that he feels unhomely while being at home, he feels shattered, even though all of his pieces are in his sight and in his grasp. Tragic, as we have already said, in his very essence, he is lost in the pathways that he himself has opened. This search for the homely, for the familiar, as expressed in παντοπόρος· ἄπορος is bringing into our mind one of the Heraclitean fragments, namely ἀγχιβασίην.

In our analysis of this obscure fragment we have seen that there are two possible ways that could be used in our attempt to achieve a more accurate

¹⁹ For an analysis of the possibilities of δεινότητα for mastery and disaster in the thought of Heidegger see: Kenny, R., & Kenney, W. (2006). The Phenomenology of the Disaster: Toward a Rhetoric of Tragedy. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 39(2), 97-124.

interpretation: either by our approaching the most familial or by hanging. We have also seen that in a play of the meanings Heraclitus had probably in mind an approaching which could either lead to the most familial, or in the case of our losing our way, to the existential hanging and to the living experience of “unresoluteness”. Following the Heideggerian approach:

“Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility-non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.”

(Heidegger, 2008, p. 303)

So, Death is our most personal possibility, non- related to any other(s), because Death in its completion is our Death, our most personal concern, certain because we always know that it will come, indefinite because we never know when.

In most of the cases, as Heidegger has very intelligently denoted, we evade the thought of Death, and we try to have it alienated it from our lives by hiding in the veil of the “they”. The most important issue is always postponed and evaded due to our fear of facing this ownmost possibility of our Being.

Ἀγχιβασίην seen in this perspective expresses this most courageous and difficult path that only the few can take. It needs courage because this path may lead to the most familial or to the hanging. The hanging, as the representation of Death, is waiting for us to walk towards it in our existential passage towards the familial- a passage of great importance, implying, though, far greater consequences. It’s normal that the majority of the people are not willing to embark upon this journey, because the perspective of Death is threatening and intimidating them. Those, however, who walk on this path, those who look forward to the ownmost possibility of Death in their waiting to be fulfilled and still stick to their path, are the ones who can find the resoluteness of their Being in this destined to Death act²⁰. We find thus the resoluteness of our Life in our passage towards Death.

It follows from the above that we live dying, namely, that our life is our

²⁰Brilliantly explained by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

inevitable way towards Death since there is no other path to follow. So, instead of sowing seeds of fear and despair this element should be giving us strength. Conscious that there is an end to our lifetime we are fulfilling it with the essence of our still living. But as history has proven- unfortunately much more than once- the human being fancies many times that he can conquer eternity in this world, either by fame or by making efforts through scientific mode to postpone what is not to be postponed. Instead of hunting for his concealed essence in this world, άνθρωπος is striving to make eternal his vacuum of knowledge of his own essence. Instead of trying to find his home in his place he is essaying to eternize the search for his home. He doesn't realize that doing so he is also struggling to immortalize his own agony and fear of not finding the homely. Ἀγχιβασίην, as we have already seen, can either be the reaching of the homely or the hanging. Thus, modern society, has abandoned her search for the homely in the name of the immortalization of its "progressive" existential hanging. The essence of the modern άνθρωπος is not only well concealed but also hard to reveal, since the modernity has diverted our attention from the goal of our essence finding. Thus, the δεινόν, is παντοπορος- since he has invented all the means to open the ways towards his essence- but, at the same time, he is always απορος, because he loses the track of the pathways that he has already opened.

II.V Δεινόν as ύψίπολις/ἄπολις; a Heideggerian approach

Having analyzed the struggle of the human being in the antithetical relation between παντόπορος and άπορος, we now set another important distinction made in the same passage namely the one calling the δεινόν ύψίπολις ἄπολις. Why this distinction is so important for the definition of the human being as δεινόν is what we will try to explain here.

First of all, before starting the analysis of the meaning of ύψίπολις (to be above the Πόλις), we have to search for the roots of that same word. One possible etymological explanation is that Πόλις derives from the verb πέλειν (pelein), (Heidegger, 1996). Πέλειν as many of the ancient greek words is not to be easily translated. The definition given by Heidegger is:

“to stir, to come forth, to find and abide in one’s locale and site.....

to emerge and come forth of its own accord: ο πέλας, is the neighbor who has his presence in the immediate vicinity, which is to say, however, that he is not present at hand before us as fixed or motionless but rather actively stirs in presencing, goes back and forth”

(Heidegger, 1996, p. 71)²¹.

Relying upon this translation of the word we can proceed to a possible interpretation of the word Πόλις:

“It is neither merely state, nor merely city, rather in the first instance it is properly “the stead” [“die Statt”]: the site [die Stätte] of the abode of human history that belongs to the humans in the midst of beings”

(Heidegger, 1996, p. 82)

“The polis is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which and for which history happens.”

(Heidegger, 2014a, p. 170)

It is, thus, in the Πόλις where the human being builds up his history in his struggle to gain his essence in the finding of what is homely to him. As human history unfolds so does the human searching. It could be said that the human history is the path that the human beings follow so as to proceed from the concealment to the unconcealment of their essence. Nonetheless, as history has repeatedly proven, this is not a linear process whose end leads to the glorification of the “abstract” human being with his even more abstract human rights. Even though modern society, faithful to its origins dating back to the “Enlightenment” tries to impose an always forward movement towards what is considered to be “progress”, the human being, more than ever, has the existential necessity of finding his roots. Our path to the unconcealment is starting from the simple fact that there has been a concealment. Everything starts,

²¹ For more possible translations see Liddell-Scott in the entry: πέλω and πέλομαι

everything has a beginning and if someday we want to find our quintessential end, τέλος (telos), that would be nothing else than the fulfillment of the beginning. Modern society, the modern Πόλις, has become the site where the concealment is glorified in the brilliance of its shadow. Being a citizen today has nothing to do with the πολίτης/οπλίτης of the ancient glorious ages. Modern man, in his passionate love for progress is fragmenting himself as we will later see. He is willing to make sacrifices for what he considers to be progress. He is facing his life as a countdown towards Death and he always tries to postpone what will inevitably come. Counting seconds he is losing the life of the moments and instead of fulfilling his essence during this living-the-Death countdown he tries to run forward as fast as he can so as to keep progressing without even securing a breathing space to realize that he is living. The human being, in the modern Πόλις, has become the instrument of the instrument he used to produce goals. Each technological goal is only the means towards another achievement and the human being has become the bridge making possible this progress; happily getting lost in the progress even if the cost is the progressive concealment of the essence which has to be unconcealed.

So, since Πόλις is the site where the human activity takes place and is transformed into history we can now better understand the meaning of the words ύψίπολις, άπολις. Thus, following Heidegger, this distinction expresses the possibility of the human being

“to tower into the height’s of one’s own essential space and thus to govern that space, yet simultaneously to plunge downward into its depths and be lost in that space.”

(Heidegger, 1996, p. 87)

We can understand from the above passage that the human being is able to find his essence in his historical abode which is no other than the Πόλις. This means that the Πόλις as the natural site of the taking place of the unconcealment is the appropriate space where the human being is able to rise and tower the site, govern that place, find the homely of his essence. But it’s also in this same site that the human being can find

his downfall, his loss in the Πόλις, his being unable to control the site, to unconceal his essence and to feel homely in the midst of his coexistence with the other human beings.

Even though this definition gives us a clear image of the struggle of the human being in the Πόλις to find his concealed essence, still there is something more that has to be added here, an element highlighting the human being as violent-actor and creator, as destroyer and creator. In the Πόλις, the δεινόν, the human beings “use violence as violence-doers and become those who rise in historical Being as creators, as doers. Rising high in the site of history, they also become απόλιδες,

“without city and site, lone-some, un-canny, with no way out amidst beings as a whole, and at the same time without ordinance and limits, without structure and fittingness, because they as creators must first ground all this in each case.”

(Heidegger, 2014a, p. 170)

In an attempt to properly understand this passage, we could say that in the case of ύψίπολις/απολις, we clearly see the human being, the δεινόν, as a violence-doer, getting out of the strict bonds of the Πόλις and getting higher where there is no restriction, no fittingness.²² So, if the δεινόν manages to get out of the Πόλις, to rise himself above it he becomes ύψίπολις, since through his violence he manages to govern the site, to be above it. He is above the space, controlling it, not limited by what is limiting the others. With this “flying above the πόλις” he also enters into a completely new and profoundly uncanny situation. He has become ἄπολις, but, ἄπολις, in this case, not as another word for exile or just a social exclusion and disapproval. The δεινόν is much stronger than that, the temporal breaking with the social bonds does not necessarily exclude him from his search of the unconcealment of his essence. What might put in his way insurmountable obstacles would be his perpetual permanence to the state of ἄπολις. Ἄπολις, following the two seemingly different definitions by Heidegger is either the downfall and the getting lost in the πόλις or the next state after the rising up in ύψίπολις. While being ἄπολις the δεινόν

²²We have to be careful at this point of the way we are using the word fittingness. It's clear that here fittingness is to be considered as a limitation to our activity and not as Δίκη, which is the all encompassing fittingness, not excluding the human activity and the violence-doing of the δεινόν.

from violent-actor becomes the creator. He has overcome through violence the obstacles and the limits of the Πόλις and now he is the one who has to come back so as to set the new limits, expand the narrowness and set the new fittingness that will now enclose the Πόλις. Being ύψίπολις he can oversee the Πόλις that he has overcome, but at the same time, being ἄπολις he can see the limits without getting limited, which enable him, to create what next is going to define and probably limit the Πόλις. The δεινόν, though, cannot continuously stay in the state of ἄπολις since he would either be a God or a beast. He is not a kind of Superman who controls and surveys everything without being restricted by anything. Were it like that, then he would have no power over the Πόλις, no taking part in the forging history of the human being. He would have no Here, making it thus impossible for him to ever reach the homely, namely, his essence.

Summarizing, the δεινόν as ύψίπολις/ἄπολις, is to be endowed with the purpose of destroying the obstacles which would prevent him from creating. Once the obstacles are surpassed then the δεινόν is obliged to show his creative power, his remaking and redefining of the Πόλις, knowing that if he doesn't manage to do that he is putting to a grave risk his own search for homely. The τολμάν of the human being as uprising and ύψίπολις is in no case a leisure activity, a mindless quest towards a simple change of the Πόλις following personal caprices and ambitions. On the contrary it is the highest act of creative destruction, the fulfillment of the destiny of the δεινόν as history making. It's the highest struggle of the δεινόν which can either lead to the ἄπολις as creator or to the ἄπολις as fallen and lost away from the concealment of his essence

II.VI Δίκη as fittingness; human being as δεινότατον in the struggle against Δίκη.

Finally, before concluding the analysis of the δεινόν we are going to present the final and probably one of his most essential characteristics. The δεινόν becomes δεινότατον όλων in its struggle against the overwhelming sway which is outside it,

against the fittingness that limits it, against Δίκη²³. As we have already seen the δεινόν is δεινόν in its holding of the overwhelming sway inside him and in his letting free this sway outside it, creating its site, its space and in his struggle with the overwhelming sway now outside him. This struggle now between the δεινόν as violent-actor /creator and the “Being as fittingness that enjoins (ibid. p. 179)”, namely Δίκη, is what makes the human being the δεινότατον όλων.

Before proceeding to the examination of this last part it is of outmost importance to clearly present the terms that we are going to use so as to make clear the special usage that has been attributed to them by Heidegger; usage which is going to help us develop our thought and our effort towards the explanation of the δεινότατον as quintessential element of the existence of the human being.

So, the term Δίκη is to be translated as fittingness:

“in the sense of joint and structure; then as arrangement, as the direction that the overwhelming sway gives to its sway; finally, as the enjoining structure, which compels fitting-in and compliance.... Δίκη is the overwhelming fittingness.”
(ibid. 178, p. 184)

But against the Δίκη as the overwhelming fittingness stands the δεινόν as violent-actor, as creator or as Heidegger would put it, as Τέχνη- Τέχνη as “knowing and knowing as the ability to set Being into work as something that in each case is in such and such a way (ibid. p. 177)”. Human as agressor is trying to set forth in each case the Being of the beings. Human being is destroying and creating as well. Even though he manages to open different paths towards what he wants to find and achieve, in most of the cases he gets lost and he is unable to find the Being that he is looking for, the homely in a world he believes to be unhomely

The δεινότατον, thus, lies exactly in this “unitary, reciprocal relation between the two senses of δεινόν (ibid. p. 176)”. the human being feeling lost and unhomely in the world is setting forth his violent forces so as to uncover and drag violently to the

²³ For an analysis of Δίκη as expressed in the conflict between Antigone and Creon see: Ferguson, A. (1974). Politics and Man's Fate in Sophocles' "Antigone" *The Classical Journal*, 70(2), 41-49.

surface the Being of the beings. The overwhelming sway that he was holding in his interior now lies outside him and is openly confronting him in a decisive and absolute combat. This struggle, unlike many others, is not a single fight, which means that even if we lose it, we probably don't lose the war. The search for the Being, the violence-acting as *τολμάν*, either leads to the unconcealment of the Being or to the fragmentation and the loss of *ἄπολις*, as downfall and loss of the human being. But which is that struggle that makes the human being the *δεινότατον ὄλων*?

From everything that has been previously said, we can afford to understand this struggle in terms of the efforts of the *δεινόν* to find the homely in the world. The human being feels uncanny in the world, he believes that this world is concealing his essence. All of his efforts, violent and not, are mainly directed towards this unconcealment and his desperate need to find a place that he could call home. This struggle is the struggle for the Being. The *δεινόν* is violently acting against the world, against *Δίκη*, as we have seen above, but in no case will be able to trespass the limits set by *Δίκη*. *Δίκη* as the overwhelming fittingness is not foreign to the human being. It is his other expression of *δεινόν* in the twofold distinction made above. It already encompasses the human being and violence, but *Δίκη* has this violence limited and under its disposal. All attempts to break the limits of *Δίκη* are vain, since as Heraclitus noted in a fragment:

Fr. 52 (94 DK)

“Ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι
ἐξευρήσουσιν.”

“Helios (Sun) will not overstep his measures;

Otherwise the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will find him out.”

If Sun itself cannot overcome the limits of *Δίκη*, then, it would be more than haughty to believe that we can venture towards things that, probably, are not destined probably to be under our control. The history of the human being, thus, is set inside the territory of *Δίκη*, where human being destroys and creates, postpones and faces Death and his

future. Everything takes place within these boundaries and those are the boundaries where the human being becomes the δεινότατον όλων. But why is this struggle so important? How could the crucial role of this struggle be explained in our everyday life?

Following the definitions and approaches given above, we are in an ever-lasting struggle against the world. We are striving to find our home, even though we do not realize that we feel unhomely in what seems to be the most homely of all, our world. In this “uncanniness” the human being is trying to change the world, break limits, set new limits. We are forcing the Being of the beings to emerge, but what most of us want is to see things not the way they are, but, rather the way we would like them to be. Instead of looking for the unconcealment we are searching for another kind of concealment, instead of our standing in the light, no matter how tough and painful it might be, we are choosing different shades of shadows as our artificial light. In our effort to change the world we do not realize that the world already is and this is why we can find its essence.

Modern society, wrapped up in its arrogance and blinded by visionless and bottom leading progressivity thinks that the world’s very existence is at odds with the way that people would like it to be. Instead of trying to unconceal world’s essence, they are attempting to impose on it its distorted way of Being, its fallacies and its fragile ideas. Modern society in its abundance of shadows tries to tame earthquake with a plough. Every effort made by us to form something new should first start by our violent-acting so as to unconceal the Being of the world. Only this violence- no matter how strong may be, due to the tragic essence of our Being- can bring into light the Being of the things. The seemingly omnipotent, technologically advanced and bureaucratic Kafkian society, however, thinks that it can first anihilate and then create. In reality, what has been achieved through wars in the modern world is but the fragmentation of our conscience. The modern human being, in his downfall from the power of his essence as δεινόν, is misled in believing that he can raze what already is. That’s why he simply manages to get rid of his conscience: scattered and lost in his narrow-mindedness, he does not realize that he fails to safely gather the parts of his own existence, even when the void in himself grows deeper and deeper.

III. ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ AND THE ESSENCE OF TRAGIC: ΑΙΑΣ AS THE VIOLENT ACTING OF ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ

III.I Ajax of Sophocles as the tragic essence of δεινότατον; why Ajax

So far, more particularly in the last two chapters, we have noticed that the essence of the δεινότατον is the tragic²⁴. In no case should we compare it with the tragic result of a competition in which our favourite team has lost the game. Nor is the tragic a bad result in a history exam. The tragic in the life of the δεινότατον implies an immense struggle which would never and could never be effective in bringing about victory. This ontological dimension of the tragic cannot be understood if approached only through some of the (various) interpretations that the modern society has provided. Although the violence -doing against Δίκη is an unimaginable strife, Sophocles made it possible for us to grasp the meaning of the tragic in his play ΑΙΑΣ(AJAX). A concrete part of this play will empower us to perceive the tragic as the essence of the δεινότατον when his thought and actions lead him to the most extreme of the violence-doing against Δίκη.

²⁴ For an excellent approach towards the meaning of the noun tragedy see: Steiner, G. (2004). "Tragedy," Reconsidered. *New Literary History*, 35(1), 1-15. For a more specific approach concerning the concept of tragic and tragedy in Heidegger's thought see: Ramazani, R. (1988). HEIDEGGER AND THE THEORY OF TRAGEDY. *The Centennial Review*, 32(2), 103-129. For an analysis of the heroes and their actions as tragic in the tragedies see also: Hall, R. (1960). Being and Tragedy. *Chicago Review*, 14(3), 99-106.

In the Iliad, Ajax was a fearsome warrior, strongest amongst the Greeks, second only to Achilles. After the latter's death, Ajax was convinced that he deserved to be the heir of Achilles and that the arms of the dead hero should pass into his own possession. This, however, did not happen; they were offered, instead, to Odysseus. Ajax, considering that his pride was deeply wounded because of such, unacceptable to him, behaviour, tried one night to kill the Atridae leaders along with Odysseus- so as to punish them for this "injustice". Goddess Athena, cognizant of his intentions, altered his vision; instead of killing the people he had in mind, Ajax killed animals and their shepherds. The delusion being vanished the hero became conscious of what had occurred and then he committed suicide. Against the will of Menelaos and Agamemnon who wanted to forbid the burial of Ajax's body, after his suicide, Odysseus convinced them to react otherwise, letting Teucer, the brother of Ajax, bury him.

Our preference to this specific play should be envisaged in the context of our efforts to understand the true essence of the δεινότατον since Ajax is the embodiment of the most extreme form of δεινότατον. Fearsome, strong and raw, he is always consequent with everything he believes to be his moral code, never surrendering to the will of the others. He is the extreme form of the violence-doing against Δίκη. His violent-doing tries to be limitless, refusing to set limits and borders to his actions. Ajax never stops struggling even when he realizes that the Goddess Athena is against him. Ajax expresses the untamed fury of the δεινότατον; a fury which knows no resistance, no check, and openly challenges Δίκη. He attempts to break the limits of Δίκη although shattered by its overwhelming sway. Even then, by the way of his death, he still challenges the world-order. It is exactly this denial to accept defeat and to bow to Δίκη that makes of Ajax the prototype of the unchained violent-acting of the tragic δεινότατον:

"Ajax is deimon and is caught in a web of logoi that are deimoi. Ajax has been punished with the deimon for having spoken deimon and unspeakable words, not because of his desire for vengeance upon the army for rewarding Odysseus

with Achilles's armor."

(Shanske, 2007, p. 97)

Those unspeakable words are the ones directed against the gods and more specifically against the goddess Athena. So, in the first case, from what we can read in the tragedy ΑΙΑΣ, when Ajax was about to leave in order to join Greeks' waging war on Troy, his father had forewarned him to hold respect for gods and to have them always taken his side:

“τέκνον, δόρει
βούλου κρατεῖν μὲν, σὺν θεῶ δ' ἀεὶ κρατεῖν.(764-765)”.

“Seek out victory on the field of battle,
And win with the help of the gods.”

(Translation Peter Meineck and Paul Woodruff).

But the response of Ajax to those words- response that would perfectly fit in with what the Greeks would call ὕβρις- was the following one:

“πάτερ, θεοῖς μὲν κἄν ὁ μηδὲν ὦν ὁμοῦ κράτος κατακτήσαιτ'·
ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα κείνων πέποιθα τοῦτ' ἐπισπάσειν κλέος.”(767-769)

“Father, anyone
Can do well with the help of the gods;
I will make a name for myself!”

(Translation Peter Meineck and Paul Woodruff).

III.II Ajax's violent acting against Δίκη

This attitude of Ajax could easily be interpreted in the schema of ὕβρις- Νέμεσις, considering his punishment just and sent by gods. Even though there can be seen traces of arrogance in his words, what we can also understand is that Ajax is not afraid when unleashing his fury so as to uncover the world. The Πόλεμος of Ajax is the might of the strongest warrior who aspires to create his own history, his own legend in the world using only his own forces. From what we have seen he does not count on the help of the gods. He believes that with the aid of the gods everyone can

do anything well. This is what he does not want. To a certain extent, we could say, he believes that he matches gods in their power and might. Quoting Knox:

“Ajax acts and thinks like a God among men. Like a God he judges, he condemns, and executes his enemies with speed, certainty and righteous wrath.”

(Knox, 1961, p. 8)“.

Ajax, as the most extreme expression of the violent doing of δεινότητα sets no limits in his manifestation of rage. His fury is not restricted by the cosmic order/fittingness²⁵ (Δίκη). That's why his attitude may also remind us of ὕβρις:

“Ajax's arrogant attitude towards the Gods.....shows him as a man who fails to recognize his place in the world, but claims an equality with the Gods, or even exalts himself above them.”

(Gasti, 1992, p. 89)

This accurate characterization of Ajax brings back into our mind the ὑψίπολις/ἄπολις seen in the choral ode of Antigone. The rising above the site which leads to having no site as to engage into the construction/unconcealment of it may lead sometimes to the total alienation of δεινότητα from the world. In this case, the majestic power and might of Ajax has helped more than once the Greeks in their war against Troy. But Ajax, is not limited to the violence-doing against the enemies which in case of war has granted him the fame of a hero and of the greatest warrior second only to Achilles- rising him in power above the rest of the warriors. On the contrary, Ajax, too confident of his might and too proud to bow his will before anyone, mortal or God, becomes ἄπολις. As Gasti has accurately remarked, the adjective μόνος is used once and again so as to characterize Ajax (ibid. p.84). Even though her comment is directed to Ajax's military way of acting, namely individual combat against the “type

²⁵ For a more thorough analysis of Δίκη, especially in the thought of Martin Heidegger, see the previous chapter.

of ordered, cohesive phalanx (ibid.)”, it could be also referring to Ajax as the sole δεινότατον, living alone following his own moral values without accepting or bowing to other kind of order, even a divine one. Ajax's fury unleashing is an effort of imposing on the world his own moral values. The unconcealment of the world would be for Ajax the glorification of his own perspective concerning the world. The resistances he faces don't make him reflect about his own actions- except the monologue before his committing suicide. On the contrary, every resistance, check, he faces, he tries to overcome it through sheer fury and violence. No will for reflection or redefinition of his motives and intentions. And such was the power of his violent acting that he would have killed the leaders of the Greeks and Odysseus were it not for the direct intervention of Δίκη-through goddess Athena in this case- who shattered his violent-acting and obliged him to reconsider his thoughts about the world he was living in, as we will later see in the analysis of the monologue. So Ajax is both ὑψίπολις and ἄπολις; above the site, ὑψίπολις, since he dominates the art of Πόλεμος- he is already above the rest of the warriors in power and might. He also stays without a site, ἄπολις, because he believes that he can impose his will on Δίκη. He considers that he is above the gods and their will committing, thus, ὕβρις. It is this belief of his equality to Gods that provokes the tough intervention of Δίκη, the violent acting of the overwhelming sway of Δίκη, which shatters him, leading him to his final act of resistance, his committing suicide. Ajax being ἄπολις was his leap towards chaos, since he believed that Δίκη is to be overcome by mortals. His being ἄπολις, his erroneous thought that he is equal to gods has confirmed once again the power of Δίκη and its unbreakable rules and borders, which do not even let the Sun get out of its τέρματα, let alone a human being, even when that human being is the most extreme form of the violent acting of the δεινότατον. It is exactly in this perspective that we should understand the words prophet Kalchas pronounced upon Ajax:

ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν
βλαστῶν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἀνθρώπων φρονῆ....(760-761)
οὐ κατ' ἀνθρώπων φρονῶν.(777)

Thus, even though Ajax is born by nature *άνθρωπος* he does not act nor thinks like one. This makes total sense knowing what the *δεινότατον* is capable of, as we have analyzed above and in other chapters. Ajax is *ἄπολις* and it is this state of mind and existence which is driving him to act in the most extreme forms. Being *ἄπολις* he acknowledges no barriers, no limits, making him different from the other people. He does not think like the rest of the people because he has dared to make a leap towards the chaos neglectful of *Δίκη*. Acting like this he has cast himself out of the site of *Πόλις* and he stands alone, absolutely alone, against the consequences of his daring to act against the gods. This form of violent acting is the glorification of the tragic essence of the *δεινόν* and a clear warning from the part of *Δίκη* that there is no trespassing allowed. If Ajax, one of the greatest warriors the Greek army has ever known, lies helpless under the overwhelming sway of *Δίκη*, then one could imagine what would happen to the rest of us in such a case.

We have earlier said that the unleashing fury of Ajax aims at the uncovering of the world and at the adjustment of it to the moral values/ideas/beliefs of Ajax. More precisely:

“in the *Ajax* this theme is developed through the exploration of one particular aspect of human activity, the working of an ethical code.....Τους μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τοὺς δ-
ἐχθροὺς κακῶ, to help your friends and harm your enemies.”

(Knox, 1961, p. 3)

III.III The limitation of the violent acting of *δεινότατον* through *σωφροσύνη*; interpretation of the concept; relevant passages in the tragedy

For Ajax everything in the world has to be in accordance with this moral code and this is what leads him to the inevitable shattering of his *Πόλεμος* by the all encompassing *Δίκη*, which in this play, we could say that it appears more than once, mainly, through the concept of *σωφροσύνη*. The words *σωφροσύνη* and *σώφρων* appear more than once in the play and it is really interesting to grasp the meaning which is attributed to them, given the context of the play.

τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέροκτον
μηδέν ποτ' εἴπης αὐτὸς εἰς θεοὺς ἔπος,
μηδ' ὄγκον ἄρη μηδέν', εἴ τινος πλέον
ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει. 130
ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
ἅπαντα τάνθρωπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακοῦς.

Look on these things and remember:
Never arrogantly boast before the gods,
Nor raise yourself up because you measure
More in strength or weight of wealth. 130
Just one day can tip the balance of a life.
The gods love the temperate
And hate the transgressor.

μὴ κρῖνε, μὴ 'ξέταζε· σωφρονεῖν καλόν.(586)
Don't question me! Show some discretion.

ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεσθα σωφρονεῖν;(677)
Then how can we not learn restraint?

οὔτ' ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ' ἔτι,
μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ' αἰδοῦς ἔχων.(1075-1076)

Where there is no place for fear.
A military camp cannot be run effectively

οὐ σωφρονήσεις; οὐ μαθῶν ὅς εἰ φύσιν
ἄλλον τιν' ἄξεις ἄνδρα δεῦρ' ἐλεύθερον,
ὅστις πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀντὶ σοῦ λέξει τὰ σά;(1259-1261)

If you feel you have a case to plead before us,
Then remember your origins and your status;
Find a free man who is willing to speak for you.

εἴθ' ὑμῖν ἀμφοῖν νοῦς γένοιτο σωφρονεῖν(1264)

I wish that you would both restrain yourselves²⁶

In all of these cases σωφροσύνη is a demand for submission, a kind of submission, though, which varies depending on who is asking it. From all those passages we are most interested in the first one, since it is the only passage where the submission is asked by a higher divine force. In the rest of them, all of great interest as well, what we see is the asking for submission to the human order, the rules and the hierarchy of men. But what we want to see in this chapter is the expression of the δεινότατον as furious violent acting against the overwhelming sway of Δίκη. This is why, the words Athena utters are of outmost importance; through them and the disobedience of Ajax we can better perceive the tragic essence of the δεινότατον which rages against forces that are far greater than his, but, even so, he does not stop struggling till the act of killing himself just like Ajax did. So, in the first case we underline the words said by Athena to Odysseus. So, quoting Rademaker:

“According to Athena’s words, there are two things which Odysseus must avoid if he is to be σώφρων and to get the help of the gods: (a) he should not speak insolent words to the gods and (b) he should not assume pompous airs (όγκον 129) on account of any superiority over others in prowess or resources.”

²⁶ The translation of the fragments is taken from: Sophocles., Meineck, P. and Woodruff, P. (2007). *Four tragedies*. 1st ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.

(Rademaker, 2005, p.126)

Athena, representing Δίκη in this case, mainly the cosmic order which is not to be treated with lightly, is identifying the subordination to the cosmic order with σωφροσύνη. The δεινότατον must be aware of his limits and in no case can he trespass them. In the rest of the passages where the word σώφρων is used, it is describing a civil subordination, either that of the slave towards Ajax or the one of Teucer to the Atreides. Ajax, though, is paying the consequences of his insubordinance to Δίκη and not to the leaders of the army. Were it not for the divine intervention of Athena, the Atreides and Odysseus would be dead. There is no reason to believe that Ajax would change his mind at the last moment or that he would be afraid of the consequences. Thus, it would not be totally accurate to say in this case that Ajax is paying the consequences of his not submitting to the civil order. His ὕβρις, his violent acting is turning against the divine, against Δίκη and this is the reason why he gets shattered by the violent action of Δίκη reacting to his “arrogance”. So, being σώφρων, is a kind of submission to a higher order be it political, civil or divine. More precisely we could say that

“the definition — not to say the translation — of *sophron/sophronein/ sophrosune* is notoriously difficult, so wide is the semantic field. They can connote chastity or common sense, be opposed to indiscipline, sheer madness or mere ill-judgement. *Sophrosune* is moderation, self-control, prudence, sanity, good sense, mental balance.”

(Winnington-Ingram, 1980, p. 9)

Hence σωφροσύνη is the attitude that the δεινότατον must adopt when facing Δίκη. It is the act of acknowledging that there are forces, which the δεινότατον can never pass over no matter how far his efforts are manifested. But the δεινότατον is tragic in his essence and this tragic element which guides him many times, in the case of Ajax is becoming crystal clear. The fact that the δεινότατον is tragic explains why we cannot enter into a moralistic perspective accusing him of ὕβρις against the Gods. Ajax is the symbol of the extremity of the violent acting of the δεινότατον; as such he

deserves, if not our respect, at least our attention. Ajax represents that form of the δεινότητα which is completely confident of himself, sure about his moral values and sharp in his actions. Even when Ajax realises that he has killed animals instead of his hated enemies he is not ashamed for his act of killing; he is simply ashamed because he didn't manage to accomplish his objective. As Knox wrote:

“when he recovers from his delusions his only regret is that his victims were sheep instead of men, his disgrace is that he failed in his murderous attempt. Ajax did not need to be driven mad to attempt to harm his enemies; once restored to sanity he never for a moment doubts that his attempt was justified.”

(Knox, 1961, p. 5)

III.IV The monologue of Ajax (645-695); the suicide of Ajax as the quintessence of the tragic essence of the violent acting of δεινότητα

Ajax, as the δεινότητα, is the expression of the fury unleashed. He strives to reach his goal and he does not stop, not even when the check/resistance is clearly given to him. Athena “merely diverts, hinders, **checks**, limits and encourages a force already in motion (ibid p. 5)”. Thus, what Athena, as incarnation of Δίκη, really does, is to give the check to Ajax so as to make him realize that there are limits strictly and firmly set which cannot be broken by any δεινότητα no matter strong and mighty he is. Athena is the bounds which limit and eventually shatter the violent acting of Ajax. Ajax apprehends that there has been a check in his actions, an obstacle which could make him think once again of his place in the world and of his actions. Δίκη through this check has served as a serious reason for redefinition in Ajax's thought, actions and attitude. It is a mere message that Ajax has to obey to the rules of Δίκη; that he cannot go further into achieving his goal, no matter the power and the extremity of his violent-acting. Ajax has to decide whether he is going to bow his head and pride to the violent acting of Δίκη or not. His decision towards this calling of obedience from the part of Δίκη is what makes of Ajax the quintessence of the tragic character of δεινότητα, since he represents the brutal and raw violent acting of δεινότητα against the

overwhelming sway of Δίκη even when the former knows that there can be no victory against the all encompassing Δίκη. This tragic and majestic struggle we will try to analyze in the coming section:

ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται
κούκ ἔστ' ἄελπτον οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀλίσκεται
χῶ δεινὸς ὄρκος χαὶ περισκελεῖς φρένες.
κἀγὼ γάρ, ὅς τὰ δειν' ἐκαρτέρουν τότε, 650
βαφῆ σίδηρος ὡς ἐθελύνθην στόμα
πρὸς τῆσδε τῆς γυναικός· οἰκτίρω δέ νιν
χῆραν παρ' ἐχθροῖς παιῖδά τ' ὄρφανὸν λιπεῖν.
ἀλλ' εἴμι πρὸς τε λουτρὰ καὶ παρακτίους
λειμῶνας, ὡς ἂν λύμαθ' ἀγνίσας ἐμὰ 655
μῆνιν βαρεῖαν ἐξαλύξωμαι θεᾶς·
μολῶν τε χῶρον ἔνθ' ἂν ἀστιβῆ κίχῳ,
κρύψῳ τόδ' ἔγχος τοῦμόν, ἔχθιστον βελῶν,
γαίας ὀρύξας ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ νύξ Ἄιδης τε σφζόντων κάτω. 660
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐξ οὗ χειρὶ τοῦτ' ἔδεξάμην
παρ' Ἐκτορος δῶρημα δυσμενεστάτου,
οὐπω τι κεδνὸν ἔσχον Ἀργείων πάρα.
ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἀληθῆς ἢ βροτῶν παροιμία,
ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα κούκ ὀνήσιμα. 665
τοιγὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα μὲν θεοῖς
εἴκειν, μαθησόμεσθα δ' Ἀτρείδας σέβειν.
ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον. τί μῆν;
καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα
ἔτοιμ' ὑπέικει· τοῦτο μὲν νιφοστιβεῖς 670
χειμῶνες ἐκχωροῦσιν εὐκάρπῳ θέρει·
ἐξίσταται δὲ νυκτὸς αἰανῆς κύκλος

τῆ λευκοπώλω φέγγος ἡμέρα φλέγειν·
 δεινῶν τ' ἄημα πνευμάτων ἐκοίμισε
 στένοντα πόντον· ἐν δ' ὁ παγκρατῆς ὕπνος 675
 λύει πεδήσας, οὐδ' αἰὲ λαβῶν ἔχει.
 ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεσθα σωφρονεῖν;
 ἔγωγ'· ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἀρτίως ὅτι
 ὅ τ' ἐχθρὸς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχθαρτέος,
 ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις, ἔς τε τὸν φίλον 680
 τοσαῦθ' ὑπουργῶν ὠφελεῖν βουλήσομαι,
 ὡς αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα· τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ
 βροτῶν ἄπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταιρείας λιμήν.
 ἀλλ' ἀμφὶ μὲν τούτοισιν εὖ σήσει· σὺ δὲ
 ἔσω θεοῖς ἐλθοῦσα διὰ τάχους, γύναι, 685
 εὖχου τελειῖσθαι τοῦμὸν ὦν ἐρᾷ κέαρ.
 ὑμεῖς δ', ἑταῖροι, ταῦτ' ἀπὸ τῆδέ μοι τάδε
 τιμᾶτε, Τεύκρω τ', ἦν μόλη, σημήνατε
 μέλειν μὲν ἡμῶν, εὐνοεῖν δ' ὑμῖν ἅμα.
 ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴμ' ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι πορευτέον· 690
 ὑμεῖς δ' ἄφραζω δρᾶτε, καὶ τάχ' ἂν μ' ἴσως
 πύθοισθε, κεῖ νῦν δυστυχῶ, σεσωσμένον.

The long and countless course of Time, 646

Revealing what is hidden, then shrouding what appears.

Anything can happen; nothing is beyond belief—

The most solemn oath and the strongest will
 Can be overcome. Even I, who stood so firm, 650
 As hard as iron, now feel my sharp edge dulled
 By the soft words of this woman. The thought
 Of leaving her a widow among my enemies
 With a fatherless child fills me with pity.
 So I will go to the springs in the grasslands 655

At the shore and wash away these stains—
Purify myself and escape Athena's anger.
I will bury this hateful weapon in a secluded place
Deep down in the earth, never to be seen again.
Let Night and Hades keep it there forever. 660
Hector, my bitterest enemy, gave me this sword,
And ever since it first came into my hand,
I have suffered only malice from the Greeks.
Now I know that the proverb is true:
"An enemy's gift is no gift and brings no good." 665
From now on I shall know to submit to the gods
And learn reverence for the sons of Atreus;
They rule and we obey—how else can it be?
Even the fiercest and most powerful forces
Accept authority: Snow-laden winter 670
Gives ground to abundant summer;
Night's eternal cycle gives way to the white
Horses of Dawn's light. Once furious winds
Breathe softly and calm the groaning sea,
Even invincible sleep must release its grip; 675
Its prisoners cannot be held forever.
Then how can we not learn restraint?
I must. I have recently come to learn
To hate my enemy while knowing
That one day he may be my friend— 680
And that I should help my friend but know
That he may one day be my enemy.
For us, friendship is a treacherous harbor.
All will be well.

Tecmessa, go inside and pray to the gods: 685
Ask them to grant me what my heart desires.

(Exit Tecmessa through the skene door.)

My comrades, do as she does; honor my wishes.

And when Teucer comes you must tell him this:

He must attend to me and care for all of you.

Now I will leave you and go where I must. 690

Please do what I ask; although I suffer now,

Soon enough you will hear that I have found peace.

(Translation Peter Meineck and Paul Woodruff).

This speech of Ajax has provoked some controversy because of its content and style²⁷. Our main interest in examining this deep philosophical and poetical passage is to highlight the importance and the omnipotence of the change in human life along with the way everything follows the rules and the unbreakable laws of change. In consideration of the above, we believe that the analysis made by Knox is the most accurate. We will treat this passage of the play as a monologue of how the world order is perceived by Ajax; a bitter perception in accordance with which every mortal being has to follow the change in the world, the same way that Winter gives place to Sun and Night to Dawn. In this monologue we see the complete affirmation of the ever flowing character of life of the δεινότατον on earth. There can be no permanence of earth and in our lives since the αἰί belongs only to gods.

Quoting Knox

“Permanence, stability, single-mindedness -these are the conditions and qualities of Gods, not of men, For man the word αἰί is an illusion; man's condition is described by other words, words which define the fluctuating, unstable nature of human reality.”

(Knox, 1961, p. 20)

²⁷ For the different opinions and perspectives of scholars concerning this passage see: Rademaker, A. (2005). *Sophrosyne and the rhetoric of self-restraint*. 1st ed. Leiden: Brill.

The passage starts naming Time and acknowledging its power to unconceal and then conceal once again the world. The unconcealment of the world, in the case of Ajax, took place due to a divine intervention, through the violent acting of Δίκη, which has showed the borders of Ajax's struggle. Not even one pass is permitted for coming out out of these borders and this is a new reality unconcealed that the mighty warrior is faced with. Ajax is seeing the world getting unconcealed, an unconcealment, though, which does not take place as a successful outcome of his violent acting, but, on the contrary, through the total shattering of his violent acting by the overwhelming sway of Δίκη. Finally Ajax sees the world as it is, unconcealed, and he realizes that his place must be in this world, as an organic part of it and not as the one imposing his own values on it. Ajax is ἄπολις, but he is not ἄπολις with the purpose of creating once again in the site of Πόλις his own world. He is ἄπολις, because he has seen the world unconcealed and he realizes that there is no place in this world for him. The unconcealment of the world has not triggered of his acceptance of the world order, but, in contrast, it has provoked his deepest denial to keep on living in it.

Ajax, in this passage, as the δεινότατον, represents the act of denying to accept the ever changing nature of human life. As it has been said above, Ajax strictly follows the moral code of harming the enemy and helping the friends; now, having killed the cattle instead of his enemies, he finds himself in a difficult position since he failed to fulfill his goal. He knows that he was not successful in his action because of Athena, (ὡς ἂν λύμαθ' ἀγνίσας ἐμὰ μῆνιν βαρῆϊαν ἐξαλύξωμαι θεᾶς); instead of following the will of the Goddess he chose not to give up his plan of killing his enemies, preferring to kill himself. This behaviour, full of tragic pride, can be explained if we take into account the way Ajax contemplates and wants the world to be. In his own perspective the enemy should pay for what he has done. Albeit, having experienced the divine intervention, he has entered into a dead end finding himself obliged to change his values and accept the way the world is, ever flowing

ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεσθα σωφρονεῖν; 677

ἔγωγ'· ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἀρτίως ὅτι

ὅ τ' ἐχθρὸς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχθαυτέος,
ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὐθις, ἔς τε τὸν φίλον
τοσαῦθ' ὑπουργῶν ὠφελεῖν βουλήσομαι,
ὡς αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα· τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ
βροτῶν ἄπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταιρείας λιμῆν 683

In this passage it becomes evident why Ajax does not wish to accept the ever flowing character of life. Ajax has been acting in order to protect the basic moral pillar of his life: the distinction between friend and enemy. Suddenly, he feels coerced to see his cosmotheory being torn to pieces with no other option being left to him than to bow before this change. Were he to accept that submission, he would be betraying his way of life and thought. Not even the divine presence, Δίκη, is able to make him change his mind. It is under these circumstances that Ajax decides to give an end to his life as an act of ultimate resistance. His committing suicide is the acknowledgement of the way the world is existing, the bitter understanding of the world order. On the other side it also represents the ultimate denial of living in this world. Ajax's death is a moment of stability in this ever changing environment. His death becomes the symbol of the tragic essence of the δεινότατον, a δεινότατον who gives his own life so as to deny the imposed overwhelming sway of Δίκη. Surely his death will not change the world. His Πόλεμος, as a process of unconcealing the world has failed. He is no longer able to struggle in this world of lost values, in this world of continuous change. But he never accepts the fate of keeping on living whilst having lost the struggle against Δίκη. He understands that the divine order is the winner but he does not do accept to live in accordance with this order. His death is the final majestic struggle. It is the final attempt against the overwhelming sway of Δίκη. It is the glorification of the violent acting of δεινότατον who fights to the death against forces that would never be tamed by him. This struggle against the eternal change is symbolized by the way Ajax dies, namely, throwing himself on the sword which was given him as a gift by the archenemy of Greeks, Hector. As Knox has insightfully stressed, the sword depicts the stability in the change of the world:

“It is no accident that Ajax, in his last speech, dwells insistently on the fact that the sword on which he intends to throw himself is “set” and “fixed”. “There it stands firm(ἔστηκεν, 815), he says. “It is fixed in the enemy Trojan soil”(πέπηγε 819). “I fixed it myself(ἔπηξα 821). The sword is still fixed in the earth (πηκτόν 907), when Tecmessa finds him impaled on it. The repetition of this word (the natural opposite of ρεῖν, to flow) defines the context of Ajax's suicide. The steady immovable sword on which he kills himself is the one fixed point in a world of which change and movement are the modes of existence.”

(Knox, 1961, p.20)

In addition to the fixed point represented by the sword it is also important to know that this sword was given by Hector to Ajax as a gift. The arm that kills Ajax is the gift of his enemy. Even the way of dying is in accordance with the way of living following the moral code of the distinction between friend and enemy. The moral code of the friend-enemy distinction is respected till the end in its most tragic form. Having been, the moral code, the only stable point of reference in the life of Ajax, it also becomes the surest and most adequate Death. The death on the sword represents the Death as the ultimate form of denial. The last violent-acting against the triumphant overwhelming sway of Δίκη. The other choice would be to bow to the greater force and live in conformity with the ever changing nature of the world. But Ajax in the eternal change has chosen, through his death, the permanence:

“This is the permanence that Ajax has chosen. It is an eternity of hatred and loneliness, but it is the permanence he longed for-he will hate always, forgive never.His yearning for the absolute, the permanent, is fulfilled by his everlasting existence as a proud and silent hater of his enemy, alone, but free, free of the shifting pattern of constant change, free of time.”

(ibid. p. 28)

Having seen the above it would be helpful to explain here a bit further why Ajax's case is so crucial for the understanding of the tragic essence of δεινότητα. Ajax

is a fierce, mighty, arrogant warrior whose moral compass has been the distinction between friend and enemy as well as the ceaseless struggle for glory. Ajax was unconcealing the world in an Homeric, heroic way of individual struggle and, thus, he incarnated the furious violent-acting of δεινότατον in the world. In his overcoming enemies' resistances and obstacles he declines the help of the gods and he does not believe that he is in need of it. His way of uncovering the world is the glory seeking Πόλεμος. But no matter his strength or his will, he cannot confront the divine will, Δίκη. His refusing the help of the gods has set in march his last struggle against Δίκη. This struggle is taking the form of the altering of the vision of Ajax. Ajax instead of killing his hated enemies, he kills cattle and their sepherds. It is the first obstacle that he does not manage to overcome with his brute force. This check makes him understand that he cannot cross borders set by the divine will. The check that Ajax faced made him realize the ever changing character of the world, as we have seen in the analysis of his monologue. He realizes that friends can be enemies and enemies may become friends. Everything flows and nothing remains stable. In front of this ground breaking realization Ajax captures the meaning of the check. He understands that this is a world where everyone has to obey to a higher order.

τοιγὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰσόμεσθα μὲν θεοῖς 666
εἴκειν, μαθησόμεσθα δ' Ἀτρεΐδας σέβειν.
ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον. τί μήν; 668

From now on I shall know to submit to the gods
And learn reverence for the sons of Atreus;
They rule and we obey—how else can it be?

In these words, even though we could trace an irony, since as Knox commented, he should have submitted himself to the leaders and show reverence for the gods. But:

“the terms he uses are loaded with his passionate obstinacy, they make acceptance of authority appear harder than it really is, and this indicates his hardening resolve to refuse.”

(ibid. p. 16)

Thus, Ajax, even though he understands that in this world he has to obey to a higher order, he does not do so; instead, he expresses his total rejection of this revealed world order by glorifying the violent acting of the δεινότητα through his committing suicide. It is this act of killing himself which expresses in the most tragic way the uncanniness of the human being in this world. Ajax is the incarnation of the δεινότητα who even though fully perceives the meaning of the check that is confronting him, does not redefine himself but steps forward to the inevitable shattering that the overwhelming sway will cast upon him. This denial to accept the higher order when it necessitates the redefinition of our most basic moral and existential values, the preference of Death instead of the surrender to the higher order is what shows us clearly the tragic essence of the δεινότητα. The δεινότητα through this furious violent acting, through his acceptance of Death instead of obeying proves why he is the uncanniest of the beings: an unlimited fury and pride which will not stop even when his own destruction is within sight. His desire to create the world he dreams of, instead of living in accordance with what has been unconcealed and revealed to him, is another lucid expression of the unlimited will of the δεινότητα and of his most profound need to find his abode in this world, while, at the same time, being ready to destroy everything in his way or even to sacrifice himself if the uncovered world is not the fulfilment of his will and his furious existential struggle²⁸.

²⁸ Our goal in this chapter was to analyze Ajax as the quintessence of the tragic in the life of δεινότητα; this is the reason why we have focused on the articles presented above. Nonetheless, in no way does the analysis of this play get limited in those articles, since there is a lot of valuable material which, even though not possible to be presented here, it provides us a clear analysis and a thorough interpretation of the play. For more see: Christina Elliot Sorum. (1986). Sophocles' "Ajax" in Context. *The Classical World*, 79(6), 361-377, Golder, H. (1990). Sophocles' "Ajax": Beyond the Shadow of Time. *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, 1(1), 9-34, Davidson, J. (1976). Sophocles, Ajax 192-20. *Mnemosyne*, 29(2), fourth series, 129-135, Heath, M., & Okell, E. (2007). Sophocles' "Ajax": Expect the Unexpected. *The Classical Quarterly*, 57(2), 363-380 Kane, R. (1996). Ajax and the Sword of Hector Sophocles, 'Ajax' 815-822. *Hermes*, 124(1), 17-28, MARCH, J. (1991). SOPHOCLES' "AJAX": THE DEATH AND BURIAL OF A HERO. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, (38), 1-36, Lawall, S. (1959). Sophocles' Ajax: Aristos . . . after Achilles. *The Classical Journal*, 54(7), 290-294.

ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΙΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ

IV ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΙΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ: IN SEARCH OF AN ABODE

IV.I Our approach towards Πόλεμος

In the last chapter we have seen that our perception of the human being's tragic essence lies on the fact that he is the uncanniest being of all. His struggle is an inner and then an outer one. The overwhelming sway first challenges the human being inside himself and then struggles to get out. The outside is where the other struggle will take place. Summarizing a bit what has already been said, *ἄνθρωπος* (the human being) being uncanny, is always in search of his homeliness, of a place to call home on earth. This search rises from a lack, the existential lack of a home, of an abode. It is exactly this lack that makes him strive more and more. Struggle takes different forms as we can easily understand. One is an inner struggle when the human being realizes the necessity of having/finding/creating a home and the other one is this desire to give life to the material world. An ontological necessity is becoming an ontic struggle, both constituting Πόλεμος.

Before proceeding to our analysis on Πόλεμος in the life of the human being as *δεινότατον*, it would be good to further clarify some thoughts so as to avoid any possible misinterpretation. Our research is by no means an attempt to morally evaluate Πόλεμος. Our goal is not inquire if there is a way to avoid war or which kinds of war exist. Recent history has shown that war is not a toy to play with. Even though many ideas about its end may be brilliant, war is striking us fiercely bringing us back to reality. So we won't engage into a research of whether there are ways to avoid war. A lot of states currently (2015) are supposed to make their best efforts for stopping the war in Syria. The more they try to stop it the more bloodshed has not been kept away. At least the thousands of sacrificed human beings may rest in peace knowing that the "strong" states did... everything they could to... "avoid" this war. So, our investigation is an effort to analyze war as the external manifestation of the inner

struggle of the human being with the overwhelming sway, with its own tragic essence of δεινότητα. Our attempt is a philosophical, not a psychological or sociological one. Even though the above mentioned fields may be of great interest, our opinion is that philosophy can find its own word to explain Πόλεμος as one of the most ancient and primordial characteristics of the human being. So our approach towards war will be essayed through an ontological, primarily, perspective, without excluding, of course, any eventual political or social consequences. But what we need to stress here is the fact that Πόλεμος is the state and the process of ongoing activities of the human being as δεινότητα. It's not a temporal situation where we respond to the call of the arms and we start fighting. As Heraclitus thought "εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἔοντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔρην, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔρην καὶ χρεών." We never stop living in strife. Everything around us is Πόλεμος. We don't engage in Πόλεμος, but on the contrary we live in it and through it.

IV.II Δεινότητα's lack of the abode

The human being finds himself "thrown" in this world as Heidegger first coined the term. So:

"Our being-in-the-world is a "thrownness," a Geworfenheit. There is nothing mystical or metaphysical about this proposition. It is a primordial banality which metaphysical speculation has long overlooked. The world into which we are thrown, without personal choice, with no previous knowledge (pace Plato) , was there before us and will be there after us "

(Steiner, 1991 p. 87)

Human being, thus, is surrounded by people, things and the environment. It is in this playground that the human being will set out upon his journey. The human being as δεινότητα , we saw it in the last chapter, is capable of doing many things, good or bad. He also has an almost endless horizon of possibilities. The most profound of them, strange as it may seem, is a feeling of abstraction. Something is missing to him, something that makes him wonder whether this place is meant to be his home. He

starts realizing that he is ἀνέστιος and the feeling of this loss is what will guide him from now on.

Conscious of the fact that there is a lack of his most familial place, his abode, the human being starts opening paths. Each path is an attempt to uncover what is thought to be hidden. We say uncover because the feeling of lack and abstraction indicates that there is something already existing which is to be missed. Were the human being to live without an ἐστία, he would never bother himself trying to create one. He would live following and according to his nature. This is the exactly same thing doing now. In accordance with his nature the human being is on his way to find that is missing from him. Thus, we are speaking of a process of uncovering and bringing to light. The human being can live up to its essence only living and acting as the ceaseless “there” of the unconcealment.

Once embarking upon his journey, the human being realizes that his world has to be changed. If the main impulse is the urge to find the homely, then everything that is not homely is to be changed. The world gets uncovered and becomes the creative material in the hands of the δεινότατον. All that remains to be seen is if the human being stands up to the challenge. The human being decides to become the creator of his own world. But this creation/discovery of the world is not a simple task, a recollection and a new ordering of the already existing material. The δεινότατον in the creation of his own world so as to unconceal his abode is setting forth his own projection of the world and he is taking the risk of vigorously energizing his own possibilities in this search of the homely. This process, this inner and outer struggle is the most essential and conflictive search of the δεινότατον. Let us not forget the analysis made on the fragment ἀγχιβασίηνβασίην. The borders between the reaching either of the familial or of the existential hanging are not that far away. This is why the δεινότατον always steps forward as τολμάν, as daring to face the consequences of his endless urge to uncover everything that is hidden in his search. Once the struggle has begun there is no way back or retreat. The δεινότατον cannot retreat when becoming aware of his innermost necessity to find out his home; he cannot just close his eyes in front of this existential necessity of self-fulfilment. It is not the goal of our research, though, to label this necessity. We don't know whether we could call it fate, destiny or simple objective.

What we are interested in is the calling itself, a calling which sets the δεινότατον into conflictive motion and leads him to dare to τολμάν. This τολμάν, yet, is not a mere everyday challenge or a mundane task that has to be performed so as to fill our gap of boredom in the modern post-industrial society. On the contrary, τολμάν is the call for the human being as δεινότατον to become ύψίπολις, to rise above the political social spectrum of his society; but this rising makes him ἄπολις since he no longer feels part of the Πόλις which he has uprisen. Having assumed the responsibility for uprising, he is feeling now the duty of his call which is to create once again. This necessity of creating is what makes more profound the lack of what he could call home. The inner struggle with the overwhelming sway which gave birth to the call for the finding of the homely led the δεινότατον above the site, above the Πόλις. Now, as ύψίπολις he becomes ἄπολις being cognizant of the the urging need to create what he would call Πόλις, his έστία. Ανέστιος is the δεινότατον because it is his feeling of lack of the έστία that calls him forth to find his site. Through this lack comes the fulfilment of what has to be brought to stand as it is into the light.

IV.III Πόλεμος as δεινότατον's seeking for the abode; correlated fragment: 29

So far we have seen the necessity and ontological call directed to the δεινότατον so as to find his abode in this world. It is clear that this calling may take many different forms, but, at least in this chapter, we are going to see the expression of the struggle as Πόλεμος, and more precicely, as Πόλεμος is interpreted in the thought of Heraclitus. With Πόλεμος the δεινότατον sets free the overwhelming sway which lies inside him and confronts it once again in the ontic level as well. This is why Πόλεμος bears such importance in our research. Πόλεμος is the releasing of the overwhelming sway which gives the opportunity to the δεινότατον to face directly his tragic essence as the uncanniest of the beings.

Fr. 29 (53 DK)

“πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε
τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.”

“War is father of all (beings) and king of all, and so he renders some gods, others men,
he makes some slaves, others free.”

Πόλεμος is not a bloodthirsty process whose only goal is the annihilation of the enemy and the sense of joy through doing so. The human being should be much more above this even though reality keeps questioning the real “progress” of the human cultures and civilizations. Πόλεμος is our eternal struggle, our ceaseless moving forward, our getting lost in paths opened by us. Through Πόλεμος the δεινότατον releases its inner essence and tries to find out its home either by destruction or by creation. Without this eternal struggle there remains only existential stagnation and decay. Quoting Nietzsche:

“And when I saw my devil, I found him earnest, thorough, deep, somber: it was the
spirit of gravity—through him all things fall.”

(Nietzsche, 2006, p. 29)

The spirit of the gravity keeps dragging us down, not letting the δεινότατον attain its proper place in ὑψίπολις. Without the struggle, without Πόλεμος the δεινότατον is enchained since he does not have a way to let the overwhelming sway of his essence find his own way into the external world. Were it not for the Πόλεμος everything would fall apart.

“ wherever no struggle reigns, standstill, leveling, equilibrium, mediocrity,
harmlessness, decline, fragility and tepidity, decay and collapse, in short: passing-away
sets in on its own.”

(Heidegger, 2010, 74)

But why should we consider Πόλεμος that important in our life? The answer to that question is not a simple distinction between “war” and “peace” where everyone

would see the obvious, namely that we all prefer peace and prosperity. Πόλεμος is our questioning of the world, our violence-doing on the world so that it may be revealed as the projection of our waiting possibility to be accomplished, “we question the world we don't take it as granted. This is why we come into a confrontation with it(ibid.74)”. By questioning the world, the δεινότατον as uncanny tries to make the world the place he could call home. He does not simply accept what is given adapting himself to the already existing politica/social/cultural spectrum. Πόλεμος, strife, is the δεινότατον's denial to go back to his *ἔστιά*.

But which is the denial of the δεινότατον and how is it manifested? The δεινότατον rejects to accept the world as it is and to live in compliance with it. His denial is based on the feeling of lack; a lack of his most familial place where he could dwell and live according to his nature and his essence. So the denial is an existential one, a product of the sheer determination of the δεινότατον to change the world, to uncover what is hidden and to create; at the same time, this denial is the acceptance of his own essence. The realization of his uncanniness and his desire/will to live according to it. Πόλεμος is the setting free of δεινότατον's deepest and tragic essence. It is a pure *τολμάν* and it is a strife of unconcealment. Were the δεινότατον ready to accept with no second thought the world which he was “thrown” in, he would not fulfil his inner essence. He would live in harmony with the rules of the Πόλις; the matrix that encompasses him would make him passive and obedient to what has already been decided for him. The unconcealment, with all its risks, would give its place to a silent embrace of the concealing passivity. Πόλεμος, thus, is the violent and radical expression of the denial to accept the already given world as the only one in which the δεινότατον has to adapt himself. It is a denial which is in complete agreement with what the δεινότατον represents:the inner and outer strife with the overwhelming sway. Πόλεμος is much more than violence doing. Πόλεμος is change, destruction and creation. What has to be broken into will be broken into, since the δεινότατον is *παντοπόρος*. There will always be ways to break out of the world's order. Once out of them the δεινότατον will stand on his own with the responsibility of finding what he most deeply desires, otherwise he will get lost in the dead end of his unfruitful *τολμάν*. There are no hideouts and refuges once the search has commenced.

Πόλεμος is as extreme as the essence of the δεινότατον. The outcome will be either the existential hanging or the finding of the abode. This is the struggle of the δεινότατον; the consequences are as tragic as his own essence.

Δεινότατον, when, finally, being called upon for the search of what is most familial to him, starts perceiving the world in another distinct way unlike the normal society does. Δεινότατον is not willing to retreat in the mass or to stay there following the already accepted norms, traditions or loss of traditions. Were the δεινότατον to be satisfied by the already existing schema how and why would he be yearning to change the world? Would he feel out and far away from what he could call home? The lust to find his refuge is the product of his uprising against the society and his denial of the way the society interprets everything surrounding him. This refusal is what motivates the δεινότατον to unleash the overwhelming sway so as to confront it in the outside, destroying and creating relationships, institutions as well as every constituent elements the human society consists of.

What is then the way the δεινότατον fights in this world? As it has been aforesaid, the struggle of the δεινότατον is double: Inner and outer. During the inner struggle he realizes the necessity to find the place he could call home, his refuge in this world. The other struggle is taking place outside him, in the world surrounding him. This struggle is what we could call history since it affects/changes the whole structure established in this world. The role of the δεινότατον is a double one: Destruction with the appearance of the ontological-ontic gap that follows it and then creation along with the bridging of the gap. Neither destruction nor creation are a simple task since the same δεινότατον is involved in every possible threat and risk that he is willing to provoke in the world. Destruction and creation are tied to each other since destruction has to be always the means to create something. In our analysis of the δεινότατον we saw that he was capable of doing many things bad and good. This is why once he gets detached from his most basic goal which is the uncovering and the creation of the world there can be only onslaught from his side. Everything has to do with daring, *τολμάν* to face what the δεινότατον really is and with readiness to accept his most profound way of being and living. The concept of *τολμάν*, analyzed above, is able to give us the motives and reasons of the actions of the δεινότατον. Thus, double is the

struggle of the δεινότατον, double his role and double the battlefields of this struggle. The first one is the inner one, the same essence and being of the δεινότατον where everything started. It is in this inner battlefield that δεινότατον first realizes the tragic aspect of his essence as δεινότατον. It is inside him where he realizes that he is the uncanniest of the beings. Only there does he confront the overwhelming sway which tries to dominate him. This is where everything starts. The δεινότατον pushed by the necessity of lack of what is most familial to him has started reflecting and willing a place to call home. In other words, he has already started struggling. But once the battle has started in the inside, it cannot be restrained there. The human being as δεινότατον is a part of the society of a Πόλις. As an actor he needs actions to define him and what he really is. It is inevitable, thus, that the struggle with the overwhelming sway storms out of the δεινότατον and is taking place outside him, in the social matrix where he belongs, in the world itself. The struggle that takes place in Πόλις and in each Πόλις is where the δεινότατον releases the sway and struggles against it. The δεινότατον in this struggle is fighting for a change. The world is not a passive agent, a simple location where things and actions take place. On the contrary the same world is the battlefield of the δεινότατον. The battles happen there and the world is transformed according to the actions occurring in it. The δεινότατον sees the world as the place where his creative/destructive actions are to be released. It is an unconcealment that has not taken place yet. It is the change that is coming to be, bringing the δεινότατον closer to what is most familial to him. This is a radical way to see the world since someone could accuse δεινότατον of depriving the world from its proper will and transforming it to a simple tool for the goals of the δεινότατον. But that is not exact, since as previously seen in the chorus of Antigone, the relation of the δεινότατον with the world is a relation of struggling to uncover. World is not an already acquired tool waiting for the δεινότατον to use it. World is the non ceasing resisting activity against the δεινότατον. The violence doing of the δεινότατον is always answered and countered by the violence doing and the resistance of the world against the δεινότατον. Nothing is granted except for the necessity of the δεινότατον to struggle ceaselessly against what he believes that still remains covered.

From the above we could easily deduce that the world is the battlefield for the δεινότατον. It is not a mere passive agent where the δεινότατον simply releases his fury and his uncanniest essence. It is the existential landscape where the δεινότατον leaves his footmarks trying to find what is really at stake: his *ἔστιά*. The world is the place of seeking and of finding. It is the ground on which everything is to be found, The world, thus, becomes the site of the continuous releasing of the δεινότατον. The δεινότατον is always in struggle in this world- a struggle that unconceals and sets under the light what the δεινότατον thinks that is covered. The endless striving is the endless uncovering of the world. The world is the circumference of the violence doing of the δεινότατον. In each struggle of the δεινότατον this covered circumference is brought slowly into light showing to the δεινότατον the unconcealed landscape that he struggles for. It is only by seeing the world as a battlefield that the δεινότατον fulfills his search for his own essence. All the actions in the world all the outer oppositions that he may have are only resistances, a “check” that creates friction to the interminable striving so that the δεινότατον can see clearer and more thorough what he really is.

IV.IV The check as resistance to the violent activity of δεινότατον

But which is exactly the role of that friction? Is it just a passive resistance towards the struggle of the δεινότατον? We could say that it is exactly this friction, this resistance that helps the δεινότατον redefine in each single case his own essence. The Πόλεμος, the outer struggle against the overwhelming sway, is a never ending one which always renews itself. The δεινότατον cannot accomplish what he wants in one single outbreak where he will uncover everything that he believes to be covered. The unconcealment is an everlasting strive. The resistance he faces is the necessary obstacle the δεινότατον is in need of so as to dedicate the time and the effort necessitated to the reflection of the world. The lack of the abode is surely what makes the δεινότατον engage into the existential struggle. But in no case could it be said that the δεινότατον already possesses the knowledge of the world. The world is covered for everyone, the

δεινότατον included. What differentiates the δεινότατον from the rest of the world is that the δεινότατον is aware of the need to uncover the world. Speaking about the modern world, when everyone tries to switch on the light so that artificiality may be shed in the room, the δεινότατον is the one going out into the open air to search the light of the sun and of the primordial calling of the abode. No artificial benefits or customs may be attributed to the δεινότατον. Were that the case nothing could distinguish the δεινότατον from the rest of the society. In our post-industrial society the δεινότατον expresses the struggle of the primordially against the overwhelming artificiality of technology and the humanotechnological way of thinking.

Going back to our main question concerning the check, the resistance applied on the δεινότατον is his “compass” in the uncovering of the world. Δεινότατον is not a beast which unleashes thoughtlessly his fury. The δεινότατον is the uncanniest of the beings because he finds his home in an uncovered world and not in the one full of shades where he finds himself thrown. The resistances he faces guide him into the world. Each time he faces a check he redefines his position in the world, he changes his attitude towards what has already been found and he thinks before acting. He reflects about what has to be done next. This check is crucial since it works as a never ending source of possibilities. Whenever he faces resistances he internalises what has already been found and he projects possibilities about what may happen later. The uncovering of the world works as a fountain of new possibilities, of redefinitions and of changing of directions. There is no beginning or end in this world. The uncovering of the world is not a linear process. On the contrary, it is a vertical one, starting from the superficiality of the society and going deeper and deeper into the innermost essence of the δεινότατον. So, each time that there is a check or a resistance, the δεινότατον in his reflection connects himself to the uncovered world. He orients himself to a pure relationship with what is surrounding him. Were there no checks there would be no reflection, no definition made by the δεινότατον concerning his own existence. That would be the case where the δεινότατον would lose his essence in an endless expression of fury. The δεινότατον then would not try to find his place in the world through the uncovering but he would endeavour to impose his will on the world; with no thinking or reflection concerning what would happen if he could not find his home

in this world. This is the main difference between the pure destruction and the uncovering. In the destruction the δεινότατον releases the overwhelming fury which he faces in every single aspect of his life in the society, in the world. His life then would be dedicated to taming what cannot be tamed. Were he to “tame”, conquer the world, then he would never be able to find his place in this world because he would have conquered and probably destroyed everything connecting him with the world. The ὕβρις of conquering what is not to be tamed would be the existential abyss of having conquered everything and still not being able to find his place in the world, παντοπόρος-ἄπορος.

On the other hand, the δεινότατον who dedicates his life and efforts to find his place in the world is acting in terms of uncovering. He struggles against the overwhelming sway but he gives time to thought and reflection. After each resistance, each struggle, he orients himself and he tries to see where he can stand at every moment. His goal is not the domination but the uncovering of the world so as to be finally able to realize which is his place in it and how he can be genuinely connected into an organic whole. Were there no resistance how could he be aware of his progress, of his going deeper into his own essence? There would be no dialectical relationship since the strive would have no check, so the δεινότατον would have no reflection about what he is doing and he would go forward as a blind wave devouring not only the external existence but his own essence as well. The means would become his goal and then the existential abyss would embrace him showing him the meaningless of his actions.

IV.V The importance of Δίκη for δεινότατον; Heidegger’s definition of Δίκη (Correlated fragments: 60,52,28,31)

In order, however, to better understand this distinction between the two different ways of approaching what is most familiar to us, we should see a bit closer

one term coined by Heraclitus and Heidegger as well, namely, Δίκη. So according to Heidegger Δίκη is:

"the *deinon* as the overwhelming is manifested in the fundamental Greek word *dike*. We translate this word as fittingness <Fug> thus, the *deinon* as the overwhelming (dike) and the *deinon* as the violence-doing (techne) stand over against each other, although not as two present-at-hand things. This over-againstness consists, instead, in the fact that techne breaks out against dike, which for its part, as fittingness, has all techne at its disposal (Heidegger, 2014, p. 178- 179)"

What can be deduced from the above given definitions? That Δίκη as fittingness is what makes everything fit inside it, it conjoins. The human being, the δεινότατον of all, is not to be excluded but in no case, as said before, is willing to find his place there without struggle or resistance. It is inside Δίκη that the δεινότατον tries to find his place, it is exactly in this all encompassing fittingness that the human being struggles to find his abode, and probably his own essence. The arrogance of the δεινότατον, ὕβρις- which is always followed by Νέμεσις- is manifested when he tries to break the borders of Δίκη, when he believes that there are no limits which could stop him from becoming the new measure (μέτρον) of Δίκη, the new fittingness of the world. It is precisely at this point that we have to be really careful in approaching the two different ways through which the δεινότατον tries to find his abode. In the first case, δεινότατον is violence-doing against Δίκη so as to find his own abode inside Δίκη. His main goal is to find it, this is why his violence-doing is based on the seeking of what he could call home. In the second case though, δεινότατον is oblivious of the point from which he started and believes that he can violate the borders of the fittingness, of Δίκη. It is exactly this supercilious perception that leads him to the existential abyss. The human being can never come out of the fittingness, but he can always struggle to find his own proper place in it. The struggle is not a black-white opposition where one wins or loses. Finding one's own place within Δίκη is what brings into attunement the δεινότατον to the fittingness synthesizing through the opposition a new approach towards what has previously been struggle. The overbearing fight, though, fomented by the intention to become the ultimate ruler, the governor of what cannot be governed by a human being, is what leads to the destruction of δεινότατον.

The importance of Δίκη is clearly highlighted in the fragment of Heraclitus:

Fr. 60 (99 DK)

“εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, ἔνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν.”

“If there were no Sun, for all the other stars it would be (perpetual night.”

Fr. 52 (94 DK)

“ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι
ἐξευρήσουσιν.”

“Helios(Sun) will not overstep his measures; otherwise the Erinyes, ministers of Justice
will find him out.”

The meaning and the importance of Δίκη are clearly highlighted in those two passages through its role with regard to Ἥλιος (the Sun). What is the Sun? Even though those fragments can also be interpreted, and have already been interpreted in association with physical phenomena, our approach will be different. The Sun, as we can understand in Fragment 60, is the one which guarantees the existence of light in our realm. There is a clear difference between the Sun and the perpetual night. Were it not the Sun there would only be night. And were there only night there would be no possibility of unconcealment. So Sun is the one providing to humanity the possibility of appearance. It is through Sun that the world appears to us, and then it is our responsibility to become aware of that fact. But Sun is the primordial unconcealment, the eternal source of the possibility of appearance and unconcealment. It is under the Sun that we see the world. It is under the Sun that we can develop ourselves in the world. Everything is brought into light by the Sun and it is this bringing into light that gives us the possibility to interact with the world. But even the brighting Sun, which is providing us the clearance of the world and the limits we can act and live in, the Sun itself is limited by the abyss surrounding it:

“The entire world of Helios, to which the entirety of πάντα belong, is encircled in a deeper sense by a nightly abyss which confines the domain of power of Ἥλιος (Heidegger and Fink, 1993, p. 42)”.

Even the almighty Sun has no power over everything. It may be the life giver in our world but it also has limits. Those limits are the ones protecting us from what lies outside the Sun, from an abyss that cannot be enlightened not even by the Sun.

So, everything in our world is tied to limits. There can be no trespassing of limits as expressly stressed in the fragment 52. Sun will never get out of its limits because Δίκη will always bring it back to its bounds. Our world is a world of order, even though it is not always clearly seen. It is an order imposed by Δίκη. Δίκη does not let Sun go out of its limits letting the Abyss enter into our own world. Moreover Δίκη does not let the Sun set light upon darkness that is not to be unconcealed. What is to be known is provided to us as a possibility of knowing by the Sun. What cannot be unconcealed won't be unconcealed by the Sun, even less by the δεινότατον. Our battleground, thus, is fixed. Our struggle as unconcealment has a set territory out of which there is no jurisdiction for the δεινότατον. Our battleground, thus, is fixed and set by limits, namely those Δίκη has imposed. Δίκη, by seeking the limits, even though it might seem as an oppressive agent who limits the human activity-especially in our days where there is a profound desire to believe that we are oppressed by every single thing- in fact it is the protector of the possibility of unconcealment given us by the Sun. Through the limit imposing it keeps the unconcealment into our life and our world not letting us enter into the never giving possibility of unconcealment of the Abyss surrounding us.

Even though many translators may use the word justice so as to most accurately reflect the sense of Δίκη, we cannot say that it is a literal translation. Δίκη is not to be thought only as justice, since that would restrict our perspective concerning its importance. It's not a set of laws or a feeling of moral justness. Our purpose here is not to appreciate the different interpretations given to this fragment. The reason to quote it, is that it shows us clearly the role of Δίκη as fittingness. If the Sun is not allowed by

Δίκη to get out of its borders, how could it ever be possible that a human being, even the δεινότατον, be permitted to trespass the borders of Δίκη? The importance of respecting Δίκη is given by a Greek myth, namely, the myth of Φαέθων (Phaethon). The son of Sun was brought down by a thunderbolt when he proved ineffectual to control his father's charriot. Δίκη, thus, as the fittingness, allows the struggle within what it encompasses so that attunement may rise out of the struggle. Never could it be challenged by the δεινότατον since it is in Δίκη that the ceaseless occurring takes place. Δίκη, thus, is not a single limit, border, which, as if it were some kind of oppressive agent, limits the human beings as if afraid of losing its reign of encompassing everything. On the contrary, Δίκη is the "where" and the how of everything taking place. Δίκη is the fittingness which does not leave the world to spin thoughtless and without a purpose. It is Δίκη that engages us into struggle so as to find our own place in it. Were it not for Δίκη there would be no order. Δίκη, thus, is allowing no human ὕβρις to cross the borders. It's a totally different matter to try to find through struggle our abode inside Δίκη and our unleashed ceaseless fury to dominate the world and become the ones setting the new borders. Νέμεσις will always follow the δεινότατον when drunk by his lust for dominance and unmindful of his goal gets lost in his violent-doing activity.

Having clarified a bit further the relationship between Δίκη and δεινότατον, we have to state clearly once again that the violence-doing of the δεινότατον is not only accepted in our spectrum but is also required and necessary for the stability inside Δίκη. Quoting Heraclitus once again:

Fr. 28 (80 DK)

“εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἕοντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ’
ἔριν καὶ χρεών.”

“One must know that war is common and strife is justice and that all come to pass by
strife and necessity.”

In this passage as well, the role of Δίκη in our world is even more lucid. It is in Δίκη as fittingness where the violence-doing of the δεινότατον occurs. It is this

ceaseless struggle that passes through every being in Δίκη and arranges the whole, a whole always included in Δίκη. Πόλεμος, thus, seen in this perspective is inevitable and common to all of us. Πόλεμος is a necessity since it is through strife that Δίκη is existant. Δίκη is strife because it is exactly through this strife that everyone finds his place inside Δίκη. There can be no crossing the limits nor violating the borders. Everything is in Δίκη; Δίκη is strife so everything comes to pass through strife. Strife, thus, is not to be morally evaluated as if there were good strife and bad strife. Unfortunately many acts of war and violence have put the moral label on them, “blessing” their sacred goals when what they were trying to do was simply to abolish Δίκη and impose their new moral world order. How many wars have been waged in the name of Humanity? How many good and evil actors have appeared in the course of thousands of years? It seems that there are people who believe that a good cause is enough for justifying any possible means which will help its being accomplished. More specifically, many times we believe that when the “good cause” demands it we can overcome some limits-moral or ethical- while reassuring ourselves that we are morally legitimated to do so because of the “importance” of our goal. It would be really interesting, at this point, to quote Carl Schmitt since his comments about some of our “sacred goals” are more than enlightening concerning their disastrous consequences:

“The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.”

(Schmitt, 2007, p. 54)

This is a crystal clear presentation of what happens when human being as δεινότατον tries to impose a new world order, when instead of trying to find his ontological home on the earth, he sets the limits for all the other human beings in the name of their own good. This is what constitutes the ὕβρις of the δεινότατον. When

the δεινότατον believes that he is the “chosen one” who can command what is the best for the whole of humanity then we can clearly see how, lost in his fury for dominance, he hides his true goals behind a moralistic vocabulary. This attempt to violate the world order of the Δίκη is a quite common phenomenon in our modern society. In our individualistic society where the individual has become the centre of the Earth, the rest of the nations/people become the necessary means to accomplish our individual goals. How many Arab Springs are there going to be begotten so as to glorify the “western values”? How can people ever understand Democracy when it approaches them in the form of a bomber? Δίκη is giving us in the world the opportunity to unconceal through struggle what is surrounding us so as to find our home in this world through a coexistence with our environment and the rest of the people. Our process towards unconcealment will, beyond any doubt, make us release our violence-doing against other δεινότατα as well, but even this struggle is going to be our own struggle, our personal struggle in search for our έστία. But when we consider ourselves able to impose our own ideas on the rest of the world, what we are doing is not an unconcealment; on the contrary, a new concealment of what is already concealed under the shade of our own perspective of the world. The δεινότατον will many times believe that he has the moral authority to set new limits to the world, rearrange the borders of the world in accordance with his liking through his dominance. It is the arrogance, the ὕβρις of the δεινότατον that makes him believe that he is above any order, and in this ardence lies the hidden tragic essence of the δεινότατον. But this arrogance will never be able to trespass the limits of Δίκη. That is why this violent-doing of the δεινότατον will always be shattered by the resistant violence-doing of the Δίκη.

One of the many outcomes of this(un)willing ὕβρις of the δεινότατον is the thought that there are wars, Πόλεμοι, that can be made in the name of peace, namely that there are wars which are different from the others just because their goal is the bringing of peace (?!). It has been expressly stated before that Δίκη is strife. There will always be struggle in the world. Struggle is what maintains the world in motion and does not let it rot:

“καὶ ὁ κυκεῶν δίσταται (μὴ) κινούμενος”

“The barley-drink disintegrates if it is not moved (stirred)”

Everything remains because of the motion. Were there no change, everything would fall apart. If we take into account that some ideas about the “end of history” were totally wrong, then we can try to understand how change is moving everything in our world. If we attempt to stop the change, if we think that unleashing our fury as δεινότατον will replace the Δίκη then we are speaking senselessly. There can be no end of history, no definite world order imposed by humans or ideologies. No ideology is meant to last forever because times change and so do our needs and abilities. How could there be any common characteristic between people who gave their lives for their ideas and for people of our modern society who believe that they give their struggle by retweeting messages or “spreading” revolution via Facebook? The world is changing, the way we struggle has changed, but the only thing that does not change is change itself. Were there no struggle there would be no change, thus, the most basic thing that could be done is probably to accept that simple fact, namely that change is strife and strife is Δίκη. Any attempt to stop strife using the “golden remedies” of ideology, be it neo-liberalism or any other messianistic post modern ideology, is bound to a deafening failure.

Summarizing what has been said so far, we conclude that Δίκη as strife always sets the limits. No arrogance of the δεινότατον is able to fight against what is encompassing it. So, strife is inevitable and necessary. Nonetheless, what can vary is the reason behind someone's decision to struggle and against whom he is struggling. The search of home through struggle makes sense inside the territory of the fittingness since it is inside Δίκη that δεινότατον struggles against the overwhelming sway. What cannot be done, though, is going against the fittingness itself. The very well known schema of Υβρις/Νεμεσις is sensibly showing us how there can be no way out of the fittingness. So, when δεινότατον tries to break the boundaries, lost in his fury and power, he will never be able to achieve what is not meant to be achieved by human beings.

“Γᾶν ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν, ἀποτρύεται”

“the earth, the indestructibly untiring, he wearies,”

No matter the fury he unleashes, the tragic struggle he sets free, his violence-doing can only achieve what is destined to achieve. The earth will never be tamed by the δεινότατον but it is in/against the earth and in the ocean where his struggle, his seeking for the abode, takes place. The struggle to find one's ἐστία is a struggle worthy of the effort. But the struggle to encompass everything is the purest expression of ὕβρις which can only be followed by Νέμεσις. Δίκη is strife and its through strife that Δίκη is. No man can ever become Δίκη itself, and no one can ever defeat Δίκη. Δίκη sets the battleground of /for search and it is through Δίκη as strife that we will ever be able to unconceal what is hidden from us. Δίκη is strife and strife is our primordial struggle for unconcealment. The δεινότατον as everyone else, is projecting possibilities. Possibilities that affect him and the world surrounding him. The possibilities vary according to what he considers to be his home and according to the world he wants to create so as to feel safe and integrated. Our world, the world of δεινότατον, thus, is becoming a series of possibilities waiting to be accomplished.

IV.VI Further analysis of the idea of check; fragment 25: analysis of Kahn and Heidegger

Previously, we referred to the idea of a check, which serves as a resistance that helps δεινότατον reflect on the world he is living in, while he is struggling to find his abode there. It would be useful to analyze a bit more this concept so as to make clearer its significance in the struggle of the δεινότατον. While being in Πόλεμος, δεινότατον is going to face more and more challenges. His struggle is not a linear one- he keeps going forward like if it were a race in the course of which the first who could cross the line would find his inner peace. On the contrary, from what we have already seen, the world is the circumference of δεινότατον and it is in this battleground where through Πόλεμος the world is being unconcealed by δεινότατον. So the latter is both:

uncovering the world and redefining his place in it at any moment. Nothing is already known since there is always a change; a change of the world which is being unconcealed and a change of the attitude of δεινότατον seeing the world getting unconcealed through his actions. But the process of the unconcealment is not simply a minutory one, as if everything suddenly appears in front of the eyes of the δεινότατον. Δεινότατον, probably, through a projection of his possibilities in the world might be able to take a glimpse of how the world is to be uncovered, but, till action is being set on march, the possibilities could not be effectuated. So, δεινότατον acts in the world as the embodiment of the possibilities in the concealed world. Thus, future in the perspective of δεινότατον plays the role of the projection of possibilities which undoubtedly affects the present of δεινότατον. Δεινότατον acts not as an unmoving being but as a want of becoming. His projection on the future is going to influence his present situation and this is the compass he always uses. But, in no case, could it be said that his projection of the future would be materialized just the way he wants it. Were it to be so, that would mean that δεινότατον had already exerted his control over the world and that everything were in plain sight; so everything that he would have to do would be a good mapping of his futural actions. But the world is concealed. Hence our projections on the future are only possibilities. As a consequence many times we will be in the need of changing them and planning everything once and again. This is the reason why we have to be really careful with regard to the role the check plays in relation to δεινότατον.

While δεινότατον being in Πόλεμος unconceals the world, he comes across resistances or unexpected impediments. Δεινότατον is in need of those resistances since, thanks to their stopping him he is obliged to reflect on his progress and consider whether he is going towards what he truly wants or not. If δεινότατον never stopped progressing, he would have never been conscious of that this progress is really existant. With no friction to slow him down he could not be aware of the fact that his life depends upon the process of a ceaseless change and progress. Those checks guarantee that the eternal change could be conceived by δεινότατον. The crash of δεινότατον with the check is not, as we can easily understand, a pleasant experience. It signifies a certain type of failure, an ambition that won't be completed, a misreading of what he

believed that would lead him to the correct place, closer and closer to find his home. But this is why *τολμάν* plays such a crucial role in the life of *δεινότατον*.

Through *τολμάν* *δεινότατον* is decided to fight his way through the world, unconcealing it. If he didn't dare to force, in spite of the obstacles, this risky passage, something quite common in modern society, then no change would take place in his life, in his way of thought. He would feel homely even though being at the most unhomely situation of having no need to see the way the world is. Ordinary life and works usually succeed in limiting our thoughts to the small matrix of our everyday tasks. But if *δεινότατον* thought like that, probably there would be no necessity to analyze his actions and thinking as we have already done. *Δεινότατον* may feel unhomely where most of the people feel being at home, that's why *δεινότατον* living in *Πόλεμος* is guided by *τολμάν*. Daring is what motivates him, what breaks the chains of accepting the regularity of a peaceful and quiet life. *Δεινότατον* is tragic in his essence, and this tragic elements make him act in the uncanniest of the ways.

The way, though, that *δεινότατον* perceives those checks may vary. These are cases when *δεινότατον* does not realize the purpose of the check and he only contemplates it as an inconvenient obstacle set in front of him. When seen like that the check loses its significance since it has not been perceived as a stimulus which would engage *δεινότατον* into rethinking his whole plans or intentions. In that case the check does not fulfil its function as a stimulus for redefinition and *δεινότατον* sticks at the same route of action and thinking. The consequences of this inevitable crush of *δεινότατον* will be later analyzed in another chapter. At this point we will focus mostly on the importance of the check when perceived as a reason for redifinition and rethinking of the course of thought and events.

Thus, when *δεινότατον* realizes that in the march of the events there is a resistance preventing him from going on with his plan, then he reflects on the found friction. What has been an external hindrance becomes interiorized in his thought through reflection. So, the check becomes a thought which makes *δεινότατον* reconsider the way he projects his possibilities on the future. The appearance of the check, always taking place through the never ending unconcealment, redefines the

way δεινότατον acts and reacts in the world. The fact that this check exists is a proof that there has to be a change in his attitude and relation with the world. Even though the world gets unconcealed it is not supposed to be unconcealed the way δεινότατον wants it to be. Let's not forget that Δίκη is strife. The all encompassing fittingness is full of struggles. There is going to be no easy way for the unconcealment of what is already covered. So, when the check becomes interiorized, δεινότατον, through this reflection on the obstacle inevitably engages into a self reflection since the major issue that arises here is the same relationship of δεινότατον with what is surrounding him. Things and situations that were covered, thus, unknown, as to their depth, to δεινότατον, unconceal themselves showing the erroneous way in which δεινότατον was perceiving them. When δεινότατον realizes that he has been misled through false projections, he starts redefining his own place in the world and his relation with it. This redefinition, even though it may change some of the ideas or hopes about the future, it most surely leads to a deeper knowing of δεινότατον in the world. Instead of being seen as an unsuccessful attempt it is seen as the only way of a deeper connection with everything that surrounds him.

This more profound connection is exactly what unites δεινότατον to the world. Since the check is helping δεινότατον to deepen his knowledge concerning the world and his same self, it would not be irrational to believe that to a certain extent it is contributing to the organic unity inside the encompassing fittingness, Δίκη. This can be supported by the fact that it is through a thesis and antithesis that we can have a synthesis. It is only by the check that δεινότατον may realize that a new perspective has to be adopted so as to go on to the unconcealment of the world and the finding out of his home. Δεινότατον never stops redefining himself in the world and each new decision cannot be based but on his other failed attempts. There can be no perfection inside Δίκη. Were perfection attainable then no strife would have been needed. However, from what we have already seen, only through strife can there be what there is. This conclusion has to be accepted by δεινότατον because it is the strife and the struggle to overcome each check that lets him understand that he is progressing but not like if it were a linear process. On the contrary it is, through a deepening of the knowledge of himself that takes place the progressive unconcealment of his

circumference, of the world. The world can not be unconcealed if δεινότατον is not aware of his place in it. Only through strengthening his bond with the world can δεινότατον realize where he really stands in reference to the world. Each check is a step for self reflection and inner- outer unconcealment.

Traces of what has been said so far can be also found in the thought of Heraclitus in one of his fragments:

Fr. 25 (10 DK)

“συλλάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον διᾶδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.”

“connexions: things whole and things not whole, something which is brought together and something which is brought apart, something which is in tune and something which is out of tune; out of every thing here can be made a unity, and out of this unity all things are made.”

“Graspings: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all.”

(Kahn, 1979)

For the analysis of this fragment we are presenting here two potential translations proposed by Marcovich and Kahn; the ancient greek word συλλαψίεις whose meaning is crucial for our better understanding of what has been above presented concerns the check and the resistance. So while Marcovich is translating as connexions the word, Kahn is using a more literal meaning, utilized till our days in modern Greek as well.

Quoting Kahn:

“Most commentators, groping for some clue, assign to syllapsies a sense that will fit the rest of the sentence: 'Zusammensetzungen' (Snell), 'things taken together' (Kirk),

'connections' (Marcovich), 'assemblages' (Bollack-Wismann). But none of these senses is attested for syllapsis (Attic syllepsis) in archaic or classical usage. Such renderings tend to short-circuit the process of understanding, by taking as point of departure an interpretation that can only be reached by an analysis of the whole sentence. Before Aristotle (for whom the word can mean biological 'conception' or 'pregnancy'), the only sense attested for syllepsis is the bodily notion of 'seizing, laying hold of, arresting, apprehending' (LSJ s.v. syllepsis II; this is still the standard meaning of the term in Modern Greek)..... Other, less usual senses oisyllapsis (or syllepsis) are nonetheless essential for deciphering CXXIV. (1) Syllepsis is etymologically a 'taking-together', a physical conjunction or concatenation of sounds or the like, as in the cognate syllabe, 'syllable'. (2) Syllepsis can designate the cognitive act of collecting together, comprehending, or summing up." (Ibid. p. 295)

So, Kahn is proposing the translation of the word as seizing or arresting (σύλληψις in modern greek too) which brings our mind the role of Δίκη in our world as seen in the fragment 52 concerning the not letting of Sun's trespassing the borders of his natural movement. In fragment 19 as well, we see that Δίκη plays the same role "Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας". Hence there is possibly a connection between Δίκη and seizing or arresting. In addition to the above given definitions we also see that there could be another translation, namely that of taking-together and comprehending. Both of the translations given are making perfect sense for us because, as previously said more than once, Δίκη is the all encompassing fittingness which lets nothing get out of its borders. It is the limit of every natural thing and, most importantly, the reminder that δεινότατον may not cross some borders which are not meant for him to cross. Δίκη sets the limits and as a matter of fact, it is apprehending δεινότατον inside his own borders, while, at the same time, a taking-together of everything in our world is occurring inside its own borders, Sun not excluded. Δίκη, thus, is gathering and setting limits which cannot be passed.

Being a difficult fragment there can be various interpretations, emphasizing on aspects that are of most interest to each case. Concerning *ὅλα και ουχ ὅλα*, wholes and not wholes, Kahn says:

“both terms also express in their plural form the idea of the manifold as such. And in terms of semantic content, the notion of 'wholes' indicates a subordinate diversity of parts and thus a greater richness of structure, a more organic unity, than the contrast of *one* and *many* alone.”(ibid. p. 297)

While there can be no arguing that there is an organic unity expressed in those fragments, the idea of a manifold with parts and then a richer structure is closely resembling a system, which, in our opinion, does not clearly express the meaning of this fragment. The word *εν* bears great importance and it is through that word that we reach at the understanding of the rest of the parts of the fragment.

Marcovich translates the *εν* as unity, and in our opinion, this translation is the one that most clearly presents the essence of this fragment. The *εν* is the unifying- a kind of unity that brings everything together. Probably it is to be understood as

“an encompassing unity that the many in entirety gather in themselves.... We must think *εν*, the one, as the unifying (Heidegger and Fink, 1993, p. 21)”.

So, *εν* as the unifying is what highlights the organic unity of the world. There are no parts leading to a greater whole, but, on the contrary, everything is united and there are different expressions of this unity since there are antitheses expressed in this unity. Thus, unity is a gathering of the things even though some of them are out of tune while some others not. Some of them are brought together while some others are brought apart. But there is no exclusion, no division into parts waiting to be properly put so as to create the perfect whole. The unifying one unifies everything and it is through antithesis and contrast that everything is unified. There is no need for everything to be in perfect accord with what our mind would call accord or order.

The unifying one is unity in a way that we cannot perceive as long as we are unable to understand the unifying synthesis of every antithesis²⁹.

It is under the light of this interpretation that we can now better absorb the role and the necessity of the check, resistance, that has been mentioned above. The checks, the obstacles that δεινότατον comes across, are not splitting him from the world, obstructing him, thus, from reaching his home. On the contrary, these checks are what δεινότατον really needs so as to better digest the way the world is united. Every resistance is obliging him to think and rethink the world and his place in it. Only through the reflection provided by the check is δεινότατον able to realize the antithetical synthesis of the world. The check is what brings δεινότατον out of his path making him understand that there is a path after all. The unconcealment of the world can only take place like that. Δεινότατον has no clairvoyance regarding the way the world is; neither is he a wheel in the machine which could be put, taken out, modified or replaced. Even though, in modern society, technology is making everything seem replaceable and is promoting a mechanistic way to see the world, this comes as a result of the blindness of δεινότατον who believes that every check or resistance in his way is an obstacle that has to be eradicated instead of seeing it as a perspective which he has to integrate so as to deepen his knowledge concerning the world. The main goal of δεινότατον in modern society is to march forward without stopping. Having lost, most of the time, his sense of belonging to the world, he does not care about the unconcealment since he believes that the covered world is the real one and tries to unleash his fury against each check that crosses his way. This is the ontological blindness of ὕβρις. Δεινότατον of modern society has become a success machine, a number whose only intention is to increase and increase without any limit. Δεινότατον has become an artificiality and only through the primordial ontological suffering for the downfall of his existence does he realize that no technology, no numbers can limit his essence. Δεινότατον, so, influenced by the (post) modern artificial society thinks that each check is an enemy, a bar blocking his success. Seen like that, the check loses its meaning and becomes a simple wheel of the machine that has to be taken out and

²⁹ For a further analysis of the “One” in the thought of Heraclitus and of its relevance to the thought of Parmenides see: Papamichael-Paspalides, E. (2005). THE CONCEPT OF ONE IN HERACLITUS. *Revue De Philosophie Ancienne*, 23(1), 41-54

replaced. Finally, when success(?) appears in the horizon, Δίκη as fittingness intervenes and shatters the vanity of the insolent δεινότατον.

What can conclude from the above, is that check is not a simple part in the life of δεινότατον. Check is the necessary impulse that makes δεινότατον understand that he is a member of an organic unity which knows no parts since everything is unified, through the antithesis, by the unifying one. It is through the seemingly “opposite” force of the check that δεινότατον has the opportunity to reflect on the world and his role in it.

Only through the check does he reach a deeper understanding of what remains covered since through reflecting on the way the world is and the way the world resists towards his actions, does he manage to interiorize the world in him and to orientate himself inside it. Everything in this world happens through antithesis and strife, and this is the way the unconcealment takes place. Only in the struggle of the violent-acting of δεινότατον against the world and only through the dialectical relationship with the check, will he ever be able to grasp the unity of the world, leading him slowly to the unconcealment of the world³⁰.

³⁰ For a more general approach concerning the relation of parts and the whole in the thought of Heraclitus see: Ungar, S. (1976). Parts and Holes: Heraclitus/Nietzsche/Blanchot. *SubStance*, 5(14), 126-141. For an analysis of the relation between the Universal and the Particular, and, more specifically, of the the relation between ξυνόν and its opposites in the thought of the Ephesian philosopher see: Pucci, P. (2005). HÉRACLITE: L'UNIVERSEL ET LE PARTICULIER. *Revue De Philosophie Ancienne*, 23(2), 21-37.

V. ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ AS THE WORLD UNCONCEALING LIGHTNING

V.I Πόλεμος and Δίκη; explanation of the importance of Δίκη

In this chapter we intend to go further into the study of Πόλεμος' crucial role in our understanding the way the δεινότατον unleashes his overwhelming sway in the actually ontic world. We will also endeavour to point out that Πόλεμος is the act of unconcealing in the world, an act which not only brightens, probably instantly, the way the world is being, but besides, is unconcealing the world in its moment(s) of reformation, at the exact time of its changing. The world, through Πόλεμος, gets highlighted in its instants of change, instants in which the checks are respected, trespassed by others, while the Δίκη having faced the overwhelming sway of the δεινότατον reestablishes its borders and limits. Πόλεμος, is, thus, a quick terrifying glimpse of Δίκη at the critical moment(s) of the reestablishment of world's order, when the γίγνεσθαι of the latter is being manifested.

It's a fact, too, that Δίκη's role in our research is equally critical, as shown forth through our analysis of the relevant fragments of Heraclitus along with correlative texts in the plays of Sophocles. Δίκη, for us, is not a single concept, inherited blindly by the Ancient Greeks and indiscretely upheld just for being repeatedly used in order to simply be preserved as word. What makes the difference is that the Ancient Greeks probably had a more profound insight into what Δίκη means and did not just restrict it to a purely legal interpretation of Justice. Δίκη, for them, was much more than a set of laws and moral values. Δίκη was the overwhelming sway encompassing the world, the δεινότατον not excluded. In our research, too, it is perceived like this. No pragmatic interpretation could be given if based only on a mere calculation. We don't walk in the street showing violations of Δίκη although, while walking we can surely witness violations of laws. The essence of their difference is more than evident. Being asked,

thus, why we consider Δίκη to be so important, or why should this world order even exist, our answer should be: for the same reason the dignity of human being, the value of life and the respect for the other(s) do exist. This question would go deeper and deeper generating an endless dialogue. Our response, though, is a bit more concrete. We believe in this world order because we have seen its way of being manifested not only in the works of the Ancient Greeks but in their life as well- more particularly in the schema Υβρις-Νεμεσις-Καθαρσις. We do believe that one of the ways by means of which the δεινότατον sets free his violent acting is Ὑβρις, and we also believe that this acting is always smashed into pieces by Δίκη. Dating back to the fights of Satan(Εωσφόρος) and his personal war against God till the military defeats, in our times, of powers like the USA in Vietnam, the USSR in Afghanistan, Israel in Lebanon(2006), among other examples, this schema never loses its efficiency; what we cannot see, however, is its full completion in the temporal spatial matrix of our own. The fact that we do not get to see the result of one action does not mean that there are no results. Surely Δίκη is not in the need of proving anything to anyone. We are the actors and the ones who bear the responsibility of our actions. Thus, we have to prove whether or not we are in a position to vitalize the existence of Δίκη in our history and our society.

Following the course of thought of the Ephesian philosopher, as will be later explained in this chapter, we can realize that the world is always in motion, in movement; this movement is driven by strife, by Πόλεμος, pursuing interminably the route that Δίκη permits. This interpretation may be striking to the people of our century for whom the concept of Πόλεμος is tantamount to violence. Criticism and countless comments about its immoral character teem in facebook and twitter. It has also been said that pen is mightier than sword. Undoubtedly, it would be a relief to all those in Syria and Libya, or elsewhere, who have experienced the destruction of their houses, culture and life, to know that they simply have to go to a bookstore and to buy a pen in order to effectively match the violent force of the bombs slaughtering their families. Pen is mighty, of course, but Πόλεμος is mightier. Many times this same pen is propounding an idea, that urges people to engage in Πόλεμος. An idea, may inspire thoughts, beget desires, stimulate intentions, but without real expression, without

practical/practibile actualization it will only remain an idealistic activity, vague in content and more equivocal/ambiguous in results. Πόλεμος is the idea energized, the intention implemented and the change made apparent. In no case do we want to restrain the idea of change to Πόλεμος- to its sternely military sense. But Πόλεμος is a military act as well and it would rather be naive to try to deprive Heraclitus's thought from this way of thinking since his numerous fragments concerning heroes, battles and sacrifice in struggle make it plain that Πόλεμος, for him, as for the rest of Greeks too, is a reality, a violent expression of their essence as the δεινότατον. To give another example of how we are going to proceed towards the concept of Πόλεμος, it would be useful to remember the saying of one of the greatest literature writers and thinkers in modern Greece, Nikos Kazantzakis, who, when asked by a reporter about his opinion on war, in 1936, answered: "Neither for nor against . . . as I am neither for nor against earthquakes (Bien, 2007, p. 9)". His opinion, especially stipulated in such words may have caused and still causes controversy. In our case, though, we will put aside the moral/moralistic aspects concerning Πόλεμος and will leave them out of our research. We are not trying to show or uncover a normative principle which would abolish once and for all Πόλεμος, or would greatly diminish its consequences. Πόλεμος, has always existed in human history. The defence of the Western world was hypostatized in Thermopylae and the expansion of the Hellenic spirit was accomplished through the might of Alexander the Great. The modern world's march, as well, in the 20th and 21st centuries, is greatly framed by the winners of the Second World War. Πόλεμος, once and again afronting is present for ever. That's why, our purpose here is neither to close our eyes vis a vis its appearance nor to engage ourselves in wishful thinking. What we want to do is to attempt to philosophically investigate this primordial relationship between the δεινότατον and Πόλεμος.

After having noted the above we will try to reach, through the Hellenic spirit and thought, the issue of Πόλεμος. It is exactly in the context of this thought and in this perspective that a thorough philosophical analysis of such an important and always actual issue as Πόλεμος is, might be better pursued. This is also the reason why so much emphasis has been led on the interpretation and the thought of Martin Heidegger, one of the great thinkers who clearly saw the necessity to go back to the

Presocratic philosophical approach so as to enable us analyze the history of thought itself. Our difficulty with regard to this approach reckons upon the fact that the ideas and points of view of modern society concerning Πόλεμος have become almost impersonal. The concept of πολίτης-οπλίτης is becoming day to day of increasingly less importance for the people of modern societies, whereas the power is yielded to mercenaries who wield it as if the duty to serve the (ir) country were a usual simply job like any other. How many of us, european citizens, do know about where our armies are fighting or deploying military activities? How do we react? Are we even aware of the fact that places far away from our homes are being assaulted by bombs that our soldiers and armies throw? It seems that many of us are hiding the issue of Πόλεμος in our closet trying to avoid its being present in our everyday life. Antiwar manifestations take place, moral issues are raised, thinkers start signing declarations against war and then another important domestic issue appears leaving the issue of Πόλεμος behind. It seems that the δεινότατον in modern society is not living the changes but is only changing folders not interrupting the normality of his everyday life. No matter how much we try to hide some issues or to pretend that they do not exist, Πόλεμος is still there, and will be there probably till the end of times. Πόλεμος is change, Πόλεμος is Death and Πόλεμος is Δίκη as Heraclitus said. The least we can do, thus, in this research, is to take Πόλεμος seriously and to do our best in embarking upon the analysis of its philosophy and its influence on the tragic essence of the δεινότατον.

V.II Πόλεμος and Heraclitus; Πόλεμος as the unconcealing lightning (Correlated fragments: 79,80,28)

We will proceed, now, to the interpretation of the fragments of Heraclitus concerning Πόλεμος; we will try to further and deeper analyze the idea of Δίκη as well as its relationship with Πόλεμος. Our analysis starts from two fragments of Heraclitus(79,80) where the idea of Πόλεμος and strife, even though not openly declared, may well be hinted by the context of the fragments.

Fr. 79 (64 DK)

“τα δε παντα οικιζει κεραυνός”

“Thunderbolt steers all things”

Fr. 80 (11 DK)

“παν γαρ ερπετον πληγηι νεμεται”

“Every animal is driven to pasture with a blow”

Those two fragments are essential since they represent the way that the world is flowing. The world is flowing through Πόλεμος and strife. Different opinions have been expressed concerning the relation between those two fragments (see Kirk, Gijon, Marcovich). So, endowed with all these more than valuable sources, we will attempt to approach those two fragments in a different perspective, a perspective which owes, though, much to the work of Heidegger and Fink in their seminars concerning Heraclitus.

Starting from the fragment 79, we see that there is a lightning which steers the world, the universe, all the things-different interpretations have been also given concerning the way τα πάντα should be translated; in our approach we will focus on the way the human beings are placed under the guidance of the lightning. Two things are of outmost importance in this fragment: the fact that we see the presence of a lightning and the action performed by the lightning, the steering of the world. The verb οικιζει, comes from the word οικξ which means, amongst other definitions, handle of rudder, tiller (Liddell-Scott). So the lightning is like the captain of a ship who has the control of the ship and guides it through the waves. Lightning, thus, appears as a guiding force of the human beings in the world. But lightning, being fire, has another characteristic as well; lighting is a flash of light which brightens, for an instant, everything. It is the light that brings everything into appearance no matter the darkness. So, through lightning, things appear in front of our eyes. But they do not appear as static beings, just standing and having light shed on them. They appear in

movement, right at the moment they are guided and moved by lightning. So lightning does not only let things appear in front of our eyes but in addition it is the force which guides us and sets us in its course, the same way that the ship is guided under the command of its captain. Lightning unconceals the world at the moment the world is moving, following the course set to it by the lightning. Unconcealing and movement/change, are the two elements that will be further analyzed in our effort to see whether we could interpret them as Πόλεμος and strife.

Before commenting the analysis of the afore mentioned fragments and characteristics it is noteworthy to concentrate on one passage from the analysis of fragment 53 made by Heidegger and Fink in their seminars. Fink, thus, says:

“Now war, that is strife, is named father and king of all things. As the father is the source of children, so is strife, which we must think together with ἐν as lightning and fire, the source of panta (Heidegger and Fink, 1993, p. 24)”.

Even though this is an analysis made for another most famous fragment of Heraclitus it's to be stressed that strife, Πόλεμος is connected with the lightning of our fragment. Later we will also examine in greater details this fragment, but, at this point, we can center on the relation between lightning and strife. Why could we associate lightning and strife? Apart from all of the symbolisms that lightning may have, as the weapon of Zeus, etc. (see Heraclitus and Kirk, 2010), in our case lightning is the bringer into appearance of the things in their movement. It illuminates while it is changing the things in accordance with its course. But what lightning does here, namely οιακίζει, reminds us of another fragment of Heraclitus:

Fr. 28 (80 DK)

“εἰδέναι δὲ χρή τὸν πόλεμον ἕοντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔρην, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔρην καὶ χρεών.”

“One must know that war is common and strife is justice and that all things come to pass by strife and necessity.”

What we see is that everything happens according to strife, which is Δίκη, and everything comes to pass by strife and necessity. The same way that the thunderbolt is steering everything, the same way everything happens according to strife. Strife guides the actions and the movements in the world; strife is Δίκη, the all encompassing world order, which does not let happen anything out of its borders as we have already seen in previous chapters. So, strife, lightning, is the struggle taking place inside Δίκη. More specifically “κεραυνός” is in a certain manner the joining and again the dismantling in reference to τα πάντα (Heidegger and Fink, 1993, p. 28)”. The lightning, strife, Πόλεμος sets the pieces once again in the matrix of Δίκη. The checks are made to change, the δεινότατον acts and the world is getting reformed. Lightning “ is the bringing forth to appearance but it is also a steering intervention in the moving of things themselves (ibid. p. 9)”. The ever flowing character of the world is put into activity and movement by the lightning which flashes everything and sounds the horn of change in the world.

What we mean speaking about the change in the world is the following thought. In the past chapter we saw the role of Δίκη as cosmic order, an order which cannot be violated by the acts of the δεινότατον. But inside Δίκη the δεινότατον is able to redefine himself through the confrontation with the checks, the resistances he would be facing in the word and inside Δίκη. So, in our case, Πόλεμος is the lightning which brings forth all the things necessary to initiate the struggle. Quoting Fink:

“The steering bringing forth to appearance is the more original movement that brings to light the whole of entities in their manifold being moved and at the same time withdraws into it.”

(ibid. p.11)

V.III Further analysis of the relation between Δίκη and Πόλεμος (Correlated fragment 45)

The lightning, thus, strife, is the force which reforms the checks and their position inside the cosmic order of Δίκη. It is a force of reformation and of setting anew, an endless force of changing of borders and actions. Thus, once the checks have been placed in a different order the δεινότατον as well is driven towards other directions and towards actions which will follow this everlasting change of checks. We could picture the process taking place as an inner reconstruction of what is involved and included in Δίκη. Δίκη, with its very strict and specific borders, can never be violated. No trespassing is allowed. But inside Δίκη changes can take place without altering what Δίκη is. Seen in an organic perspective the quintessence of Δίκη is not changing because of the regroupation of the checks and actions that take place in it. On the contrary it is only through Πόλεμος that what Δίκη is can keep living and existing. This can be better understood if we think of a case where the permanence would prevail and there would be no necessity of change or struggle. Let's take a simple example of the oppressor and the oppressed. We don't think of a world where this would not exist, where equality is already prevailing because we still have not found a "veil of ignorance" able to this end. We just take the life as we have seen it more than once either in the History of Thucydides or in every other single place of the world. The permanence in our case would only mean the permanence of the oppressor against the oppressed. No struggle would mean no change and no change would mean that there would be no Δίκη at all, no cosmic order since everything has already been established. But this is not the case as we have seen more than once. There is passivity surely in the δεινότατον, but activity as well; the δεινότατον can't only be passive or active. Both elements are included in his tragic essence and both of them find their way out and get expressed as struggle and Πόλεμος. Permanence means rottenness and lack of energy and change. No movement is a decay and a total lack of reaction. However, there can never be such a situation where there is no reaction. The overwhelming sway of the δεινότατον is not meant to be unexpressed or perpetually tamed. Δίκη needs strife because Δίκη is strife, because strife is change and change is life. A world of no changes

is a world of decay and injustice depriving the δεινότατον from changing what he does not accept or tolerate. But the world is a battlefield of ideas and actions. Were it not it would become a graveyard of long lost actions and intentions. But as Heraclitus more than once highlights in his fragments this is not possible. Everything happens according to strife and this is the way the world keeps living. From the explanation given above we can understand that everything that takes place in the world, every change and every struggle happens inside Δίκη. Δίκη never changes, never loses its power or never surrenders in front of the will of the the δεινότατον. What Δίκη does, though, is an inner reshape, an intrinsic replacement of all its organic parts through the setting of checks/resistances. Δίκη is expressed as a manifold since manifold is also the expression of the human action. That's why, the lightning as well, even though it clearly shows the way and steers everything- highlighting in this way its importance and power over the δεινότατον- is still a part of the Δίκη. It is not an external factor which transcendently appears and interrupts the cosmic order. On the contrary, it is a crucial part of the cosmic order since it expresses the call to arms for the internal change inside Δίκη. In other words, lightning " brings to light the multiple things in their articulated gathering (ibid. p. 5)." In the world everything is an articulated conjunction which, as every living organism, expands to find its space, retreats when it's not able to proceed further, loses and triumphs. But everything is taking place inside Δίκη, inside the cosmic order. Not even the Sun is allowed to trespass its borders, let alone the δεινότατον even in the fullest exteriorization of his overwhelming sway.

But in order to better conceive the necessity of Πόλεμος in the context of Δίκη, it would be interesting to see one more fragment of the philosopher of Ephesus:

Fr. 45 (23 DK)

“Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἦδυσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.”

“(Men) would not know the know of Justice, if these things(i.e wrongdoing or injustice) did not exist”

The importance of this fragment as regards the relation between Δίκη and Πόλεμος, lies on the fact that the element of change and antithesis leads to a better understanding of the world. We do understand that Δίκη is existant by doing things which are not in accordance with it. Only through the reflection provoked by the antithesis are we able to see the importance and the face of Δίκη. Were the human being perfect there would be no need for Δίκη because that would be the only way in which we could live. But human being is far from being perfect and there is always a personal struggle so as to find which is the order of this world. Πόλεμος, thus, is the violent way in which Δίκη is getting reestablished in the world. It is not a single useless violent outbreak. On the contrary, Πόλεμος, as the ultimate expression of the violent acting of the δεινότατον either can reestablish or intents to trespass the borders of Δίκη. It is the first move in a series of moves for the establishment of Δίκη. Others will cross the borders, others will fix them back. But there is one thing for sure: only through Πόλεμος can we understand the quintessence of Δίκη, the powerful overwhleming sway which encompasses the world steered by the same lightning of Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος thus, is the source of both the trespassing and the fixing again of the borders of Δίκη. Πόλεμος is the necessary step out of the path, which makes us comprehend that there was a path after all. The δεινότατον, losing himself in Πόλεμος, reaches the point of realizing that being lost means that there was an abode, a place which he would consider himself safe; the remoteness of his being from that place in Πόλεμος is what makes him understand that getting lost is the only way to realize that there is always somewhere from which you get lost, and this somewhere is the abode inside Δίκη. Outside Δίκη everyone is lost and crushed. But inside Δίκη and through the Πόλεμος and the overcoming of checks, the δεινότατον can realize that only through change and strife could he ever be able to consider his place in the world. Only through seeing αδικίαν may he ever be conscious of the existence of Δίκη. The history, thus, of mankind is the rising, the falling and the struggle between those two moments; the attunement to the cosmic order and the falling "from grace". Nonetheless, each falling is the proof of the possibility of a new rising again. It is not the damnation of the δεινότατον, but, rather, a call to arms for his new uprising.

Having seen the above we can understand why Πόλεμος is crucial for the δεινότητα both inside the world and in the schema of Δίκη. Everything is struggle, everything is change and every single step is oriented towards the better understanding of Δίκη, either by living and acting in accordance with it or by falling away from it. In the two cases, the δεινότητα is given the possibility to understand its role and its limits inside Δίκη. The difference, though, between the archaic and primordial concept of Δίκη and the Δίκη-Justice of modern society, is that ourdays Δίκη is believed to be imposed by the few, either States or people, depending on how each one sees the distribution of power. Δίκη has become the implementation of law, Justice in juridical terms. Its primordial meaning gets lost in various interpretations of different and endless laws. Abstract ideals are made efforts to govern the world not taking into account that inside the world there are divergent checks and resistances. Not everything is the same. Different cultures, different points of view, different ideologies arise now and then. Different seeds in different grounds will never produce the same fruit. That is why there can be no implantation of Δίκη in the world by the δεινότητα. The δεινότητα is an important actor in the cosmic order. He is never the cosmic order and he can never become it. Every attempt to do so will inevitably lead to his total destruction by the all encompassing Δίκη. If there are limits for Sun itself, then how could we ever believe that we could go higher than it? So, coming back to our subject, we see that in our globalized society there are actors who try to impose their concept of Justice on the others. It seems that concepts like “freedom”, human rights, rights in general, humanity, the good, the rational religion, tolerance and so many others, have become a kind of fixed formulas meant to be respected in the same way by other countries non allied or considered to be dangerous for the western type pattern of application.

The criticism made before in no case is against the ideas and the values expressed above. It is merely an open political and philosophical criticism to everyone who believes that he is representing and incarnating Δίκη in this world. The bloodiest wars are those meant to be the last wars. Πόλεμος is change and, in most of the cases, an inevitable struggle between opposite forces. There is a difference between a war destined to protect and defend what is sacred and holy for each society and the war

made in the name of the global human values with the intention to establish a global status quo accepting the rules and orders of a specific Δίκη. There can be no specific Δίκη, there is only one, unique and for all. Every attempt for the world order to be substituted will only lead to more destruction and arrogance since it aims at the imposition of a specific point of view as a truth which is not meant to be questioned. Πόλεμος, thus, is not a phenomenon of its own. It does not take place between abstract ideas and words. Πόλεμος is our tragic essence unconcealed and set into an ontic struggle. Πόλεμος, as lightning, may be guiding us but we are not its puppets. What comes out of the δεινότατον in Πόλεμος is the same essence of the δεινότατον- not a single mask which is put on us by Πόλεμος as if there were no change. Πόλεμος is not only a mirror of the essence of the δεινότατον; in addition, it is the most primordial calling so as to set ourselves in the unconcealment under the brightness of lightning at the most crucial moment of the reordering of Δίκη in the world.

From what we have seen so far we can reach two basic conclusions: The first one is the moral neutrality of Πόλεμος, at least seen in the perspective presented above. According to the second one, which we are going to further analyze, Πόλεμος is the uncovering of the possibilities for the δεινότατον in the world. It is through Πόλεμος that the δεινότατον projects his own coming to be perspective in the future and struggles to accomplish it. Πόλεμος, thus, is the outbreak of the will of the δεινότατον expressed in his innermost will to find his abode in the world, in the everchanging but always unique matrix of Δίκη. Let's further examine the ideas presented above so as to cast light on any possible doubt concerning the meaning of what has been said.

Following Heidegger, the translation of the famous fragment of Heraclitus concerning Πόλεμος should be like that:

“ Battle is for all beings indeed the creator, yet for all beings also the ruler, and it indeed makes some manifest as gods, others as humans, bringing some to light as slaves, yet others as masters (Heidegger, 2014(b), p. 112)”.

In accordance with this translation Πόλεμος fulfills a double role: Not only does Πόλεμος create, as father, the beings, but it also governs them during the

outbreak of Πόλεμος as being their ruler. Better said Πόλεμος “preserves and governs beings in their essential subsistence (ibid. p. 112)”. So, it is in Πόλεμος where beings appear as they really are. Gods are differentiated from humans during Πόλεμος and not before its outbreak, since Πόλεμος is the uncovering of the possibilities for each one and the primordial calling to the beings to become what they really are and to show themselves in this act of unconcealing inside Πόλεμος. Nothing is taken for granted before Πόλεμος. No superiority of the free man against the slave, not even that of the gods against human beings. Only through the outbreak of Πόλεμος humans are given the possibility to fulfill their role and essence. Πόλεμος gives each one the opportunity to materialize in an ontological and ontic way what he is or aspires to be. This manifold of possibilities and actors is making even clearer the necessity of struggle presented inside Δίκη. There can be no stagnancy inside Δίκη because that would destroy its inner harmony and quintessence. Strife is Δίκη because only strife gives everyone the same opportunity to project his possibilities in the future and struggle to make them real.

What we can deduce from the above mentioned is that Πόλεμος could also be considered as a call for the struggle of will in the material world. The will of the δεινότατον, first expressed in his primordial necessity to find his abode in the world, now is being tested in the trial by fire, since one possible outcome of Πόλεμος, and probably one of the most common, is Death. Πόλεμος and Death have a profound relationship; inside Πόλεμος Death appears as a possibility which cannot be hidden nor overlooked. Death arises as the end of our ontic existence and becomes the most personal and private possibility of each δεινότατον in Πόλεμος. The issue of Death will be weighted in the following unit, but what is of interest here is that this element of Death is what gives Πόλεμος the significance it bears into our life making it the steering light inside the world. Πόλεμος is an uncovering of possibilities, Death included, and it is exactly this uncovering of possibilities offering everyone the opportunity to arise the way he is. Under this light we can better understand why Πόλεμος is the lightning that steers everything. Being a lightning, fire, it brings into light the possibilities of the δεινότατον. These possibilities are no longer hidden or overlooked, but on the contrary, they appear in their most bright light. And this

lightning steers everything, because it makes the δεινότατον, act and release his will against the overwhelming sway outside him. Everyone has to act in Πόλεμος because it is inside this thunderstorm where the will of each one is to be fulfilled, fulfilling simultaneously his own essence either being God or mortal, slave or free being.

V.IV Πόλεμος as an act of unconcealing; Πόλεμος as ontical and ontological phenomenon; the different facet of war in modern warfare and society

More than once we have referred to Πόλεμος as an act of unconcealing and as the primordial calling which urges the δεινότατον to act and to unleash his violent-acting against the overwhelming sway of Δίκη outside him. It's important, at this point, to further clarify those two basic traits of Πόλεμος, namely, why it is an act of unconcealing and why it is to be considered as a calling.

If we speak about the unconcealment it's clear that we are speaking about the concealment as well. Something has to be covered first so as to be brought to light later. What is concealed in this case is the world and the abode of the δεινότατον- more specifically his relation with the world along with the urge to find his place in the world. As seen previously, the δεινότατον finds himself thrown in a world that he has not created. Having familiarized himself with the world he starts changing the world and this lust for change expressed in its most violent form is Πόλεμος. So Πόλεμος elucidates things because it motivates the δεινότατον to act, to no longer be a passive receiver of the changes of the world, but to become the origin of them. Everything flows in the world and Πόλεμος is the proof of the indispensable acting of this change. So, through Πόλεμος, the δεινότατον tries to change the world in order to shift it according to his own preferences, perspectives, needs and formations, different ways of perceiving the world and, inevitably his own change. Πόλεμος, when being in the form of lightning, is “world forming (Heidegger and Fink, 1993, p. 16)”, because it changes the form of the way we see the world and it uncovers perspectives and

relations with the world that would not have existed were it not for the outbreak of Πόλεμος.

So far we have seen a possible explanation concerning Πόλεμος as the act of unconcealing. Now let's try to understand why it should be perceived as the primordial calling addressed to the δεινότατον for change. This calling is not an abstract one coming from the opening of the skies or from voices with unknown origin. It is the same, the δεινότατον, that urges himself to unleash the violent acting of his inner struggle with the overwhelming sway outside him, in an ontic and material way. Having seen being as the δεινότατον in the choral ode of Sophocles we should not be taken by surprise if Πόλεμος comes as an expression of the fulfilment of the tragic essence of the δεινότατον. As seen in the last chapter the δεινότατον struggles against checks-sometimes against Δίκη itself. This struggle, though, in its most originary and sincere form, can be no other than Πόλεμος. This primordial calling is the calling of the δεινότατον towards himself to become what he is destined to be through the seeking of his abode in the world. From the very first moment he realizes that he is in lack of his abode in the world, he has already declared what he is destined to become. The origin of the struggle, is at the same time, the sought end of it. The origin becomes the wanted end, an end that can be achieved through Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος is the proof of the absolute commitment of the δεινότατον to his search for his abode, to his becoming what he wants to be; and it should be considered like that, taking into account that Πόλεμος needs sacrifice probably leading to Death, in other words the ontic end of the same δεινότατον. So, Πόλεμος is the primordial calling because it breaks the artificial surface of the modern society's features, a society that many times asks for/solicits the sacrifice not of itself as unity but of its representative chosen to this effect; as if life were an exchange of responsibilities and benefits. On the contrary, Πόλεμος, speaks directly to the δεινότατον, at his most personal level, a level in which there is no hiding in the mass or looking at the other side so as to avoid the response to the calling. Πόλεμος represents the ever going struggle between artificiality and primordiality; a primordiality expressed in the ontological necessity of the δεινότατον to become who he really is through the search for his abode.

One question that may arise here is why in our research we are generalizing the concept of Πόλεμος broadening, thus, its philosophical importance in contexts which are not considered to of exclusively philosophical nature. The fact is that we are not trying to project our analysis of Πόλεμος as if it were the only possible philosophical and ontological interpretation. It goes the same for our defining the human being as the δεινότατον. There may be a variety of possible definitions concerning those two overused concepts and ideas. What we want to show, though, is that Πόλεμος brings changes and is driven by the necessity of people to change their surroundings. It would be strange to imagine Πόλεμος taking place with no reason at all whereas all the members involved are happy and harmonious in their relationships. We have seen ideological wars, wars to defend one's country, wars to destroy economies if being profitable to the attacking party, wars to impose ideas where they do not fit etc. Although the optic angle could be very ample, it is essential to understand that it is absolutely connected to the idea of change, thus, bringing us back to the ideas of Heraclitus. If this change is positive or negative it's not up to the war to side with on the ideas and ways of acting of the ones participating in it. But even though Πόλεμος and the way each one interprets it may vary, there are cases where we clearly see the distinction between different expressions of war. Who could say that the war of the USA in Iraq and Afganhistan was so important or morally legitimate when compared to the defence of the 300 in Thermopylai? Who could compare the colonialism applied by the western forces in Africa and so many other areas to the campaign unleashed by Alexander the Great in Asia whose achievements and greatness are mentioned and glorified not only by the ancient historians/scholars, among others, probably in the Quran (DHUL-QARNAYN) itself.

Our opinion in this research is that no war is exactly the same as any other war, like no δεινότατον is the same as the other ones. There is also another great difference worth mentioning. It's not sure at all that each single person, each δεινότατον, will reach the fulfilment of his essence by releasing his violent activity against the world so as to change it and find his abode. Nor could we say that Πόλεμος is the only way of releasing the violent activity. How many thinkers have they provoked changes in the world after their death only thanks to their thought and their writings? Certainly,

Rousseau did not participate in the French revolution; nonetheless his ideas paved the way for the tremendous change that was to follow. Nietzsche is another typical example of an influential thinker; many different ideologies have tried to adopt his ideas and “recruit” him in the pantheon of their heroes and thinkers. Those people, those thinkers, although not engaged themselves in Πόλεμος, inevitably let their seeds in their ground of inspiration, seeds which were later harvested by people engaged in a total and material Πόλεμος.

But even though our conception of Πόλεμος and the way it outbreaks may vary, in modern society, we also have, through technology, the phenomenon of an artificial familiarization with war. In the broadcast everyday we are being informed about armed struggles taking place somewhere on the planet. Everyday somewhere people are struggling taking the lives of one another. Our role in this violent outbreak is that of the spectator or the audience. We are watching scenes of war, we hear comments and analyses about it, we see the images of dead people and after the news cast is over we usually take it out of our mind and keep going on with our usual rhythm of lives. It could be said that the distance, the lack of substantial knowledge concerning the countries involved in the war make it difficult for us to develop an empathy towards those people who are getting killed. This artificial familiarization with war, nonetheless, is what makes modern war even more tragic. If war loses its earthquake like impact on people, if people do not realize that war is the most violent outbreak that the δεινότατον can unleash, then we are not only losing our idea of the authentic character of war, we are also losing our idea about our own authentic being. Πόλεμος is too huge and profound to be hidden behind a tv screen during the moments of the news cast. War is the most dramatic change the δεινότατον can bring in the world and this ground breaking element of Πόλεμος has to be understood; not to be lost in the modern society's artificiality; one of the latter's main roots is irrigated by the economic/techocratic spirit of our times.

Thus, selling and buying stocks in the market has progressively become the new version of war and Πόλεμος in our society. Were real war like that then Sparta of Leonidas would probably be the least frightening power in Ancient Greece's era and Athens would be ruling till our days. But economy is economy, politics are politics and

war is war. It seems, though, that the spirit of our age wants to convince us of the fact that economy, as well, is war- eventually, in our epoch, its most efficient description. So, step by step, war has mainly become metamorphosed into numbers and money exchange. It is naive to believe that this is the case when Europe has witnessed the outbreak of two global wars accompanied by the loss of millions of people, no matter the real causes of these wars, were they economic political or ideological. What really matters is that war was waged, Πόλεμος in its most violent aspect. The δεινότατον as the bearer and destroyer of possibilities was engaged into real war and brought about real consequences: not numbers and statistics but bloodied battlefields, victims, heroes and martyrs. This is the face of war we are dealing with in our research and this is the idea of Heraclitus about Πόλεμος.

In concluding, Πόλεμος is to be searched for in two levels: the ontological one, expressed as the realization from part of the δεινότατον due to the latter's lack of abode in the world, and the ontic one, which is the setting free of the violent activity of the δεινότατον against the overwhelming sway of Δίκη. The ontological level, where ideas may arise and develop is the fundamental base upon which the ontic reaction of the δεινότατον is to be erected. Everything takes place inside the δεινότατον and inside Δίκη, as we have seen in previous chapters. This is the battlefield inside which Πόλεμος is to be understood and interpreted in our research.

VI. ΔΕΙΝΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΙΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ: ABSTRACTION AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DISTANCE

VI.I Modern warfare and the ontological distance

In the last chapters we have attempted to deal with Πόλεμος following paths opened by Heraclitus and then paved by Fink and Heidegger. Through this process we will endeavour (hopefully) to seek after a deeper and more accurate approach to the idea of Πόλεμος in their thoughts and in our lives.

In the new chapter we will essay to point out how Πόλεμος is progressively becoming more and more distant in our society; speaking of distance we don't refer to the long distance weapons, endowing in abundance modern armies, but to an ontological distance in the form of an existential chasm between the δεινότητα and Πόλεμος. More specifically, what we intent to show is that δεινότητα in modern society is trying, in every possible way, to keep Πόλεμος at a distance and to convert it from a life changing experience to a simple object of thought, or vision, if we take into account the news which are filled with images and videos from different wars all around the globe. Δεινότητα, thus, is aware of the existence of Πόλεμος somewhere around him, but he always keeps the necessary distances, avoiding to enter profoundly into the authentic meaning of Πόλεμος. In our days we'd rather prefer to be interested spectators than to have the phenomenon of Πόλεμος integrated in our lives, in our thoughts, with all possible consequences that this may entail.

Embarking upon the analysis of the subject we should first state our ideas concerning the "morality" issues of war; just wars, unjust wars, good wars and bad wars, useless and useful wars have one thing in common: they are all wars. This is the primordial truth which cannot be changed by reasons, explanations or moral criteria. When a war is waged people kill and people die. The reasons why they do what they

do may vary. Nonetheless the only unchangeable fact is that war remains a battleground of bloodshed. Each nation, social or political group when engaging into war, may do so for many different reasons. How many times have we seen wars carried out in the name of each religion's God, in the name of Good, or against the Evil itself. It seems that the δεινότητα of modernity's era has not only managed to locate evil but is already determined to declare the war against it. No need for God's intervention when the divine δεινότητα appears. What we can see here is that war's justification many times can be based on abstractions, on the rhetoric development of ideas aiming to hide one simple fact, a fact that is not pleasant to see or hear: people will die. This is a fact, that might be contemplated from different angles when abstract notions come into play. So, the Death of a simple human being and the Death of an offender of God or religion are not viewed in the same way . The Death of a fellow, being either a fascist, a communist or an enemy of Islam (since ISIS never lets us forget) can be faced in many different ways. In such ways which will make us say that surely Death is bad and sad, but..... This "but" will set in march a reasoning originating from something abstract which is to become more and more concrete. If it is so, due to the war against evil and since enemies surely will be killed in it, most of them could not but be identified with the evil. The abstraction would work as a moral defence when the loss of a fellow human being would knock at the door of our conscience.

VI.II Speeches of George Bush Junior as an example of the creation of "The Enemy"

In order to make even more plain what we want to sustain, let us see some of the statements/speeches made by a political leader in his efforts to justify the USA decision to engage into war.

George Bush Junior:

"No, out of the evil done to America is going to come incredible good -- peace and a better society. Because we're the greatest nation, full of the greatest people on the face of the Earth." - Speech at Louisville Kentucky Sep. 5, 2002

"We're taking action against evil people. Because this great nation of many religions understands, our war is not against Islam, or against faith practiced by the Muslim people. Our war is a war against evil. This is clearly a case of good versus evil, and make no mistake about it -- good will prevail." - Town Hall Forum Jan. 5, 2002

"States like these [Iran, Iraq, North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." - State of the Union 2002

What we see in these statements, and the reason of our choosing the above phrases, among so many others, is that they lucidely depict what previously has been mentioned about the use of the abstraction by those who in their purposefulness to guarantee their concrete goals, don't feel responsible for whatever consequences might pursue after. So, each time the USA are engaging into multiple wars for too many different reasons, often at obvious variance, we are told that they have the right to do so because they are the greatest Nation(sic); as such, they have reserved for them the right and the blessings to go to war against Evil. Those phrases would make sense if uttered by an actor in the movie "Lord of the Rings"; when aired, however, by the president of the strongest country in our modern world, then not only do they not sound encouraging or entertaining, but, on the contrary, they bring into light an arrogance which cannot be hidden anymore: the belief of the West whose leadership, in our days, is indisputably theirs, that by their assigning nouns and adjectives such as bad and good, can truly be unveiled the very essence of the world. Nonetheless, instead of unconcealing the world, they sink it deeper and deeper into concealment, a concealment made possible by the arrogance and by the glorification of abstraction at the expense of very concrete living human beings. The same remark is valid for the phrasing: "out of the evil done to America incredible good is going to come- peace and a better society". Presumably this happy ending won't just pop out of the blue. Something will precede it but this something could be nothing else than war. It is this war, which in this case, will bring peace and a better society. Thus, the USA, on the basis of their being the greatest nation and as such the moral definer of good and evil,

enjoy the privilege they have granted themselves of baptizing(along with their western allies) evil people or countries whose acts and policies arbitrarily considered as harmful to their interests whenever they deem it necessary or convenient, while closing the eyes in similar or even worse acts and policies if perpetrated by “friendly” people or states, when favouring their projects.

Referring to the above noted speeches does not mean that we want to mock the USA former president his promises or the reasons of his going to war. What we want to underline is that the abstraction is the best defence against the concrete and its consequences; the reason why political leaders are so eager to glorify the abstraction in their speeches before engaging into war. This abstraction is so important for the needs of our research since it aids the human being to be deprived of its very essence, that is his own being. How many people have been void of their own dignity becoming, thus, degraded to lesser beings in the Nazi Germany? How many people got massacred during the occupation of Germany by the allied forces just because everyone in Germany, at that time, was considered to be a Nazi? So, each abstraction, thus, operates as a sedative of our conscience, when we have to deal with simple concrete acts- no matter if they are bad or good, reckless or fully conscious; it all boils down to the fact that war is killing and in the end human beings die. This has to be well understood as a *conditio sine qua non*, if we want to be able to go on with our analysis of Heraclitus's thought about Πόλεμος and Death. War is killing and killing is taking away a life. This is the concrete reality and no abstraction, no rhetorical froth-no matter how skillfully has been polished- can it ever take away the apocalyptic image of a soldier in extreme agony while letting his last breath in the battlefield.

Our emphasis on the concrete character of Πόλεμος in the battlefield is founded on the necessity of understanding war the way it is; not hidden behind different veils of moral justification or ideas of justness. When someone is killed both he and the one who took his life away enter into different existential situations. The first who is dead gives us no longer the possibility to understand either his thoughts, or his words. The second one though, found in the position to take the first person's life is still there having lived a unique experience which is the killing of another human being. It's normal that after an act engendering Death comes suffering; especially the

suffering of the one who committed the act. The latter then is found in a maze of sentiments and thoughts. Having killed for a purpose while participating in a war upon his government's orders, when returning home, his conscience will never let him forget that he was the one who took away another human being's life. What the other people of his country may think about him, or what they may believe about his participation in the war is another interesting subject, not to be analyzed at this stage (for further details see Gertz Nolen:2014). What we will try to do here is a philosophical tracing of what has led that man to kill another fellow human being, in other words, the relation of that man within the context of Πόλεμος.

VI.III Understanding the enemy in modern warfare according to Glenn Gray (Correlated fragment 70)

The government of each soldier is expecting from him to kill other human beings in war. That's why the abstractions mentioned above are so important for the "moral resistances" of the soldier. Killing a random person in a street is quite different from killing in war a human being whose nation belongs to the "axis of evil". In the first case the person would be a simple, and, eventually, a ruthless killer, while in the second case a bearer of "justice" through arms. The abstraction, thus, in this case is par excellence responsible for shaping the "Enemy". Knowing how hard it is for a human being to kill another person, abstractions are becoming the tool in use for maintaining the necessary distance from the other, for avoiding the very natural and human shock which arises after having removed the life of a fellow human being. As Glenn Gray (1998) has thoughtfully explained, in the war the word enemy becomes a word of many transformations. Our enemy becomes "the enemy" and when referring to "the enemy":

“we seem to mean a unified, concrete universal, whereas in fact the enemy is probably not more unified than our side and possesses many other characteristics than those that are hostile to us (Gray, 1998, p. 134)”.

This makes total sense if we take into account that when speaking about the enemy, we simply mean that he is merely an enemy of our nation. Circumstances have brought our nations against each other and those circumstances are concrete and limited in their context. The war will inevitably take place but the enemy does not and should not become a universal maxim, an abstract phenomenon. He is not the enemy of the humanity, deprived, thus, of the possibility to continue being envisaged as a human himself. He is the enemy of my Nation, and this is what makes of him a specific enemy in a specific context in a specific war. But when we start using abstractions and the concrete enemy becomes “the enemy”, then :

“it is abstract hatred and not the greater savagery of contemporary man that is responsible for much of the blood lust and cruelty of recent wars. This word “abstract” signifies in origin to “draw out from”, to take from any larger whole one particular feature or aspect(ibid.)”

What we can limpidly see, thus, is that the “moral” preparation of the soldiers before going to war is, many times, bringing into concrete existence an absolute abstraction; absolute since it manages to dispossess the human being of his very essence that makes of him a human being. The human being, converted into an enemy now, is not an object that can be used for achieving greater goals. We do not have an objectification of the human being, but, on the contrary, we have an ontological change of the fellow human being to something which is a being but we cannot be sure anymore if he is a human agent or the incarnation of our nightmares and of the evil itself.

“Increasingly, we cannot fight without an image of the enemy as totally evil, for whom any mercy or sympathy is incongruous, if not traitorous. Our wars are tending to become religious crusades once more, and the crusader's image of the enemy is in sharp opposition to the militarist's (ibid. p. 146)”.

Ironically and although several times we have got used to criticizing war and all the cruel things that happen in it, we do believe that war is, an impersonal omnipotent entity, which drags out of us our worst feelings, our worst I/Ego. But this “worst I” hidden in us is not to be created because of Πόλεμος; instead Πόλεμος becomes the battlefield where things already developed in us find their way out. Were it not for the moral abstractions explained above, most of the soldiers would not believe that they are facing Devil himself in the battleground. If they were not told that evil is attacking them and that they are the predominant nation, probably, they would have seen war in a thoroughly different perspective. But when the enemy has become the absolute evil, an absolute and universal maxim which has to be eradicated for the κάθαρσις of the earth and the triumph of good over evil, then the situation gets very complicated and the bloodshed cannot be avoided but becomes morally legalized due to the gruesome character of the enemy. When the enemy becomes “the enemy”, when a concrete human being becomes an abstract idea of the greatest danger to humanity, then every measure is legally and morally justified to overthrow the tyranny of the evil.

One of the tragic elements of the above situation is that when soldiers put into action everything they have been taught about the extermination of the enemy evil, then the governments and the Media becoming aware of the excess of violence or the atrocities committed, decry their soldiers transmogrifying them into monsters, as plain worthy actors for all those acts which cannot rationally be explained. In other words, these soldiers, must be put on trial because they did not act in conformity with the moral codes of their society. Consequently, they deserve to be severely punished by their States since the latter do not tolerate any violation of human rights. Shortly, the government wants the soldier to strive against the incarnation of evil; destituting the

enemy of his human character, it makes of him an abstract notion. When, however, the soldier becomes producing very concrete awful results and consequences by setting in march the abstractions he was taught to follow by his government, then suddenly the heroic soldier is being changed into a monster and the government into a very surprised and disappointed agent which did not expect and could not predict the going astray of its soldiers' behaviour. This kind of situation is like when someone gives you a loaded gun, warning you that the incarnation of evil you must kill is in front of you and when you shoot at the enemy he looks at you surprised and disappointed by the fact that you pulled the trigger. Of course, in each case, the responsibility is going to be attributed to the soldier committing the acts and to war which is making all of us beasts in actions while the governments' role will always be, as previously said, restricted to that of the surprised agent which could have never foreseen what was about to come.

Having explained the above we could now proceed to some possible deductions that follow concerning the use of abstraction in the war and its effects on the soldiers. Even though governments know that the process of dehumanizing the enemy may create situations which cannot be controlled, nonetheless, the vocabulary, in many cases, rests unchanged with the fault always being fallen on the soldiers. In order to better understand why this situation does not change and, probably, won't change any time soon, it would be helpful to see the relation between the abstraction and the process of becoming insensitive to war.

Glenn Gray when giving examples of brutal treatment by the Americans in Japan during the WW2, writes:

“ On first reflection, the enemy conceived as beasts might be thought to be morally the most satisfactory of any image, since it avoids feelings of guilt. Granted the fact of war, the pursuit of killing without compunction could be considered the most healthy and rational possible. We will be a dirty job, but with this attitude the compulsion exercised on soldiers to carry out the unpleasant work of extermination will be minimal and bad

psychological effects will be reduced both during the operation and in the postwar world (ibid. p 151)”

So, through the abstraction, the enemy becomes the beast but the killing of a beast cannot be considered a crime. The total dehumanization has taken place and the fact that the quote was referring to American soldiers and not to Nazis, during the WW2, makes clear that each country, no matter which is, may use the abstraction so as to fulfill its own objectives. This abstraction, however, as Gray has explained, makes us insensitive to suffering and guilt. There can be no suffering when killing a beast or an enemy of the axis of evil. This lack of suffering may guarantee (?) that the soldiers, when returning home, won't feel guilty of what they have done; they will probably keep living satisfied of having offered their services to the country against the beast, the enemy. Nevertheless, it is exactly this lack of suffering which has made the soldier more beast than the “beast” his enemy represented. Suffering is one of the most archetypal human feelings especially when it is the result of the killing of a fellow human being. If we no longer suffer when cutting down the life of another human being, no matter the atrocities he may have committed, something has been broken not only in our feelings but in our essence as well. Suffering is what makes us human in war. When we cannot suffer for the loss of the other, then a great existential chasm has been opened between us, between human beings. We have to be explicit here. In no case do we say that each soldier at the moment of the struggle should throw over his weapons and avoid fighting because of the suffering. The soldier is an “homo furens” in the battle, since Πόλεμος is the most violent expression of the overwhelming sway of δεινότατον in the world. Δεινότατον can cause awe, fear and trembling when it fights as history has already proven. What we want to highlight through mentioning the importance of suffering is that no matter strong and violent δεινότατον can be is only through suffering for the loss of the other that he does not become a killing machine, a ceaseless lust for struggle. The suffering is the bond which unites us to the enemy, an enemy who underneath the social/religious/political differences is a human being as we are and his loss is a loss of our part of humanity as well. This is what makes Πόλεμος so tragic and daunting. But Πόλεμος being the set in motion,

thunderstrike is ever flowing, ever changing and it draws us with it in each single change as we have seen in the last chapter, especially in the fragment *τα δε πάντα οιακίζει κεραυνός*. But in this ever changing situation in the world, the human being is still able to get a grip of himself, to remain stable in an everchanging world and the way this is done will be shown in the last chapter. In this case what is of interest to us is the feeling of suffering and guilt when taking another's life, a guilt which "if not experienced deeply enough to cut into us, our future will be lost (ibid. p. 212)". This feeling of guilt is so crucial because it is the calling of our conscience which does not let *δεινότατον* move astray from his own being. The violent element of *δεινότατον* has to be controlled, otherwise it would control *δεινότατον* itself.

In this light we can better understand the fragment of Heraclitus

Fr. 70 (85 DK)

"Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται."

"It is hard to fight with the heart's desire; for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul"

Even though there have been diverging interpretations concerning the meaning of *θυμός*(*thymos*), namely as a desire or anger, we share what Kahn upholds:

" the tendency of anger to lead to acts of *hybris* or wanton violence explains how it works its will 'at the expense of *psyche* \ by damage to the agent's own vital interests and to the life of others in an outburst of destructive rage

(Kahn, 1979, p. 243)".

In our opinion, anger which cannot be controlled leads to the loss of the sanity of *δεινότατον* and opens his way into becoming a real beast of destruction, a potential which he has proven more than once that he fully possesses. Suffering, thus, is the limit, which helps *δεινότατον* reach the inner depth of his own essence an essence in which the enemy as well, no matter how dehumanized has been, appears as a fellow

human being, a being sharing the same essence with δεινότατον. Only through suffering and guilt does δεινότατον grief the loss of another human being and it is through this grief and through this feeling of loss that δεινότατον reaffirms his own essence of human being. It is this felt proximity provided by suffering and mourning which enables δεινότατον dive deeper into his own essence, a Herculean descent into depths which has been obstructed by abstractions and the process of the dehumanization of the enemy.

VI.IV Death in Πόλεμος (Correlated fragments: 39,97,99)

Πόλεμος, in Heraclitus thought, plays an important role and so do those who fall in war. Death is an essential part of life and is not treated as a tragedy, at least from what can be understood in the fragments of Heraclitus:

Fr. 39 (48 DK)

τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.

“The name of the bow is life, but its work is death.”

This playing with the words- taking into account, as Marcovich says: “Heraclitus shared the Greek belief that name reveals a great deal of the true φύσις of its object” (Miroslav Marcovich 2001, p. 192)- implies that Death and life are tight to one another; the same way a bow has the name of life, its function is no other than Death. Life's end comes with Death and Death is inevitable. As Kahn says:

“ the life-signifying name for the instrument of Death points to some reconciliation between the opponents, some fitting together as in the unity of Day and Night

(Kahn, 1979, p. 201)”.

What seems to be a contradiction, in this case the name and the function, are, in fact, a completed whole, a beginning and an end. Life will end, Death will come and

this is inevitable. The way, though, someone chooses to die is of high significance to Heraclitus. Thus, we see a sharp contrast between those two fragments:

Fr. 97 (25 DK)

“μόροι γὰρ μέζονες, μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι”

“Greater deaths gain greater portions (lots).”

Fr. 99 (20 DK)

“γενόμενοι ζῶειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ' ἔχειν, (μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι), καὶ παῖδας καταλείπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι.”

“Once born, they(the multitude) wish to live and to meet with their dooms; and they leave children behind them so that (new) dooms become.(?)”

According to Marcovich, when referring to the comparison of the two fragments:

“the self denying brave death of an ἀριστος on the battlefield wins the lot.... of a semi-god or hero..... On the contrary, the mean dooms of the many(say of the wealthy bourgeoisie of Ephesus) after a greedy life, filled only with earthy pleasures means a complete perdition and death already during the life.”

Thus, Death, is the end of life, but the Death of someone is of great significance to understand the way he lived and the values of his life. Heraclitus being in favor of Death in the battlefield sees in Πόλεμος an opportunity for the rising of human being above the others and of his becoming an immortal one, as it has been explained in a previous chapter. Death, thus, becomes the affirmation of a life of dignity and is not

seen as an end to a limited duration of life, but on the contrary, a passing from what is limited to the unlimited glory of the heroes.

Our purpose here is not to try and see if this other life exists, or if Death brings an absolute end to everything. One day we all will die and we see it with our own eyes, or soul. What we would like to highlight, at this point, are the possibilities Πόλεμος is offering the individual to rise above himself becoming something what only the close prospect of Death is providing him, namely the affirmation of his life through the perspective of dying. Seen under this angle, the prospect of Death instead of becoming an obstacle to living, becomes the modifying factor of choosing to live authentically knowing that the end is inevitable. The analysis of Heidegger concerning the Dasein as being towards Death is very useful for our comprehending the way an original life may be achieved. But, in our case, the prospect of Death plays an even more important role when placed into the ontological matrix of Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος becomes for δεινότατον an open field for the fulfilment of his possibilities, possibilities which will bring into surface what each δεινότατον really is since the terrifying perspective of Death leaves no place to misunderstandings. When Death is at reach then our attitude towards life will undoubtedly rise in its fullest sincerity.

VI.V The recognition of the enemy as human being; the call of conscience through the suffering of killing; the perception of modern warfare by the modern society.

Concerning Death in Πόλεμος there are two really significant aspects which have to be analyzed, namely the way how in a military struggle the person fuses in the group and Death becomes a shared possibility- since all of the members are in constant change and in constant necessity of the protection of the other- and how the Death of the enemy is experienced on the part of the person who took away the enemy's life. In this chapter we will analyze the second part, namely, how the Death of the other paves the way for the understanding of what is common in all of us, of our shared humanity. It is through the suffering of taking another's life that δεινότατον may be able to

plunge into his innermost thoughts and feelings. It is through the realization of the loss of the other that the feeling of lack can be felt, felt radically, taking into consideration that Πόλεμος is the most violent expression of the overwhelming sway of δεινότητα. Everything reaches its extreme in Πόλεμος, and it is through these extreme versions of himself and of Death that δεινότητα attains an understanding of his shared with the enemy essence.

In order to better conceive this idea of suffering and the changes it brings upon δεινότητα, first of all, we have to be aware of the context of Πόλεμος as we have sketched in the last chapter. Πόλεμος, thus, being the stinging lightning, is not a phenomenon of our choosing, totally under our control, like if Δίκη could be controlled by δεινότητα. Πόλεμος is an earthquake, and we cannot attribute moral characteristics to it. The moral characterization, if this is possible, can only be ascribed to δεινότητα as agent in the war, and to his attitude and actions as they are expressed in war. Taking into account the fact of the inevitability of war, and its repeated and ceaseless happening throughout the human history, we will try to see it under a more objective point of view.

Starting with the idea of the enemy, as we have already noted, the abstract way of seeing the enemy is what removes the enemy's being making him, thus, an impersonal entity, distinct from us. It is this distinctiveness which allows us to dehumanize and treat him as "the enemy". But this dehumanization, this strategy of protecting soldiers from guilt and from the call of their conscience is what has to be primarily eradicated if we really want to remain human beings in the war and to steer clear of becoming guiltless killing machines like if some had given us the moral authority of the cleansing of the sins of the world. So, according to Gray, "the foe is a human being like yourself, the victim of forces above him over which he has no control (Gray, 1998, p. 159)". This statement, when it comes from Gray, who was a soldier and who also witnessed the atrocities of the war, is of great weight for our better understanding of the enemy's being. The realization that the enemy may have been dragged in this war the same way we have, makes of him a very concrete subject, and agent acting according to orders whose execution he could not deny. The impersonal beast now becomes one of us, one soldier guided by powers which are above him. We

should clarify, at this point, that when speaking about people following orders we refer to those participating in the war, be this participation voluntary or not. Of course during the armed struggle there are moments when carrying out orders comes in conflict with the conscience and at that crucial moment decisions have to be made (see Gray, 1998). But here we want to draw a clear distinction between the abstract idea of the enemy as a monster just because of his participation in the war and the enemy as a person whom we can understand, entering into his shoes or judging by our own participation in the war. When the abstractions become concrete then the enemy may become from a beast of the “axis of evil” a simple soldier, like us, following orders. When the enemy is looked at in this perspective, then war can also become a struggle between agents who can share, at least the most basic mutual understanding, the recognition of the other's situation as ours.

This recognition leads us to one deduction of crucial meaningfulness with regard to our understanding of Πόλεμος made by Glenn Gray. According to him “anything is possible through the recognition of your enemy's humanity, even if it leads to fierce rejection of him (Gray, 1998 p. 141)”. In this phrase we can thoroughly grasp one of the most important elements of Πόλεμος; the dialectic between our looking at the other as enemy, our contemplating him as an adversary striving against us, whom, due to specific political conditions we have to confront even to kill without, at any moment, divesting him of his humanity, of his being a person. This simple but extremely important deduction tears apart every abstract thinking concerning Πόλεμος and the enemy. The enemy is no longer seen as an abstract idea, dehumanized and prepared to enter into our ideological slaughterhouse. The enemy is as human as we are, no matter the difference of our ideological flag- be it democracy, human rights, the destruction of evil- and still remains a human being, prepared to kill his opponent, the same way that the opponent as well is ready to kill him, or reject him fiercely in the battlefield. The recognition of the fact that we share a common essence with the enemy inevitably leads to our acknowledging that in Πόλεμος as well- no matter the extremity of the conditions and the circumstances of what is taking place- we are still to be held responsible for our actions. In other words, we have to answer the call of our conscience accusing us of being guilty for taking away the enemy's life.

We would like to stress here the significance of our responding to the queries of our own conscience, particularly in our days, since the mass post industrial society considers that each one has to accept the moral authority of the public opinion, be it what it be, to judge him for what he has done. We don't share that opinion since it seems a bit irrational to believe that a facebook user from the safety of his house, can broadcast whatever he wants about soldiers fighting thousands of kilometres away from their homes. Judging requires a total understanding of circumstances which lead to the action, especially in an armed struggle where what we consider "normal" way of life, in a peaceful society, transforms itself into a normal way of killing and dying in a bloodied battlefield. The soldier, when being in the battlefield has to think of what should be the answer to his conscience and not of what the "others" will say. It's the conscience, and the sense of guilt which define and frame our actions-finally, our attitude- vis a vis the rest of the world.

No matter how harsh the sense of guilt may be, it still remains an extremely serious issue because it guarantees our being human. Concerning this, Gray, once again, is insightful:

"Few things are more revealing about man as warrior than his tendency to slough off responsibility for the suffering and tragedy he inflicts. And if we could read aright the portent of this absence of guilt feelings in most modern soldiers, it would not be difficult to predict what is yet in store for us in the twentieth century(ibid. p. 168)"

What is hard to be comprehended in our modern society, is that if we cast away the suffering of killing the other, of killing the enemy, then what is most human in us will be transformed into a mechanized substitute. Our taking away of another's life will be nothing more than a mere act of fulfilling orders of "kafkian" institutions and governments calling us into action in the name of abstract values and ideas; the latters even though having never been properly analyzed by us, will, nonetheless, motivate and make us believe that what we are doing is the obvious and one right thing to do, without even giving the opposite side the benefit of doubt, the slightest possibility of having its share in the righteousness of their cause. On the contrary, our feeling guilty

of taking another life, our suffering for having done so is the tragic celebration of our common being in this world. This suffering has to be accepted and made part of our life, since in the human life Πόλεμος is always present. Through this suffering, δεινότατον reaches the most profound depth of his own existence, the essence of which is shared by the enemy as well. Were we to cast off the suffering of killing, we would become soulless, senseless killing machines valuing more abstractions than the same life of another human being. Were we to throw away the feeling of guilt, then we would silence our own conscience, enabling ourselves to reach the highest level of atrocities. This suffering and guilt, thus, is the primordial calling, the voice in the ruins of war which does not let us go berserk. It may seem tragic but in the taking away of the enemy's life, the vanity of the modern society and its values shine in their artificial glory, while the loss of the human life could make us feel more human than ever, because we experience the loss of the essence in our own being. It is exactly this suffering that makes us feel human, and it is the call of guilt which makes us human capable of having conscience.

Probably the idea of suffering as the quintessence of maintaining our human nature in the war may seem strange and absurd, especially in the modern society where the emphasis is laid on eradicating pain, guilt and most important, suffering. It seems that modern society is aiming at a ceaseless expansion of the numbers of citizens deprived of everything that may cause them distress or suffer. Professional armies are taking care of each nation's interests; probably the majority of the EU citizens when asked where and why their countries have deployed troops would give no answer due to their ignorance of the matter. What takes place in countries where war rages, reaches us through the Media which show relevant images, express their sentimental devastation because of the cruelty of the war and, after some time, they are used to go on with the news of everyday's life of the celebrities, of the sports etc. The citizens, thus, become aware of what is happening, dedicating their due time to think of the wildness of the war and, generally, in the world, and they keep going on with their normal lives. The routine is too strong to be interrupted by a tragedy not immediately or personally affecting them. Even though the presumed indifference of the citizens towards the military actions of their government democratically elected is a really

important issue, at this point though, we would like to take the matter of maintaining a distance from the war in another sphere, much more important, the military sphere.

The military sector, as everything in modern society, has substantially changed. It seems that war becomes more and more business. Probably, some will say that war has always been business. What does make sense is- due to the lack of interest for those “brutal” military activities- the way that even pretexts are not used anymore to explain a military intervention. Some years ago we were witnessing the intervention of the West with the purpose of encouraging the flourishing of the “Arab Spring”. If this revolution has been a spring or one of the heaviest winters the Arabs have ever known is an issue for the political scientist of the future to study and investigate. What is of interest for us here is the fundamental transformation the war has passed through especially in the 20th and the 21st centuries. Otherwise how could we explain why the US have sent Blackwater, mercenaries to do their job in Iraq for example? From the time international volunteers were taking part in the Spanish civil war and in the WW2, we live a period of mercenaries sent thousands of kilometres away from the sending country, in order to protect and defend this country's interests(sic). War has become a contract of Death and this contract of Death probably needs a new kind of soldiers, professional soldiers who must fulfill the terms of the contract. The new era of market-war has long begun and the future will unveil what vital changes this may bring. What can easily be deduced though is that in a contract there is no room for feelings. Only the result matters; everything which creates problems to the accomplishment of the goal will have to be erased. If we see wars becoming rougher everyday it won't happen because of the ferocious character of the war itself but because of the kind of soldiers we will be providing it with.

It seems that one main characteristic of the new generation of soldiers that are now formed has to be the capacity of remaining impersonal in the war while fulfilling the duty which they have been assigned to, no matter how. Otherwise it would have been difficult to explain how consistent a european soldier could be when executing the orders he has received in performing his national duty after been sent to fight in countries, like for exemple, Iraq, Syria and Libya. The only result that this kind of intervention may bring is that soldiers or people who saw their lives ruined in those

countries, when coming back to the European continent will react by exteriorizing their feelings towards the governments. This process has already begun and Europe is facing challenges that should be taken seriously into account because they set forth a really interesting and prominent issue, namely, the different ways that war is perceived in various countries and cultures. On the one hand we have European soldiers miles away from home following the orders of their governments or supra-governmental organisations, on the other hand, we have people who having lost everything, don't value that much their lives so as to be afraid of Death. This distinction is essential for our better understanding of the problems that Europe is met with extremely concerned about which will be the next day. People in Arab countries consider West an enemy- probably "the Enemy"- and, as we have already seen, the power of the abstraction is dehumanizing. It will also be even more difficult to convince countries whose regiments have been called by western forces the incarnation of Evil to see us from a different angle since it is quite possible that people who have had their countries destroyed and their families dead would only think in terms of revenge and hatred.

Summarizing, we have two different parts, two different enemies. There is not only a lack of understanding between them, but, what is worse, there seems to be a total lack of will to understand each other. As a consequence a conflict has already arisen. There is also a radically differing approach towards that conflict. On the one hand the citizens of the western world hold responsible their governments for every military action outside the country, whereas the democratically elected governments justify these operations on the basis of the supreme need both to defend their national interests and to effectively protect democratic values-ideas, social progress, economic growth, human rights and the human dignity of the people of the suffering countries, although the latter astonished see those values getting more and more often a very concrete form in destructive bullets and bombs. The abstraction is more than apparent in this case. Human rights and human dignity are used once again as the ultimate purpose, the blessed goal. The abstraction gets even more evident when we see the reaction of the common opinion to the policy/ies of the governments (selling arms, using violence to impose democratic ideas or respect of human rights attacking and

bombing), a common opinion desiring everything, immediately and in the best way. Bullets should become food and education. Freedom of speech and democratic principles-no matter where and how we citizens of the western countries consider as democracy and freedom- has to become a universal maxim which will have to be applied by the other countries which, according to our perception, are misguided and do not want to share the same values with us, obliging us, thus, to teach them democracy by violating many times their rights for self determination. It's a strange thing what abstractions western leaders are capable of. When a concrete solution is not easy to find, we are always eager to find an important value which will take away from us the responsibility of becoming more concrete, more realistic, more prudent.

On the other hand, in the countries which are being taught what western democracy is, we have very different reactions. It seems that those people believe that the western world could do more things than sending ships with food to Gaza or organizing manifestations in the streets against war. They could probably feel a lack of empathy, a lack of understanding. When this lack of understanding evolves in taking the aggressive form of military actions then the extremes are reached and the reactions are far away from being moderate. While in the western world indifference prevails, on the other side an excess of indignation's feelings is forcing its way out. Despair, Death, poverty and moral lessons from the western countries have made those people cross their lines. A sense of injustice may arise there, an injustice provoked in a high degree by our lack of sincere suffering towards their problems, towards their destroyed lives. As we have seen in the fragment of Heraclitus, anger will take its toll from the soul and the next step will inevitably be the shaping of the total enemy, the incarnation of injustice and Evil; this will lead to a passionate and blind conflict.

Each side has, thus, been shaped. The western world considers that the non western countries are morally obliged to follow the paradigm/model of the western system of values and those of them which fall short of doing that are its "moral" enemies being badly in need of re-education. On the other hand we have those countries which consider this "education" a kind of cultural and military invasion from the west in its lustful ambition for glory and total homogenization. The fact that people will die, children will lose their parents and vice versa will probably be another black

page in a glorious attempt to protect the values that most matter for each part. Abstract values will lead to very concrete casualties and to extremely concrete bloodied consequences. Seeing in this perspective we can understand why the feeling of suffering felt in the loss of another person, be it an enemy or a friend, is now more crucial than ever. The suffering for the loss of the other is the suffering for the loss of a part of us in his loss. Only through a deeper understanding of what the essence of the other is war may become a bit more human and clean our blurred from abstractness vision, enabling us to face the concreteness of the existence of the other human beings.

This idea of redemption by the way of suffering is not alien to the thought of Heraclitus who, more than once, through the use of opposites made clear that only via the antithesis the thesis is better seen, understood and properly evaluated. Πόλεμος as the father and ruler of all brings forth in its brilliance this antithetical relation of suffering. While war makes us suffer by killing other fellow human beings, this suffering is what makes us human beings, what allows us to understand the existential gravity of what has been done. Only through this guilt does δεινότατον remain human in his essence and does not become a killing machine. In the bloody ceaseless struggle of Πόλεμος, while we are forced to take away lives, we are also forced to realize and live this loss inside us. This apocalyptic revelation makes us understand that there is something common to all of us indeed, something which is not quantitative depending on the number of people, but, on the contrary, qualitative since it is what makes of us what we are. The suffering caused by the loss is, thus, a deep cut into the depths of our own essence, a violent introspection, violent because it has been inflicted upon us by the inevitability of the war, an introspection, though, which leaves no space for misunderstanding or abstractness. Through the call of guilt inside us we dive into what we are, due to the loss of the other. The other, a simple member of a majority or a group before the war, now, in his loss, becomes the defining of our own keep being. Through the realization of that loss, we can find ourselves in the others' inmost, even when the other is the enemy. The violent thunderstrike of Πόλεμος, becomes a profound diving till what we all share in common is brought into light.

VII. ALL IS WAR: THE USE OF THE MILITARY DRONES IN MODERN WARFARE- ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

VII.I Bradley Strawser: an interview concerning the use of the military drones; use of drones and moral issues; the asymmetry of the attack

In the last chapter we have tried to analyze the idea of abstraction in Πόλεμος and the way the “Enemy” is fabricated; the enemy as a new kind of being, ontologically speaking, deprived of any respect, even the minimal, due only to the fact that he is the enemy. After having invented the enemy, we can see, now, how the way of waging war, the way of killing, is to become a shift towards a direction allowing the combatants to treat the enemy as an evil soulless agent. Though there are many important issues at stake, we will focus, here, on a philosophical analysis of the everyday increasing use of drones. An american philosopher, Bradley Strawser, during an interview given to “Guardian³¹” tried to make a favorable case for the drones. We consider appropriate to set forth some of his ideas as expressed in this interview, before embarking upon a philosophical analysis of the consequences that could emanate from an eventual implementation of them. It is to stress, however, at this point, that the american philosopher’s stand should not be viewed as an (op)position which simply deserves to be dialectically or phisosophically, outstripped. We have chosen this interview because it is very illustrative of an opinion in favor of the drones; hence, since the ideas unfolded make total sense, it would not be strange to witness their being spread out. In conclusion, what we try to do here is to stimulate a fertile development of thoughts with the purpose of penetrating the philosophical core of the

³¹<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/philosopher-moral-case-drones>

use of Drones. We are also going to refer to a recently published work *A theory of the drone* by the French philosopher Gregoire Chamayou. In this interesting work we can find out several important aspects concerning the use of drones in the modern warfare, aspects which have to be duly taken into account if we really want a clear approach to be developed concerning this “weapon”, which is more than capable of opening the way for radical changes in the way we see and experience war.

So, having presented the method we deem more convenient for the analysis of this drone issue, we can turn, now, our attention to the interview of the american philosopher. According to Strawser:

"It's all upside. There's no downside. Both ethically and normatively, there's a tremendous value," he says. "You're not risking the pilot. The pilot is safe. And all the empirical evidence shows that drones tend to be more accurate. We need to shift the burden of the argument to the other side. Why not do this? The positive reasons are overwhelming at this point. This is the future of all air warfare. At least for the US."

Let us start from the last sentence: “at least for the US”. In other words, since the US possess the peculiar means and the sophisticated technology to effectively protect their pilots, improving, thus, among others, their capacity of accurately attacking the enemy, they should do this; ethically speaking as well, this has a tremendous value, at least for the US. It is ethical because in a situation of war or military struggle the US soldiers’ life won’t be jeopardized. So, for the US, it is ethical, because their soldiers do not risk to be killed. This approach no matter how tempting it may be, especially for the side which has the power and the money to impose it, is difficult to be seen as ethical only due to the fact that the attacker does not put into danger the lives of his own soldiers. It seems that it would have been indeed ethical if the US soldiers constituted the total population of our world; in that case, there would be no need for drones since no attack could occur among fellow soldiers. But the attacks are directed against the enemy soldiers or citizens. So, from what has already been said, we can understand that it is not so easy to agree on the analysis of what ethical is. In our opinion, to exclude the enemy-simply because he is the enemy- from

our “ethics”, appears more like a game in which enemy’s moral and ethical treatment is ruled out from the very beginning. Although it is hard to keep it in mind, especially when war is ante portas, the enemy is, under all circumstances, a human being, bearer of the same rights and dignity as we all of us are. The recognition of the enemy as a fellow being against whom we have to fight cannot change or refute this axioma (tic truth). The effort to dehumanize the enemy and take him out of the context of ethical impli/complications is really perilous for our own selves and conscience. As the French philosopher Gregoire Chamayou correctly pointed:

“ Once the remotely controlled machine becomes a weapon of war, it is the enemy who
is treated as a dangerous material”

(Gregoire Chamayou: 2014, pp. 117.

The enemy, thus, due to the use of drones as well, faces the danger of officially becoming a non ethical entity, limited to its material existence and representation on the screen of the drones. While on the one side the US soldiers are safe, on the other, enemies run the risk to reach the total abstraction of becoming materials. Since the death of the enemy will be represented by pixels on the screen of the user of the drone, we only hope that the latter won't reach the point of doubting about the human character of the enemy represented by pixels.

In addition to the above, further explaining his ideas, Strawser said the following:

"I share the kind of gut feeling that there's something odd about that. But I don't see the ethical problem. What matters to me is whether the cause itself is justified. Because if the operation is justified and is the right thing to do – and by the way I'm not claiming all US military strikes are – then asymmetry doesn't matter."

First of all, we could start our answer by citing a Simone Weil’s text, used as well by Gregoire Chamayou:

“the most defective method possible, one that claims to evaluate every war in terms of the ends pursued and not by the nature of the means employed. “

(Weil ,2009 p. 173)

In complete accord with Simone Weil, we do believe that the cause or the end of waging a war does not always justify the asymmetry in the means used- more especially in our case since we have to deal with soulless remoted controlled machines killing alive and breathing human beings. So, the asymmetry does matter and the means may, many times, depending on the circumstances, completely change the cause or the end. We have seen in a previous chapter the ever changing checks of Δίκη; what seems to be right at the beginning, might turn out to be the greatest sacrilege just because of the means used. Everything is changing and the limits of Δίκη are always in move, coercing us into becoming, one way or the other, more adaptable to its own movements. The main problem, though, perceived in the american philosopher’s analysis is that the enemy is not mentioned even when Strawser is speaking about the ethical implications. Of course, one could assume that as long as the enemy is considered to be the major risk for the lives of the soldiers, his moral rights or ethical implications in the use of drone seem to get lost in the asymmetry of the means of the justified cause- and this is most alarming.....

Through our analysis of the ideas of Heraclitus and Heidegger we can feel that there is no dialectic waiting to bring forth a result beneficial to the opposites; there exists an interplay between the opposites, an interplay which is of great importance for our understanding both parties. The opposite is not to be overcome so that something new may arise, but it is to be considered as the everforming activity of the already posited. More simply put, when one thing is posited its opposite is posited too and only through this interaction are we to understand the reciprocal relation developed between those two opposite sides. This is the case, as we will later see, for Φύσις as well, where the emerging sway needs the concealment so as to rise from it as emergence.

VII.II From target to prey; from an ontical distance to an ontological one

The reason for our laying emphasis on the enemy relies upon the necessity of having in mind an absolutely clear perception of the fact that when waging war it is not easy to set apart the two sides, by simply naming the first one evil guilty- whilst the other one righteous- moral. The enemy and the act of killing another human being, be it the enemy or comrade in arms, should be seriously envisaged, first of all for own being reassured that something humane had to be left after war for all of us, and, secondly, because the law of action-reaction never fails; this is what the supporters of use of drones have to never forget. When believing- rather having the illusion- that they are protecting the US soldiers through the use of drones, the only thing they can successfully finish off would be to take war outside of a specific temporal/spatial matrix; war, thus, covers all the distance till the enemy of each side is found. Possibly, the users of drones think that they are safe when they are locked in the control room because no one can reach them there. The only one who can die in this modern kind of warfare is the enemy:

“for whoever uses such a weapon it becomes a priori impossible to die as one kills. Warfare, from being possibly asymmetrical becomes absolutely unilateral. What could still claim to be combat is converted into a campaign of what is, quite simply, slaughter.”

(Chamayou, 2014 p. 13)

Drones and their “pilots”, of course, are kept in a safe distance while the enemy is slaughtered by a machine coming from the above. No matter the feeling of power and security this kind of technology may provide, it would be foolish to believe that those being slaughtered by the drones would just accept the situation and the defeat waving white flags. Which is exactly the intention behind the use of such machines? Let's assume that they complete their goal and that they control the suspicious movements in an area. Do those in charge really believe that the people would accept having every move of theirs controlled by machines, knowing that even though these

machines can be destroyed the people won't manage to kill their users? Could anyone really say that the struggle will not continue and that one side has won just because of the distance? From our point of view, the only thing that they could manage to do here is the expansion of the distance with all the consequences this fact might produce. While, in the past, when soldiers were present, the enemy and the civilians knew where war was taking place, now, with no presence except the one of the machines, the other side will of course try to find a way to reach the enemy. The only difference is that the asymmetry will now be used by them too. While the asymmetry in the case of the use of drones boils down to the unequal struggle between human living beings and the machine, the asymmetry now appears as an ever raging war knowing/respecting no boundaries. What we can achieve, when using drones, is the creation of a large physical distance between the attacker and his prey. Not being there in order to feel the wrath, the pain, the rage, lacking this ability of empathy or even strategical thought to see what may happen afterwards, the only thing that the drone pilots could achieve is the creation of a temporal artificial distance; temporal because where is action there is always reaction, and artificial because while believing that a distance is being created as long as the user of the drone is far away, he and everything surrounding him could become a possible target since the limited in a specific spatiotemporal matrix kind of war will no longer exist. If everywhere is war, there can be no distance where war does not exist. Thus, while the commanders behind the use of drones wanted to guarantee a safe zone for the military activity/killing of their soldiers, what they actually did is the opening of a breach in their own territory. It is childish to believe that those who see the machines killing them will just passively accept the inequality of the situation and will live according to the new status quo. While those ordering the use of drones may believe that the feeling of despair felt by the attacked party may remove its will to fight back, it is the despair that also opens every possible way and door since blurring the eyes of the desperate, every solution, no matter how far fetched it may sound, shines as a possible escape from the dead end. Desperate people will, of course, react. The difference is that due to the despair in which they are sinking into, they will probably do things which before could consider out of question. The humiliation and the rage that people may feel when being controlled by drones and soulless machines may be

the source for the rising of every kind of violence and retaliations. This constant surveillance and violation of even the most private moments, sooner or later, would explode leaving debris behind. Quoting Chamayou:

“That is the effect of permanent lethal surveillance: it amounts to a psychic imprisonment within a perimeter no longer defined by bars, barriers, and walls, but by the endless circling of flying watchtowers up above (ibid. p 45)”

No matter how justified the use of drones or machines may be, it would not be sensible for us to consider that people would just assume it and live on with their everyday lives. They would probably realize that their same human essence is being violated when the ones watching them are machines flying above their heads. The commanders behind the drones may presume that desperate or afraid people would not react. However, as historically has been proven, people always react, and in this case, the reaction might take much more extreme forms, since those people would dehumanize the ones by whom they have been dehumanized when the latter were controlling them with drones. The following passage, from the book of Gregoire Chamayou, as well, depicts, in a pragmatic way, the dehumanization of the enemy which is taking place in modern warfare and which is going to be accelerated in uncontrollable velocity if the use of the drones is to be adopted as an “ethical” solution for attacking the enemies:

“When questioned by a journalist in order to find out if it was “true that Palestinians were not concerned about human life, not even that of those close to them,” Eyad El-Sarraj, the director of the mental health program in Gaza, replied, “How can you believe in your own humanity if you do not believe in the humanity of the enemy?”
(ibid. p. 88)

The answer given thoroughly summarizes our own approach towards the enemy, as developed in this chapter and in the previous one. The enemy must be

considered as a human being, bearer of the same essence. No one can guarantee that a state's cause of waging a war is so just that this state is allowed to use any means available against the enemy. In our opinion the use of drones is clearly following this track of thought. By extending the distance, by making of the enemy a picture and a set of pixels, by killing a life, while seated in front of a screen, we are developing, probably like never before, our capacity of abstraction. Of course, this process is not going to change modern warfare from one day to another, but it will surely open doors that were closed till our days. This danger of total abstraction from the part of the drone operators is thoughtfully portrayed by Chamayou when asking whether:

“drone psychopathology lay not where it is
believed to be, in the possible traumas of the drone operators,
but in the industrial production of compartmentalized
psyches, immunized against any possibility of reflecting upon
their own violence, just as their bodies are already immunized
against any possibility of being exposed to the enemy?”
(ibid. p. 123)

This danger of immunity against the reflection of the use of violence, this immunity towards what makes us more human, namely to become aware that we are taking a human life's being, should be avoided at any cost. Even though the use of drones is capable of creating an ontic distance between the “predator” and his prey, the ontological distance between killing and realizing- becoming conscious of the fact that a human being's life is being taken away- is what truly matters; what is really at stake is not the security of the operators or of the combatants, but , on the contrary, the same conscience of the combatant, the dronification of the operators who merged into the invincibility of their metal drones will become immune to the deeper calling of their own conscience. Becoming deaf to that calling, or even worse not being aware of the fact that this calling exists, is an issue that could alterate the same roots of modern warfare. Furthermore, we have to understand that one of the most important issues, at least philosophically speaking, is the perception of the same idea of distance in war-

the ontical distance and the ontological- as one. Dave Grossmann in his well known work *On Killing* explains:

“At close range the
resistance to killing an opponent is tremendous. When one
looks an opponent in the eye, and knows that he is young or
old, scared or angry, it is not possible to deny that the individual
about to be killed is much like oneself. It is here that many personal narratives of
nonkilling situations occur. “

(Grossman, 1996, p. 128)

The realization that the enemy is “much like oneself” is a pure distress calling of our conscience, which has found its way out of all the abstractions made about the enemy. The enemy is a human being. When seeing the enemy dying, we see a human being dying just like us. This is a simple but tremendous truth; there can be no hiding from it, and if that could be, then warfare would become a utilitarian slaughter product of a conscienceless society. Since the ontical proximity, in this case, is also an ontological one- because of the recognition of the other as a human being- the use of drones could satisfy capably the requirements for enlarging both kinds of distance; the ontical one through the distanced killing, since the drone is miles away from its operator, and the ontological one through the perception of the enemy as a set of pixels, pixels which after the killing are only changing their structure on the screen. Of course, we don't pretend that there will be an immediate disconnection between the killing and the realization of it as killing. What we are trying to say, though, is that a generation used to killing pixels may be led to believe that it is capable of doing exactly that thing killing human beings. It's alarming that human lives, enemies or not, are limited to beings seen as pixels. This way of approaching the enemy is a step towards the dominance of the abstraction in modern warfare. What is concrete is that someone must die. That person, though, his life and who he is, is going to be perceived through a drone flying above his head. But since that person is the enemy, there can be no downside even though he is going to die without knowing that this danger exists,

helpless against a machine and without even being able to look at his killer. The philosopher Laurie Calhoun expresses in the following passage, in a very detailed and vivid way, the relation between the “enemy” and the user of the drone:

“While sitting before computer screens, drone operators snipe unwitting targets who may have no idea that they have been spied on for days, weeks even months, and are about to be annihilated stripped even of the right to surrender enshrined in orthodox military protocols forged over centuries.”

(Calhoun, 2015, p. XV)

So, at the end, the enemy is totally transformed into a simple visual representation on the screen, at least for the drone operator, while at the same time he is deprived not only of the right to be proven guilty or innocent, but of the right itself of self defence. What would be the right to live, to defend oneself or even to be surrendered to the enemy is becoming an amount of pixels, which would probably disperse after the attack, on the screen, of the one who will give the order for the enemy's death. It all boils down to one simple thing, the annihilation of the enemy, the achieving of the goal at any cost. Let's only hope that the operators will remember that the enemy's death is a human death and not a simple regrouping of the pixels on the screen.

VII.III The use of drones and the danger of the rising of an “all is war” battlefield

Another issue which we have mentioned earlier and we are now going to develop is that through the use of drones war breaks the specific geographic boundaries and becomes a much more lethal threat. War is reestablishing its limits and brings forth new ways in which it can be performed. Quoting Chamayou:

“the viability of the security model associated with the principle of “projecting power without projecting vulnerability”

rests upon very fragile assumptions. It postulates that the establishment of an effective domestic “safe zone” is possible—that the danger, the threat, the enemy can be absolutely confined to the space outside.”

(Chamayou, 2014, p. 77)

The above accurate comment made by the French philosopher is of pertinent validity and should be kept in our mind, as, we are going, now, to further explicate hereinafter. When an army is invading a country, people know that the enemy is going to attack them, and their facilities, while operating or under other circumstances, but at least they are aware of this possible attack due to the enemy’s presence. The enemy side as well already sees in the troops the invading forces in presence and would act accordingly. But if this presence is taken away, if the troops are not there but the killings do go on thanks to the flying drones, then it would be naive to believe that there would be no response just because of the absence of the attacker’s physical presence. The physical presence would be sought for, not in the grounds where the drones are operating, but, on the grounds where the drones are coming from. As a logical consequence of the above explained situation the fear that people living with drones feel and experience, could easily reach the side of the attacker as well. In a context where everything is war, no one can be protected. There can be no situation in which the victim has only the right to die even having no previous knowledge of his imminent death or the right to defend himself in every possible way, while, on the other side, the attacker cannot be attacked, perceived or even seen. This false sense of security and power that the drones provide can very easily be proven when similar situations take place on the ground of the attacker’s side. If those dying by the drones’ attacks are not entitled to the right of knowing, at least, that they are going to die, how could the possible “recruiters” of vengeance be discouraged from using blind violence and terror? They could easily reply that this blind terror and violence is what they are facing too, and most unfortunately, in many cases, those who do pay the consequences

are not criminals or the “real enemies”, but, on the contrary, innocent people³² whose only mistake is that they were not properly analyzed or verified before their killing by the drone operators and their officers. Of course here crops up a much more piercing question, raised among others, by Calhoun, “whether innocent civilians should *ever* be put at risk of death when no soldier's life is at stake (Calhoun, 2015, p. 18)”. It's a question that makes total sense, especially if we retain the fact that while the one side is vulnerable and runs the risk to lose everything, from soldiers to innocent civilians, the other side is assured in its complete lack of danger. Doubting that the attacked side will react to this attack would be like doubting that a reaction can exist after an action. It goes without saying that the reaction will occur; what is out of our reach, though, is the way and the place the reaction will take place. By violating the specific spatiotemporal limits of war, we are opening a vast range of possibilities which will prove to be almost impossible to prevent. By making of war a much larger phenomenon, due to the use of drones, we forget that we are also creating countless possible combatants, enemies and of course innocent victims.

VII.IV The backfire of the use of drones: fear and despair as the unpredictable enemy

David Cilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum³³ in their article “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below”³⁴, explain in a pellusive way the reason why the above mentioned dangers are to be seriously brought in mind. In their analysis of the use of drones in Pakistan³⁵, they arrive at some conclusions which are very interesting, disturbing as well, with regard to the possible repercussions of the use of drones. We are presenting, now, their arguments in such a way as to make even clearer the connection of the following results with the afore mentioned analysis. Thus:

³²<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/15/90-of-people-killed-by-us-drone-strikes-in-afghani/>
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/drone-papers_us_561ed361e4b0c5a1ce61f463?v4w019k9=

³³David Kilcullen, the author of “The Accidental Guerrilla,” was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from 2006 to 2008. Andrew Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004, (CV's as presented in the New York Times digital edition)

³⁴<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html>

³⁵ For more information concerning the use of drones in Pakistan by the US military forces see also: Nawaz, Shuja. “Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing Suspension of Disbelief?” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, pp. 79–87

“While the strikes did kill individual militants who were the targets, public anger over the American show of force solidified the power of extremists.”

“While violent extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a faceless enemy that wages war from afar and often kills more civilians than militants.”

“Nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased. “

Finally, and the most important, in our opinion:

“People don’t tolerate extremists in their midst because they like them, but rather because the extremists intimidate them. Breaking the power of extremists means removing their power to intimidate — something that strikes cannot do”

What we can easily conclude from all the aforesaid is that fear cannot conquer fear. On the contrary, the faceless and mechanical terror provoked by the use of drones may tie down even more people to the terror, at least, on a personal basis, in this case, of the extremists. It's quite probable that extremism, hidden under the mask of a “flesh” and personal movement, could attract at a higher rate, people who are more afraid of a sudden and unpredictable death caused by the machines above. This qualitative difference, between flesh and machine, may entail ominous results as we have read previously. The attacks, even in cases when the militants sought for have been killed, instead of dispersing the resistance they solidify it. This can be better understood if we take into consideration that death from a flying drone does not seem to be either just or moral. On the contrary, it solidifies the belief that the one launching this kind of attack is “dehumanized”. Consequently, the way is a paved for a more “dehumanized” response. Thus, a “dehumanized” machine attack could provoke a

“dehumanized” human response. In addition, as we have seen above, the increase in the drone attacks has multiplied the number of the recruits in the militant movements. This phenomenon is to be related, among other factors, to the will for revenge and vengeance of people who have seen noncombatant relatives dying as an after-effect of such attacks. A war limited in a spatiotemporal context is, of course, catastrophic for all those participating, but at least, in a macabre way, it makes sense. When a force is occupying, or trying to occupy, one space, the enemy is within reach and the losses from both sides are to be interpreted in this matrix. A drone attack, though, may seem absurd and senseless, since the only thing that it inevitably provokes is death, out of the blue. People may be walking, living their everyday routine till the moment a rocket launched from a drone kills all of a sudden a person, or a group of people. This death cannot be explained, since on the one hand no motives will be apparent to the witnesses of the act; on the other hand, if the dead one is a terrorist or not will be taken lightly due to the fact that the real terrorist will be considered as the one who decided to kill without trial, without asking, without giving the right to self defence, without even- worst of all- presenting his face in the scene. Death becomes, thus, a business of precision and effectiveness; this way of treating the death of the enemy can only bring havoc in the already bloody and turbulent whirlwind of war.

Finally, when talking about the use of drones, we could summarize the whole issue in two crucial for our understanding, feelings: fear and despair. Fear because the enemy is faceless and seemingly omnipresent. He could be watching from everywhere and he could at any moment kill following orders unknown to the rest of the people (targeted or not). The drone could be interpreted as an absurd merciless distorted idea of Justice where people die, not knowing when, why or how. The only thing reaching them is a sudden death; such a life can only be lived in fear. Living in fear, though, living without knowing how to resist or against whom to resist can easily lead to despair. The drone, seen through a more profound analysis, is the oppressive force taking out the control of the people's lives and putting it into the hands of the drone operator and his superiors. Every move is scanned, every single moment may be recorded and in due time, for reasons, sometimes unknown to the next targets, an attack is launched, an attack which cannot be predicted or avoided. The life of people

living the surveillance of drones is a constant war and no more occupying forces are needed to control the situation. In this “all is war” schema every possible way to react against the enemy is almost excluded since a priori the enemy cannot be hurt. Even if the drone falls down, another drone may be sent probably with the same operator. Under these circumstances, dominated by despair, extreme measures may be taken by the people, measures that may give to asymmetric war a new haunting meaning; in a situation where “all is war” people in despair will find the way to applicate this rule in a much more horrific way having been themselves dehumanized by the dehumanized kind of war they are facing and experiencing.

Concluding this chapter we would like to raise some thoughts/questions concerning two of the issues that have been developed above, namely technology and power. Calhoun, while analyzing the use of drones sets forth some questions that really deserve our attention. Thus:

“Given the nearly complete absence of domestic debate over the use of drones before they were deployed in hundreds of strikes abroad in countries with which the United States is not officially at war, it seems safe to say that technology has guided policy, and not vice versa. But does possibility imply permissibility? Should the current state of technology dictate morality?”

(Calhoun 2015, p. XIII)

VII.V Heidegger and the technology as “Enframing” in modern society

The above passage sets out an issue which is to become one of the most important dilemmas when faced with the use of technology. To have developed advanced technology does it mean that we are also going to change our morality? The fact that the use of drones offers many benefits does not signify that its effectiveness should make us blind vis a vis the moral issues raised. The temptation of power usually comes coupled with a price and the case of drones is a clear example of all the possible problems that can arise. If we give in to the progress of technology naming it

the lawmaker of our morality then it will be as already facing an overwhelming defeat of our own conscience. We cannot become deaf to its calling just because the vision of its progress is a pleasant sight for the power-seeking eyes of modern society. Not everything is calculable, surely human lives-enemy or not- are not. It is in this light that we can understand what Heidegger said when criticizing the way technology is understood and implemented in modern society³⁶:

“The essence of technology lies in Enframing.....Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. As the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within the essential realm of Enframing. He can never take up a relationship to it only subsequently (Heidegger, 2008 p. 26,24)”

With technology the world is revealed to man in the mode of ordering, every being is presented to him as a standing-reserve, a resource which can be used so as to keep the technology in march. Human instead of being in total control of his creations, very often lost in the progress he has caused, becomes a tool of that same progress since the only thing that matters is the continuity of the technological march. The creation, or better said the act of creating, may enchain human being to the act blinding him for everything that could provoke his second thoughts about the essence and the importance of his creations. There is, many times, an exaggeration in our attachment to the technological progress, an exaggeration which aims at making each new creation unique, indispensable, the right one for our era. This is an effort to move the center from the essence and the weight of the human being to the human being as fulfilment of the highest degree of efficacy and results. Heidegger really hit the spot when analyzing this exaggeration as follows:

“Exaggeration, devoid of memory, proclaims each succeeding occurrence in turn to be the greatest and thoughtlessly proclaims every new measure as a unique

³⁶ For a more detailed analysis concerning the use of Technology, terrorism and security in the thought of Martin Heidegger see: MITCHELL, ANDREW J. “HEIDEGGER AND TERRORISM.” *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. 35, 2005, pp. 181–218

accomplishment. Each time each and every thing is what is most decisive. And this all within the realm of an already long decided, yet only now unfolding, decisionless.

(Heidegger, 2015a, p. 44)''

This exaggeration is the proof of our rush to become effective, to calculate everything so as to come up with the right decision, at every moment, about everything. Of course, in the cited passage, Heidegger probably connects the decisionless with the lack of decision of human being concerning the Being and its grounding in the world through the becoming of human being Dasein. Nonetheless, his critique is fully representative of the way we approach the use of drones. The fact that we have made advances technologically and that we managed to achieve the fabrication of drones, this does not mean that they are the proper tool or even that our epoch is the proper one for their use. There has to be a stop in this technological rush, a stop which will make us reflect on the same process of the technological progress so as to make sure where it is heading and how it's heading. If we lose ourselves in this "ceaseless progress", if we don't set limits before engaging once again in the technological rush, then the Enframing will get totally out of our control, and the main problem won't be the difficulty to control purely our own lack of concern about the necessity to limit it.

Finally, the way the Enframing is revealed through the use of drones, can be clearly seen in the motto "projecting power without projecting vulnerability (Chamayou 2015, p. 77)". This projection of power will probably dominate the thought of those suggesting the use of drones blinding their eyes to the collateral damages it will surely provoke. A projection of power unwilling to present any vulnerability reaches almost the invincibility which modern warfare so passionately seeks. It is exactly this almost arrogant projection of power that we have to focus on in order to be able to control and limit it before we are caught in the whirlwind of its omnipotence. Power, through the use of drones, is perceived as an invincible coercing force which is supposed to annulate, or better said, not even let the appearance of any resistance. This reminds us of Heidegger when writing:

“Power admits as its other only impotence as its sole other and in this decree, since it has everything within its power of “decision”, is assured of the agreement of all, even of the impotent (Heidegger, 2015a, p. 56)”

We can understand, thus, that power will only accept the impotence as its other. It is in this schema that we can better realize the way drones could be used. The use of drones, annihilating every possible reaction, aims to give an “apparent” omnipotence to the one side, while totally cancelling the right of the other to defend itself. If we get caught in this trap of power, we will become a simple peon of our own will to power, without realizing that the cost will be not only the loss of the other peoples’ life, but of our own conscience as well; the other, the enemy, will be simply considered as the one who has to accept the new status, a status in which he is going to be deprived of every single right to resistance. No matter the calculative and material benefits the use of drones may produce, we have to be aware and ask ourselves if the toll which we will pay for the sake of power is worth it; if becoming deaf to the call of conscience is an acceptable sacrifice, the necessary evil, for the ceaseless increase of power.

TOWARDS THE EVENTUATION OF ΛΟΓΟΣ

VIII. A PREPARATION FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ΛΟΓΟΣ: ΦΥΣΙΣ IN THE THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS

VIII.I Different interpretations of the fragment *Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεί*

So far we have put emphasis, more than once, on the struggle of δεινότατον as an act of unconcealing the world, in terms of a search of his abode in the world and of establishing a different relation with everything surrounding him. The reason for our insisting on the unconcealment is that it most accurately describes the way everything is appearing in front of us. The unconcealment is implying a previous concealment, a concealment out of which the emergence and the bringing forth into light may finally appear. This interplay between concealment and unconcealment is what we are going to closely examine in this chapter, through the analysis of the fragment of Heraclitus:

Fr. 8 (123 DK)

“φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.”

“The real constitution of each thing is accustomed to hide itself.”

What we are going to do first is to set out two different translations-interpretations elaborated by Kahn and Marcovich; then we will be concerned with the fragment's analysis by Martin Heidegger, which is to be adopted and further explained in our research in order to make more perceptible the emergence of the concealment as φύσις. It is useful to mention here that in this chapter many quotations have been put on display; this is due to the fact that Martin Heidegger, when naming Φύσις, along with his analysis of Φύσις, is very clear and throughout provoking. So our goal is to find the correct order through which the clarity in his ideas and expressions may be grasped by everyone. The quotation and the citations are put in a way that could

facilitate the readers, including us, in their following the flowing of the arguments and the ideas expressed.

Charles Kahn sets this text in a group the following four fragments:

Fr. X

“φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.”

“Nature (physis) loves to hide”

with

Fr. VII

“ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὼν καὶ ἄπορον.”

“He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless and unexplored.”

Fr. (VIII)

“χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὐρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.”

“Seekers of gold dig up much earth and find little.”

Fr. (IX)

“χρὴ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἱστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον”

“Men who love wisdom must be good inquirers into many things indeed.”

The interpretation given by Charles Kahn as regards those fragments is the following one:

“VII—X recognize that the truth, the characteristic nature of things (physis), the prize

of wisdom hunted by philosophical goldseekers, is not simply there for the taking. Even if the logos is common to all, so that the structure of reality is 'given' in everyday experience, recognition comes hard. It requires the right kind of openness on the part of the percipient — what Heraclitus calls 'hope' or 'expectation'”

(Kahn 1979, p. 105)

Through this analysis we can see that φύσις is interpreted as the characteristic nature of things, that many exquisite efforts are needed, required, to catch the truth, since:

“it is not simply there for the taking”. Even though it is fully understandable that to comprehend Φύσις and, in particular, the search of it, are not going to be an easy task, we are still wondering (if the question is still remaining) how Φύσις is to be understood and what about the relation of beings with it. In our opinion, Logos is indeed indispensable in our understanding and grasping of Φύσις; not as Word, ratio, reason but as a gathering, “the fundamental and primordial “fore-gathering” (Versammlung) of Being as the primordial *Logos*””

(Capobianco 2014, p.75).

The way and the context Λόγος is to be conceived in our research are going to appear in our relevant chapter. At this point, it is essential for us to comprehend the relation between Φύσις and Λόγος, a relation which serves as a gathering of what has been brought forth.

The second interpretation of this fragment is given by Miroslav Marcovich:

Fr. 8 (123 DK)

“The real constitution of each thing is accustomed to hide itself”

Quoting Marcovich:

“Fr. 8 might belong to the doctrine on the Logos: “The real constitution of every particular thing (=Logos) usually, or mostly, hides itself (i.e. does not lie on the surface

itself of the thing).”

(Marcovich 2001, p. 33)

In this analysis of Marcovich we observe, once again, correctly from our point of view, that Φύσις has a specific relation with Λόγος and that there is a tendency/way of appearing to hide itself. This relation of hiding and being brought fourth, which is of great interest to us, are now going to see into as it gets developed in the thought of Martin Heidegger.

Thus, according to Heidegger, the translation would be:

“The emerging bestows favor on self concealing”

(Dahlstrom, 2011, p.142)

In this translation we notice that Φύσις is the emerging whilst κρύπτεσθαι appears as the self concealing. This idea of Φύσις is further explained in his lectures *Introduction to Metaphysics* where we can find some definitions:

“*Physis* means the emergent self upraising, the self unfolding that abides in itself. In this sway, rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originary unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been conquered in thinking, and within which *that which* comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings.”

(Heidegger, 2014a, p. 67)

(Physis) says what emerges from itself (for example, the emergence, the blossoming, of a rose), the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming- into- appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance-in short, the emerging

abiding sway

(Ibid. p. 16)

Physis is the event of *standing forth*, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time

(Ibid. p. 16)

We have already seen Δίκη as the overwhelming sway, but this is a sway that takes place in what has been already brought forth as Φύσις. Φύσις is that Being granting which grants beings their constancy and being. Beings are brought into a persisting appearance and they have come out of concealment through the eventuation of Φύσις as the “emerging abiding sway”. It must be stressed, though, that Φύσις is not a simple event taking place, producing results and then got left into the oblivion or inaccessible to us. As long as we are, we are as Φύσις and through Φύσις. We can only be what we are as this emergence, as this bringing forth into the unconcealment. Heidegger, thoughtfully says:

“the pure emerging pervades the mountains
and the sea, the trees and the birds; their being itself is determined and
only experienced through φύσις and as φύσις. Neither mountains nor sea
nor any entity needs the ‘encompassing’ since, insofar as it is, it ‘is’ in the
manner of emerging”

(Dahlstrom, 2011, p. 140)

In addition to what we have already presented in the above passages, we can trace one very important characteristic of Φύσις as it is interpreted in the the fragments of Heraclitus through the philosophical analysis of Heidegger. Φύσις is not the “encompassing” of all things; we are not speaking about Φύσις as if it were the total sum of the entities and the beings surrounding us and abiding on earth. On the contrary Φύσις is what makes those beings arise as such, it is an emerging which “pervades” everything and it is only through this emerging that what *is* comes to stand as it is. Φύσις is an emergence, a granting, and what is granted “is the field upon which not only all friendship, but all enmity, and indeed all appearance, becomes possible at all (Freydberg, 2007, p. 263)”. It is now better perceived what was said above that we are as Φύσις and through Φύσις. Φύσις, thus, is not a simple property, a characteristic we attribute to things, not even things in their totality. Φύσις is granting beings their

essence through their bringing forth by Φύσις.

The way according to which Φύσις pervades everything, human beings and beings in general, the relation of Φύσις towards human being is also clearly shown in the next passages:

“Rather this *physis*, this prevailing of beings as a whole, is experienced by the human being just as immediately and entwined with things in himself and in those who are like him, those who are with him in this way. The events which the human being experiences in himself: protection, birth, childhood, maturing, aging, death, are not events in the narrow present-day sense of a specifically biological process of nature. Rather, they belong to the general prevailing of beings, which comprehends within itself humna fate and history”

(Translation Capobianco, 2014, p. 52)

“*Physis* means this whole prevailing that prevails through the human being himself, a prevailing that he does not have the power over, but which precisely prevails through and around him-him, the human being, who has always spoken out about this.

Whatever he understands-however enigmatic and obscure it may be to him in its details-he understands it; it nears him, sustains and overwhelms him as that which is.”

(ibid. p. 52)

The above cited fragments are really significant, especially today, when human being, in our modern society, seems to believe that Φύσις, as natural things, is tools and resources that can be used for his achieving goals he considers to be far more eminent than his reaching of understanding what Φύσις is, even though he lives in *it* and he lives as *it*. The belief that natural resources at our disposal are simply to be grasped and made by us the adequate use, like if Φύσις were a limitless source of energy and wealth, should not take us by surprise, since it's not embarrassing at all to speak about “human resources departments”. It could be said that modern Occidental society has found the perfect machine; all kind of resources, even the human ones, are to be used

in the pursuit of the so called progress and development. No matter the efforts, though, machines are not perfect; moreover, they function till they break down; Φύσις, on the contrary, as emergence never stops the bringing forth into unconcealment. Modern society, however, seems to be more attracted to the oblivion of calculative progress and results.

VIII.II Heidegger's interpretation of Φύσις; Φύσις as emergence and its relation to the concealment

Coming, now, back to our analysis of the fragment of Heraclitus, as already seen, Φύσις is, among other definitions, an "emergent self upraising" that can only take place as an emergence. This emergence needs the where from which it can arise and emerge; this where from- the κρύπτεσθαι- as Heidegger explains, can only be the concealment. Quoting Heidegger:

"κρύπτεσθαι is as self concealing, not a mere self closing but a sheltering in which the essential possibility of rising is preserved-to which rising as such belongs.

Self concealing guarantees self revealing its essential unfolding"

(Heidegger, 1975, p. 114)

"In such an inclination each first bestows upon the other its proper nature. This inherently reciprocal favoring is the essence of φιλεῖν and φιλία. In this inclination by which rising and self concealing lean toward each other the full essence of φύσις consists"

(ibid. p. 114)

The importance of the concealment derives from its essential relation to the unconcealment. Concealment is not to be interpreted in moral terms, such as the "good" light and the "darkness" that hides everything from our sight, not even as

nothingness. Heidegger considers κρύπτεσθαι as “a sheltering in which the essential possibility of rising is preserved” (ibid. 114). It is sheltering because only from inside does the emergence take place. Emergence as unconcealment is only, and can only be emergence, when seen and understood in the matrix of the interplay with concealment. Only through the concealing sheltering does the possibility of emergence rise. As Heidegger says: “the ever and always-enduring rising is named in the thoughtfully spoken word φύσις” (ibid. p.112)³⁷.

At this point another principal feature is to be underlined since it will render more perceivable one of the ways in which this emerging takes place.

Thus, according to Heidegger:

“Disconcealment is the emerging that goes back into itself, because disconcealment possesses the concealment out of which it emerges. Emergence is φύσις. Emergence is presence”

(Heidegger, 2013, p. 45).

“What is present comes to presence in a coming forth and a going away. Even φθορά is γίνεσθαι: coming forth, a kind of φύσις, emergence—disappearance—going down.

The quintessence of γένεσις as φύσις is transition, the unity of coming forth and passing away”

(ibid p. 28)

To stress the fact that Φύσις as emerging goes back into itself is that we can finally understand through this kind of emergence the importance of concealment and its relation with the unconcealment. The bringing forth into light and the darkness are not to be seen or considered as enemies. When Φύσις emerges back into itself, it does

³⁷ In the same text Heidegger proceeds to a really interesting comparison between the fragment of Heraclitus τὸ μὴ δύνόν ποτε πῶς ἂν τις λάθοι and φύσις, mentioning that the never setting can be identified with the latter. Unfortunately, in this chapter, we won't be able to analyze more this comparison which, nonetheless, has already been analyzed by different philosophers such as Dahlstrom, D. (2011), *Being at the beginning: Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus*. In: Dahlstrom, D *Interpreting Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135-155, Capobianco, R. (2014). *Heidegger's way of being*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

not disappear, or stops emerging; on the contrary, it emerges as a sheltering of its possibility to emerge once again into the concealment as bringing forth into light. This emergence is never setting, if we consider as setting the last and ultimate setting and the final permanence into concealment. But concealment could never not let Φύσις emerge since both Φύσις as unconcealment and the concealment are what they are from this crucial for our understanding interplay. Thus, no rising and no emergence would happen if the opposite were not a possibility or even related to eventuation's possibility.

Having seen the above we can now move to a really helpful summary of the meaning of Φύσις worked out by Susan Schoenbohm:

“The meaning of physis includes:

a) the originary event or movement of articulation or differentiation of something and nothing

b) the indeterminacy of what now can be called “indeterminate nothing” which recedes back or withdraws from the field of determinate beings, and thus both serves as phenomenological background for the emerging of those beings and as that over against which beings come to stand

c) the emerging of particular beings into being

d) the entirety of this complex”

(Susan Schoenbohm 2001, p. 150)

What we can see from the schema presented above is that the event of emerging is not a completed action- once done everything has to be finished and set towards new goals and objectives. Φύσις as emergence is only emergence through the concealment from which beings come to be; as soon as beings are differentiated from “nothing”, then where they came from stands there as a differentiation landmark between what is and what is not; furthermore, as a constant meaning and essence offered to the emergence, which, so, can only be thought and eventuated, only through its constant ever rising from the concealment.

The reason for urging in an emphatic manner on the concept of Φύσις is that in modern occidental society, through the ceaseless development of technology and the everflowing information, we are starting to dive deeper and deeper into an artificiality whose ambition is to become the new Φύσις, the new emergence, groundless, though, in our society.

The predominance of crude norms and measures applicable in the domain of economy, the explanation of crisis simply in terms of deficit features and development possibilities(figures), instead of EU's being concerned mainly about the loss of the human dignity- values along with the subsequent disastrous effects for the people and the socio economic cohesion experienced in the conditions of everyday life, the sovereign but uncontrolled role of the social media over the vast masses of the population thirsty for objective and accurate information- Facebook becomes the open court where everything is allowed to be told, no matter it is true or not- are, among others, some of the elements proving to us that Φύσις, at least as thought in the mind of Greek philosophers, is fading more and more, hiding once again into the concealment. Of course, speaking about the past does not mean that we are dreaming of going back there and living it once again. Φύσις, as we have already seen, is ever rising, and the concealment is a sheltering gathering, granting the possibility of this rising. This rising, of course, can be grasped in thought as well, but this does not mean that it is not an appearance.

Thus, quoting Heidegger:

“the greek notion of φύσις and φεῖν: growth, coming forth-precisely out of the earth and thus *emergence*, self-unfolding, self presentation in the open, self-showing- appearance”

(Heidegger 2015b, p.16)”.

Φύειν is the counter concept to κρύπτεσθαι, conceal. (On this basis we understand the pronouncement of Heraclitus(D 123): η φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ- beings contain an intrinsic striving to self-concealment. That is possible only if beings as beings are at once *appearance*; only what appears and can appear, i.e can show itself, can also conceal

itself.)
(ibid. p. 16)

VIII.III The ontical and ontological aspect of Φύσις (Correlated fragment 13)

Φύσις, as self showing appearance makes us understand that, at least in the thought of Heraclitus, there is no transcendence, nor is the human body denied the possibility of knowledge.

There are also fragments of Heraclitus where he names the human senses (M 5, 6). One of them which paves the way for our understanding of senses as well as of the way they can reach Λόγος, and Φύσις:

Fr. 13 (107 DK)

“κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὠτα βαρβάρους ψυχᾶς ἐχόντων.”

“Evil witnesses are eyes and ears for men, if they have souls that do not understand their language”

Quoting Marcovich:

“The fragment stresses the need of personal intelligence or insight for the apprehension of the Logos.”

(Marcovich, 2001 p. 47)

Focusing on those hints we understand that Φύσις can be grasped by senses too, through an ontological, if we are permitted to use the word in the thought of Heraclitus, approach towards them. Ontological and not only ontical, since what we see or hear may be wrong if we are not first attuned to what Λόγος and Φύσις are. Thus, we are not encountering a dismissal of the sensory faculty, on the contrary, we

witness the need of the sensory faculty to be attuned to something more profound and more transparent; namely, an attunement to the primordial gathering of beings in Φύσις and as Φύσις.

This distinction between the ontical and the ontological character of the senses is of specific importance especially at the time the “society of the spectacle³⁸” seems to be rising in power and influence. Independently of where we are, images and information are flooding the sensory system. Videos, images, sounds, music, news and more news; we are simply receiving and in this endless reception we don't even have the time to remain silent and check for a second what we receive and if it is worth receiving. In this ceaseless reception of sensory data δεινότητων is losing his ability of proper gathering, since, being unable to gather all the information and to think about it, he gets drifted by this interminable flowing and reception becoming, thus, a part of the overabundance of the information. This is exactly the reason why the thought of Heraclitus, and the Presocratics in general, must be taken seriously. Their thought even though thousand years away from ours, has conceived Φύσις and our relation to it in a more primordial way. This primordiality has to be sought for once again before the concealment of Φύσις becomes so profound and desperate that we risk even to lose the slightest grasp of it.

One beautiful example which illuminates this relation between Φύσις and the senses, as well as its relation to the concealment and the perception of this concealment from our part is given by Daniel Daehlstrom³⁹:

“There are at least two (complementary) ways we might interpret this interpretation of φύσις as fire:

- (1) insofar as a fire, e.g., a campfire, provides light to see one another in the midst of the darkness, we may ignore the fire in order to attend to the presences and absences it makes possible;

³⁸ The famous book of Guy Debord written in 1967

³⁹ This example is originating from the interpretation the author makes of Heidegger which connects Fire and Φύσις due to the above mentioned interplay between concealment and unconcealment. For more see: Dahlstrom, D. (2011), *Being at the beginning: Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus*. In: Dahlstrom, D *Interpreting Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135-155

(2) insofar as, gazing at a fire, we see the coals and embers glowing and darkening in a regular rhythm, taking on different shapes before disappearing into the flames, we see not the fire itself but something on fire; in this sense, the fire may be said to conceal itself in the process.”

(Daehlstrom 2011, p. 145)

What we can understand from this very helpful image is that Φύσις emerging as fire brings forth into appearance things that we can see and grasp. We can either concentrate on what is illuminated around us or even what is glowing into the fire. But fire as well is there, it's there for us to see but we usually concentrate on the beings which are brought into light and not that much on the event of the emergence making its appearance possible and open for our perception and interaction with it.

VIII.IV Φύσις, Λόγος and δεινότατον: preparation for the emergence of Λόγος

The reason for our insisting on the idea of Φύσις as the latter appears in the fragment of Heraclitus, is that we consider really important to set the matrix in which we are going to see the violence making of δεινότατον facilitating the reach of his abode on the earth. Δεινότατον, like every other being, can only live through and as Φύσις, attuned to it, an attunement which can be provided by the grasping and understanding of the “primordial fore-gathering” of Λόγος as we have mentioned before. Φύσις, as the emerging sway, brings everything forth into appearance, although this unconcealment bears an essential relation to the concealment of beings withal. Thus, even though Φύσις brings everything in constant presence it cannot oblige us to be aware of this appearance. What we are granted is the possibility of living as Φύσις; nevertheless, this possibility is not an imposed obligation like if Φύσις were a human agent in need of control and dominance. Φύσις already prevails and pervades everything, yet it is up to us to realize this prevailing and live according to it.

Nonetheless, δεινότατον-especially in the modern society's life, where ideas

such as subject, subjectivity and individualism are becoming stronger deepening their roots in our essence- is many a time trying to impose his own rules and limits on the emergence which is taking place. Instead of being aware of what is brought into light he decides to become the “beacon of light” shedding his own light so as to bring things forth in his own way and through his own point of view. In our opinion, this is the moment when Φύσις conceals itself in the sheltering of its possibility of emerging again. Beings, then, are no longer appearances brought forth by the primordial emergence, but simply, tools and calculative processes which will eventually lead to the emergence of the dominant emerging of power of δεινότατον on the earth. What beings really are is concealed; what rises forth is their utility, their own being as means to reach the goal.

When mentioning this extreme “violence acting” of δεινότατον, of course, we are not limited to its relation to what, today, we name nature and natural things. Taking a close look at what is happening everyday in the world, we see that no matter which being often gets manipulated, used and, when losing its utility, thrown away, a new “resourceful” being may replace it following the same way, its “duration” depending on the amount of time it will be able to produce. Since in a modern society the exhaustive use/abuse of “human resources” is employed without caring in the slightest about the human person itself, God knows what there is to occur with regard to the rest of the resources which are not human.

Where δεινότατον is really mistaken, though, is when he considers that his own actions and his violent-acting will remain unanswered and without consequences. In a previous chapter we have seen the overwhelming sway of Δίκη. In this chapter, through our interpretation of Φύσις, we can apprehend its role in a more profound way. What has been brought into light is not brought and left to rot and disappear as if the results and not the emergence really mattered. Understanding it or not, we are all living as this emergence, as Φύσις, whose limits are not to be trespassed either by δεινότατον or by any other being. The overwhelming sway of Δίκη, thus, is the limit setting force, the overwhelming sway which does not let δεινότατον become, through his ὕβρις, the new order, the new emergence according to which the world would appear to us. Since Φύσις can always return back to itself as an emergence, sheltering

the possibility of the appearance and steadfast presence of beings, what is left for δεινότατον in this concealment is his own misunderstanding of the world. His violent acting will never let him be led to his abode, an abode concealed because of him. On the contrary, the uncanniness, the same one which first made him search for his abode, will lead him out of his own limits, out of the reach of his capacities and possibilities; guided by his tragic essence, as Ajax, he will not obey the fittingness of Δίκη and will eventually be crushed on its inviolable limits.

IX. GATHERING THE PIECES: THE EMERGENCE OF ΛΟΓΟΣ IN ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ

IX.I Review of Πόλεμος as unconcealment; δεινότατον in the midst of Πόλεμος

From what has been written so far we observe that Δίκη, through Πόλεμος, reestablishes its checks, its internal structure and is always being in constant change; new limits are set, new challenges arise for all of us and each end is a new beginning, a new base from which everything is going to start moving again and again. The lightning, seen as Πόλεμος, in our case, is a steering lightning bolt, a call for violent change and the always renewed beginning of the struggle. The struggle, the change, never ceases, only changes forms and the parts of the battleground where each time is going to take place. The battleground is one, namely Δίκη, and everything is happening in concord with Δίκη, in harmony with strife, as Heraclitus said.

Before going forward, it is important to clarify, at this point, the main perspective in which we will treat the issue of Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος, in this dissertation, is perceived as a struggle of δεινότατον to find his abode on the earth, a struggle which is inevitably a struggle of giving meaning and sense to the world. Πόλεμος, thus, is dealt with as the struggle for the unconcealment; an unconcealment that will enable δεινότατον to find his place in the world, through the understanding of the world, with no longer feeling the dominance of the uncanniness. Heidegger's analysis of the above mentioned subjects has provided us with valuable resources in our attempt to even more deepen our understanding of Πόλεμος. Hence, Πόλεμος is much more

than a military struggle. Πόλεμος is the violent ontic activity of δεινότατον, manifested so as to ontologically attribute meaning to the earth, while becoming, this way, able to grow familiar with the latter. δεινότατον always seeks for what is most familiar with it and this search, this seeking is what calls for his own unleashing of fury through Πόλεμος. Quoting Gregory Fried:

“Being and Dasein belong together in the polemos of the unconcealing of truth that opens up the world as the realm of sense (Fried, 2000 p. 76)”.

In the world, thus, δεινότατον fights for the revealing of sense, of meaning. Being thrown at it, δεινότατον, must keep struggling, reach the maximum potential of his possibilities so as to prove himself that not everything is conditional and senseless. Δεινότατον is not a lost peon in a meaningless playground. On the contrary, he is the responsible of making what seems arbitrary and artificial, meaningful and full of sense, a sense attributable to the world through his own personal struggle, which attains the peak of its manifestation in Πόλεμος.

“Truth, as Unverborgenheit (unconcealedness) and a-le⁻⁻⁻theia, is Πόλεμος. For Heidegger, truth understood ontologically is the opening up of a world, the making manifest of beings for Dasein’s understanding of Being. But this opening up, this making manifest, is always a struggle to bring forth from concealedness, from le⁻⁻⁻the. Indeed, for anything to be at issue is dependent on truth as Πόλεμος (Ibid. p. 34)”

The analysis of truth as Αλήθεια and the difference between Αλήθεια and veritas, although being a really important issue, require much more time and space, in our case, for a decent attempt to our seizing on it⁴⁰. What we can understand, nonetheless, from the above passage is the way the world is unconcealed for δεινότατον, wherever the unconcealment is tied to Πόλεμος. Through Πόλεμος what

⁴⁰ For a thorough analysis of the difference between Αλήθεια and veritas see: Heidegger, M. (1998a). *Parmenides*. 1st ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

is kept hidden is brought to light, and when we speak about the hiding we are not referring to an ontic one, where we just open curtains, but to an ontological one, which, demands, on the part of δεινότατον, a more profound understanding of the world which is surrounding him; viz a consciousness of the concealed meaning that the Earth is hiding from δεινότατον and of the struggle of δεινότατον to give meaning to the earth, is not, of course, a summarizing process, like if earth were alien to it, but a meaning which arises through the act of the unconcealment. An unconcealment which has been made possible and meaningful due to the concealed sheltering of it in the “never-tiring” earth as we have seen many times before.

Having clarified this, what we are going to examine in this final chapter is how δεινότατον can remain united in his thoughts and his essence in all this constant change. We are living in a persisting and ceaseless change but δεινότατον is not a mere, unwilling being, drifted like a lost ship in the waves of the changes of Πόλεμος. Δεινότατον is always struggling and through Πόλεμος becomes the creator of changes and the one who is more radically affected by the changes taking place around him. It is normal that δεινότατον faces the danger of losing himself in Πόλεμος, of being alienated from himself due to the things that he has experienced and lived. Πόλεμος is a totally new experience, a groundbreaking change in his life, like nothing has ever had the experience of. Πόλεμος is the most radical expression of the violent acting of δεινότατον; hence such an intensive acting influences not only δεινότατον but the environment in which he dwells. As long as the world changes around him, so does the way he perceives the world, and most importantly, this fundamental necessity to find his dwelling in the world.

This primordial necessity of finding his place in the world, as we saw in an earlier chapter, is what made δεινότατον first release his violent acting against the overwhelming sway governing the world, against δική itself. But, Πόλεμος, this violent acting against the world rises from a deeper struggle, which is only an external expression in the ontic world of this inner struggle. The struggle at the root of the existence of δεινότατον, as we have already seen, is the realization of the absence of his home in the world he lives in. This ontological and existential lack urges δεινότατον to commence his own struggle in the world. Thus he grows to be aware of the presence of

δική in the world and of the overwhelming sway inside him which is calling for his confrontation so as to be finally capable of realizing that the world has to be changed, that the world has to become a place he could call home, no matter the actions needed for achieving this critical and quintessential goal. So, δεινότατον, is a willing being, a being aware of the changes he is about to provoke and a being whose will is limitless leading him many times, as in the case of Ajax, to an open confrontation with the cosmic order of Δίκη. What the Sun may never do, as seen in the fragment of Heraclitus, δεινότατον is willing to endeavour, to reach its limits, and if possible to reestablish the limits, to reestablish an order which was never set by him. No matter the result of this confrontation what is worth praising is that δεινότατον may come to be the incarnation of the pure sheer will, expressed in his insatiable thirst for domination over the environment and in his everlasting search/acting for the finding of his home. As we have seen in the ode of Antigone δεινότατον storms the tireless earth and the waves so as to find what he most profoundly needs in the world. Being in this way cognizant of the fury he releases he can also be aware of that the consequences provoked will always come back to him as he is both the source and the origin of their appearance. So, in its critical moments of retribution, Δίκη, is not throwing the dices hoping that luck will do its job. Δίκη, through Πόλεμος, is the payback of our actions, the praise of the courage and the Νέμεσις of the ὕβρις. This retribution may not follow our temporal/spatial perception of the society, but as we should have learnt from the Ancient Greeks the schema ὕβρις- Νέμεσις-Τίσις will never fail, no matter our ideas, especially in the post industrial world, when δεινότατον is above everyone else and above everything. Empires have risen and fallen, power has been gained and then lost, pride ended up in humiliation. If something does not appear in our watches, this would not mean that it does not exist. On the contrary, it shows us that our perception of time is not the only correct one. Everything, inside Δίκη, takes place on the right moment. It is sure and inevitable that what we reap what we have sown.

So, if Πόλεμος is ceaseless change, and δεινότατον is the one who is always engaging in war then the question we might be asked about, would rather concern the never ending change of δεινότατον because of and through Πόλεμος. Being in the eye of a hurricane of changes makes us wonder whether δεινότατον is still the same

person before, during and after the war. How many cases have we witnessed to speak about changes in the war, all the more since people who participated in it in their having no remembrance of what they did in the war(see Grey, 1998) don't even recognize themselves. But still, even if everything changes in Πόλεμος, δεινότατον, who inevitably is torn apart by all those violent changes, must find a way of knowing himself, of bearing himself responsible for everything that he did, no matter violent or radical it may have been. Even if δεινότατον in Πόλεμος is torn apart, this does not eradicate the fact that he still remains the agent of what he did. Πόλεμος, as already seen, is not bringing out of us something that we have never been. Under the steering lightning bolt everything is brought into light. What we are, what we could be, as well as every possibility of our growing up to be is brought into light and it is potentially fulfilled. Δεινότατον's being able to engage into war means that he lives in a potential fulfilling of this violent possibility. The moment δεινότατον realizes the absence of his abode in the world, he starts living in Πόλεμος; Πόλεμος not only as a material expression of his violent acting, but as a way of being, of living, waiting to be brought forth as result and consequence.

IX.II Λόγος as gathering: a different interpretation

What we want to show in this final chapter is that δεινότατον, no matter the changes he may experience and the way he behaves in the war, is still the same subject acting. No matter whether it may be arduous for a soldier to recollect his memories and actions, no matter how difficult is for him to realize what has taken place in the war, it is still this recollection, this gathering of what has been done, said and experienced, which completes him as a human being, making him aware, through the pain and suffering he has caused and experienced, that there is something deeper even in the bloodshed of war. Through the violence and the pain he reaches a level of awareness deprived of any idea of superficiality. It is in Πόλεμος, as well, that what is most common in all of us comes to be realized, embraced and made a part of us by our recognizing its existence and its influence on us. What makes this attainable is Λόγος.

It is interesting here to provide the different definitions according to Liddell-Scott of the verb λέγειν (legein):

λέγω (B), *pick up*, etc.: tenses for signf. I and II, fut.

λέξω Od.24.224: aor. ἔλεξα A.Pers.292:—Med., fut. in pass. sense λέξομαι E . Alc.322: aor. ἐλεξάμην Il.21.27(trans.); Ep. ἐλέγμην Od.9.335; λέκτο 4.451:— Pass., aor. ἐλέχθην Il.3.188: also post-Hom. in these senses, but only in compos., esp. with ἀπο-, ἐκ-, κατα-, συν-; post-Hom. pf. εἴλοχα (κατ-, συν-), Pass. εἴλεγμαι, in these senses rarely λέλεγμαι (v. the compds.); also fut. λεγήσομαι (συλ-): aor. 2 ἐλέγην (κατ-, συν):—gather, pick up, ὅστέα . . λέγωμεν Il.23.239, cf. Od.24 . 72, Pi.P.8.53; αἵμασιός τε λέγων *picking out stones for building walls*, Od.18.359 (ubi v. Sch., cf. λογάς 2), cf.24.224:—Med., gather for oneself, ἐπὶ δὲ ξύλα πολλά λέγεσθε Il.8.507; ὅστέα λευκὰ λέγοντο 24.793; φάρμακα λέξασθαι A.R.3.807.

Thus, some of the definitions we are given here are: pick up, gather, gather for oneself. Perceiving Λόγος as one kind of gathering makes sense not only in ancient greek but in modern greek as well since there are many words which owe their meaning to this specific translation of the word. For example words such as συλλογή, επιλογή, διαλογή, κατάλογος, all bear the meaning of Λόγος as gathering. Syllogi means collection, epilogi selection and so on.

Even though this approach might, at first, seem a bit strange, it is important to remember that we are not the first ones to use that meaning of the word; other scholars, mainly Heidegger and David Hoffmann, have already given enough evidence which permits us to treat Λόγος as gathering. The latter, especially through his publication *Logos as composition* has shown how the verb legein in Homer and Pindar had a similar meaning with the one attributed to this dissertation, a meaning, though, changed through the usage of the word by Plato and the sophists. Quoting Hoffmann:

“The meaning of legein appears to have evolved from the older meanings of "to lay" and "to gather" toward the newer meanings of "to speak" and "to reason." In the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, legein occurs as a way of saying "to speak," but the act of speaking is signified much more frequently by the verb mutheomai, and formulations

involving epos, such as phonesas epea pteronenta proseudo ("he sent forth winged words").⁴ There are 56 uses of legein in Homer, out of which only 11 designate acts of speaking.⁵ After Homer, the singular unequivocal example of legein used to mean "to gather" in a context where it can not also mean "to speak" or "to reason or calculate" is in line 53 of Pindar's eighth Pythian Ode"

(Hoffmann, 2003, p.)

According to the above quotation the meaning of the word λέγειν has evolved from the oldest one "to lay, to gather" to the newer ones of "speaking" and "reason". This assertion relying upon the ground paved years ago by Martin Heidegger, we are going to follow, as well, in our research.

IX.III Heidegger's interpretation of the Λόγος of Heraclitus; analysis of Richardson and Capobianco; analysis of relevant fragments(M): 26,1

Our "diving" into the thought of Heidegger will take place in two stages. First we are going to see about the analysis of Λόγος in Heidegger, taking advantage of William Richardson's and Richard Capobianco's help, since their work has been decisive for a profound understanding of Martin Heidegger's philosophy in the english speaking world. Then we will address ourselves to a text of Heidegger- whose main subject of interest was Λόγος- namely Early Greek Thinking (Heidegger, 1975) . Summarizing, first comes the presentation of the analysis of Λόγος in the thought of Heraclitus as interpreted by Heidegger and made up by Richard Capobianco along with our stance towards it; we will examine the way Richardson treats the issue of Λόγος. Finally we will interpret passages from the earlier mentioned text of Heidegger so as to get an as clear as possible perspective concerning Λόγος. Having made plain the way we intend to approach this crucial issue for our investigation- as well as for modern philosophy in general, in our opinion- we can now embark upon our analysis

of the above mentioned issues.

Our starting point will be the work of Richard Capobianco, whose last book (2014) contains parts of Heidegger's seminar on Heraclitus (1944) which have not been translated so far into English.

In order to get a better grasp of what Λόγος is, we will begin from the verb λέγειν. According to Capobianco:

“First, “legein ” is to be understood fundamentally as “to glean” and “to gather” (lesen / sammeln). To gather is also to preserve, shelter, spare, protect, and safeguard.”
(Capobianco 2014, p. 83-84)

Following the same path of interpretation of λέγειν:

“Heidegger wishes to show that the *legein* of the human being is a “gathering” and “preserving” of what is “unconcealed” and, therefore, that “genuine” “knowing” (*phronein*; *Wissen*) and wisdom (*sophia*) is precisely this “gathering unto unconcealedness” (364).⁴¹”
(ibid. p. 93)

And the final passage concerning λέγειν:

“that our *legein* , our “gathering” (the “knowing” and “wisdom” spoken of in Heraclitus’s sayings), is first and foremost a matter of the silent (and obedient) hearkening to “the voice” of *Being* as the primordial *Logos* , “the primordial fore-gathering” (242–6, 383).”

⁴¹The number 364 is the page of the original text in German in GA 55 where the translation made by the author is found.

(ibid p. 90)

Consequently, λέγειν is not a mere gathering where things are put the one next to the other. It is not either- as we will also see later on in Richardson- a pure accumulation. Beings that are unconcealed are gathered and sheltered, safeguarded; “a gathering (and sheltering) into the unconcealment”, as we have seen earlier. At last, this gathering, λέγειν, is a silent hearkening to the voice of “primordial Λόγος, the primordial fore-gathering”. Beings have been brought into unconcealment through Φύσις and as Φύσις; this emerging sway is protectively gathering the unconcealed into the unconcealment as Λόγος. Even though this interpretation may sound strange, ourdays, due to the unaccustomed way of using words and concepts that we already thought to be clear, it still provides us with an original point of view with regard to Heraclitus. This gathering and safeguarding into the unconcealment brings into our minds the steering lightning, whose fire brings everything into unconcealment while at the same time it is steering the beings, guiding them, bringing them apart without letting them, though, lose their unity in this gathering. In the light of the above, we can now better adapt ourselves to how Λόγος is perceived in the thought of the Ephesian philosopher, and how is interpreted in accordance, of course, with the philosophical view of Heidegger. Thus:

“The primordial *Logos* is a gathering (*Sammlung*) of all that is or, more precisely, a “fore-gathering” (*Versammlung*). In other words, the *Logos* has always already laid out and gathered and safeguarded all beings prior to (*im Vorhinein* , *zuvor*) any other kind of selective “gathering.”

(ibid. p. 84)

“The *logos* of the customarily so-called logic is, as statement and saying, an activity and capability of the human being. This *logos* belongs to the being that the human being is. The *Logos* of which Heraclitus speaks is the gathered and the gathering as the One that unifies everything, and not as any feature within a being. This

Logos is the primordial fore-gathering that preserves the being as the being that it is. *This Logos is Being itself wherein all beings essence* [come-to-presence, unfold]. Reflecting on this *Logos* is certainly not more logic in the usual sense. (278)“

(ibid p. 86)

So, since the first definition given here is a natural outcome of the meaning of λέγειν, we can proceed to the second one, which brings up the relation between δεινότητα and Λόγος to a different level. Λόγος, thus, is not an activity, a capability, or an attribute which we have and we can develop- others more, others less; on the contrary, it is in Λόγος where beings are being through their unfolding as beings inside Λόγος. We are unfolded as what we are in Λόγος, and through Λόγος. This part is equally important since it also opens the path for our thorough and clearer understanding of Φύσις, Λόγος, Being in the thought of Heraclitus. We can understand, from what was presented above, that Λόγος is not our property, like if it were ready to be used as an instrument for our better understanding of the world. Being in Λόγος, we are already gathered in it, gathered in a way which lets us be what we are in the unconcealment. Λόγος is what keeps the unity through the difference, respecting both of the members with no violating the unity or their difference in the unity. We cannot, thus, summon Λόγος on our will when it pleases us. The philosophy of Heraclitus is not a tool store where we choose the one we use depending on the situation. Heraclitus hints the way, the path which is to be followed, and leads us to another kind of belonging to Λόγος, a belonging which can only be reached through the letting eventuate of the eventuation of Λόγος in us, as we will later see. Finally, concerning the belonging of beings to Λόγος:

“All beings, in their own particular way, have this relation-as belonging to the primordial *Logos* that lays them out and gathers them. In this way, according to his vision, all beings, including human beings in a special manner, move along the Way as

“reaching out and bringing back” within the Open/Way (Being *physis-Logos*)”

(ibid. p. 89.)

Through this analysis we do understand that human beings belong to Λόγος as a “reaching out and bringing back” in the Open. This is a belonging which does not expand like if more ground were needed to bring Λόγος into our reach. This belonging is to be understood/perceived as an awareness of our being in Λόγος, in the gathering of Λόγος, where δεινότατον can realize that he is as Λόγος, as gathered and sheltered by Λόγος. Of course this realization is not an easy task, nor could we be sure that we can always grasp it, but even the mindful thinking of trying to reach it, of struggling to make possible this eventuation is providing the ανέστιον δεινότατον with the feeling of homecoming which is no other than the attunement to the Λόγος into the gathering shelter provided to us by Λόγος. Only through the eventuation of Λόγος does this gathering become graspable in thought and felt as a homecoming.

Having seen earlier in the Liddell -Scott dictionary, the interpretations given for Λόγος as well as the presentation of Λόγος by Richard Capobianco, we will now proceed to the interpretation of Λόγος in the thought of Heraclitus and Heidegger, as provided by William Richardson (Richardson, 2003). This always going back to the interpretation of Λόγος emanates from our longing for making clear enough the way it is applied in our research. So it is completely understandable that in our being accustomed to the use of Λόγος in a totally different context, this somehow extensive presentation of Λόγος will help us keep track of the better and more precise understanding of the eventuation of Λόγος that will take place in the matrix of the military struggle in Πόλεμος. Thus:

“Λόγος, we are told, must be understood in terms of λέγειν,
whose original sense, according to Heidegger, is to "lay,"
whether in the sense of "to-lay-down" or "to-lay-before." To
lay-down-side-by-side is to lay-together, hence to bring together
in the sense of gathering or collecting. Such a gathering or

collecting, if we consider it closely, is not simply a transient accumulation but suggests a permanence by reason of which what is gathered-together is preserved and guarded in its collectedness”

((Richardson, 2003 p. 491-492)

In agreement with what we have seen so far about λέγειν as gathering, we now observe that this “gathering together” is not to be interpreted as a simple accumulation of things/beings, but there must be a reason for this gathering to take place. This is not surprising, since Λόγος, seen in terms of a simple accumulation would just become a mere encompassing of beings; like if it were a puzzle in need of all of the pieces so as to consider itself fulfilled. But this accumulative way of gathering would rather shed obscurity on the way Λόγος acts and gathers.

In the same spirit, Richardson goes on and explains furthermore the “laying” of λέγειν as follows:

“The process of laying may be considered, of course, from the point-of-view of that which is laid, as a lying-forth. In this case, the lying-forth and the laying which lets it come-to-pass are correlative in a single process, which we may describe as a “letting-lie-forth-in-collectedness.” It is with this formula that Heidegger describes the genuine sense of λέγειν. Notice in passing (we shall return to the point presently) that this single process may be conceived as proceeding from two directions at once: from that which lies-forth, as if it were emerging of itself; from that which lets it lie-forth, therefore *lets* it be, in the sense that it lays the being down⁴²”

(ibid p. 492)

⁴²At this point in the original book there was a footnote which we provide here for the sake of clarity: For the two preceding paragraphs, see VA, pp. 208-211 (legen, nieder- und vorlegen, zusammenbringen, Verwahren, beisammen-vor-liegen-lassen).

This analysis is of a considerable significance if we take into account the interpretation of Φύσις in the relevant fragment of Heraclitus (see previous chapter). There is of course a relevance between the emerging of Φύσις granting the beings their being and the way Λόγος lets beings be as laid forth in gatheredness. This similarity, if not essential relation- due to the close affinity of Φύσις and Λόγος- is further explained by Richardson:

“It is an easy step from here to see that the lying-forth in question is an emergence into non-concealment, hence the coming-to-pass of truth in that-which-lies-forth. But we are not allowed to forget that non-concealment is permeated with negativity, for λήθη not only is prior to ἀλήθεια but remains intrinsic to it at all times. However this may be, the process of truth which takes place in λέγειν is the coming-to-presence, therefore the Being, of beings. Hence to let beings lie-forth-in-collectedness is to let them *be*.”

(ibid p. 492)

It is important here to be reminiscent of the interpretation of Φύσις and of the relation in essence between the concealment and the unconcealment. It could be said that Λόγος and Φύσις are the same (Capobianco, Marzoa among others), but, unfortunately, we don't have the space in this Thesis to look carefully at all those subjects relevant to the relation of Λόγος, Φύσις and πύρ in the thought of Heraclitus. This does not mean that there is no ground for considering different expressions of the Same, but, in our case, we have chosen Λόγος as the most basic idea due to its clearly expressed and understood relation with the gathering and as gathering.

Going back to the above quoted analysis, we see that Λόγος lets beings be as gathered in collectedness. This letting is of crucial importance for our understanding the relation of Λόγος and the human being(δεινότατον). Δεινότατον can only be the receiver of the letting be of Λόγος. This opposes every possible interpretation of their

relation in terms of a transcendental activity or imposed violence. Λόγος is understood as letting, a letting granting beings their letting to be. Δεινότατον is not asking and receiving; on the contrary δεινότατον, in the gatheredness, as aware of this gathering, lets space for the eventuation of this letting. Only through this letting space for the letting free of the granting letting can Λόγος fully eventuate through and as δεινότατον.

Having clarified a bit more the way we interpret Λόγος in this Thesis, we will put stress a bit more on the afore mentioned relation between Λόγος and δεινότατον; especially on the space which δεινότατον has to provide so as Λόγος may eventuate.

Quoting Richardson:

“What may be said now about the nature of this gatheringpoint
(There), through which the unifying process of Λογος is
achieved? In the first place, it takes place in the essence of man.
Furthermore, it is itself constituted as a self by Λόγος, for it is
part of the gathering-process as such. In this sense, we have
every right to say that the gathering-point of There "belongs"
to Λόγος⁴³. Λόγος, then, will always dominate its own gatheringpoint.
Yet for all its primacy, Λόγος has want of this gatheringpoint
in order to be itself, by reason of the very exigencies of the
gathering-process as such. The There, then, in "belonging" to
Λόγος, serves its needs. We might call it an "attend-ant" of
Logos. “
(ibid p. 494)

What we can understand from this passage is that Λόγος needs the **there** for the eventuation of his “gathering-process”. This **there**, as we will also see later on in the chapter, is opened by δεινότατον. Δεινότατον is one in which this gathering point is achieved. Both Λόγος and δεινότατον are in a relation whose reaching to a mutual

⁴³Footnote in the original text: VA, pp. 215, 216 and passim (gehören).

enlightening understanding will let Λόγος eventuate as the letting to beings. This eventuation is of course needed because it differentiates the simple accumulation of beings from their gathering in and through Λόγος. Λόγος must be understood as a letting, and this letting has to be realized and eventuated in δεινότητα. If this realization does not take place, then what was gathered remains sheltered in the concealment till the light of the eventuation shines forth through a deep and sincere realization from the part of δεινότητα.

In the following stage of our research as it has already been stated above, the importance of gatherdness and concealment is going to be set forth in a more detailed way starting with the analysis made by Heidegger of Λόγος in his book "Early Greek Thinking (Heidegger, 1975)".

Taking some passages from the afore mentioned book we will try, through them, to reach the core of Λόγος as it is going to be presented in the next section.

Thus, for Heidegger:

"Legein probably means the laying -down and the laying -before which gathers itself and others. The middle voice legesthai means to lay oneself down in the gathering of
the rest;"

(ibid. p. 60)

"to lay means to bring to lie. Thus, to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside
another to lay them together. To lay is to gather."

(ibid. p. 61)

"But gathering is more than a simple amassing. To gathering belongs a collecting
which brings under shelter."

(ibid. p. 61)

"Laying, as legein, simply tries to let what of itself lies together here before us, as what
lies before us, into its protection, a protection in which it remains laid down."

(ibid. p. 62)

“What lies together before us is stored, laid away, secured and deposited in unconcealment, and that means sheltered up in unconcealment.”

(ibid. p. 63)

All the passages have been placed so as to make easier a more comprehensive understanding of the way Martin Heidegger treated λέγειν. From what has already been said, λέγειν is the gathering and bringing together under the sheltered unconcealment. This act of bringing into unconcealment is flowing in the analysis we have embarked upon concerning Πόλεμος and δεινότατον. Since the very beginning, δεινότατον, is seeking his abode on the earth, a seeking which is a struggle, a Πόλεμος, a struggle whose intention and objective is the unconcealment of the world as it is and the accomodation of δεινότατον in this unconcealment. The reason of our using the fragment of the steering lightning derives from the importance of the instantaneous bringing into light provoked by the steering fire of the lightning. This unconcealment is what makes Πόλεμος so significant in our research. Πόλεμος brings into vision the things as they really are; no abstraction, no virtuality or lie can be hidden in Πόλεμος since δεινότατον is thrown against his own impotency vis a vis Death. It is under those circumstances that Λόγος can eventuate in δεινότατον, as we will later see, an eventuation making greater δεινότατον and merging a unity of the opposites in its most majestic and thorough form, due to the gravity of the Πόλεμος as a phenomenon itself. It is exactly during the outbreak of Πόλεμος that δεινότατον is mostly torn apart of everything he has known so far and everything he has believed to be normal and ordinary. δεινότατον reaches the dark depths of Πόλεμος and has to become able to “get a grip of himself” in the most extreme situations. Killed enemies, dead friends and comrades, atrocities and sacrifices, Death, suffering and solidarity, guilt and fear are all mixed up in Πόλεμος. Δεινότατον, on his part, has to find a way, the path in this maelstrom of Πόλεμος to become what he is meant to be, to find his abode in a matrix where the glorification of his uncanniness takes place. Δεινότατον has to find his home there where suffering and fear lies without letting himself get lost

either in the excess of violence-atrocities or in the retreat in fire and desperation for the sake of the human being itself.

These absolutely extreme and uncanny situations we see that the most familiar event is to take place; Λόγος does appear through his eventuation via the space provided by him and inside δεινότητα. Within this scope we can better understand one attempt, by Heidegger, to define Λόγος when saying that:

“Λόγος, the Laying: the pure letting-lie-together-before of that which of itself comes to lie before us, in its lying there. In this fashion Λόγος occurs essentially as the pure laying which gathers and assembles. Λόγος is the original assemblage of the primordial gathering from the primordial Laying”

(ibid. p. 66)

Following the analysis of Heraclitus by Heidegger and taking it a bit further into the specific ontological matrix of Πόλεμος, what we want to show is that in the ceaseless change of Πόλεμος δεινότητα can nearly remain intact as human being only by gathering his dispersed self, a dispersion created by the violent acting of δεινότητα against Δίκη and of the equally violent response of the overwhelming sway against δεινότητα. This violent struggle, the most violent that δεινότητα is capable of, surely is not a pleasant experience one who would like to repeatedly live.

Δεινότητα is facing a total confrontation both with himself and the entire world. This confrontation can shatter him, metaphorically speaking but many times literally as well. Our attempt in this last chapter will be an effort to show- using a philosophical approach- that δεινότητα, no matter the reaching of the extremes he is capable of, can always recollect himself; recollect his torn pieces in the violent maelstrom of war, grieve for his personal loss and the loss he has provoked and stand on his feet again having become a witness of the true meaning of Λόγος in Πόλεμος. Λόγος, thus, following Heraclitus will be what is most common in all of us, the

realization of the sharing of something much deeper with everyone, even with the enemy we have just slaughtered. Quoting Heraclitus:

Fr. 26 (50 DK)

“οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστὶν ἓν πάντα εἶναι”

“If you have heard [and understood] not me but the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one.”

Fr. 1 (1 DK)

“τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν εἰκόσσι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγῆμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαίρων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιῶσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. “

- (i) Of this Truth, real as it is, men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have/heard it;
- (ii) For, although all things come to pass in accordance with/this Truth, men behave as if ignorant (or unexperienced) each time/ they undertake (or experience) either speech or deeds,
- (iii) whereas I, for my part, explain such words and things taking apart each of them according to its real constitution and then showing how it is;
- (iv) As for the rest of men, they remain unaware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep.

So, even though Λόγος is common in everyone, even though we would have to be in accordance with Λόγος, ὁμολογεῖν, we do not act like that. We are unaware of its

existence, and we are not attuned to it. This becomes even clearer when we follow the translation given by Heidegger of οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας. Thus, Heidegger translates this as:

“When you have listened not merely to me (the speaker) but rather when you maintain yourselves in hearkening attunement, then there is proper hearing
(Heidegger, 1975, p. 67)”.

The reason for our endorsing this version is that Λόγος can be understood, realized, experienced and lived only when our acting and living is in accordance with it, when attuned to it. This attunement is not a mere observation of that something metaphysical exists and that's it. We are not trying to bring forth another abstract metaphysical concept or another simple definition of Λόγος. Taking into account what has been said before we can now better comprehend the fragment

οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστὶν ἔν πάντα εἶναι

According to Heidegger:

“En panta suggests the way in which Λόγος essentially occurs. En is the unique One, as unifying. It unifies by assembling. It assembles in that, in gathering, it lets lie before us what lies before us as such as a whole. The unique One unifies as the Laying that gathers. This gathering and laying unifying assembles all uniting in itself, so that it is this One and as this One, is what is unique.”

(ibid. p. 70)

We can now understand why the eventuation of Λόγος in δεινότατον takes place as an eventuation of gathering, of assembling; an assembling, though, which as we have already seen assembles things into the shelter of the unconcealment. Everything, through this primordial gathering, is gathered into Λόγος. Λόγος is not a

simple characteristic attributable to the beings. On the contrary everything takes place according to Λόγος and everything happens in the gathering of Λόγος.

γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον

Πόλεμος, of course, can constitute no exception. It is, as we will see, the battleground where δεινότατον opens the way for the gathering of things in the unconcealment. Far from being a simple military struggle, Πόλεμος becomes one of the different ways used by the unifying Λόγος when eventuating in the life of δεινότατον.

Seen in this perspective, can now be better realized why Λόγος, in our dissertation, has the meaning of gathering. Of course there is no objection as regards the other alternative interpretations/translations of Λόγος as word, account and more specifically when seen in the context of language; but language is not placed outside of the gathering of Λόγος either. When we hearken, when we are attuned to what Λόγος says, then we can attain to the ομολογείν. When we listen to and we do not just receive waves of noise in our ears, then we can be attuned to what Λόγος expresses, an attunement which is made possible by a proper gathering of everything that has been laid in front of us waiting to be put into the shelter of the unconcealment of the proper understanding.

IX.IV Πόλεμος as ontical and ontological struggle of δεινότατον

What we are trying to do is to shed light on Λόγος in the darkest moments of war, of Πόλεμος. It is at those moments of violence, Death and suffering that Λόγος has to be brought forth so as to prove its sense and its meaning to our lives and to our thought. We have to dare to see Λόγος in these dark situations where the “social” harmony is violently disrupted and the “beast” character of δεινότατον arises. But it is exactly the “beast” that needs to be tamed and brought to tranquillity, not the silent sheep which in the comfort of his safety in his house moralizes about what Λόγος should be and how each one can live it. We do not of course disagree that Λόγος is

complex and that our attunement to it can take place in countless different ways; not only in the experience of Πόλεμος. What we want to stress, though, is the necessity of letting Λόγος, the primordial gathering, unconceal into the shadows of the shattering and the dispersion of the δεινότατον during his violent acting against the overwhelming sway in Πόλεμος

What Λόγος is, though, cannot be seen within the scope of a simple relation of Λόγος and the human beings or as a characteristic/trait of human beings which has not yet been properly developed or even discovered. Λόγος can only take place as an eventuation in the thought of δεινότατον, an eventuation which will bring about all the radical changes thought in this deeper becoming aware of. Λόγος, is a gathering, the primordial gathering which gathers into the clearness of the open δεινότατον and his surroundings so as to emerge from them, from the unconcealment, and stand fast in the unconcealment of its own Being. It is only in this clearness where the abode of δεινότατον becomes clear and visible; visible not as a simple sight, not as an object ready to be used by δεινότατον, but visible as a deeper understanding, as a way of life, as the emerging of the being from the self refusal of δεινότατον in this world.

This self refusal, which can also be expressed in the idea of Πόλεμος, works as an important shelter, a concealment from which Λόγος will arise and eventuate. Δεινότατον in Πόλεμος is torn apart, becomes aware of the fragility, of the ever flux character of earthly life and of the existence of the ontic things. It is through this bloodshed and pain that Λόγος finds a way out of the self-refusal of δεινότατον, a way out expressed as an emerging out of the refusal so as to rise above all that has been fragile and become the clearing in which what is it really is and no misinterpretation can change it. Πόλεμος is the necessary violent change/acting which sets δεινότατον in motion and in search for something deeper in the chaos of Πόλεμος. Πόλεμος is not a goal in itself, a glorification of struggle which would legitimize its perpetual existence. Πόλεμος is the necessary hiding which gets dispelled by the steering lightning, bringing, instantly everything at sight, gathering what has been shattered in the openness of the clearing, manifesting through this primordial gathering the abode of δεινότατον as a way of Being, as the open to understanding and coeventuating manifestation of Being in the realm of δεινότατον.

So, Πόλεμος, is much more than a mere struggle. It is where human beings are differentiated from gods, as Heraclitus said, and this differentiation, even though open to many different interpretations, is not to be seen as a simple ontic difference between diverse kinds of beings. It is the eventuation of Λόγος, the successful grasping and eventuation in the gathering of Λόγος which differentiates human beings from gods. There are those who will stand in the openness of the clearing having realized the way Λόγος is manifested and those who will not find this, since they have already lost themselves in the self refusal; a self refusal which leads to a refusal of Λόγος itself by denying the possibility of the self to become the space of the eventuation of Λόγος. This refusal, thus, is not a decision of ignorance or misunderstanding but the same repudiation of one's self since it is only through Λόγος that what we are rises and stands fast as the affirmation of our own Being. Our being reaches, rises and stands in clearance only through the eventuation of Λόγος in our life. A denial of this eventuation is a disavowal of the self to become the "there" of the Λόγος, a refusal which inevitably leads to the renunciation of the importance of our existence.

In order to better understand the eventuation of Λόγος, we have to briefly recall what has been said of Δίκη and Πόλεμος so far because it is the interplay between these two basic ideas which better highlights the importance of Λόγος and the way it emerges even in the tragic situation of Πόλεμος. So, Δίκη, as the cosmic order, is the limit which cannot be bound. The schema Ὑβρις Νέμεσις, which so many times before has been fulfilled, will keep on reminding us of the limited capacities of δεινότατον. Δεινότατον is a being of limitless will but having being "thrown" at the world is the proof of his limited possibilities. The fact that these limits exist does not degrade the importance and the power of δεινότατον. Δεινότατον's destiny is to become what he is meant to be, not to be lost in an abstract matrix of even more abstract and exorbitant wishes for capabilities. Knowing who he is, he fights to become what he is meant to be. These possibilities are also set into motion when δεινότατον comes to realize that he needs an abode in the world. He realizes that the place where he is thrown at is not his own home; this inner realization urges him to materialize his capacities of becoming, into actuality which changes and affects the world he is. Searching for a place in the world is not a spatial issue where suddenly a building

becomes all that we have dreamt of. The post industrial world dived in an non ending search for the acquisition of more and more material goods is simply trying to satisfy all material needs without projecting a higher goal. Money, fame and the luxury of living a “comfortable” life tend to become the modern struggle of δεινότητα, a struggle which could really limit us were not δεινότητα above those needs. That need of abode is the existential scream of δεινότητα, a scream of refusal and restraint against the invasion of artificiality in his life. A building is a home and the earth is not always our world. There are differences, and those differences are mainly based on the capacity of meaning-giving of δεινότητα. Δεινότητα searches his abode so as to give meaning to his life. The abode is not a place, but a way of Being in a place and this way of living and being is what most matters him.

Once this existential need arises in δεινότητα, then Πόλεμος, taking the form of the armed struggle, becomes one more possibility which remains to be fulfilled. If δεινότητα is not able to reach the ground of Πόλεμος then he is probably not ready to find his abode on the earth. Struggle is not just an activity, no matter how violent it may become; struggle, expressed in Πόλεμος, is a way of searching when all the other searches have not proven fruitful. It's the unchaining from the fear of δεινότητα against the possibility of Death as a nullifying possibility, and only through this deeper encounter towards the possibility of nothingness does δεινότητα start essentializing his on earth being as an in the world searching. Earth is no longer a place which can be discovered through a map and a compass. Earth becomes the battleground where the world as meaning giving activity and struggle fights his way into our lives, when in search for a meaning and for a purpose that the untiring earth is hiding deep inside it as a possibility/ponentiality waiting to be discovered and then realized.

IX.V Πόλεμος and Death; δεινότατον and the reaching of Λόγος through sacrifice (Correlated fragments:97,96)

One of the reasons why the battleground of Πόλεμος is so important for the eventuation of Λόγος is that in Πόλεμος δεινότατον is closer than ever to Death, to a Death whose proximity he has asked for by taking part in Πόλεμος. But Death what else can it be than the nullity of every possibility? Death has been really well analyzed in the book *Being and Time*, as we have already seen, and this idea of Death as innermost possibility that we are developing further here⁴⁴. What the event of Death nullifies, namely possibility, in anticipation is what most deeply drives δεινότατον to his most profound understanding of his own self. When Death approaches, δεινότατον realizes that his time for search of the abode is coming to an end and every possible spatial/ temporal conception of his own desired and sought for home is changing. It is changing because in front of Death δεινότατον is no longer a seeker but the opening and the receiving of the eventuation of the abode. In front of Death's "nihilism" δεινότατον finds the essential meaning. What is considered to be the end of everything becomes a call to a deeper understanding of what has been sought for by δεινότατον. Πόλεμος is no longer a simple military struggle. On the contrary it becomes the most urging necessity of his getting familiarized with δεινότατον. Facing Death, in Πόλεμος, the comrade in arms, far from being a stranger sharing the same bad luck with his co-fighter, a comrade in arms, he is becoming the personification of solidarity and the one who endangering his own life, strives for the life of the one at his side. Words referring to ideas or symbols like Nation, flag and identity reach the apogee of their concreteness owing to the solidary presence of the comrades in arms.

⁴⁴ For further analysis of the event of Death and its importance in Heidegger see: Grene, M. (1952). Authenticity: An Existential Virtue. *Ethics*, 62(4), 266-274, Ciocan, C. (2009). HEIDEGGER, LA MORT ET LA TOTALITÉ. *Revue Philosophique De La France Et De L'Étranger*, 199(3), 291-308 SCHUMACHER, B. (1999). La mort comme la possibilité de l'impossibilité d'être. Une analyse critique de Heidegger. *Archives De Philosophie*, 62(1), 71-94. For an interesting point of view emphasizing on the greater importance of Birth, rather than Death, for the Dasein see: MacAVOY, L. (1996). THE HEIDEGGERIAN BIAS TOWARD DEATH: A CRITIQUE OF THE ROLE OF BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH IN THE DISCLOSURE OF HUMAN FINITUDE. *Metaphilosophy*, 27(1/2), 63-77. Finally, for a critique of Heidegger's perception of Death emphasizing on the abstraction level on which it is conducted see Edwards, P. (1976). HEIDEGGER AND DEATH: A DEFLATIONARY CRITIQUE. *The Monist*, 59(2), 161-186.

At the moment/s of fight the soldier merges into Something which he believes to be higher and larger than his own self. The fact is that what he believes being superior to him is only the superior form of his own self which has found the way out of the individual and made him become a true person; a person who recognizes in the face of the other the continuity and entirety of his own essence. The simple Ego of everyday life becomes a fulfilled Ego in Πόλεμος, an Ego which manages to consider as part of its own Being people that a few moments before might have been strangers.

This approach toward the comrades of arms cannot be seen under a single utilitarian perspective of considering the other as the one who saves my life so that I have to help him to remain alive. This relation is a merging, not a contract, a merging which finds its purest proof and expression in the act of sacrifice. . Concerning a philosophical grasp of sacrifice, even though this specific passage does not refer, exclusively, to the military struggle, it would be interesting and helpful to see the way Martin Heidegger analyzes this phenomenon. Thus, according to the German philosopher:

“The sacrifice is that of the human essence expending itself-in a manner removed from all compulsion, because it arises from the abyss of freedom-for the preservation of the truth of being for beings. In sacrifice there occurs [ereignet sich] the concealed thanks that alone pays homage to the grace that being has bestowed upon the human existence in thinking, so that human beings may, in their relation to being, assume the guardianship of being (Heidegger, 1998b p. 236).”

In this passage we see that sacrifice is interpreted in terms of the relation of being to the human being. Human being, thus, freely (from the abyss of freedom) and willingly he is receiving the grace of being so as to become its guardian. It is important here to stress that the relation in which sacrifice is to be found in, is not that between human beings, but between human being and his being; a sacrifice made for the “preservation of the truth of being for beings”. This very interesting relation expressed in the above passage can be further understood in the following one, as well:

“Sacrifice is the departure from beings on the path to preserving the favor of being. Sacrifice can indeed be prepared and served by working and achievement with respect

to beings, yet never fulfilled by such activities. Its accomplishment stems from that inherent stance [Inständigkeit] out of which every historical human being through action-and essential thinking is action-preserves the Dasein he has attained for the preservation of the dignity of being. Such a stance is the equanimity that allows nothing to assail its concealed readiness for the departure that belongs to every sacrifice (ibid. p. 236)”

Thus, even though the sacrifice does bear a relation to beings, it, nevertheless, reaches its fulfillment only through the preparation of the “there (Dasein)”, a there which will preserve the dignity of being, a dignity which is to be preserved through the proper preparation, from the part of the human being, in order to let the grace of the being bestow him. The relation, thus, explained here, is not to be limited to the relations between different human beings. On the contrary, sacrifice becomes the preparation, the acceptance and the receiving of the grace of Being from beings. Sacrifice is not a pure ontic action, but an effort to reach a relation in essence with the Being. This sacrifice is a departure of the human being, a departure that seems to be a homecoming, a homecoming made possible by the fundamental attunement of the human being to the call of the distress of Being, an attunement which is demanding the sacrifice so that the human being may be worthy of the guardianship of Being.

Even though the German philosopher does not mention the sacrifice in the context of a military struggle, we can, nevertheless, easily deduce that the field of war cannot be excluded. Of course, essential thinking is indeed an action, but this action has to be brought forth as an actuality and not only as the perception of a possibility of an actuality, no matter how well thought and deep this perception is. In other words, sacrifice has to be a decision made and accomplished by the soldier, if it is to be considered a sacrifice. No matter the non reference of Heidegger to the ontic struggle, his analysis of sacrifice is a great and important step towards our own better understanding the eventuation of Λόγος in war, an eventuation which is closely tied to the relation of δεινότητα to his own being⁴⁵.

⁴⁵For a very thorough analysis of the idea of sacrifice in the French military thought see: SCHUMACHER, B. (1999). La mort comme la possibilité de l'impossibilité d'être. Une analyse critique de Heidegger. *Archives De Philosophie*, 62(1), 71-94.

In addition to the above, so as to better understand what the sacrifice is and the way a soldier could perceive it, it would be enlightening to present a small passage from the the work *On Suicide*, of one of the most famous sociologists, Emile Durkheim:

“Now, the first quality of a soldier is a sort of impersonality not to be found anywhere in civilian life to the same degree. He must be trained to set little value upon himself, since he must be prepared to sacrifice himself upon being ordered to do so.”

“The first quality of a soldier is a kind of impersonality that is not met with to the same extent anywhere in civilian life. He must be trained to attach little value to his own being, since he must be ready to sacrifice it whenever he is ordered to do so

(Durkheim, 2002, p. 192).”

In this, aiming right at the point, approach of Emile Durkheim we can deduce that a soldier, a man in war, is not to be compared to with other human beings in distinct situations. In the maelstrom of war, everything is war and everything is brought into light through a quite different way, compared to peaceful and normal situations. Even though Durkheim, thinking the situation through a sociological point of view, of course, says that the soldier is trained to “attach little value to his being”, due to the possibility of having to sacrifice it, as we will later say, it is in the military struggle, in this violent face of Πόλεμος, where δεινότητα is given the opportunity to reach a deeper understanding of his own being, and due to this more profound understanding of his relation to Being, he manages to value it more and more; seen in this scope, sacrifice, is not a sacrifice of one’s own being, but, on the contrary, it is the only way of paying honour to it, because through his voluntary sacrifice he is merging with it, not anymore as a human being in the desperate search of his abode, but as the “there” of the eventuation of Λόγος, a there whose crucial importance for the human being is better understood, when we do realize the sacrifice that he is willing to make so as to reach homeliness, an abode where he is guided to through the act of the homecoming of his sacrifice. Giving the life for the other is at the same time an act of giving meaning to our own life, to our own self. In Πόλεμος the individual is

becoming a soldier, he is losing his life as one, and as Heraclitus mentions in the following fragments:

Fr. 97 (25 DK)

μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι.

Greater deaths gain greater portions (lots).

Fr. 96 (24 DK)

ἀρηφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι.

Gods and men honour those slain in battle

IX.VI The dire dialectic of sacrificing and taking a life as knowing oneself

This glory, κλέος, from the part of the gods and the human makes total sense in the thought of Heraclitus, since in Πόλεμος others become gods and others human beings. Πόλεμος as the ultimate threat against life becomes the trial of proving the life's meaning and sense. It's really interesting to see how Death- which for most of us is the always daunting fear, the end which we always run away from and whose thought alone can deprive us of joy- as the nullity of every possibility, becomes at the same time the way of fulfilling every possibility of ours and the path which leads our Ego to its fulfilment breaking the modern boundaries of individuality and of bare utility. Death which is considered to be the end of everything is becoming in Πόλεμος the calling of our inner awakening, an awakening which makes possible the

eventuation of Λόγος through the overcoming of the purely individualistic ego. It is in front of Death that δεινότατον becomes aware of two very opposite but equally important realities:

a) the one whose life has been taken is another human being too

b) the life of the comrade in arms who lost or sacrificed it for us is a deeper part of us as well.

The enemy and the comrade in arms, who become a profound dive into our own essence, into our own being as δεινότατον, reaffirming their presence there as a part of our own essence and life. The enemy and the comrade become the two ways leading to the same path of the gathering of the Λόγος and of its emergence in us through the expansion and the profoundness of our own being as the clearing open and as the inner personal fulfillment in the eventuation of Λόγος.

Having seen the above we can perceive how Πόλεμος starts by being a larger whole involving individuals; once the persons are caught in the maelstrom of Πόλεμος a personal issue emerges involving and affecting the whole, namely the relations with the comrades in arms and the enemy as well. Πόλεμος becomes now a matter not only of action but of a more radical decision, a concerning who someone is and who he wants to become in the most extreme situation of Πόλεμος. This decision is not a simple taking of action since it is about a way of being in Πόλεμος. This, however, entails serious consequences which the decision maker has to undergo for the rest of his life. So, even though the war may have started for national, economic or political reasons it all boils down to a much more personal level. Πόλεμος, thus, becomes a decision of the person concerned about who he is and which is the perspective he wants to be fulfilled in the future. After all, even if political leaders, ourdays, decide about engaging into a war or not, they, nonetheless, cannot see war through the eyes of a soldier. All the bloodshed, the atrocities, the sacrifices as well, are experiences which if not lived cannot be taught at a high school or simply be praised in front of a public. This is why, our interest in this dissertation lies on the importance of δεινότατον in Πόλεμος, not for the society or the institutions. Each human being, each δεινότατον, in the matrix of Πόλεμος fights against the overwhelming sway of the

apparition of a world that he has never seen or even imagined before. The earth becomes a battlefield, and in this battlefield δεινότατον has to fight first of all for a meaning, because, although he may survive, the way, a meaningless explanation of what he has experienced, will probably haunt him forever. So, δεινότατον is struggling against the sway of the apparition of the earth in its cruel image of Death and suffering in Πόλεμος, using his capacity of meaning searching and meaning giving. Were it all meaningless then our everyday life would become a never ceasing increase of individualistic craziness where the only meaning would be the individual meaning attributed to things. Issues such as moral duties, obligations, respect for the life and the rights of the others and so on would fall deep into a relativist kafkian schema where everything would become an apotheosis of a cruel smothering abstraction.

But could we say that Λόγος can only appear in the middle of Πόλεμος and that the latter is the necessary requirement for its appearance? It would be naive to think so taking into account that in the thought of Heraclitus there is nothing separated from nothing. Everything is one and it is in this unity where the changes take place providing the unity with its beauty and its antithetical coherence. Πόλεμος, thus, is one of many different occasions where Λόγος eventuates. We lay emphasis on Πόλεμος and on δεινότατον in the maelstrom of Πόλεμος because it seems that, ourdays, people who have known Πόλεμος only through their TV s and their tabloids try to convince us that their moral ideas and criticisms concerning war are more important than the judgement of the soldiers participating in the real war. It's hilarious, though, to compare the opinion of one person about ethics, be it on the news or in a conference, to the opinion of one who has seen and lived in person the atrocities of war. No more ethical points of view are in need of import anymore. What we really need is the appraisal "conduct sheet" of those who have participated in the war, because it is only in this violent situation where δεινότατον is obliged to reach his deeper essence, where there is no society or mass where he could hide. The unconcealment of one's own being in front of his own eyes is the most direct and thorough plunging into his own existence. Once there no opinions are needed, only personal experience and moments of decision. Those crucial decisions are the ones

which will either become the space for the eventuation of Λόγος or the abyss of the lostness into one's own being, a lostness which is normal taking into account the extremities provided in the battleground of Πόλεμος.

So, Λόγος, in Πόλεμος arises not only as a leap of thought, a changing of view or opinion about something; Λόγος is an unconcealment which brings forth what δεινότατον has let to be brought forth. It's not an experience, like if it were a simple sentiment waiting for the proper incentive to appear. It is the bringing into light of what someone really is in Πόλεμος. Seen in this light we can understand how many different things can take place in Πόλεμος, many terrible but many precious as well. Sacrifice and unbreakable bonds among soldiers in the battlefield give evidence about the eventuation of Λόγος in δεινότατον. In sacrificising his life for another fellow, δεινότατον makes a decision being fully aware of its consequences. He is giving his own life for someone he could easily be unaware of his presence, even if he might have met sometime ago in the framework of our modern society and that in time of peace. But in Πόλεμος, the unknown becomes one worthy of sacrifice and this event is one of crucial importance for δεινότατον since he manages to overcome his fear for nothingness, as expressed in Death, while at the same time he fills his life with sense and meaning. What is astonishing is that where most of us see fear, sadness and depression in Death, δεινότατον in Πόλεμος is totally capable of seeing his own unconcealment through the eventuation of Λόγος. He receives light from the darkness of nothingness to become a beacon of meaning. Πόλεμος is, thus, one of the very exceptional situations where δεινότατον can really fulfill his destiny; a destiny that completes the overcoming of his own ontic presence by merging with the higher and more profound, though, still, nevertheless, most personal eventuation of Λόγος.

IX.VII Λόγος as *primordial* gathering

So far we have focused on how and why Λόγος can be interpreted as a gathering. It is equally important to understand why in the thought of Heraclitus, and of course in our dissertation, is considered as the primordial gathering. It is primordial

because- no matter the changes in the society, in the values of a culture and in the flux of everything on the earth- one thing remains the same, δεινότατον. Δεινότατον's essence cannot be changed or altered, and we cannot change his belonging with other beings in his life. It is exactly the reason why in Πόλεμος, Λόγος eventuates as the primordial gathering. Through the suffering for the loss of the enemy, δεινότατον has already developed a deeper bond with the other being, independently of if he is the enemy or not. This suffering is caused by the realization for the loss of a fellow human being, bearer of the same essence with him. And this suffering is the proof of this common sharing, despite the efforts made by abstractions so as to ease and soften the pain. The Death of the other is, to a certain extent, of course, experienced as our own Death due to our having killed someone whose only difference lies on the side he has chosen to fight for. This side is the only thing that separates us but the grief for his loss is what unites both enemies. In the case of the one who fights at the same side, the compassion, the sacrifice made for the other is another unbreakable bond because it also develops the same sense of belonging, the same shared essence. A previously unknown man is now becoming a comrade in arms who deserves our own sacrifice for his own protection.

Thus, in both cases, namely the grief for the enemy's loss and the compassion, care, sacrifice for our comrade in arms, δεινότατον manages to become the "there" of the eventuation of Λόγος. But this eventuation what more can it be than the gathering and the stand fast into the unconcealed opening of two strikingly opposite things, the feeling for the enemy and the comrade. What apparently seems antithetical till Death, now becomes a common path whose unique direction is the eventuation of Λόγος in δεινότατον and the merging of δεινότατον with it. Πόλεμος becomes not an armed struggle anymore but an ontological struggle where the antitheses are all gathered into one unity, a unity of the opposites as the preparation for the coming of Λόγος. All δεινότατα being bearers of Λόγος there could be no eventual exclusion. The enemy is not the enemy of Λόγος since that would make Λόγος' meaning absurd and would bring it down to the standards of a common political discourse. In Λόγος the enemy and the comrade are the necessary opposites for the realization of the unconcealment of δεινότατον as what he really is, as the one who becomes able to

open the space for the eventuation of Λόγος. Πόλεμος, thus, is much more personal than international or political or economic. Πόλεμος is a struggle for the sake of δεινότατος own essence, a tragic essence, as we saw in a previous chapter, because it dares to overcross the limits of Δίκη; an essence which can avoid this ὕβρις not by a defeat or the reluctant acceptance of Δίκη's cosmic order but through the unconcealment inside him of his own abode in the world, an unconcealment taking place through and for Λόγος.

Εν πάντα suggests the way in which Λόγος essentially exists. Εν is the unique One, as unifying. It unifies by assembling. It assembles in that, in gathering, it lets lie before us what lies before us as such as a whole. The unique One unifies as the Laying that gathers. This gathering and laying unifying assembles all uniting in itself, so that it is this One and as this One, is what is unique.

IX.VII Δεινότατον as the possibility of becoming the *there* of the eventuation of Λόγος

By reaching the conclusion it would be helpful for the reader, at this point, to summarize what has been explained and presented in this final chapter; this would facilitate a better understanding of the idea of Πόλεμος as the battleground in which δεινότατον prepares the ground, the "there" for the eventuation of Λόγος- an eventuation taking place due to the personal experience and the conscience of δεινότατον that he is not a single individual but a merging part into a greater whole which consists in being merged with Λόγος.

So, Πόλεμος as the meaning-searching and meaning giving violent activity of δεινότατον is the matrix in which δεινότατον gives his battles, reaches his limits and attempts to find his own abode in the world. What occurs in Πόλεμος, taking into account that it is the most extreme expression of the violent activity of δεινότατον, is

an unconcealment of the world as it is, in its cruelty and its most sincere expression. We say sincere because, given the circumstances, it would be very difficult, even naive, to fake the truth, when facing the possibility of Death. So, Πόλεμος is the ground in which the unconcealing action of δεινότατον is first released.

What makes Πόλεμος so important for δεινότατον is the fact that Death is much more than in other cases present in every decision δεινότατον takes. Death now really arises as the innermost possibility of δεινότατον. It is the prospect of Death, as the nullifier of every possibility, which enables δεινότατον to become what he is meant to be, namely, through the realization of his own probable end and through the Death of the enemies as well as his comrades.

In the Death of the enemy, the first important step is to take place for the preparation of the eventuation of Λόγος. Through the enemy's Death and through the grief for a loss of something deeply familiar to us -which is of course another δεινότατον, another human being bearer of the same essence with us- δεινότατον becomes aware that he is not limited to simple individualistic barriers, but the pain he feels and the inner shattering for having taken a life, becomes a deeper realization that underneath the different political, religious and ideological sides each one supports, in Πόλεμος human beings die, and human beings get killed. This is a common destiny that we all share, but especially in Πόλεμος, the prospect of Death is so vivid and present that there can be no hiding behind abstractions or generalizations of "the enemy". The enemy is a human being who breathes, who, just like us, has chosen an ideology and is fighting for it. The ideologies may vary but δεινότατον in itself no. He is one of us who is going to get killed. Nothing can deprive him of his own being; the realization of the common being that we both share, makes us understand that what unites us with the enemy- even though pointing guns at him- what unites us is much more profound than what divides. The common destiny of Death enlightens the common essence of life.

The second important step has to do with the solidarity and the spirit of sacrifice which is developed in Πόλεμος among comrades, among people who, probably, would have never met if it were not for the outbreak of Πόλεμος. This spirit

of sacrifice and solidarity is very significant because it breaks the simple utilitarian mentality of our era into pieces and makes space for the emergence of what is most common in us, the recognition of our own self facing the self of the other. A recognition, which, taking into account the extremities of Πόλεμος, is much more intense and much faster developing since Death is close by, or better said δεινότατον is in his reach. The “heroic” attitude towards Death praised that much by Heraclitus as well, is the other step through which δεινότατον becomes something higher than himself by fulfilling what is the potentiality of his own being. When the individual accepts the sacrifice, he has prepared the path, the “there” for the eventuation of Λόγος.

Λόγος eventuates in δεινότατον and through δεινότατον, since, only through δεινότατον, and by the actions and the deeper understanding of δεινότατον, Λόγος is able to emerge from the concealment to the unconcealment brought by the primordial gathering.

This gathering, as we have seen before, is the unity of the opposites in its most extreme form, in the grief for the loss of the enemy and in the sacrifice and solidarity for the comrade in arms. Friends and enemies become one in the thought and in the understanding of δεινότατον; what is most profound and common in them, is what unites the latter to him, even in the most extreme conditions and situations. Through this realization, Λόγος, eventuates in δεινότατον as the fulfilment of his own destiny and the unconcealment of his own abode, which is no longer spatial but totally ontological, since it is the offspring of the understanding of the common belonging of δεινότατον. Only through this common belonging can δεινότατον in Πόλεμος really belong somewhere, setting aside the uncanniness which has driven him so far away. Only through this common belonging does the strife against the overwhelming sway of Φύσις stop, since finally the unconcealment has taken place, through the event of merging with Λόγος. The search of the abode ends since the abode is inside δεινότατον, sheltered into concealment but brought into light now and sheltered into the unconcealment of the eventuation of Λόγος.

Having, now, reached the end of our research, we can conclude that in the search of the abode by the uncanny, δεινότατον is no longer an abstract, spatial seeking which tries to reestablish the world, and even Δίκη sometimes, so as to find what is most familiar to it. The abode is no longer a place to find or to create but a state of being, the standing fast in the unconcealed primordial gathering of Λόγος. Only through the eventuation of Λόγος inside δεινότατον does he realize that what he has been searching so far is not to be invented but discovered inside him when brought into unconcealment. Δεινότατον becomes what he is meant to be when becoming the abode of his own existence, an abode which emerges with the same eventuation of Λόγος. Δεινότατον realizes that his search, when trying to tame the earth, is not horizontal but vertical, in his process of unconcealing who he really is. What δεινότατον truly is, is to be with the others but not in the form of a simple coexistence where frivolous and mundane relationships happen. Only through a deeper connection with the rest of the people, only through the understanding and the letting emerge of Λόγος does δεινότατον share his destiny with the other people, a destiny brought into light by the realization of the same beingness that unites him to the rest, be it enemies or comrades.

So, finally, the abode could be interpreted as δεινότατον's standing fast in Λόγος, where Λόγος is not an attribute, a simple opinion or worldview, but an eventuation inside δεινότατον, a merging with δεινότατον and the occupying of the "there" opened by δεινότατον so that Λόγος may occur, rising δεινότατον to what he can become. The eventuation of Λόγος can only be through δεινότατον. Λόγος cannot be considered without a human being who will bring it forth, since only δεινότατον is able to unconceal what has been concealed exclusively for him, bringing it forth into light. Λόγος can only occur as the Λόγος of δεινότατον and δεινότατον can only become the "there" of the eventuation of Λόγος through his ομολογείν.

CONCLUSIONS

At the close of this research one would probably ask why war, why Πόλεμος- both in its ontic and ontological expression. Is it really necessary for modern society to seek for entering into the depths of war's essence and trying to obtain there any possible answers? War is declared by governments, waged, in most of the cases, by professional armies, its outcome along with the events occurred during the hostilities, judged by the courts, on so called on moral/legal criteria, whilst the wounds of the soldiers are taken care after by doctors and psychologists. It would seem that this type of schema goes well, that the machine is working well, and, if a problem appears, then there will be mechanisms to repair its damages or restrain any possible negative effects. If that's the case then why should anyone endeavour to philosophically analyze war? We already have philosophical approaches towards the just and unjust wars. Consequently, for any possible doubts/questions there will be manuals to give the proper rational explanations. In our approach, though, war is not a simple military struggle, war is Πόλεμος.

Πόλεμος, far from being a mere armed fight, turned out to be the most violent activity of the human being; an activity rooted in the feeling of the lack of roots in the world. The abode, the *ἑστία*, is what the human being is so desperate to find. The abode is not a simple house, a building or even a way of life; the abode we are searching for is the finding of our place in our own world, a world where we start realizing that there is an abode when its lack is most deeply felt. Everything starts with the lack of the abode, a lack which makes us understand that we are meant to find an abode in this world, a place where our life would finally find its own attunement to the world, an attunement which would at last answer this call of lack, this urging call for our homecoming.

Why, then, is the call of homecoming so important, so strong and haunting that

drives us into releasing the most violent activity of the military struggle? Why are we able to shed that much blood and cause destruction in our path? This ability, this fulfilment of the most violent possibilities of the human being is to be seen in the scope of his own relation with himself and the world. The violence is not limited in the battlefield; on the contrary, the battlefield is the last place where it can be traced. The inception lies in the violent activity taking place inside the human being, a violence which breaks into pieces what he believed to be a normal and peaceful life and pushes him to his extremes so as to find his own self, his own true self inside a world which he no longer recognizes as his home, as his abode. The beginning is not a hopeful vision; the beginning is the blind jump into the possibility of nothingness, of a nothingness of meaning and goals, a nothingness which obliges us to create so as to be able to see the light in it. Πόλεμος in this ontological perspective is the inner spark, a spark fueled to become a fire by our own rage, by our own fear of losing everything in the abyss of the homelessness threatening to devour not only our own actions and thoughts, but the ground itself which makes the latter possible. The same ground of the possibility of fulfilling our potentiality is at stake when the homelessness arises. It is exactly this urgent distress call that makes us understand that the extremity of our condition asks for the extremity of our actions. This state of being brings to our mind a somewhat obscure passage of Heidegger when saying:

“Beyng, pondered in terms of all the above can never be grasped.

The first leap of thinking thinks:

Beyng is the nothing.

The nothing nihilates.

Nihilation refuses every explanation of beings in terms of beings.

Refusal, however, grants the clearing in which beings go in and out, and as such can be manifest and concealed”

(Heidegger, 2015a, p. 144)

What we can understand from this passage, in the above case, is that refusal just to perceive beings as beings, as simple tools or representations- is not a mere stubborn

refusal to come to terms with an unpleasant situation or some facts that we do not like. When we refuse till the outmost decree of throwing ourselves unprepared into the unmapped ground of our eventual nihility, we are actually preparing the bridges which will not let us fall; bridges which through the most profound refusal will become the safest ground for the most decisive affirmation, the affirmation expressed as our own becoming the “there”, the ground for the eventuation of Λόγος; Λόγος as a gathering, as that gathering which- as we have already seen- brings together the broken pieces of our own existence in homelessness, pieces which when gathered conjointly again will shine forth as the homecoming that was never revealed before their breaking apart. Only when facing the abyss of nothingness and refusal can we construct the bridges of our own affirmation. The quintessence of our engaging into the search of our abode is to be found in the relation we are developing with ourselves, a relation which will inevitably find its expression in the outer world as well, as the overwhelming sway of the violent acting of δεινότητα. It all comes down to this relation.

The human being as δεινότητα, in the world, namely, the human being who has already felt the homelessness as a calling and as a rallying cry into activity, is searching for a relation, a relation in the world and with the world which will enable him to find his deeply and, sometimes, desperately sought for abode. But this relation, this necessity of the δεινότητα to be related to something, be it the abode or even the lack of the abode, is a crucial factor for his own acting in the world. It may be the case that the human being, not being able to fully understand the way how the abode is to be sought for, may even make the decision that his best relation in the world is the absolute negation of the view that the world could, or should, ever be an abode. Human being, thus, totally justified in his eyes, is a pure and sheer violent activity, a nullifying force of negation and bringing of nothingness. In this case the human being is denying to himself the possibility of becoming related to the world. The world is thus considered as the non-ego, a non-ego which is not to be thought dialectically as the necessary antithesis which once overpassed will bring the synthesis as the possible homecoming. This non-ego may be viewed simply as an object which has to be eliminated, as an object which far from becoming related to is considered as the

imposing of a relation that the human being does not desire, does not tolerate. In this case, the world and the checks of Δίκη, not only are they not seen as moments providing us the possibility of rethinking our actions, but, on the contrary, they are seen as chains of obligation, chains which no matter our unwillingness are obliging us to relate with the world when our only wish and goal is the elimination of every possible relation with it. The idea of the homecoming is overcome because there is the existential negation of the fact there can be an abode after all in this world. The possibility of finding an abode in this world would be considered as the defeat of the human being, a defeat based on his giving in to the development of relationship with the world. Any acceptance of the fact that this world may eventually provide a homecoming will be considered as a victory of the non-ego, an imposition of an external will on the human being as sheer limitless will of his being only him, through his own development, closing every possible door of finding himself in the world. Of course, in this case, as well, the world is not excluded from the influence on the human being, but this influence, instead of being seen as a call of relating with the world, so as to fit in it, is perceived as an obligation to relate for a human being who wants to set free his violent activity as a negation of every form of relating. The world, thus, is not the battlefield where different relations are taking place ontically and ontologically, but, in actual fact the same world is seen as the enemy, as the ceaseless activity of a non-ego in his tireless effort to subjugate the human being in a matrix of relations that the same human being denies. It is in this kind of struggle that the human being is to become most fearsome and arrogant than ever. It is this struggle for bringing the world to its knees that has to be avoided if we want to remain human beings and the “there” of the eventuation of Λόγος. Λόγος can only eventuate as an outcome of our own relating with the world and with the other people, a relating whose root is the ontological necessity of the homecoming.

The reason why we are stressing the importance of the danger of a possible rising of this type of human being not wanting to have a relation, lies in the fact that such a kind of human being could easily resurface from the modern society, a society which is more and more used to creating abstractions and basing on them ideologies or political campaigns of all sorts. In such a society our main fear surpasses the creation of

a species of human being which will invent an abstract idea of the enemy, an enemy who having been deprived of his essence due to the abstraction, will be contemplated as the absolute obstacle, an obstacle which once overcome will head for(?) the inner peace of the combatants or nations. What we could be dealing with would be a sort of human being who would release his violent activity against the same idea of relating himself with the world; a human being whose violence would not be directed against concrete enemies but against the idea itself that there could be a world where enemies do not exist. This human being would found his anger and wrath on the fact that the abstractions taking place in the world have made of our same relation with this world an abstract idea as well. Hence, since everything is an abstraction, every concrete action, no matter its ferocity and violence should also be understood as another type of abstraction, not only permitted but almost coarsely imposed due to the same nature of the world as presented to him. This human being, discharged from the need to suffer, would, thus, be one without suffering, since this same feeling would be alien to the perception of himself as being able to relate it with nothing or no one else. This human being, if finally appearing in the modern society, would be a dire reminder of our decision to reconsider not only modern warfare but our same life and the meaning we attribute to it. Λόγος can only eventuate as a gathering, a gathering following uniquely our own becoming conscious of this scattering in the homelessness. If, however, the human being, due to the oblivion of our own self in this modern society, has become so inured to the shattering that he believes there is no reason for a homecoming or for a gathering after his acceptance of the shattering as an existential state, then our relation with Λόγος and the Being itself should be reconsidered in a much deeper and more direct way.

Seen in this perspective it is now better understood why we have decided to choose Λόγος as the most adequate and powerful expression of Being in the maelstrom of war. It is in the ontic expression of Πόλεμος as well, where the “intimacy” of Holderlin, as interpreted by Heidegger, clears a path which is to be found and crossed by those who can really see the simplicity of the essence:

“Intimacy is that originary unity of the enmity of the powers of what has purely sprung forth. It is the mystery belonging to such being. What has purely sprung forth is never inexplicable in some respect, in *one* particular level of its being; it remains enigma through and through”

(Heidegger 2014a, p. 226)

“And this{intimacy} means as supreme enmity and as counter-turning that stands over against us like a “holy confusion”. Such confusion can be undone if we bring with us the right measure of essential simplicity, and do not conflate this with an easy and straightforward comprehensibility”

(ibid. p. 234)

We are referring to the “intimacy” of Holderlin because we do believe that it purely and essentially explains the most dire dangers the modern conception of Πόλεμος entails. Our comprehensibility limits the human beings approach to enemies and allies, enemies with rights and enemies who lost their right to appeal to rights. Modern warfare is a pure machine, and as such, it must exclude suffering of all sorts and in every form. Suffering is a deeply human trait, one which, as already seen, keeps us alive as human beings. The suffering for the loss of the other is what still makes life valuable in war. No matter what happens the core must remain untouchable: in wars human beings, exactly like us, die. No matter their actions, their death is not a reason for celebration; on the contrary it is a tragic way of apprehending the reality of our world, within which has to be found the attunement, the harmony in the bloodshed of war. The harmony, of course, won't be a state of peace of mind, as if speaking of a higher level of yoga meditation. The harmony comes as a homecoming through suffering and sacrifice, a homecoming which has just started and gathers the suffering, the pain, the necessity and the deeper understanding of the immense opposed violent activities in our world. The homecoming is not a place to reach; its a mode of becoming accustomed to getting attuned to that which has sprung forth and is given to us as it is. Enmity is not excluded from this springing forth because it is through enmity that everything is set into motion, a motion which can't get out of bounds due to the fact that everything emerges as Φύσις. Everything is brought forth into

unconcealment through the enmity, as Πόλεμος, and everything remains gathered together- without getting scattered into pieces- through Λόγος.

Nevertheless, the fact that all those forces are active always in motion does not mean that we are, at all times, aware of them, or that we do understand the way they are presented or experienced during our lives. The eventuation of Λόγος as homecoming in the ontic struggle of Πόλεμος is just the beginning of a long journey, neither the end nor the salvation. It is a homecoming that makes the human being become the “there” of his own self, a self brought forth by his own decision to affirm his necessity to find an abode and to reach even the highest ground of sacrificing himself so as to become worthy of this abode. The homecoming is the beginning of the most crucial journey that the human being can ever set out; it's a journey whose destination is the ongoing becoming of the human being a true self through the eventuation of Λόγος, and through the letting be of this eventuation, by way of his actions, via his own way of being. What the abode really is turns out to be not a place, not a time, not even a final goal. The abode is the attunement of the human being to Λόγος, an attunement which will happen in the bringing forth of the human being in the emerging sway of Φύσις, in the absolute struggle to recollect his own pieces in the radiant unconcealment of the world through the thunderbolt of Πόλεμος.

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