TOWARDS A LESS SIMPLE BUT SOUNDER (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PRAGMATICS, I: Preliminary steps[a]

Víctor SANCHEZ DE ZAVALA [*†]

ABSTRACT

Both as regards their compass (non-other-addressed speech and non-informative communication are in effect ignored) and their scarcely empirical nature, there is reason to be dissatisfied with recent developments in Pragmatics. How to find a sounder basis for pragmatic investigation? If a psychological (in this sense: centered on underlying mental processes) appproach is adopted in Pragmatics investigation, a strategic detour through mental processes leading to other kinds of activities is likely to prove methodologically sound and heuristically fruitful. For it allows outlining an abstract model of (mental processes) inception of any kind of activity, keeping so at bay theoretical bias from the particular pragmatic standpoint that the theorist may happen to favor. And filling in the model with the specific features of language use shows promise to provide more specific models of the psychological processes underlying performance of linguistic activities.

1. Introduction

Let us assume that we are interested in linguistic performance. Assume moreover that this interest nonetheless ignores the details of constructing/recovering linguistic structures (up to and including semantic structures in as far as they are determined by grammatical structure); and similarly ignore issues of articulatory/auditive nature (down to and including psycho-physiological execution). In other words, the endeavor countenanced here devolves to psycholinguistical exploration of both how (strict) linguistic competence is actually put to work, and how a speaker-hearer takes advantage of his/her psycho-physiological skills. The resulting field of study may be reasonably apportioned to *Pragmatics*, in a sense closely related if not identical to that argued for in Dascal (1983).

A fourth assumption would be that the relationship between linguistic performance and sociological facts may be safely alloted to a different avocation[1]. (Although it is not to be denied that this relationship must eventually be accounted for in a larger and more complete explanation.)

Fifth, investigation may be confined, for expediency, to fairly short linguistic events, typically utterances not more than one or two sentences long. This allows

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full theoretical use of (sentence) grammar. (Clearly the assumption does not bar interaction with previous stretches of discourse, in that processing of a sentence can -in fact, must- be assumed to be carried out against a background partially created by and mirroring those stretches.)

Finally, it may be assumed (honoring Aristoteles' insight into the subject-matter of a science) that explanations of particular pragmatic facts have to be sought for by identifying capacities, abilities, methods, or strategies generally available to a speaker-hearer in a situation classified by general features. The assertion is, in other words, to restrict study to what may be called *(pragmatic) quasi-competence(s)* -"quasi" being a reminder of its much greater proximity to actual performance, as compared to familiar linguistic (i.e. grammatical) competence.

This completes my outline of the aims that Pragmatics should pursue and therefore the task I want to begin addressing here. Unfortunately, difficulties loom everywhere if the usual, to my mind exceedingly simple approach is embraced, as shown in Section 2. The first sub-section surveys a number of widely held assumptions; in the second sub-section some arguments urging that they be discarded are advanced. And the final one outlines a strategy aimed at building a new theory that would go beyond conventional Pragmatics' arbitrarily restricted field and would possess real empirical content (although gaining such a broad vista doesn't make theoretical life simpler). In the following two Sections the essential steps suggested are successively taken. In Section 3 a general, abstract model for mental processes underlying inception of 'activities' -in a sense that will be duly specified- is laid out. The model is derived from descriptions in the literature about how some specific (and rather unique) such activities are elicited. Then in Section 4 the distinctive features of linguistic activity are identified (again by paying attention to some other, heuristically useful kind of activity), so that the abstract model can be suitably 'filled in'. Finally, Section 5 offers general observations concerning such a filling in, i.e. purported to be valid both for emission and reception, and so to be used when actual construction of specific models of (mental processes underlying) these kinds of linguistic performance, a task to be accomplished in a sequel to the present paper, will be undertaken. Three Appendixes offer some material that, while being significant to the argument, would seriously interrupt it if included in the main text.

2. The case for a new (psychological) Pragmatics

Much current pragmatic work, including speech-acts theory (and its revisions by Bach & Harnish and other workers), Grice's theory of conversation, and Sperber & Wilson's relevance theory, while clearly accepting the domain implicitly carved out by the above assumptions, also accepts other assumptions of a more dubious nature[2]. As a consequence, they lead to several dissatisfactory results. I propose to critically examine such new assumptions, to reject them if found wanting, and to sketch a strategy aimed at a better, sounder theoretical basis.

2.1. Some assumptions in current Pragmatics

Here is a list of the crucial assumptions just referred to. Most of them are substantive, one is methodological in nature.

Assumption (a) may be worded as follows: the key mental objects people 'handle' in their use of language have the same nature as objects of propositional attitudes in its narrower sense, so that it is adequate to represent them by propositional forms. True, early work on speech acts added a new dimension which Austin emphatically asserted to be free from truth and falsity (and so it should be considered as non-propositional), but mature speech-acts theory links carefully values regarding this -now realized to be multifarious- dimension (i.e. illocutionary 'force') to those of the propositional realm, as paradigmatically shown in the formulae advanced in Searle (1971).

Assumption (b) (an exploitation of the previous point) goes to the effect that the mental operations through which a language user arrives at the 'product' of his/her activity are ideally derived in a logic operating on propositions, or, at the very least, in procedures more or less formally specified where propositions play a key role. (The 'weakening' of the more stringent version is intended to take care both of the Gricean theory of conversation and of its shadows in theories of speech act interpretation e.g. that in Bach & Harnish, 1979. An enterprise such as Vanderveken's, 1990, obviously takes no exception to this assumption in that it develops a double-pronged rigorous logic, one concerning propositions and the other 'forces', on which both emission and interpretation processes must build in order not to be nonsensical.)

According to *assumption (c)*, the central subject-matter of Pragmatics is a linguistic hearer's way of arriving at an appropriate interpretation of an utterance, given its context. So, a speaker's activity, when investigated at all, is viewed only in terms of how an addressee will interpret its 'yield'. (Cp. the nowadays rampant assumption that Semantics' task is none other than to describe what kind of linguistic competence is resorted to by a hearer when understanding an uttered sentence.)

Assumption (d) claims that there is no need to pay any attention to language not used as a means of communication -all forms of soliloquy may be ignored at no significant risk. True, a few, isolated remarks within speech-act theory seem not to stick to this assumption, and I think that the theory, being essentially one about a speaker's action, has a potential for development in the realm of non other-directed speech; but in its present form it is not less than other current pragmatic theories definitely commited to the assumption[b]. On the other hand, this is not a recent development; this assumption emerged in modern Pragmatics as a deeply felt belief that 'true' language use is "a human activity demanding at least two persons" (Gardiner, 1932: 7 [Foreword])[3], although its acceptance comes out of a commitment to assumption *(c)*.

A fifth common assumption, *assumption (e)*: informational states and their changes in the addressee are the proper aim of all communication. As a consequence, any other changes resulting from a linguistic interaction either fall outside of the

purview of Pragmatics or are to be investigated only in so far as they include, or lead to, an informational modification.

A final substantive and widely held assumption *-assumption (f)-*, at first glance a highly defensible one, goes to the effect that no unintended linguistic activity should be explored in Pragmatics. For how would it be possible to gather any useful theory about 'normal' human language use (to which creativity is an essential feature) from study of a kind of use that is comparable to that of a parrot or a record?

Turning to methodological matters, every specific piece of empirical evidence for a pragmatic theory is ordinarily assumed to have a common or at least a main source: intuitions had by members of the appropriate linguistic community (who are also members of the cultural community where such discourse situations occur) about what interpretations of an utterance in a specific situation (of said culture) are more 'natural' or preferred. (The assumption *-assumption (g)-* was perhaps impressed on most Pragmatics workers by the highly successful example of generative grammar.)

2.2. Rejecting prevalent assumptions

Now, there is no reason to accept the assumptions just listed if Pragmatics aims at the goals laid out in the Introduction (see Sánchez de Zavala, 1987: §1; 1989: Appendix, §2; 1990a: Sect.1; 1990b: §§4-5; 1991: Sect.II, §2.1.2, fn.51, for detailed critique -from slightly different standpoints- of the consequences of such an acceptance). Let us review the questionable assumptions *(a)-(g)* one by one.

We obviously have a lot of even easily retrievable non-propositional knowledge; e.g. about human faces, gaits, tunes, landscapes, etc., not to speak of procedural knowledge such as that supporting a skill. To dissipate any doubts about the fact that these pieces of knowledge can indeed enter into a process of building or one of interpreting an utterance, consider that a question such as

(1) Hey, What's-Your-Name, do you remember me?

sounds entirely 'natural' -or so it seems to me. In the absence of any argument effectively contradicting examples such as this one, and so for the unlikely hypothesis that they never enter into any such process, assumption *(a)* must be rejected[4].

If *(a)* is abandoned, assumption *(b)* loses much of its motivation and alluring attire. (A reasonable replacement seems to be: model how a hearer arrives at an interpretation of an utterance by some or other hypothesised process paying appropriate heed to psychological facts and 'best theories'.)

Assumption *(c)* flies in the face of the fact that a speaker's activity logically comes before that of a hearer's; at the very least they should be considered to be on the same footing. And, unexpectedly, acceptance of this fact extends the range of linguistic *communication* events open to pragmatic study. For instance, it allows for a speaker to perform <u>not</u> as required by his/her addressee's presumed informational needs or (most justified) expectations[5].

Trivially it is desirable to be able to account for soliloquy, and more generally for all kinds of non other-addressed speech -from comparatively 'light' or perhaps 'degenerate' uses of language (e.g. swearing or mentally abusing a more powerful opponent) to undeniably significant ones, such as linguistic recall or anticipation, pondering and reflective deliberation, explicit planning, cogitative enquiry, etc. Dropping assumption *(d)* just removes this unwarranted but surprisingly pervasive impediment.

The uncontroversial importance of information in linguistic communication should not blind us to several facts that make unadvisable to cling to assumption *(e)*. For there are linguistic exchanges where modification of the (presumed) informational state of the addressee is a scarcely, if at all, intended side-effect (e.g. when a person speaks essentially in order to 'let off steam'). More generally, cognitive goals must necessarily be found wanting in explanatory ability, since linguistic not less than any other kind of performance may be driven by any kind of goals (cognitive or otherwise): think of a speaker aiming at modifying his/her addressee's affective state (he/she may try to elicit astonishment, fascination or panic, say). In cases such as these, actual information communicated will be interchangeable with a huge variety of other pieces of information. (For other potential drivers of cognitive activity in general cp. e.g. Serpe, 1988.)

But assumption *(e)* is likely to misguide investigation in a subtler, more insidious way, since it almost unavoidably instills a commitment to another, secondary assumption. Namely, that in a fully successful linguistic communication the information meant by the speaker (i.e. the one that he or she tries to elicit in his/her addressee's mind and accordingly 'guides' his/her linguistic performance) is identical to the information that is actually elicited as a result of such performance. (To repeat: this is assumed to occur in any *ideally successful* linguistic communication.) As a matter of fact, though, when impromptu speech is the case, a speaker simply *does not know* in advance what he or she will say, what precise piece of informations is he or she going to put in words; witness the ckear sense of having been presented with a fake impromptu piece of discourse whenever one notices that a speaker simply 'translates' into overt speech thoughts that were *already* in his/her mind, i.e. when one feels that a speaker 'had' in all its details the piece of information communicated. (In the parallel case of non other-directed speech, were this secondary assumption true, cogitative inquiry would be non-sensical or a mere mirage -as acknowledged in a converse way in the so-called paradox of learning.) In other words, generally speaking, the information intended lacks some detail -sometimes an exceeding ratio of it- unambiguously found in the information actually 'transmitted', a fact directly running in the face of the secondary assumption mentioned. (See on the history of this observation Sánchez de Zavala, 1991, Sect.II, §1.3 *in finem* and fn.34. I will return to the subject in the paper where the present one will be continued.)

As for assumption *(f)*, getting rid of it results in an even greater enlargement of Pragmatics' usual precinct. On one hand it allows investigation of a speaker's activities which are nearly automatic (most greetings and other socially-based exchanges, swearing and other ways of blurting something out under emotional

pressure, etc.). And on the other hand, this opens the prospect of theoretically delving into a hearer's activity, which indisputably is scarcely voluntary or intentional if at all -a feature well-nigh ignored in recent pragmatic work (probably as a result of most pragmatics workers' estrangement from any positive psychological theory-building stance).

Admittedly, excepting perhaps rebuttal of assumption *(f)*, the above confutations come down to something quite obvious. The point of the present discussion, though, is to establish a clear setting for a practical proof that it is possible to build a pragmatic theory that does not accept common assumptions *(a)-(f)*, but is at least as successful as theories that do within their restricted domain, besides its being able to account for facts that go beyond such a domain -a 'proof' to be only sketched in the sequel, due to space limitations.

Finally, the subject-matter of our investigation not being competence, but performance, or, as pointed out above, quasi-competences as 'close' as possible to actual linguistic activity, there is, I think, nothing on which to commend the methodological strategy of assumption *(g)*. For in principle not only should no source of evidence be barred from the theory, if a really empirical Pragmatics is sought after: such new sources should be actively pursued for psychological constraint on an exceedingly loose theory-building practice. Accordingly, I propose to reject this assumption also.

2.3. Towards a strategy

The suggestion to discard assumptions *(a)-(g)*, while widening the class of phenomena examined is, as claimed, apt to enforce psychological constraints liable to increase the currently rather thin empirical content of the theory. How is this policy to be implemented? Here are some thoughts which bear on such a proposal.

A drastic simplification is needed if a feasible research program is to be set up. For undoubtedly, those psychological processes underlying linguistic activity may have almost any measure of complexity if we are to encompass careful, self-conscious speech, where the speaker might be silently anticipating quite an extended stretch of his/her own future discourse, monitoring in advance its probable effects, etc. An obvious restriction is to explore only linguistic activities where such second-order (and maybe higher-order) processes do not occur. In other words, to examine only a domain defined by use of fluent, spontaneous, impromptu linguistic activities.

The fact of having bestowed full theoretical status to linguistic emission activity leads one to review current theories of action for illumination, since to speak is indisputably to act, and perhaps something not too different from an action may be predicated from understanding an utterance. (A defense of the view of language as a mode of action -a view that obviously makes the very ground on which speech-acts theory is built, and that in his more rationalistic moments was adumbrated by Grice when setting up his theory of conversation- may be found e.g. in Winograd, 1984.)

True, it has been vehemently urged (Wilkes, 1991) that such theories, being a product of ill-conceived and vacuous *philosophical psychology* (=armchair

psychology), should be studiously ignored. (A contention where, not unexpectedly, ghosts such as the non-existent *philosophical physics* and *philosophical chemistry* are derisively waved out as examples.)[6] But such 'in principle' disparagements are methodologically unacceptable. For while actual empirical work on 'levels' of human action (and its origination) which is higher than the motor-cortex 'commands' immediately governing their execution certainly seems to be far off, almost any serious attempt at charting and/or illuminating such levels from a not necessarily empirical psychological standpoint might be heuristically fruitful or might even in the future provide a rough draft on which to build in the future an adequate theory[7]. (Cp. Shapere, 1972, where a compelling general argument to this effect is offered on the evidence of specific cases -ironies of life- in the history of *physics* and *chemistry*.)

Nevertheless, even theories of action that are most detached from their modern origins in theories of economical decision and action (e.g. those offered in Brand, 1983, Bratman, 1987, Audi, 1991, or Mele, 1991) address almost exclusively momentous action, and so action that is eventually launched after a protracted weighting of alternatives. Now, since in cases such as these the use of language is typically involved in a crucial fashion, there is little to recommend using these theories to model linguistic activity -the attempt at its clarification may well involve a circle. So, adoption of some or other part of the conceptual machinery developed in theories of this sort should be highly cautious.

A second catch is related to the fact that, even if linguistic emission performance, by dissecting it into appropriate successive stretches, may be sensibly brought under the notion *action*, it does not seem right to do the same with linguistic reception. To think of perceiving and understanding a stretch of discourse as an action sounds at best somewhat misdirected. No external behavior is required, a plan to do it would be plainly ludicrous, and, as it is well-known, it is hardly a voluntary performance and perhaps not even an intentional one. As to what would be an appropriate tehcnical term, I propose to shift to a vaguer, more general word such as "activity", which seems able to comfortably denote, among other things, both kinds of linguistic performance. I submit that the following delineation of the sense in which this term must be used

> (2) An *activity* is a distinct way of operating, requiring specific conditions to be started and leading to a specific type of end results.

is enough for our present purposes. Notice that, as it should be, *activity* not only will then cover, as desired, both linguistic emission and reception, but also any common, well-behaved action as well as any chain of such actions belonging to a single kind (if originated by a single individual, of course)[c].

Once cleared the way in this manner, what seems to be needed is a general, abstract psychological theory of (processes resulting in) 'activities' -in my sense, no doubt- that have in addition the cluster of features previously identified: spontaneous, fluent, unreflective, off-hand *activities*. In as much as this schematic theory or framework will be adequate, it will cogently (and free of hidden circularity) constrain any specific theory that is concerned with a specific kind of

activities showing these features, e.g. concerned with linguistic activities. (No doubt, this assumes that construction of such an abstract but not entirely vague 'blueprint' is in principle a feasible task; i.e. that activities in the posited sense -ignoring momentarily any unique traits that could accrue to linguistic activities- are such that their inception processes are not so disparate, either within or across types of them, that no such unique abstract scheme can be sensibly posited. Obvious methodological reasons, grounding on its maximal 'strength', commend this strategy.)

So, what would then be required, as to our specific subject-matter, is simply to incorporate the idiosyncratic traits of linguistic activity (whatever they are) into such an independently derived, constraining framework: this would impose the desired drastic limitation to present freedom (better: arbitrariness) in pragmatics theory construction. Notice the added bonus that the way is paved to future research on concurring and cooperating linguistic and non-linguistic (e.g. paralinguistic, proxemic or just linguistically coordinated) activities -a kind of studies that it would eventually be necessary to carry out.

(A methodological note of caution. Clearly -as above intimated- there is no guarantee that the theoretical strategy suggested will provide adequate results, no matter how great the theorists' ingenuity. For conceivably the psychological processes leading to a linguistic activity, which deal with such a unique domain of cognition as it is *linguistic competence* -or *I-language*, whichever you prefer-, have also some unique features, that cannot be captured when starting from an abstract processual scheme extruded from processes other than those underlying linguistic activities. This indisputable possibility, though, were it a fact would simply change the ststus of theoretical enterprise here advanced: then it would be no more than a probing into the descriptive and explanatory efficiency of the implicit hypothesis just assumed to be false, i.e. the hypothesis that proceses leading to linguistic and processes leading to non-linguistic activities have a basic commonality in properties. Since to my knowledge no cogent argument -in fact, no argument- has been advanced against the hypothesis, I will proceed as if it were true, although keeping always in mind that it may be necessary to effect the indicated shift in methodological status of the theory eventually developed.)

Now, to the best of my knowledge no abstract psychological theory of the suggested kind is presently available -nor even attempted. What about current efforts more or less in this direction taking place within the artificial intelligence (AI) community? Unfortunately, those which could theoretically be immediately relevant to our enterprise (see e.g. Allen and Perrault, 1980, Moore, 1983, Morgenstern, 1986, Cohen and Levesque, 1988, or Pollack, 1992) are essentially grounded in psychological theories of action such as the ones referred to above. This means, first, that the introduced notion *activity* is effectively ignored, reverting instead to the notion *action*, an approach which, as we know, is not methodologically optimal (in that when applied to linguistic performance will force entirely independent construction of the two associated branches of psychological Pragmatics). And secondly, that -as it was to be expected given the state of the art in the AI field- only informational and decision processes are modelled, a fact that

results in an extreme cognitive bias. On the other hand it should be acknowledged that the liability to circular pseudo-clarifications in the domain of linguistic performance is apparently warded off, since weighting alternatives and deciding courses of action are carried out in a sort of machine language or logics (ultimately a model of a 'language of thought') different from and simpler than language proper.

Still, some developments in the field, and related efforts by linguists, psychologists and philosophers pursuing similar goals (e.g. Récanati, 1986, Grosz & Sidner, 1986, Fass, 1988, Carberry, 1990, Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1990, McKevitt, Partridge & Wilks, 1992, Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1993, Korta, 1994) cannot go unmentioned, since they deal not with processes presumedly underlying action in general, but with those presumed to specifically underly linguistic action; then, if they were satisfactory enough they could perhaps spare us the circuitous journey through action (or better: activity) abstractly considered. This variegated work, that builds not only on the above mentioned theories of action but also on current classical pragmatic theories (such as those referred to at the very beginning of this Section) and on a comparatively recent renewal of philosophers' interest on intention -and action- (Searle, 1983, 1990; Tuomela, 1991; etc.) is highly interesting, and should be paid continuing attention. But again, confinement to conversational use of language, lack of an adequate notion of *activity*, unyielding cognitive bias, and other drawbacks inherited from the common AI way of tackling action in general, spoil most of its potential usefulness for our purposes. The theoretical resources offered by this work will be considered when specific construction of a theory of linguistic performance is addressed, i.e. in the paper that will continue and extend the investigation here reported.

There is other AI research in some neighboring areas -mainly where language use is seen as connected to its sociological setting- that might have relevance for the present endeavour (recent reviews can be found in Carley & Palmquist, 1991, and Carley, 1992). Yet it would in fact require a major enlargement in theoretical scope that cannot be tackled here -and may even make quite unmanageable the projected theory-building task.

In this situation, an apparently most simple strategy to elude the menacing impasse is as follows. First, identify studies about (mental) processes both liable to launch activities and displaying 'naturally' the indicated features. Then, abstract out of them the coveted general framework by way of ignoring the specific marks of the concerned processes -which presumably follow from the specific kinds of activities they result in.

3. Building a general framework for inception of activities

Obviously, affective states and their changes ('emotions', for convenience) may be construed as some kind of *activities* as per the delineation suggested in (2), §2.3 above, irrespective of their unique nature. And emotions, as against most other 'activities', unmistakably show at the very features so many times referred to: they are elicited spontaneously, unreflectively, and can be said to arise fluently, off-hand, in response to changes in the current situation (as assessed by the subject). On the other hand, as discussed at length elsewhere (Sánchez de Zavala,

1990a: §2.2; 1991: Sect.II, §2.1), recent research efforts towards clarifying the links between how a subject appraises his/her current situation plus its presumed developments (a process necessarily cognitively-based) and what an 'emotion' arises in a him/her, have lead to a number of proposals about emotion elicitation. I propose they be taken advantage upon in the fashion suggested in the indicated places.

3.1. A model for fluent, unreflective activity elicitation

True, the prime proposal in this area (Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1987) hardly offers but a taxonomy of emotions in terms of a subject's interests and the situation he or she (believes) is in. As to the main paper where the process approach is explicit (Stein and Trabasso, 1991), it may be deemed a mere re-telling of the same approach, couched in a process vocabulary. No matter; however dimly, a suggested inception process of emotions is discernible; it may be summarized as follows.

First step: the subject appraises whether in the current situation there are specific aspects or items (possessing specific properties) that do in fact, or are likely to, have any of the following effects: to further or to interfere with the subject's (or someone else's that the subject feels 'close' to) approaching or securing actual goals, enjoying attractive (or avoiding aversive) 'qualities', and/or complying with assumed standards of behavior. (A preceding emotion may substitute for this assessment `process'; e.g. we become ashamed because of having been afraid.) In a second -but not necessarily later- step, the subject incorporates an estimate of the (un)predictability of such (construed as) actual or anticipated effects, and also of how heavy the investment was (in time, effort, and so on) that the relevant person(s) devoted to approaching, enjoying, etc. the concerned goal(s) or 'qualities', and/or to promoting compliance with the concerned standard(s). Third step: if an actual or anticipated effect is unfavorable (i.e. if attainment of a goal and/or enjoyment/avoidance of an attractive/aversive 'quality' is interfered with -and similarly for compliance with an assumed standard), an appraisal is carried out of the feasibility of reversing such effects; in other words, the feasibility for the subject to secure a more favorable situation.

Performance of these steps -it is posited- leads to emergence of an emotion in the following way. When the appraised effects are not too small, the *first step*, as adjudicated by a collection of parameters (here only alluded to or just ignored), results in a first determination of which specific emotion will emerge, and of its intensity (it will match the degree to which the subject is committed to the relevant goal or standard, or is attracted/averted by the relevant 'quality', plus -or perhaps better: times- the degree to which the associated approach, enjoyment or whatever is presumed to be furthered or interfered with). The *second step* (where I omitted for convenience several factors) is responsible for further modulation of emotion intensity -which is greater the greater the unpredictability and the past investment. Finally, the *third step*, if at all befitting (i.e. if the subject deems feasible to overcome a considered 'unfavorable' effect), will be able

both to change the kind of emotion initially determined and to modify the previously specified intensity[8].

3.2. Generalizing the processual sketch

In the above description no procedure is given for settling 'conflicts' between several simultanerous goals, attractive/aversive 'qualities', etc. The omission, perhaps inconsequential for a theory of emotion, is certainly significant for activities in general, and must be repaired. A similar omission regards the lack of any hint in the third step about how possible ways to overcome presumed 'unfavorable' effects are surveyed. Again, the specification is apparently irrelevant for a theory of emotion elicitation, but most needed in a process theory aimed at covering inception of overt action, since disparate courses of actions are rarely compatible.

A 'null-hypothesis' -and so an optimal- strategy, I submit, is to accept wholesale the model for emotion inception just offered, but substituting everywhere "activity" for "emotion" (plus of course *mutatis mutandis* as immediately dictated by the substitution); the result may be dubbed a 'translation (into activity terms)'. These minimal changes must be enriched, though, in three main directions. First, apparently, a few other modifications are required. Second, co-occurrence of also elicited emotions is to be reckoned with. Finally, the pointed out omissions should be made up for.

At least two changes are needed in the first direction. Be it as it may regarding emotions, actions may have quite a complex structure; so, we must try and specify how they are elicited, no matter what the step -otherwise there would be a gap in theory. (But I will defer addressing the point to my account of the third step, where some clues are closer at hand.) The second change is a minor one: many times we carry out even overt actions while the relevant effects are not exactly unfavorable, but simply not as favorable as possible or as we would like them to be; then either our translation's requirements for initiation or modification of an activity (at least in its third step) should change, or "unfavorable" should be interpreted in a broader way -so that it includes the mentioned cases. (I assume throughout the latter solution, which allows simpler formulations.)

The enrichment in the second direction might be secured by simply assuming parallel elicitation of whatever kind of activity is considered and of emotion (if any). Certainly, almost any item conceptualized in the activity inception model, from *goal* to *anticipated feasibility* of overcoming 'unfavorable' results, is to some measure emotion-dependent; for simplicity, though, while mentioning emotions at the appropriate junctures, I will ignore their potential influence.

The last enrichment direction suggested (adequate 'facilities' to remove the indicated omissions) may in principle go down to any depth of implementation; in the present theory-establishing paper I merely sketch in roughest features a promising way to address the issues.

As to the first omission (how to negotiate conflicts), we may begin by accepting as a background the usual assumptions on goals and aims. Namely, they make a set of tree-like hierarchies, where the longer-term ones are closer to the root; they

have different (and variable) intrinsic motivational powers or 'strengths'; they crisscross, in that low-level nodes may belong to several trees. Similarly as regards attractive and aversive 'qualities'; they also possess different, changeable 'strengths'. And *faute de mieux* I will also accept something similar regarding (greater or smaller leniency or stringency of) assumed standards of behavior. Ignoring for simplicity individual differences, and keeping, as always, to spontaneous, unreflective, off-hand activities, I outline below a rough but very simple solution to the stated problem.

Let us call *potential driver* to any of the following items: a sub-tree of goals, an (assumed as immediately accessible) attractive or aversive 'quality', or a standard of behavior, on the condition that they might be deemed by the subject to be involved in effects originating in (some specific items in) his/her complete current situation -or, to be more precise, in (some specific items in) some or other 'part' of that situation (a 'part' currently paid attention to). This 'part' (which may range, say, from the physically perceptible setting where a perceived event occurs to a fictional world of ours -perhaps activated by a mention of Carroll's work- where Alice goes through the looking-glass) will be here dubbed *current situation's focus*. We will denote by *driving agency* a *potential driver* active in a subject.

An apparently plausible hypothesis regarding conflicts between *driving agencies* is that, in order for a subject not to get blocked activity-wise, some or other of them must play a main driving role, and so propel the resulting activity in a specific direction, although obviously nothing prevents a few of the other *agencies* from also contributing to all-out pull and result. (This crude outline of solution obviously needs additional assumptions, some of which may be found in Appendix 1).

Regarding the second omission: in order to appraise whether it is feasible to perform an activity, it seems necessary to gauge it mentally in a simplified form (simplified both because of the demands of time and because otherwise an infinite regress would certainly lurk). In other words, some or other *survey* of *general ways of offsetting* the relevant 'unfavorable' effect (or, more simply: *of responding*) must be conducted. Alternatively, a response activity may be selected in the general manner, whatever this (disposing of conflicts included) may be; and finding out which are the *general ways of responding* is but a theorist's *taxonomic* task. In other words, they would not be a resource for a language performer as such, but only a resource for theorists[9].

Three quick points concerning this issue. First, in the latter interpretation, the *general ways* of responding should for consistency also classify activities emerging from first and second steps, and the extension needed to do it ought to be minimal. (I will assume that this is the case.). Second, the patterns introduced by these *general ways* amount to a constraint on the theory. Third, if some regular connection is found between features of an appraised current situation (more precisely, its *focus*) and the *general way* of acting subjects choose in response to it, some (admittedly, limited) explanation of the emergence of activities subsumed under this *general way* is in fact secured.

As a preliminary move towards addressing the 'gap' associated to the first and second steps (first direction in which our 'translation' needed completion), note that spontaneous, unreflective, off-hand activities could not proceed fluently, allowing the subject to respond appropriately to a constantly changing situation, if elaborate moves or complex novel plans -the workhorse of usual ('armchair psychology') theories of action- were to be devised 'in flight'. (However, this definitely does not mean that such activities will prove simple when examined over very short time intervals, a claim contradicted by extensive evidence: see again Appendix 1). Building on this observation, it may be hypothesized that a subject, in responding spontaneously, fluently, to a certain effect appraised as 'unfavorable' and deemed as originating in (some specific item in) his/her current situation's *focus*, will pick up and use, in an (almost) automatic way, partial responses that he or she has available in a fitting repertoire, combining them as required (i.e. as innately determined or as practice-dictated) by specific features either of (the originating item in) the situation or of the effect itself to be offset, or both.

Here an important vagueness should be noticed. For "the originating item" may refer to any of the following:

1. The ultimate source of the 'unfavorable' effect: upon seeing a man that using a 'walkie-talkie' directs a whole platoon of enemy soldiers towards your fortified position, you may simply shoot at him.
2. The immediate cause of such an effect: perhaps you open fire with your machine-gun on the advancing platoon.
3. Or any intermediate link in a (likely) causal chain terminating in the 'unfavorable' effect: you may also e.g.,
    a. fire a precision shoot at the walkie-talkie itself,
    b. just electronically jam the receiver sets.

For a different and more apposite example (because of the off-hand nature of the actions involved): if you notice that a colleague of yours is about to inadvertently hit an auxiliary table, from which a heavy brass paperweight may fall on your toe, you may:

1. shout at your colleague, so that he freezes,
2. reach for the table, steadying it, or
3. simply take hold of the paperweight.

If we accept as essentially correct the account just offered of the manner in which a subject responds spontaneously, fluently, to effects appraised as 'unfavorable', and also accept the simplest and strongest hypothesis regarding how this account should be modified in order to make it also applicable to the first and second steps (namely: by introducing no modification at all), we are finally able to fill in the 'gap' noticed in these steps. To that end it will be enough to assume as roughly valid the description in §3.1 above and to trust the common-sensical

experience that an emotion emerges in a rather involuntary, automatic way: we are thus led to the suggestion that an activity determined in the first-cum-second step (as opposed to one emerging from the third step) is launched in an automatic or almost automatic way, with no prior computation by (or 'within') the subject of its role as a means to an end. In other words, the activities are not fully motivated or 'rational' (they may be considered, though, 'minimally rational' in Cherniak's, 1985, sense). Lacking evidence on this matter, I will simply assume this allocation of tasks, an assumption that may in turn suggest a second one: in steps one-two, goals, because of their deeply anticipating nature (that does not fit comfortably into automatic activities), are at a disadvantage as items involved in main *driving agencies*.

Pending a specification of the *general ways* of acting, that will be tackled in Appendix 2, this completes the examination of refinements on the straight 'translation' initially suggested. Only one observation should be added: nothing has been assumed about degrees of 'unfavorability' of the *driving agencies* (in the sense defined a few paragraphs back) secondarily contributing to all-out activity, since some or even all of them could well be definitely 'favorable'. Where this is the case, their contributed modulation would presumably be directed at preserving as much as possible such a partial 'favorability'.

3.3. A general blueprint

We may now offer the desired sketch regarding the general process of inception of a specific kind of activity (from which emotion is set out as a separate category). Such a process is assumed to develop in a subject that is in an initial affective state and performs an initial activity (the former being possibly 'neutral' and the latter, possibly null), that is committed to certain goals (differing in strength and arranged in partially crisscrossing trees), is in a state such that he or she deems some 'qualities' as (more or less) attractive and some as (more or less) aversive, and endorses (in different degrees) some standards of human behavior.

The subject notices and appraises his/her current situation and its developments (possibly as originating from specific items having specific properties), in that he or she assesses whether they do or will (likely) have effects on certain target items; namely on current attainment (or attainability of goals, on impending or current experience of 'qualities' deemed attractive or aversive (i.e. on their enjoyment or endurance, respectively), and/or on compliance with endorsed standards. The subject also appraises both the past cost of having entered the current situation and the degree of (un)predictability of said effects.

In an *early processing stage*, each of the *driving agencies* of the subject in the appraised situation (refer to definition of *driving agency* in §3.2 above and to subsequent discussion on how potentials conflicts between them are settled) is in principle apt to elicit an emotion and, in an (almost) automatic fashion, some activity (of the specific kind of activities at issue). Whether or not results of the second type occur, and how intense are they, are controlled (as regards activities anyway) both by the nature of the *driving agencies* (those involving goals being at a

disadvantage as 'thrusters' of activity), and by how they compare in 'strength' -the greater the 'strength', the greater the likelihood and (if indeed an activity ensues) the intensity of its occurrence. (These activities can presumably be classified by *general ways* of simply, directly acting such as the ones for coping with 'unfavorable' effects and those for fostering 'favorable' ones introduced directly below.)

Whenever some presumed effect(s) is (are) appraised as 'unfavorable' in the explained sense, a *late processing stage* develops. First of all, the feasibility of more or less successfully opposing such an effect (or such effects) is assessed. The assessment is presumably conducted by exploring *general ways* of (simply, directly) coping with 'unfavorable' effects ushering from (an originating item in) the current situation's *focus* -although, as just noted, these *general ways* may be thought of as no more than a classificatory device.

> Notice, though, that only within a comparatively homogeneous field of activity, i.e. only when the considered inventory of potential activities belongs to a single kind -they are all linguistic emission ones, say- is intuitively appealing the notion of a previous survey of *general ways of responding*. Otherwise it is not at all clear whether after deciding for a *general way* a specific kind of activity is selected, or whether the converse is the case. (I will return to the problem in the paper that will continue the present one.)

Were the effect appraised as 'favorable, it seems plausible to assume that *general ways* of (simply, directly) fostering it may be identified by means of a minimal extension from the 'unfavorable' effects case. (See Appendix 2 for a first exploration of such *general ways of simply acting* -which subsume the *general ways* associated with *coping* and those relative to *fostering*.)

If the result of probing -for feasibility by the subject- some or other of these *general ways* of (simply, directly) acting, duly specified for the current situation's *focus* (or else, if the result of doing a preliminary similar probing of some entirely specific activity that opposes the 'unfavorable' effect -an activity that may be classified by such *general ways*), is positive, a modification is likely to result, both in the incipient emotion and in the activity being performed. Disregarding the former (as we always do), the latter will essentially amount to launching, for each 'unfavorable' effect having resulted in a positive decision, an unabridged specification process for an entirely specific activity along such general lines (or, in repeating -perhaps with some refinements- the previously launched specification process for the preliminarly probed activity)[10].

A methodological point. If application of this general blueprint to a specific sort of activities (e.g. to linguistic ones) is to provide a truly empirical theory, not a formal exercise, it must be possible to derive from it specific predictions. The conspicuous current lack of adequate psychological theories about the various processes here posited (and so able to account for them), suggests asking, as a minimum, interim requirement, that the ultimate sources of activity assumed, i.e. goals, aims, attractive/aversive 'qualities', etc., be identified in particular discourse situations with no extreme difficulty. A first step in this direction is to establish an acceptable inventory of 'permanent' -i.e. generally ascribable by

default- goals, 'attractors' and 'aversors', etc.; for they may be assumed to be operating but when explicitly described features of the situation (including the subject himself/herself) motivate their dismissal. A very tentative list of this kind may be found in Appendix 3 below.

4. Preliminaries to a process model of linguistic activities

The task here confronting a theorist may be best approached by comparing linguistic activity with some other activity not as unique as language use, but having in common with it significant traits. The rationale for this strategy is of course its potential heuristic worth: it may be expected that (at least some) areas where more clouded features prevail enjoy almost flawlessly parallel attributes.

A case in point is *pretense play*, an activity spotted a long time ago (Piaget, 1945: chs.IV-VII) as closely related -even as to timing of ontogenetic emergence- to language use. It was recently investigated from a very different, almost diametrically opposed stand-point, but which also associates it to linguistic phenomena (see e.g. Leslie, 1987, 1988).

4.1. A comparison

Taking my lead from previous -although exceedingly inadequate- work along these lines (Sánchez de Zavala, 1990a: §2.1; 1991: Sect.II, §1), I will first pay joint attention to linguistic and pretense play activities -occurring in specific occasions I will call *episodes*-, in an effort to identify their common features. These are, I submit, as follows.

(a) There may be one single participant in the episode (actor-player; speaker) who through his/her activity actually supports it. But a second participant (spectator-player; addressee or just hearer), that may join in, has an entirely different (roughly antisymmetrical) role: he or she takes up (the 'product' of) the first participant's activity. They may be respectively dubbed *first* or *episode-supporting* participant, and *second* or *taking-up* participant.

(b) 'Antisymmetrical' participants (partners in an episode) may at no cost and at (almost) any time shift roles.

(c) While a subject may become an episode-supporting participant driven by any motivation that needs no more than to ensue in this sort of activity to be satisfied, mere perception of a first participant's play usually drives a second person to play second, taking-up participant role in the episode.

(d) An episode-supporting participant enacts a relation to an item (event, situation, object, property or whatever) that in some way or other is at variance with his/her current situation; in fact, its not occurring in the latter is quite common.

If *situation* is also meant to cover a sequence of them 'naturally' connected, i.e. what in the ordinary way of speaking may be called an evolving situation, and *part* is used in a rather broad sense, one that picks up any comparatively invariant aspect or piece in a situation (or even a whole situation -when an

'improper part' is involved), we may call such an item a *designated partial situation*, in a sense of "partial situation" not far from that advanced in Barwise and Perry, 1983 -although, with a similar proviso, it could also be called a *designated partial object*, in a sense of "partial object" similar to Landman's, 1982-85. (Notice, by the way, that parlance of designated, pretended, or meant partial situations -and similarly for objects- carries no more vagueness than the innocuous one -or so I think- obviously built into it.)

The central task confronting a taking-up participant is to find out (in fact, conjecture, guess) from his/her partner's actual performance the identity of such a partial situation -plus, of course, the often trivial task of identifying the relation to it being enacted. Let us consider an example. A little boy slowly and carefully turning an empty pitcher from an upright to a horizontal position, while keeping under it an upright, also empty glass, may -as an episode-supporting participant- pretend that he -as a (perhaps only implicitly) designated acting creature (an *agent*)- is pouring into the glass -a (causal) relation- the water (or maybe some or other liquid compound) the pitcher holded -non-existent amount of liquid that makes up the designated partial situation. While a little girl may -as a taking-up participant- watch the operation, and conjecture what was the relation the child pretended was being established and which person was pretendedly having it to what.

(d') As implied by the preceding feature, a first participant not only chooses a designated partial situation, he or she also chooses a specific relation to it to be enacted -a choice clearly including a particular way of performing such an enactment. (In as much as a second participant tries to guess on what bases these choices were made, he or she may be called an interpreter participant.)

(d") The description in *(d)* leads to an obvious observation: an enacted relation (had by a -perhaps just implicitly- designated agent to a designated partial situation) and its enactment itself differ. While the latter (to be called a designating activity) occurs trivially in an episode's current situation (and modifies it), the former (which may be called a designated one) is quite naturally construed as if it would take place in a (no doubt, implicitly designated) 'background situation' -that obviously includes as (certainly schematic) parts the designated agent (which, either only implicitly designated or not, no doubt may well be the first participant himself/herself) and the designated partial situation. In other words, one may construe it as if taking place in a situation where a subject (whether the first participant or not) would, by actually performing the designated activity, actually establish such a relation. (E.g. a -pretended- situation where the child of the example above would pour water from the pitcher into the glass. Or the little boy may instead pretend to be Daddy pouring water -or Mr Hyde pouring his potion- into the glass; then the designated agent would be other than the actor-player himself.)[11]

(e) Even though a non-fake episode-supporting participant must know in advance the (kind of) partial situation he or she designates (otherwise how a relation to it could be enacted?), there is no obvious reason why he or she should

have specific advance knowledge of every detail of such a partial situation, which will be -schematically- specified through the enactment (see also difference 2'. below). In other words, this previous knowledge may be a very rough one.

(f) A precondition to play second participant role is to construe a first participant's activity as such -i.e. to identify somebody's behavior as an episode-supporting activity.

(g) An taking-up participant will be the more effective as an interpreter the greater his/her knowledge about the ways of the episode-supporting participant, both concerning the latter's grasp of (the usual relationship to) the designated partial situation (see difference *(3)* below), and about his/her understanding and ability as regards episodes in general and the particular instance of them he or she is supporting.

On the other hand, and unsurprisingly, activities by pretense players and by linguistic performers differ as to other features -the essential difference being apparently that language use is not tied up by a few but material restrictions operative on pretense play. Most important seem to be the following differences:

1. A pretense actor-player's actual designating -in fact, pretending- activity is a *mimicry of* some actual behavior regarding his/her designated -in fact, pretended- partial situation (a mimicked behavior is all an actor-player's designating -pretending- activity is about). This constraint does *not* apply to a speaker: here the ground for the association between designating -in fact, (linguistically) meaning- activity and designated -in fact, meant- partial situation is not imitation, but *convention* (and here the designated -meant- activity, even though having as its term the designated -in fact, meant- partial situation, is free from imitation).

2. In pretense play, a designated -pretended- activity (the one an actor-player directly mimics) is a piece of *behavior that*, were it actually performed, *would match* an actual partial situation belonging to the pretended partial situation's *kind*; in effect (at least until the pretended partial situation's identity is clearly established) it would be a *conventional, most times stereotyped, behavior* regarding this kind of items[12]. (So a child pretendedly rides or trots a horse, or has it prance about, rather than pretendedly touching it or looking at it; again, a child may pretend to be chatting through a telephone -perhaps actually a pencil, or just nothing at all-: hardly will he or she pretend to be rubbing a stain it may have.) On the other hand, a linguistic episode does *not* comply with this constraint, since the designated -in fact, meant- activity is a piece of behavior that could in principle be *any* relationship *directed at* the meant partial situation, on the sole condition of it being possible for this relationship to be linguistically enacted, i.e. meant at least partially on the basis of *language conventions.*

2'. The respective first members of the constrasts in 1. and 2., when combined, imply that a pretense actor-player *may* -and in many cases does- *actually handle* a real, physical item (*as if* it were the pretended partial situation).

But a speaker's activity does not -in fact *cannot*- handle anything (i.e. anything previously available), in spite of its being, of course, a physical activity that involves the speaker's language organs.

3. As implied by the first member of the contrast in 2. -cp. also feature (e) above-, a pretense actor-player must *know in advance* how items belonging to the same kind than *the pretended partial situation* are -*or*, at the very least, how is *some appropriate behavior* regarding items of such a kind (the minimum case must be accepted since e.g. a person may certainly pretend that he or she is looking at some elusive object barely discernible in the offing). A speaker is *not* tied to this condition: both a meant partial situation and virtually every feature of potential behavior regarding it may be novel to him/her, in that they may be known only in broad categorization; for they are (schematically) 'built' through the convention-based unbound (recursive) *productive system* available (in a specific form particular to a specific language) to speakers generally.

4. A spectator-player identifies a pretense play episode (and its actor-player) on the basis of both his/her *advance knowledge* referred to in 3. and his/her perceiving that the observed behavior is *not directed at* a partial situation of the *kind called for* (it may be even directed at no item at all). A linguistic hearer (obviously) does *not* resort to such means: he or she identifies an utterance (and its speaker) on the basis of both his/her knowledge of *features of linguistic activities* in general and of specific *recurring items* and their characteristic *patterning* (in 'products' of such an activity) *in a particular language*, and his/her perceiving a spell of behavior where such properties are instanced.

Two final observations. Firstly, I ignored at least one obvious and very important difference; language is very commonly used to represent or schematically depict what (the speaker believes) is, should be or ought to be the case, as when we discuss, explain, tell or ask about how things are in some particular section or bit of the world; while pretense play is hardly ever used in this way (it standardly conveys 'fiction', rather than a report, a description or a disclosure). But this difference, obviously related both to the playful contexts where such a 'play' usually occurs and to the (almost Swiftian) practical encumbrances that would tax actual use of a 'pretense play language', is clearly irrelevant for present theoretical purposes. Second, for simplicity, the offered description is somewhat idealized, in that too great an 'invisibility', especially as regards its reception, is adjudicated to whatever is different from independent meaning in an utterance. (Too great because in fact a hearer normally does, and not unfrequently must, perceive and grasp in an utterance much more than just meant items.) Yet, in the present phase of theory building, the idealization does not seem to cause much harm[d].

4.2. Specific traits of linguistic activity

The catalogue just given of similarities and dissimilarities enables one to identify in a comparatively unbiased way a number of features ('traits') of language

performance (listed below) presumably suitable to specify as desired the general blueprint above; i.e. so that the outcome is a general sketch for processes unerlying inception of linguistic activities. Admittedly, most of the traits are dismayingly obvious; in some cases, though -see trait *(iv)* below-, their having been distinguished through an independent heuristical bolstering procedure (which compares quite favorably with the usual, unargued way of assuming them as brute facts) is moderately surprising and lends a measure of support to the strategy resorted to in this paper.

(i) The activity comes in two roughly antisymmetrical and so quite unmiscible kinds: a speech-supporting and a speech-taking up activity -pertaining respectively, of course, to speaker and hearer.

(ii) Speech-supporting activity may be performed ignoring any possible linguistic partner.

(iii) A person may initiate a speaking activity with no external prompt -apparently just in order to do something at all, or perhaps in order not to get stuck in a position not as 'favorable' as it could be. And whoever perceives speech originated by somebody does develop in an (almost) automatic way a linguistic hearer's activity.

(iv) Items 'supported' by a speaker and having to be conjectured by a hearer must be distinguished from items relative in each case to a subject, no matter what his/her role. The first category includes: the partial situation designated -in fact, meant- through a speaker's activity; the designated -meant- activity (an apparently enigmatic item forced on us by our heuristic comparison, on which see directly below); and the implicitly designated -in fact, meant- (background) situation, of which the meant partial situation is only a 'part' or aspect[13]. The second category clearly includes, amongst other things, the current situation.

Let us make a brief aside on meant activities (from now on MACTs). As we know, a meant activity is an enacted relation to a meant partial situation; in other words, a relation from a meant 'agent' (perhaps only implicitly meant, and quite commonly identical to the speaker himself/herself) to the -presumedly objective- 'semantic content' of an utterance, which is set up through the speaker's performance of his/her meaning activity. The description clearly points to a '(semantic) attitude' regarding such a content; an attitude which, on one hand, may be considered as a generalization of the familiar *propositional attitudes*, in that it should include, whenever that content is a proposition (obviously it isn't necessary for it to be so), either an instance of a propositional attitude or a counterpart to it in present, 'mentalistic' theoretical framework. Let us call 'first facet' of the semantic attitude that 'part' of it having this nature). On the other hand, the described (comprehensive) semantic attitude may also incorporate other 'facets', i.e. attitudes of a different -perhaps emotional- kind. If this is correct, the specific kind to which its first facet belongs in a given instance will be contingent at most on a highly broad categorization of the relevant partial situation, since clearly counterparts to, replicas of, or just 'propositional

attitudes' (such as to put forward as an actual one, to hesitate about its being so, to question, etc. a partial situation) can only occur if this partial situation is construed as belonging to some or other category in the class formed by *situations*, *events*, and so on (not in those that include *objects* or *properties*, say). In counterdistinction to this dependence, though, all other potential facets of MACT seem to be able to apply freely to any kind of partial situation.

(v) As to the enactment itself performed, i.e. as to the designating -in fact (linguistically) meaning- activity, even though it obviously is speaker-supported, it does not fit in either category; in a sense it bridges them. On one hand, the meaning activity certainly occurs in a speaker's current situation, but is not a part of this situation -eventually it modifies it. And it is obviously a part of a hearer's current situation, but not anything to be (linguistically) conjectured: just something to be perceived, and construed as having a designating -in fact, (linguistically) meaning- nature[14].

(vi) There is apparently no reason why a speaker should know in advance every (or every significant) specific detail that make up the meant partial situation identity, or that of the meant activity. Apparently, he or she may well bring about on the spot, by virtue of the unbound productive potential of language, a meant partial situation genuinely novel to him/her.

(vii) A linguistic hearer identifies (in fact, conjectures that he or she is identifying) both a spell of linguistic activity and its speaker on the basis of his/her knowledge of linguistic activities in general and his/her linguistic competence in a particular language.

(viii) The greater the knowledge a hearer has about both how his/her linguistic partner grasps the meant partial situation and the actual current situation, and how great is such a speaker's command of language, the better the hearer will be able to implement his/her role in the discourse situation.

4.3. Applying the framework to language

I will survey successively how the above traits, both constrain any process theory of linguistic activity inception, and imply some properties of this activity.

Trait *(i)* necessitates dissimilar inquiries for a speaker's and a hearer's activity; research routes must be conducted separately -although not unconnectedly, it may be hoped.

Trait *(ii)* calls for a distinct assay of speech not addressed to a partner. A proposal to the effect that study begins by this case, apparently the simplest one, seems amply reasonable; so I will follow this strategy.

Trait *(iii)* simply says that we are warranted to attribute to a speaker's *driving agency* a just-not-as-good-as-it-might-be, or a being-ripe-for-a-change kind of 'unfavorability' (cp. §3.2 above). And a linguistic hearer's activity may be (almost) automatically triggered by someone else's speech.

It is not dazzlingly obvious, though, what contribution complex trait *(iv)* may make to theory -even though it is apparent that the two categories occurring in it must be associated in some way or other to the main notions of the general

blueprint above, such as *originating item*, *driving agency*, or *completely specified activity*. Since the above introduced construct *general way of* (sumply, directly) *acting* incorporates in a definite pattern the first two notions, a lawful linkage between such a construct and these categories is likely to provide some inklings as to the process we are interested in. I will rapidly explore some possibilities.

A first suggestion to the effect that as many items as possible, from those included in our two categories, be specified by our *general ways* (the current situation cannot be so specified, being an initial quantity, and a similar fact bars current situation's *focus* from specification) faces several problems. For were our *general ways* to determine in a one-to-one fashion triples of meant items, the ridiculous notion that there can be only five triples admissible for 'unfavorable' effects and four triples for 'favorable' ones would immediately follow. And substitution of kinds of triples for triples does not reach the real source of the problem: the fact that the number and variety of meant items is effectively unbounded, a fact that precludes their mapping in a non-arbitrary way onto any finite number of triples (or, for that matter, n-tuples) -not to say onto seven or eight of them. So the suggestion proves wrong.

An acceptable way out, though, is to assume that what is specified are not items, but of their relationships -so the items themselves may range over any domains, unbounded or otherwise. An optimum proposal along these lines seems to be: since now the current situation (focus) creates no obstruction, such a relationship covers, for generality, both categories spoken of in trait *(iv)*. But clearly most of the items concerned are in a fixed relation to some other item: a *meaning activity* (henceforth MNGACT) is a process/event *in* a *current situation* (CST) that *ensues in* its *meant activity* (MACT), which in turn is a *relation between* a *meant agent* (perhaps only implicitly meant, and either identical to the actual speaker himself/herself or not) and a *meant partial situation* (MPST)[15]. Again, MACT 'takes place', and MPST 'is', *in* an *implicitly meant 'background' situation* (IMBST) -refer to common feature *(d")* in §4.1 and to trait *(iv)* in §4.2. So, what may vary from one case to another boils down to the relation between *focus* of a current situation (F_{CST}) and IMBST -plus maybe a few other parameters.

However, this proposal apparently fails on two counts. First, it is not at all obvious that the (almost) automatic linguistic activities allocated to *early processing stage* can be properly classified by the discussed *general ways* in their present form -these are essentially means to ends, and automatic activities, in spite of their having (very likely) an origin of this sort, are triggered independently of a subject's purposes. Secondly, new complications are introduced by trait *(iv)* and trait *(v)*; the last category in the former trait is clearly relevant to any study of a (linguistic) hearer's activity, the latter trait then ensures that he or she has in principle access to a speaker's actual MNGACT -this being presumably the *originating item* (ORITM) in his/her linguistic hearer's F_{CST}-, and trait *(iv)* guarantees that its perception provides such a hearer with the material needed to carry out his/her own, conjecturing activity. All this strongly suggests that we missed a number of new items, that must enter the picture to attain generality.

But (practical) comfort for these misfortunes is close at hand. A brand new classification of *general ways* of (almost) automatically acting may indeed be necessary, but arguably these new ways are a limit case of the familiar ones. (The latter assumption I will accept for expediency; see Appendix 2.) The second trouble heals by itself, as it were, since the clearly needed new 'characters', i.e. ORITM, the 'bridging' MNGACT, and both partners in the linguistic episode (the hearer being, of course, possibly null), play different roles in reception and emission, so not much can be said about them from a general stand-point. Summing up: traits *(iv)* and *(v)* suggest hypothesizing that the discussed *general ways* determine the relationship between F_{CST} and IMBST -plus possibly a few other parameters concerning the categories that occur in such traits[16].

Traits *(vi)*, on one hand, and *(vii)* and *(viii)*, on the other, are unmistakably to be deferred to actual construction of specific models of (processes leading to) linguistic emission and reception, respectively, and are so out of our present purview.

5. A general sketch for linguistic activities

Even though linguistic emission and reception must be studied separately, there are a few issues relating to a speaker's and a (linguistic) hearer's activities that deserve unified examination.

First of all, what may be called their *initial phase*: inception of any linguistic activity should be predicated on the assumption -a trivial assumption certainly- that the concerned subject is in a specific psychological state (including his/her goals, 'qualities' deemed as attractive or aversive, etc. and an initial affective state), is currently acting in some way or other (initial activity), and is appraising his/her current situation (CST), specifically, a certain 'part' or *focus* of it (F_{CST}). A second, slightly less obvious assumption is that a subject perceives (some ORITM, i.e. some item -possibly mere aspects- in) that situation as originating, or being about to originate, certain effects (or EFFs) involving his/her attainment, enjoyment, endurance, or whatever is suitable, of some of his/her goals, of some 'qualities' attractive or aversive to him/her, etc. (Notice that "current situation" is here intended to denote, not only the subject's actual, occurring -and appraised- situation, but also the possibly not yet actual situation where the EFFs are in fact originated, i.e. the situation his/her activity is supposed to respond to; an observation that also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to "current situation's *focus*". I think it best to maintain this ambiguity.)[17]

The *processing stages* distinguishable in a linguistic spell of activity that follow the just examined *phase* show deep differences between both main types, emission and reception, differences that demand separate lines of study (as per trait *(i)*: see §4.3). Nonetheless, there is still a notion common to both types, namely the *general ways* of simply, directly acting, whatever they are (refer again to §4.3 above and to Appendix 2); for we will see (in the paper that continues the present one, where some needed specification will be offered) that, although playing quite different roles, a *late processing stage* may occur in emission and reception activities. Parsimony counsels that these *general ways* be assumed to apply in a similar way in both cases[18]; and so will I.

Finally: as mentioned in §4.3, there is reason to believe that the relations between parameters such as IMBST and F_{CST} are important to individuate a spell of linguistic activity, in that these relations apportion it in each case to a distinct kind. But what should we accept as actual range of variation for such a relationship?; and what are the empirical implications that a specific pigeonholing (as regards these relations) of a specific spell of activity may have?

As a basis I will assume -an apparently highly plausible assumption- that F_{CST} establishes a sort of ground level of 'reality' for meant items. So, you may be paying attention either to the physical premises you are in (perhaps extending beyond whatever is immediately perceptible, in a more and more vague way, towards the world at large), or to your reminiscences, or to Hamlet's plight, or... In such circumstances, anything said or meant is, I submit, grasped by the subject at issue as something 'located' relatively to that 'ground level of reality'.

Before developing somewhat this suggestion let us review for clarity what will happen according to it in the first case mentioned, i.e. when F_{CST} is just the subject's physical neighborhood. Then an asteroid hurtling towards the Earth is, as far as we know (in fact, as far as we confidently believe), something not real, but only possible, and so it may be said to be *'ontologically' different* from such a 'reality'. On the other hand, what our reminiscences hand down to us is (believed to be) as real as any item (that you considered or you might have considered as) included in such a 'ground-level reality'; a fact that warrants allotting it the *same 'ontological' status* than any such item. Similar relations *mutatis mutandis* would be found when starting as 'ground reality' from the scenes the reminiscences present you, from Hamlets's fictional world, etc. (Clearly, the notion underlying the *sameness* and *difference* here talked about is related to Goffman's, 1974, *frame*, as well as to Fauconnier's, 1982, *mental space*. The methodological stance taken in this paper, though, counsels that recourse to it be only scantily -in fact minimally- had; I fully abide by this policy.)

This basic assumption leads immediately to a simple, highly restrictive proposal regarding the first question above: there are only three 'ontological' relations between IMBST and F_{CST}. First, both may be the very same focussed situation, so that a MPST is simply an item (perhaps previously not paid specific attention to, misperceived, etc.) *within* F_{CST}. Secondly, they may have the same 'ontological' status while not being the same situation (MPST, even though being as 'real' as any item in F_{CST}, *cannot be possibly* considered as *included* in F_{CST}). Finally, they may be 'ontologically' different, which implies that a MPST is *'not real'* relative to the kind of 'reality' that items included in F_{CST} have. We will see in the sequel that a fourth, non-basic possibility should be also reckoned with: the 'ontological' relation may be any of the above -due to lack of constraints.

The answer given to the first question raised has been phrased in terms of the 'ontological fate' of MPST. Now, what about MACT, that was construed (cp. §4.3) as an enacted relation, 'taking place' in IMBST, between a (perhaps only implicitly) meant 'agent and MPST?

Let us ignore for convenience facets in MACT which -somewhat coarsely- may be called affective or conative (facets such as desiring, hating, and so on). Then the

simplest answer begins by positing a single facet or parameter -the one previously considered as similar, if not identical, to a straightforward generalization of the notion *propositional attitude*- having a different 'value' for each case. (A tantamount alternative: three different but closely related parameters.) But this is clearly too restrictive a suggestion: attitudes, even of this narrowly cognitive sort, regarding a partial situation that appears as 'real', say (i.e. as something to be assessed within the realm of 'real' items) may be highly different; so, each of these 'values' must be enriched with others. Taking one's lead from the (here ignored) affective and conative facets, a polarly opposite 'value', even a whole scale of intermediate ones, may be added to each 'value' (forming therefore a sort of new parameter or 'dimension' orthogonal to that defined by the three basic 'values' originally posited.

The proposal I wish to submit regarding our first question countenances, as common parameter, the relevant subject's *degree of commitment to MPST's 'reality'* -a quite 'natural' proposal, I think, having in mind the significance for present theory of the 'ontological' statuses of MPSTs. Then my detailed suggestion is as follows. First value, i.e. when IMBST and F_{CST} are the very same situation's *focus*: *endorsement* (plus *full rejection*, and some intermediate 'values'). Second value, i.e. when IMBST is as 'real' as F_{CST}: *acceptance as fully 'real'* (plus...). Third value, i.e. for IMBST 'not as real' as F_{CST}: *preparedness to have 'non-reality' dispelled* (plus...).

It seems to me that the proposal is in a clear sense minimal, in that (if for simplicity we stick in each case just to the maximum positive 'value') arguably an act of *commitment* to A's reality cannot be but: its *endorsement* when A is seen as something 'inhabiting' the primary, paradigmatic domain of 'reality'; its *acceptance as fully real* when A is apparently 'located' in a different, albeit also 'real' domain; and *preparedness to have A's non-reality dispelled* when it is considered non-real. Nonetheless, this suggestion, in addition to resulting -as it must- in the familiar propositional attitudes (or fitting counterparts to them) when MPST is an event, a process or a state (as against a thing, a continuous 'mass', a quality, etc.), it also yields other encouraging results. For when *full* other-addressed emission activity is considered, the submitted proposal provides replicas of the different main groups of 'speech acts' -and it certainly provides also much else if these restrictions are not laid (however, I will not explore in this paper its potential on this issue)[19]. These results, though, will be offered in a sequel to the present paper.

The second question raised (what empirical import the just sketched classification has?) cannot be answered in advance from actual research. Note, though, that in an ideal case (providing a standard against which to measure actual returns from future investigation) to each 'ontological' relation there would be an associated, formally identifiable linguistic (family of) form(s); and when breaking down any of these relations according to the values had by other parameters, specific kinds or varieties of the associated (family of) form(s) should match in a one-to-one fashion the new categories so arrived at.

APPENDIX 1 - On the microstructure of a specific activity

If the 'solution' to the first omission problem outlined in §3.2 is to work, it must be completed by further assumptions, such as the two hypotheses I list below -which may be considered, I believe, quite sensible assumptions. First, the *driving agency* having at current time greatest 'strength' (including here any 'weight' accrued from approaching the relevant goal, impending enjoyment of the relevant attractive 'quality', etc.) is the one that takes the lead[20]. And second, those few other *driving agencies* that, in a rapidly dwindling series, contribute to specify the ensuing activity are ordered by decreasing 'strengths'. (Otherwise the very notion of *strength* would have no rhyme nor reason in this context.)[21]

As pointed out in §3.2, spontaneous, unreflective, off-hand activities are not to be assumed as simple, even when we consider them over short time intervals; for, as evinced e.g. by movements of a skier flashing downhill on moderately bumpy snow (see Kaminski, 1981), by operations a modern fighter pilot performs in combat, or by what does a pianist when playing, say, a regular piano concerto, activities may well be formed by a sequence of highly complex manoeuvres. The examples suggest a condition that must be observed: not only each of the 'individual', constantly changing pieces of activity that were discussed must be executable with no effort or delay: their links to the features of the situation that trigger them (and even adapt their basic patterns to their own idiosyncratic traits) must be so entrenched, either by innate specification or by experience and continued practice, that they may be considered as partial repertoire responses, only to be overruled (or, more likely, just slightly distorted or qualified) by the subject's global perception of the situation -including his/her own purposes. (Notice that these purposes are already taken care of without stipulation in present theory, since they are a part of the subject's systems of aims/goals, attractors-aversors, etc. And, obviously, both any occurring emotion -i.e., because of the accepted simplification, any initial emotion- and any subject's activity, either initially performed or later developed, may in principle be so modified.)

The suggestion just advanced about partial, repertoire responses may be slightly unpacked by saying that these responses may range from those most basic or general, applicable at any opportunity (such as having your legs so balanced when skiing that they increase or decrease their flexing in accordance with any unevenness of the ground), and so automatically used as 'dictated' by circumstances, to more specific responses, steered to specific kinds of (originating items in) situations or to projected specific results effects, that will be used only when considered -or just dictated as- apposite (e.g. taking weight off a leg while the skier tilts to its side, a manoeuvre directed towards making a turn).

APPENDIX 2 - A sketch of general ways of (simply) acting

Consider the general ways in which a subject can (simply, directly) act in order to cope with (an originating item in) a situation focussed in a specific way and leading to effects appraised by the subject as 'unfavorable'. These *general ways* (I will say, for simplicity: *of acting*) seem to be the following: [a] the subject moves to a

different situation; [b] he or she modifies the current situation's *focus* (either [b.1] globally so that such effects wanes, or else by [b.2] hindering the operation of the originating item or by [b.3] directly compensating for its 'unfavorable' effects), and [c] the subject changes the appraisal into a new, 'favorable' one[22].

(3) Take the machine-gun man and platoon example in §3.2 above. You may:
- [a] move to a better fortified position;
- [b.1] blur (the enemy's) vision by dropping smoke-bombs;
- [b.2] shoot the commander ... electronically jam the radio sets;
- [b.3] fight back -in the future- the attack;
- [c] decide that being taken as a prisoner of war is not such a bad deal after all.

(4) In the paperweight example the options may be:
- [a] leave the room, or your position near the table anyway;
- [b.1] break the nearest window-pane with your elbow, so that everyone stops acting;
- [b.2] shout at your colleague ... take hold of the paperweight;
- [b.3] move your foot to a position far from the likely landing place of the weight;
- [c] decide that some suffering is good for you as a preparation for more serious hardships of life, or as a deserved punishment for your sins.

Notice that two sides can in general be distinguished in an 'unfavorable' effect: an external event, process, state or whatever that is deemed unfavorable by the subject, and a bothering internal event or state elicited by the other, external side of the effect. (Obviously there will be problems of delimitation whenever the 'unfavorability' lies solely in an annoyance, distress or vexation to the subject, e.g. when the outcome of an experiment in the physiology of olfaction is 'unfavorable' only because of a foul smell experienced by the subject.) If, as it seems natural enough, *[b.3]* is restricted to mark 'compensation' for the external side of the effect, then there is another not yet considered way to cope with an 'unfavorable' effect: to (fully or partially) offset that internal event or state -a scheme that, because of its being in many cases hardly distinguishable from *[c]*, I suggest to call *[b.3.c]*. We could accordingly add supplementary cases

(5) [b.3.c] protect yourself so that -in the future- you survive the attack (swallowing the affront of being made a war prisoner).

(6) [b.3.c] defy ('stoically') the impending landing of the brass paperweight on your toe.

to our previous examples. Since in addition to its frequently not clear distinction from *[c]*, in many -if not in most- cases *general way [b.3.c]* leads to stop doing anything along the kind of activity at issue (example *(4)* is a clear instance), it seems to me doubtful that its consideration is highly significant; but this is a matter for further investigation in specific cases[e].

A brief remark: I have glossed over matters of time location of both effects and ways of opposing them, even though undoubtedly temporal dimension has paramount importance in devising, patterning, and launching an activity; and no matter what the limitations inflicted by this extreme simplification are (as it may have been noticed, some were already apparent), in this paper I will steadfastly keep to it.

Complying with the minimal extension policy advocated, it may be submitted that there are only two *general ways* of (simply, directly) fostering effects appraised as 'favorable' (maybe perceived as originating in a certain item in the current situation): [b'] the subject modifies the current situation (either [b'.1] globally so that the effects wax, or else by [b'.2] bolstering the operation of the originating item, or by [b'.3] concurring to its 'favorable' effects); and [c'] he or she changes the appraisal into a more 'favorable' one[23]. I will accept this straightforward extension without argument.

Now, as soon as there is any indirectness in acting we may consider a part of it as a *preparation*, as a *preliminary* step towards the remainder -i.e. as a very simple, two-link chain activity. This notion may obviously be applied when the second link is already typed by *general ways* of (simply, directly) acting. (You may e.g. [pr-a] reach for your military equipment and study a contour map of the surrounding area, [pr-b.1] grope for your last smoke-bombs, [pr-b.2] take hold of your telescopic rifle... take the communications jammer out of your breast-pocket, [pr-b.3] stack your ammunition carefully by the machine-gun, [pr-b.3.c] prepare a good shelter and 'harden' yourself to resist the hardships of being made a prisoner, or [pr-c] start thinking about likely outcomes of a gallant defence of your fortified position. And if instances of [b'.1] through [c'] are given, we could similarly list appropriate 'values' for [pr-b'.1]... [pr-c'].) Two issues may be raised now -one about only two-link chains being considered, and the other on how *preparatory* segments themselves develop.

Concerning the first issue, there is no stipulation here, but mere conjecture: greater degrees of indirectedness could certainly be considered, but the accepted limitation seems to suit a spontaneous, offhand activity -although certainly implementation of the second, anticipated activity may call for further indirectness. As to the second query, the simplest answer is: just as it has been posited up to this moment. So, a *preparatory* activity might be typed by our familiar *general ways*; and, in principle, any two-membered sequence of the types already distinguished would be possible.

However, such an answer apparently does not fit the facts. For in spontaneous, fluent, unreflective activities, the actual procedural path seems most times to be as follows. First, a global problem (an 'unfavorable' effect stemming from an originating item in the current situation) is noticed. Then, an obvious way to hinder or suppress the effect comes to mind; but this 'solution' requires some prevailing conditions that do not in fact obtain. Third, the fact that such conditions are lacking is considered as a new (dependent, ancillary) 'unfavorable' effect of the current situation that needs offsetting; this gives rise to a new, *preliminary* problem to be addressed in the usual way. Finally, whatever *preparatory* activity was devised to tackle the preliminary problem is now launched; and, if successful,

then the anticipated way of opposing the original effect -the final segment of activity, as it may be called; but see directly below- follows. (Alternatively, the preparatory activity concurs with the other 'segment' to oppose the 'unfavorable' effect, so that both must develop in parallel, more or less at the same time -a case which, it seems to me, occurs less often than the other one, and where assignment of labels "preparatory" and "final" may be considered as somewhat arbitrary.)

Notice that a subject, in confronting an anticipated 'unfavorable' effect, may select, as his/her (single-link) way of opposing it, to freeze or inhibe any initial activity of a certain kind he or she was performing or about to perform. And it may be suitable for a theory about activities of a such specific (say, linguistic) kind to study even instances of this sort: they might be considered as forming a limit, 'degenerate' case (see e.g. Sánchez de Zavala, 1991, Sect.II, §1.3.2). Nevertheless, this genre of theory may safely ignore single-link activity that do not show non-null activity of the relevant kind -otherwise they should be considered as non-instances. This is not the case, though, as regards multiple-link chains: it makes perfect sense to study e.g. a two-link compound behavior of the type described in previous paragraph where its *final* segment is none other than a *suppressed* activity of the relevant kind, for its *actual occurrence* in the *preparatory* segment is enough for the compound to qualify as a case of such an activity.

A final remark, concerning the interaction between processing stages and indirectness. In an early *processing stage*, where a subject acts in an (almost) automatic way, obviously no *preparatory* activity is possible, because of its essentially means-ends -or, 'rational'- nature (cp. §4.3). In most cases *[a]* looks as if it requires the use of quite a complex knowledge (of the surroundings, at the very least), so that it may scarcely be automatic; but it would be perhaps arbitrary to leave it out entirely. And a similar argument bars also *[b.2]*. As to *[c]*, it apparently demands deliberate thinking; if so, it must also be excluded. To sum up, regarding the *early processing stage* I will tentatively accept -with strong misgivings- *[a]*, and also *[b.1]* and *[b.3]* -even though it is not clear to me that a true distinction between all three is here warranted, because of their hardly purposeful nature. But if they are accepted, so must be their matches for 'favorable' effects, i.e. *[b'.1]* and *[b'.3]* -subject of course to a similar reservation[24]. On the other hand, no limitation as to occurrence of *preparatory* acting is apparent in a *late processing stage*.

APPENDIX 3 - A catalogue of 'permanent' goals, attractors and aversors

Building on suggestions by Fromm (1974: ch.10) about 'existential needs' in man, as well as on other, more common proposals, such as those mentioned in Deci & Ryan (1985: ch.2), it is possible to form a small list of goals -plus associated attractive and aversive 'qualities'- that we may tentatively deem 'permanent', i.e. meaning that they are attributable to subjects by default.

In Sánchez de Zavala (1991: Sect.II, §2.2.3) I advanced one such list, which in addition covered most items mentioned in anthropological literature about 'exotic' cultures where the sense of belonging to a group/society is of prime importance.

(See e.g. the review Markus and Kitayama, 1990.) The list, with slight modifications, is as follows (where, for convenience, the terms "attractor" and "aversor" substitute respectively for the expressions "attractive 'quality'" and "aversive 'quality'"):

G1. (Immediate GOALS matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSORS *pain, injury to bodily well-being*).

G2. (Immediate, GOAL matching the ATTRACTOR *satisfaction of bodily needs*).

G3. GOAL: *optimal stimulation level* (matching the ATTRACTOR *to be optimally stimulated*).

G4. GOAL: *competence* about specific tasks at hand.

G4'. GOAL (related to previous one): appropriate *knowledge* about matters and objects related to task at hand. (To some extent matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSOR *too much uncertaionty*.)

G5. GOAL: *efficiency* in specific tasks at hand. (To some extent matching the ATTRACTOR *to be pleased about oneself*.)

G5'. GOAL (related to previous one): appropriate *control* about matters and objects related to task at hand. (To some extent matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSOR *restrictions on autonomy*.)

G6. (GOALS matching the ATTRACTOR *well-being of 'allies'* -loved ones, friends, supporters, etc.-; and also matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSOR *harm to 'allies'*.)

G7. (GOAL matching the ATTRACTOR *harm to opponents*.)

G8. GOAL: to have *prestige* within specific groups. (Matching the ATTRACTOR *being loved, admired, envied, feared...*; and also matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSOR *being blamed, ridiculed, despised, ignored...*)

G9. Ultimate GOALS and/or AIMS: to have *optimal qualities* and *relationships* -including relationhips with the whole of/supreme beings.

G9'. Ultimate GOAL and/or AIM (related to previous one): to *persist* in one's (optimal) being.

G10. (GOALs matching the ATTRACTOR others' *acceptance of one's own accepted (conception of) reality*; and also matching the 'inverse' of the AVERSOR others' *rejection of one's own accepted (conception of) reality*).

Certainly, some -if not all- of the goals, attractors, etc. advanced are exceedingly vague -seemingly to the point of defeating the very purpose that guided their postulation, since they apparently cover *any* possible human motivation. But, albeit undoubtedly they should be elaborated and refined in the future, such an

appearance is deceptive; for most of them include free parameters (such as *task at hand*, *opponent* or *optimal stimulation)* that must be specified in every instance.

A methodological observation. While in analysing a particular situation attribution to a subject of goals and attractors/aversors considered universal by most members of his/her culture is perhaps allowable (such motivations are likely to be permanently effective *in that culture*), no such reliance should be put on judgements by a subject's culture-fellows about mere cultural validity: the very fact of being acknowledged as norms may compel the latter to mention them as motivation to action, while in fact they are not (or not always) so.

* Depto. de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia
UPV/EHU

Notes

[a] But for a number of minor improvements, the present paper duplicates the first five Sections of a previous and much longer essay entitled "How to build a sounder, albeit less simple (psychological) Pragmatics". A majority of the changes were prompted by critical comments, and these, when having a modicum of importance, are provided with a Note marked, like this one, by an alphabetical tag. As to the critical comments themselves, most of them were kindly forwarded to me in April, 1994, by Professor Jacob Mey (who also contributed some comments and advice of his own). I am very grateful to all these scholars, even though in this paper I follow their suggestions (perhaps in a wrongheaded fashion, alas) only in a few instances. I will try to do full justice to the points raised by these people in a sequel to the present paper, where the final Sections of the February, 1994 essay will be offered in a thoroughly revised form. *(October, 1994)*

[†] I am very much indebted to Teresa Bejarano, Violeta Demonte and Pompeu Casanovas, who kindly read a previous version, offering useful bibliographic suggestions and penetrating even if charitable critiques. But no blame should be put on these scholars and friends, for unfortunately most of their comments went disregarded -otherwise the substantial changes of approach they sometimes called for would have resulted in postponing completion of the paper for a hardly foreseeable time.

[1] As against the other preliminary assumptions, essentially shared by every recent pragmatic theory I will mention below, a *granum salis* should be added here when considering speech act theory (and some derivations of it, such as its revamping by Bach and Harnish). It will be seen that a similar warning should be made as regards some later assumptions.

[2] Notwithstanding that last mentioned theory is not just a Pragmatics, but a general theory of 'ostensive' (human) communication.

[b] Comments that reached me through Professor Jacob Mey are at the root of the revised way of handling the special position of speech-act theory regarding several of these assumptions.

[3] This conviction is, of course much older: Gardiner himself traces his own 'social view' of speech to Meillet, Durkheim, and even Wegener; and Mauthner wrote profusely about language being "in the air", i.e. "between speaker and hearer" -a notion partly based on speculations by Von Humboldt and by Hegel on the importance of both speaker and hearer for full meaning of a spoken expression, and on the need of a social group for the very existence of language. For an explicit challenge to such a conviction see e.g. Dascal (1983: §1.4).

4 Conceivably, at some 'deeper' (say, neuro-physiological) level all of these kinds of knowledge could be supported by 'machine-language' expressions. But even disregarding connexionism's ban against such 'micro-structures', the hypothesis does not warrant unconstrained hypothesising of just those propositional assumptions needed to derive, using the inferential process postulated by one's own theory, any interpretations of an utterance that intuition tells us are *natural* or *preferred* -as it is usual in current Pragmatics.

5 This kind of communication occurs whenever a speaker wants to send a message that to his/her mind is beyond current understanding capabilities of the addressee (but will not be so, he/she expects, at some foreseeable time or occasion in the future) and chooses accordingly the utterance to be made. (It is not uncommon for the speaker to tag the wording of such a message with a clarification of the following sort: *THIS you cannot understand right now; you will understand it in due time / when you grow up / when you have your own children...*)

It is interesting to note that, far from being a circumstantial error, this procedure was suggested quite a number of years ago -by E. Panofsky- as an optimum educational strategy.

6 The comparison 'argument' is vitiated in that it ignores that while we are not fundamental (single or unified) physical nor chemical entities, we are fundamental (more or less unified) psychological entities -and so conceivably have a say in how do we function psychologically. (An acknowledgement that emphatically does not suggest not keeping familiar skeptical tabs on attempts to theorize on the basis of so-called introspection.)

7 Wilkes (who semms to consider work by Davidson and his followers as a paradigm of philosophical approaches to action) buys only general explanations when they are provided by scientific psychology after the "nitty-gritty, nose-to-the-grindstone" relevant empirical work is suitably done. In fact some 'armchair psychologists' about action -see notably Brand (1983)- seem as keen as Wilkes herself on a truly empirical theory of action, and they accordingly construe their own efforts as preliminary steps towards this goal (an attitude that, alas, doesn't guard them from being harshly taken to task by through-and-through devotees of neurophysiological explanation). So they may be considered as embracing in advance the position argued for in the text.

c Lingering suspicions forwarded to me by Professor Mey about the suitability of (the ordinary sense of) "activity" to do the job here trusted to it (specifically, to comfortably cover *emotion*) are responsible for the effort to define its technical sense to be used in this paper.

8 Only this last step, it seems to me, needs some illustration. You may grow appalled by an immediate menace to your life. But fear will rapidly subside after your realizing that you can easily overcome the projected danger -and may turn into derision if a quick glance at the angry, menacing man shows that you can disarm and overpower him in no time. (Notice, by the way, how relevant can be specific properties of the specific item that, as anticipated by the subject, is likely to originate 'unfavorable' effects.)

9 Here and everywhere that these expressions are used, keep in mind that only *general ways* of acting *spontaneously*, *fluently*, *unreflectively* are considered.

10 As pointed out in Appendix 2, when studying activities of a specific kind the possibility for a subject to respond to an 'unfavorable' effect by *inhibiting* any activity of this kind being performed or about to be performed at current time must always be kept in mind.

11 Alternatively, it may be considered as followa. In a designated situation (now no more an implicitly designated background one) it 'occurs' that two (in general, several) designated partial situations -one of them (the perhaps only no more that implicitly dsignated agent) being, in what we usually consider 'normal 'cases, the first participant himself/herself- relate to each other through a third designated partial situation (a designated relation). The designating activity designates directly only

this designated relation -and indirectly their relata. (Now the child would just pretend an occurrence of water -or Dr Jekyll's mixture- being poured from the pitcher into the glass by Daddy -or Mr Hyde.) This interpretation, that makes pretense play episodes to look more similar to linguistic ones, strikes me as being, in an overwhelming class of cases, less plausible than the other one. But its assumption would hardly require any significant change in the argument, I think.

12 This is undoubtedly related to cue validity in indicators/signals -see Nunberg (1977: ch.2).

d I have -hopefully- get rid of a couple of terminological infelicities that tainted this paragraph. They were brought to my attention through the kind conveyance of Professor Jacob Mey.

13 For clarification and examples concerning meant activity refer to §4.1, common feature *(d")* and difference *2*.

14 A still more 'exotic' bridging category should be acknowledged regarding first participant's bases for choice of way of enactment, mentioned in §4.1. common feature *(d')*.

15 Refer to §4.1, feature *(d")* and footnote 11, on the alternative regarding the first term of this relation.

16 In order to attain maximum generality, F_{CST} must be so understood that CST itself is one of its possible 'values' -its improper *value*.

17 A number of ways suggest themselves to eliminate the ambiguity, but they would be rather encumbering. On the other hand, most situations are perceived as evolving or 'dynamic' (see e.g. Yates, 1984; Freyd, 1987; or Gilden, 1991), so that in many cases trying to make the distinction would be a hairsplitting, psychologically misleading attempt -and the ambiguity reduces to vagueness.

18 As indicated below, an extension of the *general ways* to other *processing stages* seems to be a desirable move. Parsimony dictates again uniform theoretical handling.

19 Speech act theory terms-of-trade are here handled in a thoroughly non-committal way, as a convenient set of labels to name a few intuitively significant ways of using language. (In the very last sentences in the text I point to their not being sufficient, let alone necessary, even for the modest task of describing all significant ways.)

20 I assume here and henceforth for simplicity a ceteris paribus proviso, where the *other* factor alluded is intensity of effects as determined by degree of change on attainability, enjoyment, or whatever is relevant concerning their target items -i.e. concerning subtrees of goals, attractive/aversive 'qualities', etc. Perhaps this is not as arbitrary as it might seem; for arguably intensities may be construed as mapping on a single pair of values -either license or blockage- while the items are increased so that they differ only minimally. (A little girl upset by being prevented to play with a toy house may perhaps be less so if allowed just to look at its inside. Both interpretations are clearly possible.)

21 The hypotheses are not trivially circular as long as the match between 'strength' and priority for specification of activity may be violated. E.g. if a non immediately fluent, spontaneous, unreflective, off-hand activity is considered, or else if an 'anomalous' situation (such as a pathological condition) obtains. A second, empirically effective way or evading circularity will be possible if and when independent -e.g. neuro-physiological- ways of measuring 'strengths' are developed.

22 Whenever the 'originating item' is deemed by a subject to be so ill-defined as to be virtually coextensive with the current situation's focus itself, the distinction between *[b.1]* and *[b.2] ways* seems to vanish. But their equation is still problematic: notice that while in *[b.2]* -and *[b.3]*, for that matter- the subject actively interferes with the causal chain stemming from the *originating item*, in *[b.1]* no actual interference occurs: an unhindered operation of this very causal chain, although in the new, modified setting, is the only source of the preclusion of the original effect. I cannot press the issue here.

e An observation by my 1993-94 students at the Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset led me to question the adequacy of the strict separation between *[b]* and *[c]*, and so to the suggested modifications.

23 Obviously *[a']* cannot be accepted, since it would mean that the subject flees from a 'favorable' situation.

24 See previous Note.

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