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The role of the social network structure on the spread of intensive agriculture: An example from Navarre, Europe.

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Corresponding Author:	Amaia Albizua, Ph.D Basque Center for Climate Change Leioa, Bizkaia SPAIN	
Corresponding Author Secondary Information:		
Corresponding Author's Institution:	Basque Center for Climate Change	
Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution:		
First Author:	Amaia Albizua, Ph.D	
First Author Secondary Information:		
Order of Authors:	Amaia Albizua, Ph.D	
	Elena Bennett	
	Unai Pascual	
	Guillaume Laroque	
Order of Authors Secondary Information:		
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Abstract:	<p>Social structures underpin land management decision-making in agricultural landscapes by influencing how farmers access knowledge and resources. We explored the role of social networks in decision-making among farmers in Navarre (Spain) to understand how and why some practices spread among farming communities. Social network analysis allows us to understand how farmers in this region share both knowledge and resources, and the potential implications of this sharing for the landscape. We find that large-scale farmers undertaking intensive land management are at the core of the network in this region, controlling the flow of knowledge and resources related to farm management, policy, technology, and finance. The central position of these farmers in the social network, and their reputation, are key to the spread of intensive farming practices in the region, which ultimately may lead to homogenization of local agricultural landscapes. Understanding farmer network structures in a context of agricultural intensification can help tease out the social mechanisms behind the spread of agricultural practices.</p>	
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Author Comments:	<p>We would like to emphasize that the lead author has two affiliations. We also include here the affiliations of all the authors.</p> <p>Amaia Albizua Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Parque Científico de UPV/EHU, Leioa, Spain amaia.albizua@bc3research.org Department of Natural Resource Sciences and McGill School of Environment, McGill University - Macdonald Campus, 21,111 Lakeshore Road, St. Anne-de-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X 3V9 amaia.albizuaaguinaco@mail.mcgill.ca</p> <p>Elena Bennett McGill University Macdonald-Stewart Building (Room 2-062) 21,111 Lakeshore Road Ste. Anne de Bellevue, Québec H9X 3V9 CANADA</p> <p>email: elena.bennett@mcgill.ca</p> <p>Unai Pascual Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Parque Científico de UPV/EHU, Leioa, Spain unai.pascual@bc3research.org</p> <p>Guillaume Larocque McGill University Stewart Biology, McGill University, 1205 Avenue du Docteur-Penfield S3/18, Montréal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada</p> <p>Thank you,</p>

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1 Full name(s), professional affiliations and e-mail addresses of all author(s):

2 Amaia Albizua

3 Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Parque Científico de UPV/EHU, Leioa,

4 Spain

5 amaiabc3@gmail.com

6 Department of Natural Resource Sciences and McGill School of Environment, McGill

7 University - Macdonald Campus, 21,111 Lakeshore Road, St. Anne-de-Bellevue,

8 Quebec, Canada H9X 3V9

10 Elena Bennett

11 McGill University

12 Macdonald-Stewart Building (Room 2-062)

13 21,111 Lakeshore Road

14 Ste. Anne de Bellevue, Québec

15 H9X 3V9

16 CANADA

17 elena.bennett@mcgill.ca

19 Unai Pascual

20 Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Parque Científico de UPV/EHU, Leioa,

21 Spain

22 unai.pascual@bc3research.org

24 Guillaume Larocque

25 McGill University

26 Stewart Biology, McGill University, 1205 Avenue du Docteur-Penfield S3/18, Montréal,

27 QC H3A 1B1, Canadá

28 guillaume.larocque@mcgill.ca

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30 **example from Navarre, Europe.**

31
32 **Abstract**

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35 by influencing how farmers access knowledge and resources. We explored the role of
36 social networks in decision-making among farmers in Navarre (Spain) to understand
37 how and why some practices spread among farming communities. Social network
38 analysis allows us to understand how farmers in this region share both knowledge and
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41 network in this region, controlling the flow of knowledge and resources related to farm
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47 of agricultural practices.

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49 **Keywords:** social network structure, knowledge-sharing, resources, land management,
50 sustainability, agriculture, agrarian landscapes

51
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55

56 **1. Introduction**

57 The integration of rural economies into global commodity markets has led to a
58 restructuring of rural agrarian sectors worldwide (Kay, 2002; Cramb, 2007) accelerating
59 agricultural intensification processes (Tilman et al., 2011). Such restructuring is
60 normally accompanied by an increased area of monocultures and the use of new
61 technologies such as improved seed varieties and large-scale irrigation (Zarrilli, 2010;
62 Andreas and Zhan, 2016). While intensification may favor yield increases it can also
63 lead to habitat and biodiversity loss (Díaz et al., 2020), increased greenhouse gas
64 emissions (Shukla, et al., 2019) and other environmental problems (Foley et al., 2011).
65 Farmers' land management decision, including the level of agricultural intensification
66 of their farm, is influenced by their interactions with fellow farmers and other
67 community members, including agronomic specialists and seed and fertilizer
68 salespeople (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). It is important to understand how farmers'
69 position within their social networks affect knowledge and resource acquisition as this
70 may influence their current and future land management decision-making (Crona et al.,
71 2011; Inman et al., 2018), which ultimately can shape the structure of landscapes over
72 time.

73 Access to knowledge and resources related to farm management directly affects farmer
74 livelihoods (Scoones, 1998; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012).
75 Knowledge and resources are key assets (Barnes et al., 2017) that can contribute to
76 accumulating other necessary benefits (Bennett et al., 2018). For example, knowing
77 who to ask for agrarian related subsidies often facilitates access to key resources, such
78 as land or technology. The capacity to access resources and knowledge in rural areas
79 can also affect the adoption of environmentally friendly farming practices, such as those
80 associated with agro-environmental policy schemes (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011;
81 Alló et al., 2015; Inman et al., 2018).

82 Knowledge sharing depends to a large extent on how farmers are connected to local
83 farmer networks; these networks also shape the distribution of control over farming
84 resources at the local level (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005). This means that such
85 networks can have direct effects on farmers' livelihood outcomes (e.g. their income
86 level and stability), and indirectly on local environmental outcomes, such as on soil and
87 water quality, and agrobiodiversity (Scoones, 1998; Allison and Ellis, 2001; Hahn et al.,
88 2009).

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89 Control of knowledge and its distribution can reinforce power relations among actors.
90 Uneven access to resources and knowledge within a social network is both a result and a
91 source of asymmetric power relations (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Likewise, the
92 uneven distribution of resources is also a direct source of power asymmetry (Carlsson
93 and Berkes, 2005). It is therefore important to understand how uneven distribution of
94 knowledge and resources can shape farmers' livelihood strategies and their effects on
95 landscapes in the context of uneven power among farmers. We hypothesize that the
96 more central some farmers are, in a social network and in terms of access to knowledge
97 and resources, the more power they have over local land-use decisions and the more
98 they can thus affect the decision making of more peripheral farmers in the network.
99 Ultimately, such a situation leads to restructuring the landscape in ways that favor the
100 interests and preferences of those farmers at the core of the network.

101 Social networks link organizations and individuals across space and time, through the
102 sharing of information or resources, creating different kinds of knowledge and resource
103 flow structures (Guerrero et al., 2013). The literature on formal and informal social
104 networks suggests a variety of ways in which networks influence individuals' thoughts,
105 values, and behaviors (Reyers et al., 2015; Colloff et al., 2017; Inman et al., 2018)
106 including the adoption and spread of new technologies and farming practices in
107 agriculture (Warriner and Moul, 1992; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry,
108 2001). Farmers who are very central in networks may play a critical role in the
109 introduction, transfer, and implementation of new farming techniques (Isaac et al., 2007,
110 2014). Additionally, whereas local networks can directly impact local land-use change,
111 external bridging ties can also drive local land-use change via the introduction of new
112 technologies (Isaac and Matous, 2017). Kiptot et al., (2006) and Isaac (2012) show how
113 the role of information networks affects the innovative land-use practices in agricultural
114 systems and their effects on agrobiodiversity. Moreover, farmers who are central in
115 social networks can leverage their control of resources to maintain their social position
116 within the network, which may exacerbate the unequal dissemination of agricultural
117 inputs, such as seeds (Ricciardi, 2015). Finally, the literature also points to the idea that
118 social networks exhibit structural features related to multiple social processes (Levy and
119 Lubell, 2018).

120 Understanding rural communities' social network structures and how they can influence
121 farming decision-making by different types of farmers can contribute to policy decision

122 making about how to best use incentives to encourage sustainable agricultural practices
123 within a landscape. For example, understanding farmers' social networks can help
124 identify which types of farmers incentive programs should target first to help
125 disseminate more sustainable land management practices (Isaac et al., 2007, 2014). This
126 information can also help policymakers improve the cost-effectiveness of the
127 dissemination of information and the design of self-monitoring instruments.

128 Here, we focus on a village in Navarre, Spain, as a model system in which processes of
129 agricultural intensification are accelerating to explore the role of social networks in
130 shaping the land intensification process happening in this region and in many places
131 around the world (Grafton et al., 2018). We use network analysis to understand a) how
132 different types of farmers are connected to each another; b) what types of farmers are
133 located at the core of the social network, thus potentially having relatively more
134 capacity to control resource and knowledge flows within the network, and c) what the
135 social network structure may imply for the structure of the landscape, e.g., the
136 likelihood of increased landscape homogenization. Our underlying assumption is that
137 core farmers in the network can influence other members of the network to adopt
138 farming practices that suit those central farmers' interests (Isaac and Matous, 2017).

139 **2. Social networks and land-use decisions**

140 Changes in land management decisions can result from social processes (activities that
141 involve interactions between people or organizations), which are influenced by, and
142 serve to form, the structure of a social network (Groce et al., 2019). Two network
143 members who share a tie will influence each other over time, potentially leading to an
144 increased similarity between them (Crona et al., 2011). Relational ties for the exchange
145 of some specific kind of knowledge can evolve into deeper social relationships, which
146 can aid the development of common norms and values or even trigger behavioral
147 change (Bodin and Crona, 2009).

148 In the context of agricultural land management, we assume that a) members with similar
149 farming practices tend to obtain similar information and behave similarly within their
150 respective circles, and b) shared knowledge by farmers can influence farmers' decisions
151 about land management and affect the structure of agroecosystems (Villanueva et al.,
152 2017).

153 Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used to understand the structure of social
154 networks, and to identify those members of the network who are most relevant in terms
155 of *influence and control* over resource flows within a community (Crona et al., 2011).
156 SNA can be used to analyze connections among individuals based on the number of ties
157 they have to other network members. By occupying central positions in the social
158 network, some network members are better situated to access valuable knowledge,
159 which can put them at an advantage (Bodin and Crona, 2009) because their position in
160 the network means they have higher levels of agency (Brown and Westaway, 2011). In
161 SNA, the number of ties reflects the degree of centrality in a network and is typically
162 associated with that member's influence over other network members ("out-degree"), or
163 the influence he or she receives from others ("in-degree") (Bodin and Crona, 2009).
164 Betweenness centrality is another metric that refers to the degree to which a network
165 member indirectly connects other members (Granovetter, 1977; Bodin and Crona,
166 2009). This type of centrality of the network can be associated with the level of
167 *bridging and bonding* social capital (Bodin and Crona, 2011).
168 Bonding ties promote trust, reciprocity, and cohesion within communities, which is
169 generally seen as beneficial for consensus building and conflict resolution (Bodin and
170 Crona, 2009). Bonding ties are also frequently required for tacit knowledge transfer.
171 However, homogeneity can also hinder problem resolution or uptake of innovative
172 management strategies, which require diverse knowledge and perspectives (Lyon, 2000;
173 Prell et al., 2010). Bridging ties, on the other hand, connect otherwise disconnected
174 actors (Siciliano and Wukich, 2017), providing access to external resources and helping
175 actors initiate or support collective action (Bodin and Crona, 2009). Members with
176 bridging ties outside the central network can act as 'brokers' for change (Bebbington,
177 1997). *Brokerage* in this way refers to when an actor connects otherwise unconnected
178 actors (Gould and Fernandez, 1989). Members who can balance bonding with brokerage
179 tend to be in a better position to perceive and access knowledge and resources,
180 balancing the tendency to work with similar network members with the benefits of
181 coordinated action across diverse network members (Wukich and Robinson, 2013;
182 Siciliano and Wukich, 2017).
183 While the importance of central actors who use bridging and bonding ties to benefit
184 other network members is often assumed (e.g., Hahn et al. 2006), being in a favorable
185 (central) position in a social network does not necessarily imply being the only

186 members having important influence over others. There can also be network members
187 who occupy marginal positions but retain influence through a formal level of authority
188 (Bodin and Crona, 2009).

189 Social network structures, distinguished by their density of connections, influence the
190 way that information spreads through a network (Janssen et al., 2006). Density and
191 centralization are indicators that show the potential of power exertion by central
192 members —i.e. the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others
193 (Bodin and Crona, 2009).

194 Some networks are defined by having a core-periphery structure, which consists of two
195 classes of network members, one core group densely connected and another periphery
196 group only loosely connected to this core (Mascia et al., 2013). This structure has
197 implications for information diffusion and access to diverse types of knowledge (Bodin
198 and Crona, 2009). Core members can frame the discourse and the decision-making
199 agenda, through their central position, effectively channeling and exerting influence
200 over other members (Ernstson et al., 2010). Isaac et al., (2007) found this kind of
201 structure in farmers' advice networks in Ghana, where the core members were
202 significantly more engaged in the acquisition of new information and knowledge than
203 periphery members, acquiring information from external sources and peripheral
204 farmers. Core farmers acted as bridges, bringing new information and knowledge to the
205 village, and disseminating this new information. Further, high status individuals tend to
206 occupy central/core positions in the social network and they are thus more likely to
207 receive valuable knowledge within information exchange networks (Lu et al., 2017).

208 In summary, core members within a network, who have a high level of out-degree ties
209 and brokerage positions, are enabled by the network structure to channel and control
210 knowledge and resources flows. As a result, such core members influence other
211 members' farming strategies and land-use decisions (Ernstson et al., 2010; Isaac et al.,
212 2007). The aggregated effect of these decisions can change the structure of the
213 landscape, ultimately leading to landscape homogeneity due to the spread of similar
214 land management strategies (Isaac and Matous, 2017).

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216 3. Case study and methods

217 3.1. Study area

218 Our study area is Artajona village in the region of Navarre, Spain, in the Ebro River
219 watershed. Navarre, which features both small-scale family farms (0 - 5 Ha), and large-
220 scale farms (50->100 ha), and which remains as one of the few autonomous
221 communities in Spain noted for still its large communal land area (Aguas, 2010). This
222 means that farmers can access more arable lands than those that they own privately.
223 Navarre has undergone rapid agriculture intensification fueled by the development of a
224 large-scale irrigation project, by the governments of Spain and Navarre, known as *Itoiz*
225 *Canal de Navarra*, that irrigates 37,445 ha (Albizua et al., 2019a, 2019b). This large-
226 scale irrigation transformation affected around 22 villages in the region. Our study
227 focuses on Artajona village with a population of around 1,600 inhabitants.

228 The large-scale irrigation project has led to a homogenization of the landscape of
229 Navarre (Albizua et al., 2019a, 2019b), in part due to a process of grouping small plots
230 of land into holdings of at least five hectares (De Vries & Garcia 2012). Farmers who
231 owned land in the areas affected by the irrigation project had three options: they could
232 adopt modern irrigation, collaborating with other farmers if they owned less than five
233 hectares; they could switch to lands in other areas under rainfed systems, or they could
234 simply sell or rent out their lands. Some farmers, unwilling to invest in the new
235 irrigation technology, left their land to the local rural cooperative¹, rented to other
236 farmers, or sold their land. This has led to a concentration of land in fewer hands and a
237 decline in small-scale farming in the region. These landholders are nevertheless still
238 influential in some land management decisions by deciding who is going to farm their
239 land and, sometimes, by deciding the type of farm management in the lands they own.

240 The irrigation project has led to land management changes. These include the increased
241 cultivation of corn and forage and increased use of pesticides and fertilizers (Albizua et
242 al., 2019a, 2019c).

243 The irrigation project has been strongly subsidized by the government of Navarre, and
244 other funding has followed suit. Some examples include funding available for farmers
245 to create farm cooperatives to share the heavy machinery necessary (Gil and Bonis,

59 ¹ There is a strong culture of agrarian cooperatives in this region around which farmers normally organize
60 themselves.
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246 1986). There are also other kinds of local cooperatives, which help with crop storage,
247 farming advice, and selling fertilizers and other inputs. In the village we studied, the
248 local cooperative is one of the oldest and most important in the region, having started in
249 1904 (Gran Enciclopedia de Navarra, 1990). After the large-scale irrigation project
250 started, this local organization has taken on a new role as the mediator between
251 irrigators (with the labor and the machinery) and landholders who are often renting out
252 their lands. The access to communal land has also been altered, since some
253 municipalities in the region have prioritized allocation of communal land to full-time
254 and young farmers, who are the main adopters of modern irrigation technology (Albizua
255 et al., 2019a).

256 **3.2. Sampling strategy**

257 We selected a sample of farmers by triangulating various approaches. First, we obtained
258 a list of farmers and landholders in Artajona from the Navarre government. We added to
259 this list all farmers that belonged to the local cooperative and others registered in the
260 Ecological Agriculture Council of Navarre. We then asked key farmers and community
261 members to check the list and add missing members, using snowball sampling until the
262 addition and mention of new farmers' names were minimal which indicated that our list
263 had reached saturation. We tried to talk to every farmer and landholder in the village so
264 that our sampling was an accurate reflection of the farming practices and network
265 structure of the village.

266 We collected information to characterize the social networks in our study site that
267 influence the exchange of several types of knowledge and resources through surveys
268 administered in-person to heads of households during June-August 2017. During the
269 survey, we explained that our aim was "to explore the surveyed person's social network
270 to understand who influences him or her when making decisions about land
271 management and his or her farm performance". We performed a name generator with
272 free recall (Alexander et al., 2018) and invited farmers to mention people who might
273 influence their land-use decisions. We told them that "we'd like you to begin by
274 identifying up to five people with whom you exchange knowledge/information or from
275 whom you receive advice about farming, and then we'd like to learn a little more about
276 each of them. You could start with the person you probably talk to the most and we can
277 go on from there". We asked the same question regarding resource exchanges among
278 the farmer being interviewed and the other five farmers. For both, knowledge and

279 resources, we made an open question followed later by a list of topics generated in the
280 trail. We then aggregated all different types of knowledge and resources being
281 exchanged into manageable categories. Knowledge categories included a high variety of
282 topics (see **Table 1**). Resource categories consist of labor, land, machinery, crops,
283 money, seeds, fertilizers and subsidies.

284 Farmers and landholders nominated other farmers and landholders, agriculture/farmer
285 organizations, extension service agents or consulting firms (from in or outside the
286 village) as those with whom they shared resources and knowledge. We also inquired
287 about 1) the frequency of knowledge and resource exchanges, 2) the importance
288 attached to relationships with each of the persons mentioned, and the reasons behind
289 those exchanges and 3) if and how they thought that connections to the mentioned
290 people influenced their farming practices. All participants mentioned that knowledge
291 and resource exchanges influenced their farming decisions. However, they did not
292 normally specify exactly in which particular ways. Nevertheless, how such interactions
293 influence their farming practices is, to some extent, revealed by the data collected
294 regarding the management they performed (see **Table 2**).

295 We approached a total of 106 people, of whom 81 completed the survey (a response rate
296 of 77%). Farmers nominated 80 additional people leading to a total network of 161
297 people. The total network included *intensive* farmers (N=48): generally, young farmers
298 owning and renting land to cultivate agro-industrial commodity crops including
299 biofuels, maize and other cereals in large plots (50->100 ha) and applying relatively
300 high doses of inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation); *small-scale diversified*
301 farmers (N=44): part-time farmers or retired farmers owning the land and cultivating for
302 self-consumption or small-scale trade; *landholders* (N=29), who were mainly old retired
303 farmers who rented out their land; *farming-related organizations* (N=27) including
304 agrarian cooperatives, agrarian unions, seed and food companies, land cultivation
305 service companies and the Council of Organic Agricultural Production of Navarra
306 (CPAEN);² and *others*, which included other farmers as family members (N=13) (see
307 **Table 2**). We also carried out 32 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with
308 organization representatives and key informants related to the regional agrarian sector.

² Most surveyed organizations were included as part of the initial fieldwork design, following the main author own criteria due to her familiarity with the context, and some few were included as suggested by surveyed farmers.

309 These were normally outsiders to the local farming community. The information was
310 useful to get a better sense of the main actors influencing farmers' decisions at the
311 regional level (see supplementary material).

312 **3.3. Statistical and social network analysis**

313 We first performed a hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to classify farmers and
314 landholders in different groups (García-Llorente et al., 2008) based on the decisions
315 they made about land management. Some of the key variables included were plot area
316 (ha), type of fertilizers and irrigation used, and types of crops grown. This analysis
317 indicated the farming strategy of each group of farmers. We then carried out a
318 'multiplex network' analysis. That is, we focused simultaneously on multiple graphical
319 representations of networks, each of them in turn representing a unique resource or
320 knowledge exchange relationship and where each node represents a member of the
321 farming community, and where every node appears in each of these graphical
322 representations (Bodin and Crona, 2009; Rathwell and Peterson, 2012; Baggio et al.,
323 2016). By comparing the multiple graphs, we assessed the structural differences at
324 several levels.

325 At the individual level, we calculated two individual centrality network measures:
326 *centrality degree* and *betweenness centrality*. We measured the *centrality degree* to
327 understand the level of involvement each network member had (how active they were)
328 in terms of exchanging knowledge and resources with others. The centrality degree
329 indicator represents the level of activity of the members of the network—i.e. the number
330 of ties entering or coming from an individual—with larger nodes representing more ties.
331 Also, we assessed *betweenness centrality* to understanding each network member's
332 position in terms of connecting different types of members' subgroups (for example, to
333 determine if who used more similar farming practices were closer to each other within
334 the network) (Prell et al., 2010). We carried out the Gould-Fernandez Brokerage
335 Analysis for the two knowledge and resource exchange networks to understand the roles
336 played by network members based on where they are positioned in the network and
337 with whom they exchanged information. Brokerage is the only mechanism that permits
338 isolated or unconnected actors to share knowledge and resources. It is assumed that a
339 broker's connections to and control over knowledge and resources being exchanged
340 between unconnected network members gives them greater access to information and
341 resources compared to those who are not brokers. Together these network analyses

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342 provide information about who is more central in the rural community, for every type of
343 knowledge and resource exchange.

344 At the group level, we calculated mean module-to-module knowledge exchange-
345 correlation scores among different groups of network members to understand the degree
346 of homogeneity of those groups for each of the different types of knowledge networks
347 (Sayles and Baggio, 2017). The mean module-to-module calculation aims to understand
348 the extent to which farmers of one group exchanged knowledge with other groups of
349 farmers (Sayles and Baggio, 2017). This analysis shows whether there is an asymmetry
350 in the knowledge flows between different groups of farmers (Doreian et al., 2004). In
351 our case, the groups are intensive farmers, small-scale farmers, and landholders, all
352 being differentiated by their different land management decisions given the information
353 obtained from the HCA (organizations and ‘others’ were removed from the analysis.

354 Finally, at the level of the whole farming community, we describe the network structure
355 for each type of knowledge or resources exchanged (e.g. core-periphery vs loose and
356 open structures), and we measured cohesion indicators such as *density*, *reciprocity*,
357 *centralization*, *diameter* and *average path length* (Prell et al., 2009). *Cohesion*
358 represents the minimal number of members in a social network who need to be removed
359 to disconnect³ the group (Moody and White, 2003). *Density* refers to the proportion of
360 ties that are present out of all possible ties in the network. *Reciprocity* refers to the
361 proportion of ties that are reciprocated. *Centralization* refers to the central position of
362 individuals regarding their betweenness for the overall network cohesion. This is a
363 position of strategic significance in the overall structure of the network. *Diameter*
364 expresses the longest minimum distance between any pair of individuals. *Average path-*
365 *length* refers to the mean of the shortest distance between each pair of nodes in the
366 network. These measures complement individual level calculations and reinforce the
367 answer to the question of which group of farmers is more central and whether the shared
368 knowledge or resource is reciprocal or not. The analysis is also geared to compare the
369 multiple types of knowledge and resource exchanges. For example, some types of
370 knowledge flows may be more frequent but the ties may not be reciprocal; by contrast,
371 the network may have a lower density for other kinds of knowledge exchange but with a

³ Disconnection of the groups refers to make such community dysfunctional –i.e. not useful for farming related decision-making, in this case.

372 higher level of reciprocity. Similarly, we compare other interactions regarding the
373 number of “intermediary” people between two actors.

374 **4. Results**

375 **4.1. Well-integrated active intensive farmers versus weakly integrated passive** 376 **small-scale farmers**

377 At the individual level, we found that intensive farmers were the most active in
378 exchanging all types of knowledge and resources, except for crop exchanges (see **Table**
379 **4**). Likewise, intensive farmers were the closest to all other farmers in all the networks
380 analyzed, as shown by their higher score of *betweenness* centrality. This central position
381 allows these farmers to serve as brokers of knowledge and resource flows in the
382 community, thereby having the capacity to influence the spread of knowledge and
383 resources to other farmers in the network. Interviews also revealed that intensive
384 farmers had a privileged position to access policy-related knowledge (such as how to
385 obtain subsidies to access machinery and adapt to the new irrigation requirements) due
386 to their connection to farming organizations. This puts them in a privileged position viz-
387 a-viz other farmers who also require this type of information.

388 Small-scale farmers were less active in exchanging knowledge and resources (i.e., lower
389 *degree* centrality) and occupied a peripheral position in terms of knowledge and
390 resource exchange networks, indicating that they were less able to connect to other
391 farmers. The cohesiveness measures (centralization and diameter, **Table 3**), the low
392 value of individual measures (mean values of *degree* and *betweenness centralities*,
393 **Table 4**), and small-scale farmers’ peripheral position (**Figure 1**) suggest that they are
394 more likely to rely on brokers, such as intensive farmers and formal organizations, for
395 knowledge and resources. There were also few examples of younger small-scale
396 diversified farmers whose networks seemed to be external to the community, but these
397 farmers represented a minority among the surveyed small-scale farmers.

398 **4.2. Asymmetric knowledge exchange among farmer groups**

399 Farmers exchanged a variety of types of knowledge with other farmers who generally
400 shared common farming practices (**Figure 2**). In addition, there appears to be
401 asymmetry in knowledge sharing between different groups of farmers and landholders.
402 Although small-scale farmers mainly mentioned landholders when asked with whom
403 they exchanged knowledge and resources, landholders did not always mention small-

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404 scale farmers when asked the same question. This reveals that landholders did not attach
405 the level of importance to such interactions, as did small-scale farmers (**Figure 2**). We
406 also see a relatively strong alignment⁴ between intensive farmers, formal organizations
407 and landholders, who tend to exchange key resources such as land, labor, and
408 machinery, as well as management-related knowledge. Key informants provided further
409 information about the type of advice/knowledge intensive farmers shared: mostly
410 related to newly introduced crops (maize, grass, and biofuels), the rotations that suited
411 such crops, sprinkling irrigation, and other technologically related management options,
412 and about the required fertilizers and pesticides. Interviews also revealed that
413 landholders hired in intensive farmers' labor and gave them responsibility for all
414 farming practice decision-making.

415 Intensive farmers play many roles, including acting as representatives, coordinators,
416 gatekeepers, and mediators of knowledge exchange (**Table 5** shows the multiple roles
417 comparable across farming groups). Local organizations act as mediators when
418 knowledge exchange is assessed in an aggregated way (**Table 5**) and, particularly, in the
419 exchange of land resources (**Table 6**), where such organizations mediate the transfer of
420 land from landholders to intensive farmers and the transfer of labor in the opposite
421 direction. Although intensive farmers and landholders are the most active agents, other
422 actors, typically family members, play a role as mediators for groups of similar farmers
423 (known as itinerant broker role) and among different groups of farmers (known as
424 liaison broker role) in the network. This reveals the importance of those "other" actors
425 in land plot exchange networks (**Table 6**), despite their low activity when the network is
426 assessed at the whole community or individual levels. Intensive farmers are
427 representatives, coordinators, and gatekeepers of labor (see **Table 7**) whereas
428 landholders, and, to a lower extent, organizations, are the gatekeepers and
429 representatives for land and machinery exchange networks (**Tables 6 and 8**
430 respectively).

⁴ With strong alignment, we refer to the fact that intensive farmers, landholders and some local organizations always mentioned each other for land, labour and machinery exchanges (see Figure 2). Fieldwork revealed that intensive farmers laboured landholders' lands, and local organizations helped this to happen and helped intensive farmers organize to share machinery among themselves.

4.3. Core-periphery, and loose and open community network structures

At the community level, we found that the networks about land management and finance-related knowledge exchange have a strong core-periphery structure. This implies that a small number of intensive farmers, who are primarily transmitting such knowledge to other farmers, occupy central positions in these knowledge exchange networks (**Figure 1-A-b,c**). The data shows that farmers who share land management knowledge hold less reciprocal exchange of information (reciprocity: 0.69) compared to those sharing knowledge about technology (0.81), policy (0.78) or finance (0.76). Interestingly, while fewer farmers talk about technology, policy or finance, when they do, there is normally a mutual sharing of knowledge. With technology and policy-related knowledge sharing, there are two distinguishable subgroups. When they share information about technology, the subgroups are interconnected via a formal organization—the local rural cooperative—whereas when they share information about policy the farmer groups do not seem to be connected (**Table 3** and **Figure 1-A-d,e**).

The land (resource) exchange network is more open and less dense, meaning that fewer people are involved in land exchanges. The structure is not a core-periphery one, with few farmers providing lands to the rest; instead, some landholders provide lands to intensive farmers who are connected among other intensive farmers, creating a linear structure (see **Figure 1-B-c**). Machinery and labor exchange networks are more reciprocal than land exchange networks. The distance between two individuals in labor networks is the highest of any of the networks, which implies that there are normally broker persons in such exchanges (e.g. local cooperative acting as a mediator).

5. Discussion

We pose that the social structure of a farming community, which determines the flow of resources and knowledge exchanges within the community, can affect individual farmers' land-use decisions and land management behavior. Further, when aggregated, these decisions can impact land use and landscape configuration. Because of the strong influence of central farmers, the landscape may be reconfigured over time in ways that are associated with the interests and preferences of those farmers who are central to the social network of the farming community. Here, we analyzed the main network characteristics as regards knowledge and resource exchanges of a representative farming region in Navarra, Spain, with the objective of predict how the farming landscape may evolve shortly based on the social structure of the community.

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464 Bridging ties between different types of farmers, and between farmers and other local
465 organizations, can increase information dissemination and adoption of farming
466 techniques (Bodin and Crona 2009). Promoting external bridging ties can also
467 contribute to land use diversification when there is a strong local network to implement
468 that change (Isaac and Matous 2017). In our case study, we show that intensive farmers
469 are the ones who mostly disseminate knowledge about farm management and serve as
470 gatekeepers of such knowledge within a core-periphery network. Their core position
471 and the role they play allows them to determine the main ways that knowledge is
472 disseminated in the network, and by so doing we believe that this allows them to
473 maintain the status quo that promotes their farming strategies and interests. In a
474 different context, Ernstson et al., (2010) also demonstrated the ability of key network
475 members to block transformational change. The multi-level network structural
476 differences found in the access to knowledge and resources puts intensive farmers in a
477 position of power influencing other farmers' land-use decisions. Intensive farmers'
478 central position and their capacity to control not only the flow of knowledge about farm
479 management, but also about policy, technology, and financial aspects, as well as key
480 resources such as machinery, labor, and land. Thanks to their features and core position
481 in the network, intensive farmers have created their own "in-house expertise" for
482 technology and policy knowledge as well as for labor and machinery resource exchange
483 dynamics.

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484 The knowledge sharing asymmetry that we found in the Navarre case study reinforces
485 the view that the agricultural intensification occurring in the region is made possible by
486 the close connections between intensive farmers and local organizations and institutions
487 that favor intensification (Albizua et al., 2019a, 2019c). In this way, the results suggest
488 that the social structure in Navarre may be reflecting a positive feedback loop between
489 the colluded interests of formal organizations and those of intensive farmers, and
490 landscape intensification and homogenization, further marginalizing small-scale farmers
491 in the region. In line with Inman et al.'s (2018) findings, the data suggest that
492 landholders also colluded with intensive farmers' interests. This is probably explained
493 by the fact that intensive farmers' experience with sharing and their long-term
494 membership in the local cooperative makes them valuable (high reputation) for
495 knowledge exchange. Thus, social network analysis is aligned with the expansion of
496 intensive farmers' practices in the Navarre region (Albizua et al., 2019a, 2019b).

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497 Fieldwork observation and interviews in the region revealed that landholders preferred
498 renting out their land to intensive farmers for cultivating their lands, normally leaving
499 intensive farmers to decide their farming strategies. These relationships can be depicted
500 as fueling the ‘instrumental power’ (Wong et al., 2017) of intensive farmers. That is,
501 intensive farmers and farming organizations in the region can exercise their influence
502 over less powerful actors (in this case small-scale farmers) through the control of the
503 exchange of knowledge, e.g., over finance and technology, as well as resources. This
504 indicates that intensive farmers are in a strong position to influence landholders’ access
505 to knowledge and resources, and thus their behavior regarding land management.

506 We argue that the high level of bonding capital among intensive farmers, as well as their
507 bridging capacity with formal organizations and landholders, are necessary conditions
508 for the intensification of land management and the spread of their farming strategies. In
509 contrast, small-scale farmers mainly interact with other small-scale farmers and
510 landholders for the sharing of knowledge about land management. Hence, small-scale
511 farmers’ alternatives to intensive farming do not find sufficient support in the network
512 to grow or spread. Small-scale farmers occupy peripheral positions and other
513 landholders typically do not take into account their management-related knowledge. We
514 also found that few small-scale farmers connect to external actors and appear in isolated
515 subgroups; their lack of strong local networks seems to prevent the diffusion of their
516 farming strategies. Interviews provided some additional evidence about small-scale
517 farmers still holding to non-intensive land management, characterized by growing
518 mainly vegetables and fruit trees and following more traditional practices in terms of
519 irrigation, pest control and fertilizer use (Albizua, 2016). Hence, we posit that the
520 ensuing farming and social homogeneity may impede the uptake of innovative
521 management strategies that favor less intensified agriculture, for which diverse
522 knowledge, values, and perspectives are required (Lyon, 2000; Prell et al., 2010).
523 Further, we argue that, with time, intensive farmers and local organizations may
524 increasingly be able to influence small-scale farmers’ identities and behaviors. As Van
525 Hecken et al., (2015) pointed out, the lack of recognition towards weaker actors is, at
526 least in part, the result of institutional exclusion processes and deserves more attention
527 in future research.

528 We acknowledge that structure is not everything and small-scale farmers’ behavior also
529 depends on other contextual factors such as their governing institutions, socio-

1 530 demographic factors, as well as their attitudes, beliefs, and intentions (Barnes et al.,
2 531 2017). In this regard, complementary interviews revealed that most small-scale farmers
3 532 are part-time or retired farmers still laboring land as a hobby and/or because of the
4 533 importance they attach to self-consumption crop quality. This typology of farmers has
5 534 low interest in engaging in the agricultural commodity market, they do not tend to self-
6 535 organize, as intensive farmers do, and are not actively resisting intensive farmers’
7 536 management expansion. Albizua and Zaga (2020) show some struggle between
8 537 intensive and small-scale farmers at the beginning of the large-scale irrigation
9 538 implementation but as Bebbington (1997) pointed out, once intensive farming practices
10 539 are settled, those seem to become widely accepted and they have gradually turned into
11 540 deep structures taken-for-granted.

12 541 Other relevant factors that may be shaping the current land use intensification spread
13 542 leading to landscape homogenization, are connected to policy and development
14 543 interventions (Bebbington, 1997), which are for the most part oriented to intensive
15 544 farmers’ needs. One example in this context is the Foral Law 1/2002, which requires the
16 545 local government to subsidize approximately 40–50% of investment costs to farmers
17 546 adopting the new large-scale irrigation technology. Besides, most small-scale farmers
18 547 found that this irrigation technology does not fit with their livelihood strategies and
19 548 hence decided not to invest in the uptake of modern irrigation. This fact, on top of the
20 549 aging of the farming population and the lack of family members interested in keeping
21 550 the traditional agrarian activity, led some small-scale farmers to arrange land deals with
22 551 intensive farmers (Albizua and Zaga-Mendez 2020). All in all, our results indicate that
23 552 small-scale farmers’ low activity and peripheral position limit their ability to influence
24 553 the rules and deployment of agriculture intensification in the region (Calvário, 2017).
25 554 Likewise, small-scale farmers show a low capacity to incorporate their cultural values
26 555 and land management practices into the dominant agricultural model (Smit and Wandel,
27 556 2006).

28 557 We acknowledge some limitations in this study. Although we aimed to approach all
29 558 farmers and landholders in the local community, the use of free fixed recall of
30 559 mentioning up to five people means that we were not able to include all potential ties,
31 560 which may add some bias to our results, over-representing those perceived as the most
32 561 central actors. This choice was taken based on that the empirical literature on social
33 562 network analysis generally relies on an individual’s ability to freely recall their

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563 interactions and give the example of asking an upper limit (“list up to 5 people . . .”) or
564 period (“within the past 2 years . . .”) (Groce et al 2019). Since the number of
565 intensified farmers and small-scale farmers is similar, the initial number of farmers
566 surveyed is unlikely to have a major influence on centrality.

567 We have also calculated an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to check the
568 effect of homophily and probability to receive ties based on the type of farming (see
569 supplementary material for more details). We found that homophily is not a significant
570 factor in determining the network configuration. However, the group of farmers the
571 member of the networks belong to is important when it is the case of small-scale
572 farmers and landholders.

573 We also acknowledge the importance of paying attention to connections outside the
574 community boundaries that we defined. Our reasoning about how the current network
575 structure is displacing small-scale farmers could be incorrect if small-scale farmers were
576 involved in other networks beyond the community studied here. However, our analysis
577 would have allowed us to detect if small-scale farmers were part of an external
578 community by checking whether the nominees are part of our defined community or
579 not. In this regard, we found that only a few small-scale farmers were part of other
580 networks outside the community we have analyzed. While some of those small-scale
581 farmers may be resisting the influence of large-scale actors, relying on agro-technology
582 may be the exception rather than the norm. Finally, it should also be noted that since our
583 dataset is not longitudinal, it is not possible to identify clear cause-effects in the
584 network.

585 Despite the limitations noted, our qualitative and quantitative findings, taken together,
586 offer some support for the hypothesis that influential network members – intensive
587 farmers –can affect other farmers’ management decisions and that this may be one of
588 the main reasons for the ongoing (and likely future) spread intensive farming practices
589 in the region, leading to a homogenization of the landscape.

590 **6. Conclusions**

591 The results of our case study in Navarre, Spain, improve understanding of how
592 agricultural intensification can spread once initially established in a community. In this
593 community, the social structure led to uneven access to knowledge and resources. We
594 found that intensive farmers had an important brokerage role in most of the knowledge

595 and resource exchange networks in the community we studied. Moreover, they balanced
596 bonding with brokerage, which enabled them to have a better vision of, and access to,
597 important external resources and knowledge. These farmers' position in the network
598 also facilitated their ability to control knowledge and resource flows, which meant they
599 could influence other farmers' decisions about farming strategies and land use (Ernstson
600 et al., 2010; Isaac et al., 2007). We further showed how those powerful farmers were
601 aligned with landholders. This alignment, together with intensive, central farmer's
602 frequent connection to regional organizations, allowed them to take advantage of their
603 social connections, maintaining their position and ultimately spreading their farming
604 strategies through the community. The knowledge and resource exchange affected
605 farmers' land-use decisions, which, in the aggregate, can affect the structure of the
606 landscape because it encourages the adoption of similar practices over time, making the
607 landscape more homogenous (Isaac and Matous, 2017). We posit that the core-
608 periphery network we identified, and intensive farmers' position within this network,
609 reinforce the worldwide phenomenon of agricultural intensification (Campbell et al.,
610 2009) that co-exists with rural abandonment (Rivera-Ferre, 2008), especially among
611 farmers attached to traditional farming (Proebstl-Haider et al., 2016).

612

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Comment	Response
<p>Reviewer 3 I think the manuscript has largely improved since the first round. While I still have some methodological questions remaining in terms of sampling techniques and interpretation of network metrics, I think these are issues that would need a broader exchange, and might risk to go beyond what is possible in one, empirically oriented paper. I think it is much clearer now what the aim and context of the study was, and how the authors went about.</p> <p>1) I have one issue, that I would ask the authors to revise (one again), before giving my green-light for publication. I think the paper would benefit a lot from setting out from the beginning the difference between sharing knowledge and sharing resources (as I have mentioned this in my previous review). While the authors do make an attempt to distinguish between the two (especially in the results and discussion sections), it would help the argument of the paper (and the conclusions which can be drawn) to distinguish between these two distinct issues right from the beginning. In terms of the literature, there are also two distinct strands, one on resource-exchange, the other on knowledge-exchange and proliferation. While the authors quote seminal papers from both strands, it would help the reader to better distinguish between the two, and derive distinctive questions for resource vs. knowledge-sharing in the farming communities of the Spanish region into which the authors are looking. This allows to set the insightful results from this case-study into the overall academic discourses related to the two issues, access to resources on the one hand, and knowledge-sharing and control on the other.</p>	<p>We agree that making clearer the difference between knowledge and resource exchange at the beginning of the paper can help to interpret the results from this case study in a way that can contribute to the academic debate. We have now included the difference between sharing knowledge and sharing resources in the introduction (page 3 L61:72). We have done so by reflecting the importance of this difference regarding asymmetric social power relations. We believe that bringing in power relations further helps understand some of our results such as the interdependencies between landholders and intensive farmers as well as the asymmetric exchange of knowledge and resources. This illustrates the extent to which intensive farmers control some types of knowledge. Besides, making the difference between resources and knowledge allows a more nuanced discussion regarding the brokerage results.</p>
<p>2) I have one additional, content-related question which intrigued me: in table one (and less clearly in the text), you speak of small-scale landholders. What do you mean with this? Are all landholders owning only small parcels of land, or is it to make the distinction from (implicitly large-scale) intensive farmers clear? Are the intensive farmers all owners of their land, or are there intensive farmers who farm the land for LARGE-SCALE landholders? This distinction should be made clear, in order for not appear arbitrary in the eyes of the reader.</p>	<p>Thank you. We have clarified this further in Table 2: small-scale landholders are landholders owning small parcels of land. Information from interviews indicated that if we account for the whole surface owned by these small landholders, it could represent a large amount of land (this is perhaps why it was confusing in Table 2 explanation). We hope it is clearer now. By contrast, we describe some farmers as <i>large-scale</i> intensive farmers when they labor a large area of land. They may either own or rent the land they labor. Table 2 shows that there are three different groups of large-scale intensive farmers. The main characteristic of the large-scale intensive farmer group is that their farming strategies are intensive regarding the level of inputs they use in farming, the type of machinery used as well as the types of crops grown. We have also</p>

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	<p>added further information about farmers' groups' characteristics (i.e. ownership, socio-demographic features). This helps understand better that for instance in the case of small-scale landholders, they are normally old retired farmers. We also make this information explicit in section 3.2. page 9 L269:275.</p>
<p>3) Then, and that is my last comment, I think the authors should think again about the temporal dimension in their analysis. They write in the conclusion, that this study contribute(s) to better understanding how agriculture intensification spreads once it is initially established in a community. I only partially agree with this. While the interviews conducted in the region might suggest this, the network analysis only allows to show how the agricultural actors in this region interact with each other, and might hint at certain (future) outcomes of these exchanges, both in goods and knowledge/information. In my view, it does not allow, however, to make the bold statement that intensification will spread in any case, since there might very well be influence factors which balance or counteract this tendency. I would like to see this point discussed a bit more critically. For example, the predominance of interactions between small-scale farmers mentioned on page 14 (lines 424 and 425) could also lead to strong(er) communities resisting the influence of large-scale actors relying on agro-tech, as we see it in many parts of the world, e.g. also in Western Europe.</p>	<p>Thank you for this insightful comment. We do agree that the network analysis only allows showing how the agricultural actors in this region interact with each other, and might hint at certain (future) outcomes of these exchanges.</p> <p>While it is indeed not possible to infer from the network analysis the evolution/spread of different farming approaches, supporting material based on interviews and previous work in the same region since 2013 (see references in page 7 L 197 and L201) suggests that the temporal tendency has been for the spread of large scale intensive farming. Thus, we bring this additional information more explicitly to the paper now.</p> <p>Additionally, we further discuss the fact that in this context, small-scale farmers are not interested in a strong engagement in the market and are not organizing themselves to resist the spread of intensive farmers' practices, as far as we are aware (page 17 L505:508). One way to hint at this phenomenon is provided by bringing in some new data to the paper about how many small-scale farmers decided to abandon farming altogether after the introduction of large-scale irrigation (page 7 L206:208). Interestingly, information from the interviews also reflected that only a minority of small-scale farmers sell their produce in the market and had their own network community (external to the assessed community). Together these pieces of information support our view that in this area large scale intensive farming is likely to spread viz-a-viz small-scale farming. We thus hypothesize that although intensification consequences could have supposed some struggle between intensive and small-scale farmers in the beginning, once it is settled, it is probably becoming widely accepted and gradually turning into deep structures taken-for-granted (page 17 L508:512). We have now clarified this line of argument both in the discussion and conclusion sections.</p>
<p>Reviewer 4: In this manuscript the authors explore the role of social networks in decision-making among farmers in Navarre (Spain) to understand the adoption of certain agricultural practices. As they find, the centrality of intensive farmers can be associated to the dominance of intensive farming practices and the homogenization of agricultural landscapes. The study is innovative and very promising but has also some deficits that prevent its publication for now.</p>	
<p>Major</p>	

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<p>In the introduction, the research questions are a bit descriptive and not too problematized theoretically. They seem to address a problem (i.e., that of intensification of agricultural practices and homogenization of landscapes) but I missed a bit of theoretical problematization (for example one that revolves around the distinction between resource and knowledge exchange or one about the different roles that farmers can have in a network.</p>	<p>Thank you. Following the suggestion of the reviewer, a theoretical problematization around the distinction between resource and knowledge exchange has been included in the page 3 L61:72). We address the importance of this difference regarding existing asymmetric social power relations. We believe that bringing in power relations further helps understand some of our results such as the interdependencies between landholders and intensive farmers as well as the asymmetric exchange of knowledge and resources, and illustrates the extent to which intensive farmers control some types of knowledge. Besides, making the difference between resources and knowledge allows a more nuanced discussion regarding the brokerage results.</p> <p>The issue about the different roles farmers have in the network is already explained on page 10 L307:309. We have now emphasized this in the second section of results page 14 and on page 13 L387:402, where we explain the module-to-module results. We then bring this back to the discussion and conclusions sections.</p>
<p>The authors have a hypothesis but I wonder whether the hypothesis is not a bit trivial given that the literature (as per the author's account) already supports the claim that networks do affect farmer's decisions. Also, the authors do not discuss the hypothesis in their results or discussion sections</p>	<p>The novelty we bring in the paper is the point about how the impact of the network on farmers' decisions helps to understand (un)sustainable agricultural pathways in the context of rural Navarra, a historically rich agricultural region of Spain. We believe that the analysis and results contribute to useful knowledge for decision-makers interested in understanding how in a given context farmers' interaction, access and control of resource and knowledge flows, for example when designing rural development and land-based environmental policies. In our specific case study, the analysis also allows knowing the importance of landholders trusting intensive farmers (i.e. landholders leave intensive farmers decide about the farming strategy in their land), as well as the role of the local cooperative, which by acting as a mediator between intensive farmers and landholders, shapes the network among farmers, in terms of exchange of land, labor and machinery within the network. We think this context may share key similarities to what is happening in other Mediterranean rural landscapes.</p> <p>To recap, our motivation for the paper is to understand to what extent and how that influential network members can make other farmers adopt similar practices, ultimately leading to modifying the agroecosystem towards homogenization. We suspect that this is occurring and that large intensive farmers are the main drivers of such</p>

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	<p>homogenization of the landscape. To understand this phenomenon, our goals are to check 1) how different types of farmers (e.g., large vs. small scale farmers) are connected to each another via resource and knowledge flows; 2) who the central network members are and how much and with whom they mostly interact; and 3) by understanding the main features of the social network structure, shed light on what this could imply for the landscape structure.</p> <p>We have clarified the motivation of the paper. We have also re-written the discussion to make more clear how we have answered these questions (see the last paragraph of the discussion). We believe the paper now makes it clearer that our results support our original expectation regarding that intensive farmers are influential and their practices are spreading in this region rural landscape, leading to a homogenization of the landscape.</p>
<p>Also, it is difficult for me to see how the authors connect knowledge/resource exchanges/networks with land use decisions. They claim that the former affect the later but I wonder whether the later may also affect the former. The assumptions made by the authors (lines 99 to 102) are not clear in this regard.</p>	<p>We created the groups performing a HCA based on the farming practices performed by farmers. The variables included in the HCA were the types of fertilizers used (organic, mineral and mixed), the type of irrigation performed (sprinkler, dropping, other), and the type of crops grown (including maize and biofuels or trees and vegetables).</p> <p>We, therefore, assume that each farmer category is associated with a different type of farming practice or land management. Assessing how such different groups relate to each other is the way we connect knowledge/resources exchange networks with land use decisions. We now explain in section 3.3. how the groups of farmers were created (Table 1 now better describes the farmers' groups).</p> <p>The reviewer is right that it is not possible to conclude what comes first (network exchanges or land management decision-making) since we believe it is a bi-directional process with a continuous feedback loop (see page 4 L112:114). We acknowledge it as a limitation of the paper (in the Discussion section, page 18 L539:544). However, during the fieldwork, we formulated the question as with whom and about what did they talk to make their decisions about farming, so the direction was established in this way, in the design of the analysis. Interviews made us suspect which direction is stronger, i.e. from knowledge and resource exchange to land management (rather than the opposite) Included on page 9 L264:266.</p>

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<p>In the methods section I find particularly important the question about "if and how they thought that connections to the mentioned people influenced their farming practices". This seems to me critical to test the hypothesis. However, I could not easily track the results emerging from this question, which left me wondering how the authors finally proved that the expansion of intensive farming in the region under study has anything to do with the central role of intensive farmers in the knowledge and resource sharing networks (and, ideally why couldn't we think that the causality is the other way around).</p>	<p>Reviewer is right, we have certainly not developed much the “how their farming practices were influenced” by their nominees, but all respondents affirmed their decisions were influenced by the knowledge and resources shared. We formulated the question in this way (advisors influence their decision-making); this is, with who and about what they talk to decide their land management.</p> <p>We found a central role of intensive farmers not only regarding technology, finance, and policy-related information shared but also management which includes new crops, fertilizers, pesticides, laboring techniques, pest control, etc. Most of the participants did not develop their answer much but attending to the topics or resources they said they exchanged and the profile of the farmer they talked to, we can deduce how their farming is affected (concerning the farming practice decision-making). We have added a bit more detail in the 4.2. results section, page 13 L380:386 and we have also turned the potential impacts on the landscape into a more speculative position in the discussion.</p> <p>If farmers affirm that their network community influences their farming practices and we found that landholders group normally left intensive farmers to decide the farming practices. We can affirm that the central role of intensive farmers in the knowledge and resource sharing networks is associated with the expansion of intensive farming. Indeed, more land plots are being labored intensely due to the land resource exchange dynamic between landholders and intensive farmers.</p> <p>The reviewer is right regarding that social network is one factor more in the expansion of intensive agriculture. There may be, and there are, others, such as policies, global trade, etc. that influence agriculture intensification expansion (included now in the discussion section and the introduction). As said in a previous review we present this paper as a descriptive paper with the main aim of disentangling who holds the power and capacity for keeping and spreading intensive farming strategies within the rural community.</p>
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<p>Related to the above, I believe the analysis would be clearer if the authors developed more detailed hypotheses or provided clearer explanations that justify the different analyses the run (HCA, module-to-module calculations, several network structure measures...). What is each piece of the analysis helping the authors do with regard to their research question? For example, why do they need HCA and then the module-to-module calculations if both allow to identify groups of farmers? Do they need to look at all the network structure measures to test the hypothesis? How are they informing they hypothesis differently?</p>	<p>We have now added more detail on the reasons for each of the analysis run and how they contribute to answering our research questions and hypothesis. This can be found in section 3.3. at the end of each analysis explanation.</p> <p>The HCA allows us to see the different groups of farmers we have in this context (based on their land management) and the resulting groups of farmers are used in the module-to-module calculation, to check with whom each group exchanges knowledge and resource, but they are not the same analysis. We acknowledge it was not well explained in the Methods section and we have now corrected it (page 11 L316:325).</p> <p>Every analysis complements each other and confirm and reaffirm our hypothesis regarding which group of farmers controls the flow of knowledge and resources, and have the potential to influence other groups' farming decision-making.</p>
<p>All the above is also important also when looking at the discussion section. A careful second read of this section made me realize that it mostly centers around the dominant position of intensive farmers, which makes me wonder whether the authors needed all the network calculations to arrive at that conclusion. I like that the authors did all the network analysis work but I see two issues there. First, it seems to me that most of it only speaks about the independent variable and misses the connection with behavior (i.e., the "influence on farming practices" part). Second to me there is a mismatch between the richness of the results (i.e., regarding the independent variable) and the shallow discussion. For example, the authors spell out in the results section the different "representative", "coordinator", "gatekeeper, etc., roles that farmers can take, illustrate show how organizations are important in some regards but not others, and point to the core-periphery differences between the knowledge and resource sharing networks, but all this is not further commented in the discussion section.</p>	<p>Thank you. We have now enriched the discussion regarding the behavior of farmers regarding their management decisions. We have maintained and added more nuance to the discussion about how different farmers' position in the network, their level of activity, the asymmetrical access to knowledge and resources, and especially the role of intensive farmers as gatekeepers, as well as their alignment with local institutions favor their powerful position. We have also improved the discussion regarding how the network structure may influence on farming practices and implications for the landscape structure. We have also triangulated other information from qualitative data and previous analysis to strengthen our interpretation of the results towards understanding future social-ecological pathways (social structure leading to future land homogenization)</p>

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<p>Minor</p> <p>There are a number of methodological questions that I believe need clarification (see commented pdf).</p>	<p>Amended. We have answered all the comments in section 3. Some answers to comments that have not been much extended here:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Interviews were made to outsiders of the community to better understand their role influencing farmers’ decision-making.2. We first performed a hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to classify farmers and landholders in different groups (García-Llorente et al., 2008) based on their land management decisions. We have corrected this and explain all the variables regarding management that were considered in the HCA.
<p>In the results and discussion sections, I missed better substantiation of the authors claims (this has to do with the issue about the connection between the network analysis and behavior). I have signaled those paragraphs in yellow. In the results section, I believe it is just a matter of better referring to the numbers in the tables and guiding the reader in comparing them, and maybe also offering more (qual. or quant.) evidence that shows how position in the network affects decisions (and not the other way around). In the discussion section, I believe the authors just need to better structure the paragraphs, so they are clearer about when they talk about their data vs. build on others' findings vs. make conjectures.</p>	<p>Amended.</p> <p>We have followed the suggestions indicated by the reviewer in the pdf and we have changed the order of some paragraphs and specified whether some statements correspond with results or not.</p> <p>Some answers to comments that have not been much extended here:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The graphs do distinguish different information and resource sharing networks but the stats tables do not. Tables 3 and 4 do.2. Not sure that I understand. So intensive farmers play many roles regardless of how the data is aggregated? No, they play many roles when checking the data aggregated (Table 5). However, when we pay attention to the roles in resource exchange (see the Tables that used to be in the supplementary material but they have now been moved to the main manuscript. Those are now Tables 6, 7and 8) we found that other actors also play important roles such as landholders who can be gatekeepers of land and “other” actors that are itinerant for land exchanges. For labor exchange, intensive farmers still play several roles such as representatives, coordinators, and gatekeepers.3. We have now added some captions to Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 that explain better how to interpret the roles played by the different groups in our rural community. Columns show the roles whereas rows represent each group. If we compare values at each column, we can identify with whom the highest value corresponds, so that we can attach such a role to a specific group. A further explanation has also been included in the text page 13 L387:389.4. We have also included more qualitative evidence to show how our results align with farmers’ decisions taken in the case study.

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	5. We have better substantiated the indicated statements, normally adding explanations after them.
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




Figure 1. A) Knowledge exchange networks. (A) Networks of actors exchanging knowledge about management, finance, technology, and policy. All individuals with intensive farmers in red, small-scale farmers in orange, landholders in yellow, organizations in blue, and 'other' individuals in grey.


a) Labour



b) Machinery



c) Lands



d) Crops




Figure 1. B) Resources exchange networks (B) Networks of actors exchanging resources such as labor, machinery, land, and crops. All individuals with intensive farmers in red, small-scale farmers in orange, landholders in yellow, organizations in blue, and 'other' individuals in grey.




Figure 2. Mean module-to-module knowledge exchange scores among different groups for different types of knowledge

Caption. Colors indicate the mean of knowledge exchange score by the group. Data should be read across in rows; for example, the lowest row represents scores from intensive farmers to other types of farmers or organizations (directed ties are considered). When analyzing different relationship types, isolates (i.e., nodes without edges to other nodes) were removed. For this reason, there are some empty blocks.

Table 1. Types of knowledge and resource exchange

Knowledge		Resources	
Farm management knowledge exchange (aggregated categories)	Knowledge type mentioned during the survey	Farming resource exchange (aggregated categories)	All resources mentioned
Management	Crop varieties; seeds; fertilizers; pesticides; irrigation management; tillage; crop rotations; yields; crop illnesses; land quality state; organic farming;	Labour	Labour Machinery Land Crops Seeds Water Money
Finance	Farm expenses; land trade; subsidies; insurance; crop prices; crop trade; inputs prices; water tariffs	Machinery	
Technology	Irrigation infrastructure, large/heavy machinery;	Land	
Policy	Agrarian normative related to the allowed use of fertilizers and pesticides, subsidies; communal land access;	Crops	

Table 2. Network nodes characteristics

Sampled community (N=161)	Farmers' types of management / other nominees' main characteristics (N=161)
Intensive farmers (N=48) hold large areas with agro-industry oriented crops (maize, grass, biofuels, cereals), sprinkling irrigation, mixed fertilization. They make all decisions about farming and investments. They normally contract labor.	Large-scale intensive farmers (N=22) cultivating maize, biofuel crops in plots larger than 300 Ha, and using sprinkling irrigation and all type of fertilizers.
	Large/Medium-scale intensive organic farmers (N=12) cultivating mainly maize and grass in plots of 50-100 Ha and using organic fertilizers
	Medium-scale intensive cereal farmers (N=14) cultivating cereals in plots of 5-50 Ha, using sprinkling irrigation and only mineral fertilizers.
Small-scale farmers (N=44) hold plots between 0-5 hectares of "other" crops (vegetables, fruit trees). Not sprinkling irrigation, not main commercial crops (maize, vineyards, and biofuels).	Small-scale organic farmers (N=7) only organic fertilizers are used.
	Small-scale conventional farmers (N=37) mix mineral and organic fertilizer but they mostly use mineral fertilizers.
Small-scale landholders (N=29) are not directly associated with farming and they do not make decisions on it either on technology investments. They are normally retired farmers who own many small surfaces of arable land in the village and rent those lands to other farmers to labor them.	Small-scale landholders do not make decisions about farming but they do about their land management.
Others nominees mentioned in the survey (N=13). They were mentioned by farmers as key people they interacted with for land management decision-making.	Family nominees (N=4); Land labor service enterprise workers ¹ (N=4), Unknown (N=5).
Formal organizations mentioned in the survey (N=27). The farmers mentioned such organizations regarding who influenced them in their farming decision-making.	Local cooperative (N=7), CPAEN ² (N=2), Food enterprises (N=6), INTIA ³ (N=4), Private service(consultancy and water Company) (N=2), seed Enterprise (N=3), agrarian union (N=3).

¹ Land labor enterprises refer to small cooperatives in which farmers join for the use of agricultural machinery

² CPAEN - Consejo de la Producción Agraria Ecológica de Navarra, in English: Council of the Ecological Agrarian Production of Navarre.

³ INTIA, Tecnologías e Infraestructuras Agroalimentarias. The public company attached to Navarre Government that projected the irrigation canal and advice farmers about farming techniques, new strategies etc.

Table 3. Degree of cohesion in knowledge and resource networks

	Knowledge			
	Management	Finance	Technology	Policy
Density	0.011	0.0067	0.00628	0.0038
Reciprocity	0.69	0.76	0.81	0.78
Centralization	0.111773	0.06563	0.03221	0.00613
Diameter	9	8	10	6
Average path length	3.82056	3.7467	4.27187	2.8218

	Resources				
	Land	Labor	Money	Crop	Machinery
Density	0.0025	0.0055	0.0021	0.001	0.00427
Reciprocity	0.46	0.47	0.07	0	0.56
Centralization	0.00023	0.00891	0.00046	0	0.003279
Diameter	2	7	3	1	5
Average path length	3.4176	4.7206	4.4412	1.72	4.3928

Density scores range from 0 (no exchange of knowledge or resources) to 1 (all the people in the network are involved in such exchanges). Reciprocity ranges from 0 (all exchanges go only in one direction) to 1 (all exchanges are reciprocal). Centralization can range from 0 (exchanges are not concentrated in one person but rather everybody is equally central) to 1 (one person is most central for exchanges). Diameter for knowledge exchange ranges from 6 (the longest minimum distance between any two individuals is 6 for policy-related knowledge flow) to 10 (the longest distance between any two individuals is 10 for technology-related knowledge flow). For resource exchange, the diameter was smaller, ranging from 1 to 7. The average distance ranges from 2.8 to 4.2 (the minimum value is approximately 3 people between any two individuals who exchange policy-related knowledge and the maximum value is around 4 people when they exchange technology-related knowledge). For resource exchange, the average path length ranges from 1.7 to 4.7.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics (mean) of degree centrality and betweenness centrality types for each of the knowledge and resources exchange networks

	Knowledge				Resources			
	Management	Finance	Technology	Policy	Land	Labor	Crop	Machinery
Degree								
Intensive farmers (11.3)	7.54	5.19	4.94	3.19	1.65	3.79	0.33	3.19
Small-scale farmers (3.23)	1.68	0.34	0.43	0.05	0.57	1.23	0.34	0.64
Small-scale landholders (3.6)	1.86	1.03	0.86	0.28	0.48	1.14	0.1	0.76
Others (2)	1.46	0.69	1.08	0.69	0.62	1	0	0.92
Organizations (6.2)	3.15	1.67	1.07	0.81	0.15	0.22	0.07	0.19
	Knowledge				Resources			
Betweenness	Management	Finance	Technology	Policy	Land	Labor	Crop	Machinery
Intensive farmers (819)	360	185	131	25	0.625	19.1	0	8.6
Small-scale farmers (127)	33.3	2.41	1.61	0	0	0.955	0	0.0682
Small-scale landholders (130)	36.4	5.12	2.86	0	0	0.069	0	0.0345

Others (0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organizations (409)	116	27	25.1	5.59	0	0	0	0

Values in brackets in the first column refer to the overall network degree (activity) and betweenness (bridge role). These values are mean values by group of farmers and stakeholders. For example, in the case of activity, scores range from 2 to 11.29 being those values the minimum and maximum levels of activity respectively.

Table 5. Expected brokerage score matrix for all knowledge exchanges aggregated by farming group

Roles	Coordinator	Itinerant	Representative	Gatekeeper	Liaison
Intensive farmers	0.14	0.23	1.35	1.35	0.58
Small-scale farmers	0.12	0.25	1.24	1.24	0.61
Small-scale landholders	0.05	0.32	0.84	0.84	0.78
Other farmers	0.01	0.36	0.37	0.37	1.03
Organizations	0.04	0.33	0.78	0.78	0.81

Coordinator role: the broker mediates contact between two individuals from his or her group.

Itinerant broker role: the broker mediates contact between two individuals from a single group to which he or she does not belong.

Representative role: the broker mediates an incoming contact (from an out-group member to an in-group member).

Gatekeeper role: the broker mediates an outgoing contact (from an in-group member to an out-group member).

Liaison role: the broker mediates contact between two individuals from different groups, neither of which is the group to which he or she belongs.

Coordinator scores range from 0.01 (no coordinator role of knowledge flow) to 0.14 (the group with the highest score to coordinate knowledge exchange). Itinerant scores range from 0.23 (the lowest itinerant role for knowledge exchange) to 0.36 (highest score to play an itinerant role). Representative scores range from 0.37 (lowest value to act as representative) to 1.35 (highest value to act as representative). Gatekeeper scores range from 0.37 (lowest value to behave as the gatekeeper) to 1.35 (highest value to behave as the gatekeeper). Finally, liaison scores range from 0.58 (lowest value to act as liaison) to 1.03 (highest value to act as liaison).

Table 6. Expected brokerage score matrix, by group, when lands are exchanged

	Coordinator	Itinerant	Representative	Gatekeeper	Liaison
Intensive farmers	7.03	11.59	2.91	2.91	29.59
Small-scale farmers	5.88	12.77	3.22	3.22	31.39
Small-scale landholders	2.46	16.29	3.46	3.46	39.98
Other farmers	0.43	18.42	2.11	2.11	52.37
Organizations	2.11	16.65	3.38	3.38	41.34

Coordinator scores range from 0.43 (“others” play a very low coordinator role for land exchange) to 7.03 (intensive farmers have the highest score to coordinate land exchange). Itinerant scores range from 12.77 (small-scale farmers have the lowest itinerant role for land exchange) to 18.42 (“others” have the highest score to play an itinerant role). Representative scores range from 2.11 (“others” have the lowest value to act as representatives) to 3.46 (landholders have the highest value to act as representative). Gatekeeper scores range from 2.11 (“others” have the lowest value to behave as gatekeepers) to 3.46 (landholders

have the highest value to behave as gatekeepers). Finally, liaison scores range from 31.39 (small-scale farmers have the lowest value to act as liaison) to 52.37 (“others” have the highest value to act as liaison).

Table 7. Expected brokerage score matrix, by group, when labor is exchanged


	Coordinator	Itinerant	Representative	Gatekeeper	Liaison
Intensive farmers	1.56	2.57	3.32	3.32	6.55
Small-scale farmers	1.30	2.83	3.16	3.16	6.95
Small-scale landholders	0.54	3.61	2.36	2.36	8.85
Other farmers	0.10	4.08	1.15	1.15	11.59
Organizations	0.47	3.68	2.23	2.23	9.15

Coordinator scores range from 0.10 (“others” play a very low coordinator role for labor exchange) to 1.56 (intensive farmers have the highest score to coordinate labor exchange). Itinerant scores range from 2.57 (intensive farmers have the lowest itinerant role for labor exchange) to 4.08 (“others” have the highest score to play an itinerant role). Representative scores range from 1.15 (“others” have the lowest value to act as representatives) to 3.32 (intensive farmers have the highest value to act as representative). Gatekeeper scores range from 1.15 (“others” have the lowest value to behave as gatekeepers) to 3.32 (intensive farmers have the highest value to behave as gatekeepers). Finally, liaison scores range from 6.55 (intensive farmers have the lowest value to act as liaison) to 11.59 (“others” have the highest value to act as liaison).

Table 8. Expected brokerage score matrix, by group, when machinery is exchanged

	Coordinator	Itinerant	Representative	Gatekeeper	Liaison
Intensive farmers	7.03	11.59	2.91	2.91	29.59
Small-scale farmers	5.88	12.77	3.22	3.22	31.39
Small-scale landholders	2.46	16.29	3.46	3.46	39.98
Other farmers	0.43	18.42	2.11	2.11	52.37
Organizations	2.11	16.65	3.38	3.38	41.34

Coordinator scores range from 0.43 (“others” play a very low coordinator role for machinery exchange) to 7.03 (intensive farmers have the highest score to coordinate machinery exchange). Itinerant scores range from 11.59 (intensive farmers have the lowest itinerant role for machinery exchange) to 18.42 (“others” have the highest score to play an itinerant role regarding machinery flow). Representative scores range from 2.11 (“others” have the lowest value to act as representatives) to 3.38 (organizations have the highest value to act as representatives). Gatekeeper scores range from 2.11 (“others” have the lowest value to behave as gatekeepers) to 3.46 (landholders have the highest value to behave as gatekeepers). Finally, liaison scores range from 29.59 (intensive farmers have the lowest value to act as liaison) to 52.37 (“others” have the highest value to act as liaison).



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