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Nature of Knowledge Origins in Connection with Experiences: A Cognitive Philosophical Analysis

By

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DEDICATION

to 'all' who guided and nurtured me in this process.

ABSTRACT

In recent era, investigation on knowledge and its elements has become prominent in various subfields of philosophy and other streams like linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. This focus is mainly on understanding the intentionality and its referentials to know how they enriched knowledge with their existence. Also based on the reflexive acts that arise from different objects in relation with contents of perceptual capacity. From which, I emphasize that, the contemporary debates between conceptual determination of content and thinking elements of knowledge is embodied by our perception but considerably less interest on truth and correctness of knowledge in view of its origins nature. Although, on the one hand both Kant and Husserl closely describes the knowledge sources of first-person experience on the transcendental notions (Allison, 2007), and on the other hand for Lomar (Rosa, 2010) the knowledge belongs to structure of self which is normative because all mental states are constitutes of normativity. It is significant to address how we understand the truth and correctness of knowledge sources by drawing a rigorous philosophical analysis of the cognitive and phenomenological dimensions of human achievement. The investigation of this project has been carried within the phenomenological boundaries of self experiences from an *observer and observed* interactions view, by considering analysis on the nature of knowledge sources and the errors of epistemic-cognitive associations, such as, falaises, and ignorance in the perspective of awareness. The results of this investigation has been offered an advancement in describing certain *facts* on the nature of knowledge origins in addition to Husserl phenomenological ideas.

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PREFACE

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This work is to the best of my knowledge original, except where acknowledgements, references and footnotes are made to previous work. Neither this, nor any substantially similar dissertation has been or is being submitted for any other degree, diploma or other qualifications at any other organisation or institution or any other university.

Part of this work has been presented in the following conferences:

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Some Basics of nature of consciousness-Debate

Consciousness is one of the fundamental facts of human existence, each of us is conscious (Chalmers, 2002, 2010). We all have our own inner experiences which are observable (simultaneous multimodal interactions). There's nothing we know about them more directly. But everyone knows about their own consciousness directly, but not certain that others are conscious. For instance, assume, an amazing multi-track movie playing inside every person's head. It has 3D vision and surrounds sound for what perceiver is seeing and hearing and not limited to them. It also has a smell and taste and touch. It has a sense of body, pain, hunger, orgasms. It has emotions, anger and happiness. It has memories, like scenes from childhood playing before the perceiver. And it has this constant voiceover narrative in the stream of conscious thinking. At the heart, such movies are perceiver's direct experiences. This movie is perceiver's stream of consciousness, the subjective experience of the mind and the world. Such consciousness also is what makes our life worth; otherwise nothing in our lives would have meaning or value. At the same time consciousness is the most mysterious phenomenon in human mind evolution and the universe. Most of the people in the scientific community say, studying consciousness in a scientific way is impossible because by nature it is subjective.

In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have been studying behavior and brain objectively but not given much scope to consciousness. However, few researchers like Penrose (1994) and Crick (1995) have attacked consciousness from different approaches in a way of scientific investigation and also it has many fundamental limitations so far. Most of such studies have been carried out in the search for correlations between certain areas of the brain and states of consciousness. For example, understanding which area of the brain goes with the conscious experience of feeling pain or happy or identification of visual objects such as, face recognition and responding to voice and so on. The possible results are correlations from these experimental studies, and make us to know the correlations between different brain areas and certain conscious experiences, but not explanation of why those areas respond to such experiences. We may draw an objective prototypes to the emergent behaviors' such as how hurricanes function and how a traffic jam behaves or how a living organism reproduces or how a metabolism adapts, also we could apply to our brain functionality, how we talk, play, eat, walk and so on. These are the questions about behavior and objective functionality. At one sense those are easy problems from the neuroscientists view. This doesn't address the real mystery at the core of consciousness phenomenon: why is it that information processing in mind should be accompanied by subjective experience? Why is there an inner subjective experience accompanied by consciousness? According to Dennett (1988) "there is no hard problem of consciousness. The whole idea of the inner subjective experience is a kind of illusion or confusion. Actually, all we've got to do is explain the objective functions, the behaviors' of the brain, and then we've explained everything that needs to be explained" (Weisberg, 2014). This idea is purely reductionist brain-based theory of consciousness and it is directly denying the datum of consciousness (Chalmers, 2010). One

hand, consciousness is “fundamental” like some aspects of the universe: space, time and mass which postulate fundamental laws; for example laws of gravity, quantum mechanics and so on. Such fundamental laws and its properties are taken as primitive and aren’t explained in terms of anything because they are more basic, rather we build up the world on top of it. And sometimes we expand them to explain. For instance, during the 19th century Max Planck suggested that we cannot explain electromagnetic phenomena in terms of the existing fundamentals: space, time, mass and Newton’s laws. So he postulated fundamental laws of electromagnetism (Plank, 1920). Similarly, if we cannot explain consciousness using fundamentals: space, time, mass and charge, or matter of logic, then, we may need to expand the list. Which means, postulate consciousness itself as a fundamental block of nature. This opens up a new way to study the fundamental laws governing consciousness, the laws that connect consciousness to other fundamentals (space, time, mass, charge and physical processes).

This direction may help us to draw fundamental laws of consciousness so simple. We don’t know yet what those laws are, but we are after it. On the other hand, that the consciousness is “universal”, it says that, every system might have some degree of consciousness, like not only humans, animals, insects, elementary particles, photons and so on. This means they are not “intelligent or thinking” except humans, but the idea accommodates subjective feelings and some primitive precursor. Such a phenomenon termed as panpsychism (Skrbina, 2005). The primary motivation for this idea is also, “consciousness is fundamental”. However, this argument is less counter-intuitive to different cultural aspects, where the human mind has a long and continuous association with nature. Perhaps this motivation occurred due to the way the consciousness connected to information processing in mind linked to fundamental laws which are related to

consciousness. For instance, Tononi (2010) says, where there is information processing there is consciousness, explained by using a mathematical measure of information (i.e. high Φ (phi), high consciousness). According to his measurement complex information processing is directly proportional to complex consciousness like in humans; similarly simple information processing is directly proportional to simple consciousness like in mammals far so. Furthermore, in microbes and particles the amount of consciousness falls-off, but never becomes zero (Tononi, 2010). In this effect he proposed the fundamental laws of consciousness. However, another interesting motivation is the physics describes the structure of reality using equations but it doesn't reveal the reality underlies it. On the panpsychist view, the equations of physics are really doing to describe the action of consciousness. So, consciousness is part of the physical world, but with extra intuitions. Also, that view has potential to transfigure the notions of human kind like, social, ethical, moral and cultural considerations, but what matters for the consequences is the degree and complexity of consciousness. Similarly, on this view, it is natural to ask about the existence of consciousness in other types of systems, like machines, microbes and far so. For instance, an artificial intelligent machine also has consciousness by having complicated information processing mechanisms. But it raises counterintuitive ethical issues in both developing and turning them off (Chalmers, 2010). In search of understanding the mysteries of consciousness the views raises a number of questions and challenges upon those little bits of grasped knowledge add up to the complex awarefull distribution of consciousness, and the type of experiential content manifest in the mental states as objects when the complex conscious involves in information processing is a real key to understand both the universe and ourselves.

Consciousness met ‘act of knowing’

Philosophers have been talking seriously about consciousness over the past two thousand years, in both west and east traditions. The nature of the topic provokes many challenges in answering the questions raised by conscious mind due to reasons like levels of abstractness and disagreement between arguments. Recently, most cognitive and neuroscientists directs their focus to study correlations between neural processes and psychological behavior that happen to different conscious states. The most relevant studies are arousal and tonic alertness; qualitative interceptions (hunger, thirsty, pain and etc.); proprioception (awareness- sense of self as being in space and time); emotions and feelings (fear, disgust, love, depression and others); sensory perceptions (vision, touch, auditory, olfaction and gustation-touch and smell); behavioral cognition (attention, working memory, reasoning, motor control and others) (Welshon, 2011). The results of such studies exemplify the process and their cortical areas in the brain (Schaefer and Northoff, 2017). Since these are correlative studies of processes (cognitive and conscious states), that provide only indirect evidence. Still the methodological scruples uneasiness pervades thinking in turn an implication of skeptical arguments about the gleaned quality of data. Attempts to explain the phenomenal processes of consciousness in neurophysiological and neurobiological or even in cognitive terms are still having great resistance. This means many conscious mental states simply cannot be reduced directly to, or explained in terms of lesions and its active states or something less problematic. It seems, to some researchers, it may be an easy problem of consciousness, but by attempting to see how mental processes and states are relevant to conscious features to goings inside the cranium and its actions. With these present outline challenges to anyone who thinks that consciousness is easy to explain by identifying particular

mental processes and by its activities with instantiation of conscious properties. We know we are conscious, because we were known that conscious events occur in our mind, by personal experiences and other perceptual sensations. But, we still would not understand how qualitative richness, subjective perspectivity represents in mental states or processes and beyond. And, how those processes endure in manifestation of knowledge conception and what reflections located and accessible in mental processes and activities relevance of content and its representations which is significant to explain as fundamental and nature of them, committed to closing the distance and defuse.

Understanding the ‘act of knowing’

It is evident that, as we human beings interact with the environment for information, and perceive through senses, the sensory information leads a person who has rational awareness that usually mediates perceiver’s daily decisions. A well understood phenomena by the world: at a conscious state, we perceive different input signals through different senses, analyze the facts, and make decisions or act based on this perceived sensory information by dividing the world into categories. The conscious level of awareness is problem-oriented, it is difficult to be completely certain of decisions in this state, because the analytical mind can provide all the possible solutions, but ultimately it doesn’t have an ability to distinguish which one is the best. Also, in this process, others opinions and personal beliefs, subjective feelings have a strong role which can cloud our ability of decision making and conception. For instance, received synsonic information become associated with the experience ‘feel’ of what has experienced by being is wedded to knowledge or information (content of *aboutness*) in mind, thereafter forming coherence between prior and new information within the bounds of the circumstances as fixed by

communication through interactions with the world, that leads to the emergence of meaning in the mind.

To some extent, as far as the details shown above, all are concerned at the content conceptualization level, according to existing models and theories, the sensory organs interaction with the world is necessary for the establishment of structural constraints that govern on one hand, form-meaning relationships in mind especially at “linguistic (syntactico-semantic and semantic-pragmatic) view”. Apart from “language”, there are other mental states of a different character that exist within the fabric of human consciousness which is highly subjective and very difficult to quantify, such as beliefs, desires, thoughts, intentions and sometimes moods, feelings which are part of emotions, etc. For instance, we may think our mind is the repository of all past and present experiences and its impressions, that is, every experience and thought what we had determines the patterns of conceptual notions by being unrestricted demands of logic, and flow of various ideas. This flow may govern by different mental states which can be conditioned with subjectivity, and not always corresponds with the external world. For example, when one dreaming at sleep, they mainly operate within the existing conceptual episteme, although it can be imaginary or retentions of impressions. Which means, the subjectivity conditioned mental states are easily intrude on one’s conscious awareness, and initiate them to thinking to have an understanding about them, although, the perceiver’s desires are unfulfilled, which is influenced by the past experience impressions.

In some ways it is intertwined with the intentions about a particular situation or event. In the above activity, both, ‘awareness about past’ and ‘logical obstructions’ are involved, therefore it is more open to the calamitous decisions, actions or, preconditioned activities which caused by the

conceptual information usually mixed with confusing imagery and different subjective beliefs and someone responds with only pre-conceptualized information. As seen here, the subjective mental states are intrinsic or constitutive states of human consciousness (Walimbe, 1987; Armstrong, 2006). This phenomenon is not limited to the subjective experiences and the very cornerstones of the conceptual representations are affected in terms of act of knowing. Thus it would be worth examining the mental states that connect intentional states to mental objects that evoke conceptual challenges in knowledge grasping.

I start an investigation with the relation between experiences and coherence derived from intentions at a macro level, that is, within the boundaries of Husserlian framework by taking into account the role of the conscious sensory experiences and its information from the world, specifically onto-epistemological structures are concerned. What is the intrinsic relation of epistemic conception when one has experiences, and, is the experiential intentionality the ground of all knowing acts.

Some Basics about the Knowledge and Knowing conception

In defence of knowledge conception through grasping both as a cognitive approach and as a philosophical methodology with some references to the philosophical tradition that has inspired, that is '*awareness*' has been interpreted as the highest level of mental activity of consciousness in an individual. For instance, the reality is reflected in the form of mental images considered them as objects when one observes an individual after separating them from the environment. In this context, conception of knowledge is a highly complex mechanism in a consciousness system consisting of diverse and constantly interacting elements from informative signals and existing at

different levels of perception. This mechanism has its nucleus in the processes of experiential intentions, through elementary sensations, subjective feelings, imaginations and perceptions to the highest manifestations of reason, emotional refinement and the human will (Smith 2013). And the foundation blocks of conception of knowledge, as it were, for the structure of more complex intellectual formations and representations, imagination, intuition, artistic and logical thinking, reasoning in decision making (Bayne, 2011). The interesting fact is that the conception mechanism could not have manifestat without the dynamics of both dimensions of experiences and epistemology, that is to say, the ability to record, preserve and recall sensuous and representations after in terms of subjectivity and intentionality.

This manifestation process not only recalls the conceptual representations in ideal forms, it acts and coordinates according to the individual's mental states and practical activities, for instance, expressed in attention and efforts of will. Attention and will are essential for setting the goals in an action. Before undertaking anything in practical stand, an individual *does* it ideally, in his own imagination. Emotional feelings and phenomenal experiences are the fundamental dimensions at a lower level of the world knowledge manifestation. Nothing happens in this process without the participation of individual experiences and feelings at a lower level. It reflects in an individual's inner world and his own relation to it, to things or objects, to other individuals and himself. This phenomena takes place in every individual with a rich inner world acquires degrees of subtlety, colour, and fullness (Husserl, 2001 and Merleau-Ponty, 2012). As we saw, this process has a complex relationship with various forms of sensations, perceptions and mental states. Every form has their own structure and their elements are connected and they interact with each other, which influence the process of knowledge conception in their turn information and in their turn

themselves. However, in Chalmers (2012) view intentions have been grounded in all phenomenal experiences which influence the content and mental states, and mostly influenced by or through unconscious activities (Chalmers 2012). For instance, we as human beings are sensibly aware of things that influence us, but by no means all sensations, feelings and beliefs are a fact of our conscious awareness, but unconsciously they register in our memory. The level of content registration depends on the intensity of the sensations or feelings or imagination, for example, sometimes the majority of them register only peripheral and few of them permit to beyond on account of occurred actions. This may cause doubtful or conceptual vagueness due to lack of fullness of information which is deficiency and awareness of the activity or action. Although, our conscious activities of an action are controlled consciously, the content drawn from the existing notions which originally formed, and the conscious activity later became mechanical. Any conscious activity is possible only when the maximum number of elements of an activity are formed against automaticity. For instance, As we develop from childhood, many of the conceptual items adapt automatically with regular usage although we are consciously aware of it when one using them, for example, the concept of (being) *ready* (as in ‘The shipment is *ready* for delivery’) cannot be pursued through explanations borrowed from physics or chemistry, but the concept of something being *steep* must require a scientific explanation, especially in terms of physics, irrespective of the linguistic community in which such a discourse takes place. Also, every concept requires a scientific explanation for its representation in machines, but not in humans because *everyday knowledge* cannot come for free in machines. In the previous example, the speaker’s intention is not to express wrongly, but often contextual usage of the concept offered doubtful or vagueness, and the speaker has experienced the lexical items or concepts

often in terms of the regular usage. In thought, the speaker's reaction on principle in a few conversations, 'oh.... I didn't mean it, I said something else' although both individuals that are speaker and perceiver were present in the context, this situation arises commonly. Here the individual speaker's intention is to convey-what is thinking, but how the individual listener has not experienced similar levels of conceptual understanding or sometimes problems of intentional communication deficiency. These results may differ from what was originally intended and what has conveyed. Particularly, conversations and actions have the influence of external forces and internal nurturing, which sometimes turn out to be quite different from what thoughts they are and they were. This notion is applicable to both short and long term actions and individual as well as group intentions too. For example, the French '*bourgeois*' dreamed of reign of reason, social justice and fraternity, etc and the masses fought to establish their society in the name of these principles. But it turns into dictatorship of Napoleon instead of enjoying the reign of reason establishment (Tolstoy, 1965). Our (human) activities are conscious only related to rational results that initially goal oriented actions. But the goal cannot be separated from the impressions and further it may be conceptualized differently; it includes all the consequences of the actions which have adapted in this process. The general phenomenon, unconsciousness cares the adaptation functionality which avoids the interference of the rational behaviour not as a rule intrudes on the conceptualization. Unconsciousness manifests itself in an extremely diverse form, including information accumulation from various experiences and registering in an individual's memory and also in the form of illusionary sphere, like dreams, instincts etc. On the other hand, faced with another dimension are opposite the positivity notions like obsessive or maniacal ideas, states of alarm, unmotivated fear etc. of knowing within the scope of

unconscious activity. These are kind of *unbidden guests*, which is something mechanical, extends to all mental states and its actions. It has shown that both positive and opposite of it has a similar form of activity in this process. And our mind grasps the general picture of any activity including the thought. However, the activities vary the action moment such as accelerate or decelerate or stop them altogether in both rational and irrational manifestations in act of knowing process. Whereas, in the content conception process on one's self has reasonable measure which is dictated by the vital necessity of preserving a stable harmony of the whole (Johannes, 2014). Here, phenomenally both the conscious and unconscious experiences mainly influence one's (perceiver) adaptation capability and intentionality. The variations in equilibrium cause difficulties of orientation and reduce the effectiveness of the content formation and conception which is information lacking or deficiency, this may cause to develop doubtful or announce the significance of trustworthiness in one's conceptual space. It urges this investigation towards the deeper analysis for a certain essence of inclinations in drawing the nature of knowledge origins in connection with experiences.

Some remarks on conceptual knowing

One can find from the relevant existing literature, understanding the nature of knowledge sources means of how reliable knowledge is significant in the search for truth and what conditions has involved in. This derives the level of conceptual growth and improvement in perceiver's episteme (Langacker, 2005). It is evident that, every perception leads to an experience, as expressed here by Paul Bloom: "we don't just respond to things as we see them, or feel them, or hear them. Rather, our response is conditioned on our beliefs, about what they really are, what

they came from, what they're made of, what their hidden nature is" (Bloom, 2015). The capacity of perceptual experience carries different forms and structures which are transformed into mental states and represented in one's cognitive system. This implies that perceptual experiences are symbolic forms before they are transduced into representations in conceptual space. More clearly, in the conceptual space, the conceptual content of an intentional event is the way in which the perceiver does not think about the objects in the event rather they try to experience it from a certain way. For instance, one does not just perceive the music; one perceives its rhythm, intensity and lyrics if it is a song. For that matter, one perceives it *as the music* rather than as some waves in the air, that is, the dynamics of an occurrence.

The content can be a set of information that the perceivers take to characterize and apply according to their intentionality. For example, thinking about an apple or some eatable in the kitchen means, they are entertaining a certain representations of their kitchen and of the edible that the perceiver able to take to be in it and it is in the quality of activity that the perceiver directs the respective thoughts towards the edible, instead of nothing or something else. Here, the content represents its objects in a symbolic form rather direct, however, the content follows certain linguistic properties, but it is not essentially linguistic (Horst, 1996, De Vega et al, 2008). The notion of content is also important in relation to the *aboutness* and reference to non-linguistic expressions and non-representative objects which are subjective feelings and imaginary such as pain, bliss, perceptual illusions, etc.

It is important to have meaningful (not necessary every experience is meaningful one) experiences, thoughts and beliefs about non-linguistic and non-representative objects, if not, the perceiver's conceptual notion creates a gap which causes to develop conceptual lacking or

deficiency and the relevance causes to doubtful or skeptical *aboutness* to the nearest object in conception. For instance, considering lacking information are often governed by subjective influences in relationship to contexts of communication; we immediately understand that we can have two different starting-points. For example, when we discuss a concept of paintings, is it possible for one to furnish clear scientific laws which can explain the causation of an artist's creativity? Can one describe the event that (s)he creates things, which could happen because of A% of B's contribution and B% of A's contribution? Here, intentions towards the participation and cause that underlies in the event are quite important; otherwise the observer cannot pursue the "*aboutness*" of the representations in the content.

However, human beings are dynamic, rational, and "not merely" instinctive like animals, there will be a lot of contingency in the cultural dimension of the social world (Haslanger, 2008). Instead of drawing a law-governed process, we can suggest that certain events (the cause) would cause certain other events (the effect) in most such cases. "Causation" is a case in point, for example, cancer is affected by various factors, but the likelihood of cancer is smoking. So stopping smoking is a possible condition to avoid cancer. Also, every concept requires a scientific explanation for its representation in machines, but not in humans because *everyday knowledge* cannot come for free in machines. In this context I would like to explore and explain an idea that this notion is rooted in our "everyday understanding" of different areas and extensions. Thus, it is very important to study the subjective mental states of conscious mind for that a series of conscious sensory information where the linguistic elements (syntax, semantics or pragmatics) alone is not sufficient to explain this conception because using such elements one

can express their thoughts, but not the complete complex nature. The results of this investigation will offer to advance a conception of cognitive philosophical notions.

Investigation Goal

The intended aim of this research is to pursue the true nature of knowledge origins in connection with experiences, whereas the truth and correctness of self has been involved. This project facilitates refer to different intellectual accounts of knowledge origins, and to think, the self is an embodied entity of awareness and the knowledge arises from it. Because its awareness is the central cluster for self-knowledge and the possibility of cognition. For instance, how atoms itself consists of much smaller particles moving around a central cluster in the stable orbits at high velocity, in such captive movement the nucleus of atoms contains a vast amount of energy and locks itself due to self-absorption. Similarly, the self is an awarefull entity, the true energy of self is unchanging awarefullness which does not appear at surface level as it gets absorbed. But, the partial expression of that energy determines the direction of the intentions and knowledge. Therefore, phenomenally the self is an action of energy substance. One can directly *observe* this phenomena by being an *observer* of their own self, because of its ecological embodiedness. That is, naturally we have been prepared to extend ourselves by inferences of self to interpret the nature of our own experiences as living, and thinking beings. Atlast, alongwith thinker Husserl account of intellectual conception of the knowledge origins from phenomenological view by showing the nature of self is as an energy form of awareness, it may appear as formidable as the challenge of contemporary methods.

Objectives

- a) I have evaluated the knowledge transitions from first-to second-order experiences that interact with epistemological foundations and belief transitions, when “I” become by shared and introspective “me” and viceversa.
- b) I conducted an analysis on ‘what determines the varying individual relationships with “quality of things” which is part of their everyday thinking and judging sense and attitudes, if acts are encoded as schemas one can move from isolation to introspective and it may incline to detach or engage of own mental objects’.
- c) A study to be conducted considering the 1&2 objectives, a focused augment view with an open mind is necessary from within or first-person perspective which serves the significance of intuitive aspects that develops within a self. This investigation, on whatever emerges in experiences without grasping, avoiding, judging of things needed a suspension of habituality or receptivity towards the experience or attention from the exterior to the interior, will reveal the true nature and correctness of ‘self’ that appears to be an awarefull witness.
- d) Finally, revealing the correctness of the grounded self is sufficiently detailed to what is signtively mean and intuitively given at indexicals, especially on temporal processing or experience of time in understanding one’s own nature.

Central Problem Definition

The primary problem here is to determine whether the true nature of knowledge origins of a human being in connection with experiences is reflections of awareness in a self (I-ness) or a subject to I-ness and to what extent. Here, to understand how the unchanging awareness is the true nature and correctness of knowledge origins, where it is an energy substance that was grounded in self. I have started with a quest: if the self and the ego-ness are put together by our own thoughts, then whatever it does at the highest level is called consciousness and it is still incomplete. On the other hand, if we did not put them together then it is something sacred, indestructible, or something that is beyond time. The quest continues upon these settings for nature of the knowledge origins and the self by our thoughts, whatever it does is incomplete. However, it might occupy-oneself with itself as a whole, but does it can come upon truth or a total illusion and deception (Bach, 1981). Other way around, if they are something, that is, not of truth in terms of objective reality which are beyond expression and immeasurable by regular tools like language or actions. Therefore, these two factors must be examined with phenomenological methods of observer-observed interactions from first-person view.

An observed 'I' is the conscious observer of our own awareness: who knows the presence of that mental objects in our minds. This would confirm by being a awarefull witness lead to self-evidence for a conscious observer, for awarefull witness conscious observer would present the image of impressions: a tree in our mind in the form of mental objects and become known to us, which include higher-order cognitive activities such as judgmental sense takes place in our mind and are known to us. Likewise, our emotions too arise in our mind as mental objects and

they become known to us as feelings. Thus, we are the self-evident observers (awarefull witness conscious observers) of all the mental activities that would proceed by the state of awareness. Therefore by using a strategy to investigate this problem will involve the development of phenomenological methods for a careful examination. These experimental procedures are to examine, to what extent the encodings of various acts are invariant across our experiences, when observers become introspective for their own mental objects that arises in mind consisting of semantic properties.

Design and Methodologies

In the following, I used a methodology for this project including different phases of implementation and the development of phenomenological methods. Which attempt in connection with experiences to grapple with observer-observed interactions with “errors of epistemic-cognitive associations and authenticity of knowledge sources”. That leads to a rigorous philosophical analysis to subjectivity, which is going beyond another merely logical-methodological opposition. It is worthwhile to get away from the easy reductionisms that may fail to follow the complexity of the project theme “structure and the nature of true knowledge origins”. In fact, on the one hand with rich conceptual tools and methodologies from contemporary perspective for the exploration of this theme has greatly increased our possibilities to analyze it thoroughly. At the same time on the other hand due to diversity in tools it is difficult to recognize the unequivocal notions of the theme in cognitive philosophical and phenomenological contexts.

Despite the contrary, in a schematic representational view we can inquiry that one of the most characteristic aspects of the contemporary discussions on the quest for truth and correctness of knowledge origins. Although it may dwell in the challenges made opposite to the dualism among the internal and external, psychic and physical, or mental and matter, which defines the cartesian paradigm. However, as an equivalent alternative to the schematic representation, a recent thought has been carried out the skepticism towards the ontological-metaphysical vocabulary approaches by the traditional British empiricists, which was also put forward by Rene Descartes. In this context, a favorable response has been awarded to both the theories that attempted to dissolve this conception based on vocabulary by reducing the entire human reality to neuro-cerebral processes. And the theoretical position that challenges the notions of the human subject as the essentialist and centralist by indicating to the dimensions of behaviour, and its action in order to exhibit self centralized object in the world, instead of its plasticity and dynamic nature in terms of promoting decentralization.

Interestingly, in the history of philosophy, many efforts made to dissolve or disprove this concept of human subjectivity, however, be at odds, with its effective nature, and persistence of its essence made it to reappear, the constant recurrences are especially in our language practices. In any condition, we know that subjectivity is the independent center of experiences. Furthermore, in all human subjects, the knowledge and its action linger to be a significant indexical in the formulation of substantial consequences with existentialist approaches. Especially, at surface level or behaviour in the environment, these are the dynamics of affective mental states and its objects. In general, it is the central problem of the patterns of rational reasoning.

Thus, within phenomenological contexts it is a matter of taking into account the conception of observing being an observer. We have of ourselves and of our peers, that is, our usual way of considering ourselves as the entities, completely different from every other component of the physical-natural. Such a conception embroidered with terms like ‘me-ness or the ego, I, or the self’, which makes us to implement an analogical-semantic role of opposition to physicality, in both the epistemic and ontological moves at the cognitive and creative sense.

In this case, exemplification of philosophical explanations determines the implications of the pursuit of existing theories on entities broadly classified as human subjectivity. At ground, on the various epistemic-cognitive associations and(or) self-reflexive models, which accepts the conventional savvy of physical and neurophysiological causes of perceptual experiences, and reasoning with causal strength. This addresses broadly on: epistemologically, how can one obtain objective knowledge about ego-ness, subjective experiences in connection with awareness, and if the ‘self’ itself is a witness of such awareness, then are there any boundaries associated with it? Methodologically, as we cannot attach this directly to the measuring apparatus, so what methods are appropriate to this study? Therefore, this conception of observer-observed interactions of a self in connection with its experiences being involved with a great potential observation act on the nature of the observed, given this notion of acts, we would develop this theme of project with introspective and phenomenological methods where the observer is observed their own self. In recent decades, there have been few established methods for investigating the true nature of knowledge origins within cognitive philosophical aspects (Velmans, 1996). Given the scope of this project, I will focus myself broadly on the problem of epistemic-cognitive errors posed by misconceived authenticity of knowledge sources. Which are largely denoting from falaises,

ignorance. So here I use(d) the epistemological and metaphysical analyses as a methodology within the given process-content framework of conceptual contexts.

Therefore, this study focuses on the development of observer-observed interactions which is an extensive methodological treatment for knowing the true nature of knowledge origins.

CHAPTER II

‘Essentials’ of Knowledge Sources and the ‘act of Knowing’

Abstract: Husserl initiated a claim ‘philosophy as a rigorous science’, it is precisely laying the foundation for pursuing knowledge origins and its nature. Therefore a starting point of this investigation sets out to foreground a fundamental problem of the essential beings on the identification a form of intuition, as the object-giving source within in the formulation of objectivity. In the context of immediate and transcendence experiences that turn toward the notion of intentional states, by way of explorations into act of ‘act of knowing’ paradigm allows us to bring the nature of knowledge sources thematically into focus. In this article, I intend to point out the essentialities in transformation of objects in knowledge become enriched later in Husserl’s conception of knowledge origins and act of knowing in connection with experiences and science.

Keywords: Categorial intuition; Foundationalism; Knowledge Origins; Perception and intuitive objects; Epistemology; Objectivity; Experiences; Immanence; Transcendence;

Introduction

As Husserl puts it in a 1922/23 lecture course: The rightful problems of epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie] can ... only be posed on the ground offered by phenomenology. All radical epistemological problems are phenomenological; and all other problems that, beyond those, can

be designated as epistemological, including the problems of the correct "interpretation" of actually existing nature and the results of the sciences concerned with it, presupposes the pure epistemological problems, the phenomenological ones (XXV 189).

The fundamental task of this paper is to establish the essentialities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge origins in connection with science and experience, while it is justifiably clear that it is an inherent property of intentionality, consciousness and perhaps self-knowledge. In fact, the nature of origin, grasping and acquisition of knowledge is also considered a central task for positive, naive and non-phenomenological sciences and this is something that remains active in pre-thought and experience. For instance, pre-thinking is a natural process of unconscious projection, which is relatively the lack of *to-me-ness* or ownership. The results of such orientation convey the degree of self-reference in their statements. But importantly this sidelines the matter of factual significance. For instance, the point is that every statement conveys information about the speaker and whatever the speaker may seem to be talking about; it tends to make questions that are vague and often factually meaningless. The answers to such questions often mislead theories, for example, the postulation of the idea that the earth is flat and the sun revolves around the earth. This can affect predictability and foresight which may not be achieved at all or may be achieved slowly, but as a result social maladjustments, retardation and individual infantilism are thereby advanced. Viewed from one perspective the tendency to hold on to rigidity and conservativeness allows one to establish types of beliefs and habits regardless of any changing situations or contingencies in order that social constructions can be fostered by these static constancies of notions.

Thus, knowledge is of various types and epistemological interests. For example, it is about knowing something or knowing how to ride a bike, or even knowing a place, a person etc. etc. Such a kind of 'knowing' fulfills propositions using referent schemas within necessary and sufficient conditions which are situations, but the question is how such conditions are defined. For instance, when it is the case that 'A knows that p ', where A is a subject who holds knowledge about something and ' p ' is the proposition describing what is known, we may ask what situations serve to help A justify that p is the case as it should be discussed in traditional and nontraditional ways. For instance, in the case of knowledge false propositions cannot be known because the attribution of knowledge requires at least a true belief to justify that p , and additionally, the p proposition A does not believe cannot be a proposition that A knows. On this account, knowledge must be justified with fulfilment of a *truth* and a justified *belief* in that truth that is, A knows that p if and only if p is true and A is justified in believing that p . Thus, if A is not correct in believing p in a situation this might not satisfy the sufficient and necessary conditions--which simply means that truth, belief and justification are jointly the founded conditions for knowledge on a subject. However, on the other hand, a non-traditional approach differs from this in terms of whether A's belief is an objective probability of truth, and this is accomplished if and only if a belief originates in cognitive faculties.

In later sections I would shed some light on the following relevant questions: how does phenomenological knowledge have non-phenomenological knowledge in terms of both scientific thinking and pre-thought? Following this I shall also present the philosophical validity of such a view and try to show what view Husserl holds on it as there are commentators who have a similar understanding. However, the reasons appear indefensible. Thereafter, I shall seek the

scope to extend my defence of Husserl's view of epistemological difference on the externalism versus internalism debate for *objective categories of truth claims* in relation with *knowledge origins* through transcendental correlations. I aim to do this by asking if knowledge depends upon the epistemic principles that the subject knows along with what this entails.

(Epistemological) Foundationalism versus non-foundationalism

According to J.N. Mohanty, Husserlian phenomenology "aims at an absolute knowledge: non-relative, grounding of human knowledge." (Mohanty, 1988:177). Several commentators--both critics and sympathizers--holding a similar view attribute to Husserl's phenomenology tasks which consist in providing foundations of knowledge having a flavour of traditional conservativity, especially as in the case of Descartes's project. In spite of that, Smith and McIntyre (1982) have shown that philosophy's fundamental task is to discover the ultimate foundations of one's beliefs about the world and their state in it with a justification. This idea is characterized by one's nature of thinking about everyday experiences, common sense, theoretical and scientific reasoning about the world at least in terms of the effect of understanding. Thinkers like Smith and McIntyre (1982) say that Husserl had a thought similar to Descartes that the foundations of knowledge are laid with an understanding of the nature of one's own experiences, and such experiences are not without direct support (Smith and McIntyre, 1982). Importantly, in Husserl's terms the sense of science requires theoretical completion by logic and metaphysics as described in his Sixth Logical Investigation (LI), and subsequently, the completion itself requires lengthy and difficult preliminary phenomenological investigations (Husserl, 2000). Nevertheless, Husserl speaks of the idea that all non-phenomenological sciences (eg. putative positive

sciences) are dogmatic which undergo criticism from phenomenology with an effort to produce an absolute grounding for knowledge in us. Similarly, Husserl describes in formal and transcendental logic the old platonic idea of genuine science: knowledge grounded in absolute foundations (Husserl Ideas:141).

It reminds us that a discussion from Walter Hopp (2008): in a natural way, perhaps, it attributes to transcendental phenomenologists an attempt to justify existing sciences with an aim of establishing epistemological foundations in the phenomenological perspective. However, there are few advocates and opponents of the justificatory conception of foundationalism as widespread in the recent epistemological foundationalism literature such as Fumerton¹ (2006), Alston (2005)², Steup³ (2005), Kelen⁴ (2005), Audi⁵ (2001) and Howard-Snyder⁶ (2005). In this regard, Walter (2008) has drawn up epistemic foundational conditions: a) for the primary epistemically basic pieces of knowledge every portion of knowledge in a proper noetic structure is either epistemically founded or immediately directly or indirectly justified epistemically, and all noetic structures concerning this are formed properly; b) the secondary epistemic foundational

¹ “Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. The foundationalist’s thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief.” (Fumerton, 2006, sec: 01)

² “The most sober and most neutral epistemological sense” of the term ‘foundationalism’ “consists of viewing the overall epistemic structure of a particular subject’s beliefs in the following way. Some of the beliefs enjoy a PES [positive epistemic status] without being based on other beliefs, and hence without owing that status to their relation to other beliefs.” (Alston, 2005:230–1)

³ “According to foundationalists, knowledge is structured like a building. They hold that without foundational knowledge on which non-foundational knowledge rests, there couldn’t be any knowledge at all” (Steup, 2005:123).

⁴ “All foundationalists think of warrant as arising autonomously in so-called basic propositions and being transferred to other propositions through permissible forms of inference.” (Klein 200:132)

⁵ Epistemological Foundationalism is the view that “if... one has any justified beliefs at all, then one has at least one non-inferentially justified belief; any other justified belief one has is adequately justified by, and would not be justified apart from its (positive) dependence on, at least one non-inferentially justified belief.” (Audi, 2001:30)

⁶ “A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other justified beliefs or their interrelations; a person’s belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Foundationalists agree that if one has a non-basic belief, then -at rock bottom - it owes its justification to at least one basic belief.” (Howard-Snyder 2005:18).

condition has been derived from Audi's⁷ definition mentioned in 'The Structure of Justification' in relation with epistemological and psychological functionalism, stating that every piece of knowledge is not itself epistemically founded but at least proportions of knowledge are on the basis of phenomenological knowledge, and c) it is not a psychological thesis, it does not maintain an actual noetic structure; rather, it satisfies the conditions for constitutive peripherals of a proper noetic structure.

Most of the versions of foundationalism are historically against skepticism and have maintained that epistemically founded beliefs must be certain in terms of truth and also incorrigible. But, of course, this is not an essential component in foundationalism, especially with reference to epistemic foundationalists who are not, however, qua foundationalists, committed to the claim that the content of the mental states is foundational. Its precise epistemic status confers the non-foundational nature on the relations it makes available but the second 'epistemic foundational condition' (from here onwards referred to as EFC') is applicable only for the content of the foundational mental states. Follesdal (1988) defines foundationalism as "one can reach absolute certainty, at least concerning some matters, and also that... it [is] a main task of philosophy to attain such certainty." (Føllesdal, 1988:107). But, Husserl did not endorse such a position, that is, the necessity of infallibilism. In this regard, many commentators have in mind the question of whether Husserl had any commitment or inclination towards foundationalism. Zahavi has made mainly three comments with reference to what Husserl says "is to bar oneself from an understanding of any scientific production." (Husserl, 1969:161 sec.60). These are: a) "establish a science which is based exclusively on absolutely certain truths", which is misleading

⁷ "The view that the structure of a person's body of beliefs is foundational in the strong sense that some of his beliefs are not based on others, and any other beliefs he has are based on the former." (Audi, 1993:49).

about science (Zahavi, 2003:67; Walter, 2008:196). b) “the transcendental analysis passes through phenomenology to be capable of refinement”, which means that it is to be necessarily incomplete (Zahavi, 2003:67; Walter, 2008:196). c) Rationalist foundationalism has not been accepted by Husserl: phenomenological propositions fulfil certain requirements as axioms from which all other knowledge is to be inferred (Zahavi, 2003). With reference to this Zahavi has commented “there is... something very misleading about calling Husserl a foundationalist, at least if the term is used in its traditional epistemological sense.” (Zahavi, 2003:67). These pieces of evidence show that Husserl rejected most of the varieties of foundationalism, including the traditional versions. According to Zahavi’s first claim, the foundational conditions mentioned above are not required the foundational pieces of knowledge to be “absolutely certain”. This projects the possibility that Husserl has held a modest form of foundationalism which allows the epistemically founded pieces of knowledge to have a degree of commitment that falls short of certainty, or in other words, uncertain. With respect to the second claim, Zahavi does not confront all of the phenomenological propositions prior to scientific propositions, and so in order to fulfill the science of phenomenology and for other non-phenomenological pieces of knowledge epistemological foundationalism is not required. However, non-phenomenological pieces of knowledge depend on few phenomenological propositions. The third claim states that epistemological foundations are not responsible so as to respond to beliefs in foundationalism, and hence this logically entails non-foundational commitments or the involvement of any other natural relations.

However, this points in the same direction, that is, towards establishing the supremacy of truth through the justificatory sense striving over knowledge in terms of the ‘act of knowing’.

Significantly, J. N. Mohanty says with reference to Husserl's thought that recognition in a justificatory sense⁸ is primarily of an idealist character for the constitutive part of knowledge, but the distinctive nature of this constitutive part will be understood if one enquires into the exact nature of this knowing activity in the judgemental sense. The most important question in this context is: what is meant by the statement that knowledge is "constituted" by an act and that such an act is not completely definite as we articulate it, except in the terms of the knowing act?

Justification of truth claims and objectivity

Relevant to these questions is the question of how 'objects' constitute the subject's knowledge irrespective of their type. As discussed in the previous sections with reference to Husserl's reply, there is one consideration which is clear to us in the first place: "The same object can be an object of perception, of judgment, of inference of feelings or aversion. Thus there is a certain independence from the varying modes of apprehension" (Mohanty, 1954:345). The 'independence' in question is a character object which has aspects of negative and positive polarities in acts when the object falls into the problem of identity (Corazza, 2018). However, we are not dealing with whether it is a positive character or a negative aspect; rather, we are considering the point that an object persists among all variations of acts. As a matter of fact, the same object can appear as the ultimate objective⁹ (goal-seeking intention) of various acts, and

⁸ A justificatory is derived from a judgment sense which is also considered on few conditions as an act of mental state for affirming or denying the agreement of ideas. It may be recalled that affirmation or denial exists by a mere analysis of ideas such that they confirm or deny that they agree with one another. If an act of agreeing or denying is analytic, that is, formed a priori to experience or formed by pure reason, it is not learned by sense-perception, as is boolean agreement, for example: 'modesty is praiseworthy,' 'ebriety is not worthy of man. Otherwise, if a judgment is consequently found to be dependent on experiences such as 'gold is a soft and moldable material', then the agreements or disagreements are a posteriori, experimental, contingent, conditional and physical (Williams, 2018).

⁹ "Experiences what we experience a descriptively peculiar consciousness of fulfillment, an act of pure meaning like ultimate goal (goal seeking intentions), finds its fulfillment in the act which renders the matter intuitive" (Husserl, LI VI §8, p.694).

such objects can be both intentional and unintentional (unconscious) in the judgmental sense. While focusing on the problem of essentials of knowing sources in our mind being a conscious observer, we note that what counts as important is our consideration of the justification of truth claims and objectivity. But what is the ground for this justification and objectivity in the general noesis-noema doctrine? We should be aware that although the noetic-noematic structure follows a parallelism, it implies shared properties of experiences. This means that noesis (conscious act) has different objects corresponding to every noema (meaning of the act). Then, we may wonder what makes out of the statement that ‘a corresponding object’ endures as the ultimate objective of varying acts in judgemental sense. In this relation, every conscious act (noema) has a nucleus that holds its own meaning through which it can be related to the object and different nuclei for distinct acts or noemata of varying perceptual acts exist. These various nuclei are close together in a referential unity in which it is something determinable but hidden in every nucleus that is a referent as awarefull witness or evidence¹⁰ for self-perception through the reflections.

This is somewhat different from the view of the sensuously ‘given’ referential unity articulated in the Kantian tradition wherein the referential contents do not guide conceptual acts by merely a causal influence (although this may obtain by virtue of being constitutive of sensuous intuitions, and such referential evidence of being ‘given’ is distinguished from a ‘justification act’ where it

¹⁰ “It is a correlative duality of descriptive phenomenological difference between an act of empty intentional meaning (Meinung) and intuitive fulfillment (Anschauung). In Husserlian terms, in the unity of an act of knowing, the epistemological feature intuitive fulfillment lends to an act of meaning is referred as evidence (Evidenz). The reason is, evidence can be understand as a feature of justification to cognitive states that is conferred upon acts of pure meaning by being brought into union with a sensuously intuitive act in an act of fulfillment. And an act of fulfillment is an act that brings an act of pure meaning into non-inferential union with a sensuously intuitive act in a way that confers the evidence of the intuitive act on the act of meaning (Kidd, 2014:131).

is perceived to be derived from inferential relations with beliefs of a subject (Sellars, 1968:16)). Thus, the 'given' in an intuition offers referentiality where the grounds are so expected to be understood.

It would be important to look into the central substance of Husserl's phenomenal intentionality where our inner experiences seem to be directed beyond themselves, that is, oriented in a way that makes the outer world manifest. In fact, intentionality counts as the primary component in phenomenological descriptions of all our experiences and experiential facts are the most fundamental phenomenological facts. Hence the descriptive elucidation of intentionality from subjective experiences is the centerpiece of Husserl's theory of knowledge problem which has driven my inquiry into its nature of origins. Sometimes for skeptics this conception stands squarely with the Kantian tradition which regards knowledge as the product of intuition and concept. For instance, if I believe that *a rose flower is blooming in my backyard* and let's also suppose that it is red, in this condition my thoughts must be intended at the relevant state of affairs, that is, the performance of an act of meaning in thought must be associated with the justified belief corresponding to the relevant state of affairs. Then, after attending to the newly bloomed flower which is covered with bushes in my backyard, I may experience the act of pure meaning that is the ultimate goal of seeking intention which descriptively serves to ensure fulfillment through the matter of intuitive projection consciously. In this regard Husserl had an elaborate discussion on it in the first Logical Investigation (Husserl LI, VI §8). In later writings of Husserl, this idea changes to the one describing a distinction between the ideal essence of the intrinsic intentional features of a conscious act and the meaning of the act, that is, a distinction between noesis and noema as discussed above. In this context, I would bring into focus Husserl's

elaborate discussions on the relation between *intentional content* and *meaning* in an *act of knowing* where the intuitional component satisfies the awareness of the object ('thing' itself) in the body (*leibhaft*) with intuitive fullness, as intended in the act (Husserl LI, VI §16, Husserl TS, §4-5).

Thus, we can observe the consistency of an essential distinction between an act's intentional content and its object in the act, and it is evident that Husserl refers to the intentional feature of an act as an element in the intuitive activity by virtue of which it is intentionally directed to its object which becomes manifest in the world later (Husserl LI, V §20). In order to draw the logical significance here, we might say that the intentional feature is an essential part of the intuitive event that represents the relevant object, as in, for instance, 'The bloomed rose is red in my backyard', that is, an intentional feature cannot exist alone without an intuitive act as it is an essential part of the act. Therefore, the intentional feature is an instance of an intuitive act which is distinct from the meaning content and the object (thing) itself, and the ideal meaning can be expressed as mental states such as believing, imagining, remembering, desiring and so on in subjective experiences. Nevertheless, it is different from the object of experience itself.

Early Husserlian approaches on phenomenal intentionality took the intentional content of experience to be determined by the way things appear to the subject from their own experiences. It should be observed that intentional content cannot be determined by just historical, causal and theological functional relations. However, we are not dealing with meaning and matters of content here but rather with the nucleus of conscious acts. That is, if all that we get are a series of perspective variations¹¹, also referred to in some cases as sensuous components but in a limited

¹¹ Perspective variations are the data of sensations achieved by apprehension (Schubert, 2012)

sense, one may wonder where we arrive at the referential things through the unity of appearances in a continuum of appearances. Somehow, Husserl also addresses this as the 'problem' is required to be dealt with on a transcendental level and also needs a phenomenological clarification: objects are not given as constituents of conscious experience independently, and so Husserl does not leave this matter to skeptists, nor does he assert such referentiality naively as in the case of physical realists. One may note further proceedings on Husserl's Ideas in line with Kant: "how in the spirit of phenomenological science we are to describe noematically all the connections of consciousness which render necessary a plain object precisely in its character as real" (Husserl Ideas:377).

This context makes one think of the relevance of Kant to Husserl's thinking-- intentional objects both in the actual world and the imaginative realm are known as 'things' which are themselves part of experiences, and hence help develop a distinction between immanent and transcendent perception when the relevant purpose is to respond to what we have in the series of 'variable perspectives' which are infinitely determinable in possible infinite directions. In the case of immanent perception the object is an immanent constituent of the conscious process and the object is 'given' absolutely, whereas the object of transcendental perception is manifest only with perspective variations. In the latter case, the object and the conscious process do not constitute any natural unity, although if we extend the series of variable perspectives in all possible directions the object cannot be completely or absolutely given without a marginal indeterminacy left over (Mohanty, 1954).

Therefore, the problem of knowledge origins in nature in connection with experiences can be explained with two different types of intentional experiences in two different ways with the same

criterion. The true being reduces itself to givenness (immanent and transcendent), but it is important to understand whether or not this givenness is adequate by considering two cases within a phenomenological analysis (Husserl Ideas:395). This adequacy is conceived in immanent experiences as complete givenness of the object itself, which means that it includes all possible and actual determinants without any indeterminacy remaining. But in the case of transcendental perception it is different since it never reaches an experiential adequateness of the object to the fullest extent as the margin of determinable indeterminacy always appears in some way or other. So a principle of judgement sense is invoked to make up for the deficiency. However, as far Husserl's idea goes, although the adequateness of the object itself is not possible, the reasons of justification in judgement sense nevertheless prescribe the adequateness predetermined by the appearances continuum to be defined as *a priori* (Husserl Ideas: 397). This leads me to think within in the scope of continuum that the idea (appearance) of something is not itself something, for instance *the insight that this infinity is intrinsically incapable of being given does not exclude but rather demands the transparent givenness of the Idea of this infinity* that is, the infinity is not itself infinity (Husserl Ideas: 398). Therefore, irrespective of the criteria for the fulfilment of complete givenness for an objective factor, what is given is an idea of this objective factor. In other words, the idea serves with predetermined adequacy, although it consists of inadequateness or incomplete givenness of experiences: *an a priori rule for the well-ordered infinities of inadequateness of experiences (ibid)*. Here we may recall what Husserl has borrowed in order to look at the apprehension of object closely from the phenomenological view from Kantian heritage account of reason¹². In Kant's view the philosophical reasoning would stand in

¹² The term "Idea" in Kantian sense is "a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience." (Mohanty, 1954; Ideas: 397). Also, Kant lays emphasis in his writings on aesthetics about the

doubt, and so he insists that it is difficult for a metaphysics interpretative task. Also, he has announced a clear distinction between the concept of understanding and ideas of reason for all types of metaphysical tasks in terms of knowledge: firstly, the constitutive knowledge representations are yielded to by the fusion of concepts, but it is different from what Husserl thinks as for him ‘sense-intuition’ is the foundation of any knowledge (Williams, 2018). In fact, ideas are never ‘given’ in intuition and refer to the transcendental essence of things. Similarly, the completed series of perspective variations cannot be ‘given’ to intuition so as to serve as an *a priori* rule for inadequate givenness (Mohanty, 1954; Corazza, 2018).

As per Kant’s deduction, our awareness of an object apprehension is a ‘thought’ recognition process through concepts and its manifolds followed by reproduction in imagination. We can easily notice that this conceptual process is similar to the idea yields in Husserl’s notion of source of intuition. Although Husserl has made no distinction between concepts and ideas, he considered the rational explication of concepts to be equal to intuitiveness. This supports the point that Husserl noticed that Kant’s first deduction has such phenomenological grounds, but this was limited to the first edition of deductions. But in later writings he was accused of having such grounds for ideas, for instance, in Kant’s second edition of deductions. In any case, in the present context we have not focussed on the need to discuss “why” Kant was accused of having phenomenological grounds for ideas or concepts. (Mohanty, 1954; Husserl Ideas:183). Tracing back to the view of the Kantian account of reason, we find that the idea that *no object can be given in sense-experience* (Williams, 2018) is not unjustified in case of Husserl, as the object apprehension based on experiences does provide a series of perspective variations but yet to be

term “Idea”: “the quality of empirical knowledge gained through the understanding, reason and its “ideas” often appear as mere sources of error and illusion.” (Williams, 2018).

fulfilled and never to be given full determination. The completed series of perspective variations of experiences whose object cannot be given complete adequateness may be interpreted as non-Kantian, but not possible through dialectical illusions due to inheritance of the shared property of 'sense' (noetic). In many ways similar to the Kantian thinking, the idea of the object does determine infinite experiences as an apriori rule for the completion of the series at hand, but in principle it is indeterminable for any further empirical explanations.

However, in Husserl's view of constitutive knowledge, acts with the structure of fulfillment can find their origins in our own or other individual's intuitive history that has been handed down in scientific practice or culture, and such heritage declares that every piece of human knowledge is in some way founded on the sensuous components of acts or hyletic data of acts¹³ with the structure of fulfillments. Also, certain varieties have been distinguished as the categories of sensuous perceptual intuition and straightforward perceptual intuition of individual objects in which the acts can be founded. That is, if forms of foundations are epistemic in character, we may wonder if the evidence of belief is *directly* drawn from sensuous perceptual act with knowledge gained in the unity of the fulfillment act. For one thing, the forms of conditions could be non-epistemic or merely ontological as the sensuous perceptual experiences are not *directly* involved in evidence, but without the existence of perceptual experiences an intuitive awareness

¹³ The Hyletic data or sensuous components, on the Husserlian view, "do not themselves intentionally aim at or represent anything. But they are 'brought to life' or imbued with intentional content, and thereby we see, hear, taste, smell, or feel them to present objects or states of affairs." (Williford, 2013, p.502). These components are account of what is presentational about perceptual experiences in a variety of ways, for instance, we can differentiate seeing a 'flower' as real and in the painting, from a perspective of merely thinking of one. But we are aware the different experiences of representational content arise due to not just thoughts given that perceptual sensations with the same intentional objects are different, as the latter are presentational and former are not. Such a distinctive nature of awareness exists because of the intentional correlations which remain the same, as the sensuous components can obtain in a variety of ways (Williford, 2013:502).

of the essential truth about the evidence of belief is not possible, for the essential truth does not depend on the evidence associated with individual objects,. Thus, for example, if I do not have an intuitive awareness that the *red rose in my garden* in its color is ‘red’, which is an essential truth about the red ‘object’, and also if it were not available in my sensuous awareness about the ‘red’ color of the given object, merely the evidence about the rose’s color ‘red’ associated with my beliefs about individual red objects would not ground the knowledge concerned. As for the three different kinds of fulfillment, it is evident that each of these is founded on sensuous perceptual experience in different ways of acts: (i) moments which comprise a straightforward perceptual intuition give rise to a direct and intuitive awareness required in evidence of belief relating to their properties, (ii) a categorial intuition of the states of affairs which are synthetic wherein the individual properties of evidence are bound together by an ideal form of categorial intuitions, and (iii) the last one is an essential intuition which is a direct awareness of ideal essences and categorial forms themselves also referred to as ‘ideation’ (Kidd, 2014). Among these three intuitive fulfillments we can observe three different levels of evidence which yield to the apodicticity of evidence in some acts and thus constitutes the ideal of self-evident knowledge (Husserl Ideas §13, 73–5; Husserl C. Meditations, §3-6): (a) it is completely adequate as every aspect of an intuitive givenness of an object obtains as it is meant, (b) as the object cannot be conceivable and it is intuited and meant in the acts, the evidence of belief is indefeasible, and finally (c) and the last level down, as it satisfies both (a) and (b), is not conditionally certain in lacking adequate fulfillment, that is, the objects of the evidence kind that can be negated by the next acts could be other than what is meant and intuited in the given act. Although the last level of fulfillment seems adequate and defeasible, it lacks the achievement of adequacy--rather, it

yields to a partial fulfillment of the total intentional object and relations of the given act. Husserl redescribes the conception of evidence in his theory of phenomenal epistemology after combining these distinctions, and significantly, these reinscriptions contribute to the understanding of the rationality of intuition in view of the evidence of knowledge problem (Husserl Ideas §13).

Be that as it may, it does not show that forms of evidence and knowledge can be put together into one basket; rather, it presents each level of evidence as constitutive in varied facets of knowledge through different levels of intuitive fulfillment which are all founded on sensuous experiences. It may be argued that this understanding of evidence is in a way appropriate to its epistemic fulfillment. Thus, it presents Husserl's underlying idea that all evidence rides on a foundation of sensuous experiences, but not all levels of knowledge. From this perspective, Husserl became interested in the extrapolation of his approach to epistemological problems and elaborated on various methods including Descartes' skeptical doubts. So one should be very careful here to understand Husserl's views from the vantage point of any traditions of foundationalist ideas. For instance, as mentioned above, Husserl does not completely fall in with the Cartesian approach that views all knowledge as apodictically certain, nor reduced to evidence deriving from sensual experiences which characterize an empiricist approach.

Objectivity and the act of knowing

Modern critics have commented on the problem of knowledge origins on basis of few models of 'justification of knowledge' and, by examining the epistemic conditions which are part of truth claims in mental acts in connection to beliefs, have stated that there is a strong element of

subjectivism evident in establishing the justified true claims for knowledge (Tassone, 2017). On this view, commentators accept the role of mental factors in justifying true beliefs, and these factors will fall in the mental domain for internalists, whereas the role of mental activity not being given greater consideration can suit externalists. However, this work does not aim to elaborate on a discussion on questions pertaining to internalist or externalist orientations; rather, the question to seek is this: does objectivity necessarily invite subjective sources in favor of Husserl's interpretation of the epistemological approach for justifying truth conditions, and how does the immediate (immanent) experience act as a transcending ground for justifying beliefs? In an important sense, it may be noted that most of the modern epistemological thinkers have thus far overlooked what is required to show that truth and falsity of beliefs are developed only at cost of inseparable connections with internal elements that are part of intuitions at the locus of truth. Nevertheless, although most Socratic and Cartesian thinkers hold the opinion that Husserl's analysis of the justification of knowledge stands on anti-foundational assumptions and squares with the externalist approaches to attain knowledge, because they insist that the justification of truth requires only an account of rational belief. But, it is plausible that internalist aspects are as important as the externalist ones if we look into Husserlian approaches on experiences and internal relations of consciousness in view of sense and perception allowing for epistemic access to evidence in an account of the 'objectivity of justification'. The detailed structural analysis of such an account opens up a debate about the indispensable role for mental states in offering access to evidence for the justification of beliefs as this emphasizes the necessity of internal (mental) states for subjective experiences as the self-transcending ground for determining knowledge about the world in modern epistemological approaches. This radical understanding

secures essential structures posed by the Husserlian thought to naturalistic accounts of how belief formation in view of ‘objectifying’ of subjective experiences is an element of knowledge origins (Tassone, 2017). Husserl early writings have been deemed important for the role of intentional objects along modes of givenness to describe how subjective experiences afford transcendence for meaning and knowledge, and also how the access to evidence relies on an epistemic relationship of intuitions for direct awareness to objects in the experience itself.

However, the empiricist idea is that consciousness is either reducible to natural categories or analogous to some known container for holding ideas. Although there are some differences between the Husserlian approach and the methods of the earlier british empiricist Richard T Murphy (Murphy, 1980: 90), the empiricist falsification approach towards the true nature of perceptual experiences can be discerned in Husserl’s early works wherein the “ways of ideas” about mental acts and associations are mediums for representing the world (Husserl¹⁴, 1971). Husserl insists that beliefs require reasons, and additionally, he warned of the occurrence of the ‘rendering problem’ if the belief justification is doxastic, that is, if the relevant justification relates solely to individual subjective immanent ideas. In a representational model the rendering problem has been referred to as the ‘access problem’ by current epistemologists for meaning and reference. However, the internal ideas of mental states may be directly accessible in immediate access, and non-mental contents such as beliefs about the world and transcendent objects are indirectly accessible. In this context, Husserl says if the empiricist assumptions about the mind

¹⁴ This assessment has been made in his early writings, and he regards an appeal to uncritical acceptance of the naturalist framework as ontologically valid for explaining consciousness, mentioned in Husserl’s Critique of Locke’s ‘physicalized soul’ Crisis manuscript (Husserl, 1970. p.63). But, Drummond argues that Husserl does not endorse an empiricist brand, according to which “some non-empirical, certain knowledge is said to be prior to our knowledge of worldly realities.” (Drummond, 1990, p. 240). However, the detailed consideration of how faithfully he interprets earlier writings is not within the scope of this article.

uncritically accept the reliability of even most belief claims, this turns out to be indicative of a kind of skepticism. In order to prevent such a fatal theoretical empiricist weakness, Husserl extended his framework to include knowledge attainment and its acts. Initially, Husserl aimed to provide a *coherent theory of science* by exploring questions about the ‘origins of experiences and knowledge’, and this has provided many consequential insights from a philosophical view. For instance, Husserl’s critical diagnosis of empiricism led him to think of an alternative view, that is, an account of *general ideas and concepts originate* phenomenologically informed as discussed in the Second Logical Investigation (Husserl LI, II, vol.1, § 21).

As for perception, Husserl was a critic of the early pure empiricist and representational realism, but his account of mental factors involved intuitions, feelings, judgements and mental associations for the act of knowing in accessing the world in order to achieve immediate access to both types (physical and nonphysical structures of perceptual experiences) of objects given directly. It gives way to the elimination of external causal factors when experiences turn to objective categories of knowledge. Nevertheless, we need to see how physical objects are presented by their nature in perspective acts, and also whether they are necessarily given in to incompleteness? For example, if a cushion chair is presented to me from a particular perspective, in usual appearances many of the details are permanently hidden to visibility by necessity. For instance, I cannot see the internal structure of the cushioning, but I assume that it exists if I am not prepared to see it by opening up the outer structure. Likewise, in the case of mental objects such as concepts and ideas, higher order categorical experiences are given adequacy and apodictic evidence. Consequently, if I am thinking about the chair as an object as its properties are presented to my perception in a spatio-temporal frame, this is an *a priori* feature of

perceptual structure. At the same time, apart from the perceptual properties of existence as cohering to a physical object by being justified with its qualities, there are factors that are largely internal to the structure of perceptual acts and determine the justification of existence for saying: “the chair is on the floor”. In this context, Husserl’s notion of mental acts is necessary for understanding both intuitive and qualitative features of an object. However, Husserl developed a doctrine of “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt) influenced by his teacher and psychologist Carl Stumpf as an ideal and transcendent reference point of expressions which are non-physical and non-mental propositions. This affords a simplistic classification of mental acts as fully justifying knowledge (Husserl LI, I, vol.1, § 11–13).

By contrast, a “situation of affairs”, which is privately accessible, (for instance, the situation (Sachlage) “the chair is on floor”) can be perceived by various people in different ways in different situations which go on to constitute and justify the same “state of affairs” as true or false (Husserl LI, I, vol.1, § 11–13). Such a distinction in mental acts (experienced and founded contents play a significant role in intending meaning, and also contribute to the expression of actual meanings by constituting intentional objectifying acts possessing both a ‘material’ aspect and a ‘qualitative’ aspect) shows the essentiality to make sense of the difference between truth stating and truth making, or between the intuitive (propositional content) and the significative (world dependent factors). These reflections helped establish the basis of truth at an early stage of the Husserlian account of investigations (Husserl LI, p.244–246). Nonetheless, these various levels of reflection distinguish the apprehension of meaning in judgements from the required representational content as possible conditions: objectifying acts are treated to be interior conditions for making possible both meaning making and stating, that is, both the significative

and intuitive conditions in both sensuous and categorial intuitions. Such an important distinction linking meaning to reference has been explored in sections on “indexical” expressions, to be found in Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigations (Husserl LI, VI, vol.2 § 4, 25, 44, and so on). For the meaningful expressions, Husserl has not given a privileged epistemological role ‘only’ to the subjective experienced content of intuitiveness or to the mental existence of transcendental objects. Rather, he has affirmed a correlational condition between the external and the internal. This implies the innate existence of structure as founded on intuitiveness which looks for the fulfilment of contents both experienced and transcendental.

Although Husserl offered ‘a theory of constitution’ of the objective reference for meaning and truth claims, this understanding of semantics introduces an ambiguity in the ontological status of purely transcendental objects. In the objective correlates of acts the primary focus of this investigation is to develop further detail from the objects acquired through judgements in categorial intuition to the nature of knowledge origins in connection with science and immanent and subjective experiences. Further expansion of this phenomenological project is required to undertake this task by theoretically conjoining the beliefs of rational life and the nature of origins for act of knowing in new directions.

Constitution of objective categories

In this section, we shall consider the philosophical significance of attaining truth claims on *objective categories* of knowledge from a pure immanent experience and mental objects (existence or non-existence of imaginative or ideal objects). According to Kant, a phenomenal correlational condition between transcendental objects and subjective experiences is least

shaded, but is unacceptable to the correlation motive. We need to examine the arguments that underlie Husserl's critique of the objects grasped intuitively. The question is whether they are the old (or rather new) wine put in a new bottle? In Kant's view, as discussed in *Refutation of Idealism* (Potter, 2000), the immanent being presented to us in absolutely immanent perception is contrasted with the possibility of the transcendent being as a thing but presented in transcendent perception within perspective variations. Although it is a new argument, it renders the idealistic faith charged with inward knowledge in seeking enlightenment (self-knowledge or understanding about self). Self-knowledge requires our knowledge of the natural world. But Husserl has rejected psychologism simply by accepting that the inner events (objects of immanent perception) are not like the natural objects or events of the outer world, also argued in connection with the contrastiveness between immanence and transcendence in perception.

However, on Husserl's view, most of the idealists have no awareness of objects' absoluteness, but empiricists who study eidetic memory say:

the real world, as it is called, the correlate of our factual experience, then presents itself as a special case of various possible worlds and non-worlds, which, on their side, are no other than correlates of the essentially possible variations of the idea 'empirical consciousness' (Husserl Ideas: 148). [...] And the actual world is the realization of one amongst infinite possibilities, as all actual experience refers beyond itself to possible experiences which themselves again point to new possible experiences, and so in infinitum (Husserl Ideas:149).

Then it may turn out that the existence of nonexistent things is not accidental; it is not just possible that these objects may have been nonexistent, but the question is whether such things

belong to more than one possible experience in view of the point that things are intended as internal (intentional process) private elements of experiences which Husserl calls “phenomenological transcendental reflection”. It leads me to ask for a naturalist thesis if all transcendence is rejected, then how phenomenology will still deal with the ‘constitution’ of immanent objects and its realm. Husserl states that the principle of the phenomenological study is neither to be determined by how the intentional analysis of such immanent experience should be the subject matter nor to have the naive assertion of things. However, the elaboration of this principle is undertaken by the phenomenologist who admits of a very significant concession about the phenomenological sphere which is relevant. Here, within the transcendental reflection view, the content as the subject matter must be the nexus of corresponding meanings and positions within immanence experiences. That is, all activities over objects will be traced to their constituting sources which are the subject matter of correlational claims. It is shown that Husserl assigns importance to immanence as essential aspects of experience through transcendental approaches. Husserl worked with different forms of immanence structures to analyse the role of acts in establishing the truth about “origins of knowledge”. Husserlian phenomenology can be viewed as a unique kind of approach in understanding the levels of ‘knowledge origins’ within the nature of knowledge in connection with science, immanence and subjective experiences. The framework posits, for example, a standard since the structure of knowledge lying beyond experiences and holding beliefs to be justifying essential subjective factors render themselves incoherent.

This study concerns the nature of knowledge and has shown how important a fuller understanding of Husserl’s writings of phenomenological account is in contemporary concerns.

However, few thinkers have provided more insights on this theme in greater detail beyond Husserl into accounts of objectivity, transcendence, and representationalism and others.

CHAPTER III

Judgement Sense “of or for” an Act of Knowing

Abstract: In this article I aim to focus on the fundamental aspects of ‘judgement sense in nature of knowledge origins perspective’. To put it ahead, I consider Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, especially the sixth logical investigation concerning the notions of categorial intuition which is distributed carefully among the perceptual acts in terms of analyses: active and passive synthesis. In order to explain the consequences of this, I first try to reconstruct the notion of categorial intuitions described in *Sixth Logical Investigations*, relating it to the obvious problem of how ‘knowledge origins are intuitive fulfillments of signifying acts’.

From one corner, categorial intuitions originate from simple intuitions but cannot be reduced to them. Simple intuitions structurally offer a global grasping of the intended object with partial intentions which are perceptual and gradually blend to form a single entity. It turns into a categorial intuition with a new sort of act, or comes as a result of ‘perceptual analysis’ between disclosed partial perceptual intentions and global perception. The operating intentions are implicitly the same in this scenario. It is curious to understand that in this synthesis (both active and passive analyses) intuition depends on the signifying intentional acts that guide the selection of intuitive aspects to be combined in active and passive perceptual acts. It follows that the components of categorial intuition arrive from the sphere

of external perceptual contents. However, Husserl's conception showed contrastivity in his later texts on perceptual analysis as a notion of passive synthesis: the genesis of categoricity in the very realm of sensibility. This, I shall argue, allows us to formulate an approach to clarify the phenomenological sources of knowledge and its nature.

Question of knowing and judging

Significant subconscious processes in sensibilities of knowing and judging about their systematic relationships have not been clearly defined in history with remarkable exceptions of what we find in Kant's or Husserl's analysis. As a consequence, there is no clear basis for a scientific demarcation of hidden goals of thinking where goals are broader than identifying, locating and recognition, and so on. But in a significant sense, in the cognitive psychological turn intuition, imagination, and insight are defined and located in the systematic framework of thinking processes. Recall and judgment are also defined as subconscious processes in the thinking framework for the focused collaboration of different modes for 'knowledge grasping or acquiring through perceptual acts' is significant and phenomenologically fused (Husserl 2001a). Husserl's explanations of the intentional role of categorial intuition is the foundation for *Logical Investigations*, especially in the phenomenological analysis of knowledge advancement. He has expressed in the sixth investigations that the real or genuine knowledge is presented as the result of a synthesis between 'signification and intuition' which are two kinds of intentional acts (Husserl 2001a). The objective of the act, at first intended only by

“empty” meanings, later becomes perceptible with its intuitive richness: the signifying intentional experiences are fulfilled by intuitive contents.

Thus, for example, ‘knowing’ has been characterized as a base or fundamental act which is built upon a combination of different simple acts (Husserl 2001a). One should be careful here about where and how the foundational acts come to constitute or form a new intentional object that offers a new objective goal, in that the new intentional object with its new objective goal is not grasped by the simple acts involved (Husserl 2001a). In this context, according to Husserl, the nominal (naming) classification is an example of knowing within which a word or an expression that refers as a name to something serves the job of fulfilment of referring through an intuitive apprehension of the named or referred object¹⁵. As a result, at the objective end, knowing is neither only signification nor sensible contents, but to a certain extent it is an ‘intuited object’ of an intuition which can be recognized through notable expressions. And the givenness of such intuition fulfills the signifying intention, that is, it guarantees the evidence of knowledge. Husserl has also brought into focus more complex cases of ‘knowing’ through the judgmental or propositional sense. But, as discussed above in the case of nominal classification, the judgmental sense contains grammatical expressions in which different categorial functions are in action. For example, if a judgment ‘A is p’, operates under both the categorial function of the subject and predicate, then the

¹⁵ “The relation, as one of naming, is mediated, not merely by acts of meaning, but by acts of recognition, which are here also acts of classification. The perceived object is recognized for an inkpot, known as one, and insofar as the act of meaning is most intimately one with an act of classification, and this latter, as recognition of the perceived object, is again intimately one with the act of perception, the expression seems to be applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment” (Husserl, 2001b:202).

statement as a whole is structured as predicative form *as it is marked with the copula, i.e. 'is'*. For a judgment to express the evident knowledge, it must require a fulfillment of synthesis among the intentional experiences of the base acts¹⁶ involved. In addition, Husserl has developed an idea of categorial intuition through the following point: 'signifying intentional experiences includes the logical articulations' (Husserl 2001a), that is, an intuition offers fulfillment to categorially complex intentions. On this notion, one can maintain the intuitive apprehension as the general scheme of fulfillment for complex judgements, especially in the analysis of nominal classification. But my focus here is, in particular, on the categorial intuition which satisfies perceptual judgments of the type 'A is p' where knowing sources.

In the history of philosophical analysis several researchers throughout the past decades have contributed to the general function of categorial intuition within the sixth investigation—notable among them are Sokolowski (1991), Lohmar (2002), Benoist (2008), Mohanty (2011). In addition, thinkers have usually contributed to 'Formal and Transcendental Logic', 'Experience and Judgment', and 'Analyses concerning Passive and Active Syntheses'. For Husserl, the latter of the two for all such terms are of particular relevance, and hence he has reformulated his analysis on knowing in terms of evident knowledge, particularly in some important aspects with reference to the role of perception in cognitive interests and synchronization with experiences. As this notion develops, he describes how categorial functions of judgements are grounded in perception (Welton 1982;

¹⁶ "in the case of a perceptual statement, not only the inwrought nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole meaning of the statement finds fulfillment through the underlying percept" (Husserl, 2001b: 271).

Mohanty 2011). In this context, I intend to explore the fundamentally intrinsic aspects of categorial intuition in the presence of perceptual analyses where the sense of judgments is grounded as this is also a synthesis process of active and passive acts as part of knowledge origination. To this end, I have tried to provide an analysis with help of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. This analysis would be confronted with later descriptions of perceptual analysis of categorial intuition when it loses its epistemic function (Mohanty 2011). In order to present it, I follow Husserl's conception of knowledge as expounded in the course of perceptual analysis, that is, 'Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis' (Husserl 2001a) as part of the sixth logical investigation. Although few critics have confronted it as an alternative conception, I deem that it is the part of the same analysis with few gradual modifications. Importantly, I do not attempt to reconstruct Husserl's position differently; rather, I undertake to understand the new analytical key which clarifies the sources (origins) of knowledge proposed in the *Logical Investigations* for synthesized comparison of two distinct positions constructed here. With this in the backdrop, I focus on explaining the conception of categorial knowledge containing the sense of judgments that are grounded in perceptual intentions as intentional experiences that offer a privileged occasion to understand why the kind of categorial intuition to which Husserl dedicated most of his sixth Investigation is no longer necessary to explain how acts of knowledge are ordered.

Components of categorial intuition

In this section my inquire into how the categorial intuition is a foundational act and the grounded components in it. Starting with §45 in the sixth logical investigation where Husserl asserts, for the purpose of understanding the structure of judicative essence in evidential knowledge, that it requires an expansion of the ‘sphere of sensibility’: “there must at least be an act which renders identical services to the categorial elements of meaning that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elements” (Husserl 2001b: 280), means the simple act that shapes the quality of perception provides intuitive fulfillment for signifying elements, and that those are fully not necessary to be articulated logically. For instance, the term ‘sky’ and the simple intuitiveness express the color of it as ‘blue’. Although the expressed judgment ‘the sky is blue’ and the copula ‘*is*’ manifest the key to evident knowledge for judgment, the categorial forms cannot be fulfilled by these simple intuitions as they are not complete sensible objects that can be immediately perceived. This means that to be in categorial forms objects and its constituent parts including relations between them are intended as articulated together and they should not be in isolation (Sokolowski 1991).

As Husserl makes it clear in his text, since categorial relations can be intuitively apprehended they cannot be considered to be just pure meanings: “the object with these categorial forms is not merely referred to, as in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it is set before our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not just thought of, but intuited or perceived.....what shall we call the correlate of non-sensuous

subject-presentation, one involving the non-sensuous structure, if the term ‘object’ is not available to us? How shall we speak of actual or direct givenness, if the term perception denied us?” (Husserl 2001b: 280).

According to the solution discussed in §45, the evident knowledge of categorial intuitions and its formed objects expressed by judgments need intuitive fulfillment for categorial relations. And the sensibility sphere expands in terms of the direct givenness of sensible content. This kind of givenness does not exhaust the realm of sensibility, though, due to the intuitional fulfillment for the categorial forms of signifying intentions in judgements. The desire is to obtain a categorial intuition, and Husserl believes that evident judicative knowledge would be unachievable without a specific intentional act (Mohanty 2011). Husserl has detailed a contrast in §46 and §47 between categorial intuition and ordinary sense-perception in order to assert that categorial intuition functions at a higher level, whereas simple sensible intuitions are directed to real sensuous objects¹⁷. Also, it is important to note that sensible intuitions are simple as they do not employ any sort of conditions of far simpler previous acts to present an objective pole, that is, it is mainly the absence of intentional foundations. It operates on a single act-level which does not contain, or is not constructed on any previous layers of acts. In contrast, categorial intuition turns on the opposite because it has sensible intuitions as foundational acts, and has both previous and next objective poles, that is, formed objects and sensible objects. But, Husserl also states that

¹⁷ The characteristics of the objects are: “sensuous objects are present in perception at a single act level: they do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion in acts of higher levels, whose objects are set up for them by way of other objects, already constituted in other acts” (Husserl 2001b: 282).

formed objects are new, and that appears only via respective categorial acts.¹⁸ Thus, I pursue the line of thinking that the categorial intuitions can be seen as epistemically dependent on simple intuitive acts, and no formed objects are yet apprehended there. However, without sensible apprehension of objects the formation of categorial intuitive apprehensions of formed objects would not be possible. Therefore, this complicates the occasion to have the Husserlian analysis of knowledge in terms of categorial intuitions.

Husserl emphasizes at the beginning of his investigations that knowing is to be understood as a foundational act, since it is the combination of intuition and signification which are two root intentional acts. However, at least in case of judicative knowledge, also considered to be propositional knowledge, there is an additional internal level which is the very intuition-sort of condition fulfilling the signifying intention at work. This makes categorial intuition represent itself as intuition in part of the 'act of knowing'. As the formation of a categorially articulated intuition, knowing is an act which is distributed among two levels of epistemic foundations. The primary level of knowing is constructed through a fulfillment of the combination of a signifying intention and an intuitive intention. And the secondary level construction moves from the internal to the global, that is, when categorially articulated the intuition fulfillment is based on both simple sensible and categorial intuitions (which are themselves founded on simple intuitions). Now I shall focus on the foundation which makes the categorial intuitive act possible, with reference of §47, which also provides a characterization of the simple sensible intuition in view of a correlation between partial

¹⁸ "the new object like formation is based on the older one; it has object like relation to what appears in the basic acts" (Husserl 2001b: 282).

perceptual intentions that present their intended objects and the fusion of sense-contents. As a result, the simple intuition acquires sensible objects in isolated conditions, but the intuition is not an isolated act because it is not discontinued from any of perceptual intentions through partial grasping of intended objects.

It is clear that as in §46, although multiple partial intentions compile the perception of a single isolated sensible object, the fundamental functionality of perception remains the same because in such cases no new act appears in intentional foundations. In other words, the partial acts of perception are not synthesized in the sense of a new intentional act, but they are fused into a homogeneous object at the same intentional level¹⁹. Additionally, another character of simple intuition is particularity, since the sensible object is intended in its unity although it requires different partial intentions in constant fusion for grasping certain aspects of the object. Thus, “in sense-perception the ‘external thing’ appears in one blow, as soon as our glance falls upon it” (Husserl 2001b: 283). The highlighted part implies that the partial intentions are always fused into a global intuitive object, that is, as a grasped sensible object continuously perceiving a single same object (Husserl 2001b:284). As he evidently states that in a simple sensible intuition perceptual intentions are always directed to the object in unity. For example, as mentioned in his text: “whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see this book. It is always one and the same thing, and that not merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our perceptions themselves” (Husserl 2001b: 284). Thus, although the sense-perception involves a fusion of

¹⁹ “The act of perception also is always a homogeneous unity, which gives the object ‘presence’ in a simple, immediate way” (Husserl, 2001b, 284).

several partial apprehensions, the ‘whole’ is an object which is immediately perceived. So the global perception of the object constantly imposes itself on the perceived reality which reflects a result of simple perception. It is the relations between global perception and the partial perceptual intentions fused which occasion the possible appearance of categorial intuitions²⁰. The state of this fused synthesis with intuitive fulfillment provides categorial articulations. Hence it is possible to observe this in the appearance of partial sense-intentions and their combination with global perception, especially in Lohmar’s interpretations (Lohmar 2002).

As we move to the next logical investigation with reference to a perceived object §48 where Husserl has explained how the intuitive character of the judicative intention ‘A is p’ is formed, it turns out that an act of perception grasps A as a whole in universals at a blow, and as a dependent moment an act of perception is trained upon ‘p’ which belongs to A relatively. These two acts are not performed together one after another in a way of disjointed experiences, otherwise they together would not be bound as if in a single act, that is, A is containing ‘p’ in itself (Husserl 2001b:287). Thus, the disclosure of the partial intention which intends the aspect ‘p’ to belong to an object A is implicit and synthesized with the global intentions that are dependent on the moment A is captured. Such synthesization process is also sometimes known as a deeper way of being a predicative categorial relation explicitly presented but intuitively fulfilled. One may clearly note that regardless of whether categorial intuitions are presented on simple intuitions to which they cannot be reduced (that

²⁰ “The individual precepts of our series have a continuous unity: In this unity, our manifold acts are not merely fused into a phenomenological whole, but into one act, more precisely, into one perception” (Husserl 2001b: 284).

is, when the global perception of the intended object and the partial intentions are fused and operate on the same intentions implicitly under a cover among them), categorial intuitions consist in a new sort of act that as an independent act has its own perceptual objects. In fact, Husserl touches on this point at §48 in terms of fusing our total perception with one specific perception: “[In] the narrowing down of our total perception to one specific perception, the part-intention to ‘p’ will not be torn out of the total appearance of ‘A’, so as to break up the latter’s unity, but an independent act will have ‘p’ as its own perceptual object. At the same time, one’s continuously operative total perception will *cover* this specific perception in respect with one implicit part-intention”(Husserl 2001b:287).

What is interesting here is that an emphasized aspect of ‘A’ is a particular perceptual intention which correlates with the constitutive aspect of the object ‘p’ as it appears explicitly in global perception. This way the event of ‘covering’ in synthesis takes place among intentions. Now onwards the object of the global apprehension will be intended through the emphasized partial aspect. If there is a covering synthesis between partial and global apprehensions, then the unity of perception provides the categorial intuitive content as a continuation to the covering synthesis process. Thus, the categorial intuition should be considered to be the unification of explicit partial intentions with global perception of the intended objects, rather than merely sensible intuitions. The result of this process as a ‘covering unity’ depends on what provides intuitive fulfillment for categorial forms. That is, the categorial aspects of the base intuition have a kind of sensible-content collected through simple intuitions as caused by the covering synthesis between partial intentions and global

perception. But this kind of synthesis guarantees the categorially articulated signifying intentions. That is how categorial intuition occurs from ‘covering unity²¹’, and a new type of object appears with a state of affairs therein. This is similar to those relations that are expressed in judgements, such as a predicative relation ‘A is p’ with copula ‘*is*’, and they can only be intuitively given through the covering synthesis between partial intentions and simple global intentions, which provide a new kind of intuition. It should be observed that the two-fold foundation in intuition that constitutes evident judicative knowledge is covered with structural differences. As we have seen that the foundation of categorial intuition needs a covering synthesis, it becomes evident that it is a synthetic type and quite different from the simple intuition. It should be noted that the synthesis with the more autonomously relative character has the capacity of continuous fusion of contents. In categorial intuition, partial intentions are implicit but later they become explicit and are overlaid onto the global perception where the partial intentions are already integrated as an intrinsic part. In a strict sense, a covering synthesis of intentional experiences takes place on the act of knowing on which the synthesis as such obtains between categorial intuitions and significations (empty intentions). Importantly, it does not seem accurate, although this is to understand the nature of fulfilling synthesis at the base level of categorial intuition.

Whatever way this turns out, the main purpose here is to merely make the partial intuitive content correlate with the global givenness of the object, which ensures that the sense of an

²¹ The covering unity between global and partial intentions “will not set itself up as our object, but will help to set up another object. It will act representatively, and to such effect that, A will now appear to contain ‘p’ in itself (or, with a reversed direction, ‘p’ will appear as contained in A)” (Husserl 2001b: 287).

object correlates with the intuitive content. And the concept of fulfillment involved in the formulation of empty intentions, whose experience is then covered by fully intuitive data, is the main characteristic of knowing—a (synthesis) between empty intentions (significations) and that which offers fulfillments to them (intuitions), that is, a covering synthesis between significations and intuitions. It is the notion of acts that bring about the intuitive givenness of that which it has or requires for the covering of the experiences, but until then they are symbolically intended. As a result, covering is considered to be the fulfillment in the case of synthesis between significations and intuition. However, it is worth discussing the double synthetic structural relation as foundation layers in the act of knowing for the characterization of knowing where it takes place only at higher level relations, that is, at intentional modalities, but not in the categorial intuitions. We shall discuss this further in the section that follows, but before we proceed it is important to understand the meaning aspects of the intuitions and thoughts in view of the ‘act of knowing’ with reference to *Logical Investigations*.

Realm of intuitive acts and meanings

Husserl thinks about how significations are empty intentions themselves and how they can be intuitively fulfilled through the notions of categorial intuitions. But the intuitions derive autonomously from the thought acts and just operate through categorially formed significations, and hence the realm of meaning does not restrict itself to the origins of categorial intuitions as mentioned in §63 of *Logical Investigations: the realm of meaning is*

[...] *much wider than that of intuition, i.e. than the total realm of possible fulfillment* (Husserl 2001b:312). It declares that pure thought is independent of intuition. Significations are open to combining themselves freely, regardless of what intuitive restrictions are. As a result, the signifying acts are submitted to purely logic-grammar laws rather than to intuitions, which sets the possibilities for sense-bearing statements as argued by Renaudie (2013). In turn, the intuitive content does not by itself keep any categorial relations, but this content can at most be a function of confirmation for categorial articulation which originated from the pure thought sphere. For instance, Husserl states in §62 as *with real [intuited] contents none of the categorial forms which fit them is necessarily given: there is abundant freedom to connect and relate, to generalize and subsume, etc.* (Husserl 2001b:309). The main argument is that intuition contributes to only the situations for the evident confirmation of logical articulations not originally stemming from the intuitive, and it does not serve to the creation or ordering of categoriality by itself. Thus, there is a discontinuity between intuitions and thoughts, which is a serious concern for the genesis of creation and operation of categoriality, mainly because categoriality requires in advance a set of logical functions through which pure thought orders and can express itself without external restrictions (Sokolowski 1991).

It seems necessary to deem that intuition is a constitutive part of knowing and not just a bearer of categoriality, and has the power to affirm and disconfirm the categorial relations which are produced by pure thinking. This conclusion is applicable only to sensible objects in isolated conditions carried over by simple perception, not by any relations between the constituent parts. But Husserl made great efforts in depicting categorial intuition as

something drawn from the evident apprehension of isolated objects and logical relations. We can observe this in simple sensible intuitions as there are multiple partial intentions which are fused together and do not explicitly appear as they are: the general appearance of the intended object as 'whole' in global perception through simple sensible intuitions. As we have observed, categorial intuitions are derived from the disclosures of certain partial intentions and their covering synthesis with global perception so that the intuitiveness applies to different types of relations as and when they are formulated as judgements. Since the intuitiveness of categorial intuitions is to be understood as a formulated judgement and judgments can be given different types of relations, this intuitiveness of categorial intuitions can be established as a type of intuition such that it will offer evidence to judicative categorial relations. But, this evidence source offers nothing other than the characterization or shaping of an intuition by something intentionally different from it. In any case, it is all about the perspectival intuitive content moving from which signification categorially delimits the ways of how it has to be synthesized into categorial intuition. For instance, according to Benoist (2008), *in knowing, intuition is molded according to signification or, in other words, intuition operates in exclusive accordance with that which signifying intentions set up as a target to be attained* (Benoist 2008:211).

Interestingly, in order to consider a categorial intuition a foundational act, a process guided by signifying intentions is required in order to make the implicit partial intentions with global perception explicit and synthesize. Thus, this directs the certain categorial relations to have confirmation by perceptual intentions which are, of course, partial. For example, in the

sentence ‘the apple is red’ the categorial functions are guided for the act of knowing. That is, partial intentions which are perceptual highlighting the color of the object (which is red), instead of emphasizing other factors such as shape, texture, taste or quality etc. are clear and explicit and synthesized with the global apprehension of the object, that is, ‘a red apple’. As a matter of fact, it is due to simple intuitions that are attentive to relations in virtue of signifying intentions which have the intuited data that simple intuitions are synthesized in a specific manner to provide intuitive fulfillment for the categorial articulations at work.

Be that as it may, the logical articulations derive from pure categorial thinking expressed by judgments, but not from the intuitive content which is used for the fulfillment. And these logical articulations when fully formed before the confirmation of their intuitiveness also guide the selection of the partial perceptual intentions for synthesization in categorial intuitions. In this way, intuitions are molded by the categorial relations expressed in the judgements, for instance, as a stake from the stakeholder statements. In fact, Husserl has not clearly indicated in the sixth investigation that intuition allows itself the categoriality characterizing categorial intuition, that is, that the relevant logical relations are explicit and independent of judicative intentions. But Husserl states in his text that the ‘categorial articulations are originally exterior to intuitions’, and later they become functional in the act of knowing, but to verify this at first offers not so clear connection to the evidence of logical relations.

Nevertheless, *Logical Investigations* says that intuition accepts the logical restrictions from judgements. If we pursue this line of thinking, as we have seen in the example of the ‘red apple’ above, certain simple partial perceptual intentions are made explicit instead of other factors, thereby revealing the importance of significations in the knowledge ordering. But, how intuition can be guided by logical relations originally and on what grounds this prevails are not still clear. I presume that there must be some sort of continuity between the categorial understanding and sensibility, and perhaps it might be a prior act for the intuition concerned with respect to the categorial forms. Also, if there is no continuity between these two realms concerning origins and functions of categorial relations, then it would be unclear why intuitive acts are led by complex structures outside of their original functioning. I would be interested in exploring this from Husserl’s point of view in the following section using the case of perceptual analysis.

Perceptual synthesis for judgements

It is important to understand Husserl’s conceptual change about categorial intuitions in his later writings, especially in ‘Perceptual Analysis for Passive and Active and Synthesis’ (APAS). Since I pursue an extensive reflection on logic as the theory to justification of knowledge as in APAS sections (please see Husserl 2001a: §1-10), I consider this to be a further extension of *Logical Investigations* itself. Here, Husserl takes up the genetic method as an approach to explain how the subjective sources guarantee the evident givenness of logical validity. In other words, it is vital to see how subjectivity arises from founding or

primary constituent layers to make explicit the requirements of theoretical thinking, and it must be correlated to its objective scope where it is rooted in pre-theoretical synthesis turned to the sensible world as an intuitive function. Husserl insists on the pre-theoretical life of consciousness and on its intuitive function which is conditioned by the conceptual activity where thought brings out scientific understanding of knowledge (Mohanty 2011). We may thus look into how a process takes place in terms of rooting in sensible experience as the epistemic ground for having higher-level intentional acts and its relations. In this section, I aim to merely explore a few insights that allow me to understand the role of categorial intuition in APAS, rather than venture to spell out exhaustive analysis.

Hence the first topic I highlight in Husserl's reconsideration of the foundational differences between the two levels of knowledge foundations is the way in which the main characteristics of the general structure of knowing are presented through the intuitional sphere. For instance, Husserl described 'perceiving as a two stage process': *the object is constantly given to us as unchanged, as the same* (Husserl 2001a:34), And then there is "a constant variation of modes of appearance, perspectives, so that we have a consciousness that runs through them and connects them up, a consciousness of the one and the same object" (Husserl 2001a:34), mentioned in the section §10, the introduction part of APAS. Here, what is emphasised as a characteristic of perception is the constitutive relation between the unitary givenness of the apprehended object that remains the same and its diverse modes of appearance.

In this respect, Husserl regarded modes of appearances as explicit and complementary aspects. As a consequence, when the perceptual process unfolds, the first part is established as an identity of the perceived content: recognizing objects and later being intended, that is, a single object is viewed from a series of variable perspectives. For example, in looking at an object with subjectivity and also with an objective scope, the difference is all about how the content has been established in the sense of the world and how that appears in the judicative evident knowledge. Let's now come back to the case of perception. As an identifying synthesis of the partial modes of appearance or manifestation of an object allows for the object recognition process (in discerning the identity of the perceived object), I posit that its general schema is similar to content fusion in simple perception as mentioned in the sixth logical investigation.

Moreover, Husserl renders the temporal flow of partial intentions as the structural gain and loss of intuitive prominence as an apprehension process. This becomes clear as he states that the partial modes of givenness inherent in an object's identity are not just partially apprehended, but they are successive modes in terms of an ordered structure in a temporal flow. Soon these modes lose their identity to other modes of givenness, and till then they are only suggestive possible modes of givenness for a new apprehension so that they can be perceived attentively (Steinbock 1998; Husserl 2001a). That is how the identity of perceived objects is constituted and manifest in different aspects which are part of consciousness and thus become structurally inherited. This description shows how perceiving a single object by means of multiple modes of givenness in terms of manifestation or appearance obtains when

not all of these modes can be available to consciousness. This point also explains why only the structural succession can be presented to consciousness. For example, to be clearer, let's have a look into the Husserl's description on the perceptual process "between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived" (Husserl 2001a:40). As he goes on, we come to notice that each and every single perceptual intention has a particular aspect (second) of the object and that object is emphasized with intuitive features in terms of apprehensions (present, past and future) which later become the central theme of perceptual consciousness. This is due to the perceptual grasping of the object features such as present, past or future. This means that perceptual synthesis is not just a fusion of intuitive contents added one to another in an effective manner, but also a confluence of the aspects of both what is intuitively given and what is not given or co-intended in every object perspective. For instance, in the synthesis between different types of perceptual intentions some of which are effectively intuitive and some others of which are not very intuitive the different types of perceptual intentions confer the objectual identity globally on the perceived object. For example, in connection with universals extracted from particulars through intuition as in 'the sky is blue' genuine intuitive knowledge of the colour of the 'sky' is taken to be 'blue', but the non-intuitive knowledge constituting the possible colours of the sky may be orange, violet etc. across VIBGYOR. Therefore, the perceptual synthesis is not merely the convergence of the intuitively given and non-given, but also the consolidation of foundational layers of the varied perspectives of the object 'sky' which constitutes an

objective global identity. These remarks serve to throw light on the relations of new knowledge in the context of its origin.

Thus, even though the intentions are fully intuitive and are synthesised with others that announce only additional aspects of intuitiveness, these intuitions are part of the givenness of intuitivity in terms of the aspects which are referred to by the intuitive data at a given moment as already perceived or as newly perceived. As a result of this, the object in perceptual apprehension always goes beyond the particular intuited data grasping moment, since the relevant aspect of apprehension is not currently apprehended in their intuitive fullness, but influenced by what is already perceived or to be apprehended. For instance, “it is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the side actually seen as a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not taken for the thing, but rather, that something transcending the side is intended in consciousness as perceived” (Husserl 2001a:41). Here, in each turn the partial data are effectively intuited but they are never considered to be the whole objects in being identical with it—they are merely synthesized with the horizons of further possible data. So we can say that objects perceived with their global character can be apprehended through the constitutive partiality of each perceptual givenness. For instance, it is evidential knowledge that varied appearances of the object ‘sky’ form but it still arises from a non-intuitive perspective that exists as the earth traveling across the orbit changes its color from blue to a reddish hue depending on the distance from the sun to the earth.

Thus far we have seen that the discussion on the passive ordering of perception in Husserlian view, especially in the context of *Logical Investigations*, is meant for higher-order synthesis posited between two intentional acts: significations and intuitions. The prominent issue revolves around identifying certain structures earlier attributed exclusively to the relations existing between intentional modalities which are simple intuitions or simple perceptions (though it is just a matter of difference in terminology). As Husserl says in APAS: “we now have to describe the process of perception as a process of acquiring knowledge” (Husserl 2001a:44), which means that for Husserl the prominence of particular feature that defines knowledge is the fulfillment of synthesis. Thus, for instance, when he talks about ‘act of knowing’ only perception does not constitute knowledge by itself and so it requires an act of fulfilling synthesis between significations (empty intentions) and intuition (intuitive knowledge) which are intentional modalities. These are already at work in the ordering of simple perception autonomously. In fact, there are empty intentional prefigurations of experiences inclusively which can be fulfilled as the aspects of the anticipated act fill in perceptual consciousness. This is very similar to attaining full intuitive givenness. This way empty intentions posit gradual fulfillment, thereby formulating the horizon for every single intuitive act. With this process, I contend, the transformation takes place from the undetermined and vague to the fully determined. Thus, the conceptual activity promotes that as knowledge which is within the premises of simple perception and without the interference of signifying acts, but transformation has a degree of variance, though.

Judgments and categories in the perceptual realm

We have observed in the sections above that the general structure of synthesis with reference to *Logical Investigations* plays a prominent role in simple perception. How simple perception reveals the basic categorial articulations is thus clear. In fact, these articulations are already to be found at this intentional level. Husserl discusses how ‘active synthesis’ can constitute the notion of an object, and in the process of knowledge acquisition about the objects or world perception cannot be reduced to a passive event. In fact, as I have argued, perception with cognitive interests should be considered an initial level of subjective activity, and hence it is able to reveal explicitly involvement of the intrinsic elements in the content: significations (empty intentions) and categorial articulations (Husserl 2001a). In this process, Husserl identifies two momentums which belong in the sensible or perceptual realm and can be understood as the initial acts of intentionality. As far as the judicature act goes, the objectivation is effectively involved with cognitive interests, but it is not that easy to notice this realm through its initial active exercises: genetic and sensible syntheses (Husserl 2001a). As a result, the knowledge expressed by its judgements are still considered to be founded act, but this act must need intuitions as its founding layer. This means that the role of intuitions in judgements cannot be neglected, and so it is not sensible to regard categorial articulations as external to intuitions in perception.

At the first level, perception should be the establishment of the perceptual theme in the constitution of an objective sense. We can see this in directing attention which affects the

subject, for example, when we direct attention to an unfamiliar sensible object such as an unknown sound or visual object. As it distracts the attention and diverts the subject towards something which attracts us, a change of the attentive state through the cognitive interests in perception is evident. In fact, this is just about what occurs in the fixation of *the object as the substrate and center of a unitary interest* (Husserl 2001a:290) that is prior to the actual perceptual exploration through cognitive interests. At this particular level the notion of objects is not fully formed as the objectivity of the apprehended data has just begun. At this initial level, the perceptual theme will be gradually enriched to the point where it can be formed as an object intentionally: *grasped in undifferentiated generality* (Husserl 2001a:293). Husserl has marked the notion of global perception as he has described in his sixth logical investigation the moment when affecting pre-data effectively turn to conceptual data without exhibiting the parts of the object but as whole a perceptual theme is uniquely constituted.

In any case, it is certainly the case that there is always a difference between global perception and simple perception in the sixth logical investigation because the global grasping functions are implicit until the partial simple intentions become explicit through the process of rendering the object as something. In a way, it appears only when required by the categorial signifying intentions, as per APAS. This is an undifferentiated apprehension or perception in a perceptual process only for the initial moment, but it is different from the usual character of the perceptual process since it is an autonomous intentional modality.

Conclusions

As I make some final remarks here, further extensions from the second level of perceptual activity are still to be analyzed. Significantly, we have observed that the general structure of knowing synthesis and perceptual activity follow a genetic ordering. This shows that the fulfillment of categorial forms (including intuitions, articulations, and intentions) is rooted in synthesis where perception autonomously explores its themes. Hence categorial intuitions are to be replaced by the perceptual explication process with reference to the intuitive synthesis. This way the general structure has a genetic continuity, and it runs through intuitive synthesis between sensibility and knowledge for judgements. Here the signification can direct the intuition to higher-level acts of knowledge due to its basic structure which takes place in the notions of unrevealed sensibility.

However, as mentioned above, the fundamental problem dealt with here opens up the scope to delve into aspects of categoriality and its forms. For instance, global perception indicates an intentional modality as just an explanatory process which is triggered by the initial levels of affection, but if one continues with cognitive interests from a genetic perspective the genetic history of cognitive interests becomes objectivized. Then global perception loses its autonomy in intentional modality as an objective sense constitution process. There are also further questions like how the covering synthesis and categorial intuitions are grounded in each other in the active mode of perceptual activity, and what categorial forms are inherent in intuitive synthesis which is infused with cognitive interests. This is still open for further

research. Investigations into these questions can perhaps provide an advancement in understanding of the fundamental aspects of the sensibility of judgment in an act of knowing or in nature of knowledge origins and acquisition as a conceptual activity rather than as merely causal reasoning. I believe these arguments from Husserl's *Sixth Logical Investigations* and APAS would lead to further developments of ideas on judicative essence in evidential knowledge at a possibly higher level.

CHAPTER IV

Forms are Objects of Intuitions

Abstract: Recent works on philosophy of mind and cognition have seen an increase of interest in the theories of knowledge sources, yet its nature offering an advancement of form of intuition is an object-giving source within it. The standard view holds that object of intuitions can be heavily considered for in terms of their sensory or hyletic contents. However, Husserlian view on *synthesis* specifies that intuitions required a passive and temporal synthesis of content, mode, and the objects of it. This view is also suggested to hold for states of knowledge objectivity and tendentials. Primarily, this chapter has been developed upon the Husserlian phenomenological framework, and I continue that a focus on the historicity relating how forms are objects of intuition where the object constitution in knowledge which is phenomenologically implausible yet. The parts of this chapter offer the self-transformativity of sensory experiences into fulfillment of awareness which is an anchor for a form of reflexivity and its dimensions that become enriched in connection with an act of knowing.

Keywords: Meaning, experientiality, essence, objectivity, tendencial, intuitions and judgmental sense

Objects in 'Truth'

Down the ages, 'interpretation of truth': *discarding the falsehood* is a significant problem in metaphysics, philosophers have spent their lives to have doctrines on relation between soul and body. According to Aristotle, soul²² is the form of organism which are the actuality and potentiality of the body as an expression of it is like a connection between 'form (actuality) and matter (potentiality)', that is a composition of two elements which results in one substance in a whole (Hicks, 1907:49-52). The 'form and matter' formulation of realization and potentiality was first expressed as a doctrine by Aristotle, says mainly, "the form gives essential meaning to matter when it confers specific being on it, so the soul gives essential to the body when it constitutes it a human organism." (see Brennan, 1945:31), and that became a primary solution to the vexed philosophers those who devoted their lives on this investigation, though many commentators and critics are uncertain about the completeness of this solution. Such as hylomorphic doctrine which is midway between the formalistic²³ tradition proposed by Plato and Democritus materialistic²⁴ traditions, these two were established before Aristotle and revived

²² For Aristotle, "the term "soul" covers the whole range of biological life, manifesting itself at vegetative, sensitive, and human levels. The entire series is to be regarded as "a continuous development from lower to higher: starting at the inorganic level, pushing its way up through all the manifold exhibitions of vital phenomena, and crowned at its highest cosmic level by human existence [...] beyond this, there is the distinct possibility of forms entirely separated from matter, having a degree of intelligence more perfect than man possesses". Thus Aristotle viewed the "universe in a sweeping vision that could range, by the power of his insight, from for less matter to matterless form" (Brennan, 1945:31).

It is clear that the modern evolutionists are so preoccupied with grasping of dynamic principle, for instance the "Darwinian hypothesis was fairly well projected by Aristotle in the fourth century before Christ" (Brennan 1945:32 and Conway,1941).

²³ On the other hand, the idealist who regards "matter as nothing more than a projection of mind, and physical processes as aspects of mental phenomena, is not more empathic than Aristotle in maintaining that man exhibits a formal or intellectual side to his nature." (Brennan, 1945:31)

²⁴ The materialist who regards "the mind as nothing more than another and subtler aspect of matter, and mental processes as the outcome and development of physical phenomena, is not more empathic than Aristotle in maintaining that man has an essentially material aspect to his nature." (Brennan, 1945:31).

many times after him. Thereafter, contemporary philosophical interests and medieval notion of intention of thought influenced by Aristotle's theory of sensations in various ways appeared in frame mainly on René Descartes (1596—1650) and the Empiricists like Franz Brentano (1838—1917); Aristotle defines in his theory of sensation, intentionality is a distinctive characteristic of the mental phenomena: 'directedness of mental acts'. Nevertheless, Franz Brentano's claim as described in psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) states every mental phenomena is intentional that involves "the reference to something as an object" this has been coined as *intentional inexistence*²⁵ (Brentano et al, 1995:97).

According to Brentano, Aristotle's solution for the problem of intentionality is the fundamental requirement for any adequate 'theory of mind': on the basis of causal powers and physical magnitudes of potentiality, particularly, his analysis of representations on casuals powers and the emphasis shows the role of non conceptual content, but Aristotle confirms the inadequateness of his solution to solve the problem of *phantasia* as it is a representational (Brentano and et al, 1995:97).

Latter Aristotle, at regular intervals, Bertano developed quite differently, and profoundly a theory of content: on the relation between acts and objects, it says, every mental phenomenon has its own object and it is different from every other, that is different mental phenomena relate to own objects in different ways based on whether they are mental acts of presenting or judging or evaluating of something (Brentano and et al, 1995).

²⁵ According to Brentano ([1874] 1924), "intentionality was a means to a further end, that of securing the autonomy of psychology: while all mental phenomena exhibit intentionality, he argued, no physical phenomenon does; therefore, the subject matter of psychology must fall outside the scope of the physical sciences." (Caston, 1998:249).

Here, in his arguments, *identification of something* is about identifying intentionality as symbol of objects, that is different forms of imagination, sensations, hallucinations and perceiving and etc. connects and bear to one another in terms of the relationships. For instance, the ‘relationships’ are like between expressions and judgments, and(or) evaluations, that is, judgments or evaluations are fundamentally based on how we communicate the symbol of objects through an expression or presentation of which about judging or evaluating (Brentano and et al, 1995).

Although the evidence is not much supportive, to an extent, Brentano along with other students of him have continued the discussions on tracing the history of the intentionality in connection with Aristotle, he described the central doctrine conception of intentionality ‘On the Soul’ as precursors, for instance: “Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages used to call the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object, and which we might call—although with expressions which are not entirely unambiguous—relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is here not to be understood as something real), or immanent-object-hood. Each contains something as an object within itself, although not in the same way. In presentation, something is presented; in judgement, something is accepted or rejected; in love, loved; in hate, hated; in desire, desired; and so on”. (Brentano et al, 1995:88–89).

Edmund Husserl who was a student of Brentano, and with others (1884 to 1886) studied the intentionality in connection with reflections and proposed that the analysis of intentionality of the mind is a fundamental key to explain other issues in the philosophy relating to knowledge sources. However, the term ‘intentionality’ is the central notion of phenomenology and concerns

the ‘aboutness’ or ‘directedness’ of our experiences as it is their characteristic notion which certainly performed a unifying function. In view of Husserl (1982), the intentional experiences are our mental experiences with different modes or forms (perceiving, judging, believing, imaging, hallucinating, etc) directed to an entity in contrast to mental states such as pain or other sensations lacking directedness that is not part of that experience itself (Husserl 1982, §13, 378f, §15b; Hauser, 2018), these intentional experiences are referred as acts, however, Husserl (Husserl 1901a, §13, pp. 378f) has introduced this term for merely notational simplification purpose when talking about acts “all thought of ‘activity’ must plainly be excluded” (see Hauser 2018:31 for translation). Also, Husserl had a view that ‘propositions’ are *not* the objects of judgments and they are ‘act-universals’ represented in particular acts of ‘thinking’, so the propositions of knowledge are abstract semantic entities, and their types necessarily receive their tokens in acts of finite rational thinking (Mulligan, 2004). This view points out the significance of Husserlian metaphysics of the ‘propositions’ especially for the problem of psychologism in all forms (Willard, 1997).

According to Husserl the psychologism is equivalent to naturalism²⁶, it says the whole sphere of idealities and ideal objects are equated with psychological being for empirical sense. So something that can be psychologically, but Husserl was not really favor of psychologism, and on philosophy of arithmetics since mathematical objects dealt in the sense of ideal objects having been psychologistic which has been rejected in *Prolegomena*. Although psychologism thesis (Kusch, 2007) expressed its strongest form, Husserl commented with several strong unfavorable

²⁶ “The concept of naturalism allows us to achieve a deeper reading of the psychologistic thesis,...logical psychologism is the thesis that logic explanatorily reducible to empirical psychology [...] explanatory reduction of logic to empirical psychology entails scientific naturalism about logics. Thus logical psychologism is nothing more and nothing less than a species of naturalized logic or form of naturalism about logic” (Hanna, 2009:13).

instructive arguments on it. The rejection of psychologism thesis was essentially based on the evidence from strategies of modal, epistemological and anti-relativistic. Thus, such examination, psychologism constantly maintained a compound view, propositions are necessarily mental items and the logic is the branch empirical psychology, by induction from empirical psychological evidence, but be it strictly phenomenal and physicalistic. Husserl describes in *Logical investigations* (see 1913 edition preface) psychological analysis of philosophy of arithmetics in prolegomena with a strict distinction between a phenomenological and psychological analysis, where the phenomenological analysis is about all connections to actual experiences of individuals think in an empirical way have cancelled and how it directs to the phenomenological reductions and eidetic descriptions. Such findings are based on “what can be intuited in pure immanence” (Ruin, 2011:71), it represents the significance of the pure intuitions to describe the transcendental consciousness in a phenomenology as a discipline.

Let me brief them, for Husserl both the logic and rational thinking in humans are essentially intimate. And all the logical propositions in knowledge are mental items though it is not the case that necessary, but he is particular that necessarily all logical proportions are possibly thought by only finite rational thinkers among all which is weak logical psychologism. On one hand, Husserl argued between the lines of logical knowledge thesis and logical cognition, that rational insight or self-evidence is primacy for a finite rational thinker to grasp the logical truth in knowledge, similarly, finite rational intuitive minds can able to grasp all logical truths with self-evidence. Sometimes arguments to prove the second condition may yield to evidence for weak logical psychologism thesis. However, by holding such views on these thesis is not the same as that I am holding relativistic theory of logical truth, and that logical relativism is

unsuccessful, means in a least sense, truth with rational thinking ensures some logical truths are necessary truths. Perhaps, such a view showed the difference between the possible finite rational minds having at least certain performative rational cognitive powers or actual human minds (Hanna, 1993). However, Husserl, discussion on ‘truth’ as immanent to awareness in his logical investigations reflects the epistemological position, similarly other commentators like Dallas Willard (1984) pursue Husserlian ideas are realist one quest through rigorously scientific philosophy: “If there are minds with true assumptions or beliefs about the objects of experience, then those objects must exist, and insofar there is of necessity a ‘world’. The world’s existence is therefore relative to truth, but not to minds; and...truth itself is for Husserl independent of minds.” (Willard, 1984:237). This systematic methodological exploration in further sections about the forms of knowledge, how all forms of intentional relations can be treated as intuitive knowledge or intuitive objects is significant to the current investigation and advancements in the area.

Though the interpretation of inferences for truth and reality has been determined in logical investigations of Husserl, the following question still remains: does Husserl think the inference interpretation for the expression of truth depends on whether someone could be justified in believing the expectations would fulfill or satisfaction completely or partially in the intention?

I focus on Husserlian early conception of intuitive fulfillment in connection with expression of truth. And then, my analysis on this framework emphasize merely not on adjacency among the propositional truth and the discursive justifications on beliefs rather than the constitutionality between synthesis and the elements for knowledge where the objective identity involved.

Object awareness in self is a mental activity

Nevertheless, in relevance with questions of justification sense: it can be argued two ways, on the one hand, few commentators in latter literature of Husserl affirmed that normally 'justification' is on the basis of 'epistemic conception' grasped from the perceptual experiences, however on the other part to some significant degree has interpretation of truth and, and on the other hand, opposite critics said to this affirmation have a non-epistemic conception of truth. However, the question is especially prominent for the theory of knowledge, the essence of experiences and intentionality²⁷ that relates to the conception of hyle. Thus, these assertions are indeed of a comprehensive analysis among the distinct types of relations for the objects or things in the knowledge, those relations who interpret merely to a self (egoness) and another that applies to individuals that is it represents the integration of a particular intentional relation which can be produced without matching of action (Barresi and Moore, 1996).

For instance, the intentionality thesis of Brentano says "every mental phenomenon has an object, one cannot describe the mental life attitudes without mentioning its object." (Brentano and et al, 1995, pp.88-89), that is an expression of feelings without felt, for example sorrow without sadness, interest without the interested and so on. And such objects cannot be dissociable from attitude as they are the internal features of them (Brentano and et al, 1995).

²⁷ "The theory of intentionality in Husserl is roughly the same as phenomenology in Husserl. His descriptions of Intentionality - or, intentiveness are the principal part of his transcendental phenomenological idealism. [...] Translation of term intentionaliteit in English as intentionality, that directs attention reflectively to the present and immediately past temporal extent of my mental life, this life to be changing from moment to moment in many respects. But, no matter how widely it varies, each of its successive partial extents is intrinsically an awareness of things, an awareness of them as other than the given extent itself or any of its really immanent components (Cairns et al, 2001:116-117). [...]Equivalently stated: The reflectively observable stretch of mental life is, as a whole and in each of its phases, an intending of things; it is (to revive an obsolete expression) intensitive to things. Thus it has the intrinsic quality that Husserl called intentionality or inventiveness" (Cairns et al, 2001:116-117).

But, for Husserl, in the broadest sense, the successive components of mental life²⁸ is an ‘awareness of things’ that also refer as ‘conscious things’²⁹ and the mental life does not prefer to stick up merely for the external relations rather our mental attitudes, intentionality and perceiving too.

However, as indicated by Husserl in his logical investigations (Husserl, 1901, L.U., V. Unters. § 11 [Cairns 2001, translation]: “in intentional mental processes an object is meant, is aimed at,” that is the object referred to a state of affairs which is a mental phenomena... “that involves no more than that certain processes are present, which have a characteristic of intention Only one affair is present, the intentional process, whose essential descriptive characteristic is precisely the intention. If this process is present, with its psychic concrete fullness, then the so-called ‘intentional relation’ to an object is effected ipso facto ... And naturally such a process, with its intention can be found in consciousness even though the object does not exist at all and, perchance, cannot exist”. (Cairns et al, 2001:118-119).

Generally, the term ‘awareness’ is used to refer to the mental activity processes in which I (self) or some other’s ego (self) get involved, thus, the ‘aware of things’ are conscious where the mental processes are inventive. But, does the mental processes are conscious in the narrowest sense?, not certainly, that is, which I or other’s egotic doesn’t engaged and it can be distinguished carefully in full stream of our mental life, however, in both conditions the processes are intrinsically inventive towards things (Cairns and et al, 2001), for instance, engaged in thinking or intending about a ‘thing’ as part of ‘mental process’ which perceiving through our senses, for

²⁸The distinctive quality of mental life is about its awareness of things, in the broadest sense the metonymy of mental life is itself intentionality and the quality of it’s intentiveness (Cairns and et al 2001)

²⁹In fact, the word ‘things’, and ‘awareness,’ is used to express unusually broad senses.

example visual or tactical senses has been going on thinking about a thing like a “sitting’ (in a chair) on the floor’, for the time-being to recall that I or our egoic desires to give this ‘sitting’, I or our egoic extrinsically not aware where we are sitting, which is a ‘floor’, but, while perceiving, being an observer I can able to recollect it, thus in a broader sense, intrinsically I was already on the thing-perceiving process and it was in itself inventive to the thing-floor. But in a narrower sense an awareness of things (here it is a floor) are not conscious, nevertheless, our senses of the ‘thing’ turn into conscious applies to narrower sense also, though it is in a sense of anticipation it is significant, however, our ‘awareness’ have an observable egoic quality as a property, which is a newly determinable dimension of its inventiveness. Thus, again in the broadest sense all our mental life is all about awareness of things, that is, ‘intending to or intend of’ is to purpose of something, like true conversely of all derivative expressions to the world. In this manner, it is certain that the intentions are merely a quality of intending. It is not limited to intentions but also other characters of feelings and acts which are intendings such as perceiving, remembering, expectations, loving and fearing and thus have inventiveness. As they are things of inventiveness and are intrinsically qualifies as having objects, as having senses, which are not real constitutes of them (Cairns and et al, 2001). Though it differs, the intentionality (intentionaliteit) is not just a relation rather it is the nature of mental processes or a qualitative phenomena of the mental life, that means every bit of mental life successive partial spaces are constitutionally ‘awareness of things’ because it is other than any given space itself thus considered as any of its own elements. But as already discussed in the literature from decades by not denying the intentionality is about the directedness or awareness of things, the ‘quality of awareness’ (intellectual or experiential) is significant in the mental process and manifestation of

things or realization of things in one's self or ego knowledge. Simultaneously, if someone would justify the experientiality is an act of knowing the self (ego), would that objects constitutes the intellectual content for the fulfillment of awareness knowledge, in fact, self have own things from their experiences, that is experiential content represents things as native elements of the judgemental sense though they are momentary but have a significant contribution to the conception of knowledge.

For example, if I put my hand on an object 'coin or a stone' on the table involuntarily, when I initially put the hand on the coin we react to the feel of bump on the palm which causes a kind of discomfortness, this whole experiential phenomena of happenings has unmediated objects and not described and merely a pure experience on its own, like sipping an empty cup, which is the first-order experience, referring back to the same example, the feeling of discomfortness makes me took of the palm on the coin or the object because the immediate givenness of the feeling as something-below-my-palm which are the native elements of the reflective experience and I am able to recall the shape, texture, and size of the object that would help in conclude type of object that I put a hand on it. These are the second order of experiences, or second order of awareness.

Objects embodiment and transcendental

Yet, no matter how widely the experiential content varies, for Husserl it is all about the reflections from the first-person or self as it is the starting point of the transcendental phenomenology by providing the essential features and the essence of what we experienced.

But the experiential phenomena of experiences are immediate and first-personal givenness which is accountable in view of pre-reflectiveness, that is the experience happens for the subject experience part of immediacy, that marked implicitly as self-experiencing of things or (self) awareness of things, according to Gallagher and Zahavi (2013) in a minimal form it is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Yet, the pre-reflective self-awareness notions are merely about how the experiences have a feel towards the objects though it is unmediated, which the subjective feel to them is a typical phenomenal quality of first-personal (first-order experience) givenness of experience, and what it is like to have them.

Fundamentally the term self-awareness is neither an entity for the attentively inspects about one's momentary activity nor reflectively introspects their own experiences, rather it is an embedded process of pre-reflectiveness in a higher-order cognition which is very primary mental state and sometimes it behaves as a process too, thus it is very primary substance in the experiences which always self-manifesting in consciousness and that part of self-appearances.

However, for Brentano and Heidegger, the pre-reflectiveness in self is not really a qualitative accessory to experiences, instead of it constitutes the being mode which is experiential, such that, the reflective self is an explicit being of a lower-order or second-order conscious experiences can also known as inner perception³⁰ (inner reflections) that contrast to the outer, but it involved in every conceptual and objectifying awareness. However, for Heidegger (see *Die Grundprobleme*

³⁰ Cyril McDonnell (2011) writes that in regard with Brentano, “the inner perception is an inner act of perceiving that accompanies each and every psychical act-experience that befalls the mentally active subject. [...] Brentano’s inner perception also means the ability of the mentally active subject to turn attention away from ‘physical phenomena’ (or ‘things’) given to outer perceptual-sense experience and towards psychical act-experiences themselves correlated to their objectives, in order to describe what such experiences are themselves, without appealing to any natural scientific, or any other kind of hypothetical or causal line of reasoning.” (McDonnell, 2011: 108).

der Phänomenologie, 1989, translations) the self awareness is very primary to all reflections and that pre-reflections are the ‘mode of experiential being’ in self for apprehensions, but not for the disclosure of it (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2005). Thus, the *self* is capable of accounting for all psychic experiences of identity: the experiences about the self-identity through an active space is no need to project as a different entity over and above the stream of experiences in the context of Brentano’s inner perception (See McDonnell, 2011). It shows that pre-reflective awareness of things in one’s self deals with inner perception and it is distinct from explicit awareness of things in a self, but the contents are hints and cues for insights to understanding into the essence, but not the real things, whereas the high influence of our belief system which may be hardwired or due to the conceptual and objectification of things. Though, it appears to be more like qualitative features of our experiences which are ‘feelings’ than the rational knowledge of the force of cognitive insights, however, the moment ‘self’ becomes aware of such feeling, it draws the qualitative nature of reflection as medium and it does not oppose with the thematic of experience as it is belonging of the mineness or oneself, but it deals with the non-observable, non-objectifying and self-acquaintance by virtue the pre-reflective self-awareness notions are connected with the idea of a certain experiential phenomena that have a quality of what it is like to be or feel have to them. Thus one can pursue and realize them as perceptual experiences and that can be characterized through the mineness those dealt with higher order subjective experiences of feelings which are phenomenal and cognitive functions: desires, wishes, emotions and thinking, for instance as reported by James (1890) latter Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson and Zahavi’s (*see Self, No Self?*³¹) in their studies on Self from different perspectives affirmed that

³¹“According to the authors: “these meditative instructions offer the glimpse of an experience of awareness as being clear and without content, while being self-aware. It is a state in which awareness experiences itself without the distortions imposed by the dualistic structure through which we usually deal with reality. In this state, consciousness

every experience is personal and subjective givenness require an experiential reference implicitly to the self and its dimensions³² (Siderits, 2011). Similarly, physicalists says that, an aspect of such reference to self describes the structure of things, also it governs the self into it: through the sensorial experiences *to know* and to be a *self*, however they hung up on the fact that not able to figure out as being what an experience is about, simultaneously they appear to be abstracted to unknown fact in an experiential phenomena that is what is to be physical (Glattfelder, 2019). Yet, understanding those cues of conscious experiences from the world appears to be physical, yet that experiential knowledge is impalpably psychic and there are relevant objections from phenomenal and cognitive side in with respect to the experiential content. The question is about the relation of these two particular dimensions whether *physical and psychic or internal and external or self and no-self* of conscious experiences (C.E) and the components of it, though it is evident that happening of such experiences in a temporal state of mental and biological phenomena have intangible involvement as the *self* is not an organism, rather than the ‘self’ is a higher level structure which loaded with order of qualitative feelings of every experience,

appears as empty since it is free from any content, but it is not nothing either since it is luminous, having a basic self-presencing or reflexivity that is irreducible to the usual subject-object structures of our ordinary conception of experience. This non-dual state seems to correspond, at least partly, to how many Yoga *ca rīns* understand consciousness at its deepest level, that is, as being free from dualistic distortions and experiencing itself directly. Although we think of experience as having a dual structure, in reality the duality is more a result of how we interpret experience than an accurate reflection of its nature. In its most basic state, consciousness does not exist apart from its object. Both subject and object forms are superimposed on a consciousness that is but a single field of awareness”. (Siderits, 2011:122).

³² The self and mineness of an individual behaves like synonyms, when the self or mineness becomes aware of ‘itself’, thus it secure reflection quality, and reflected to the self (Siderits, 2011). Similarly, an explicit awareness is not opposed with pre-reflective self-awareness - however, is explicit awareness synonymous with intellectuality of a self? Suppose if the experience as belonging to a self, it deals with non-observational, non-objectifying self-acquaintance. “Thus the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is related to the idea that experiences have a subjective ‘feel’ to them, a certain (phenomenal) quality of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have them. It is a case for perceptual experiences, experiences of desiring, feeling and thinking”. So the feeling of mineness characterizes all such experiences. If we put all experiences are ‘feelings of subject’, then the first-person givenness should entails the experientiality as self-reference. (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2013:56). Gallagher and Zahavi developed this phenomenological analysis connected with Nagel (1974) theories of consciousness.

perhaps it recalls them from secondary (second order) experiences that resides in the human memories, it significantly mediates the response of the biophysical phenomena to experiential phenomena through its own functional and structural components that expect to prove the fundamental relation (Glattfelder, 2019). Thus the self is an experiencer and it holds the concept of existence but few supporters of the physicalists have an objection to this 'concept of existence'. However the query is different, what transcendental constraints made interim relation of 'processes' in terms of 'acts' for the sources of knowledge and how complex those transactions are enough capable to progress further arguments. And as the discussion goes on I advance in the present a view of the conceptual and phenomenological confusions.

Having said that, from phenomenological aspect in the realm of transcendence conscious experiences of self has arrives to a state of evolution in higher planes, thus the implications of it aware the self itself in the context of 'Dasein' (Hoffmeyer, 1996) which can refer as 'being' in highest level of ontology, however it is not in our scope of the project.

According to Christian Bayer (2018), self is not experienced as something irrelevant and disassociated in temporal-consciousness, so the transcendence of the regular and perpetual methods are cognitively loaded which used of identifying meanings via our personhood or identity. However, happening experiences of self is not construed and analysed in temporality as an event but the temporal relations always represent the pastness of experiences later they become part of human memories, yet, the self as 'being' is meant experiencing the presentness in a particular space, so the inquiry of that self has been analysed and defined within proximity of experiential content of the analyst, which the awareness of things in self influenced from the timely occurrence experiences. In such process of the inquiry itself transforms at some point of

time into the cultivation of results, however, it is not the ultimate piece of knowledge rather than a localized experience, fundamentally, if there is a certain ways of duality (*physical and mental or matter-psychoic duality*) is implied then transcendence of experiences are not allowed by themselves, but in this case a major experiential component has been ruled-out for the analysis within the given experiential content, this would be something different from the one who really experienced it. However, the knowledge is blended with the act executions of experiential execution of any acts, latter it turns out as an embodied cognitive component in self, that is according to Soldati, (2005) the knower of object and the relevant knowledge all must have to meditate on the same plane, thus the inquiry process for the knowing as the one expression of Truth³³ (Kripke, 1975; Soldati, 2005). Although this is a cognitive process it may transcended as habitual linearity of everyday experiences with many qualitative acts and the belief system influences the modes of thinking, this applicable to secondary experiences also. But, the ultimate state of transcendence is a sought of bindingness of the separated acts for the formation of knowledge in the same higher plane i.e. expression of Truth.

Nevertheless, the ordinary experience³⁴ of the *self* cannot be considered as similar to linear experience rather it contains a curve that causes to manifests a serious interest in all aspects of the identity without contradictory to other experiences (that includes imaginative reflections) that lead to enlightened³⁵, thus the second order experiences which are reflections of inner

³³ “The general notion of truth applies to an utterance, a belief, a proposition, etc., which corresponds to the world or to some portion of it, for a fact obtaining in the world. The notion of Truth can state the meaning of the expression ‘true’ in ordinary language; or it can provide a criterion for establishing whether truth obtains in some specific case” (Soldati, 2005:65).

³⁴ “Ordinary experience does not employ the technical procedures and theories of professional philosophers. However, there is some awareness of and influence from these sources. Nevertheless, such theories and techniques are not, generally speaking, decisive factors in ordinary experience. The term "experience" here means awareness of various kinds of entities. The term “entity” is here used to refer to “anything” of which a person is aware”. (Johnson, 1964: 96-97).

³⁵ Profoundly informed to ego or educated ego or freedom from embodiment.

observations of the same that influences the initiation of the higher level of intuitions or transcends to intuitive thinking latter stages of observations. In such a cognitive process, shift in identity should be treated as a *knowledge* of self or identity. However, in case, if this cognitive process is considered to be an instrument to the experiences of ‘other’ then the same process is also an instrument for the experiences of the transcendental, and with the help of such an instrument one can able to pursue the duality through their own experiences, also it might qualify as prospective activity of the enlightenment, this lead to manifest all aspects of the transcendental. For instance, a thoughtful statement made by an Indian scholar Adi Shankaracharya³⁶ (788-820 AD) who consolidated the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta (non-dualism)³⁷ is significant to mention in this context: “if at all the experience of I am ‘this’ has to be there, let the ‘this’ include everything in the creation.” (Menon, 2014: 216, translations of Harinama Keerthanam: 3 by Tunnettu Ezhuthachan (2000, 12 eds)), according to Sankara, the Brahman³⁸ (the whole or the ultimate) is the space because of the ‘other’ is possible and that spreads throughout everything (Sankaracarya, 1987:59; Menon, 2014), which means, for cognition, the essential meaning of any content is transcendental, but is ‘the essential meaning is the same as the essence of any content’ of cognition, however, by engaging ourselves into a

³⁶ Sri Adi Shankaracharya (CE 788 – 820) is a profound scholar of “*advaita vedanta*”, his works in Sanskrit discuss the *unity* of the ātman and Nirguna Brahman i.e. “brahman without attributes” (Sharada Peetham, 2016)

³⁷ Modern scholarship places the fundamental premise of Advaita Vedānta is a school brought into light by Shankara, it says that everything is an illusion: everything else is a mere appearance, projection, formation or illusion, merely that Brahman is the one and only reality. For example, if we saw a snake in a rope momentarily when it is lying in the darkness. The appearance or project of a snake is an illusion, and the object rope is the reality. In this way, appearances in our mind as a formation over the Self. Menon ([1976], 2004)

³⁸ As described in the Upanishads (Indian philosophical text), the Brahman (ब्रह्म) is the ultimate reality in the universe which is the formal and ultimate cause of all that exists. the presence of Brahman (the whole) appears in the ‘other’, Brahman does not allow in the traditional way of how we relate with the regular transactions in the world, thus it is not a subtle nor a gross, *anan asthulam*, not short nor a long *ahrsvam adhirgham*, not born, not changing *ajam avyayam*, and without a particular form or quality or colour and a name or fame for description, i.e *arupa gun varna akhvam* (Nikhilananda, 1946, Mayeda 2006)

cognitive process to be conditioned for a dualistic reasoning, thence, it is not an apt process for *knowing* the edetic meaning of all our experiences, but, as they are part of the inquiry process of truth, to have content without malfunctional structure, essentially features of the phenomenon transcends them, otherwise the process of transcendence would not be adequate. Because there's nothing like without a structure, no structure at means also has structure in a higher order plane of intuitions appears in cognition (Narayana Guru 1996:14; translations by Menon, 2014).

However, such transcendental cannot experience with usual triad thinking categories, rather it should employ a different set of categories, likewise metaphors, imageries and tederal visualisations tends to juxtaposition shifts in identity through the patterns, the mode of thinking should be linear. For instance, any experiencer self is not separable from the self as it is a first-person experience and the self able to observe through the reflections of given to the content of experiences: the experiencer is not a kind of another experience of identity, however it is true when a shift in identity plausible the essential meaning given to the experiential content, thus the nature of *shifts* blend with the order of experiences that are mild and qualitatively vary with the very primary instants or occurrences.

Perceptual objects in the intentional consciousness

Whereas, about the system of experiences according to Husserl mentioned in the book of Ideas, §131: “the ‘Object’ the ‘Determinable X in the Noematic sense’: [.....] we say that the intentional Object is continuously intended to in the continuous or synthetical course of consciousness but again and again ‘presents’ itself ‘differently’; it is ‘the same’, it is only given in other predicates with a different determination-content; ‘it’ shows itself only from different

sides, whereby the predicates which remained undetermined would have become more closely determined; or 'the' Object has remained unchanged in this stretch of givenness, now however 'it', identical." (Husserl, 1983, § 131, p. 314).

We have seen the structural conception of the experiential self where reflexivity and its objects are embodiments. It is a claim that formation of belief indexes at meta level on top of experiential self, thus the meta sense says the experientiality of self is *nothing but awareness* which directs to knowledge objectification. In view of Husserl, we as human beings having the ability to direct or refer to an object or something consciously based on certain cognitive capacities³⁹, however their momentum is dynamic. For instance, if any intentional experience occurs with capacities in the momentary states (are also referred as transtemporal structure of intentional states *see* Soltau, 2009) in the same sequence, then the object can be consciously recognizable by other individuals, that means the object A or B or C determine a system of possible intentions in noemata which refer to one and the same object, hence we accept that *ability* to direct towards something consciously which is instinct as the reflexive nature is embodiment of it. However, speaking phenomenologically, this *ability* all about is to keep track objects that includes state of affairs across the momentum, but also facilitates how our knowledge objectifies the particular objects basis of its usage in the given situation. So it can be pursued effortlessly in terms of expectations and anticipations, for instance how the particular object appears, for example, an individual by pursuing from its facet and focusing on the object properties, in this case an object flower and its properties in the space and in the dimension of time. This might be the very first sense of intending the flower as an object, perceptually the first

³⁹ Cognitive ability is an ability to be "able to keep track of states of affairs and objects across time in mind".(Bayer, 2018:1)

facet is in colour purple, and paying significant attention while walking around the flower the individual has further perceptual intentions of the flower. This is a reconceptualization process of a thought on object, and it continues for every moment of perspective shift in the individual's conception due to each time occurrence of a new perceptual content and a possible way in which the object flower can be 'an experienced being', this means the self has the *ability* of observation on the same object from different perspectives, which lead to perceptual variations depends on the usage of the object in the momentum or the given situation. But what if the observer pursued the object which kept in a particular condition throughout a period of time, leads the perceiver to an adequate fulfillment. Other way around, perhaps, on a closer inspection or an intense observation of the object, the elements of the object may satisfy the expectations and they realize them into higher-order intentional states, which are at meta level representations of the given *object* from various dimensions. However, the influence of particular dimensions will be more intense iff the exposure is merely a facet of the given object. Such intensified exposure motivates to generate conceptual indexes of the object from certain perspectives as well also formulate the intentions of it, thus the perceiver will be a performing agent for the object flower under certain indexical conditions which was there already, yet it continues further. Notable this activity may turn to unconscious anticipation and expectations from conscious (intentional) experiences, however such phenomena may lead to inadequacy of fulfillment, therefore as said to be the *qua* (*qualitative feelings*) is founded in first order experiences which distinguishes the conscious and unconscious states (Di Nucci and McHugh, 2006). For instance, if an individual conceptualizes and experiences the object flower in an absolute way, it leads to a fulfillment of experiential continuum with nature of absoluteness.

In this case, the perceiver integrates every bit of present experiences with previously had experiences, therefore, identifying the flower object at the essence of the present experiences with the essence of the previous experiences and at the same time it will direct to a new potential ways of filling out our own experiences of the flower in the horizon of sense, that is by penetrating the properties of the flower in a deeper sense. In a normal sense the intentional consciousness goes with the present state of higher-order conception of expectations, beliefs or anticipation although it is inevitable that the proximity of *a priori* knowledge that indexed from the first order experiences, such presence of the sensations make the distinction of conscious and unconscious states of intentionality.

Husserl intends the intentional consciousness focussing on the paradigm of intentionality, says conscious perceptual experience of things, it is reasonable to perceive how this consciousness goes closely with higher-order conception of expectations, anticipations and beliefs, known to be present and latter, however about the future experiences for not appeared from anywhere else just like that, rather develops from all over memories of experiences i.e. now and just now, earlier, last time. Yet this has been informed empirically by Husserl, intentional analysis performed from first person view, thus, it is *essential* where the conceptual explication is founded for understanding the object directed intentional consciousness which is a paradigm -- the higher-order conception of perceived content lead to indexicality of beliefs or expectations or anticipations at meta level for the future sense, however, it is an essential prerequisite for intentional consciousness as a structure and the corresponding structural features are from the first-person view (Beyer, 2018). In this context, the meta level indexicality of the subjective relations *per se* anticipative or pre-anticipative are motivational factors and logical foundations

contains ontological dependencies which are *essential* to obtain proximity between intentional states and dependents parts. Such that, both of these features contributed to the essential structure of intentional consciousness (awareness) at different levels of ontological cues, however, few such essential spatio-temporal features turn to be more fundamental than others in the sense of knowledge conception, particularly those relations are motivated by themselves and founded in the meta level indexicals.

On the view of a notion says, consciously perceiving an object flower over there as a flower that involves the idea of existence through experientiality of that flower under various circumstances now, that implies, in turn, that the self expects same flower to present itself to the ego in a certain way or ways which depends on keenness, for example, if I observed while walking around the flower and then in my perceptual ability manifests certain characteristic series of it. This does not belong to the notions of intentional state of certain circumstances, having said that, this order (apart from prime reflections all are second and so) of perceptual experience manifest certain content, but can it be propositional content of the relevant meta conception of expectations or beliefs. Perhaps, the conception referred to the meta-level concepts in a systematic way on the basis of circumstances through a thought or an expression of Truth, yet, immediacy of these referred concepts of the self (ego) is in a space becomes 'now' i.e. the present state, because through the observation of object we can report our conscious intentional state as: *I am seeing 'now' the saffron flower in the farm.* The *now* represents the particular state of temporal in given spatiality. I agree with this because subjectively reported content coincides with the content of indexical conceptions of expectations or beliefs at meta level that ensures the structure of conscious mental states, that is, according to Husserl and his interpreters (see: Zahavi, 2015),

fundamentally, the intentional structure constitutes the *true nature* of consciousness, it does not derive from nor reducible and grounded in higher-order representations of it (Beyer, 2018).

One should understand how our *consciousness* having certain intentional structure always refers to a certain motivated indexical conception at meta level perhaps it is the 'identity' of self, because by it's instinct nature our every-day experience accountable to the facts of abilities concerned with conceptual leaps flow. Although, identity seems to appear to be a psychological fact but at speaking cognitively it is an indexical conception of personality which reflects in higher order conception (Lyyra, 2010). However, if the everyday experiences treated as ordinary experiences then the self-forgotten remains inactive, yet such happening certain merely when the ego reflecting upon it, elseways, the reflexive self-awareness manifestation is itself obtained for higher-order conception such as judgements, this means it facilitates access to conceptual judgements, however, higher-order judgements can also occur in the absence of the reflexive self-awareness merely such as on involuntary states and first-order experiences. As Husserl stated, self-forgotten or inactiveness of first-order experience is before its conforming to be obvious through reflexive self-awareness: an introspective judgment is hidden ego (self) in connection with self-forgotten of primary experiences or first-order conscious experiences (Beyer, 2018). Conditionally, Christian Beyer (2018) having said that, though Husserl warns on the actualists higher-order concept. But reflective self-awareness represents conscious awareness (perhaps might refer as cognition in some texts) and always accompanied by its own things because of the constitutional relation within pre-reflexive and reflexive self-awareness. However, this conditional situation led me to draw the linkage among the elements of belief system which are individual habitualities: that says within habituality notions, considerably the habituality and

in the process of becoming habituality through manifestation in memories by extracting the essence of it. However, in view of indexicality at meta-level they are interrelated with each of them, in view of Husserlian ideas this affirms a kind of new developmental version on the conceptual phenomena of consciousness (awareness) (see: Christian Beyer 2018). However, though for Zahavi (2015) this phenomena is skeptical because an account of a person's ability is conscious iff merely one has the capacity to judge what is an expression of our inner consciousness, but he also referred to an object that is relevant to inner consciousness (some ways referred to as time-consciousness) concerning the structural features, according to Zahavi (2003) the stream of consciousness elements may not endorse the constitutional nature of conscious awareness thesis particularly, because the explanation of higher-order judgemental dispositions have an extension towards the knowing act in the sense of negation (Not Now) thesis about consciousness, but having said that in literature, a mental state is merely conscious as it owns dispositional (tendential) judgements at meta-level representations (Beyer, 2018).

But I should also make it clear on how at a very primary level those Husserlian notions of the relevance of tendential (dispositional) structure at meta-level representations bear with the nature of conscious experiences or awareness, yet this made me think about the relation among indexical conceptions of expectations with their fulfillment and mental abilities or capacities as said to be in an act of knowing.

(Communicative) acts and reflexivity

It is known to be true in view of Husserl, the communicative acts of reflexive self-awareness for the constant ability to perform which indulge certain essences of conscious experiences, therefore,

those are by its nature the possible notions or abilities which are self-reflexive, at the same time those abilities require an epistemic capacity to grasp and produce meaningful knowledge through reflexive self-awareness that corresponds to higher-order judgements.

Thence, perceived them as the intentional structure of consciousness that may direct to further level of argument about the acceptable structure of intuitional state that draws judgemental sense. Perhaps it is described as pre/reflexive self awareness.

But, Husserl conceived the meta level representations are conscious though mental state owns a nature of tendenciality, but it does not possess reverse. In view of Husserl, due to tendencial nature, the real ability of us belongs to the certain essence of conscious experiences, however, I see there is no need of describing the underlined temporal nature of its essence as the pre-reflexive awareness can stand without its embodiedness in intentional structure, and it is not comprising. However, at a very fundamental level a question to be asked by not having any communicative or correspondance capacity for reflexive self-awareness the higher-order constitutions to inner perception or judgements would possible, perhaps, I conceptualize that would barely apt to assign them (pre-reflexive self-awareness of conscious experiences). But considering the epistemic capacities functional attitude in inner perception with its relations are involved in the meta level conception of beliefs where the indexical conception of expectations or resultants of experiences or normative abilities with tendencies involved in the intentional content, that is, the hidden Ego found as evident in the self-awareness analysis. For instance, if the self-awareness founded in higher-order perception (or inner perception or meta level conception of expectations) as an introspective judgment of everyday living experiences reflexively grasps or acquires that also founded in retentions (memories) and original

appearances⁴⁰ (Hintikka, 2003). Well, as understood the higher-order perception is grounded in the temporal awareness where the retention and original appearances involved. As a matter of fact, the higher-order perception does not continue without any of them as such they are edetic governing law concerning the structure of reflexive self-awareness capacity for grasping knowledge. Nevertheless, those by its nature different from the outer or external perception where the perceived object does not anticipate itself in higher-order perception. However, the object reflects itself a qua intrinsically where experiencing of presence involved in its edetic nature as a conscious experience.

Though the essential character (*edetic* nature) does not belong to the perspectival predictions, it always appears as presentness (Now) in everyday living experiences just prior to the temporal awareness that is the present and pastness are sensed beings or living beings. But the intentional positing **opposed** by the sensations and immediacy or resonance that is higher-order perception grounded in sensational resonance with normative pastness that contains temporal awareness, however these are non-representational reproductive representations with an effective flow of conscious experiences, yet these are accountable for the peculiar character of essentiality (Beyer, 2018). For instance, our present experience becomes an experience of a moment ago, the awareness of such transformation is reflexive as the retentions are alive about the prior experiences. However, the transformation is a spatio-temporal activity, presentness to pastness, but not the 'future' as it cannot be anticipated alone, without the retentions it may become false or unmanifested. However, the structural notions of consciousness built with elements of past and presentness that involved our original appearances and their intentionality as unaffected to

⁴⁰ That helps the on-going state of the everyday living experience to existing or present or shows itself.

any vulnerable commits available for temporal indexicality, therefore, our immediate subjective past can be perceived, but in this process it should not be dazed with relevant higher-order perceptions also referred to be acts of reflexive self-awareness because the temporal sensations ‘motivates’ the acts of reflexive self-awareness for perceiving them, this constitutive nature appears in our everyday living experiences, for example sense of living or being (Beyer, 2018).

Well these motivational aspects appears merely with respect to the notion of I (the self) with necessary mental concepts⁴¹ of communicative perceiver, of course such a situation is known to be a temporal indexicality of presentness in a given space or “Now”, for example: “eating a Dosa with tamarind chutney” similarly, “eating Pizza with sausage”, perhaps the chutney may have different taste from the previous one because of the two sense of living beings, but the intentional meta-level structure commits to fulfill situation rather a person’s specific interests then the corresponding mental attitude the would grasp the sense of living being in the actual given to the individual in the “Now” space.

If such temporal indexicality commits to fulfill the motivational aspects as the pre-reflexive self-awareness for the purpose of potential grasping or acquisition of knowledge, it must have intrinsically an intentional structure at meta-level with awareness (but intensity differs) in the communicative perceiver's mental attitude, else the grasping behavior appears to be similar to primates, of course it is always a question to address, but not the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, I conceptualize this intentional meta-level structure as an epistemic capacity considering an account of mental attitudes of the reflexive self-awareness is a part of conscious

⁴¹ Perhaps, the mental concepts could fall underneath everyday experiences, though Husserl regarded with the reflexive ability is an essential feature of awareness, yet reflexivity facilitates the subject possesses the required concepts.

experiences. Thus, I would address this meta-level indexical view of expectations of fulfillment. However, the primary aspect is about the structure of dynamic fulfillment and the status of the meta-level indexicality in connection with experiences that lead to express this chore raised through judgemental sense.

Fulfillment of structure in relation of narration and synthesis

Husserl marked in his logical investigations, about how we comprehend or express the truth is intrinsically *an sich* (being) of objectivity turns ‘presented and apprehended’ or ‘present and understand’ in knowledge and so ends up becoming subjectivity or subjective experience within a phenomenological framework. By describing the problem of objectivity around what intersubjectivity is *acquirable or graspable or express* from an individual’s intention, it is the very primary of an individual’s knowledge like flesh and blood in the body, so we should be aware, the one who knows a narrative is the one can able to express it into his actions.

Now, I would mention, Husserl’s explanation which is similar to Kantian, in the sense of fulfillment to be understood as a function of an act which is possible only from an extreme egocentrism, that is an individual can expect a moment of fulfillment as they have a priori experience about the object, so one way to bring the structure of fulfillment into a sharper focus is to bring out the ‘notion of narrative’ that grasps how others in the field engages into the world. Thus, an individual certainly gains an insight that a settled correlation between structure and the world, however, as others already into the world then it is not inevitably new what individual

grasps, but it is important to understand how the *narrative coherence* is a mediator among the world and intentional structure of fulfillment.

This return to Ricoeur's account "Reading appears by turns as an interruption in the course of action and as a new impetus to action" (Ricoeur, 1999:414). This dynamic notion of fulfillment as a payoff in our analysis on correlation between narration and action where an individual gains insights into the world, perhaps, individual making possible reality within the analysis of own conception of actions through narration, that describes how the individual's action in the world can come from the fusion of narratives. Nevertheless, the dynamic notions of fulfillment is directly drawn from the individual's actions that follow from the proposal for acting in a new way, that is an individual making possible of real emptiness, well it should demands that individual must act simultaneously with the world in order to sense it, but this conjunction merely follow the narrative is non-usable terms in the world, like, *baladbjsdhfs* or *pssddsff* or *f/fi/ahle*..etc or murmuring.

In this context, I would recall Wittgenstein's ideas (Garver, 1987; Nyíri, [2001], 2006) on recognize things (*wiedererkennen*), mainly on what is to recognize and how to identify them within cognitive and phenomenal normativity of an individual where no further *synthesis* is needed, yet as a process the recognize is all about the *things* connected to the reality itself in a certain way, per se immediately the responses represents the use of the connected things or pre-established connections, however, it is yet open to advancement on how such connections are pre-established whether it make use correctly or not. For instance, it may be essentially True for the following expression: "I see a blackboard in a classroom", *seeing* in normal conditions are sufficient to satisfy that I see a blackboard in a classroom, and not need a special kind of *seeing* it

as a blackboard except, I (self) need just to be used to see *blackboards* but whether it is in a classroom or not is irrelevant, however, to be experienced visually the blackboards in any condition that implied in normativity of an individual, that is the connections between the thought about the things and reality requires pre-establish uses in any means.

As strange as it might seem to know that “I see a blackboard in a classroom” is kind of direct connection between the thoughts and reality, that statement is structurally represent individual’s world that was rooted in experiences without any doubt, it even reflects the no further need of synthesis in order to show the connection of world between the experiences and the thoughts, means it says no necessary of an act for mediating in order to have an intention, more in way, as already we have the apriori hyle that applies to the latter directly. But, intentions are not just a way to sort of making calculations as to know whether it is by verifying how they are really fulfills something, rather it is beyond, for instance, to act-out a way to do whose connections to reality have already been established which is an act from expectation to fulfillment, that is making a calculation for satisfying the given expectation with clarity. However, in view of Husserl, the sense of fulfilment is an act, if *something* that was not established already when we are with what experienced then how about the remains that somethings or of anything to do? Yet, the remains are in reality, pursue that, if any intention is just a way to sort of experience absent then the notion of *synthesis* appears to conceive of hardship one might have engaged in such kinda action. For instance, according to Russell (see 1913 and 1984), there are particular circumstances that are qualified to certain conditions deals with equation of expectations that determines the adequacy of experiencing or happenings in events, says that one individual knows what others are expecting, but to express the internal features of the things that appears in an

expression as a question form, that is while expressing about the *thing* itself in reality the experiencer get the impression of things to know it was expecting likewise “what is happening or what I was waiting for or what does it mean or what does it contain or where shall I go etc.”. Well in our everyday living experiences each of what is happening has an expectation given to us and the determination of what was expected is an intrinsic feature of each experiential or happening activity. But, having said above, if we are not clear or skeptical about the expectation then the consequence of such condition lead to generate a confusion or dilemma about the expectation, in fact, if suddenly something arises, and it will become obvious and we relate to that expectation, although the intensity of dilemma reduces but still pertains some proportionations of it.

Given this context, on the one hand, our understanding is not as much that it was and not anything else that we have been looking for, that is it is not about the objects but it is about the expectations, on the other hand, we can observe, there are no expectations without objects, they are inseparable from each other as far as we were not able to demonstrate ever merely about the object, and if the expectation was unveiled and resolved at the same moment it is skeptical about the understanding the absolute or actual expectation.

In this synthesis process, individuals have certain expectations about a real situation in order to see the latter fulfilments of expectations, primarily those expectations should be empty to the given situation, that is pre-existing expectations are initialized with emptiness, if not the answer lies simple, this or that way expects, such experiences existence is certain and they do continue further. However, it is not limited to a particular case of expectations rather it is applicable to all types of intentional attitudes that involve anything like a representation, anywhere. According to

Kantian theory of knowledge, those things were never necessary but as they are given they represented one or the other way (Dicker, 2004). However, to represent them, we must make an effort as there is something to do i.e. motivational factors as described in the previous section, that there is something lead to some synthesis to operate.

For instance, we can infer how something leads to some synthesis to operate from the marvellous narration of a painting in a situation, the narrator confesses how and what it makes his experiences and feelings about that art on the canvas. In such narration of art, the eliteness⁴² is not merely what the artist believed, but it to be also socio-cultural panoramas, temporal series of events or momentary actions, imaginative and fictitious too, where every narrative painting presents its life through the symbols as representations, what-if the narrator feels as the story or moment of symbols that would want another reality than the presented one that is given to the world in order to be possible different passages, that is relatively small cues may be convey the narration thoroughly detailed realism. For example, a canvas painting by Robert Peake the Elder (c. 1551–1619): “The Lost Prince ⁴³” narrator William Hayden, narrates the content in this as “He was tall and of an high stature, his body strong and well-proportioned (Graham-Dixon, 2012)”..... Groom of the Prince’s Bedchamber, “the colour of his face somewhat swart and scorched with the sun, his whole face and visage comely and beautiful, looking for the most part with a sweet, smiling, and amiable countenance, and with all full of gravity, and Princely majesty...”. Don Giovanni de’ Medici a foreign visitor who seemed to have had a much more

⁴² “*Some of the oldest examples of art tells the stories of heroes, gods, rulers and legends of times past*”. (Lussier, 2017).

⁴³ “Around 1605 Robert Peake the Elder, Serjeant-Painter to the royal household, painted an elaborate portrait of the boy whom he supposed to be the future King of England. Its subject is the king who never was: son and heir to James VI of Scotland and I of England; ill-fated elder brother of Charles, the weak-willed boy who would become king in his place and eventually lead England into the turmoil of the Civil War”. (Graham-Dixon, 2012)

interesting would to describe at their conclusion. He feels if narration would want another reality than the one that is Nonsuch Palace in Surrey, noting how he danced the galliard, leaps, spins and all, with unbelievable talent - “incredibile disposizione” (Graham-Dixon, 2012). Yet, Marchese Vincenzo Giustiniani another foreign visitor describes much promise in him that exactly the world how he knows, that is one of Caravaggio’s principal patrons in Rome, was struck by young Princess Henry’s precocious talent for languages, remarking that he was “piccolo, bianco, biondo, disposto” – small, pale, blond, gifted (Graham-Dixon, 2012). But, Don Giovanni de’ Medici describes young Princess Henry differently, inadequate: the world they are speaking of, that does not seem to him as interesting as William Hayden informed. Perhaps, if the William Hayden descriptions are misgivings about the power of narration seems that former is unable to represent the latter, it is not the world or situation aptable for the narration, but the narration is not for the world rather than fulfillment of expectation about the world in an individual. Now, the artist’s vocation becomes obvious for William Hayden as the canvas painting speaks about how exactly the world, which is uncensored by the narrator. Well, as far as it has been taking us away from the experiences that we really have of the world where it has no other object, the individuals of whom the canvas painting speaks, those are the actual individuals who move within the circles of young princess i.e. serjeant-painter and the individuals ideas are not only some canvas works of them, have a certain *image* of them. Thus, they are able to use such forms for representing to see it as relevant for the actual situations that we experience, this is exactly the same as to know how to use it, sometimes it may take a life-time to reach a certain level of understanding or experience, to avoid it is necessary to have some moments of *revelation* like how the narrator or the painter experienced the Prince’s Bedchamber.

As explained, the truth about the narrations, the narrators are very similar they believed to know, almost they use same elegant terminology as tools for narration, they are able to make a connection between the respective art e.g. paintings and the actual scenes, in virtue one must be there, means the artist to be described something one can substitute other; thus Husserlian synthesis emphasis grounded to make sense of that necessary active participation to do an activity, then there wouldn't be any difficulty as much to synthesize the given experience with our intention cause to synthesize the intention as ours on the particular moment of experiences. Well this we can purse, obviously something on the part of the world, but also something on the part of the phenomenal normativity of the individual in the world, as it.

Point of unity and the expressions

We have seen the expectations and synthesis, for Husserl a dialogue to be actual case of expressions such as gestures, patonamies, monologues etc, has not been treated them to be expressions (Johnson, 1964), though one may argue that discourse can be referred as an expression, as such expression of meaning can take place in that but Husserl ideas were not favor to it, for him in a discourse the meaning cannot be expressed properly, as the discourse is different from dialogue, his distinction is, for instance, in the ordinary dialogue case, the lexmes indicates their sense and it directs mental state of the utterer or speaker, but in discourse case it is exactly the reverse, suppose if we considered a relation between the formal expressions and meanings, at some point of mental state the individual starts talking to himself like grumble or murmur because of his mental state, the sense points out the murmured terms of the speaker, that is the sense of verbal expressions are apriori to the verbal expressions itself. Again for Husserl,

within the discourse people lived in imagination rather than the actual world, that is, in the discourse, “the existence of a sign neither motivates the existence of meaning nor properly expressed our belief in the expression” (Husserl and Demort 2001:191), so it does not take as a proper form of representation or an expression. Husserl question the existence in the actual world of the writings or lexical utterances or verbal expressions that float in front of us when we lived in the imaginative world or imagination. He warns us about the confusion due to such presentations though they appeared to be real in imagination, those are lilliputs, aliens etc. But, in view of Husserl, in soliloquy though the mental states does not get engaged in the expression of meaning absolutely but still those states get communicated, that is an individual can be reached to the imagined speaker or articulator. For example, if an individual expresses himself like ‘I’ve gone mad now,’ is not an actual communication to the world rather than it is within himself and eventually not in terms actions in the world, such kind of expressions are merely relevant himself, whether it can be intimating of expressing. As said above Husserl has taken this as an actual expression for communication purpose but this soliloquy can be considered as a real communicative expression or not is a serious debate among commentators. In fact the communicative expressions have both combination of physical⁴⁴ and non-physical⁴⁵ phenomenons, well Husserl use to distinguish the sound patterns from expressions that have physical acts, for instance, if one articulate ‘blablabla...’ may not have a proper sense, however, it holds the meta level sense where the context impart with such sound patterns. But in normal conditions if an individual expressed as “The Horse has horns and it’s color is Blue” may sense

⁴⁴ The physical expression consists of activities like articulating or writing sounds.

⁴⁵ Though we were involved in a physical act while expressing, articulating or writing but also adding a meaning to it. This is a kind of attaching sense to commutative expression. Similarly, every non-physical act of expression also produces its meaning.

as Unicorn but it doesn't exist in the actual world, although such kind of expressions introduce a sense but not a complete fulfillment from the physical world as the meaning that is added to an articulated sound pattern may or may not be confirmed because of the existentiality of such kind of things.

Well, Husserl counts them in terms of the meaning-conferring act through difference between the meaningless articulated sound patterns and significance of expressions. Suppose through a physical world if a conferring act is asserted the rest we will be having the fulfilling act, in this context, both the fulfilling and conferring acts of meaning are lead with physical expressions. For example, articulating like "Diamond is Liquid or Sky is Green or Black Rose" is a conferring acts of meaning, though it is an intentional meaning asserted with a physical phenomena but it is not really accompanied by the fulfilling act thus the *intentional meaning* has not realized its own relations to the concern objects on the physical world, because of insufficient truth value in verifiability. The "Diamond is solid", "the normal color of the Sky is Blue" similarly "Roses are not in Black", will be realized in the physical phenomenon merely unless there is some mysterious activity happening, like any chemical gases does the Sky color change job, of course such are very exceptional. However, expressions like "the Red Rose or Sky is Blue or Horse run faster than a Donkey" are the physical phenomena accompanied by both conferring and fulfilling acts as the intentional meaning of it has a relation of realizing its relations to the objects. Such characterisation of intentional meaning becomes embodied of conferring acts that appears in the inquiry on unity of fulfillment with meaning acts, that is the physical phenomena that initially made with *intentional meaning* will shift to meaning-fulfillment latter.

In view of Husserl, in case of communicative discourse, those intentional and corresponding meaning acts (meaning-conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts) constitute our knowledge, for instance, the Diamond is liquid or the Sky is Green or a Black Rose is a complete expression because in the latter there are both acts. Similarly, in case of communicative discourse, although both acts have a significance in *intimation* but the intentional meaning act constitutes the innermost core of *intimation*. For instance, the intention of an individual who expresses some sounds through the vocal cord or physical words is merely to establish a physical phenomenon of acquainted through awareness with whom he targeted, that can be a hearer or reader. Such acquaintance (experiential knowledge) through awareness takes place either one of the acts, but, Husserl gave more weight to the meaning-conferring act for a communication between two individuals. That is, the communication is possible only if the targeted individual understands the intention of the communicator or expresser, thus, in the case of communication the relevant fulfilling act is implicit in intentional meaning act which is not necessary to aware explicitly, it is applicable to have knowledge about something. Such experiential knowledge required the conferring and fulfilling act knowledge. Speaking phenomenologically, the conferring or intentional meaning act, corresponding or meaning-fulfilling act and the physical phenomenon are the elements that decides the individual's linguistic behaviour by unifying each other, that reflects in communication through a dialogue. For instance, individuals as *remain content* through physical phenomenon experiences where it has expectations, but how is that possible without expectations: whenever individuals having experiences with any physical phenomenon or physical activity, it's expected outcome that motivates them to experience, and they are able to grasp the meaning of the content or the sense of experience in the very next moment, though the

individuals successfully draws the attention of the audience to a particular conferring-act but still there is a miscommunication happens because of an expected outcome failure, for instance, if the same individual should not have any expected outcomes from such experiences of physical activity or a phenomenon, it attaches the ignorance and ignores the sense or meaning, or the pleasures from the activity becomes unreal, similarly, the individual expresses the conferring act to grab the audience's attention with their expressions could not fulfill the audience expectations, in that case if an individual articulated some vocal sounds it may not be grasped by the listener, so hearer fails to understand the speaker or communicator.

In view of Husserl, an expression to be an actual expression, where all the three elements of an actual expression interacts and unifies each other gives a proper analysis of meaning which constitutes a complex structure of knowledge, however, this structure needs an adequate phenomenological explanation: the analysis concern, in general we never bother about the physical elements of expression rather we are concerned about the relation between expression and meaning, for instance, an expression 'Duck⁴⁶ or Crow⁴⁷', we are not concerned about how the word 'Duck or Crow' uttered or written like what nerves have moved or how the tongue twists or any contractions happen while this articulation or in case of writing what way the hand movements taken place or any geometrical directions followed etc, rather we are concerned about the meaning of the expression 'duck or crow' in general, although the ideal meaning or dialect of the expression is the same but the meaning may differ depends on the context of expression, this was treated by Husserl as a subjective act of articulation directs to the meaning of the given object in a context, although it appears differently on surface level meaning, the

⁴⁶ a bird belonging to the Anatidae Family (Carver, 2011)

⁴⁷ a bird belonging to the Corvidae family (Madge, 1994)

pre-reflective state of the expression themselves, and the objectivity and sense of belonging to what is given “in” expression. It is appropriate to consider the transformation of ideal reference from the real reference of acts of their objects, that is subjective acts soon allows to the objective acts. In order to understand the ideality relationship between expression and meaning by asking the meaning of an expression, for instance, if an individual expressed sincerely some sound patterns e.g. a sound ‘mess’ or *untidy state of things*, is not merely about the articulated sound pattern or sound structure, returning of identically same transient of sound patterns is skeptical, however the expression is falls in an actual specified form. But the expression term *mess* is identically same, whoever may articulate it. In view of Husserl, here, the meaning of the expression is not about the subjective or conferring acts that follow the sound patterns of articulation, but it is a *state of affairs* and directed towards an ideality of meaning to the objects (Farber, 1968). According to Marvin Farber (1968), from the examples the expression is *specie*, shown an essential distinction between the inner experiences and judgments that involves merely objective, such as the intimated consist in inner experiences and the assertions are in the judgements, even the *judgment* about the example *mess* can also be prepared by somebody, that is essentially the same expression may be repeatable, perhaps this is due to “the form of expression” for the identity or pre-reflexivity in the self is its meaning.

Meaning of self and judgemental units

In fact, the real act of judging may arises and passes away temporarily in an individual’s experience, but the same individual judgement asserts have no place for the identical meaning evidently in the content brought through repeated articulation of examples, which means the

expression to a fact of whose validity we felt assured, those are neither rises nor passes away with the judging act, rather a valid *unity* in itself and it is always the same holds to all statements of expression, therefore, it is an essential Truth of the articulated examples. But, in an identical sense, the Truth can be asserted indefinite time by anybody, it is applicable to all assertions in judgmental units. Although if the expressions are false or no-sense, the meaning of the expression is a valid 'unity' in the varied possible experiences. For instance, if someone expresses a statement like "the Snow is Green" or "the lilliputs are everywhere" .etc, that directs from a subjective act to the ideality of meaning to the objects as discussed already. In relation to it and in the evident acts of reflection, one can state that to be an identity of intention also refer as ideal unity or intentional unity, such 'unity' lies between expression and meaning, however, this cannot be attributed arbitrarily with the judgement assertions, rather should found it in conceptual content, for instance, while making judgemental assertions like "you've *messed up* my kitchen and house", has been dealing with various things, such as something that says completely different from intimated through the judgement assertions (Farber, 1943, 1968). In the judgements, perhaps the expressions are not a psychological act of hypothetical assumption or addressed by an intimated subjective act, but they are something objective and ideality, that is, for Husserl, as said by according to Marvin (1968), all knowledge is complex because of unitedness between intention and fulfillment: "the hypothesis whose conceptual content can appear as the same intentional unity in many possible thought-experiences, and which evidently strands before us in its unity and identity in the objectively-ideal treatment characteristic of all thinking" (Farber, 1968: 228-229). For a meaningful understanding⁴⁸ or use of experiences

⁴⁸ "Understanding, according to Husserl is the grasping or re-living of the meaning intentions." (Mohanty, 1976:44).

required an intellectual act of knowledge (awareness of things), but expressions express about something, and not limited to meanings rather it *refers* to the objects through the meaning-fulfillment and meaning-giving acts are presented in the aspects of manifestation, therefore expression allows to a judgement in an articulation, however, perceptions and other meaning-fulfilling acts also expressed accordingly.

Nevertheless, referring to objects is all about the contents of these fulfilling acts and they are being expressed that refers to the objectivity in the presented or in the expression and meaning of it. Perhaps such relation will be different for every moment of the same expression, that is the relation between expression and meaning depends on spatio-temporal happenings thus it may change at every time but the expression is same and it is not true that every time the object meets meaning, however, both the meaning and objects are belonging to the expression itself, thus this due to the meaning-giving acts. For instance, according to Mohanty (1976:43) when the expression does not necessarily account for the understanding then we will verify the intentional correlation of acts for the understanding an expression.

Husserl was defended for conferring act lead to intentional meaning, very particularly expressions about acts not aware the meanings objectively, that is while a higher-order cognitive activities like judging, believing or questioning or forming a conceptual leap, such confined activities referred to the *state of affairs* but not the meaning of the expression. This merely a consecutive act of reflection of referring to the *state of affairs* thus it may appear aware of meaning or the proposition to be objectively in the expression. This may cause the failure of verifiability in particular contexts and request for sort-out the problem of criteria for meaningfulness, especially in their functional relationship, however, Husserl was skeptical about

the developing a criteria or finding evidence for meaningfulness through verifiability, but in an ample sense, one cannot deny that all our awareness is intentional as the awareness of thinking reflects awareness of some or the other things(Farber, 1968).

But, as we are aware that our nature of thinking is intentional: it is more precise than in all awareness as declared (which is said to be), then if the intention serves to establish a group of experiences which are capable of being fulfilling-relationships such specificity of peculiarity would be categorized as narrower group of meaning-intending acts within the intentional acts, but such narrower group does not permit to constitute their own classes by itself, therefore other intentional acts that are belonging to these *acts* and having certain peculiar specificity as similar to the narrower group may share their properties or commonalities before turning into a group primarily involved with it (Farber, 1969). However, very primary we should consider that, this narrower group of specific intention of acts is not an expectation like other acts rather it is a type that not directed towards the future or the next from the present condition with reference to pastness. For instance, if we experienced suddenly some rhythmic chants, our immediacy of experience would bring to our conscious by understanding the awareness (a kind of acquaintance) of the sounds or the person who articulate them and the progress of the rhythmic chants according to our expectation it will develop an unambiguous shape in a broader sense that may fulfill steadily, though, in our intentions every bit of rhythm intended to attend in a given situation is type of living but is not intended essentially offered for next fulfillment (Farber, 1998).

However, our experiences of the rhythmic chantings of sounds not given in a particular moment may constitute an intentional meaning for the fulfillment of the rhythmic chants, this provides an

idea about the narrower and broader sense or the specific sense of intentional act. Nevertheless, for Husserl in view of Mohanty's theory of meaning (2012), in this kind of moment one must have a specific form of transient representational intention about the given object: this involves a serious distinction of acts that deal with phenomena of seeking (*wish, desire*) oriented intentions and objectifying intentions. Where the objectifying has been discussed in previous versions of my own text (Refer chapter II, Pala) within the framework of Husserlian, said to be merely if objectifying is liable to act as a functional component of knowledge then it is different from the thought in intuitive fulfillment, however, the objectifying intentional acts identify this interrelation between thought and intuitive fulfillment when the object directedness secures the subjective experiences, in such conscious acts intentional meaning is defined to be in the hands of objectifying intentional acts. Furthermore those acts described as intuitive⁴⁹ and signitive acts, but the intuitive acts are capable of further fulfillment and they certainly contain unfulfilled intentions.

⁴⁹“Intuitive acts are basically intuitions about perceptual or imaginative. These intuitions are capable of further fulfillment and that therefore even intuitive acts may contain unfulfilled intentions within them.”(Mohanty, 1976:46).

CHAPTER -V

Essence of Experiences transduced as Indexical (Meanings) of Self

Where essence there memory matters.

Experience is a process that continually gives us new material to digest (MT, 1909/1975: 208), and the experience leads ever on and on, and objects and our ideas of objects may lead to the same goal (MT, 1909/1975: 258).

It has been popular to articulate the notions of the interpreted inferences for the truth about the fundamental nature of experience though says it is beyond the power of expressions (see, e.g., Brough, 1987:23; Zahavi, 2003:92). This is an idea that Husserl put forward occasionally on necessary conditions, especially on lacking names, for instance, our temporal experiences in intentionalism varies between knowledge constitutive acts, the very differences among the constitutive acts are mostly belonging to the time, which is a moment of change reflects in our perceptual experiences, normally, such concept will be explained through a particular intentional structure filled with experiences, again, for instance according to Dan Zahavi (2003) as he articulates: “when Husserl claims that the intentional act is constituted in inner time-consciousness, he is not saying that the act is brought to givenness by some other part of subjectivity. Inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act, and to say that the act is constituted in inner time-consciousness simply means that it is brought to awareness thanks to itself. It is called inner time-consciousness because it belongs intrinsically to

the innermost structure of the act itself. [...] This internal consciousness is not a particular intentional act, but a pervasive dimension of self-manifestation, and it is exactly this which precedes and founds reflective self-awareness. In short, Husserl would claim that to have an occurrent experience, e.g., a perception of a flowering apple-tree, is to be aware of the experience. But this self-awareness is not itself a separate experience in need of yet another awareness. The self-awareness of the experience is an internal, nonreflective, irrelational feature of the experience itself, and thus the regress is stopped.” (Zahavi, 2003:168).

The view of Husserl on intentionalism is about the temporal experiences made of perceptual experiences that able to retain both the thematic and unthematic, and tactile awareness, but how those notions of experiences possessed for knowledge formulation which the pre-reflective awareness is intrinsic and inherent. In further sections I explore the dimensions of how we develop our experiences able to be involved in the very primary acts which have the objects with temporal extensions.

Perceptual experiences and temporal object indexicality

Although, we found the explicit reflections of temporal objects⁵⁰, of perceptual experiences with the extensions of temporality, but the very primary perception of these objects would overcome the laws of temporal constitution, however, does the objects unite upon the arise of very primary acts to retentional, and potential in terms of the acts themselves as being constituted in the structure of them (Huemer, 2003), within this framework known that they are self-aware and merley self-given, how would they fend off infinite regression? For instance, pursue, if the unity

⁵⁰ Objects with temporality in our experiences in the analysis of inner time-consciousness (Findlay, 1975)

duration of a visual cues sequence is constituted by the awareness nature⁵¹, else if the cues of visual activity is itself given with the unity duration, then it might not forced to postulate but another conscious experience can be responsible to the given unity duration, thus, forward to forever *ad infinitum*: drives to infinite regression (Alweiss, 1999; Zahavi 1999:68). Although infinite regression is significant and fundamental question to address, but I am limiting in this section towards the temporal indexicality within Husserlian framework because my targeted view; I stick with the nature of knowledge origins, if one can able to determine distinction between the constituted versus constituting dimensions of objects then we are capable to draw distinctions between the same dimensions of acts, for instance, if the one can able to draw a distinction between the existing transcendental objects⁵², then their dimensions allow them to manifest is the same as how it is applicable to acts exist and manifested, that is. the acts considered themselves as temporal objects that constituted or also can be said temporally indexed at meta level of subjectivity which the temporality is inheritance such that have an absolute flow of it. Though for systematic and exegetical reasonalists are not favouring this account, many other commentators have supported it. Considering a reflection theory it deals that the ‘acts’ are originally given as objects in inner-perception or also referred to be self-awareness because the very primary givenness of impressions infer them as objects, but it is skeptical that how it will be able to handle the explanation of self-awareness as it is completely different from pre-reflexivity. Apparently, it may lead to form a question how the inner-time awareness is itself in control of self-awareness is debatable. But, if such control is not

⁵¹ It is already exist or formed because of conscious phenomena, so the manifestation of an activity can be from the manifested, it cannot be a new, past to present (Smith, 2017).

⁵² According to Kant: “a thing in itself or the mere form of an object representing in knowledge our reference of the content of experience to an independent object” (Kantianism, 2019)

self-manifest then the awareness is itself self-aware, thus the infinite regress is certainly no more. However, as mentioned this account may not be able to show how acts in-relation of inner-time awareness that manifest result in self-awareness, perhaps if it explains how the inner-time awareness has been grounded in self-awareness that may encounter with infinite regress as it forms in the same manner the acts brought to givenness, and also such explanation covers inner-time awareness is under control of intrinsic nature of self-manifestation. However, if it is recognized the existence of self-awareness then we should also address about the meta-level indexicality of subjective experiences, though it is not a feature of the act itself according to Sokolowski (1974) and Brough (1987), but it is known that flow of inner awareness is itself self-awareness and it operates with various combinations from beyond givenness of acts, especially in terms of given content. However, in view of Husserl, yet these acts are matured enough inner objects that appear prior to reflection, of course immediately given. But the absolute flow of sensed data must be given to itself therefore it appears in the analysis of perceptual experience reflections. For instance, if we start analyze a reflection on a perceptual experience of a bird ‘Duck⁵³ or Crow⁵⁴’, then it throws different possibilities such as the perceptual experience of Duck or Crow can given as a transcendent object, or reflectively given as inner object, either, the perceptual experience acts of reflection is pre-reflexively thus it given as inner object, however, all these given objects grounded and reveals themselves in the absolute flow for experiencer (Sokolowski, 1974; Brough, 1987). Thus, as seen the consequences of reflection, it results in self-awareness with two inner and one transcendent object. This reveals an enormous discern between the characterization of objects and acts (Sokolowski, 1974).

⁵³ a bird belonging to the Anatidae Family (Carver, 2011)

⁵⁴ a bird belonging to the Corvidae family (Madge, 1994)

Nevertheless, I am skeptical, particularly about the characterisation, for instance ‘pre-reflectively given as an inner object’, sometimes it may misleads, at a very primary impression if our pre-reflexive self-awareness is not a substantial form then the resultant will be a reflectively given inner object; similarly, at prime state of impressions, if the reflectively given inner object is a marginal level object then it delivers the pre-reflectively given inner objects, including Husserl was not appreciated such characterisation itself, therefore it allows a form of explanation for dissolution, because without any involvement of cognizable content which have the perceptual processing in the background, thus the characterization alone cannot provide a solution, suppose if the cognizable content introduced even before any processing of perceptual experiences, that is any early reflexive awareness, then what content would be left for the processing? According to Husserl, this is a serial process and asserts that “without a transcendental affection of perceptual experiences from externally provided impressions the consciousness has no significant amount of content for rest syntheses” (Mensch, 2014:5): it says, a complete presentation would never arise, if an individual lose the preceding impressions from their thoughts and not able to reproduce them on the advancement to those which followed. However, it is necessary to prevent the impression from letting go disappear or dissolve as individuals advance to the next impression. However, Husserl noticed these modifications and he puts that “consciousness is nothing without impressions” (Mensch, 2014:6), that is a source-point of an object with an enduring production starting is a primal impression (Mensch, 2014).

As said, though the impressions are the origins of our temporal consciousness, but it always have limitations as it get alter according to order of experiences: a constant alteration of the contents of present a ‘Now’ but not the ‘Past’ experience, to understand this conception perhaps we

should introduce what Husserl describes the perceptual experiences in relation with self-awareness and cognizable content that provide a realization of missed link between temporality at meta level indexicals and the present state (*de nuca*) awareness.

State of content in terms of awareness

Consequently, I distinguish the content of awareness is not merely about objects or things out of the sensible experiences rather than ‘order of experiences’: for instance, a very first sensual experience of objects give an immediate *awareness* of impressions, for example, experiencing ‘flowers’ in the garden ‘directly’ will provide one facet awareness of them, perhaps it could intended as merely colour of the flower, or may be intended some sort of structure. Such kind of intensive content is descriptive, if the experience of flower through the hyletic senses is merely limited to a certain dimensions per se the facet of it, and the qualitative features part of impressions within the given momentum of space enforce the temporal indexicals at meta level, thus, the claims of the ‘experienced object’ possessing other sides as a three and/or more-dimensional capability of being explored and determined regarded to all the parts and properties as its features, for instance, the sensible data of perceptual experiences, the flower with colour may transcends the hyle - the intention of it within by given noema.

However, the expression of truth shows that the person who has intended about the flower is within very primary thought itself is inclusive of self awareness, thus the reality is not necessarily by knowing intellectually⁵⁵ although experiencing through our perceptual senses, iff

⁵⁵ For instance, awareness of ‘I-life and other is intrinsic, such awareness may be the world while it exists I also exists, it is self-experiential and nobody can disprove that existence even if there is profiles exist when the world exists and I access the relevant channel, may be for a reasoning one can make a distinction similar to how a studied distinction made between the intellect and mind, but when it is a matter of experientiality it is not possible to

the very primary perceptual sensible experiences of a given object or thing (a flower) depends on

division which comes first. Therefore, the actual experience in I-life maybe that what's the thing exists in some way maybe existing in a different way because when I say, 'I know the tree' or when I say 'I know when I say no', what's the meanest that I have been given some inputs through my senses to hear, to smell, time to taste, or touch, the five organs of perception are the instruments of perception for an entire life experience around, the data from these five synsonic senses, when I say, I see a tree image in the sea, I feel through my five sense organs what I mean by i'm not saying the tree rather then, I becoming known by asserting emotive feelings in such persuasion.

In this context, I may ask, what are the learnings in which everything that's unknown becomes known, for example, what is referring to the by knowing Clay all that's made of Clay is known, similarly by knowing Gold all that's made of Gold is not, what's it mean by that? Well consider a Pot, we say that this Pot is made of Clay but really speaking Pot and Clay are not too different things, the Pot is simply a form of Clay it's just Clay but in the shape of a Pot, if it weighs a few ounces how much of that way is due to Clay and how much is due to the Pot, the Pot adds nothing, the Pot is merely a name and a form it's not an independent thing like Clay, but Clay can exist without this Pot, but this Pot cannot exist without the Clay that which independently exists, like clay, this said to be real or truth, i.e. *Satyam*; and something like this Pot that has no independent existence is said to be Mitya, illusion or not real; the same is true with this Gold chain, Gold can exist without the chain but the chain cannot exist without gold, so we say that gold is real and the chain is illusion, its existence depends on metal Gold. Here we are using Clay and Gold as metaphor to represent the ultimate truth of reality also known to be Bramhan, by knowing the Clay all these Pots are known, by knowing Gold all this jewelry are known, and by knowing the ultimate truth of reality from non-dual substances all that exists and the entire universe becomes known.

According to The Chandogya Upanisad (Gupta, 2001): the ultimate truth of reality *Braman* is *Satyam* or real and the world is *Mitya* or illusion or non-real, because it's existence is entirely dependent on its underlying reality. To understand, this would form and are based merely on words. (*Vac-arambhanam vikarah namadheyam*): *Vikara* is any form or shape like Pot or Chain and *Vac-arambhanam* is based merely on world and ideas or concepts, similarly *namadheyam* is any name like the name taught name is also based merely on ideas, therefore, the Clay alone is real. These names and forms of ideas or concepts that we refer to as *Nama-Rupa* which are not tangible things. These ideas or concepts rooted in thoughts and words not in physical reality, to say that this Pot is merely Name-form (*Nama-Rupa*) means it has no physical existence whatsoever unless it's associated with a substance like clay, when does metaphors extended to the entire world its implication is astonished everything we experience is merely name and form which is *Nama-Rupa*, the world is only an appearance for form of the underlying fabric of existence which is non-duality of ultimate truth of reality. Consider another example, an object table, the table it's made of wood so we can say, this table is a form and wood is substance, but the wood in the table is made of cellulose fiber so we can say wood is merely a form and fiber is the substance, but then those fibers are made of microscopic cells so fibers are only forms and cells are substances, but then again cells are made of various kinds of molecules, so cells are simply forms and molecules are the substances, but those molecules are made of individual atoms, molecules are merely forms and atoms are the substances, atoms are themselves made of subatomic particles proton neutron and electron, so atoms are only forms and subatomic particles are substances, but then those particles are made up of six kinds of Quarks, so subatomic particles are simply forms, and Quarks are substances but then what are those Quarks made up of? Eventually we will tell, those Quarks are made of something else and they won't stop there so continue to probe for deeper and deeper searching for the fundamental substance from which everything is made, will they ever find it, but we still think the scientific inquiry will continue indefinitely because whatever is discovered can be further subdivided, if science can never find a truly individual and visible fundamental substance, and then can we conclude that there's really no underlying reality because of which the world of names and forms exist? Well no one can exist without some kind of substance apart can't be made of nothing and if that's true for a particular form then it must also be true for the entire series of forms that we saw when we examined the table, without some kind of underlying reality just table could not exist, if it's just a bunch of forms which are ideas and not physical things then how can we sense the table was here in this way, we can infer the existence of an underlying substance for reality because of what all these forms exist and that underlying reality is a quest of ultimate truth called Brahman.

their intensity that manifest a kind of a wonder or a shock lead to emotive⁵⁶ feelings like blissfulness or painfulness or sometimes both, such perceptual experientiality is undeniable because these are undoubtedly significant for the matter of instantaneous conception of things and formation of own relations with each other. Therefore the conception of fulfillment with the extensions of those concepts joining with 'order of experiences'. Perhaps, the intensity of sensible experience which involved in the capacity matters to have the longing of the remembrance extensions, the sensitivity of perceptual senses are significant in the fulfilment of emotive feelings like wonder or surprise with high intensity although the higher-order or inner-perceptual content is formulated and hardwired as the entrance to the external stimuli cause, perhaps this is meant as *horizon*, that means an individual has *sense* about the experienced object, and how to determine it further is different from very primary experience of object or in the given tendential thought or(and) thinking at meta-level. For instance, in the case of the object- a flower, possibly, the self (I) have the present (now) experience is from the front facet of the flower (object) as being colour in purple with the experience as part of its *horizon*, but, by understanding the *nature of intention* or sometimes the past experiential reality of other objects in the world, that flower must also have other facets and that along with its colour in the space and present (*de nunc* refer as Now) experiential reality, perhaps it will be the same, unless a self (I) experienced differently with the given object in the presentness (nowness). However, every further (future) experience of object 'determines' further dimensions of impressions lead to intentions accordingly and the determination of features to it in the thought or higher-order perception or reflexive self-awareness, but does the original impressions remain lied down in the

⁵⁶ Although, fundamentally for human-beings very primary emotive elements are merely 'fear or love' as two faces of a coin yet it has many other dimensions for each face such as for fear-afraid, grudge, illness, shock etc, in case of love-wonder, bliss, pleasantness etc.

pre-reflexive state, such state may have a clear influence impulsive dispositional (tendencial) judgements. Yet, in the given process, object 'flower' is the same and one that itself, such objects will be 'transcendent self-identical' too when merely they are directed towards their own intentions, this doesn't mean these can be distinguishable as parts of the given content.

Nevertheless, the one and the same object is definite and that underlies all of particular presentable properties which 'unites' them in 'synthesis of identity' and provide an unbroken series for further determination or adequate fulfillment in thoughts, therefore the intentions in which adequate fulfillment or more determined about the way object actually is. It can be questioned as would an object determine the possible intentions in a noematic sense though we have seen that all our thinking is a reaction to the elements of past being (conception, memory (appears in retention) and experiences) in a momentum of space, indeed the pastness is about temporal dimension as discussed above. In relation to this, impressions are inadequate by themselves on the first time constituting phenomenal experiences in a self (I), later the constant changes of content in the present state (now) but not the departure of the change of content into the past: "in receding into the past, the temporal object also contracts and in the process becomes obscure" (Mensch, 2014:7), for instance an object get recede and weaken from after experience it and eventually it vanished or altered from the roots. Observations from Husserlian account of phenomenal experiences says, whatever all the temporal fills, vanishing away of the new experiences of objects fills are temporal and cannot be part of the physical phenomena, for example, to a self (I) can have an experience of an object at now has many facets of a flower is not just a weak appearance, or not merely sensual imagination, or not visual echo and visual reverberations. Although, there is no sensuous content available and grasping may get weaker

and weaker, but with the capacity of experiences we keep to maintain its presence for a moment, such a kind is called 'retention' by Husserl (Mensch, 2014). In this context, Husserl in common with Kant's argument "if I were to lose from my thought the preceding [impressions] ... and not reproduce them when I advance to those which follow, a complete presentation [of an extended event] would never arise." (Kant 1955, A 102:78-9, Translated by Mensch, 2014:121).

In retention, if the properties of it an awareness vanishing away then it allows to happen what we experienced is not really attached itself, but the empty act allows to happen itself, that is where the I vanishes, there appears another I by itself, this might lead to infinite regress of experiences in self, however, such infinite is also determined by the existence of life.

Typically, such an experience has continuous changes on retained content and that change being that of disappearing by vanishing or erasing, this changing process can be perceived as serially. However, if the impressions does not erase or stopped from erasing that will advance to *now* state of the next impression either through the external perceptual senses or internal perception, however, conditionally this reproduction employs the past impressions for the next one, and it must be reproduced if the serial process not erased as that preserves the past impressions. Yet, it will be infinite until the end of our conscious awareness, that is the life of a human.

In view of Husserl essentials (Husserl, 1999:190), §11 *Primal impression and retentional modification*: this account was accepted as the continuous change or vanishing that marks on our experience of retentions. Therefore, the primal impression of an object that we have passes over into a retention within a duration (short), and that itself is a *now* -- something is about the primal impression's actual existence (Husserl, 1999:190). Furthermore, with the vanishing of its 'now',

the retention is itself retained: “changes into retention of retention and does so continuously” and it results as :“a continuum of retentions arises in such a way that each later point is a retention for every earlier point” (Husserl, 1999:190), that is, the impressions we have appears as retentions of retentions of retentions.. so on serially, of course it has somewhere the earliest or very primary impressions. Known that every retention retains its own earlier impression, also it alters itself because of it the reproduction of it never retains exactly the same as the earlier but the earliest can be retained with modifications or alterations because of the latter sensory experiences. However, as a short-term memory act, it holds a number of impressions for a temporal aspect prior to meta level indexicality. In such phenomena, every impression carries its own continuity of retentions and if we see holistically, all temporal aspects are retained in the form of continuities along their substances as said “time-points of the duration of the object” (Husserl, 1999:189) the retention belonging to the different temporal aspects.

It is significant to address what Husserl was about the duration of the object retention, according to him, the short-term memory and the altered retention is away merely within a period of minute, latter whatever the recollected is from its long-term memory, thus it is tempting to continue an analysis on *priori to recollection* of certain pro-active formulation and it lead me to know how the inner content assimilates with the external sources of input as if there are no motivational factors to adapt it, the properties would have penetration through experiencing, however, if any kind of instantaneous acts are established *a prior* for the affirmation of the penetration to placed in memory as an impression have certainty of fragments caught in this process. For Husserl, the noema is true or real, and the concept of unity is able to invoke the object determinations, for instance, *unity* has ability to describe how the temporal object

determinations are descriptive and how they can constitute the *horizons* of existing perceptual content from the experiences, and what if they are undetermined.

Likewise, the concept of unity can able to draw a line between identity of the object and descriptive content, it can also able to determine intended object in a noematic sense (perhaps applicable to a particular sense), therefore the intended object can be treated as an ultimate determinant of truth (Zahavi, 2003).

For instance, in view of Zahavi (translation of Husserlian manuscripts IX, 202 in Husserl-Archive): Husserlian account of temporal indexicality of intended objects says: “it becomes evident that concrete perception as original givenness of a temporally extended object is structured internally as itself...” an existing perceptual content which are known to be primal impressions. “...But each such momentary perception is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of momentary gradated retentions on the one side, and a horizon of what is coming on the other side: a horizons of existing perceptual content that lead to “protentions” or essence of intuitions” (Zahavi, 2003:165).

Similarly, as said by Husserl in investigations on transcendental phenomenology and internal time §11: “Primal impression and retentive modification”: “the primary memory, or retention, continuously attaches itself to the ‘impressions.’ [...] In the case of the perception of a temporal object [...], the perception terminates at any moment in a now-apprehension [...]. During the time that a motion is being perceived, a grasping-as-now takes place moment by moment; and in this grasping, the actually present phase of the motion itself becomes constituted. But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet’s tail of retentions relating to the

earlier now-points of the motion [...] Thus pushing back into the past continually occurs. The same continuous complex incessantly undergoes a modification until it disappears; for a weakening, which finally ends in imperceptibility, goes hand in hand with the modification.” (Husserl, 1999:190). This has been argued by not going into deeper discussions on ‘concept of unity’ from both diachronic and synchronic views concerning the phenomenological structure of intentional experiences implies both spatio-temporal properties and relations. However, the concept of unity shed a light in addition to structure of consciousness as a continuous series of perceptions, that is as a whole of its constitutes the experiential content of a physical movement. Husserl have already figured out a complex structure of it (perception) that underlies in the ‘order of experiences’, whereas within microstructure of consciousness.

These accounts of retention is not merely about few particularities in conscious experiences or awareness, rather it is going into the *problem of identity* that is the problem of perceptual retentions, for instance, what we experienced visually the just-past impression as it can be retained: without a co-occurrence between just-past and present (now), that is between retained and its aspect of awareness.

Later Husserl, Brough⁵⁷ (1989:276) has strongly emphasized on horizons of retention in perceptual content, he noted that, the just-past impression doesn’t stay in present awareness, but it is always available to access for present awareness state as past-impression. In fact, the retention appears as a different form of intentionality in awareness, because the retentional content is altered with the intentional content and it cannot be anymore exactly same as original

⁵⁷ “Retention does not transmute what is absent into something present; it presents the absent in its absence” (Brough, 1989:276).

impressions what we have experienced as the sense of it already passed. But, in view of Husserl “the retention is not a modification in which impressional data are really [reell] preserved, only in modified form: on the contrary, it is an intentionality—indeed, an intentionality with a specific character of its own” (Husserl, 1966/1991:118, Gallagher, 1998:48). Thence, the results of just-past phase of the objects or events in the retentional awareness is not about having just-past phase consciously appear together in a different distorted mode (Brough, 1989). For example, if we glance at the object ‘flower’ while walking in the garden, our attitude of perception may have more concentration on the flower but at the same time our eyes gather information of other objects surrounded too, however the duration may less now-phase of such motion. Eventually, such perceptual activity of glance is not a necessary act for remembering all the properties of flower or any object as it has no intendedness, thus, in order to have a successful establishment of the temporal context of our now-phase is not possible as the glance of flower appeared to us from nowhere, but at the same time if our attentiveness attracted to the object due to different distortions mode, relatively our temporal context can be established. For instance, if it is possible that all our previous phases of this physical motion is perceptually appeared in the same way as our present phases of perceptual notions, then it is quite evident that our entire perceptual space may fulfill with what we have crossed across physical motion in the garden. Yet, the perceptual notions present in some vague and hidden way although we did not pay enough attention or avoid the idea of past phases of our motion.

Consequently, the alterations fulfilled associated with temporality into the past phase is not the same as the alteration of a changing visual appearance of fulfillment, that is, the visual image still appears in notions of perceptual experiences. In fact, the sense of our just-past experience of

pursuing maintain the retention, although according to few critics, retention does not act by keeping the altered image in our consciousness, but it is true that our perceptual experiences are necessarily associated in a temporal horizons: the past-phase yet retained intentionally, and objects appear being a memory. Although Husserl commented as “the retention facilitates us with an intuition of the just-past sense of the object, and it traverse our perception of succession is to be possible” (Husserl, 1966/1991:41; Gallagher, 1998) but Husserl would not have agreed with the idea that perception of succession is merely about grasping the present state, that is ‘now’, rather his emphasis is on our current perceptual activity of the just-now phase of objects that includes a retention of the just-past phase, and the protention⁵⁸ is the phase of the objects about to occur (Zahavi, 2003) . As our perception cannot be merely a perception of present-phase, to endure an object in our perception: Husserl described in a noematic sense, an object in our perceptual presence is a sphere of now, not-now and not-yet-now is given horizontally, and that can distinguish the really immanent from the imagined, thus as our mental encodings of objective sense with properties and unique characteristics constitute for conscious awareness (Gallagher, 1998).

On this view, how temporal indexicality was an encoding and itself extended to inherently an intrinsic structure? This is a deceptively simple question in order to relate ‘intentionality’. Husserl stress-out that our experiences are a type of temporal processes, which the time (means *time* appears as order of experience) is countless and *ad infinitum* forms, that is an affair of

⁵⁸I pursue the idea of ‘future’ or ‘protention’ may not possible to experience in given now either horizontally or vertically, as all these past, just-past and now are experientials, which are information used merely for a predictive process of our awareness, thus the protention is always skeptical until it manifests in perceptual presence, yet sometimes this process may lead to imagined, however, the analysis of this argument is beyond the scope of this writing, I end up my statement at this point.

transitions or transmutations or transfigurations. And our experiences are naturally perspectival, partial and transitional, says that if the retention of our own familiar experiences is truly reflective, therefore imaginative, it resulted with fresh insights and surprising illuminations (Colapietro, 2013). For instance, if our perceptual experience of a sunset near seashore makes sense of express that I had an experience of indescribable joyful or blissful, such experiences end up the 'now' becomes just-past, afterwards it becomes 'past', if not it is highly difficult to express that 'I can remember a previous experience of sunset', in this regard all reflections in the sphere of experiences allows us for the state of presence or absence, but it alone cannot become itself past and absent, yet evenly retaining of our sphere of familiar experiences can be truly reflective with a very dimension of *inner time-conscious awareness*⁵⁹ manifests with its structure of three dimensions: a very primal impression-retention-protention, thus Husserl made clear sense of three layered temporal indexicality: "a) the appearances, b) pre-phenomenal acts of time-constituting consciousness or indexicals acts c) the objective time of the appearing objects, the subjective, immanent or pre-empirical time of the acts or mental acts, *sensa*" (Zahavi, 2003:168, translation of Husserlian manuscripts X, 73, 76, and 358 in Husserl-Archives). Such layered distinction leads a close and intrinsic structural nature between subjective time and the indexicals, hence it becomes clearer about the precise relation between the perceptual experiences and its objects, although it is a matter of ontological enquiry it would determine by

⁵⁹ Inner time-conscious awareness is a sphere of experiencing, a dimension of manifestation, which encompasses all three temporal modes: primal impression, retention, protention, these three are not exactly related to each other as present, past, and future. Rather it is their conjunction which makes possible the senses of present, past, and future. For Husserl, the absolute time-constituting consciousness as an unchangeable form of presence. Husserl did not recognize that the concept of standing presence is to be understood as referring to merely one of the three temporal modalities (Zahavi, 2003, translation of Husserlian manuscripts, XXXIV,384 in Husserl-Archive). The presence in question is not the 'now', is not the '*Gegenwart*': a now that one stands over against (Zahavi, 2003, translation of Husserlian manuscripts, XIV, 29 in Husserl-Archive).

both the elements of external conditions and the internal content of the experiences, which is a *sensa*. But for early Husserl, those mental acts, *sensa* are foundations of meaning, both the experienced and founded contents involved in intending meaning as an expression of actual meaning which constitutes intentional objectivating acts possessing in terms of both material and qualitative aspects (Husserl, 2001: 244–246).

However, as discussed in Husserl sixth logical investigations, if the indexical acts status is defined then it is concern about abstract entities in the noemata, on the other hand, it is applicable to in case of non-indexical acts also as they found embodied noema and real, such conception⁶⁰ of noemata is identical to the *meaningful content* of every situation with which individual moments of the acts associated with real, for instance, if an object presented to a perceiver visually during a perception then the phenomenological description would be different, for example, according to a study by Smith and McIntyre (1982): “a perception presents an object visually before the perceiver on the occasion of perception: in phenomenological description he may say “I see this tomato now here before me and affecting my eyes”. Now, the object of perception is not a function of the content alone, for another perception on another occasion could in principle have the very same phenomenological content and yet have a different object. That is, there is no functional, or many-one, relation between the content of perception – the content only insofar as it is embodied in that particular perceptual experience on that occasion – if you will, the demonstrative content-in-the-perception prescribes, or is satisfied

⁶⁰ “Husserl himself came gradually to find attractive, merely one difference remains that is the meanings of the LU are noetic they are species of acts. Yet, noemata is belong to the object correlate of the act, whether abstract or embodied. However, it is significant that this difference can be specified only by appeal to the terminology of the later theory: the opposition of noesis and noema is simply not at home in the framework of the earlier work. We conclude, therefore that there is nothing which the noema theory can explain what the earlier theory cannot also explain. But with much less ontological ado” (Mulligan and Smith, 1986:155).

by, the object of perception, the object contextually before the perceiver” (Smith and McIntyre 1982:225).

In this context, for Husserl, the class of expressions such as ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ uses are relatively restricted uses in the occasional meanings and these expressions are not associated with his account of perceptual judgments, but concerning with the entire class of sentences they are essentially indexical (Corazza, 2002a), that is, all empirical predictions fall in the conception of occasional meanings, but the pervasiveness of occasionality is becomes significant in building relations between acts especially between meaning and perceptual acts that illustrates between empty and filled acts of all varieties.

Do all empirical predictions belong to occasional meanings? But Husserl sixth logical investigations said that §5 (*Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it*), “If perception never constitutes the full meaning of a statement grounded on perception....meaning acts that are not fully determined acts with an empty slot. A meaning act with an empty slot cannot, as a matter of necessity, occur unless there occurs an act which fills the slot.” (Husserl and Moran LI VI §5, 2002:285-290) means when the perception and expression alter together then some other meaning act may possible in place of original meaning, in such process the original meaning act might not lose its *essence*, in that case the essence will then not be meaningful essence of an act which determines by another act merely concern of least differences. This conceptual change can be observed in Husserlian prolegomena (Hanna, 1993).

However, we have seen the necessary manifestation of meaning acts with empty slots within perceptual acts, and it appears that no perceptual act is responsible for the manifestation of meaning act with an empty slot⁶¹ rather the perceptual acts content with very fundamental specifications are different from the meaning acts content specifications, for instance, up-down, left-right, here-there, and etc., these are the referential points to the structures of hyle or hilectic data or sensible data⁶² (Husserl 1907; Mulligan, 1997). Yet, the perceptual fulfilment of meaning act's empty slot can be described independently of one another.

Temporal indexicality is an intrinsic structural feature for grasping

the characteristic of demonstratives is not a special mode of reference but a special mode of identification. (Hintikka, 1998:204)

According to Kaplan (1989), the pure indexicals like 'here' and 'now' are spatio-temporal extents that depend on the intentions of the expression (Corazza, 1994; 2002a). In agreement with Kaplan, John Perry (2001) have extended his exploration, according to him, this type of classification justifies the nature of unrestrictedness in other indexicals, for instance, the example provided by Perry (2001), 'today' or 'yesterday' may appear at very primary sense to be an automatic indexical, but implicitly it used to refer to temporality for longer than a particular duration of time in a single day: yesterday I spent a good time with friends in market, etc. however, this temporal indexical expression is different in its use that linking between the

⁶¹ It is a markable notion, "no perceptual act serves as fundament for an act with empty slot, that is no content instantiates any of the species which are characteristic for meaning acts, but it may cause to mislead if one conclude at this moment, however as Husserl already noted, a perceptual act, is not something that is simply inarticulate". (Mulligan and Smith, 1986:154).

⁶² Husserl, E refers to Kant's 1772 letter to Herz in his Thing and Space lectures of 1907, see Husserl Ding und Raum (Husserl, 1907)

singled out (solo) object and indexicals (Corazza, 2002b). This linkage between the previous and next is developed by the very use of indexicals and that can be observed from the speaker's expression, that says, such variant indexicals are self (I)-centric particulars, that are intrinsically featured as ego(I-ness) and spatio-temporality. In other words, the use of indexicals are implicit and intrinsically blend in the subjective perceptual experiences when we pursue an object, they strictly tied with an anchor of spatio-temporal relations, that appears in our expression of an action, that can be any mode, like an utterance by an individual.

Yet, to begin with a question about temporal indexicality by its nature, it seems temporality has determined implicitly in every moment of perception especially in grasping from the external world, however, to understand what precisely the act of grasping or knowing notions to be appeared in the process of perceptual experiences as it can be observed for others merely through expressions, although such conceptual alteration can be done within this act, but the relation with the meaning act merely says the precise notations (essence) of experienced object. To begin with, how does the meaning act shape the essence of the perceptual experiences and what exactly are 'truth conditions'?, and where do the propositions accommodated within this spell. The following inferences sounds reasonable: an act of meaning should filter the essence of sensual experiences, but 'meanings' are entirely mysterious at this moment, because every experience has a different representation of the same event, or object or a situation, all these representations somewhere fall in a straight line that belongs to the categorical concepts defined by the propositional attitudes of experiences and relevant beliefs with respect to accessibility of them⁶³.

⁶³Though Perry (2001) rejects the idea of psychological propositional attitudes, according to his summary of its central tenets, proposition becomes inaccessible, that is we can still identify the propositions from the expressed words during its expression, but that cannot express them with those words any longer, for with each passing

Though the meaning of an expression is a function of the object referred to a situation, which provides good grasping on the meanings of expressions that intuitively have a referent but it still doesn't shed light on what "meanings" are for expressions that do not intuitively have a referent. In fact, what if we focus on grasping essence from expressions that intuitively have a spatio-temporal and agential indexicals as a 'referent' with trifocal-conditions? This idea the conventional grasping of meaning through essence of perceptual experiences in its situation is relation between the functional and occasional meaning, such that an expression is belonging to what it refers to words like 'I', 'here' and the quantifiers in reflections of awareness? For instance, the words consist spatio-temporal information like 'here', 'now'..etc constitutes the proper meaning merely based on the representation variable (should hold) for its location and time, that says, it is 'true' that sentences having personal pronouns as representation variable would constitute of proper meaning but intrinsically the 'referent' must satisfied with three conditional properties: determining whose meaning, demonstratives, or adverbs of spatio-temporal relations. Whereas the determining whose meaning includes the representation variable of an individual, like personal pronoun, and the demonstratives dealt with representation variable of an individual objectively related, and adverbs of spatio-temporal relations of the representation variable of an individual's when and where i.e. position and location, and its rational analysis making sense for absolute knowledge or meaning, however, in sixth logical investigations Husserl mentioned as §5: *Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it* (Husserl, E. and Moran, D., 2002:285-286): inferences from the hearer view the pursuing or identification or expressions or anchoring about spatio-temporal

moment they express a different proposition. And we can find no other words to express it.(Nelson, 2000; Grush, 2006)

indexes to a specific meaning has been identified with undermined representations, but the meaning function to an act has been identified with determined representations, it means that the perception is not merely for meaning to an act, rather it confers to a meaning then an empty slot suppose to be facilitated to fulfillment of essence from the content of perceptual experiences. Thus, the meaning of an expression merely in a sense of determined relation towards an objectifying act which is essentially in identification of spatio-temporal indexing process at meta level, however in Husserl view, the meaning is not merely responsible for the determined relation to an object, but it is essential for judgmental sense (Yamagata, 1998).

A Phenomena of essence, indexical meanings and temporal indexicals

In order to expose how temporal indexicality and indexical meanings is said to be intrinsically essential features of the perceptual experiences and judgements: what follows to determine more precisely in complex events judging sense founded on perception. For instance, ‘there is a flower in that bush’, for a truth-maker it is significant what is the essential act in which the meaning of ‘this’ associated and implicit assertions reside which are spatio-temporal indexicals. In the sixth logical investigations of Husserl showing the meaning of an expressing act always having a special founded acts which are signitive acts⁶⁴ (intentional), but never in a simple founding act of seeing, for instance, seeing a ‘red flower’ and subsequently expressing a perceptual judgement as

⁶⁴ According to Husserl, “signitive acts or signitive intentions as empty acts of intending that use a sign to aim at some kind of objective fulfillment. Signitive acts have a certain content which is construed as a sign of the object or state of affairs. Signitive acts are contrasted with acts of intuition where the objects are immediately given. Signitive acts can be intended either simple objects or more complex categorial objects or states of affairs. Husserl distinguishes between signitive and significative acts but he is not always consistent. Signitive intentions contribute to the meanings of expressions. Significative intentions contribute to words having their meaning ... and allow for intentions to be expressible in language. The signitive intention is what operates when signs are used to express the meanings. Signitive acts involve signs but not necessarily linguistic signs” (Moran and Cohen, 2012:299-300).

‘this is a red flower’ contains a demonstrative reference and temporal indexicals⁶⁵, the spatio-temporal relations with which ‘position and location’ of the expressed judgment arise directly from the experiential content of our perception, but merely expressed meaning without experientiality in the given content is arguably the most difficult to have a judgement about the particular action in a situation. Since the expression is an action which produced by an individual in a particular position and location, to have a fullness in this relevant contextual parameters must satisfy for indexical⁶⁶ references which are the spatio-temporality of the expression of an individual. For instance, when an individual expresses: ‘this’ flower is red, the person (I) refers to another person (the listener) in front of me, while if I am not in the listener’s locality and present state I cannot refer to the same expression to the listener, and if i am talking now about the ‘past event, I may use probably ‘that flower is in red’, or ‘it was red colour..and so on, from the listener’s view pursuing of an indexical needed the grasping of the contextual parameters in which the expression obtains the demonstrative references (D.R).

Though, one can stress out a fact is demonstrative references are mainly ‘this and that’ usually linked with a particular kind of predicates, for instance, linguistically speaking ‘sortal’ predicates available to solve the reference problem in formation of complex demonstrative expressions like

⁶⁵“temporal indexicals, i.e., expressions of the form ‘today’, ‘this week’, ‘last Monday’, etc. and temporal terms such as ‘Monday’, ‘week’, ‘spring’, ‘February’, etc. After showing how indexicals, unlike other terms, rest on perspectival identification, ... some features distinguishing pure indexicals (e.g., ‘now’, ‘today’, ‘here, . . .) from demonstratives (e.g., ‘this’, ‘she’, ‘that’,. . .). ..in favor of three main theses: • temporal indexicals are pure indexicals, • they must be explained in terms of ‘now’, i.e., the time at which they are uttered and • temporal terms are count nouns. As such they can be used as sortal predicates to form either: (a) compound indexicals of the form ‘last week’, ‘next year’, ‘this summer, . . . or (b) quantified expressions of the form ‘some days’, ‘every Monday’, ‘every year’, ‘all Marchs’ . . .”(Corazza, 2002b:441)

⁶⁶ As written by Richard Nordquist, English Grammarian, (May 25, 2019). “Indexicals are intrinsically perspectival strictly close with an individual’s I-ness. These indexicals are different from the proper names and other terms: proper names as names of unique beings or things.” (Richard Nordquist, former English professor and Grammarian, 2019)

‘this flower is...’, ‘that liquid is..’, coupling with contextual parameters in a universal narrower sense. For example, if our perceptual statement pointing to a bush, like ‘this flower is red’, then the sortal predicate ‘flower’ helps to solve the object ‘flower’ but not the ‘bush’ as the referent, that means, an aspect of considering indexical expressions, the meaning of indexicals are descriptive, insofar they describe as referent where the indexicals fulfill the constraints merely as referent of descriptive expression and they must fulfill its referential component which is again a ‘descriptive’. Although, sometimes unlike these descriptions, indexicals are singular terms, where this demonstrative references are implicit in given expressions, explicitly we as a listener may understand the use of it, likewise if an individual cannot not grasp the meaning of the expressions with singular terms perhaps they are missing the contextuality, yet their relation with linguistic meaning is not part of this project to continue further more discussion.

Nevertheless, in order to determine the connection among the perception and essence, the act in which the meaning of this essential or occasional associated in perceptual experiences is necessary, in fact, this account of temporality is not merely into expressions of perceptual judgments, but account of expressions have the essential personal and temporal indexicality associated to the meanings, those are relatively restricted to use of expressions, for example, ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’, that is, this distinction is not limited between meanings and perception, but it has been extended to the perceptual statements that do not have a contribution in the meaning of an entire act, means that, an expression without causing to lose its meaning the perception might alter and also able to fade altogether. For instance, in case a truth-maker expressed a perceptual statement, say ‘there is a flower in the bush’ which is true and meaningful merely when the pertinent perception is made. Hence, this perceptual statement says an act must provide the

meaning of perceptual experiences on its encounters; the latter it serves a distinction between original and occasional contents based on its qualities, forms and so on. Whereas such acts are intuitive or signitive and sometimes both, yet these acts because of grasped knowledge refers relation between a quality and a matter⁶⁷.

Although these acts for knowing or grasping the knowledge through the making distinction between quality and matter stands in need of evidence but that can be provided merely by the act with successiveness of fulfillment, particularly when the intuitive acts elements synthesized. For instance, if the original contents of articulated perceptual experiences are canonically conceptual then the same perceptual contents not merely fulfill the meanings of the original contents rather it is intuitively lawful; though such synthesis of acts is complex in givenness, but it servers as a foundational act over the perceptual content because the fullness of an intuitiveness with which relation of judging sense, that is as the pre-reflexive awareness available in the background process of immediacy in the given sensory content, an extra act in that is an act of judgement, otherwise it should available besides the judgement. All means, the sense of judging in relation of givenness is about the elements or parameters (agential indexicals, spatio-temporal indexicals) in a given situation, but the meaning expression is not exactly 'in' that contextuality, because the act though which it comes to givenness, and those expressions are rather an act founded upon the perception. When the hyle as a kind of simple perception and treating it as a core eventually intentionality be symbolize a beholding of the object itself as the sensations have a direct contact with it, i.e. *directed to aboutness of object*, but in the case of intuition it is the other way around, that as beholding of an object itself where the sensations fits with contact indirectly within the

⁶⁷ In this contextual view, according to Husserl the "matter" means the *content or intension* that determines the reference to a certain object or object-directedness.

life of the egoness (self or I-ness). However, I do not find Husserl entry in this anything that confronts the Kantian line, that is the *intuitions* are always both sensible and immediate (Senderowicz, 2005; Friedman, 2012; Leech, 2014).

Also, this Husserlian thesis did not discarded the preference at first had assigned to merely pre-intentional constituted affective states which have no noematic sense i.e. the sphere of senses which references to objects are the pre-structure sensory contents from the sensations within the background of awareness, but for an accomplishment of perceptual fullness without the sensual apprehension and explication would not complete as they become another dimensions of self awakening process though its involvement which is passive and limited to allow the appearance of objects. In fact, the underlying issues are complicated, but my attempt was merely brief of this fundamental ones: the cases of pre-structured affective sphere founded on intentional acts (subjectivity and worldhood properly) employed genetic conditions for the acts of *attentive* perception which relies for input on both ego-subjectivity and the worldliness of ego-subject, though sometimes it is clearer, in view of judgmental sense for an ego-subject the simple perception considered to be *apriori* to any other act, but how should one understand this if there is no motivational factors available for this perception; thus far, in order to have a judgemental sense, one must able to relate this analysis of relation among the reflective and pre-reflectiveness of awareness, yet the outcome of this relational analysis facilitates explicitly a thematic and objectifying reflection, although a kind of non-objectifying acts⁶⁸ are implicitly featured as

⁶⁸“The thesis that Husserl abandoned the priority he at first had assigned to objectifying thought over non-objectifying acts in favor of either a priority or a sort of equiprimordiality of non-objectifying acts, may indeed be true. [...] Husserl subscribed to a similar view of what Brentano held that judgmental and emotional intentionalities presuppose the intentionality of *Vorstellung*. Emotional acts, for example, on his view derive their objective reference from the intentionality of some underlying objectifying act—judgment or presentation. In loving a person, the latter is object of love only through first being the object of a presentation or of a thought. This is true of other non-objectifying acts such as desire and hope. [...] But other phenomenologists, prominently Heidegger and

dimension of a self (me-ness), but the self-awareness always distinguishes all our experiences for reflective nature through conditioning, this means the necessary structures have precise relation between the matter and qualities of an object while perception. As if there are no motivational factors to adapt qualities of content when the real and inner content assimilates with input from external sources by penetrating the properties of it through experiencing, in this context the memory reflects as tendencies for any kind of instantaneous acts which are established *a priori* for the affirmation of the penetration to adapt them, thus the fragments of these processes become correlational for a meaning shape.

Phenomenal correlation of content for a meaning from experience is a cognitive process

“An exposure and its links with prior experience are some of the major traits in the formation of a mental representation. For example, if any new smell is found to be linked to a related family of smells or some related smell, people say it is similar to it/them or they convey their thoughts.... about ‘object’. If an environment is embedded within a combination of previous experiences (i.e. related knowledge structures), unknown information leads to indeterminacy with respect to the identification and categorization of that piece of information. [...] Every informational aspect from a smell cannot draw the attention of the person; even smells often

Merleau- Ponty, rejected this thesis, and held that the world (as well as things in the world) are primordially experienced in non-objectifying acts. [...] they do not want to say that the non-objectifying acts originally objectivate their intentional correlates, i.e. present them. They rather want to say that the world (and worldly things) is originally experienced non-objectively through our concerns, emotions, projects, desires, love and hatred, amongst others. [...] but, Husserl held contrastively that the intentional correlates of non-objectifying acts are objectified only through some *Vorstellung* or thought. [...] he holds that non-objectifying acts are a necessary component of our experience of the world, while insisting that the world is objectivated, however, only in the objectifying acts.” (Mohanty, 2003:129-130)

diversify and spread around the surroundings through the wind. The intensity of a smell may divert the attention of a perceiver and thus cooperate with other visual, emotional or cultural associations to make a meaning at an intentional state in specific situation the person interacts with adaptive and maladaptive patterns via cognitive processes which are functionally activated by procedures” (Pala and Gangashetty, 2016:50-51).

Consider this perceptual statement: ‘I see there is a flower on the bush and the colour is red’ from contextually this sentence may be true, but it's the truth doesn't seem to be inconsequentially what the lexemes involved meaning, if this is accepted as ‘true’ in virtue of its ‘essential’ meaning of its act, then it seems that ‘I saw a rose on the bush’ would be false.

Let's see how both a quality and a matter of an act determines the meaning of the perception, eventually it expressed as a perceptual statement what Husserl said that in very primary state it is a simple perception and latter on object-directedness. According to Brough (1989), Husserl denoted that originally the perception does not have an act of meaning , but a new act of meaning develops in the perception based on a quality and a matter acts respectively, and though it can be restructured latter very independent of the previously had perceptual experience, and the meaning of an indexical expression would not be altered or vanished. For instance, in an ideal case, if I assert acts in suitable circumstances such as grasp of a thought from the recognition of its truth then the meaning of such an assertion consists in those acts. The kinds of *ideality* that the acts of meaning can have its truth-value by recognition of indexical expression that determines independent of the perceiver's perspective or subjective elements of judging, that is from the first-person view. But, in the end, how do those complex perceptual judgments, turn themselves as judgments founded on perceptions? As seen for a meaningful expression, the truth

value of proposition does not affect with the spatio-temporality which includes the tense too. As it handles the assertions together other communicative acts such as expectations, retentions, protentions and so on, that means the quality as a nature of those communicative acts determine the character of the perspective identity (Brough, 1972), for instance, if we organized a study of intentionality permits a performance perspective then it determines the noetic sense, else if the study is about objects, it determines different perspective of identity, in this way altogether if there is a change in perspective which lead with efforts of communicative acts, consequently a change appears in a relevant propositional attitude too. Therefore, a concept meaning of an expression is merely about the functionality of contextual parameters towards the object used in the expression but the idea also facilitates a good capacity of grasping ability to the perceiver on the meaning of an expression. Such ability is intuitively has a 'referent' by the expression i.e. to the object referred by the expression.

For instance, follow the statement by David Lewis (1972, 'General Semantics'): "In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that (Lewis 1972:22)". It says that, a fundamental idea that combines by all means to provoke meanings of expressions, sometimes such expressions appears to be more complex, though for knowledge claims to do this combination (synthesis) is indeed of intuitive evidence, but that merely served by the fullness of intuitive acts, for example, look into the successful synthesis of expressions, a perceptual statement 'I have headache' means what it does in virtue of what 'I' is referred and what the object is 'have headache'. In this framework, can we think that reference occupies the essence of meanings, but if we think of meanings of 'have headache' is merely something that synthesis with the meaning of 'I' i.e. the 'subject' of the expression, it is an

undifferentiated present state of reality, the essence of this expression is to have merely of the 'now' but not to transcend the given representation. Thus, it is helpful to understand how the essence is significant in meaning and how the meaning of expressions synthesis to bring about the meanings of more complex expressions. In fact a simple perception being a kind of intuitive act which produces epistemic evidence to meaning acts, that is, a particular kind of synthetic fulfillment takes place in the grasping of objects which are supersensuous and intellectuality, for instance, within normal conditions of everyday to an individual, experiencing 'gravitational force' is implicit and no need of further explicit explanation of it, yet it is necessary that a truth-value with valid apriori notions to fulfil those acts such as meaning, judgemental and so on, but it has never been with a direct perception; the essence can merely be found in a universal intuition which perceive its ideal content involves abstraction. However, sometimes it appears to be skeptical, as the intuition is opposed to generalizations, but epistemic essence is to particular kind of acts which implying generalizations and ideally the essence can be seen in universal intuition. For instance, Husserl as described in his sixth investigations §66: *distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of 'intuiting' and 'thinking'* (LI, II 317, §66). "...the opposition between individual intuition (usually conceived, with what is plainly baseless narrowness, as sensuous intuition) and universal intuition. A new concept of intuition is fixed by means of this opposition. It is opposed to generalization, and so, further, to the categorial acts implying generalizations, and also, in unclear admixture, to the significative counter-parts of such acts. 'intuition', we now say merely presents the individual, while 'thought' points to the universal, is carried out by way of 'concepts'. one generally speaks in this context of the opposition between 'intuition and concept'" (LI, II 318, §66).

It says the sensible intuitions are not adequate to fulfill the various kinds of knowledge as alone it cannot provide the intuitive evidence to them, that is the various kinds of intuitive acts are necessary to have adequate intuitive evidence in the formation of signitive intentions such as beliefs and so on. Husserl claim about fulfilling knowledge is true when it is intuitively fulfilled not merely about actually fulfilled (Bennett, 1916).

In order to show the full span of various signitive intentional acts fulfilment should encompass possible intuitive evidence with a concept of epistemic essence. In view of Husserl, conceptually evident that epistemic essence of an act contains its elements of knowledge are actively functional (Bennett, 1916). Therefore, the result of acts is upon the matter, quality and fullness which are the imputes of the intuitive content, as a result those imputes to epistemic essence is soon after that attribute to all acts with intuitive content. After explication the conceptual relation of the intuition with essence says that perceptual intuitions are not indeed to allow the epistemic evidence rather it serves merely certain intuitive fullness for knowledge origins, that is for an absolute source of knowledge is indeed of justification for a communicative act of signitive intention where for a the meaning resides in intention. Such justification carries implicitly a significant truth value, yet on a successful synthesis of communicative acts or signitive intentional acts and intuitive acts will serve the epistemic essence, that is, for an ideal case, the act-matter synthesis is sufficient which means intuitive and signitive intentional acts are appropriate but in normal conditions there may be a better or worse at various levels of intuitive evidence, however concern with fulfilling the empty intention, the latter follows the former merely on adequate givenness, yet this case is not dismissal on inadequateness though it holds a partial givenness and nature of sharing with a priori evidence, that is, in view of Husserl, the

adequate givenness for a communicative acts *when the object meant is in the strict sense given in our intuition, and given as just what we think and call it* (Husserl and Moran, 2002:329, translation of Husserlian Logical Investigations II).

Such conventional communication determines the correlation between the acts which is phenomenologically equivalent, for instance things or objects and a sense of meaning correlation fulfills the evidence of essence, that is the *adequatio rei et intellectus* (Husserl and Moran, 2002, Intro. Iiii; LI, Intro. §2:169).

‘essence’ is therefore an intuition

In the light of the essentiality of a phenomena essence, token modes of presentation obtained with a certain type of correlation of sense meaning and things which is content of propositional attitudes and the bearers of truth-value that emphasis the ‘operative concepts’⁶⁹ in empirical experiences. But these actual empirical experiences have been informed collectively from two main ingredients (satra) are sensory raw material or hyle and forms or essence which objectively existing and independent to individual minds (Hintikka, 2003). Thus it is significant to understand Husserlian ideas on intuitions, though it is which one or many may have thoughts differently. According to Husserlian Ideas, all our empirical experiences pertain to intuition and as an intuitiveness or intuitive consciousness⁷⁰ (Kersten 1983; Hintikka, 2003). In our immediate experiences these ‘objects’ originally given to self (me), and within the epistemological

⁶⁹ As Kersten mentions in his translations: He shown instead of “can reach” writes as “perhaps reaches”, “the operative german word is not vielleicht, however, but eventuell, which carries the combination “if necessary” or even “if successful”.” (Kersten, 1983, Hintika, 2003:59).

⁷⁰ “the intuition is consciousness of an individual object...and it makes this object given as perception, it makes this object given originally in the consciousness of seizing upon this individual object originally in its selfhood i.e. me-ness” (Husserl, 1983:09, Ideas I sec 3; Hintikka, 2003).

constitutive process for both starting and ending points of reduction has used the same token for intuition to provide self-presenting objects. Yet, such objects embody forms foist on hyle, thence, they are not simple, so we can direct our awareness merely on the ‘essence’ but not to hyle, this conception require an idea of division of embedded forms (*eide*) as a sort of objects from the matter (material) within the intuitive consciousness known to be intuitiveness of a self, and according to Kersten (1983) that objects have the ability to draw our intuitive attention that is, Husserlian *Wesensschau*⁷¹(Hintikka, 2003). However, what makes Husserl distinguished from empiricists is that not merely ‘dependency’ on intuitions as such, but also, the ‘objects’ in intuitions are given to the self is merely ‘instantiations of forms’ and they belong to a different class of essences itself, except the individual objects of sensory awareness. So, Husserl has informed to intuitions by recognizing⁷² ‘the essence’ is not merely to the ‘objects’ or abstract instances as in a normal sense but the essences can be the objects of immediateness or a kind of immediate experiences, however, we can serve ‘the essence’ as objects with few ‘appendages’ like other usual objects. Such an abstract idea ‘essence’ is merely possible in intuitive notions and it has a pivotal role in further discussions on how essence could be the notions of intuitions and what all features has been grounded in that.

⁷¹ The effect in consciousness, the empirical objects not only deals with the form and matter or essence itself, and it separated from hyle. It results that the intuitions and objects of intuitions are two different kinds in our empirical experiences.

⁷² Intuition of an essence is consciousness of something, an “object,” a something to which the intuitional regard is directed and which is “itself given” in the intuition. It is something which can nevertheless be "objectified" as well in other acts, something that can be thought of vaguely or distinctly, which can be made the subject of true and false predictions — just like any other “object” in the necessarily broadened sense proper to formal logic (Hintikka, 2003:52).

Hence, Husserl points out about a formulation⁷³ of *essence* is not grasping *essence* itself rather it is pursuing and knowing about an object which is given to ‘itself’ (Smith 1989), that is, intuitive notions are not about our mental capacity rather it is a product of it, like an *essence* for the chosen constitutive activity, however, all of something, it is an abstraction of its essence which extracted from an empirical object merely ‘when’ it is immediately given to us and apart from that it is not possible to bestow from its hyletic elements.

However, few critics from Kantian framework have encountered how synthetic representatives are *a priori* in Husserl, although this has been discussed in previous sections in detail: undeniably, such synthetic *a priori* knowledge is purely dealing with universals, that is, essences or forms. As the ‘universals’ concern to essences are obtrude on hyle, then a priori knowledge is no more an empirical intuitive knowledge at the same time the essence can be distinguished in knowledge through intuition likewise *Wesensschau*⁷⁴ from hyletic elements, i.e, elements of sensory raw material (Kern, 1984).

Though, in connection with forms or essence as being invoked on sensory raw material capable of separable elements of experiences themselves for that hyle does not need any hyletic data. As we read already, in the experiences, the hyletic data is the elements of it but not the objects of it,

⁷³“Any possible object ... has prior to all predicative thinking, precisely its modes of becoming the object of an objectivating, intuiting regard which can reach it in its ‘personal selfhood,’ or ‘seize upon it’ .” (Hintikka, 2003:58).

⁷⁴“*Wesensschau* is knowledge of objects, not of facts, i.e. knowledge that. As we saw, *Wesensschau*, too, pertains to objects, albeit objects different from sensible particulars. For husserl, *Wesensschau* transforms sensory intuition into intuition of essences. The fact that essences come to us in the form (Sic) of their particular instances does not effect the nature of *Wesensschau* pertaining to general forms. What *Wesensschau* opens for us is therefore not a system of synthetic truths a priori but a world of abstract entities called essences. Therefore, Husserl *Wesensschau* is closely related to his notion of eidetic reduction. What happens in the eidetic reduction among other things is that one brackets the hyletic component and directs one’s attention to the essences alone. In other words, only the results of *Wesensschau* are left unsuspected.” (Hintikka, 2003:59-60).

thus it is important to be attentive with expressions such as *ideal entitles*; nonetheless, actions in *Wesensschau* is not solely about abstract objects in intuition which are part of a formal phase rather than an intuition can also refer to the essence of our empirical objects, and they are individual. Yet there are different sorts of *Wesensschau* are indeed co-extending with the different categories, according to Hintikka (2003) thus far *Wesensschau* is not merely about the ‘categorical intuition’ rather than within the universals, it is an intuition of the sensible particulars of forms which is an essence (Kersten, 1983, Hintikka, 2003:61).

Also, this can be persuaded in other ways within *Wesensschau*: whatever given the object to us through perception that we can intellectually pursue as a universal idea, of course, in view of Husserlian use, this idea is not a duplicate to Kantian Idee⁷⁵. in fact, these ideas are merely instructive when we compare them among Kant and Husserl, for instance, in the Kantian view, the intuitions and synthetic knowledge is *a priori*, i.e. in our sensations those have been already the forms of spatio-temporal relations, so our attainment of such knowledge is through the intuitions of spatio-temporal relations. Similarly, in Husserlian *Wesensschau*, the essence has been distinguished from hyle by indicating it as empirical experiences. However, in the case of essences, the difference among them is that, we do not constitute the essences rather only recognize them by distinguishing from sensory raw material i.e. hyle. According to Hintikka (1969), another difference is Kant thought that all the spatio-temporal aspects are merely about particulars, and whatever the ‘synthetic knowledge’ that we acquired through spatio-temporal relations applies to sensibly given particulars.

⁷⁵ Kantian Idee is in the case of the temporal form of physical object, *the phenomenologically clarified concept of Kant's pure intuition* (Hintikka, 2003:61)

However, in Husserl, the forms on their own appeared as objects of knowledge, that is, such transformation of forms is a kind of apodicticity of conception of concepts, however, does the density of adequateness is apodictic in fulfillment for constitutive activity or it is an apodicticity of conception of concepts which yet to be cleared. But in a definitive way Husserlian Wesensschau fulfill two different things in two different levels, that is, it constitutes an object of intuition by extracting the essence from its raw sensory material as an empirical object, and the secondary fulfillment of attainment is accordingly known an intuition that provide us to have an access of abstract entities⁷⁶, furthermore, we can observe that how Gödel was interested in this idea of intuitive access to the world of abstract entities (Follesdal, 1974; Wang, 1996), however, few critics would not interest to accept Wesensschau as its association to the notions of ‘intuition’ is merely ‘givenness’, and not anything more. Although for all possible experiences, the essence forms a framework but we cannot predict from that any particular experience as the essence come to self (me-ness) which kept on hyle, however, we will be aware those essence prior to their examination of themselves within the framework of all possible experiences⁷⁷.

In fact, according to Levinas (1973), as discussed, because the hyle is dissimilar to all facts which are configurations of different objects and each of objects has its own form i.e. the hyle does not ‘project’ as to the ideas of other commentators, like Russell and Wittgenstein. The sensory raw material does not add anything nor it repel the forms, thus, the form of the complexity cannot be unrevealed without knowing all of its elements or ingredients, and all the

⁷⁶ About notions of intuition: “notions even though Husserl typically speaks of the entire Wesensschau as an intuition. These elements are opens up for me the world of essences for my intuition by separating them from hyletic data. The upshot therefore is that a phenomenologist can have intuitive access to the world of abstract entities in a Wesensschau”. (Hintikka, 2003:65).

⁷⁷ “I know ahead of time that they are what I know them to be from examining them on their own.” (Hintikka, 2003:66).

elements are given to the self (me) in the experiences to know the logical status of the form, that is, categorial status of the complexity. However, according to Levinas (1973), in Husserlian view we merely aware 'essences', the sensory raw material follow their lead and the forms have no indeed to entangle with other forms as they were given to the formless state of sensory raw material forcibly. However, does Russell and Wittgenstein have articulated in their analysis to such hyle and its elements, if then Levinas could have accepted them as his target. But as Levinas do agreed the manifestation of intuition can be described with 'elements of hyle', such manifestation have a special sense that we can predict a specific experience although Wesensschau does not allow a prediction of any particular sense of judgement, that is, a priori synthetic judgements (Levinas, 1973, p.71).

Conclusions

Indeed of Husserl it is misleading especially in association of *a priori* synthetic knowledge, for instance, the forms given to us in immediate experiences were not explicitly placed on the hyle rather it was on it prior to the given. Therefore, it is not possible to predict what data was there on hyle and which Wesensschau is responsible for constituting the knowledge of the essence that means the knowledge of the several ways in which way it can be placed from the sensory raw material is knowledge of objects and not of the material. For instance, when the forms imposed on perceptual raw data then in a natural logical sense the reflections appear in our linguistic utterances and it is similar to the 'constitutive actions or activity' as these are the knowledge of objects not merely the perceptual information.

CHAPTER VI

All Roads lead to Absolute awareness

As far, I have explored through-out the chapters of this dissertation with a focus on the thematic relations among the nature of knowledge origins revelation within the true nature of a 'self', where the absolute awareness becomes the essence of such a being which is the ultimate presence irrespective of our mental state. In this chapter, my focus on the notions of absolute awareness within the Husserlian framework being a awareful observer, this led to a closer view about the intrinsic correlations between knowledge sources and experiences in terms of truth and meaning. Thus, my advancement of these all chapters conclude the awareness is the absolute essence for nature of knowledge origins in connection with experiences though the transcendental endured, therefore, in this chapter I would raise the essentialities and fundamentals of awareness by keeping all the chapters in mind. And, I put forward how a awareness is holding a nature of absoluteness as an energy that serves independently to our own mental and physical activities. Also, I draw my remarks targeted towards where the cognitive realism and transcendental idealism offers a synthesis relevant to this analysis.

Keywords: awareness, conscious beings, self, trustworthy knowledge, judgemental sense, intentions and mental objects intuitive character.

Introduction

In this enquiry, I import methods from the principles of cognitive philosophical analysis, which is differentiating and distinguishing or unifying as unity between the known from the unknown, for instance, we the awareful observers saw before anything known to us is an object and is therefore different or separate from us by knowing, that is, everything in the world including our own body can be known to us as an object and is therefore different from awareful observer. Now what about objects not in the world but in our mind, such as mental objects like ideas, intentions, thoughts, etc. these activities of our mind are also known to us just like the objects in the world are known to awareful observers, such mental objects or activities can be categorized into perceptions, cognitions and emotions.

For instance, life is for me, and the other which is awareful, and the awareful may be the world while it exists while I also exist. Nobody can disprove that it exists even if there are profiles that exist when the world accesses and I access it. Actual experience in life about: what is the thing exists, in some way or it maybe existing in a different way, for example, because when I say 'I know the tree or when I say I know or when I say don't know', what is the meanest, I have been given some inputs through my senses associated with the five organs which are the perceptual instruments for experiences to entire life, those experiences around the data from these five senses to do act, so when I say: I see a tree image of, the 'see' is a conscious feel through my five sense organs what I mean by I am not saying the tree.

Thus, I and others are the awarefull witness conscious observers where the experience is the ground of all sensorial knowing and intrinsic to every moment. We get to know the objects in

every moment because by over look it continuously, that continuous experience of objects gets in direct affect the cognitive capacity of our minds as its changing activities. Therefore, it is important to view and address the fundamental identity as natural awareness, which is free from clinling thoughts. It is vitally important to understand and recognize the essence of that is 'awareness' as a synthesis for knowledge of having uncountable boundaries with conceptual things of conscious beings. Concerning this thesis, let me broaden my perspective about 'awareness' is also having absolute nature and not merely limited to certain existential mental states, particularly while dealing with conception of ignorance it becomes independent of physical sensations and relevant emotions though they are embodied. By providing, a gist of this exploration would appreciate the relevance with an 'act of knowing' through the lens of experiences which was detailed in the previous chapters of this dissertation.

Overview of chapters

Chapter I: In this chapter I have discussed different intellectual accounts of epistemological foundations on the use of "science". For those accounts, *science* simply means 'knowledge' but there are many different kinds of knowledge/ science, e.g. natural science (which uses observation x hypothesis x experimentation). Rather, Husserl's view of phenomenology as an 'descriptive eidetic science' is clearly no such 'natural science' nor is Brentano's idea of 'descriptive psychology' based upon 'inner perception', nor is Descartes's 'clear and distinct ideas' or 'intuition of an attentive mind'. The monkey on contemporary analytic epistemologists is Hume and his distinction between matter of fact (that are true but never necessarily true) and relation of ideas (that are necessarily true, all the time, but of no significance, i.e. they tell us

nothing about the ‘real world’ for example $3+3=6$ is necessarily true but that does not mean that 3 bottles of wine + 3 bottle of wine = 6 bottles of wine in the fridge, without checking the fridge!). How Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas understand ‘science’ as the study of eternal causes of things, is simply not how any ‘modern’ natural scientist would understand the term ‘science’, and if we observe the difference between the ‘transcendental reduction’ versus the natural attitude, in Husserl and ‘eidetic reduction’ versus factual knowledge claims which are different thought operations. Many thinkers thought that Husserl was responding to the problems he found in his attempt to understand and develop Brentano’s ideas, but not to the Gettier problem of justified true beliefs, etc. But, this chapter addresses the problematic ideation by watching the comparisons on spot similarities and differences, the concept of similarity implies differences in relation to Husserl and(or) other critics of Husserl coming from the modern foundationalist justified true belief propositional discourse, again this is not Plato, Husserl is more about understanding ‘knowledge’, ‘believe’, ‘justified true belief’, not propositions. In this context, the ‘act of knowing’ paradigm brings out the essentialities of transitions. And I have asserted critical points on how do ‘X’ holds a sense of the inferences in forming concepts, such that these inferences *seem* objective because of epistemological transitions of things are, in view of trustworthy knowledge. Also, such trustworthy knowledge inferences *represent* as meaningful artefact in X’s epistemic-belief. I also examined this utilization of conceptual analysis elicit the essential elements for objectification, when one involved to attempt reliable knowledge.

Chapter II: This chapter mainly concentrates on Husserl Sixth Logical Investigations (1901) that discusses the dispense relation of perceptual synthesis analyses on the notion of categorial intuition. which is founded on simple intuitions although these cannot be reduced to them. This

is because they merely offers a surface level grasping of the intended object, with partial perceptual intentions continually fused therein, thus, categorial intuition is a kind of act as a synthesizer on same intentions between global (surface level) and partial perceptual intentions which are already operating implicitly. This synthesis intuition acts upon signifying intentions that made us select which intuitive aspects supposed to be synthesised and it follows mainly from the categorial elements for judgemental sense or thinking and attitude comes from outside, that is from the very sphere of perception.

Let's see the example, "the computer standing on the table" or "the chair is blue", in these expressions occur elements which can be easily fulfilled in the sense perception through the global properties of objects such as the colour and shape of them. However, merely sense perception does not allow the 'being blue' or 'standing on the table' for fulfillment rather those intentions directed at states of affairs (Sachverhalte). On one hand, in this perceptual sense we can see the 'color Blue' but in the same way cannot the 'being Blue' that is, being predicative something is not perceivable at the same time it is not being fulfillable in sensibility alone, this phenomenal claim does not include merely being predicatives but all categorial forms such as 'one', 'and', 'all', 'if', 'then', 'or', 'not', 'no' and so on. However, on the other hand, this claim is not merely applicable to the emptily intended acts of categorial forms, but also acts which fulfill signifying intentions. Suppose, if we are in a room with a Red carpet, in this situation our judgements would be depends on the intuitive fulfilment of judgmental sense and attitude which distinguish among the judgements with an 'act of knowing', like the carpet is Red and the carpet is Green, in this case the judgmental sense and attitude intuitively fulfill the first one but not the second. Interestingly, we are already aware of this difference but it is not easy to determine

where and what they are based on, though it is not so obvious that we will not be able to make the distinction without an analysis of the contribution of sense perception but this does not serve the problem completely. So this chapter looks into the formulation of categorial intuitions from the limited sense perception, later indicates the tension between categorial intuitions understood as foundational acts and founded acts. According to Husserl sixth logical investigations describes the notion of passive synthesis, the genesis of categoriality in very realm of sensibility, this allows to formulate relational role among ‘act of knowing’ and phenomenological approaches to judgmental sense. And this chapter’s intended focus has been extended to perceptual judgments and perceptual categories which address the fulfillments of categorial elements of judgemental sense and attitude.

Chapter III: Initially this chapter has a focus on the historicity of objects relating to their constitution in knowledge by saying that form of intuition is an object-giving source within it. I have followed the Husserl view on expressions on how to be an actual expressions where they interact and unify each other. It gives a proper analysis of meaning on the objects for constitution in knowledge. Analysis concern this chapter made a phenomenological explanation relating to elements of expressions and meanings in connection with their experiences. This phenomenon has been informed as a paradigm, this addresses the notions of conceptual explanations which founded for understanding the object directedness in higher order conception, such activity is an essential prerequisite for a content lead indexicality in our own memories. In part of this activity at the meta-level conception this chapter involved in the discussion of Husserlian view on *synthesis* specifies that intuitions required a passive and temporal synthesis of content, mode, and the objects of it. Therefore this view, made an assertion for states of knowledge objectivity and

tendentials those involved in self-transformative: Self and its own transformations due to different experiences and its reflections that into fulfilment of awareness which becomes an anchor for object directedness. I have also addressed how these dimensions develops a significant connection with the act of knowing within a Self, whereas this Self has been targeted from different directions explications, especially in this chapter I have tried to present the relation among the nature of true self and awareness in connection with non-duality and essence of meaningful acts, where it can projected the correctness of fundamental relations with the form and objects. Thus, this chapter becomes a bridge between previous and further explanations of this thesis, this study presents the involvement of cognitive processing of experiences in first-person perspective.

Chapter IV: This chapter starts with an articulation on the notions of the interpreted inferences for the truth and correctness of the knowledge constitutive acts focusing on Husserl's logical investigations, it argues their correctness which is disrupt common polarity among the epistemic and non-epistemic analysis. Whereas this analysis essentially but not comprehensively on the fundamental nature of experience was loaded in intentionality: however, it is not really imputed, that is, in sensations, if the experiences does not allow the openness to the world, that does not direct towards the objects or events, therefore it cannot essentially determines itself as an intentional experience. According to Husserl's phenomenology, we can pursue the intentionality as a cognitive-functional attitude because of givenness to truth makers, that have their own being, identity, perceptual objects, and states of affairs within time. On the other hand he wasn't opposed for the givenness of truth makers with respect to the accessibility of relevant beliefs and on the complexity of experiences within which propositional truth claims arise in non-epistemic

conceptions. To develop this, at the beginning, this chapter discussed the validity of the early conception of intentionalism within the notions of being and time, though initially this conception encountered different opinions such as indeterminate concepts by obscurities in its account of individuation. However, the essay explains by explicating Husserl's account of experiences is a process that continually gives knowledge. By emphasizing this, our self reveals through own reflections between what is signatively mean and intuitively given at indexicals, this Husserl approaches to the cognitive-functional account of mind clarifies the correctness and truth of the essential nature of knowledge origins in connection with experiences from first-person perspective which is awareness.

Knowledge is an algorithmic metaphor of awareness in a self

In my childhood I have seen and experienced a very conservative or orthodoxical phenomena while interacting with different groups in society, indeed, for them it was absolutely forbidden to articulate few terms or words though I was not really certain of the consequences of such utterances. This is an idea from the beliefs of their primitive generations of such groups, which shows that a clear effect on the mode of analysis for the external world in the name of its objects and respective actions of it. The phenomena is, as human beings we treat ourselves as objects and therefore we apply language to communicate ourselves for fulfilling the expectations of our own mental faculties. For instance, being a awareful observer, we express our own thoughts to our knowing conception in terms of thinking or a rehearsal for clarifying our own thoughts, this would be in the form of symbolic forms or representations, that symbols carry the structural notions of our own experiences to an extent, but this may not apply in all conditions or situations, for example, in an abstract sense how Newton thought and expressed about

gravitational force of attraction in the literature and science texts, similarly, a general statement in human language: “John cannot catch it” is a symbolic expression that appears to have no formal and structural relation with the Newton’s theorem. But this kind of general statement cannot be understood everybody exactly as how it was uttered, though the exactness varies in everyone because the mental objects arises from our own memories and experiences that compressed visually all that we pursue the world and derive from language, thus the content is relatively cognitive and functional. For instance, the content has evolved by a continuous process from animal signals to human language that contains words which stand for the actions performed by the objects or things in the world as well in mind. However, what we see the objects conjure of the external world that arises in our mind is closely related to visualisation or sometimes led to visual imagination. In my view, this content derives highly active two dimensions which are the situation or context and a form of symbolic representations, both actively describes in memory about what happens when we do something, however ontologically it does not deceive by sameness or similarity of experiences, but draws the linear regression among them using the method of separation and uniting. Though this provided evidence can hold the nature of subjectivity, but this sort of content can be treated as reliable knowledge in person that can be subjective or objective knowledge or sometimes both.

In this context, evidentiality, reflections of all such activities would be pursued in the impressions which is indexed, and the way we construct this content reflections within the onto-epistemic and cognitive relations that would relate the evolution of intelligence or change in *noesis*. However, we should note that evidential impressions are considerably peculiar content because the impressions that are context or situational dependent, we extend them to further

experiential knowledge nodes unless awarefull witness conscious beings. For instance, with our communicative language if we utter simply a statement like “Sun is the focal point for the planet ellipses”, it appears to be more abstract and the semiotics of the statement doesn’t give any glimpse of pragmaticality, but it is enough evidential and fairly descriptive sense of trustworthiness in that communication. So a summary of the above statement will be fairly fulfilled the way an extension of a contextual or situational experience, like Newton’s description about gravitational force of attraction.

In my view, we always look for the reflections of experience which constructs the content of reality in our mind as mental objects, but our problem is, does the same way our existential knowledge evolved with trustworthiness from the signs and symbols that represents as individual things or actions in the world? In fact, being an awarefull witness, for evidential attribution, if we treat them (signs and symbols) as constituents of those representations then it must seek constantly descriptive features of them which can be inferred from the perceptual impressions of the world, that is the trustworthiness is directly proportional to the content of experiential reality upon the mode of analysis where evidentiality is part of it. For instance, if the mode of analysis, in the case of subjective and content of experiential reality, no more represents the self-evidential then the trustworthiness is also follows the same. For example, according to Wittgenstein Tractatus, our language could give the structure of reality: if one says ‘I like you or I doubt you, etc’ have the same structure about the relations among the speaker and listener which is inherent; this explains that our conscious experiences actually mirror these structures within our brain as an innate feature, whereas the primary reflections of the awareness on awoken state from the impressions of conscious experiences construct symbolic representations in an abstract sense that

we make them into mental objects. We do this essentially by considering the nature of encoded messages like in cryptogram, which include different patterns or symbolic representations. However, we do request to decode them in a way individual things emerge under various transformations in life. Yet, this process could act underneath the dispositionality or tendencial of self. For instance, awareness of spatial knowledge in terms of destination or target object to pick up which comes along with the development of childhood, for example, if we are the awareful observer in awoken state, normally kids that less than four year age are always very puzzled when we take direct them towards shortest path to collect their toy, if we ask them to bring back their Toy from certain point of distance, they try to find a straight or diagonal way, though between both points the distance is almost equal, but their feel or tendencials caused by attributions of their perceptual experiences through the visual cues without exception. Perhaps they may express as ‘this is the shortest distance’; this is because they are not in the least persuaded, that all our prejudices about the external world tend to be built into the knowledge, that may hold a label of trustworthiness within subjective notions that include beliefs, habitualities etc. Suppose, when somebody shows that the whole thing was nonsense, that we put our prejudices into it and we always taken back. For example, if anyone says in the initial days of 1900 we could fly, everybody could have laughed or looked puzzled like ‘it is kind of child thinking’. But after 1903 Wright brother’s invention of a flying machine, everybody started appreciating it and corresponding prejudices became cleared. Given this situation, which concept is true or real? We can think about another example, in theory we could say that a float rule, say by laying down in a bathtub with our own weight order of 10 or more times prove that “floating object displaces a weight of liquid equal to its own weight.” Of course we cannot prove directly

by doing this normal conditions as the same in a laboratory or strict premises but it is interesting to see the concepts with the nature of encoded messages.

In this way, if the reflections of the worldly knowledge constructs in our awakened state it must hold three features: primarily, concepts or entities that inferred the symbolic representations that have the essence or certain character of it. Secondly, the structural attributions or kind of grammar, which is essentially deals with the 'operational rules' described by the axioms of every individual, for instance it is essentially operates how these concepts or entities should put together; in the case of communicative language, the subject-verb agreement errors would be ungrammatical and that sentence would not acceptable within a formal communication. For example, in English language, a basic subject-verb agreement operating rule is like a singular subject takes a singular verb and a plural takes a plural verb: a simple sentence like "*list* of items *is/are* on my table". In this case, the subject *list* chooses its verb according to its nature to complete the operation. And the other feature is an 'indexer' which is a reference translator, in this essentially we integrate or transfer all our experiences to the symbolic representations that are the descriptive solutions of the encoded messages, appears in our conceptual memory.

Nevertheless, the structural attributions present as the explanation of transactions among other contributors or the beholders of the transactions, the indexer dealt with the descriptions of the referential experiences and the concepts which explains the symbolic representations. However, with all these, as a whole our awareness does not complete, but out of this, it will be an evidence for the existence of being a new content, therefore, it represents a highly subjective account of how we are aware of things as a self. Though, as a whole, this appears to be an idealist account but distinguishing the self with others and things in the world, and later adding various

reflections to it: a transformation in the mode of knowing through decoding messages. For instance, if we considered the Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) account of the fundamental blocks of matter was highly controversial at the time of experimental verification. In fact, though he had drastic mood swings, and many personal relationship problems, the frequent criticism within the physics community on this idea was one of the major reasons for his sudden dismissal. However, if we start construct through the analysis of decoding messages of his account, fundamentally we try to create certain concepts through the reflections out of which we made trustworthy knowledge or a priori knowledge, in fact in this immense intellectual bifurcation the involvement of emotional elements are forbidden but undeniable, such thinking through the analysis of its nature is highly subjective and perhaps sometimes it is imaginative too.

In this context, we can notice how the world can be divided by thinking into being things and thinking not-of-being things, such thinking makes an advancement in self-identificational awareness due to conceptual clarity through the decoding of representations, but certainly not going to get the world as trustworthy because of the assumptions that have been made of dividing the world into relevant and irrelevant of beings. However, the nature of things in the world is bounded with an individual's identity or the associations of self-identification that gives an approximation of what goes inside the boundary of encoded messages which can be a statistical or a conceptual approximation. As it is smaller than the totality of world therefore it is a finite set, that is in our awakened state we are aware of all our experiences or while experiencing we start decode them as a part of its nature, which generates certain judgments or approximations but does not give complete *essence* of such experiences, because of the boundedness of certain relevant memories. To overcome this, we have had to push further and

further and the judgments to be irrelevant or are not very relevant. In fact every time our acts construct reflections of experiences about the world which can newly added or alter to the existing constructs within the boundaries of our own finiteness, sometimes, it is not really in a complete awaken state and the decoding of messages cannot completed, thus it expects the high level inductive instructions to complete this process, which is intuitive awareness. For example, if we simply throw an object it may fall immediately, if it is a bit harder may fall further, harder more fall far away, so hard that it falls away from the boundaries, similarly, it is full of imaginative impressions about the world, being around with our intense attention as how the object behaves and so on.

Chapters unification: awareness and knowing the self

In this operational facts, everything that we experienced on the basis of world time which has two fundamental procedures when the account of direct perception is suspended: we abstract things from every act of sensation includes somatic what we encountered from the world and internal, consciously and beyond which becomes primary contents in us within the sphere of emotive phenomena. Interestingly, in many ways, we reduce our perceptual appearances also to the primary content, that is, to retain our sensual content of temporality we actually reduce the apprehension aspect. For instance, all our sensations are anchored with our own feelings except in dreamless deep sleep. Although, our feelings have been categorized as positive, negative, cognitive and somatic, they are known to be emotions that distinguish our feelings as pleasant or unpleasant during the emergence of self-ness (I-ness) through reflections of awareness. And this development happens along with phenomena of cognitive activities like thinking, reasoning and

language. Turns-out, we constantly experience a stream of feelings which are imbued with somatic sensations, therefore we are able to separate the feelings from one to the other through a feedback mechanism. However, as self-ness or a personhood or individualisation emerges because of such separation of feedback significantly, a wide range of subjective feelings are intimately anchored with multiple somatic and psychological states, and they also demonstrate a strong embodiedness with higher cognitive functions and(or) mental states. By spell-out their relationship will be helpful for understanding and analysing of further notions such as proprioception⁷⁸ and interoception⁷⁹.

Such experiences of organ integrates the emotional assessment while interacting these feelings with insular cortex through our central nervous system, for example, due to anxiety if our breath is like shallow we may interpret that observations with integration of emotions as tense or nervous feelings, such phenomena of interpretations get adopted by our brain and this causes an alteration of existential impressions that affects an internal sense of cognition accordingly, for instance, the pathways of spatial movements communicate from the brain to the body according to those interpretations in a connection with sensory responses, these evaluations of our brain preserved as impressions in our memory, this would the way of adopting active homeostasis and maintain an equilibrium among the positive and negative sensations, these are as character of internal physiological process regulates all our learning competences and higher order cognitive processing which reflects in our social behaviour.

⁷⁸which decides the somatic balance.

⁷⁹ being able to perceive internal states of feelings through the receptors of feedback located all over the body and interact with the insular cortex of our brain.for example, if we feel thirsty, we could drink water, or if we feel hot, then we open window or turn-on the fan or something.

Speaking rigorously, our window of experiences facilitates an interaction among feelings and emotions, it is really difficult to distinguish them, suppose our feelings that caused by sensations implied with emotions has a huge influence on cognition, like a judgmental sense has a serious effect from emotive feelings. For instance, somatic-sensations caused to incidental feelings happen to be presented at the time of physical and mental correlation, though it has nothing to do with a decision or a judgement but that drive us to the scenario which should make a decision. For example, we may feel very uncomfortable to work because of the driving in extreme heat, or because you had an uneasiness in stomach or a migraine headache, and so on, it is a self reflective and involuntary act. However, this can be controlled with emotional intelligence being in an awakened state. For instance, by thinking of parameters to a decision or its implications drive us to a certain conscious state which might be a sign of cautiousness to make a decision. For example, the very first time driving or working near fire, etc. In fact, our feelings serve us on the basis of inferences which can be positive or negative such distinction determines depending on the relationship among the feelings and the referent things which is a target. As Beings in the world, though we have the adaptiveness of feelings that has informational value in the judgments, however this influence merely on the basis of relevance to the certain assignment, therefore it is not incorporated when incidental feelings plaused judgemental sense. But if a conscious attribution implies as a focused proposition, ranging from our feelings to the thoughts that becomes mental objects in our minds. Such focus would turn-out to be *aboutness* within the close proximity of spatio-temporality. This process becomes automatic operation accordingly and does not require any focused attention of conscious attribution. Interestingly, conscious attributions do participate in the conception of elevating Self which is a subconscious or

phenomenal activity. For instance, while paying attention to a particular mental object caused by thoughts or sensations or feelings, the proposition of experiences requires us to extend from matter to lower forms, that develops distinction of one's own identity from other forms in the external world. At the same time, we withdraw our attention from other fields of perception going around us, so we cannot project our normal awareness as same in awoken state. We know this from our own experience of awareness and intense responsiveness to the stimuli occurred in dreaming or subconscious state. Though, it is true that such proportions of stimuli is motionless, unawarefull, and unresponsive in the physical world as the state is self-absorbed and sometimes even limited to merely memories, but to an experiencer, being an observer of that dreaming state, it feels as inanimate or real. This phenomena because the embodiment of experiential reality as content with the momentum of impressions, it represents the inherent capacity of awareness which controls or exceeds the boundaries of physical sensations in both awoken and dreaming states. Yet, it controls our own 'intentions' with itself, but the reflections of our somatic sensations able to trigger mental tendencies or subconscious urges or feelings, means an instantaneous reflex response without the need of conscious control, like applying a sudden brake without thinking when we may fall in danger while driving, or sudden reaction to heat, etc. it is not quite different from our routine physiological responses, like, sending electrical messages to support different functions in our biological system, but if our physical system decides to reduce these subconscious urges to an act of physical feedback messages then it may possess a structurally similar to conscious attributes or mental objects of awareness. But, it can be different merely when it deals with extreme physical processes in nature, like how other animals and plant species possess their character, as long as they are alive a subconscious

awareness arises for responses. For example, higher animals such as mammals and other vertebrates show their awareness towards the environment through the feedback messages. Similarly, plant species express sensory awareness of their living environment, means detect of light and water, and may not be able to wistfully reflect their life history in the conventional sense, but it is able to retain clues from past experiences through feedback messages and it makes a decision accordingly. Interestingly, although they are merely insentient according to plant pathologists they can extend their sensory awareness towards the feel of other species presence nearby. In this context, with regard to physical substance, we can merely conceive that sensory awareness of the plant species and animal instinctive behaviour based on their capacity of physical sensations that are the expressions of electrical and chemical processes which can be conscious or subconscious or sometimes both.

From the relevance of the above discussions all our mental, physical and vital processes development has a common ground and they are closely associated with each other, thus with their correlational association is expected to be an expression of single process, it means all our proportions of experiences are naturally the single process expressions. However, the act of single process is typically a process of awareness but not exactly a physical process though it does manifest as ion exchange and electrical impulses, all these are physical expressions of “profound acts⁸⁰” and the consequences would be able to perceive in their own actions though they are grounded in the roots of founded acts. For instance, please refer to chapter-II that

⁸⁰ It has no witness than own Self, it does not accept remembering but recorded in the blank pages of Self and hidden, yet ready to appear from the bottom of our memory as insights or thoughts or intuitions when there is an action or intervention of Self for truth based on first-person’s capacity of awareness. These acts lies in Self, thus it defines based on how it is resulting at local instances, however they are not blind voluntaristic.

indicates how tension between intuitions understood as foundational acts (p.2, 4) and founded acts.

Furthermore, though the elements of physical sensations are intrinsically awarefull themselves, their engagement fully at the roots of founded acts as to be undetectable. Because those expressions are abstract and preoccupied, like how the energy flows in the atomic fields. However, our firstmost concern must be with the interoceptive senses are at the end of the spectrum, as we have seen if our awareness preoccupied with such existence then have no difficulties in distinguishing our own self from others because our mental objects are the expressions of the self. And we can notice that the awareness and responsiveness found in other mammals has limitations in view of their expressions at the same level of consciousness that we have, for example physical, mental, vital forms. Yet, if we seen to certain notions of physical forms of our own self in contact with vital and mental forms, we may have difficulties in associating properties with their qualities, for instance, properties of our vital (emotions, feelings) and mental (cognitive, psychological) functions for identifying our own self through meta-awareness. In this process, we pursue the physical self as valued by others, that include own self, this development manifests as an awareness of how we judged by others based on how they encountered our self, such situated physical activities feed the awareness as mental objects, this may oscillate very frequently whether we are awake or dreaming state or highly conscious in environment, or in a state of dissociation, as if we engage ourselves in theater or reading, etc.. As our physical sensations serve at relevant perceptual properties, for instance, the sensation of the colour Blue serve not the blue coloured physical object, rather it serves the Blueness, so our sensations with perceptual properties would serve merely the relevant mental state but not to the

self which belongs to a mental state. Thus, a sensation can trigger a corresponding mental object that would make the self to be awarefull, but not of the state belonging to a self: a perception or a feeling or a thought are the mental objects belonging to a conscious mind. So a mental object about a mental state is always to have a mental object about that state belonging to one's own or someone's conscious mind. For example, if a thought about a feeling, another subject has the same feeling as I have but a thought about an expression of such mental state is always imputes that state to someone.

As a result of this phenomena, we get engage in involution process, which offers self when applied to itself in the form of own identity, for example, let's have a look into a famous Indian folktale that can be a metaphorical analogy in this process, it is about the "lioness and its Cub": there was a lioness and her little Cub, while they were in the forest, once the Cub saw some butterflies and became fascinated with them, as the Cub was running behind them didn't notice that his mother had walked on. After he stopped playing around, he couldn't find his mother in any part. He dreadfully afraid alone in the dark scary forest and the Cub become alone by missing his mother. When the little Cub waited for accompany to return, it encountered herd of sheep raising nearby, the Cub feeling sad and lonely, approached them for seeking comfort, as the cub was still too young to fully appreciate the difference between lions and sheep and even though sheep is usually afraid of lions, the Cub was so small and helpless, that Cub was readily accepted in them. This could be adapted to facilitate whatever is being thought at the time those of familiar with the little lion Cub will find an interesting addition. Cub loneliness and feelings of abandonment for each summer in the company of the sheep herd, sadly the mother lion never return, the Cub remain with the herd and grew up amongst the sheep, have the Cub live with

them over the over the years, the sheep came to accept one of their own and gradually learned their way of producing sounds and similar behaviour of the sheep. Not surprisingly the little lion cub grew up thinking that it was a sheep, this story offers a powerful analogy to illustrate the knowledge of self-identification perhaps it might also be referred to as knowing one's own self. With such nature the little lion cub considered itself a weak, defenseless sheep and it did not shown it's true nature which is wild due to its limited knowledge of its own identity that attributed by physical sensations embodied in the perceptual properties of mental state, interestingly whenever the herd was threatened by other passing predator, the lion would tremble in fear and run for safety like the sheep. The sheep sphere was well founded because sheep are a favorite food for many predators but the lion suffered from fear unnecessarily due to the association of vital and physical sensations, though the physical sensations are different from the vital-mental sensations but they involve amongst.

However, in this scenario, just like the Cub grew up with persistence of physical sensations of his true lion lean nature, we start our lives with someone who just look like us, or even better in sense of physically or contextually continuous with us, that make us fail to recognize or identify our own self and we think that physical continuity of someone is our ownness. Perhaps this is because of a clear dissociation of fundamental sources of our own nature, however, it is subject to the afflictions our mental and physical sensations, even though none of that can truly threaten the innate fullness of conscious being awarefull witness. Nevertheless, in this context we identify ourselves with the retention of impressions considered it as *evidence* just like the lion considered himself of weak defensive sheep and just like the lions suffered due to publically available physical facts so do we. However, what if we encounter supporting opposite verdicts, so being

awarefull witness, our mental states having higher-order sensations results in terms of mental appearance to us because the self becomes a subject of each mental state, means we acknowledge our own appearances and movements with an observation or an aptitude for mapping own bodily space contact with own vital and mental attitudes for identification knowledge.

In this view, this identification knowledge is something more complicated considered to epistemological beliefs where both subject and object interests are integrated, as a consequence of this “the knower” more focused on the knowledge evolving from different versions of truth, in this active developmental process though “the knower” subjectivity mediates to understanding of reality or truth from their own beliefs but the nature of epistemic cognition emphasize critical thinking to enhance the understanding of reality out from grounded ignorance about Self. Fundamentally, on a general view, knowledge is a *justified belief and true*, however, and said that in chapter-I and partially in chapter-II apart from merely the true and justified belief, also both the confidence and satisfactory justifications are necessary for the knowledge claim to be called as identification knowledge that deemed as knowledge for involute grounded ignorance: lack of knowledge in relation to everything that possible to know by understanding the reality or truth with an attitude of introspection or pragmatic, such a conception is about the presence of self as established according to awareness.

Let's continue the flokare, many years later, one day another lion was passing through the forest and happened to see a herd of sheep grazing in the clearing and standing amongst was a lion raising on the grass, the passing lion was dumbfounded by this incongruous sight as he moved closer to get a better look, the herd of sheep sensed his presence and ran off in fear for their lives and of course the ignorant lion also ran off in fear, seeing all this, the passing lion became

extremely curious so he chased after the ignorant lion to find out what was going on, due to ignorance of its own identification, the lion climb up a tree where he crumbled in fear and beg please don't hurt me, please don't eat me, the passing lion said why would I eat you, the ignorant lion replied because I am a sheep and lions eat sheep, the passing lion said but you're not a sheep, "you are a lion" to which the ignorant lion, but he replied, how can I be a lion? This is due to the lion concepts of his own identities was thoroughly conditioned by his many years of living as the sheep, thus the ignorance had about self-identification become deeply ingrained and as a result even when he heard the truth that "you are not a sheep", his wrong conclusion about himself, does not dispelled and he continued persistence.

In the same way we have all engaged in systematically copying the behaviour from the bounded-contexts and domain specific notions, while we grew up for many years of life with attitudes that develop subject to the afflictions of our own physical and mental sensations, then our ignorance about the profoundness of self identification remains. But, does knowing our own self through the medium of hearing about the truth destroys the ignorance and can it remove our wrong conclusions about the profoundness of self as we are grounded in the physical bodies and the physical energy substances through our sensations? However, our subconscious or dreaming state awareness extends our preparation by intense inferences of our direct experiences of physical substances, that makes us thinking beings of a self, that lead us to come out from the ignorance. In fact, the self as a thinking being is the process of natural development which brings out a closeness among the dynamics of psychogenetic and(or) biological transformations within us.

Let's appreciate the story further, even the lion clearly said how can I be a lion king? The passing lion said come down and I'll show you that "you are a lion", don't worry, I promise that I won't eat you, then he gave a small mirror for the ignorant lion and asked: are you look like a sheep or do you look like me? The ignorant lion was stunned by what he saw, I am not a sheep, I am a lion and he thanked the passing lion again and again for removing his wrong notions about his own identity, and he strutted off into the forest boldly by knowing full and well that he was at the top of the food chain system, and no predators could harm him. Notice that, merely by hearing the words like "you are not a lion" is not enough to remove his deeply ingrained ignorance rather than merely being told the truth, he needed to experience it, thus the convictions have certainty with satisfactory reasons like by looking into the mirror in this context, and that mirror represents the evidence of truth where the ignorant lion have altered his concepts of identities through the nature of experiences and in the form of words.

Similarly, we can see our true essence of self by distinguishing the reflections of meta-awareness which engender introspection based on mental and vital object forces, by being awarefull witness one can easily find these possibilities within observer-observed phenomena. In fact, we reduce our meta-awareness from mental to physical sensations which passthrough vitality, during this process both awareness and intentionality are so deeply penetrated, and the manifestation of them cannot be sensed directly on the surface level unless we engaged in the conception of involution explicit, means it the capacity of awareness keeps tracking object forces in the state of affairs across the momentum, therefore it facilitates how our knowledge of identification about self objectifies with the particular objects on the basis of its form, appearance and usage in the given state, however, in the context of dreaming state, though our physicality is limited, absorbed

and motionless, but not completely absent, therefore the manifested self on the surface level is a receptor and responder of all our sensations through the reflections. Interestingly, that counts as *evidence* for elevating self which shows us the truth about our own nature of existence as said in Chapter-III and IV. So they destroy the deeply ingrained ignorance. But our story isn't over yet, how night fell then both the lions stretched out on the forest floor and slept soundly, now the realized lion no longer needed the companionship and security of living with a herd of sheep. But, the next morning, he awoke and saw, the sheep grazing and clearing as usual having just woken up, walked towards to herd purely out of habit and joined them, and started grazing under the grass again as he has done for so many years. The passing lion still in the vicinity and happened to see all this, as he approached to herd sheep they scattered and feared, the realized lion remained there having remember that he was a lion, the passing lion ask him why are you so living with the sheep and grazing on the grounds, he replied, I guess it is just a habit. In fact, habits can be very powerful and surprisingly tenacious even though the lion clearly knew that it was a lion, but his habitual sheep behaviour and thinking continued nonetheless in the same way, even after we discover our true essence of self by meta-awareness, the nature of our habitual wrong notions makes us continue with false impressions of self, sometimes this misrepresentations may cause to skepticism. However, this is merely due to our sensations of physical substances. Our reflections of these substances are accompanied by our own things because of the constitutional relations of belief systems, that persist out of habitualities; In some texts, we can pursue this as cognitive-functional attitude because of subjective semantic givenness to the truth makers. However, this givenness considerably becoming habitual notions is a manifestation process in memories, this phenomena has been clearly discussed in chapter-III

and IV in relation with self and indexical meanings. Yet, merely experience of listening or perceptual sensations itself cannot resolve our habitual wrong thinking so the contemplation of introspection made us avoid or remove such lingering misrepresentations. Means, the involution addresses not only the problem of ignorance by becoming thinking beings, also it addresses this habitual wrong thinking by the practice of contemplation process by extracting the essence of experiences that methodically enabling us to see our true sense of self with the unfolded reflections of awareness, from meta to physical sensations and vice versa which was detailed in chapter-IV.

Well the last part of the story shows how that works, to help the lion to overcome his habitual wrong thinking, the passing lion gave him a mirror and said be sure to look at your reflections each morning before you do anything else, every morning thereafter when the lion looked at the reflections of him, though he did not see or learn anything new but by repeatedly seeing reflections of his true nature reflections with all pride, gradually his habitual sheepish behavior faded away. In this flogare, the lion needed to see himself in the mirror again and again to remove his habitual wrong thinking, in the same way, by gaining knowledge to the true Self or the knowledge of identification we get to remove every last trace of our own habitual wrong thinking: it is the process of contemplation that takes place in portions of the original self by exclusive introspection differentiates the essence of true self from each other appearance.

Nevertheless, while we are totally free from traces of any misrepresentations about self with our altered impressions or later indexed sensations, we will acknowledge this objective reality of the non-physicalities that includes subjectivity is transcendent and it has an abstract nature. Even though we have difficulties in acknowledging this, because in some of the contexts this can be

treated with infinite quality due to the infinite number of relations among the observing awareness is the central cluster for the self and its associates which is the true nature of it.

Yet, in the essence of true self, there is all the time the existence of non-physicalities objective reality with an interaction among the awareness and the centre of consciousness, that can be counted as an extent of our perception tied with our physical embodiments this causes further impressions. For instance, our motor awareness is deeply embodied in physical movements of our bodies, what we are aware primarily the experience of vitality with more physical contact as embodied in our physical constitution and indeed our own thoughts of this aware merely after they have been dressed up in language. Such dispositions have associating limitations because of what surrounds us, they are not culturally ingrained habits rather they are embodiments of mental and vital based on what comes first to the sensory perception. For example, while walking if we encountered first bump in foot or we may encounter a smell of flowers or an arousal due to a visual presence. This enables us to access the other side of reality which is an act of inner sense within us. Interestingly, if such acts are merely themselves, we may not be aware of them explicitly within the contractions of the motor movements, but in the physical world we will know their subordinate manifestations like walking or picking or catching etc.. Yet those acts extend their possibilities of contact by sharing the objective existence of reality to further states of awareness through our experiences and gained knowledge, therefore our capacity curve of knowing self has a significant change within the aspects of identificational regularities.

In the phenomenological sense such change of capacity mediates among the noesis (consists the intelligence or judgmental sense) and noema (where the content of a thought, or the mental objects involved) in a subjectivity through a momentum of memories within the sphere of

consciousness which has been as elaborated in last two chapters which are III and IV. But in short, for instance, within the notions of our temporality, primarily the content acts itself which is the real content of a self in a phenomenological way, the latter same content turns-out its nature into abstract by intentional correlation of the content, which is a feature for concepts and it is significant for judgemental sense. But if the resultant of the intentional correlation is an objective time reduction, then the temporal unity of that content must be an impression prior to that reduction, because particularly the presented impressions get altered while retaining from memory, which means the preceding phase to retentional does not folded into objective so the original form preserved or the preceding phase might involved in the original impression retentions to distinct “now” from the temporalization of objects. For instance, suppose, if we are paying a deep attention to within us, that is being without any thoughts or thinking, we may feel like our mind is experiencing a clear silence. Every experience has beginning, middle and the end. Every experience for the beginning, duration and end, so there must be something that is aware of the beginning of them, the duration of them and the end of them. We are aware of it, the beginning of experience and even of silence of stillness is an experience, something to aware notice feeling great stillness. For example, if we go in the kitchen and make something, but our inside the stillness itself, the stillness doesn't gone away then we eat what we prepared, the stillness is still with us, then may be a phone rings and take phone call then at the end of phone call then the stillness is gone. Suppose, I'll be on the phone to make a message, is it a sensation or silence? The real silence is more than a sensation, the real calmness is more than a passing sensation. It is one with us, it is right there a fragrance, that is always with us, that is a calmness or silence. It is not something that we know or we have to keep, because even the idea of needing

to keep it means that it can go away, what is it, that is here, that cannot go away. Similarly, everything that we see from the world, everything we can remember, or imagine comes and goes, we can take a minute to just reflect on that if we want: whatever it is, it can be a thought, an image or a memory or some sensation, and whatever it is, it comes and goes in our mind. Everything comes and goes, even the idea we have of who we are, comes and goes, our assessment or beliefs about the world and people etc, it is coming and going. Everything is changing, coming and going, but what about something that witnesses this, is it coming and going? Something is watching or seeing, such coming and going and knowing us. It knows or it sees the coming and going. For example, yesterday there was a moment just like today, a time just like today, suppose, now the time is afternoon 3.43, and yesterday afternoon there was 3.43 too, but that moment doesn't look like this moment. And it comes and goes, may be sounds of fans, or the temperature and everything is very tangible right now, soon or sooner it will also pass. Means everything is like that, everything comes and goes, but, is there anything that is not coming or going? Relative to all, we can see or imagine or remember, if we start observing the feeling right now what we have: it gives an awareness of our body in the particular place where we are, and if it is a room filled with furniture, there is something, then in our mind it must be that which is aware of coming and going, everything is coming and going, something must observed that coming and going, and that which watches is that also coming and going. Well relatively, the traffic or moments of awaken state, everything that, sensations, emotions, feelings are coming and going, but relative to them the *witness* of them is not coming and going, itself unmoving, it watches even, the turning of our head or blinking of eyes, everything that takes place in its presence, that witnessing is functioning, in front of whom everything is noted,

something is felt to be more important than others and then automatically gets saved, and that impressions remains in our awareness, that functioning happening by itself, this phenomena has been explained with different analogies in the conclusions chapter.

By the way, relative to all that perceiving it, feels it is stationary, like nucleus in the atom. For instance, let's follow the analogy of physics to make this manifest more brighter than primarily awarded to our sense loaded minds, we perceive the world as matter and inanimate substance objects because on surface level we never knew the amount and flow of energy engaged in the momentum of atomic motion, but aware that the matter consists millions of atoms with a collation merely on self-absorption of what is maintaining as the stable form of matter. For example, the atoms itself consists of much smaller particles moving around a central cluster in the stable orbits at high velocity, during this captive movement according to quantum mechanics the nucleus of atoms contains a vast amount of energy get produced and locked by the atomic structure, but it does not manifest at surface level because of self-absorption of nucleus to maintain structural stability. Similarly, the self is a conscious being awarefull witness acts as nucleus of atoms which is awareness, the true energy of self which is unchanging awarefull does not appear at surface level as it gets absorbed. But the partial expression of that energy determines the direction of the intentions and knowledge. By showing that awareness is merely the action of energy substances because it is grounded in self, therefore that directly enables our perceptual capacity more intelligent to enhance our intelligence in evolution view, that is both direct and indirect perceptual apparatus prepared to extend towards openness of our inferences from the experiences of the matter and vitalities, and the nature of such experiences as living and thinking beings.




Figure 1: Awareness is a process of knowing 'self itself' is consciousness, it is a continuous process for life-time; the knowing process must be a momentum for self and becomes absoluteness;

Awareness: a bedrock for consciousness

This is an interesting and challenging topic to describe, on the one hand, consciousness and awareness have encountered different definitions from various perspectives, and on the other

hand, many of them pursue there is not much difference between awareness and consciousness and sometimes they do refer interchangeable in many literatures because they both carries similar feature set, and share all features but at different levels. We have learnt about the awareness is the ability of perception which drives to have knowledge by adapting the reflections of perceptual experiences.

Awareness is not something that ON or OFF, it travels as life continues, awareness is all about the reflections no matter whether it is external or internal and volunteer or involuntary, and direct or indirect, that turns as both conceptual and nonconceptual knowledge in our mind, that is it is a kind of reflective action without changes being original state. Although, such reflective action as a communicative ability consists in most of the species in some or the other form with each other. But merely belonging to higher species especially in human beings language is big assets as an intersubjective communication of reflections to higher order cognition turns into knowledge, that is, conception of knowing within local, that can be abstraction or concreteness. However, having said already, in this context the idea of awareness is typically a sphere of knowledge fulfillment belongs to 'I' expectations, that is knowing conception revolves around 'I' or self. Although various theories about consciousness have been discussed in terms of problem solving or a synapse activity or knowing self etc, however fundamentally, considering the capability aspect of human life in terms of potentiality having an internal representations for the objects and their relationships is more appropriate, which is a kind of innate intelligence. Interestingly, whereas, consciousness is led by awareness of self that declares the aspect of knowing capability, that is consciousness results in awareness, but not vice versa, because our awareness deals with sensory apparatus relatively at different states of reality, for a self to reach

absoluteness. It is very important at surface level though consciousness and awareness appear to be somewhat similar but they are distinctly different.

Having said that awareness is not merely a responder to the physical sensations rather it is also lead perceptual apparatus reflections among the internal representations that are caused by the sense of differentiate by distinguishing and unifying the objects and their relations which appears in the momentum of our own memories, however, it is the property or the essence of our own life. For instance, in everyday experience of ordinary walking, 'I' seems to be on automatic mode for much time though I am not using my intelligence for this task explicitly but I am in awoken state, if I notice any bump in front of me, with response to my perceptual apparatus that can be visual I try to avoid it because I feel that I may fall or it may hurt, such manifestation is possible due to intelligence scan our own memories to distinguish the relations among the objects, now may be fully aware of being state or conscious. If we take a break from walking, and relaxing on a chair meanwhile if I feel thirsty, I become aware of it but I am not using the sense of distinguishing unless I start to rank the options by considering the order of internal representations that manifested through the experiences. If our inferences are not associated with the orientations of internal representations then it may be limited to external world and there would be no self for it to be aware of due to lack of distinguishing sense of things which commonly appears in primitive species.

However, if we merely consider representing objects and their relationships, computing machines are very good at that, but knowing things by experience or sheer observations are different, it is merely manifest when capability allows the reflections of things. For example, consider a person having epilepsy seizures, they may suffer from lapses in awareness though

they are awake and alive, their physical bodies know their position but don't have a control over things, that is a temporal loss of representations belonging to self caused to the complex association problem involved among the objects and their relationships, on this condition as their organs are functioning and the correct muscles are toned, they are consciousness but not aware of their own self. But, our bodily intelligence associated with such consciousness brings out or maintains the awareness in an un-volunteered state or a kind of dreaming state through the reflections of nervous system and the indexed memories, like, immediate responses to a pinch or a reaction to an itch, etc. Similarly, patients with Alzheimer have impairments in awareness they cannot accurately recall the episodic memories pointing to a specific personal memory rather they may be able to recall the semantic data, however, they are consciousness but their disease caused to impairment of control over awareness of self, perhaps it is an impairment of life to them. Many reports have been supported that unable to engage with personal memories as they lose their awareness of the experiences because the capability of perceiving or the sentience of self-knowledge and access to the personal details from memories are heavily dependent on each other. Along with this often the patients may have temporal disconnectivity which degrades their spatio-temporal abilities, therefore they couldn't accurately locate themselves in the past or future or where they are. So they are unaware or partly aware of themselves, but they remain conscious of what has been experienced, however, in the same circumstances they will have different levels of awareness, like meta-awareness, because of the greater consciousness, and it may alter according to the state of being.

From the above context, if we lose our awareness then relatively our behaviour would be similar to zombies, though we are conscious. Let's find the following simple example, suppose a table

witnessing a hurricane, it will not become aware of it, though it may be witnessing, same way in the case of tree, it will have unease with limited awareness, but in the case of a bird, it will have a sense of unease with limited awareness but greater than the tree, it will feel disturbed with unease emotions, it will search for a safe shelter, perhaps it may not be able to understand about the event occurring, its intelligence is limited to survive at that moment. But in the case of normal human beings, it is different, they are aware of how to react and protect themselves from future hurricanes, they respond to the objects and their relations with different levels of awareness. This has arrived from their innate nature of intelligence, as a result consciousness led by such a sense of awareness, which is a bedrock. Now we know the difference: the nature of awareness is (pre)reflections which are instinct, its original state of being begins with life until the end of it. But consciousness is in contact with awareness, thus, no consciousness can be meaningful without awareness, but there it can be sustained. In noetic sense, the awareness is *evidence* for the matrix of every experience which is unfolded to partial and temporal changes, in fact for the perceptual mind in mental objects view the time is to maintain the proper order of things as it does not flow uniformly all relevant measurements are only conventions of our minds. Awareness is independent of time though it appears to be highly dependent, thus it has been awarded as unchangeable witness, it does not change, having such nature it is absolute when it becomes correlate or blend with the self as shown in the figure-I which is embodied of consciousness rather not just being a subject to it. Therefore, inevitably awareness will be carrying out other features such as *unchangeable, all-pervasive, no-boundaries and infinite or non-finite*, but my argumentation is limited mainly in connection with experiences.

Further sections of this topic would continue with knowledge origins nature is being awareful, and how the self becomes known itself, at the same time, I would conclude this with the notions of awarefullness which holds an absolute nature as an awarefull witness conscious being or evidence.

Properties of awarefullness

All our experiences actually take place in our mind and reside as memories, in fact the only things we can directly experience are the activities of our own mind. The world around us has been experienced merely indirectly where these perceptual experiences become known to us as mental objects (mental activities) which are mental representations of the various colored, sounds, smells, Etc, in the world around us, although literature of psychology denotes the experience gained through immediate sense perception is the direct experience as they are connected with the world and must be blend information of other elements in the world.

But from the act of knowing view we directly know the presence of these mental objects in your mind, and with the help of these mental objects we know what we gain through indirect knowledge of the world around, for example, right now if we are watching an image Tree on a screen, in order to see that image an incredibly complex process has to be placed, like, the light from the screen has to reach our eyes where the lens on the front of each eyeball can then focus a tiny inverted image of Tree onto the surface of each eye where the retina is found, and then the so-called rods and cones convert those two tiny upside down images into electrical impulses that travel along our optic nerves. Impulses from our right eye goes to the left occipital lobe of our brain and impulses from our left eye go to the right lobe this process is so convoluted. It's

amazing we can see anything at all, right now too tiny upside down reversed images of Tree are creating electrical impulses in the neurons of our brain, is that what we're experiencing right now? Of course not, we see one normal right side up image of Tree, but that image isn't in our brain? No, but it is in our mind. The firing of neurons in our brain that we do not experience normally, but we merely experience an image of Tree that arises in our mind. In this way everything we directly experience takes place in our mind alone, the only time we might directly experience our brain itself is if we get a migraine headache. So our faculty of sight produces an image of me in our mind that image is in the form of a mental object of mental objects, and those mental objects are known by us. For instance, it is an observed 'I', that 'I' is the conscious observer of awareness: who knows the presence of that mental objects in our minds other than our ego-ness. This would confirm by being an awarefull witness lead to self-evidence for a awareful observer, thus for awarefull witness would present the image of the Tree in our mind right now in the form of mental objects. Likewise, this concept of self-evidence has been described and discussed in Adi Sankara's advaita vedanta as *Sakshi*.

Particularly, these images are produced by our senses, similarly, in a way, our other faculties also produces mental objects in our minds, and those mental objects become known to awarefull witness which is self-evidence for us: these mental objects become known to us, which include higher-order cognitive activities such as judgmental sense takes place in our mind and are known to us, likewise our emotions too arise in our mind as mental objects and they become known to us as feelings; thus we are the self-evident observers (awarefull witness conscious observers) of all the mental activities would proceed by the state of awareness, therefore by using cognitive philosophical method (separate and distinct or unity) for a careful examination, we can

distinguish the awareness in terms of its essence, as mainly: awaken, dreaming and the deep dreamless sleep states.

So far we have been focused on awaken or the conscious state: we interact with the world around us everything we experience arises as mental objects in our minds and that can be observed by us with the awarefull witness (self-evidential).

In the same way, then in the dreams are subconsciously awareful, we continue to observe mental objects in our minds, but those mental objects are produced by our dreams. Known that, our five senses do not function at all while we are dreaming, so no mental objects can arise to the perceptions of the world around us, yet whenever we are dreaming, we still perceive lots of things which we grasped in awaken state, such as people, buildings, sounds, smells and so on, and these perceptual experiences don't come from the physical world, but they all retain from the memories. In addition to these perceptions, we recall various other thoughts and emotions. However, what happens in our sleep, everyday while we are awake, we observe countless sensations, thoughts and conceptions and feelings, even in the dream state we are able to observe all these mental objects produced by our dreams and they stay back in our memories. Then what happens in sleep when our dreams come to an end we observe nothing, just as we observe the activities of our mind during the awake and dream states sleep.

Likewise, in the deep dreamless sleep, we are able to observe the complete absence of the activity in our mind, we continue to observe the contents of our mind but there's nothing to be observed, no sensory information, no thoughts and no feelings, whatsoever, that means we as an observer remain completely conscious and but there's nothing to be conscious.

This assertion contradicts the common notion that deep sleep is a state of unconsciousness, but the principles of cognitive philosophy and Husserl notions of self-evidentiality, can firmly support the fact that we remain awareful in deep dreamless sleep.

As we discussed before to reveal our constantly changing mental objects awareness itself must be unchanging and if the awareness is unchanging then how can one turn off so to speak during deep sleep and then turn back on during the awake and dream states. The awareness isn't like the light bulb in one's refrigerator that turns off every time we shut the door the unchanging awareness that continually reveals each and every mental object while we are awake or dreaming, also reveals the complete absence of mental objects during our deep dreamless sleep. For example, imagine, our mind is like a room filled with furnishings the table, chairs, lamps and so on represents our mental objects. If we start observing by standing inside the room its content just like we be awarefull witness (self-evidential) observers can have all the mental objects details in our mind. Standing in the room we see not only its furnishings, but we can also look out through the window and see what is happening outside the window which represents our five senses that enable us to perceive the world around. This scenario represents the awakened state merely when we observe all the things in our mind including mental objects produced by our five senses. But, let's consider the dream state, when the curtains in the room are closed, we cannot longer look through the window and see outside, in the same way in the dream state when our senses are inactive we can no longer perceive the world around us. But, through our dreams we can continue to perceive people, buildings, and other things that arise mental objects in our minds. As celebrated in chapter-IV, these mental objects aren't produced by our senses they arise or retain from our memories of things. We can experience when we are awake, that is like

looking at a photograph hanging in the room of what we saw earlier when we looked out through the window before the curtains were closed, now suppose we are standing in the same room but its been radically transformed all the furnishings have been removed the walls have been painted with a non-reflective blackpaint, and the base curtain has been replaced with a black one, even the floor has been painted black, and the far side of the room out of our view and not visible in this image, a lamp continues to shine and the lamp fills every corner of the room with its light.

As if we stand in the well-lit black room with our eyes wide open, what do we see? Nothing, we can continue to see but there is no longer anything to be seen. This scenario illustrates what happens in deep dreamless sleep, when we feel awareful witness (self-evidential) continue to observe the contents of our mind, but our mind has become perfectly silent and absolutely still.

Having said before, in the deep dreamless sleep state, we continue to be conscious there is nothing to be conscious of. So we feel we are full and as an observer of whatever happens in our mind during all these three states continue to alternate taking turns every day and night throughout our life. Eventually, of course, merely when we die or physically no more exists, then this cycle of awakening, dreaming and deep sleep will come to an end. After that when our brain and mind cease to function we as the self-evidential or awarefull witness will continue to be awarefull, but just as in a deep dreamless sleep state, there will be nothing to be awarefull off.

We will be aware of the absence of anything whatsoever like standing in the black room with our eyes wide open from this, we can infer the truth with the interpretations that the experience of being is dead or it is similar to the experience of deep dreamless sleep, but then according to the doctrine of Husserl, as we've already said in chapters: if the awareness is spreadover in our

minds then it is everywhere it would have illumined, that is on the intentions or thoughts in our minds should be the same. But if the awareness simultaneously illumined in all our intentions or thoughts then why can't we know other's intentions or thoughts directly? This is the question of mental objects that raises as a product of mind, being an unchanging awareness it is certainly different than separate from my mind and all other minds, but then it might raise one more objection by saying if my and others awareness is all-pervasive (when comparing with consciousness it is at a different level) then my awareness would also illuminate the intentions not only in my mind, but in other's as well, likewise, other's awareness would also illumine their intentions or thoughts in both minds, and then how could we tell the difference between both awareness?

If we each had a separate all-pervasive awareness both of them would overlap each other cause a serious-mess instead of having a pervasive correlation of both intentions or thoughts. However, all-pervasive awareness of one and that same one is responsible for simultaneously illuminating each and every mind, that is shining awareness becomes manifest or reflective by each individual mind like 'the sunshine gets reflected by so many oceans, lakes, rivers and ponds'. Each individual body of water reflects the sunlight and by doing so each body of water itself becomes another source of light, in the same way each individual mind reflects the same one all-pervasive awareness, and by doing so each mind has awareness, it is an intrinsic feature of it, so there is only one source of absolute awareness but their countless reflections on countless things in the world or in countless minds, just like each body of water reflects the sunlight differently depending on the object's size and shape, in the same way reflections of awareness appear differently by each of our minds even though awareness one and the same in every mind, we feel

like individual awareness because of the separateness and distinctiveness of our individual minds.

However, a transformation of intentions into an intuitive mentality through the extensions of feeling in our minds, this most prominent transformation will be the transmutation of the thoughts or intentions, such fulfillment activity appeared by the substance of the absolute attention with intellectual reason arise in our minds, as long as these feelings dispose with a rapid sight of actualities and their combinations does not affect our individualities, they proceed directly with an intuitive character and seizing upon its appropriate relations. But an awareful witness conscious observer known all these movements by the essence of either sensations or the reflections of awareness, thus usually this enlightenment caused to the development of other mental activities, such observation unchanging self which is not dependent on the outer sense and the reason because of separateness and distinction method. These mental activities can be translated as cognitive knowledge by identity, which was elaborated in chapter-III and IV.

According to the knowledge by identity, unchanging awareness is represented through their reflections that grounded in a self which is unaffected; for instance, emotions like lost, failure, pain and illness can't *truly* affect us, they can't even touch the self, because they don't truly belong to the self, this has been explained with the following example, suppose I am returning to my car in a parking lot and parked next to my car parked another car that happens to be exactly the same color make and model has mine, from a distance I cannot tell which car is mine, as I get closer I noticed that one of the cars has been badly damaged, someone carelessly smashed into the car and left, seeing the damaged car, I start to worry, wondering if it is my car that was damaged or the other car when I get close enough I can see that my car is fine, and it is the other

car that is damaged and my feeling would be great sense of relief. Now consider the damage exists and I see the damage and this was experienced by the ego of mine, but it doesn't affect the self *truly* very much, because the damage does not belong to the self, since the damage doesn't belong to self then there's no problem. Supposed for true about all the problems of everyday life, getting a headache, losing a job misplacing an important thing, etc. Suppose if these problems do not actually belong to us and they cannot affect us. This could be possible because we are the conscious being: an essence of awareness.

We are the awareful observers of all that we sense, likewise, we are the awareful witness of everything that we experience: being an awareful witness is a fundamental nature of an awareful observer, similarly self-evident for self-observation. As an awareful witness observer, we do ourselves a categorical separation and distinction from anything that we observe. For example, when we see a bunch of fruits, suppose grapes, we separate and distinguish ourselves from those grapes, similarly when we see a little puppy ourselves separate and distinct from it and when we observe our own hand, as being an awareful witness we are separate and distinct though we express it is my own hand, but truly being an awareful observer we do categorical separation and distinction even from our hand, likewise when we see our own body or world it is known to us in the same way that the grapes or puppies are known to us. As an awareful observer, body or world observed by ourselves as an object therefore we do separate and distinct from them. This is because we are the only awareful witness to observe it. Of course our own bodies are different from other things in the world as we feel sensations and feelings of it. But, when we experience all these sensations that arise in our mind, we start to observe them like each sensation is a mental object and we are the awareful observer who perceives them, within ourselves. As the

awarefull witness, we witness not only sensations, we witness all our intentions, thoughts arise in our mind as mental objects and they become known to us, that is to the awareful observer.

As an awarefull witness observer, we can observe the constant changing flow of mental activities reflected through awareness as categorial for the conception in terms of 'knowing act'. This act, would be explained by using a modern metaphor: there is a screen in our mind like in a movie theater and on that screen is projected we are constantly changing flow of sensations, intentions or thoughts and emotive feelings. We are the awarefull witness who watches them appear on the screen of our mind, with our observation we do separate and distinct from whatever we observed, really speaking, those projections belong to our mind but not to the awareful observer of the self. And if our sensations, intentions or thoughts are actually belonging to our mind not to the awareful observer of the self, then how could they affect us be an awareful witness conscious observer: for instance, suppose we are sitting in the theater to watch a movie when a sad scene is projected on the screen we may feel sad and if a happy scene is projected on the screen then we may feel happy, as those experiences are projected on the screen of our mind, this is what happens to us throughout everyday life.

And, I still remember, in my childhood, normally most theaters had an intermission followed by a second movie we called it double features. Similarly, there is also a double feature projected on the screen of our mind, the first feature is everything that happens while we are awake, the second feature is our dreams, and our dreams can be really strange like some science fiction, the first movie represents our awakened state, when everything we experience throughout the day is projected on the screen of our mind, the second movie represents our dream state when all our dream experience on the screen of our mind, but in deep sleep there are no dreams or dreamless

because the second feature has come to an end, and we remain in the theater watching as a screen goes black.

We can find the awareful observer of the self in a perfectly dark and looking at a perfectly black screen, this describes the experience of deep sleep where no dreams. However, in this state we are the awarefull witness of the silence of our mind, we remain conscious but there are no mental activities to be conscious of, it is just like sitting in a dark room and watching a black screen. In the deep dreamless sleep, we are the awareful observer of a completely silent mind. Interestingly, being a awareful observer we do not cease awareness during the deep dreamless sleep, our awareness does not blink ON and OFF like a light bulb in the refrigerators, when the door opens or closed.

In this state, the awareness reveals what is happening on the screen of our mind, every single moment whether we are awake, dreaming or in a deep dreamless sleep. Therefore, the awareful observer of the self which is the essence of awareness, and it cannot be an object like the light in our refrigerator. To have a better understanding how we remain awareness even in deep dreamless sleep, let's again illustrate previous example, suppose if we are standing outside a room looking into the window the room is bright, it is illuminated by a lamp located on the side where we cannot see it directly. The walls of the room are painted black but we can clearly notice the furnishings in the room, now suppose we remove all the furnishings from the room except for the lamp, then the room would still be filled with light from the lamp, but we would see only blackness, even though the light is on, we can see only blackness because there is nothing in the room to be seen, in this illustration, the room with black walls represents our mind and its furnishings represent all our mental activities, the light it represents our awareness. In our

deep dreamless sleep, our mental activities will disappear, merely the presence of a total silence in our mind. But even then our mind continues to be aware, like the light: we remain as awarefull observers but there is nothing left in our mind to be observed just like the empty room filled with light because our deep dreamless sleep is engaging into pure darkness, thus we merely can find merely silence in our observations.

Everything that we have seen so far is the true nature of awarefulness by being an awarefull witness which is able to illuminate our minds to reveal our sense of being. Yet, we can see how our content of being turn into meaningful or the trustworthy knowledge as analyzed in chapters I and IV, when the screen of our mind is constantly cluttered with seeing, but frustration and irritation scenes of sadness and grief scenes of hurt and resentment, we can remain content if we are utterly unaffected by anything projected on the screen of our minds, for example, we return to a movie theater to watch a movie and suddenly appeared an emotional scene particularly heartbreaking scene then we will probably feel sad and we might even cry sometimes, but we know that whatever happens in the movie doesn't really affect us, so we enjoy the sad scene and might even enjoy crying too. The state may continue for a period of time after the movie outside the theater also, this implies we feel sad when sad experiences are projected on the screen of our mind, and just like in the theater as being awarefull witness those sad experiences do not truly affect us, even though sometimes it might lead to imaginative ideation, as the awarefull witness we are completely separate from the screen of our mind and utterly unaffected by anything projected on it. As we saw, we are separate and distinct from everything projected on the screen of our mind because we are the awareful observer of all that is projected, thus so whatever is projected on the screen of my mind belongs to mine and not to others.

We know this absolute awareness to be completely independent of affective or constant changes of our mind and the world. As the unchanging awareful observer of the self with an absolute awareness is utterly unaffected by any kind of mental activities like the sun is utterly unaffected by all hit illuminance. However, the self, by becoming an absolute awarefulness we will find the conception with fulfillment of meaningful and trustworthy knowledge in every possible dimension of life.

Awareful observer and unchangingness

Speaking phenomenologically, some mental objects are produced by our sense organs conveyed to our mind and become known to us which are perception. In addition to this, their mental objects produced by our intellect can simply be referred to as higher-order cognitive elements like intentions or thoughts and so on. Every activity of our mind must falls in one of these categories, and the latter, they become known to the awareful observer or aware to the self, but we as knower of these mental objects necessarily separate and different from them because we are the observers or experiencers and they are observed or experienced.

In fact, though as a knower of these mental objects are separate and distinct from us, they certainly seem to affect us, whether they are perceptions, cognitions or emotions, for example, when we smell something really follow the terrible scent seems to affect us, or what if a dear friend has inexplicably stopped returning our emails and phone calls great uncertainty seems to affect us, or, when happiness arises in our mind those emotions definitely affect us; everything

that happens in our mind seems to affect us, because we are the awareful observers or experiencers of those mental objects of the self.

However, from the ancient times as described that absolute awareness is utterly unaffected by all the mental activities although they are part of it, and it is the essence of a self, so whatever happens in our mind doesn't truly affect the self, that is to the awareful witness.

Let's find out the conception of absolute awareness with a metaphor: the sun reveals countless objects in the world like shining upon them by illuminating, but the sun doesn't get affected in any way whatsoever by what it shows upon. If the sunshine on sacred scripture that doesn't become holy, same way, if the sunshine on a filthy garbage it doesn't become impure, likewise, the absolute awareness that illuminates all the activities of our mind is not truly affected by mental objects at the illuminant, that means for an awareful observer, in our mind, if we feel the presence of happiness it doesn't become happy, and when we feel sadness, the awareful observer doesn't become sad. On the other hand, this assertion seems to absolutely confer usual experience, when happiness or sadness or prizes arises in our mind we definitely feel like those emotions are affecting us which the awareness that reveals them.

Yet, if we re-examine this more carefully it turns out to be another situation in which we misinterpret our experiences. For example, when we watch the sunset, the sun doesn't go down it actually remains stationary in the sky while we stand on a rotating planet and slowly tilt over backward, yet we wrongly say that the sun is going down, just this we misinterpret our experience of the sunset. We also misinterpret our experiences of happiness, sadness and everything else that arises in our mind, how does this confusion take place in our mind? Our

mental objects or activities are in a constant state of flux, in our mind the mental activities continually change from moment to moment, due to correlation of many external and internal elements of experiences, this conception has been described under the conception of ideation in chapter-I.

If we are the awareful observer, accurately observe the constantly changing mental activities, for that we must necessarily be an unchanging observer. Otherwise, if the observer changes along with the mental objects then how could their changes be known or recognized or identified. For example, suppose, we are driving on the motorway at 60 km speed in an hour, and in the lane next to us, there is another time traveling at exactly the same speed, when we glance at the other driver, while driving the driver is sipping a bottle, but that driver actually sipping bottle at 60 km per hour speed. However, we experienced it differently, we have seen that sipping bottle in a motionless state but in reality it is driving state. Suppose, if we want to see a driver who is sipping a bottle at 60 km per hour speed, we will have to watch it from the roadside standing, as an unmoving observer. This example shows that merely as an unchanging observer of our mental objects can we accurately experience their constantly changing nature. To a better understanding, let's begin to visualize, suppose a grey cloud of sadness to gradually descend upon our mind, if we the observers of our mind, i.e. self observation simultaneously become grey, as the gray cloud pervaded our mind bit by bit which represents sadness, could we really sense that the growing presence of the grey cloud of its elements, in order to observe the sadness setting upon our minds we must necessarily be an unchanging observer and then we are completely unaffected by whatever is being observed like the sun is completely unaffected by all that it illuminance.

This is true not just for sadness but for all of the activities of our mind: when we see the Blue Sky, as an observer I don't become blue, similarly when I smelled a foul stench I don't stink, such of these perceptual experiences don't affect me because I am the awareful observer of the mental activities, and I do separate and distinct me from the mental objects that arise in my mind.

This applies to our cognition as 'knowledge by identity', as well, whether we are engrossed in the phenomena of grasping or performing like problem-solving at work or we are balancing accounts or if we are planning for a vacation, the mental objects that arises in our mind due to these cognitive activities. They are all observed by us, as being an unchanging awareful observer we can separate and distinct ourselves from all those cognitive activities, thus we are completely unaffected by them. And we are the unchanging observers not only of our perceptions and cognition but of all our emotions as well. For instance, when we feel angry, hurt, joyful or worried feelings that arise as mental objects in our mind, once again due to separateness and distinctiveness from all those emotions we are completely unaffected by them as discussed. However, anger, hurt, or joy arises in our mind we'd probably say, 'I am angry' or 'I am hurt' and so on. However, if we'd never say 'I'm not angry' but some anger has arisen in my mind, yet, as odd as that may sound that's exactly what happened when anger arises in my mind. If I am the unchanging awareful observer, I do not become angry, and I say, I am angry because anger seemed to affect me. It seems to somehow rub off on awareness as of the absolute awareness stained or painted by these emotions, but our awarefulness illuminant mental objects are like the sun in illuminance objects in the world and that's how it can actually be affected.

Let's again look into this in connection with the doctrine of Husserl, how mental activities certainly affect us, even though being an unchanging awareful observer. For example, look into a

Crystal object, we can see it is perfectly clear, yet when I hold it in front of me it appears to become my cloth colour, that colour belongs to the cloth which I am wearing, it seems to have affected the crystal changing its color, of course this crystal remains clear but it certainly appears the cloth's colour. In the same way, the notions belonging to our mind seemed to rub off on us. So to speak, they seem to be thankful for a fact, we somehow even though as an unchanging awareful observer, we are actually unaffected by those emotions in any way. This change of colour appearance is due to the nearness or proximity of this crystal to the cloth.

Suppose, if I hold this crystal at it distance, it won't appear the same colour, likewise, it is the distance between the mental objects and us. Being as awareful observer, then what is the distance between awareness and our mental activities or objects? In fact, there is no real distance at all, every mental activity is bathed in awareness (embodied) like fields and forests bathed in sunlight. Due to such close proximity between our mental objects and awareness the qualities of the mental objects like sadness and hurt scene to paint or rub off on an unchanging awareness, similar to how the colour of the cloth seems to paint on the clear crystal.

Now let's consider the next stance, this crystal remains perfectly clear even now while it appears cloth colour may be blue, it's blueness only an appearance not a reality, but the blueness of the cloth is real. Thus, the blueness of crystal is false, it is false like a snake projected as a rope in the dark street. Or similar to that the sun apparent travel down each evening, even when the sun appears to go down we know that it's actually stationary even when the crystal appears blue. We know that it remains perfectly clear and even when sadness and hurt up here to rub off, we know that unchanging awareness remains unaffected. In this way, this might lead to skepticism. Suppose if we want for clear crystal right now, well, there is nothing that needs to be done, it's

always clear in spite of its appearance, in the same way, if we want to be completely unaffected by sadness, anger, and hurt, then there is absolutely nothing that needs to be done.

The awareness that our essential nature remains unchanged and unaffected by our emotions, for knowing the truth, this must be personally verified with perfect clarity and unfettered by doubts or skeptical. Normally, for us, the absolute truth remains hidden, unknown or unheard, when the truth is known it might not be known with perfect clarity and unfettered by doubts or skeptics. So for the sake of making trustworthy knowledge in a perfect, clearer and doubt free can be achieved by paying enough attention towards the experiences given impressions.

This directs towards a doubt free knowledge of the absolute truth that we must be unchanging awareful observer are utterly unaffected by the activities of our mind, for example, suppose if we are seeing merely the crystal in a proximity of the cloth, so every time we have seen the crystal it appears blue in colour to us, now even though if we tell that this crystal is really clear, and listeners have no reason to doubt, about our utterances, so far they have only experienced a blue crystal and as a result of this, we might have some doubts as to whether-or-not this crystal is truly clear, in the same way all our experiences, throughout our everyday life have taken place in the presence of mental objects, this seems to fact, that is color awareness due to their close proximity. Though, these methods tells us about absolute awareness is not affected by mental objects, such as color awareness, we are still skeptical as to whether-or-not awareness is truly unaffected by mental objects, but those doubts could be removed by the experience of being a awareful observer in the absence of those mental objects, which always seem to possess awareness.

Return to the crystal example, suppose if I remove this crystal from the cloth just for a few moments, and watched it carefully, now in those few moments we could see without doubt that this crystal is perfectly clear; although the crystal appears in the color of cloth again, we do not have any doubts about it and truly being clear. Thus, our brief experience of the clear crystal soundly confirmed that, what have been experiencing all along, that this crystal remains clear in spite of the continued appearance of blueness. Now, to confirm the fact that this crystal really is clear, how long should be our experience of the clear crystal. Should we hold it away from the cloth for several minutes or several hours, or several days, but certainly not necessary and experience of just a few moments is enough to experientially confirm the clearness of the crystal. Based on this example, by paying absolute attention or an involution with an intense capacity that could make our perspective shift towards the absolute flow of informative clues from the experiences that turns as meaningful or trustworthy knowledge. For instance, few moments of attention or introspection can easily be produced in the interval or gap between mental repetitions of absolute flow, for example if our introspection on observation or attention on crystal for a long time it will eventually become firmly established in our mind, then we can gradually increase the gap between each impression or pay less intense attention for persuasion. When we're confirming the attention during the gap between each impression through experience there are no separate mental activities, then what else remains is merely *absoluteness*. We as awareful observers remain present as unchanging awareness, then that gap between each experiential persuasion of impression can subjectively reveal that awareness is utterly untainted by any mental activity.

Thus, whatsoever let me explain, for instance, what if I remove this crystal from the cloth, not the traits of blueness remains because the crystal was never affected in any way by the blueness, in the same way when all mental objects for a few moments we can discover that awareness is utterly free from any trace or residue left over from those mental objects, because awareness was never affected by the mental objects in the first place. Using attention in this way we have an opportunity to experientially confirm with the evidence that our true nature of absolute awareness is utterly unaffected by anything and everything that happens in our mind.

When this cause of absolute awareness knowledge is perfectly clear and doubt free, we will no longer be an agent of actions or a subject to actions caused by mental objects, whether they are perception, cognition and emotional activities. We'll know that awareness remains utterly unaffected and we will know that awareness always remains unaffected, awareness forever remains full and perfect even in the presence of mental objects just like this crystal remains clear even in the presence of blueness. That awareness is unchanging full and perfect yields to our essential nature for the endurance knowledge sources.

Intuitiveness and awareful observer

And finally, on this same pane let's clear how we related both to awarefull witness intuitive character and the knowledge world around us, this is a big and heavy topic was discussed in the chapter-IV, but now we can get the gist of it by using another metaphor that compares us showed up to a mighty ocean waves born at the ocean, waves are sustained by the ocean as a travel across its surface and waves eventually return to the ocean when they wash up on the shore. In this way, I, we and everything else that exists in the mind are born with intuitive character. Our

conceptual thinking and absoluteness of knowledge sustained by the objects of intuitive character, and we return to some waves are huge they could represent soaring mountains and some waves are tiny they could represent all of us living amongst those mountains, and these waves large and small all exist within the mighty ocean just like every living being, an inert object in the mind.

We have already seen when we used to dream metaphor even though this metaphor makes the same point it's actually intended to show something more who's big idea every wave is made of water, in fact, a wave is only water the shape of the wave isn't something separate or differ if a wave contains 100 gallons of water the shape of the wave does not add anything, every wave in the ocean is just a form of water the entire ocean is itself another form of water even though it's a much larger for both ocean and waves are but forms of water the same water the water because of which the mighty ocean exists is exactly the same water because of which each and every individual wave exist the mighty ocean and individual wave heart utterly different in form but 'one' in essence because they are just water and nothing else can you see the striking implications of this metaphor shows how our intuitive character and its notions are 'one' including you and me and even though all are forms are utterly different. In fact even Husserl notions articulates the same: the intuitions do not contradict reasoning like a normal belief, whereas intuition influences not only the conception of knowledge by identity also the perceptions that gives form and meaning of the world because of the fulfilling continuity among the intellect and intuitions, like wave contains water, each other are inclusive as the intellect gives conception of whole through the analysis of the parts, but intuition has the direct knowledge of it. This is how the intuition is considered to be *nous* in Aristotle and as *wisdom* in

many other philosophical faculties around the world. However, The essence of self separate and distinct mental objects through their meaning, objectivity and the existential status arise in our minds, because of this sense of certainty brings out in the knowledge at transcendental level. The intuition because of the fulfillment of empty components through the essence which we all exist are one and the same as the awarefull witness, thus the awarefullness is not a piece of world neither the world nor a piece of awarefullness but they are embodied in each other as every individual wave exist the mighty ocean and individual wave heart utterly different in form but 'one' which is the 'unity', shows how they are united internally through the intentional interpretations which arise in our minds. Such an assertion of awarefullness reveals the cognitive form of reality in connection with experiences. In fact the knowledge is absolutely grounded in the highest sense, which is the source of all ontological formations on the foundations of true epistemological relations. Yet, in order to approach the universal knowledge by a atma vichara, self-examination or self observation one must lose the world by epoche is the necessary path. Thus, Husserl says the truth resides in mind which gives access through direct perceptual inferences by awareful observer.

'Awareness' is synthesis between transcendental idealism and cognitive realism

Most importantly, all the post-Hegelian debates are upon the idealism and realism, mainly empirical philosophical circles were interrogated this with multiple significance(s) of observations on various occasions such as reclaiming or foregrounding in terms of ideas. For instance, the consciousness often offers a logical priority in their following inferences on the

basis of its foundational nature, for example, falsification of extra mental reality that has no materialistic properties in the physical world. But even though the notions of the consciousness accepted as the logical presupposition of all our experiences with both realism and idealism at metaphysical level. Awareness does not create differently and the reflections of them appears as impressions of knowledge that reveals merely the pre-existing reality but not the external reality, this means according to metaphysical realists there is mind-independent world, so to know an object by a self through transcendental experiences with an epistemological priority that object must be part of the self. Thus, the awareness is involved in each and every act of knowing with a chronological order of priority in the form and meaning relationship, for instance suppose if the pre-reflexivity is a priori to the awareness then it has no meaning involved so it cannot be part of any explanation of things, therefore the non-conceptual materialistic theories cannot be fulfilled but they are intelligible merely in an extent as it appears to the self. Apparently the cognitions rolled back inhabit of specific temporal determinations and its relations with meanings, but in a sense of the external world the meanings are not in the time rather in the relations. However, for the empirical realists the phenomenal reality is grounded in the absoluteness, but this doesn't entail our everyday objects are fused into the absoluteness or the notions of illusions which are caused by their own belief system **from anterior to the awareness**. For a better understanding of the differences among the realism and idealism says that, the realists occupy the external world and the idealists seek for grounding analysis for that establishment, that means the facts of establishment is upon the face-value for the realists and the factual nature conditions for idealists. By saying statement that the world is not merely composed with the elements of ideas Kantian agreed with realists especially while pointing out

the realists to check the scientific theories because it is difficult to verify the theoretical nature of subjective idealism compared to nature scientific theories. However, post-Kantian empiricists pointed out that idealism is not merely part of subjectivist account and it does accept the extra mental world because of intersubjectivity nature which constitutes all our ontological notions upon the true epistemology. Interestingly, on the same pane we can see the resemblance of this synthesis would reject the categorical assertions of a self in empirical experiences, but we can see that while having the impressions our mental objects are blended with objective referents in the world which are independent of our minds. This presents how the idealism minimize the differences between the subject and object through the separation and unity, whereas the world unity and the separation are interrelated absoluteness notions which does not affect the distinctions among self and awareness or non-self through the transcendental conditions, that is the matter and quality does not oppose each other for their phenomenal correlation during the impressions. Therefore the idealism does not reject the external world upon the transcendental conditions experience. However, it goes far more than realism in order to know the real world indeed of knowledge by identity, therefore the awarefull witness can be understood through the impressions of the objective world and the synthetic unity of the awarefullness. In this way the absolute division of mind and matter does not considered purely as the unity brings the self and world together through the correlation of transcends and comprehends which says the world information fledted to mental activities.

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VITA

1. Full name and date

- Pala, Kiran Kumar
- Male
- 10th December, 2019

2. Date and place of birth, nationality, current residence

- 1983 and Vidavalur, India
- India
- Metsurintie, 4D, 31, Kuopio, Finland (+358-0449321660, kiranap@gmail.com, skype: kirankumar.pala)

3. Education and degrees awarded

- Research Masters in Cognitive Science and Humanities: Language Communication and Organisation, (University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Spain), Cognitive Philosophy, (July, 2015).
- Master dissertation: *How does transduction occur between symbolic and non-symbolic representations.*
- For verification, please contact: Secretary, Master and Doctoral School, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Leioa, Spain. email: mde@ehu.eus
- Bachelor of Technology in Computer Science and Information Technology, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad (JNTUH), India Computer Science and Information Technology, (April, 2008).

4. Other education and training, qualifications and skills

- PhD (University of the Basque Country, Spain), Theoretical Philosophy
- Minor: Cognitive Philosophy, Indian and Eastern philosophy
- Doctoral dissertation: *Nature of Knowledge Origins in Connection with Experiences: A Cognitive Philosophical Analysis*
- For verification, please contact: *Dr. Javier Aguirre Santos*, javier.aguirre@ehu.eus, The Dept. of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Gipuzkoa Campus, Spain.

5. Linguistic skills

- *Native*: Tamil and Telugu (Native)
- *Fluent*: English (C2), Hindi (C2), Malayalam (C2), Kannada (C2),
- *Basic*: Spanish (A2), French (A1), Japanese (A1) and Finnish (A1)

6. **Current position**

- Full-time doctoral researcher: Dept. of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Gipuzkoa Campus, Spain. Subject: Philosophy of Cognitive Science

7. **Previous work experience**

- Research stay at Doctorate level, University of Fribourg Scholarship for 4 months at Faculty of Arts, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland. (06-02-2017 to 05-06-2017).
- Technical consultant (Freelance), Belia Security Systems, Donostia, Spain (November, 2015 to September, 2016)
- Project manager, PACT LABS, Hyderabad, India (August, 2013 to January, 2014)
- Research Programmer with Anusaaraka Lab, Language Technologies Research Centre-International Institute of Information Technology -Hyderabad (Dec-2007 to August 2013)
- Visiting Researcher for Development of Lexicons with Fuji Japanese academy & Language Technologies Research Centre, IIT-Hyderabad (Mar-2007 to Dec-2007).
- Software Developer with Panacea Dream weavers Software (P) Ltd, India (June-2005 to Mar-2007).
- Project participant for Enabling Indian language support to a text processing framework. Natural Language Engineering Lab, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India (Nov-04 to June-05).

8. **Research funding as well as leadership and supervision**

- Co-supervised 6 Master of Science in Information Technology dissertation projects at EnhanceEdu Lab, International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India.
- Supervised 4 Bachelor of Technology dissertation projects, Anusaaraka Lab, International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India.

9. **Merits in teaching and pedagogical competence**

- e-Governance Course Tutor and mentor for course projects mentor, International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India
- Computer Problem Solving Course Tutor and project mentor, International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India

10. **Awards, prizes and honours**

- Awards, prizes and honours granted for scientific, artistic or research merits or on the basis of the recipient's academic career
- Conference Grant for XII Polish Cognitive Science Society Meeting 2018
- Conference Travel grant for attending on Cognitive NeuroEthics, United States, Sep (2017)
- ISEP Scholarship for Research exchange, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, February-June 2017
- Awarded "Young Researchers Conclave" at IIT Gandhinagar, December-2011
- Summer School on "Language and Communication" at NIAS, Bangalore-2011

- Full fund to participate in “Yahoo Summer School on Information Retrieval” at IISc Bangalore-2011
- Full fund to participate and delegate in WWW2011 Conference (Nixi-fellowship)
- CIIL–NTS Module writing fellowship, 2011
- Government of India, State Scholarship for Diploma, Bachelor Studies, 1998-2001 and 2002-2005

11. Other academic merits

- Guest reviewer for Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer.
- Guest reviewer for Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Springer
- Regular reviewer for Cognitive Science society conferences
- Regular reviewer for Language and Linguistics series, Palgrave Macmillan

- Member, Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft (GK)
- Member, EXRE (Experience and Reasoning).
- Member, PLM (Association of Phil of Language and Mind).
- Member, ACL (Association of Computational Linguistics).
- Member, ISE (International Society of Ethnobiology).

- Organized a Workshop on Social Networking WebApps (April 2011).
- Organized a National level Workshop on Applied Computer Science (December-2010).
- Organized a Workshop on Python Programming (November 2010).

- ‘essence’ therefore Intuition, EuroCogSci 2019 in Bochum, September, 2019.
- Essentials: Knowledge Origins Nature on ‘act of Knowing’, XII Polish Cognitive Science Society Meeting 2018
- Objects and Conception of Judgment Sense, XII Polish Cognitive Science Society Meeting 2018
- Judgement Sense “of or for” an act of Knowing, CCS, Flint, MI, USA, September , 2017
- Praxis of Conceptual (Reco) Structuring, XII International Ontology Congress, October 2016, Spain
- Complexity of Language Organisation in Cognition: A New Dimension, 8th Annual International Free Linguistics Conference, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China 2014.
- How Lexical Meanings are Shaped by Olfactory Perception, 13th Congress of the International Society of Ethnobiology (CISE2012), Montpellier, France 2012.
- How to Build Bilingual Lexicon for from Web Corpus Automatically, Presented at National Seminar, University of Kashmir, India, 2011
- Statistics in Social Sciences Research, EnhanceEdu, IIT Hyderabad, India, 2011
- Visual Experience in Cognitive Structures, Free Linguistics Conference Sydney, Australia, 2011,
- Effect of Technology on Perception in-terms of Language Contact in Multilingual Society. At the South Asian Languages Analysis Roundtable 29, Mysore, India, 2011.
- A correlational Condition of Academic Background and Cognates. At EnhanceEdu, IIT Hyderabad, India, 2011.

- Anusaaraka (Translation) engine for Webpages, Word document, pdf or text from English to Hindi. At the Workshop on Free/Libre/Open Source Software (FLOSS), Delhi January 2010.
- A Proposed Approach for Testing the Hypothesis that Cognates & Background Information Together Facilitate Vocabulary Learning. At ICLCI, Allahabad, December 2009.
- Modeling user categorization for language learning. 29th Annual Conference, Linguistic Society of Nepal. Khatmandu, Nepal. 2008.
- Semi-supervised verb frame learning given seed frames: A Cluster based approach. At the Winter School on Natural Language Processing, IIIT Hyderabad, India. 2008.
- Grammar and Multilingualism in the Emerging Linguistic Scene in North East India. Shillong, India. 2007.
- Member PLM Workshop on Senses and References, ILCLI, Spain (Sep 2014).
- Organizing Member workshop on Image and Speech Processing, IIIT Hyderabad, India (Jan 2012).
- Speaker in workshop “On Pronunciation Lexicons For Indic Languages”, JNU-Delhi, India (May-2011).
- Supporting mentor NIAS Summer School on Cognition and Mathematical Models (April 2010).
- Mentor CMU Winter School on Learning Sciences, December 2009, IIIT Hyderabad, India
- Mentor Workshop on Ontology Building with NLP, IE and IR-2008, IIT Mumbai, India
- Organizing Member ICON-2007(International Conference on Natural Language Processing), IIIT Hyderabad.
- Participant in India Resource Person for Lexical Resources for Indic Languages, 2007 CDAC- Mumbai, India.

12. Scientific and societal impact of research

- Praxis of Conceptual (Reco) Structuring, Physis Kai Polis, International Ontology Congress, Spain, 2016
- How Lexical Meanings are Shaped by Olfactory Perception, in Words for odours: Language skills and cultural insights, (Editors) Barkat-Defradas, Melissa and Motte-Florac, Elisabeth, 2016, Cambridge Scholars Publishing
- Virtual Environments Can Mediate Continuous Learning, Technologies for Inclusive Education 2012, IGI Publications, (Editors) David Griol Barres (Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain), Zoraida Callejas Carrión (University of Granada, Spain) and Ramón López-Cózar Delgado (University of Granada, Spain)
- A Generic and Robust Algorithm for Paragraph Alignment and its Impact on Sentence Alignment in Parallel Corpora. In LREC-WildRE 2012, Istanbul, Turkey.
- Integration of Multimodal Interaction as Assistance in Virtual Environments. In ACL-SMIAE 2012, Jeju, Korea.
- A Generic Framework of Computer Adaptive Testing Mechanism. In Research Cell: An International Journal of Engineering Science, Vol 6, July 2012

- Challenges and Opportunities in Automatically Building Bilingual Lexicon for from Web Corpus. In Interdisciplinary Journal on Linguistics Dec-2012.
- Games for Academic Vocabulary Learning Through a Virtual Environment. In Proceedings of IEEE-IALP, COLLIPS 2011, November-2011.
- An Experiment on Resolving Pronominal Anaphora in Hindi: Using Heuristics. In Springer-CCIS LNCS (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), March-2011.
- The Relevance of Variations in Auditory Perception for Second Language Teaching and Learning. In Proceedings of the 4th Language Technology Conference (LTC)-Human Language Technology (HLT), LTC09. Poland. 2009

13. **Positions of trust in society and other societal merits**

- Previous Chair and councilor for Computer Society of India.
- Member of 5 dissertation evaluation committees related to Natural Language Processing projects.

14. **Other merits**

- Hands on experience in different Libraries and tools used for qualitative research analysis tools: eye tracker, PsychoPy, SPSS, PRAAT, Audacity, etc.