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María Ángeles de Frutos, María Paz Espinosa,

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints
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María Angeles De Frutos†
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

María Paz Espinosa
Universidad del País Vasco

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Abstract

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face financial constraints that may force
them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at
a resale market. First we show that the inefficient speculative equilibria of second-
price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale
where only the high value bidder is financially constrained. However, when all players
face financial constraints the inefficient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for
auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are financially constrained and
there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate
mechanism to achieve an efficient allocation.

Keywords: auctions, resale, financial constraints, subcontracting

JEL Class.: D44, L1, D82

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†Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. C/Madrid 126.
28903 Getafe. Spain. E-mail: frutos@eco.uc3m.es.
Introduction

Competition for acquiring a public firm or winning the allocation of a big facility is often characterized by the presence of a small number of qualified bidders who assign a large value to the good although they may face financial constraints. Because of this, the acquirer can share the property of the good with other buyers. One specific example is the allocation problem of the European Spallation Source that has to be allocated to a single country or location but whose property can be shared after the initial allocation, to alleviate the winner’s financial constraints.\(^1\) Similarly, operating licences (e.g., in the telecommunications sector) are awarded to one firm, and (some or all of) the actual services can be subcontracted.\(^2\)

Beyond these particular examples, this framework fits privatization processes involving the sale of a public firm to a single buyer meeting the (legal, administrative) requirements or the procurement of large-scale production contracts in the public sector.

Previous work on auctions with resale relies mostly on the potential inefficiencies of the auction allocation mechanism to provide the basis for resale. An inefficient allocation may result from noisy signals at the time of the auction, as in Haile (2000, 2001, 2003), or from asymmetries among bidders when the auction is conducted as first price, as in Gupta and Lebrun (1998) or Hafalir and Krishna (2008). In contrast, in our model the auction is a second price auction and the resale market is justified by the presence of financial constraints which may force the winner of the auction to sell part of the property of the good.\(^3\)

Our paper is related to Garratt and Tröger’s (2006), who have shown that a second price auction can result in inefficient allocations in the presence of speculators who only value the object by its resale price. In a similar context,\(^4\) we show that the introduction of financial constraints (players’ wealth may be below their use value) and partial resale can bring back the efficiency of the second price auction. However, when the financial constraints are slight, an extension of Garratt and Tröger’s inefficiency result is delivered.

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1 Partial resale after an auction or contract award may come from the divestment requirement imposed by antitrust authorities on the winners whenever their market shares increase substantially after the award.

2 Horizontal subcontracting is a common phenomenon in many industries (see, e.g., Kamien et al., 1989; Spiegel, 1993; and Chen et al., 2004, for further discussion and examples).

3 Splitting of an auction target was the outcome in the UK brewer Scottish & Newcastle accepted takeover bid from Carlsberg and Heineken. Despite splitting up the business, concerns were raised that Calsberg may struggle to fund the deal.

4 We also model an auction in which a strong buyer with a private use value competes against a weak buyer whose use value is known to be lower than the rival’s; although in our model the weak buyer is not a pure speculator because he values consuming the good, his behavior can be interpreted as speculative.
The literature on auctions with resale has focused on the case of total resale of the good and to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper introducing partial resale in an auction framework under incomplete information. However, partial resale (or horizontal subcontracting) is a common assumption in two-stage contract games under other modes of competition. Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) study a procurement auction for an endogenously determined quantity of a perfectly divisible good with two identical and completely informed bidders. In their setup decreasing returns create a need for subcontracting, as financial constraints do in ours. Whereas we assume that the object to be procured has a fixed size, we relax two other important assumptions such as symmetry and complete information. By considering a double source of asymmetry (in use-values and in wealth) our paper is also close to that of Spiegel (1993) where firms are supposed to compete in quantities rather than prices again under complete information. As in our model, incentives to resale arise from asymmetries, and at the bidding stage firms take advantage of their (relative) strength.

The presence of a resale market affects bidding strategies in several ways. First, it may generate a more aggressive bidding behavior at the first stage as the auction winner can get extra resources from reselling, which affects players’ endogenous valuations. Second, first stage bidding can reveal information on the loser’s use value which will be taken into account at the post-auction resale market.

The presence of financial constraints also affects the first stage bids as the possibility of default creates a link between the resale price and the auction price. This link can affect equilibrium behavior at the auction stage as it may induce a potential loser to set the auction price so as to fine-tune the winner’s resale offer. The loser bidder may have incentives to raise the auction price to make the winner financially constrained. Interestingly, a loser may also have incentives to decrease the auction price to soften his competitor’s financial constraint. A buyer with severe financial constraints can behave very aggressively when setting his resale offers as the opportunity cost for a rejected offer -namely, losing his own wealth- is very

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5 Examples of real-life auctions in which financial constraints have played a key role abound. In the privatization of ENTel (an Argentinean telecommunications company) the winner of the ENTel North, Bell Atlantic and Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, failed to obtain the necessary financial resources to meet their bid. ENTel North was then awarded to the next bidder, a consortium of buyers including France Telecom and J. P. Morgan. Similarly, in the European 3G Telecom Auctions some firms faced difficulties in borrowing (see Klemperer, 2002).

6 This effect is reminiscent of the incentives for bidders in multiple-object auctions to bid aggressively on one object, with the objective of raising the price paid by the rival and depleting his budget, so that other objects may be obtained at a lower price (Benoit and Krishna, 2001).
low. Facing such a rival, a loser buyer may prefer setting a low auction price to soften his competitor’s financial constraints.

We show that whenever the weak buyer is not financially constrained the structure of Garratt and Tröger’s speculative equilibrium, and its resulting inefficiency, hold true. In equilibrium high-value strong players bid their endogenous valuation or use value and win the auction, while the low-values lose the auction pooling at either the valuation or use value of the lowest type.\(^7\) The weak buyer bids his valuation taking into account that as a winner he will resell optimally to the set of low types who are pooling (cf. Proposition 2). It is worth noting that under financial constraints partial resale is necessary for this result to hold, and that partial resale boosts the auctioneer’s revenues.

The crucial assumption driving inefficient speculative equilibria with incomplete information is the absence of financial constraints for the weak buyer. When the weak buyer does not have unlimited wealth, the inefficiency created by speculative behavior disappears if his wealth is below a critical level, even if the weak buyer wins the auction. Furthermore, when all players face the same financial constraints and they are severe enough, the inefficient speculative equilibria disappear (cf. Proposition 3). Therefore, for second price auctions of big facilities or contracts where all players are financially constrained and there is a resale market, inefficient speculative behavior is not an equilibrium phenomenon.

Another result stemming from our analysis is that financial constraints can bring about collusive-like equilibria in which the strong buyer bids low to soften her rival’s financial situation and to fine-tune the resale price she will be offered (cf. Proposition 4). This will be the case whenever the weak buyer is either resourceless or has insufficient wealth as compared to his use value for the good. Although collusive equilibria hurt auctioneer’s revenues, they result in efficient allocations.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model, which is solved in Section 2 under complete information. In Section 3 we solve the resale stage and the bidding stage under private information on use values and present the main results of the paper. Section 4 is devoted to analyzing the role of the weak buyer’s financial situation for the efficiency of the auction. In Section 5 we show that the results hold true when pure speculators participate

\(^7\)Other related models where partial pooling occurs in equilibrium are Haile (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). Our pooling at the lowest "common" valuation plays a role similar to the pooling at the reserve price in Haile’s. In Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) pooling is the result of the externality that awarding the object to one bidder imposes on the others. As Haile points out, the existence of a resale market imposes a positive externality not only on the auction loser but also on the winner as the option value of selling in the resale market is positive.
in the auction, and Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

1 The model

A government wants to auction the location of a facility, or to assign a big project to one of two potential risk-neutral buyers, bidder \( A \) ("she") and bidder \( B \) ("he"). The worth of the auctioned good may be large compared to the buyers’ wealth, so that default may occur. Each buyer \( i \) has a budget or wealth \( w_i \). As in Zheng (2001), a buyer’s wealth represents both her liquidity constraint and her liability. Thus, \( w_A \) and \( w_B \) will set the maximum amount by which buyers can be penalized if they default. We assume that \( w_A \) and \( w_B \) are known.

Buyer \( i \) has use value \( v_i \) when \( i \) is the solo owner of the good.\(^8\) If \( i \) obtains a fraction \( z \) of the property of the good then her use value will be \( zv_i \). Use value \( v_A \) is private information. It has distribution \( F \) with associated density \( f \) and support \([v_A, \bar{v}_A]\). We will assume that \( f \) is log-concave. We will denote by \( h \) the hazard rate of \( F \), i.e. \( h(x) = \frac{f(x)}{1-F(x)} \) which is non-decreasing by the log-concavity of \( f \) (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)). Monotonicity of the hazard rate implies that the virtual use value \( (\psi(v_A) = v_A - \frac{1-F}{f}) \) is strictly increasing.\(^9\) We further assume \( v_A h(v_A) > 1 \) which is the necessary condition for no buyer \( A \) exclusion through a positive reserve price being profitable for the seller. Use value \( v_B \) is common knowledge, with \( v_B \leq v_A \).

We will define buyers’ ex-ante financial situation by the relationship between their use values and their wealth. We will say that buyer \( i \) is ex-ante financially constrained if \( v_i > w_i \), and that \( i \) is ex-ante unconstrained otherwise.

An important assumption of the model is the inability of the initial seller to prohibit resale. Because of this, buyers participate de facto in a two-stage selling game; in the first stage, they compete for the object at an ascending auction, and in the second stage the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the auction loser for a part of the property or for the entire object. Player \( i \) can always guarantee himself \( w_i \) by not participating in the selling game.

\(^8\) Due to the possibility of resale, and following Haile (2003), we will distinguish between buyers’ use value of the object, which is exogenously determined, and buyers’ valuation - the value players attach to winning the auction- which will be endogenously determined.

\(^9\) The hazard rate represents the instantaneous probability that the valuation of buyer \( i \) is \( v_i \) given that it is not smaller than \( v_i \). A sufficient condition for the hazard rate to be increasing is the log-concavity of \( f \). See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for the class of log-concave distributions.
At the first stage, the good is sold through a second-price auction and assigned to a single buyer. Bids are denoted \( b = (b_A, b_B) \). Ties are solved in favor of the player who values the object the most. We will denote by \( p \) the auction price. The price will be paid to the auctioneer by the winner at the end of the game, i.e., after resale has taken place. The loser does not pay anything to the auctioneer. We will denote by \( U^W_i \) the utility of player \( i \), \( i = A, B \), when the auction winner is \( j \), \( j = A, B \). At the end of this first stage the auction price is announced publicly. This bid announcement policy may prevent the existence of a first stage equilibrium in strictly increasing bidding strategies. However, it is consistent with most real life auctions given the prevalence of the English format.

At the second stage, the winner of the first stage auction, \( i \), must decide whether to keep the object or to resell it, and if so, at what price and which fraction. We will assume that the winner has all the bargaining power.\(^{10} \) Thus, resale takes place via monopoly pricing - the winner of the auction makes an offer to the loser after updating her/his prior beliefs based on the information revealed from winning and from the auction price. A resale offer by bidder \( i \), \( O_i \), is a pair \( [r_i, z_i] \) which comprises a resale price \( r_i \) and a fraction of the good \( z_i \). Keeping the object is dominated by reselling if the auction winner does not have enough wealth to cover the auction price, i.e., if \( w_i < p \).\(^ {11} \) We will denote the option of keeping the object by the offer \( O_i = [0, 0] \). If the winner is unable to pay \( p \) after resale, she defaults and loses all her wealth. We will denote defaulting by an empty offer, i.e., by \( O_i = \emptyset \). Note that if \( p > w_A + w_B \) then \( O_i = \emptyset \) no matter the identity of the auction winner. The auction loser must decide whether to accept or reject the resale offer. It can be easily verified that the auction loser \( j \) will accept buying \( z_i \) at a price \( r_i \) if and only if the following two conditions simultaneously hold: 1) \( r_i \leq v_j \) and 2) \( r_i z_i \leq w_j \).

We search for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the selling game (PBE, for short). A strategy for a player must hence specify a first round bid, a second round offer if the player is the auction winner, and a second round acceptance decision if the player is the auction loser. Posterior beliefs are determined by Bayes rule whenever possible, and resale offers must be optimal given the posterior beliefs and the first round bids. Finally, we will only consider rationalizable equilibria or equilibria which survive the elimination of (weakly) dominated

\(^{10}\)Similar assumption is adopted in Zheng (2002) to characterize the optimal auction with resale, and can also be found in Hafalir and Krishna (2008). In contrast, Pagnozzi (2007) assumes that bidders bargain in the resale market, so that the outcome is given by the Nash bargaining solution.

\(^{11}\)An alternative interpretation is that the winning bidder can sell equity to finance a portion of his bid as in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000, 2005). But here the equity provider is a bidder and not the equity market.
2 Solving the model under complete information

Let us first assume that use values $v_A$ and $v_B$ are both known and that $v_A > v_B$. The opportunity of resale creates a first stage auction with *endogenous common-valuations* among players who have *private-use values*. These endogenous valuations will take into account the overall surplus from winning and reselling the object, as well as the bidders’ wealth.

To determine bidders’ valuations, assume first that bidder $A$ is the auction winner. At the second stage, she will never resell if she has enough wealth to cover the auction price ($p \leq w_A$). Her offer will be $O_A = [r_A, z_A] = [0, 0]$, and her utility from winning the first round auction will be $U_{WA}^A = v_A - p + w_A$. In contrast, if her wealth does not suffice to cover the auction price, she will sell, at a price $r_A = v_B$, the minimum fraction needed to fulfill her financial obligation, i.e., $z_A = \frac{p - w_A}{v_B}$. For $z_A$ to be lower than one, it must be the case that $p - w_A \leq v_B$. Similarly, $B$’s total payment cannot exceed his wealth so that $z_A r_A = p - w_A \leq w_B$. Combining both requirements, $p - w_A \leq \min\{v_B, w_B\}$ must hold. Consequently, if $w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\} \geq p$, the optimal resale offer by $A$ is

$$O_A^*(p) = \begin{cases} [0, 0] & \text{if } p - w_A \leq 0 \\ \left[v_B, \frac{p - w_A}{v_B}\right] & \text{if } p - w_A > 0. \end{cases}$$

Finally, if $w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\} < p$, then $A$ will default and will lose her entire wealth. Summing up, her payoffs from winning are as follows:

$$U_{WA}^A = \begin{cases} v_A - (p - w_A) & \text{if } p \leq w_A \\ v_A \left(1 - \frac{p - w_A}{v_B}\right) & \text{if } w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\} \geq p > w_A \\ 0 & \text{if } p > w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\}. \end{cases}$$

Player $B$’s payoff from losing is $U_{WB}^A = w_B$, with or without resale.

If the auction winner is player $B$, he will resell at a price $v_A$, the largest fraction that player $A$ can afford with her wealth. Consequently,

$$O_B^* = [r_B, z_B] = \left[v_A, \min\{v_A, w_A\}\right].$$

Thus, if $A$ is financially unconstrained, player $B$ sells the entire object to $A$ as $\frac{\min\{v_A, w_A\}}{v_A} = \frac{w_A}{v_A} = 1$. Whereas if the overall wealth, $w_A + w_B$, is lower than the auction price, $B$ will
default. Player B’s payoffs from winning are hence given by

\[ U_B^{WB} = \begin{cases} 
  v_B \left(1 - \frac{\min(v_A, w_A)}{v_A}\right) + \min(v_A, w_A) + w_B - p & \text{if } p \in [0, w_B + \min(v_A, w_A)] \\
  0 & \text{if } p > \min(v_A, w_A) + w_B,
\end{cases} \]

whereas player A gets \( U_A^{WB} = w_A \) when B wins.

The difference between the payoff from winning and the payoff from losing will determine players’ endogenous valuations, \( V_i = U_i^{Wi} - U_i^{Wj} \), which are as follows

\[ V_A = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{v_A - p}{v_B} \left[ v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) + w_A - p\right] & \text{if } w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\} \geq p > w_A \\
  -w_A & \text{if } p > w_A + \min\{v_B, w_B\}.
\end{cases} \]

and

\[ V_B = \begin{cases} 
  v_B \left(1 - \frac{\min(v_A, w_A)}{v_A}\right) + \min(v_A, w_A) - p & \text{if } p \in [0, w_B + \min(v_A, w_A)] \\
  -w_B & \text{if } p > \min(v_A, w_A) + w_B.
\end{cases} \]

Bidders’ endogenous valuations will in turn determine the first round bids. To see this, let us denote by \( \Lambda_i \) the maximum willingness to pay of player \( i \), that is, the value that would make a player valuation equal to zero (\( V_i = 0 \) at \( p = \Lambda_i \)). In what follows we discuss the different values of \( \Lambda_i \) which will depend on players’ wealth.

If \( A \) is unconstrained, \( v_A \leq w_A \), it is weakly dominant for both players to bid up to \( v_A \). Since \( \min\{v_A, w_A\} = v_A \) then \( v_B \left(1 - \frac{\min(v_A, w_A)}{v_A}\right) + \min(v_A, w_A) = v_A \), which makes B’s valuation identical to that of player A, independently of \( w_B \). Trivially, bidding \( w_B \) is weakly dominated by bidding \( v_B \) due to the possibility of resale, which, by the same token, is dominated by bidding \( v_A \).

If \( A \) is constrained then, in contrast to the previous case, buyer B’s wealth affects players’ valuations as it can beget default. In particular, if \( w_B > v_B \) then for all \( p \in [w_A, w_A + v_B] \),

\[ 12 \text{ A similar result is obtained by Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) when analyzing Bertrand competition under subcontracting. At the unique equilibrium, firms bid the same price at the first stage and both receive zero profits.} \]

\[ 13 \text{ In a static one-round second price auction with budget constraints it is a dominant strategy to bid min}\{w_i, v_i\} \text{ (see Che and Gale, 1998). The reason is that if the second highest bid is above the winner’s budget, he will renge, will not get the object and will pay the fine, resulting in a negative surplus. With the possibility of resale this argument breaks down if the winner can resell the good and, by doing so, can get more than the auction price. This is the case here as long as the potential buyer at the resale market does not follow dominated strategies.} \]
it remains true that $A = B = \Lambda = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$, even though $V_A \neq V_B$, and, for the same arguments as above, the first stage bids will equal the maximum willingness to pay $A$. Since $A < v_B + w_A$, no player will default. For higher prices, $p \in [w_A + v_B, w_A + w_B]$, player $A$ will default whereas player $B$ will not. In contrast, if $w_B < v_B$ then the set of first round defaulting prices coincides for both players, namely, $p > w_A + w_B$. Furthermore, if $w_B < w_B = v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$ it is no longer true that both players will bid $\Lambda$ in the first stage as bidding $\Lambda$ and winning begets default $p = w_A + w_B > w_A + w_B$. Consequently, either player is better off deviating to $w_A + w_B$.

The discussion above is summarized in the next proposition.

**Proposition 1** (Complete information) Assume $w_B \geq w_B = v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$. Then

i) If bidder $A$ is financially unconstrained, at any SPNE in (weakly) undominated strategies, players will bid $b = (v_A, v_A)$ at the first stage auction. The high value bidder, player $A$, will get the object and she will pay her entire use value $v_A$. In equilibrium, there is no resale at the second stage.

ii) If bidder $A$ is financially constrained, at any SPNE in (weakly) undominated strategies players will bid $b = (\Lambda, \Lambda)$ at the first stage auction, where $\Lambda = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$, and will follow the take-it-or-leave-it offers $O_A^*$ and $O_B^*$ at the second stage. The high value bidder, player $A$, will get the object and she will pay her valuation. In equilibrium, there is resale at the second stage.

Some features of Proposition 1 are noteworthy. First, the presence of a resale market is beneficial to the seller. In the absence of financial constraints by the strong buyer [part i)], the seller’s revenue equals $v_A$ which is larger than the revenue when resale is prohibited, $v_B$. If the strong buyer is constrained while $w_B > w_B$, [part ii], the seller would get a revenue equal to $\min\{\min\{v_A, w_A\}, \min\{v_B, w_B\}\} = \min\{w_A, v_B\}$ if there is no resale market, which is lower than $w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$, the proceeds under resale. Second, in the presence of resale, financial constraints hurt the seller. If only $A$ is constrained, seller’s revenue decreases from $v_A$ to $w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)$. Third, the condition $w_B > w_B$ ensures that $p = \Lambda \leq w_A + w_B$ so that in equilibrium there is no default. Finally, these results provide a justification for the assumption that the seller sells the object to a single buyer. The seller has nothing to gain from selling shares of the object, as all the surplus is already extracted. This result depends on the complete information assumption which prevents any informational rents.

As discussed above, the symmetric equilibrium fails to materialize when both players are financially constrained and the auction price is large enough. This is because players’ maximal


willingness to pay exhibits a discontinuity at \( p = w_A + w_B \). At that price the utility from winning is strictly higher than that from losing, while for a price slightly higher the utility from winning drops to zero. Because of this, in equilibrium at least one player must stop bidding at \( w_A + w_B \). However, both players stopping at \( w_A + w_B \) is not an equilibrium. To see this note that \( B \), with wealth \( w_B < w_B \), loses when bidding \( w_A + w_B \). If he deviates instead and bids higher, his expected utility will be \( v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) + w_A - p = v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) = w_B > w_B \). It hence follows that in equilibrium one and only one of the bidders will drop at \( p = w_A + w_B \). In fact, it is a SPNE to bid \( b = (w_A + w_B, \lambda) \), for any \( \lambda > w_A + w_B \). In this case the seller also gets more when resale is allowed than when it is prohibited as \( w_A + w_B > \min\{w_A, w_B\} \). However, in these equilibria \( B \) is using a dominated strategy since there is always a \( \lambda' \in (w_A + w_B, \lambda) \) which is a better response in case the other player’s bid lie in \( (\lambda', \lambda) \), and it is equivalent otherwise.

In sum, under complete information, resale emerges as a response to financial constraints and not due to speculation. The auctioneer extracts all the surplus, and the outcome is equivalent to that in a market with a discriminating monopoly.\footnote{When player \( A \) is unconstrained, a monopolist would sell the object to player \( A \) at a price \( v_A \). When \( A \) is constrained and \( w_B < w_B \), the monopolist would sell the fraction \( \frac{w_A}{v_A} \) to the strong player at a price \( v_A \), and the rest \( \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) \) to player \( B \) at a price \( v_B \); if player \( B \) is further constrained and cannot pay \( v_B \) for the fraction \( \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) \), the monopolist would sell it to \( B \) at a price such that the revenue from \( B \) is \( w_B \).} Note that there is allocative efficiency since there is no other outcome which provides higher payoffs to the bidders and the auctioneer. We next explore the impact of incomplete information on these results.

## 3 Incomplete Information

### 3.1 The resale stage

At the resale stage, the auction winner will set the offer that maximizes her/his expected payoff given her/his posterior beliefs about the loser’s use value. A key difference between the strong buyer and the weak buyer behavior when reselling lies in the shares they put up for sale. Whereas buyer \( A \) resells the minimum fraction needed to cover the auction price, i.e., \( z_A = \min \left\{ \frac{p-w_A}{v_A}, 0 \right\} \), buyer \( B \) may resell the entire object if \( w_A \geq v_A' \). Resale offers will hence depend on the identity of the winner.

If the winner is player \( A \), she will not resell if \( p \leq w_A \) and she will always default if \( p > \min\{v_B, w_B\} + w_A \). Since buyer \( A \) has complete information her optimal offers are
identical to those obtained in Section 2.

**Lemma 1** At the resale stage, player A will set $O_A = O_A^*(p)$ if $p - w_A \leq \min\{v_B, w_B\}$, and she will default, $O_A = \emptyset$, otherwise.

When the winner is player $B$, and he is not forced to default because $p < \min\{w_A, v^H_A\} + w_B$, his posteriors will depend on the first round bids. Whenever they are fully revealing (a perfect separating equilibrium), the updated distribution is a point distribution so that his optimal offers will coincide with those described in the previous section as there will be perfect information at the resale stage. When there is incomplete information at the resale stage, his posteriors, which are characterized in the next lemma, will take into account what he learns from the auction price.

**Lemma 2** If $b_A$ is a non-decreasing bidding strategy and the auction price is such that $p = b_A(v_A)$ for all $v_A \in [v^L_A, v^H_A]$ and $p \neq b_A(v_A)$ for $v_A \notin [v^L_A, v^H_A]$, then

i) Buyer B’s updated beliefs are given by $\widehat{F}(x) = \Pr(v_A \leq x \mid v_A \in [v^L_A, v^H_A])$, where

$$
\widehat{F}(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{F(x) - F(v^L_A)}{F(v^H_A) - F(v^L_A)} & \text{if } x \in [v^L_A, v^H_A] \\
1 & \text{if } x \geq v^H_A \\
0 & \text{if } x < v^L_A,
\end{cases}
$$

with $p = b_A(v^L_A) = b_A(v^H_A)$, and $\underline{v}_A \leq v^L_A < v^H_A \leq \bar{v}_A$. If $v^L_A = \underline{v}_A$ and $v^H_A = \bar{v}_A$, then the updated distribution coincides with the prior distribution, i.e., $\widehat{F}(x) = F(x)$. Conversely, if $v^L_A = v^H_A$, then the updated distribution is a point distribution.

ii) If the posterior beliefs generate a left truncation random variable, i.e., $v^L_A > \underline{v}_A$, then the posterior hazard rate $\widehat{h}$ coincides with the prior hazard rate $h$, whereas if they generate a right truncation random variable, i.e., $v^H_A < \bar{v}_A$, then $\widehat{h} > h$.

Since $\widehat{F}$ is a truncation of $F$, both $\widehat{h}$ and $\widehat{\psi}$ are non-decreasing functions (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005), with $\widehat{h} = h$ ($\widehat{h} > h$) if the posterior beliefs generate a left (right) truncation random variable.

Buyer $B$ must choose between selling the entire object ($z = 1$) or only a part of it ($z < 1$). When $z = 1$, $r$ must solve

$$
\max_r \left\{ (w_B - p + r) \left( 1 - \widehat{F}(r) \right) + K_B(p) \widehat{F}(r) \right\} 
$$

whereas when $z < 1$, $r$ must solve

$$
\max_r \left\{ \left[ w_B - p + w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{r} \right) \right] \left( 1 - \widehat{F}(r) \right) + K_B(p) \widehat{F}(r) \right\}
$$
where $K_B(p)$ stands for the payoff when buyer $B$ keeps the object because the resale offer is rejected. It coincides with the payoff in an auction without resale and hence it takes on the positive value $v_B + w_B - p$ when there is no default ($p \leq w_B$) and 0 when there is default.

From the comparison of the expected payoff at $z = 1$ and at $z < 1$, $B$'s optimal resale offers $[r^o, z^o]$ when $p \leq w_B$ and when $p > w_B$ follow:

For $p \leq w_B$:

$$O^o_B(p \leq w_B) = \begin{cases} 
  w_A < v^L_A & \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
  [v^L_A, \frac{w_A}{v^L_A}] & \text{if } v_B \leq \tilde{M}(v^L_A) \\
  [r^*, \frac{w_A}{r^*}] & \text{if } v_B > \tilde{M}(v^L_A)
  \end{array} \right.
  \\
  w_A \geq v^L_A & \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
  [v^L_A, 1] & \text{if } v_B \leq \tilde{\psi}(v^L_A) \\
  [r^*, 1] & \text{if } v_B \in \tilde{\psi}(v^L_A), \tilde{\psi}(w_A) \\
  [w_A, 1] & \text{if } v_B \in \tilde{\psi}(w_A), \tilde{M}(w_A) \\
  [r^*, \frac{w_A}{r^*}] & \text{if } v_B \geq \tilde{M}(w_A)
  \end{array} \right.
\right. $$

For $p > w_B$:

$$O^o_B(p > w_B) = \begin{cases} 
  w_A < v^L_A & \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
  [v^L_A, \frac{w_A}{v^L_A}] & \text{if } p - w_B \in [0, L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A)] \\
  [r^*, \frac{w_A}{r^*}] & \text{if } p - w_B \in [L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A), w_A]
  \end{array} \right.
  \\
  w_A \geq v^L_A & \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
  [v^L_A, 1] & \text{if } p - w_B \in [0, \tilde{\psi}(v^L_A)] \\
  [r^*, 1] & \text{if } p - w_B \in \tilde{\psi}(v^L_A), \tilde{\psi}(w_A) \\
  [w_A, 1] & \text{if } p - w_B \in \tilde{\psi}(w_A), L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A) \\
  [r^*, \frac{w_A}{r^*}] & \text{if } p - w_B \in [L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A), w_A]
  \end{array} \right.
\right. $$

where $\tilde{M}(x) = \frac{x^{2h(x)}}{1 + x^{2h(x)}}$, $L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A) = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{M(v^L_A)}\right)$ and $L_{\tilde{M}}(w_A) = w_A - \frac{w_B}{w_A h(w_A)}$.

The optimal offers depend on $B$'s use value for the good ($v_B$) when there is no default risk ($p \leq w_B$), but on the amount to be covered at resale to avoid bankruptcy when there is default risk ($p > w_B$). Note that a less wealthy $B$ will behave more aggressively at the resale market than a wealthy one as he has less to lose from bankruptcy.\footnote{In a model without resale Zheng (2001) has shown that the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium bidding strategies are also not monotonic as a function of the bidder’s budget.}

Regarding $z$, when all the $A$ types are financially constrained ($w_A \leq v^L_A$), $B$ will always set $z = \frac{w_A}{r} < 1$ In contrast, when $A$ is wealthy enough ($w_A > \tilde{M}^{-1}(v_B)$), $B$ may find it optimal to sell the entire object. As for $r$, resale prices satisfy $v^L_A \leq r^* \leq w_A < r^{**}$.

The resale offers by the weak buyer are stated in the following lemma.

**Lemma 3**

i) At the resale stage, player $B$ will set $O_B = O^o_B(p \leq w_B)$ if $p \leq w_B$, he will set $O^o_B(p > w_B)$ if $p \in (w_B, \min \{w_A, v^H_A\} + w_B]$ and he will default, $O_B = \emptyset$, if $p > \min \{w_A, v^H_A\} + w_B$.
ii) The optimal resale prices set by $B$ are constant in $p$ for $p \in [0, w_B)$ and non-decreasing in $p$ for $p \in (w_B, \infty)$. However, resale prices may decrease with $p$ at $p = w_B$.

Proof. See the Appendix.

3.2 The bidding stage

The presence of a resale market affects bidding strategies in several ways, as the existence of the post-auction market allows players to foresee future resale revenues that they will incorporate into their valuations. Similarly, the presence of financial constraints affects the bidding stage, as a strong bidder $A$ facing a wealthy rival may prefer losing with a bid above $w_B$ than with one just below to induce $B$ to set better resale offers (Lemma 3 [part ii]), whereas a strong player $A$ facing a less wealthy rival may prefer setting a low auction price to soften her rival’s financial situation.

When financial constraints are absent, a separating truth-telling equilibrium $(b_A = v_A, b_B = v_B)$ coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria (see Garratt and Tröger, 2006). We explore the effect of financial constraints on this result. To disentangle the role of each buyer’s wealth, we first suppress any strategic incentive by player $A$ to affect the resale price by assuming that $w_B$ is sufficiently large, while allowing $w_A$ to vary.\textsuperscript{16} As we saw in the previous section, the wealth of the strong buyer is crucial for determining whether a winner weak buyer will sell the entire object or just a part of it. Player $B$ sells only a fraction of the good as long as $w_A < v_A$ and also when $w_A \geq v_A$ as long as $v_B \geq \overline{M}(w_A)$ (see $O_B^p(p \leq w_B)$).

Since $B$’s optimal resale price depends on the information he obtains from the bidding stage, we will write $r^*_v$ to denote that optimal price when $[v_L, v_H] = [v_A, v]$ and $z = 1$; $r^*_v$ to denote the optimal price when $[v^L, v^H] = [v_A, v]$ and $z < 1$. Finally, $T(w_A)$ will stand for $F^{-1} \left( F(w_A) + w_A f(w_A) \left( \frac{w_A}{v_B} - 1 \right) \right)$.\textsuperscript{17} Note that $T(w_A)$ is an increasing function with $T(w_A) > w_A$ if $w_A > v_A$, $T(w_A) = v_A$ when $w_A \leq v_A$ and $T(w_A) = \tilde{v}_A$ when $w_A \geq M^{-1}(v_B)$. To save on notation, let us denote $\Lambda_x = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{x} \right)$, with $\Lambda_{\underline{V}_A} = \Lambda$ and $\Lambda_{\overline{V}_A} = \overline{\Lambda}$ for short. The following proposition presents the main result of this section.

Proposition 2 (Inefficient equilibria) Let $w_B \geq \overline{\Lambda}$. The second price auction with resale has a family of Perfect Bayesian equilibria in (weakly) undominated strategies parameterized by

\textsuperscript{16} In Section 4 we analyze how results change when wealths are identical, $w_A = w_B$, and also when $A$ is wealthier than $B$.

\textsuperscript{17} In a right truncation, $v_A \in [v_A, v)$, the condition $v_B \geq \overline{M}(w_A)$ can be alternatively rewritten as $F(v) > F(w_A) + w_A f(w_A) \left( \frac{w_A}{v_B} - 1 \right)$, so that $T(w_A)$ is the minimum value of $v, v^H_A$, such that $z < 1$. 

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\( \bar{v}_A, \tilde{v}_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \), with equilibrium bidding functions given by

\[
b_A(v_A) = \begin{cases} 
\min \{v_A, A\} & \text{if } v_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \tilde{v}_A] \\
\min \{v_A, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\} & \text{if } v_A \in (\tilde{v}_A, \bar{v}_A)
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
b_B = \begin{cases} 
w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) & \text{if } w_A \in [0, M^{-1}(v_B)) \text{ and } \tilde{v}_A \geq T(w_A) \\
\min \{v_B, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\} & \text{if } w_A \geq M^{-1}(v_B) \text{ or } \{w_A \in [\underline{v}_A, M^{-1}(v_B)) \text{ and } \tilde{v}_A < T(w_A)\}
\end{cases}
\]

At this equilibrium, resale offers by the strong buyer are given by \( O^*_A(p) \) whereas resale offers by the weak buyer are given by \( O^*_B(p < w_B) \) and are optimal given \( B \)'s posterior beliefs

\[
\hat{F}(x/p; \bar{v}_A) = \begin{cases} 
\min \left\{ \frac{F(x)}{F(\bar{v}_A)}, 1 \right\} & \text{if } p \leq b_A(\underline{v}_A) \\
1_{v_A \geq \bar{v}_A} & \text{if } p \in \left( b_A(\underline{v}_A), \min \left\{ \bar{v}_A, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\right\} \right) \\
1_{v_A \geq b^{-1}_A(p)} & \text{if } p \in \left( \min \left\{ \bar{v}_A, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\right\}, b_A(\bar{v}_A) \right)
\end{cases}
\]

i.e., \( r^*_A \) solves (1) and \( r^*_B \) solves (2) for \( v_A \sim \frac{F(x)}{F(\bar{v}_A)}, v_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \).

**Proof.** See the Appendix. \( \blacksquare \)

The proposition above identifies a continuum of equilibria in undominated strategies, in which high-value \( A \) players, \( v_A > \bar{v}_A \), bid their valuation and win the auction, while the low-value \( A \) players, \( v_A \leq \bar{v}_A \), lose the auction bidding either the valuation of the lowest type \( \Delta \) when \( w_A < \underline{v}_A \), or the lowest use value \( \underline{v}_A \) when \( w_A \geq \underline{v}_A \). Player \( B \) bids his valuation taking into account that as a winner he will resell optimally to the set of low types who are pooling (see \( O^*_B(p \leq w_B) \)). When he wins at a price \( b_A(\underline{v}_A) \) he infers that \( v_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \) and resells accordingly. When he wins at a price above \( \min \{\bar{v}_A, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\} \) he infers the type of his rival and he resells under complete information. Finally, given an off-equilibrium price, he believes that \( v_A = \bar{v}_A \). Incentives to hide information from the auction winner create pooling at the bottom.

When \( \bar{v}_A = \underline{v}_A \), a perfect separating equilibrium materializes. Player \( A \) will not deviate as she prefers winning over losing (with strict preference if \( v_A > \underline{v}_A \)). Deviations by \( B \) to win are unprofitable as when winning he would have to resell at the auction price. Deviations to lose would affect the price \( A \) has to pay at the auction and hence the proportion of the good

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18Equilibria in Proposition 2 are supported by other off-equilibrium beliefs as long as they lead to a resale price not lower than the one set by \( B \) when he wins and observes \( p = b_A(\underline{v}_A) \).
that A would have to resell to meet her financial constraint. But since A resells at $v_B$, these deviations are unprofitable too.

Consider first the case $w_A \leq \underline{v}_A$. In this case the low A types are constrained and they all bid the valuation of the lowest type, $\underline{A}$, since $\min\{v_A, \underline{A}\} = \underline{A}$. Since all the high types will have to resell part of the good ($w_A < \underline{v}_A$), their valuation is lower than $v_A$. By contrast, B’s valuation is higher than $v_B$ as when B wins he may resell part of the good. For $\tilde{v}_A = \underline{v}_A$ the strategies detailed above generate a perfect pooling equilibrium in which all A types bid $\underline{A}$, whereas for $\tilde{v}_A = \underline{v}_A$ they generate a perfect separating equilibrium with all A bidders bidding their valuation truthfully while B bids $\underline{A}$. From the seller’s viewpoint both extremes in the family of equilibria generate the same expected revenue, namely $\underline{A}$, lower than in other equilibria in the family. When there is pooling and player B wins, there is the possibility that B’s resale offer is rejected (low types of player A) and an allocative inefficiency is generated. Therefore, from an efficiency viewpoint, the best equilibrium is $\tilde{v}_A = v_A$ (all A types bid their valuation) as the risk of no resale is zero. The tension between efficiency and the auctioneer’s revenues is hence present.

Consider next that $w_A \geq \underline{v}_A$. In this case the low A types are unconstrained and they all bid the use value of the lowest type, $\underline{v}_A$. When most types are constrained ex-ante, $w_A < M^{-1}(v_B)$, the optimal reselling strategy by B entails $z < 1$. Note that in this case the set of $\tilde{v}_A$ for which the aforementioned strategies constitute an equilibrium is reduced to $\tilde{v}_A \in (T(w_A), \underline{v}_A]$. In contrast, when $w_A > M^{-1}(v_B)$ there is an equilibrium for any $\tilde{v}_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \tilde{v}_A]$ with the weak buyer optimal reselling strategy entailing $z = 1$ so that B bids the resale price. For any $\tilde{v}_A > \underline{v}_A$ such that B wins, the equilibria result in some inefficiency as B’s resale offers are rejected with positive probability, whereas for $\tilde{v}_A = \underline{v}_A$ the equilibrium is efficient as the strong buyer wins, pays $p = \underline{v}_A$ and consumes the entire good.

Despite the potential strategic behavior induced by the presence of financial constraints, perfectly separating strategies in which the strong buyer bids her true valuation, namely $\min\{v_A, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\}$, constitute an efficient PBE of the second price auction with resale. The possibility of partial resale is crucial for a fully separating equilibrium to emerge under financial constraints. If partial resale were banned, then bidding above $\min\{v_A, w_A\}$ would be a dominated strategy so that financial constraints would give rise to pooling for the high A types. In our case, if the high A types pooled at $w_A$, the weak buyer might find it

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19To further illustrate this point, assume that $v_A \sim U(3, 5)$ with $v_B = 3$. Since $r_{\tilde{v}_A}^{**} > w_A$ if and $w_A < M^{-1}(\tilde{v}_A)$ holds (or, equivalently, if $w_A < \sqrt{3}v_A$ holds), then for $w_A < 3.5$ there is a PBE for any $\tilde{v}_A \geq 4.083$, whereas for $w_A = 3.87$ the only equilibrium in the family entails $\tilde{v}_A = \underline{v}_A = 5$. 15
profitable to deviate so as to win, pay \( p = w_A \) and resell a fraction of the good at a price above \( w_A \). This would be the case, for instance, if \( w_B \) is large enough whereas \( w_A \in (v_A, M^{-1}(v_B)) \).

Proposition 2 is an extension of Garratt and Tröger’s (2006) speculative equilibria for the case of partial resale and financial constraints for player \( A \). High \( A \) types bid their valuation considering that they may have to resell a fraction of the good to be able to meet their financial constraints; player \( B \) also bids his valuation taking into account the resources of player \( A \). When limited, he will find it optimal to resell only a fraction and get in return all \( A \)'s resources, \( w_A \). As in Garratt and Tröger, low \( A \) types pool at the lowest valuation (which may coincide with the use value when the low type is not financially constrained, \( w_A > v_A \)).

This result shows that the inefficiency in G&T’s speculative equilibria may also be obtained when player \( B \) is not a pure speculator in the sense that here he has a positive use value for the good, \( v_B > 0 \), and in the presence of financial constraints and partial resale.\(^{20}\) In the equilibria of Proposition 2 player \( B \) is acting as a speculator, that is, his valuation is determined by the returns he can get at the resale stage, although his optimal resale offer depends on his value \( v_B \). In the next section, we will see that it is necessary for \( B \) to play this role that he be financially unconstrained. When both players have access to the same financial resources (\( w_A = w_B \)) and these are scarce, the second price auction leaves no room for inefficient equilibria of the family shown in Proposition 2. In other words, we will show that what is essential to the speculative equilibria, and the resulting inefficiency, is not the fact that the strong player is financially unconstrained or that the speculator has no use value for the good, but the fact that the speculator is not financially constrained.

4 The financial situation of the weak buyer

We have provided a description of the PBE when \( B \) has enough wealth. We now assess the role played by buyer \( B \)’s financial situation in the previous equilibria. In order to uncover the role of the weak buyer’s wealth for our results, we first analyze the case of identical budgets. We will end the section by considering a less wealthy weak buyer.

4.1 Equal wealth

Arguably, whenever bidders’ resources come from the financial market, buyers’ financial constraints might be similar so that \( w_B = w_A = w \) may prevail. We show next that with equal

\(^{20}\)Garratt and Tröger (2006) show that there are inefficient speculative equilibria also for \( v_B > v_A = 0 \).
wealth, the inefficient equilibria disappear below a certain level of \( w_B \), leaving only efficient equilibria.

We will consider first wealth levels in \([w_B, v_A] \) with \( w_B = v_B(1 - \frac{w}{v_A}) \). Note that if \( w \) were even lower, financial constraints would be so severe that the entire family of strategies in Proposition 2 would result in default; since buyers would go bust, these strategies cannot be an equilibrium.\(^{21}\)

Since \( w < v_A \) then for any \( \tilde{v}_A \geq v_A \) the strategies in Proposition 2 imply an auction price \( p > w \). When \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} = v_A \), \( b_B = \Delta \) so that \( B \) loses and \( p = \Delta \); when \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \), \( b_B = \Lambda r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > \Delta \); if \( B \) wins against the low \( A \) types \( p = \Delta > w \) and if he loses against the high value \( A \) types, \( p = \Lambda r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > w \). Note that an inefficient outcome emerges only when there is a possibility of no resale, i.e., when \( b_B > \Delta \) since in that case \( B \) may win against the low value \( A \) types, set a resale price \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \) and some low value \( A \) types will refuse to buy. For \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \), it is necessary that \( p - w > L_M(w) \) (see \( O^o_B(p > w_B) \)). Substituting \( p = \Delta \), this condition may be rewritten as \( v_B > \frac{v_A^2}{\Delta} h(v_A) \), which cannot hold given our assumptions \( v_B \leq v_A \) and \( \underline{v}_A h(v_A) > 1.22\) Thus, with equal wealth, if \( w < v_A \), the strategies in Proposition 2 would never give rise to an inefficient outcome.

For levels of wealth \( w \in [v_A, M^{-1}(v_B)] \) and \( z < 1 \) (i.e., when \( \tilde{v}_A > T(w_A) \)), either the equilibrium is efficient (\( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} = v_A \)), or if \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \) there is a profitable deviation for low-types of player \( A \), who by bidding higher than \( v_A \) (slightly higher than \( w \) and lower than \( b_B \)) would remain losers but they would get the resale price \( v_A \) instead of \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} \) (see \( O^o_B(p > w_B) \)).

In sum, whenever the strategies in Proposition 2 imply that \( B \) is bidding above \( w \), either there is a profitable deviation by low value \( A \) types to fine-tune the resale offer they get, so that the strategies are no longer an equilibrium, or they produce an efficient outcome. Any of the surviving equilibria in Proposition 2 result in an efficient allocation.

Consider next higher wealth levels, with either \( \{w \in [v_A, M^{-1}(v_B)] \) and \( \tilde{v}_A \leq T(w) \} \) or \( w > M^{-1}(v_B) \). At any of the equilibria in Proposition 2 when bidder \( B \) wins with \( b_B = r^*_T_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \), he pays the auction price \( p = v_A \), lower than his wealth. Moreover, since \( r^*_T_{\tilde{v}_A} \leq w \), the low value \( A \) types losing the auction cannot affect the resale price as they only depend upon \( v_B \) (see \( O^o_B(p \leq w_B) \)). Consequently, all equilibria in Proposition 2 remain equilibria for these

---

\(^{21}\)As with complete information equilibria when \( w < w_B \) may require one buyer to use a weakly dominated strategy. Recall that it is a SPNE to bid \( b = (w_A + w_B, \lambda) \), for any \( \lambda > w_A + w_B \) where the player bidding \( \lambda \) and winning is using a dominated strategy.

\(^{22}\)Dispensing the restriction \( \underline{v}_A h(v_A) > 1 \), so that the optimal resale price of a constrained \( B \) could entail \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} > v_A \), the inefficient equilibria would also disappear as low-types of player \( A \) would not bid \( \Delta \). By bidding lower (but above \( w \)) they can get the resale price \( v_A \) instead of \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} \), and a higher fraction of the good.

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wealth levels.

The discussion above is summarized in the next proposition.

**Proposition 3** (Equal wealth) Assume \( w_B = w_A = w \). If either \( w < v_A \) or \( w \in [v_A, M^{-1}(v_B)] \) with \( \tilde{v}_A > T(w_A) \), the strategies in Proposition 2 are a PBE only if they result in an efficient outcome.

### 4.2 A less affluent weak buyer

When the good to be auctioned-off is a big facility or an important procurement contract, buyers might not afford their use values, with bidders/firms facing severe financial constraints becoming the right modelling assumption for these problems. We will study these environments by keeping the strong buyer’s wealth fixed at some \( w_A \). In order to reveal the role of the weak buyer’s wealth we will gradually decrease \( w_B \) starting from the wealth level considered in Proposition 2, \( w_B = \bar{A} \).

We first note that the assumption \( w_B \geq \bar{A} \) in Proposition 2 is more stringent than needed for the proposition to hold. The family of strategies played by \( A \) (parameterized by \( \tilde{v}_A \)) is such that the posterior generates a right truncation random variable, i.e., \( v_A^{\tilde{v}_A} \leq \tilde{v}_A \) for any \( \tilde{v}_A \leq \bar{v}_A \). Consequently, the resale prices set by \( B \) when winning are increasing in \( \tilde{v}_A \) with \( r_{\tilde{v}_A}(p) \in [r_{v_A}^{***}, r_{\tilde{v}_A}^{***}] = [\bar{v}_A, r_{\tilde{v}_A}^{***}] \). This implies that the entire family of equilibria described in Proposition 2 would remain equilibria for any \( w_B \in \left[ \Lambda_{\tilde{v}_A}^{**}, \bar{A} \right) \). Consequently, \( w_B > b_B = \Lambda_{\tilde{v}_A}^{**} \) suffices for the result to hold true.

For lower wealth levels, \( w_B \in \left[ \Lambda, \Lambda_{\tilde{v}_A}^{**} \right) \), it is profitable for loser \( A \) types to deviate so as to raise the auction price. If \( A \) bids \( \Lambda \) then \( B \) has enough wealth to pay the auction price, whereas by bidding higher she can make \( B \) financially constrained and get a better resale offer. Moreover, increasing the auction price might turn profitable as \( r_{\tilde{v}_A}^{***} > \bar{v}_A \) if the auction price equals \( \Lambda \) and \( v_B > \hat{M}(v_A) \), whereas \( r_{\tilde{v}_A}^{**} = \bar{v}_A \) if \( p \in (w_B, b_B) \) (see Lemma 3) for any \( v_B \). Thus, if \( w_B < b_B \) loser \( A \) types will deviate destroying the inefficient equilibria characterized in Proposition 2 (those with positive probability that the resale offer is not accepted).

Finally, when \( B \) has even lower wealth \( (w_B \leq \Lambda) \) while \( w_A \in [M(v_A), \bar{v}_A) \), two new concerns arise. First, high \( A \)-type bidders can no longer bid their valuation as, otherwise, their bid could be larger than total wealth, a weakly dominated strategy. Second, deviations by low \( A \)-types to bids below \( \Lambda \) are no longer dominated.\(^{23}\) To the contrary, it may be optimal

\(^{23}\)This is not true if \( w_A \leq M(v_A) \) as shown in Lemma 5 (in the Appendix). We have ruled out here such low levels of wealth for the sake of a clearer exposition.
for them to bid low in an attempt to lower the auction price. To further clarify this issue, let \( v_B = v_A \) so that \( \underline{A} = v_B = v_A \). Whenever \( B \) is financially constrained his offers depend on the auction price (recall that \( B \)'s resale offers depend on whether \( L(p) \) is above or below \( L_M(w_A) \) (see the proof of Lemma 3), i.e., they depend on \( b_A \). Moreover, resale offers are non-monotonic in \( w_B \). Take, for instance, \( p = \underline{A} \) so that

\[
  r(p = \underline{A}) = \begin{cases} 
  r^* > v_A & \text{if } w_B \in \left[0, \frac{w_A}{\Sigma_A h(v_A)}\right] \\
  r^* = v_A & \text{if } w_B \in \left(\frac{w_A}{\Sigma_A h(v_A)}, \underline{A}\right] \\
  r^* > v_A & \text{if } w_B > \underline{A}
  \end{cases}
\]

This non-monotonicity stems from the different opportunity costs, losing one's own wealth, associated with a rejected resale offer. For a very low wealth, it is worthy setting a larger resale price, as the gains from getting an offer accepted compensate the losses. This is the case unless \( w_B \) is large enough, in particular unless \( w_B > \frac{w_A}{\Sigma_A h(v_A)} \). As a consequence, when \( B \)'s wealth is scant, loser low \( A \)-types will not bid \( \underline{A} \) as they are better-off deviating to a lower bid (\( b_A = w_B \) so that \( p - w_B = 0 \)), so as to induce \( r^* = v_A \) by softening \( B \)'s financial situation. Consequently, the strategies considered in Proposition 2 are no longer an equilibrium if \( B \) has low wealth.

An equilibrium exists when \( B \)'s wealth is very low (alternatively, when use values are high enough) at which \( B \) bids total wealth (\( b_B = w_A + w_B \)) and all \( A \) types pool at any bid that makes \( B \) financially constrained and ensures for them a resale price equal to \( v_A \). Any equilibrium in this family is outcome-equivalent: \( B \) wins and resells part of the object at a resale price equal to \( v_A \). Note that these equilibria may be perceived as "collusive-like" as \( A \) sets a low auction price to get a better offer at the resale stage.\(^{25}\) As mentioned before, this equilibrium requires \( w_B \geq w_B \) as, otherwise, buyer \( A \) prefers to win by bidding total wealth.

For completeness we end by discussing situations in which some strong buyers are financially unconstrained so that \( w_A > v_A \). As in the previous case, Proposition 2 holds true for any \( w_B \geq b_B \). In contrast, if \( w_B \in (v_A, b_B) \) loser \( A \) types will deviate to \( b_A = w_B \) to induce \( r^* = v_A \). Similarly, if \( w_B < p = v_A \) then loser \( A \) types may now be better-off by softening \( B \)'s financial constraint. More precisely, if \( w_B \hat{h}(v_A) < 1 \) holds (see \( O_B(p > w_B) \)), then loser

\(^{24}\)At \( p = \underline{A} \) if \( v_B = v_A \), the condition \( p - w_B \in \left[0, w_A + v_B(1 - \frac{w_A}{M(v_A)})\right] \) simplifies to \( w_B \in \left(\frac{w_A}{\Sigma_A h(v_A)}, \underline{A}\right] \) as \( v_A = v_A \) at any of the equilibrium strategies considered in Proposition 2.

\(^{25}\)As in Pagnozzi (2007), the strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation, and acquire the good in the aftermarket. However, in our case the strong bidder does so to soften her rival's financial constraint, while in Pagnozzi (2007) she does so to gain a better bargaining position in the aftermarket.
A players will deviate by lowering their bids to ensure themselves a resale price equal to \( v_A \).

As before, several efficient "collusive" equilibria emerge.\(^{26}\) For instance, if \( w_B h(v_A) < 1 \) holds, it is an equilibrium for all \( A \) types to bid \( w_B + \psi(v_A) \) and for buyer \( B \) to bid \( w_A \). The weak buyer wins and resells the entire object to \( A \) at a price equal to \( v_A \). Other strategies also result in an equilibrium as the next proposition states.

**Proposition 4 (Collusive equilibria)** i) Assume \( w_A \leq v_A \). If \( w_B \in \left[ \frac{w_B}{v_B} + \frac{v_B}{v_A h(v_A)} \right] \), there is an efficient PBE equilibrium in which all \( A \) types pool at any \( b_A \in \left[ w_B, w_B + w_A - \frac{v_B}{v_A h(v_A)} \right] \) and \( B \) bids \( b_B = w_A + w_B \).

ii) Assume \( w_A > v_A \). If \( w_B \in \left[ v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right), \frac{1}{h(v_A)} \right] \) there is a family of efficient PBE equilibria parameterized by \( \tilde{v}_A, \tilde{v}_A \in [v_A, \tilde{v}_A] \), at which buyer \( A \) bids

\[
b_A(v_A) = \begin{cases} w_B + \psi_{\tilde{v}_A}(v_A) & \text{if } v_A \in [v_A, \tilde{v}_A] \\ \min\{v_A, w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \} & \text{if } v_A \in (\tilde{v}_A, \tilde{v}_A] \\ \end{cases}
\]

and buyer \( B \) bids \( b_B = v_A \). At this equilibrium, resale offers by the strong buyer are given by \( O_A^*(p) \) whereas resale offers by the weak buyer are given by \( O_B^*(p > w_B) \) and are optimal given \( B \)'s posterior beliefs

\[
\hat{F}(x/p; \tilde{v}_A) = \begin{cases} \min\left\{ \frac{F(x)}{F(b_A)}, 1 \right\} & \text{if } p \leq b_A(v_A) \\ 1_{v_A \geq \tilde{v}_A} & \text{if } p \in \left( b_A(v_A), \min\{\tilde{v}_A, w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \} \right] \\ 1_{v_A \geq \tilde{v}_A} & \text{if } p \in \left( \min\{\tilde{v}_A, w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \}, b_A(v_A) \right] \\ \end{cases}
\]

**Proof.** See the Appendix. ■

Results in this section reinforce our previous claim. What is essential for the inefficiency associated to speculative-like equilibria, is not the fact that the strong player is financially unconstrained or that the speculator has no use value for the good, but the fact that the speculator is not financially constrained.

As with complete information, even at the "collusive" equilibria, the seller benefits from the possibility of resale. He gets at least \( w_B + \psi_{\tilde{v}_A}(v_A) \), which is larger than \( w_B \), the price he would receive in the absence of a resale market.

\(^{26}\)Following Garrat, Tröger and Zheng (2009), it is a “collusive equilibrium” as all bidders’ types are better off than in the bid-your-value equilibrium.
5 Adding a pure speculator

We study next the robustness of the results to the participation in the auction of a pure speculator, i.e., a player with a zero use value for the object and a high wealth. We show that the presence of pure speculators would neither alter the allocation of the good at the auction (nor the bids) as long as one player with positive use value is unconstrained. Thus, a pure speculator cannot profit from participating. We present this result for two specific resale rules but we believe the result holds more generally.

At the first stage a pure speculator buyer $C$ with $v_C = 0$ and $w_C > \bar{v}_A$ participates in the auction together with buyers $A$ and $B$ whose wealth levels are $w_A < \bar{v}_A$ and $w_B > \bar{v}_A$. After the auction stage, all bids are made public and the auction winner has the possibility of reselling. Two resale rules are analyzed, which differ in the timing of the resale offers. Under rule 1, resale comprises a single stage so that the winner makes an offer to the other two players, who may accept or reject and then the game ends. Under rule 2, the winner makes a resale offer to one of the losers, either with $z = 1$ or $z < 1$. That loser (loser 1) responds. If either $z < 1$ or the offer is rejected, the winner may then make a new offer to the other loser (loser 2). No further resale offer by the winner is allowed. Loser 1 can then make an offer to loser 2 if he has become the owner of the entire good. This offer may be accepted or rejected. After that, the resale game ends.27

Under either rule, the resale offers by players $A$ and $B$ are not affected by the presence of $C$. Notice that there is no point in trying to resell to the speculator. Player $C$ has no use value, so that $A$ and $B$ may only want to sell to $C$ as an intermediary (i.e., as loser 1 if rule 2 is employed), but as an intermediary he is in a worse position (he is as wealthy as $B$ but less willing to take risks with the resale price since he has no use value, which means that $C$’s valuation -when facing player $A$ as a buyer- is strictly lower than $B$’s). This implies that player $A$ prefers selling to player $B$, and $B$ would prefer selling to player $A$.

The next lemma characterizes $C$’s behavior at the resale market. We will further assume in this subsection that $v_A h(v_A) < 1$ holds as, otherwise, buyer $C$ will always set a resale price equal to $v^L_A$ and the results would follow trivially. Notice that $C$ behaves at the resale market as if he were player $B$ with $v_B = 0$. Thus, when reselling the entire object $r^*_C$, solves (1) for $v_A \sim \hat{F}(x)$ and $v_B = 0$.

Lemma 4 Let $C$ be the auction winner,

27This timing tries to prevent signaling (rejecting an offer to send a signal of low value so that the next offer is better). Thus, each player receives at most one offer at the resale stage.
i) If $w_A < v_A$, under rule 1 $C$ will split the object between the two buyers, selling $z = \frac{w_A}{v_A}$ at a price $v_A^{L}$ to player $A$, and $1 - z$ at a price $v_B$ to player $B$. Under rule 2, $C$ will sell the entire object to player $B$ (as loser 1).

ii) If $w_A \geq v_A$, under rule 1 $C$ will sell $z = 1$ at a price $r_C^{*}$ to player $A$, where $r_C^{*}$ solves (1) for $v_A \sim \hat{F}(x)$ and $v_B = 0$. Under rule 2, $C$ will sell $z = 1$ at a price $r_B^{*}$ to player $B$ (as loser 1) where $r_B^{*}$ solves (1) for $v_A \sim \hat{F}(x)$.

Proof. See the Appendix.

The lemma above provides the arguments for our claim: As long as one player with positive use value is unconstrained, there is no role for a pure speculator.

**Proposition 5** A pure speculator would never (profitably) win the auction as long as $w_B$ is high enough.

Proof. See the Appendix.

6 Concluding Remarks

We have analyzed the impact of financial constraints on second-price auctions with resale. The financial situation of the weak buyer shapes his resale offers and hence the players’ optimal bids. When he has enough resources an extension of Garratt and Tröger’s (2006) speculative equilibria is obtained, which includes the possibility of financial constraints for player $A$ and partial resale. High $A$ types bid their valuation considering that they will have to resell a fraction of the good to be able to meet their financial constraints; low $A$ types pool at the lowest valuation, while player $B$ bids his valuation taking into account how much he will resell and the extent of his rival’s resources. As in Garratt and Tröger, there are inefficient equilibria where the weak buyer acts as a speculator, that is, his valuation is determined by the returns he can get at the resale stage and he puts up for sale as much as $A$ can afford with her wealth $w_A$.

When the weak buyer’s wealth is low, the inefficiency result no longer holds. The reason is the link between the resale price and the auction price introduced by the presence of financial constraints. Such a link induces a potential loser to modify the auction price so as to fine-tune the winner's resale offer, which may require forcing the winner to be financially constrained, or, to the contrary, to soften his/her financial constraint. As the weak buyer’s wealth gets reduced only the efficient equilibria survive.
In the context of our motivating example, a government auctioning off a big facility or contract, severe financial constraints seem to be the right modelling approach with use values above the financial resources of a single bidder. When this is the case, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an efficient allocation.
7 References


8 Appendix A.1

Proof of Lemma 3

Denoting by \([r^o, z^o]\) B’s optimal resale offer, we first show some of its properties.

i) \(v^H_A \geq r^o \geq v^L_A\) and \(r^oz^o \leq w_A\).

Since buyer \(A\) will never pay more than her use value, \(v^H_A \geq r^o\) follows, and since any type of player \(A\) will pay at least \(v^L_A\) then \(r^o \geq v^L_A\). Finally, buyer \(A\) total payment cannot exceed her wealth, \(r^oz^o \leq w_A\).

ii) If \(r^oz^o < w_A\) then \(z^o = 1\).

If \(r^oz^o < w_A\) it is possible for \(B\) to increase his payoff by increasing \(z^o\) while keeping \(r^o\) constant, so that \(r^oz^o < w_A\) still holds. Since his utility increases (note that \(r^o \geq v^L_A \geq v_B\) and the probability of \(A\) accepting the resale offer does not change) it must be the case that \(z^o = 1\) whenever \(r^oz^o < w_A\). For the same arguments next property follows:

iii) If \(z^o < 1\), then \(r^oz^o = w_A\).

Assume not, \(z^o = 1\). Then \(r^o = r^oz^o \leq w_A < v^L_A\), which contradicts i).

Using the results above we show next part i). When bidder \(B\) sets \(z = 1\), his optimal resale price \(r^o \in [v^L_A, \min\{w_A, v^H_A\}]\) solves

\[
\max_r \left\{ (w_B - p + r) \left(1 - \hat{F}(r)\right) + K_B(p)\hat{F}(r) \right\}
\]

In an interior solution, the optimal resale price when \(z = 1\), denoted \(r^*(p)\), solves

\[
r - v_B = \frac{1}{\hat{h}(r)} \quad \text{if } p \leq w_B \quad (3)
\]

\[
r - (p - w_B) = \frac{1}{\hat{h}(r)} \quad \text{if } p > w_B \quad (4)
\]

These equations yield the optimal resale price, for any value of \(p\), when the solution satisfies (a) \(r^* \geq v^L_A\) (property i)), which requires the LHS to be larger than the RHS when evaluated at the minimum possible price \(v^L_A\) and (b) \(r^* \leq w_A\) (from \(z = 1\) and property i)), which requires the LHS to be larger than the RHS when evaluated at \(w_A\). Note also that, from property iv, \(z = 1\) may only be optimal when \(w_A \geq v^L_A\). Finally, there are corner solutions with resale offers \([v^L_A, 1]\) if (a) fails, and \([w_A, 1]\) if (b) fails.

Alternatively, \(B\) can set \(z < 1\), so that \(rz = w_A\) (property iii)). When \(z < 1\), so that \(z = w_A/r\) (by property iii)), resale price \(r\) solves

\[
\max_r \left\{ \left[w_B - p + w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{r}\right)\right] \left(1 - \hat{F}(r)\right) + K_B(p)\hat{F}(r) \right\}
\]
In an interior solution, the optimal resale price when \( z < 1 \), denoted \( r^*(p) \), is implicitly defined by

\[
\frac{r}{v_B} (r - v_B) = \frac{1}{h(r)} \quad \text{if } p \leq w_B
\]

\[
\frac{r}{w_A} \left( \frac{r}{w_A} (w_A + w_B - p) + v_B \left( \frac{r - w_A}{w_A} \right) \right) = \frac{1}{h(r)} \quad \text{if } p > w_B
\]

with \( z^* = \frac{w_A}{r^*} \). Each equation for \( r^* \) yields the optimal price when the solution satisfies \( r^* \geq \max\{v_A^L, w_A\} \) (from properties i) and iii)). Corner solutions with resale offers \([v_A^L, \frac{w_A}{r^*}]\) and \([w_A, 1]\) emerge when the aforementioned conditions \((r^* \geq v_A^L \text{ and } r^* z^* = w_A)\) fail.

To determine the optimality of \( z = 1 \) or \( z < 1 \), we compare the two alternatives for \( p \leq w_B \) and \( p > w_B \).

1). Assume first that \( p \leq w_B \) so that we need to compare the solution to (3) with the solution to (5):

1.1). If \( w_A < v_A^L \) and \( p \leq w_B \) then the offer \( z < 1 \) dominates any offer with \( z = 1 \) by property iv). The optimal resale price is hence the solution to (5). Resale offers are

\[
\begin{align*}
[v_A^L, \frac{w_A}{v_A^L}] & \quad \text{if } v_B \leq \hat{M}(v_A^L) \\
[r^*, \frac{w_A}{v_A^*}] & \quad \text{if } v_B > \hat{M}(v_A^L)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( v_B > \hat{M}(v_A^L) \) ensures that \( r^* > v_A^L \). Recall that \( \hat{M}(x) = \frac{x^2 h(x)}{1 + x h(x)} \).

1.2). If \( w_A \geq v_A^L \) and \( p \leq w_B \) then \( r^* > r^* \) (the LHS of (3) is steeper than the LHS in (5) while they are both equal to zero at \( r = v_B \)). The optimal offer entails \( r^* \) only if the solution to (3) is the corner solution \( r^* = w_A \). Consequently, the resale offer \([r^* < w_A, 1]\) dominates the offer \([r^*, z < 1]\), whereas \([r^* > w_A, z < 1]\) dominates the offer \([r^* = w_A, 1]\) as \( B \) gets the same resources with both of them, namely \( w_A \), but with the former he also gets to consume part of the good. The optimal offers are hence

\[
\begin{align*}
[v_A^L, 1] & \quad \text{if } v_B \leq \hat{\psi}(v_A^L) \\
[r^*, 1] & \quad \text{if } v_B \in \left[\hat{\psi}(v_A^L), \hat{\psi}(w_A)\right] \\
[w_A, 1] & \quad \text{if } v_B \in \left[\hat{\psi}(w_A), \hat{M}(w_A)\right] \\
[r^*, z < 1] & \quad \text{if } v_B \geq \hat{M}(w_A)
\end{align*}
\]

where the condition \( v_B > \hat{\psi}(v_A^L) \) ensures \( r^* > v_A^L \) when \( z = 1 \), and \( r^* > w_A \).

2). Assume next that \( p > w_B \), so that we need to compare (4) and (6):
2.1. If \( w_A < v_A^L \) and \( p > w_B \) then selling only part of the object dominates any offer with \( z_B = 1 \) for the same arguments given above (both yield \( w_A \) and with the former B gets to consume part of the good). Resale offers are:

\[
\begin{align*}
[v_A^L, \frac{w_A}{v_A}] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[0, w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{M(v_A^L)}\right)\right] \\
[r^*, \frac{w_A}{r^*}] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{M(v_A^L)}\right), w_A\right]
\end{align*}
\]

2.2. If \( w_A \geq v_A^L \) and \( p > w_B \) the optimal offers are:

\[
\begin{align*}
[v_A^L, 1] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[0, \hat{v}(v_A^L)\right] \\
[r^*, 1] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[\hat{v}(v_A^L), \hat{v}(w_A)\right] \\
[w_A, 1] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[\hat{v}(w_A), w_A - \frac{v_B}{w_A h(w_A)}\right] \\
[r^{**}, z < 1] & \quad \text{if } p - w_B \in \left[w_A - \frac{v_B}{w_A h(w_A)}, w_A\right]
\end{align*}
\]

with \( r^{**} > r^* \).

By defining \( L(p) = p + K_B(p) - w_B, L_{\hat{v}}(w_A) = w_A - \frac{v_B}{w_A h(w_A)} \) and \( L_M(w_A) = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{M(v_A^L)}\right) \), resale offers for the cases \( p \leq w_B \) and \( p > w_B \) stated in the main text follow.

We show next part ii). Since \( L(p) = v_B \) at \( p = w_B \) and \( L(p) = p - w_B \) at \( p > w_B \), it follows from \( O_B^p(p \leq w_B) \) and \( O_B^p(p > w_B) \) that the resale price decreases in \( p \) at \( p = w_B \) if \( v_B > p - w_B \) holds.

**Proof of Proposition 2**

Assume first that \( w_A \leq \tilde{v}_A \) so that \( b_A(v_A) = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) \leq v_A \) as \( v_A - b_A(v_A) = (v_A - w_A) \left(1 - \frac{v_B}{v_A}\right) \geq 0 \). Since \( w_B \geq \overline{X} \), when \( B \) wins he pays \( p < w_B \) and resells according to \( O_B^p(p \leq w_B) \). Any type \( v_A > \tilde{v}_A \) is indifferent between losing, by bidding \( b_A(\tilde{v}_A) \), or winning, by bidding \( b_A(v_A) \), as

\[
U^W_A = v_A \left(1 - \frac{b_B - w_A}{v_B}\right) = v_A \frac{w_A}{r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A}} = \max \left\{ w_A, v_A \left(\frac{w_A}{r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A}}\right)\right\} = U^{WB}_A
\]

where the second equality follows from the fact that \( p = b_B = w_A + v_B \left(1 - \frac{w_A}{r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A}}\right) \), and the third equality follows from \( r^{**}_{\tilde{v}_A} < v_A^H(b_A(\tilde{v}_A)) = \tilde{v}_A \). Any other deviation either increases the resale price when losing given the off-equilibrium beliefs, or it is equally profitable when winning. Consequently, the high value A’s types will not deviate.
Types in \( [\underline{v}_A, r^*_A] \) strictly prefer losing and refusing to buy at resale as winning yields a payoff \( v_A \left( 1 - \frac{b_B - w_A}{v_B} \right) = v_A \frac{w_A}{v_A} \), which is lower than the payoff from losing and refusing to buy, \( w_A \). Types in \( [r^*_A, \bar{v}_A] \) are indifferent between waiting for resale (by bidding \( b_A(\bar{v}_A) \)) or overbidding player \( B \) as they get the same payoff in any event. If they deviate to a bid in \((b_A(\bar{v}_A), b_B)\) they are worse off by the off-equilibrium beliefs.\(^{28}\)

Focus next on player \( B \). Trivially any bid above \( b_A(\bar{v}_A) \) is payoff-equivalent to \( b_B \), either he remains a winner against the low types, at the same price, and a loser against the high types (when he loses the resale price is always \( v_B \)) so \( B \) has no incentive to change the auction price or the fraction that \( A \) resells, or he also wins over some interval of high \( A \) types to which \( B \) will resell at the auction price. Deviations to tie, \( b'_B = b_A(\bar{v}_A) \), yield lower payoffs than \( b_B \). Given that there is no profitable deviation for either player, the result follows for the case \( w_A < \underline{v}_A \).

When \( w_A \in [\underline{v}_A, M^{-1}(v_B)] \), the proof follows the same steps. Nevertheless, the following remarks are in order. First, low types of buyer \( A \) now bid \( \underline{v}_A \) (note that \( \underline{A} \) is strictly increasing in \( w_A \) with \( \underline{A} = \underline{v}_A \) for \( w_A = \underline{v}_A \), and \( \underline{A} > \underline{v}_A \) for \( w_A > \underline{v}_A \)). Second, the set of \( \bar{v}_A \) for which \( b_B = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \) is part of a PBE is smaller as compared to the previous case \((w_A \leq \underline{v}_A)\), as now \( \bar{v}_A \) must be higher than \( T(w_A) \). Note that if \( \bar{v}_A \) were lower than \( T(w_A) \) then \( r^*_A < w_A \) and \( z = 1 \), so that \( b_B = r^*_A \).

Consider next that \( w_A \geq M^{-1}(v_B) \) so that \( b_B = r^*_A \) for any \( \bar{v}_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \). For \( \bar{v}_A \leq w_A \) the strong buyer’s bids are \( b_A(v_A) = \underline{v}_A \) for \( v_A \leq \bar{v}_A \), \( b_A(v_A) = v_A \) for \( v_A \in (\bar{v}_A, w_A] \) and \( b_A(v_A) = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \) for \( v_A \geq w_A \); whereas for \( \bar{v}_A > w_A \) her bids are \( b_A(v_A) = \underline{v}_A \) for \( v_A \leq \bar{v}_A \) and \( b_A(v_A) = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \) for \( v_A \geq \bar{v}_A \). We first show that there is no profitable deviation for the weak buyer. His bid \( b_B \) wins against the low types, \( v_A \in [\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \); in that case he makes positive payoffs as he buys at \( \underline{v}_A \) and resells at \( r^*_A > \underline{v}_A \). Any bid in \((\underline{v}_A, b_A(\bar{v}_A)] \) would yield the same payoffs than \( b_B \): \( B \) remains a winner against the low types, reselling the entire object at the same price \( r^*_A \); if he now wins against any type larger than \( \bar{v}_A \) he breaks even (either buys at \( \underline{v}_A \) and resells at \( \bar{v}_A \), or he buys at \( w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \) resells \( z_B = \frac{w_A}{v_A} \) at a price \( v_A = \underline{v}_A \) getting payoffs equal to the auction price).

Focus next on the strong buyer. For low types in \([\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \) the losing bid \( \underline{v}_A \) is preferable to any other losing bid by the off-equilibrium beliefs. Types \( v_A \in [\underline{v}_A, r^*_A] \) strictly prefer losing to

\(^{28}\)If \( B \) considers that such deviation is equally likely to have come from either type in \([\underline{v}_A, \bar{v}_A] \) (i.e., if we alter the off-equilibrium beliefs), it would remain true that deviations to bid in \((b_A(\bar{v}_A), b_B)\) are unprofitable as they will not affect either the probability of winning or the resale price set by \( B \) given that \( w_B \geq b_A(\bar{v}_A) \) holds.
winning as when losing they get payoff \( w_A \) whereas when winning they get \( v_A - r_{\overline{v}_A}^* + w_A < w_A \).

Types \( v_A \in [r_{\overline{v}_A}^*, \overline{v}_A] \) are indifferent between winning and losing as in either event they get \( v_A - r_{\overline{v}_A}^* + w_A \). Finally, types in \( (\overline{v}_A, \overline{v}_A) \) win and get payoffs \( v_A - b_B + w_A = v_A - r_{\overline{v}_A}^* + w_A \).

Since no other bid allows them to get higher payoffs, there is no profitable deviation for these types either.

Finally, appealing to Lemma 5 in Appendix A.2, it follows that no player is using a weakly dominated strategy. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4**

i). At the equilibrium candidate \( B \) wins and resells at \( \underline{v}_A \) the fraction \( \frac{w_A}{\underline{v}_A} \) as

\[
p - w_B = w_A - \frac{v_B}{w_A \overline{h}(\underline{v}_A)} = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{M(\underline{v}_A)} \right)
\]

Buyers expected payoffs are given by

\[
U_{WB}^{W} = v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{\underline{v}_A} + \frac{1}{\underline{v}_A \overline{h}(\underline{v}_A)} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad U_{WA}^{W} = v_A \left( \frac{w_A}{\underline{v}_A} \right)
\]

The only payoff relevant deviation by buyer \( B \) is to lose so that he would obtain \( w_B \). Since \( U_{WB}^{W} = w_B + \frac{v_B}{w_A \overline{h}(\underline{v}_A)} \geq w_B \) buyer \( B \) will not deviate. Consider next deviations by buyer \( A \). Deviations to bids below \( w_B \) will leave \( B \) unconstrained and are hence unprofitable. Deviations to bids \( b_A \in (w_B, b_A) \) are payoff equivalent to \( b_A \) while deviations to any \( b_A \in (b_A, b_B) \) will trigger a higher resale price, and are hence unprofitable. If she deviates to win, by bidding, for instance, \( b_A' = b_B \) then her expected utility will be \( U_{WA}^{W} = v_A \left( 1 - \frac{w_B}{v_B} \right) \). Since \( w_B \geq w_B = v_B \left( 1 - \left( \frac{w_A}{v_A} \right) \right) \) those deviations are unprofitable too.

ii) The proof follows the same arguments as the proof of Proposition 2. The only additional remark comes from the fact that at \( p = w_B + \psi_{\overline{v}_A}(\underline{v}_A) \) buyer \( B \) will sell the entire object at the resale market at \( r_{\overline{v}_A}^* = \overline{v}_A \) (see \( O_B^R(p > w_B) \)) which ensures that low \( A \) types do not find it profitable to deviate neither to larger losing bids (they would trigger a higher resale price) nor to larger winning bids. ■

**Proof of Lemma 4**

i) Focus first on rule 1. In this case, if \( w_A < \underline{v}_A \) player \( C \) would sell \( z = \frac{w_A}{\underline{v}_A} \) at a price \( v_A^L \) to player \( A \) (\( C \)'s optimal offers to \( A \) are the same as \( B \)'s for \( v_B = 0 \), see \( O_B^R(p \leq w_B) \)), and \( z = 1 - \frac{w_A}{\overline{v}_A} \) at a price \( v_B \) to player \( B \), getting payoffs from the resale market equal to
\[ \Lambda_{v_A} = w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_B} \right) . \] Note that by reselling the entire object to a single buyer, the most
C can get is \( \max \{ w_A, v_B \} \) which is lower than \( \Lambda_{v_A} \).

Under rule 2, selling the entire object to A is dominated by selling the entire object to B.
If selling to A, the resale price must equal \( w_A \), whereas when selling to B the resale price
will equal \( v_B (1 - z_B) + w_A \) (B will consume part of the good and will resell the remaining
part to A in return of \( w_A \)). Compare next selling the entire object to B with selling part of
the good to each buyer. If selling \( z = 1 \) to B, the resale price would equal B’s valuation so
that C gains \( w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_B} \right) \). If C were to sell to A (as loser 1) then C will set
\( r = v_A^L \) and \( z_C = \frac{w_A}{v_A^L} \) (see \( O_B^B(p \leq w_B) \) for \( v_B = 0 \)) and he will sell the remaining fraction to B at a
price equal to B’s use value. Proceeds accrued by C would be \( \Lambda_{v_A^L} \), which are strictly lower
than \( w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_B} \right) \) whenever \( v_B > M(v_A^L) \), i.e. when \( r_B^{**} > v_A^L \) and are equal otherwise.
Thus, the result follows.

\[ ii) \] Under rule 1, selling the entire object to A dominates selling it to B as \( w_A \geq v_B \).
When selling only to A the optimal offer when \( w_A \geq v_A^L \) is \( [r_C, z_C] = [v_A^L, 1] \) (see \( O_B^B(p \leq w_B) \) for
\( v_B = 0 \)). Similarly, selling to A with \( z_C = 1 \) and \( r_C = v_A^L \) dominates selling to both buyers as
\( v_A^L > v_B \), and \( v_B \) is the maximum price that C can charge to B.

Under rule 2, C will approach first buyer B. The reason is simple, C gains from the resale
market less than B when dealing with buyer A as \( r_C^{**} \leq r_B^{**} \) (see \( O_B^B(p \leq w_B) \) for \( v_B = 0 \)
and recall that the resale price is non-decreasing in \( v_B \)). Thus, it is best for C to sell the entire
object to B at a price \( r_B^{**} \). ■

**Proof of Proposition 5**

Assume, by way of contradiction, that C wins at a price \( p \).

\[ i) \] Let \( w_A < \underline{v}_A \) hold. Since under either rule he can get at most B’s valuation from the
resale market, then \( p < w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_B} \right) \) must hold for C to make profits from participating.
Since B bids \( w_A + v_B \left( 1 - \frac{w_A}{v_B} \right) \), C cannot profitably win the auction.

\[ ii) \] Let \( w_A \geq \underline{v}_A \) hold. Since C’s proceeds from the resale market are bounded above by
\( r_B^{**} \) (\( r_B^{**} \) under rule 2 and \( v_A^L \) under rule 1, with \( v_A^L \leq r_B^{**} \)), then \( p < r_B^{**} \) must hold for C to
participate. Since B bids at least \( r_B^{**} \), C cannot profitably win the auction. ■

**Appendix A.2**

The following lemma presents some results on weakly dominated strategies.
Lemma 5 i) If \( w_A < v_A \), bids below \( \Lambda = w_A + v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) \) are weakly dominated for player A if any of the following two conditions hold: (a) \( w_B \geq \Lambda \) or (b) \( w_A \leq \hat{M}(v_A^i) \).

ii) If \( v_A < \min \{w_A, w_B\} \), then

1. Bidding below \( v_A \) is weakly dominated for buyer B.
2. If \( v_A = \bar{v}_A \) then the bid \( v_A \) constitutes a weakly dominant strategy for player A.
3. If \( w_B \geq \bar{v}_A \), bidding above \( \min \{v_A, w_A + v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A})\} \), is a weakly dominated strategy for buyer A.

Proof. i) Compare payoffs from \( b_A = \Delta \) with those obtained with a lower bid \( b'_A \). Trivially, if A wins with either bid they are equally profitable. When losing with both of them, payoffs will depend on B’s resale offers. If \( w_B \geq \Lambda \), resale prices are independent of \( p \) so that both bids yield the same expected payoff, whereas if \( w_B \in (b'_A, \Delta) \) while \( w_A \leq \hat{M}(v_A^i) \) resale prices will be lower if \( p = b_A = \Delta \) making A better-off. Finally, if \( b_B \in (b'_A, b_A) \) then A wins with the former and loses with the latter. Since A is better off when winning the result follows.

Note that \( U_A^{WA} = v_A \left(1 - \frac{b_B - w_A}{v_B}\right) \) and \( U_A^{WB} = \max \{w_A, v_A \left(\frac{w_A}{v_A}\right)\} \) so that

\[
U_A^{WA} = v_A \left(1 - \frac{b_B - w_A}{v_B}\right) > v_A \left(\frac{w_A}{v_A}\right) \geq U_A^{WB}
\]

where the inequality is deduced from \( b_B < \Delta \). Since \( U_A^{WA} \geq U_A^{WB} \) the claim follows.

We show next part ii).

1) Since buyer B can always get \( v_A \) at the resale market by setting \( r = v_A \), a bid below \( v_A \) is weakly dominated by bidding \( v_A \).

2) For buyer A, payoffs with the strategies \( b_A = v_A \) and \( b'_A < v_A \) are equal when either losing, since \( r \geq v_A \), or winning; when winning with the former while losing with the latter it must be the case that \( p = b_B < v_A \) while \( r \geq v_A \) and therefore \( b_A = v_A \) yields higher payoffs. Similarly, payoffs with the strategies \( b_A = v_A \) and \( b'_A > v_A \) only differ when losing with the former while winning with the latter. Since any resale offer satisfies \( r \geq v_A \), her utility when losing equals \( w_A \). When winning the price must be \( b_B > v_A \) (recall that player A wins with \( b'_A > v_A \) and loses with \( b_A = v_A \)) so that the utility is lower than \( w_A \). As losing yields larger payoffs than winning, the result follows.

3). Since \( w_B \geq \bar{v}_A \), resale offers by buyer B only depend upon his use value. Consequently, payoffs with the strategies \( b_A = \min \{v_A, w_A + v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A})\} \) and \( b'_A > b_A \) only differ when losing with the former while winning with the latter.

Assume first \( \min \{v_A, w_A + v_B (1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A})\} = v_A \) so that \( b_A = v_A \). When winning with \( b'_A \) the utility is lower than \( w_A \) as \( p > v_A \) (since \( b_A = v_A \) would be a losing bid against \( b_B \)) and the
resale price is \( v_B < v_A \). As losing yields larger payoffs (at least \( w_A \)) than winning, the result follows.

Assume next \( \min \{v_A, w_A + v_B(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A})\} = w_A + v_B(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) \). For any \( b_B \in (b_A, b'_A) \), when winning by bidding \( b'_A \) buyer \( A \) has to resell as \( p > w_A \) (note that \( b_A = w_A + v_B(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) \) would be a losing bid against \( b_B \)), consequently her utility is lower than \( w_A \) as the most she can get after resale is \( w_A + v_B(1 - \frac{w_A}{v_A}) \) which is lower than the auction price. Since when losing her expected payoff is at least \( w_A \), losing yields larger payoffs than winning, and the result follows. \( \blacksquare \)