Now showing items 1-20 of 44

    • Thumbnail

      A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift 

      Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón ORCID (2005-07)
      Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of ...
    • Thumbnail

      A Game-Theoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies 

      Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón ORCID (Departamento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2015-10)
      This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken ...
    • Thumbnail

      A Marginalist Model of Network Formation 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-08-18)
      We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ...
    • Thumbnail

      A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus 

      Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier; Katsev, Ilya (Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 2013-02-26)
      We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...
    • Thumbnail

      A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings 

      Biró, Péter; Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Molis Bañales, Elena (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
      The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
    • Thumbnail

      A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules 

      Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier; Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Luquin, Paloma (2006-07)
      This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ...
    • Thumbnail

      A Unifying model of strategic network formation 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2015-02-17)
      We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ...
    • Thumbnail

      Admissible Hierachic Sets 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción ORCID (2005-05)
      In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...
    • Thumbnail

      Altruism and Social Integration 

      Brañas Garza, Pablo; Cobo Reyes, Ramón; Espinosa Alejos, María Paz ORCID; Jiménez, Natalia; Kovarik, Jaromir ORCID; Ponti, Giovanni (2009)
      We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We ...
    • Thumbnail

      An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID (2003-12)
      We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We ...
    • Thumbnail

      Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria 

      Fabrizio, Germano; Zuazo Garín, Peio (Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-07-16)
      We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ...
    • Thumbnail

      Asymmetric flow networks 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV-EHU, 2012-06-22)
      This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme ...
    • Thumbnail

      Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior 

      Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier; Feltkamp, Vicent; Montero García, María (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-10-10)
      This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...
    • Thumbnail

      Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Laruelle, Annick ORCID (2011-02-08)
      We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
    • Thumbnail

      Efficiency vs. Stability in a Mixed Network Formation Model 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2015-03-26)
      The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the incomplete results relative to effciency in a transitional model introduced in a previous paper, distinguishing two types of links, strong or doubly-supported and weak or ...
    • Thumbnail

      Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion 

      Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier (2003-01)
      The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.
    • Thumbnail

      Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis 

      Escobedo Martínez, Ramón; Laruelle, Annick ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-12)
      The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: ...
    • Thumbnail

      Expected Fair Allocation in Farsighted Network Formation 

      Navarro Prada, Noemí (2013)
      I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...
    • Thumbnail

      Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice 

      Barañano Mentxaka, Ilaski ORCID; Kovarik, Jaromir ORCID; Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Ánálisis Económico I, 2014-10-08)
      Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of ...
    • Thumbnail

      Forward-looking Pairwise Stability in Networks with Externalities 

      Navarro Prada, Noemí (2013)
      We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...