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Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-03-25)
In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible
or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might ...
Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-07-16)
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the
assumption of common ...
Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a
dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...