Now showing items 1-10 of 10
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
In this paper we provide a general model of "quaternary" dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote profiles in which ...
Information, stability and dynamics in networks under institutional constraints
In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that ...
An axiomatization of success
In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.
Network formation under institutional constraints
We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets covering the set of players specifies ...
Majorities with a quorum
Based on a general model of "quaternary" voting rule, sensitive to voters' choices between four different options (abstaining, voting "yes", voting "no" and staying home), we systematically study different types of majority ...
The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate ...
Preferences, actions and voting rules
In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not ...
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
Admissible Hierachic Sets
In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...