In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might ...

Previous research has shown a strong positive correlation between short-term persistence and long-term output growth as well as between depreciation rates and long-term output growth. This evidence, therefore, contradicts ...

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...

The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ...

I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...