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      A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies 

      Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor; García Enríquez, Javier; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012-11)
      In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). ...
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      A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags 

      Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2008-09)
      In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. ...
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      Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market 

      Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2005)
      The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence ...