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dc.contributor.authorUsategui Díaz de Otalora, José María
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:33:40Z
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:33:40Z
dc.date.issued2006-01
dc.identifier.issn1988-088X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6702
dc.description.abstractIn a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherUniversity of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis IIes
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDFAEII 2006.05
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectdurable goodses
dc.subjectcommitmentes
dc.subjectdemand variationses
dc.subjectregulationes
dc.titleNon-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopolyes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelD42
dc.subject.jelL12
dc.subject.jelL41
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200605es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico IIes_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak IIes_ES
dc.subject.categoriaMICROECONOMICS
dc.subject.categoriaECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE
dc.subject.categoriaINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION


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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported