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dc.contributor.authorCiarreta Antuñano, Aitor ORCID
dc.contributor.authorGutiérrez Hita, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-06T14:38:26Z
dc.date.available2012-02-06T14:38:26Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.issn1988-088X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6748
dc.description.abstractThe paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherUniversity of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis IIes
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDFAEII 2005.02
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectcollusiones
dc.subjectrepeated gameses
dc.subjectelectricity marketes
dc.titleStrategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Marketes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelL11
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL51
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200502es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico IIes_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak IIes_ES
dc.subject.categoriaECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE
dc.subject.categoriaINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION


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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported