We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...

In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.

I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...

Previous research has shown a strong positive correlation between short-term persistence and long-term output growth as well as between depreciation rates and long-term output growth. This evidence, therefore, contradicts ...

This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity ...

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce ...

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...

Gene-culture co-evolution emphasizes the joint role of culture and genes for the emergence of altruistic and cooperative behaviors and behavioral genetics provides estimates of their relative importance. However, these ...

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...