In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price ...

The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable ...

In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal ...

We analyze the consequences of consumers behavior concerning personal arbitrage in a spatial discrimination context where firms know the consumers distribution but cannot distinguish them by location. The firms' equilibrium ...

We examine competition in Mobile Internet services, when operators bargain over the coverage sharing and their reciprocal roaming charge. Results show that in equilibrium operators cover the overall territory entirely and ...

Potential efficiency gains due to a merger can be used by competition authorities to judge upon proposed mergers. In a world where agents’ efforts, observable or unobservable, affect the success of a production cost reducing ...

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. ...

This paper is concerned with the study of durability as an aspect of competition and market structure that contributes to determining the incentives for mergers. We find that relative to the incentives in industries that ...

This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which ...

In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak ...