

Public Perception, Justification and Motivation of Development Aid

–

The Feasibility of Peter Singer's Culture of Giving

Tesis de Doctorado de Lorenz Lauer

Directores: Agustín Vicente Benito y Daniel Innerarity Grau

Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia

UPV/EHU Universidad del País Vasco

Berlin, el 18 de Mayo 2017

Abstract

In view of the 2017 famine in Eastern Africa, the incredible human suffering caused by extreme poverty once more becomes evident. This makes poverty in developing countries a pressing ethical issue. But how to solve this complex global problem? Peter Singer (2009a and 2015) argues that there is an individual responsibility to *save a life*. His proposed solution: Each citizen in affluent countries should dedicate as much as possible of his or her income to eradicating poverty. Singer's approach makes use of new findings on donor behaviour, proposing that it is possible to establish a “culture of giving” or “effective altruism” that will finally overcome poverty. Importantly the donor should select and support the most effective projects. This thesis argues that while Singer's moral maximalist position is asking too much of each of us individually, a duty to act against global poverty can nevertheless be established, depending on personal responsibility and fellow humanity. Unfortunately, from a psychological standpoint appeals such as Singer's may increase donations temporarily, but cognitive limitations will prevail in the long run, as they are intimately related to our altruistic behaviour. Even more problematic may be Singer's underestimation of the complexity of the causes of poverty and of development aid. Reasons for a country's poverty can be international political and economic structures that disfavour developing countries. Internal reasons for a country's poverty are the lack of functioning institutions, conflict and corruption. Neither of these problems can be solved by charity alone. Charity may even be harmful, as it often focuses on donor opinion instead of recipient need. An analysis of different interventions finds that direct financial support is the best way to aid the world's poorest population. Due to the psychological mechanisms of donor behaviour and distrust towards the poor, this is however highly unlikely to be financed via donations. A global Tobin or wealth tax combined with efforts from the developing countries themselves is proposed as a solution.

Palabras clave: ayuda al desarrollo; altruismo eficiente; límites cognitivos; Peter Singer; donaciones

Resumen en español

Percepción Pública y Motivación de la Ayuda al Desarrollo

—

La Viabilidad de la Cultura de Ofrenda de Peter Singer

En esta tesis se discuten y contrastan las implicaciones éticas, psicológicas y prácticas de la “cultura de dar” o del “altruismo efectivo” de Peter Singer con el fin de responder a la pregunta de qué papel deben tener las donaciones y la recaudación de fondos en el contexto del alivio de la pobreza extrema global. Se examinan las consideraciones éticas del punto de vista maximalista moral de Singer, que se basa en la responsabilidad individual de aliviar la pobreza global mediante la inversión personal, especialmente limitando los gastos, aumentando los ingresos a través de opciones de carrera y donando la cantidad máxima posible durante la vida. Esta posición es rechazada como demasiado exigente, ya que deja poco espacio para el desarrollo de la persona y de otras actividades valiosas, como la familia, los amigos o, por ejemplo, el arte. Si bien una vida centrada en el altruismo puede ser una vida buena y satisfactoria para algunos, la consideración individual de otros, por ejemplo, los pobres globales, implica que hay una razón necesaria y éticamente importante para ser libre de considerar sus propios planes de vida y desarrollar sus capacidades. Además, atribuir la máxima responsabilidad a cada individuo que podría ayudar donando una gran parte de sus ingresos, implica la pérdida de importantes consideraciones de justicia y responsabilidad. Dependiendo de la posición individual, el lugar y la capacidad, las personas tienen diferentes niveles de responsabilidad hacia los demás. Por ejemplo, el jefe de gobierno de un país desarrollado o el director general de una empresa que importa recursos

naturales del un país en vías de desarrollo tiene una mayor responsabilidad hacia los pobres del país.

Se demuestra que hay muchas maneras en que las instituciones globales, las regulaciones comerciales y el estilo de vida occidental perjudican a la gente que vive en los países en vida de desarrollo, por lo que la responsabilidad de los ciudadanos occidentales de actuar colectivamente parece razonable. Peter Singer capta así una importante intuición ética, que es que parece irresponsable que la riqueza global se distribuya de tal manera que parte de la población viva en la abundancia, mientras que aproximadamente mil millones estén sometidos a sufrimientos y que se acorte drásticamente su vida porque ni siquiera cuentan con servicios básicos de salud y unas condiciones mínimas de vida. Esto implica una responsabilidad mínima de cada individuo que podría hacer algo contra la pobreza global de sacrificar una parte de sus ingresos, pero existe una responsabilidad mucho mayor de individuos y corporaciones muy ricos con inversiones o proveedores en los países en desarrollo.

Además del fundamento ético, el altruismo efectivo se basa en dos implicaciones prácticas. La primera es que es más fácil convencer a las personas a donar a un alivio efectivo de la pobreza que implementar medidas legales o políticas. Esto justifica una deliberación en profundidad de la psicología de los donantes, el análisis estadístico de los niveles de donaciones y los métodos de recaudación de fondos, como se indica en el capítulo 3 de la tesis. La investigación del comportamiento de los donantes ha ganado mucho impulso en los últimos años, en parte debido al auge de la economía experimental. Los psicólogos morales en la tradición de David Hume muestran claramente que los seres humanos tienen inclinaciones altruistas y se sienten bien al ayudar a otros (el llamado “resplandor cálido”). El comportamiento pro-social como la donación realmente aumenta la felicidad personal. Pero hay varias emociones e intuiciones en conflicto que impiden tomar acciones concretas y efectivas hacia un mundo mejor, por ejemplo: tendemos a identificarnos con las víctimas

individuales hacia las que sentimos una cierta conexión. Como Singer ve claramente, el problema es que, aunque tengamos instintos altruistas, estos instintos sólo funcionan bien en casos en los que nos sentimos personalmente responsables y cercanos a la víctima. Singer propone varias soluciones, en particular que los individuos deben unirse en un comportamiento generoso comprometiendo públicamente sus donaciones, alentando así a otros y poniendo cara a los necesitados. Pero subestima el grado en que los donantes se centran en sí mismos y que la decisión de donar está influida por factores situacionales.

La argumentación racional en realidad tiende a disminuir la voluntad de donar. El estudio de los fenómenos del comportamiento de evitación y de la contabilidad mental, junto con un análisis del patrón de donación de la sociedad, indican que las donaciones son un recurso de crecimiento lento y que sólo una cantidad limitada se dedica a los pobres del mundo. La atención de los medios es un factor clave en este caso: los desastres naturales en los países de vacaciones arrastran mucha atención y donaciones, mientras que otros desastres tienden a ser olvidados.

Junto con una industria de recaudación de fondos muy profesionalizada, los medios de comunicación (sociales) también son parcialmente responsables de la continua imagen negativa de los pobres globales, especialmente en África, y de la prevalencia de modas de desarrollo como muestra el ejemplo de la campaña KONY 2012. Mientras los donantes sean estereotipados como “salvadores blancos”, que son la única esperanza para los pobres estereotipados como niños, el paternalismo inherente a la industria de recaudación de fondos será realmente un obstáculo para aumentar la justicia global.

La segunda premisa práctica del altruismo efectivo es que la donación de manera sostenible de pequeñas sumas, impiden un sufrimiento enorme. La cuestión de si la ayuda oficial y privada beneficia a los países en desarrollo en general es difícil de responder debido a las dificultades para obtener e interpretar correctamente los datos pertinentes. Muchos proyectos demostrablemente aportan poca mejora sostenible a las condiciones de vida lo-

cales, ya que los proyectos se seleccionan centrándose en los intereses estratégicos y económicos de los países donantes, en lugar de centrarse en aliviar la pobreza. La corrupción y la malversación de fondos son problemas endémicos, al igual que los efectos secundarios no deseados como el desplazamiento de los productores locales. Los críticos de la ayuda señalan que las ONG y las agencias de ayuda al desarrollo pueden beneficiar a los regímenes cleptocráticos y opresivos, ya que ayudan a ocultar las fallas del régimen, tales como la incapacidad de proporcionar educación pública, servicios de salud y un servicio tributario efectivo, debilitando la responsabilidad gubernamental. Los estudios de caso del movimiento de las microfinanzas, del “comercio justo” y de los “Pueblos del Milenio” de Jeffrey Sachs, indican que los sesgos, las modas, la desconfianza y la falta de comprensión de los pobres que se muestran en el capítulo 3 se traducen en el fracaso de los proyectos de ayuda al nivel de implementación. La doble rendición de cuentas de las organizaciones hacia los donantes y el grupo destinatario a menudo se presenta como una vía unidireccional hacia la tranquilización y el fortalecimiento de los donantes público y la autoestima, y no la eficiencia real.

Hay, sin embargo, algunas buenas noticias: simples intervenciones médicas, tales como vacunaciones, desparasitación o la provisión de mosquiteras contra la malaria, tienen un efecto considerable en la salud individual y el bienestar. También se demuestra que los proyectos que confían en los pobres simplemente apoyándolos con dotaciones monetarias comparativamente pequeñas, con poca o ninguna condición, son efectivos, sorprendentemente con efectos positivos que sobreviven al período de distribución. El aumento de los ingresos y la salud se traduce en una mayor capacidad de los pobres para ayudarse a sí mismos mediante la inversión en su propia educación, participando económicamente y políticamente, proporcionándoles la suficiente energía y el tiempo para formar asociaciones civiles. También puede significar menos dependencia de los partidos políticos, el clientelismo o las estructuras de clanes. Aquí las donaciones pueden tener un efecto sostenible. Des-

afortunadamente, estos mismos proyectos tienden a ser infra-reportados, ya que no son muy espectaculares, y por lo tanto acaban siendo sub-financiados. Es dudoso que el laudable ascenso de los evaluadores de caridad como “GiveWell” pueda cambiar esto. La cantidad de personas que están dispuestas a donar puede ser aumentada, pero no significativamente. La voluntariedad de los donantes seguirá siendo voluble y dependerá de factores moralmente irrelevantes. Más importante aún, se ha demostrado que la caridad desinformada puede causar daño a largo plazo en lugar de hacer el bien. Como conclusión propongo tres maneras de actuar frente a estas dificultades psicológicas e institucionales:

- De acuerdo con Peter Singer y William MacAskill, debemos centrar nuestras donaciones en las ONGs más eficientes e intentar convencer a otros de que sigan el ejemplo. Los “evaluadores de caridad” deben desempeñar un papel más importante en el discurso público sobre la distribución de la ayuda. Debemos asegurarnos de que son escuchados por el Estado y los donantes, la academia y los medios de comunicación. Una evaluación profunda y veraz de los resultados de un proyecto caritativo o de un gobierno puede mejorar las actuaciones y, junto con el uso extensivo de los sistemas de gestión de la información, crear conocimientos que pueden aplicarse en escenarios de desarrollo similares. Stern (2013a) exige correctamente que algunas organizaciones filantrópicas sean excluidas por lo menos del privilegio de deducibilidad impositiva, si tienen un desempeño muy bajo en comparación con sus competidores.

- En contra de la recomendación de MacAskill (2015a, 181ff. and 2015b) de no trabajar en una organización caritativa y en su lugar centrarse en ganar para donar, sostengo que una persona debe ser libre de seguir su propio plan de vida. Sin embargo, la decisión de trabajar para una institución gubernamental o una ONG incluye la responsabilidad de aumentar el uso efectivo de los recursos existentes. Se ha demostrado que las organizaciones grandes y establecidas, y por lo tanto bien conocidas, se quedan con gran parte de las donaciones existentes. Trabajar para hacer a estas mismas organizaciones más eficaces, y

estar dispuestos a escuchar a los beneficiarios de las ayudas, puede marcar una importante diferencia.

- El discurso del desarrollo necesita urgentemente un cambio de paradigma. Necesita ser re-enmarcado como un asunto de justicia, no de caridad, pero no desde un punto de vista moral maximalista, sino con responsabilidades claramente establecidas. Para un programa eficaz contra la pobreza y el hambre, las naciones desarrolladas – y en esto Europa, debido a su historia y poder económico, tienen un lugar especial en el mundo – deben centrarse primero en crear las instituciones democráticas internacionales necesarias para permitir que la población de un país se mantenga por sí misma en vez de depender de la buena voluntad internacional (cp. Crocker 2008). Esto incluye las regulaciones sobre los flujos financieros ilícitos y la corrupción, pero también el perdón de la deuda. El acaparamiento de tierras debe ser bloqueado en todo el mundo, y debe permitirse en cierto grado la protección de la industria con mano de obra infantil para dar a las manufacturas en las naciones en desarrollo una oportunidad justa. Por otra parte, unas regulaciones justas en el tema del cambio climático deberían ayudar a los pobres mundiales a salir de su apuro. Pero la principal responsabilidad recae en los propios países en desarrollo. En muchos casos, los regímenes corruptos y cleptocráticos o incluso opresivos se preocupan poco por el bienestar de parte o de toda su población. Apoyo la afirmación de Leif Wenar (2011a y 2015) de que debemos detener el comercio y los intercambios bancarios con regímenes que no se adhieren a un estándar ético mínimo. Por esta razón, las corporaciones multinacionales también tienen una fuerte responsabilidad. Nicole Hassoun (2012) se ocupa del hecho de que las enfermedades que ocurren frecuentemente en los países pobres no son atendidas por la industria farmacéutica, ya que no hay grandes beneficios (Pogge, Rimmer y Rubenstein 2014) . Con el resultado de que en 2014, el largo descuido de la investigación y el desarrollo de la medicina contra Ebola se ha tomado su venganza matando a varios miles de personas (Baker 2014). Otras industrias que comercian, invierten y contratan personal en países

en desarrollo tienen responsabilidades similares. La inversión y la creación de empleos con estándares mínimos deben ser un foco de desarrollo.

- Un paso necesario podría ser establecer un impuesto Tobin dirigido a la especulación financiera para financiar un sistema social mínimo que apoye directamente a las personas más necesitadas (Lauer y Lepenies 2015). Otras alternativas serían un dividendo global de los recursos (Pogge 1998 y 2010a), un impuesto universal sobre el lujo o el patrimonio mundial, tal como prevé Piketty (2014) o un impuesto mundial sobre las empresas multinacionales. Si bien este proyecto no será fácil de implementar políticamente, las conclusiones del capítulo 3 indican que esto puede ser realmente más fácil y ciertamente más sostenible y fiable que tratar de canalizar la ayuda a través de donaciones voluntarias. Dos factores podrían servir para hacer esta propuesta más aceptable. Por razones de aceptabilidad política y rendición de cuentas en el país en desarrollo, es necesario que el propio país en desarrollo contribuya al fondo social que beneficia a los ciudadanos más pobres. Esto podría ser financiado por los países en desarrollo a través de los ingresos de exportación de recursos naturales, como propone el Banco Mundial, por ejemplo (Moss 2011). Además, los impuestos deberían ser dirigidos de una manera que incida sobre las empresas y firmas más ricas o multinacionales, no sobre los trabajadores o la clase media y los pequeños y medianos empresarios de los países desarrollados, que ya están sujetos a una alta carga tributaria.

Como se menciona en el capítulo 2 de esta tesis, la desigualdad es un problema importante tanto en los países en desarrollo como en los desarrollados. Esto se repite en una encuesta de Pew Research Center (2014, 3) de los ciudadanos de 44 países, que encontró que una media del 60 por ciento – incluido el 46 por ciento de los estadounidenses – dice que la desigualdad es un problema muy grande en sus respectivas sociedades. Varios economistas importantes (Cingano 2014, Lansley 2011 y Stiglitz 2012) ya han advertido que el aumento de la desigualdad perjudica el crecimiento económico y el orden social, y los filósofos tien-

den a estar de acuerdo (Nagel 1991, Sandel 2012, Temkin 1993 y van Parijs 1995). Pero la opinión es bastante limitada a nivel nacional. Para incluir el nivel internacional, deberían establecerse vínculos (quizás incluso interdependencias) entre la justicia nacional e internacional. Esta reelaboración del desarrollo como una cuestión de justicia que nos concierne también a nosotros, así como el establecimiento de un diálogo con las personas que queremos apoyar como verdaderos interlocutores y no como solicitantes de ayuda, servirá para dar algunos pasos importantes hacia la reducción Y, con suerte, un día para la abolición de la pobreza absoluta.

Los esfuerzos de Singer y MacAskill para crear un movimiento de altruismo efectivo son loables. Sin embargo, a menos que el movimiento avance hacia la inclusión de los pobres y la justicia internacional, corre el peligro preocupante de convertirse en una moda. Mientras los pobres sólo sean vistos como un número, una vida que se necesita salvar, son fácilmente excluidos de la atención de la privilegiada comunidad de donantes predominantemente blanca. Jennifer Rubenstein (2015, trad. el autor) en una respuesta a Peter Singer en la revista *Boston* evalúa la situación así:

“El problema es que aborda estos desafíos a través de un movimiento social centrado en aliviar la pobreza que excluye a la gente pobre de sus filas. Este movimiento viola el principio democrático de inclusión, resumido en un eslogan utilizado por décadas por los movimientos sociales de Polonia a Sudáfrica: “Nada sobre nosotros sin nosotros”. [...] Esta orientación pasa por alto el papel central de las personas pobres en aliviar su propia pobreza y el de la gente rica en contribuir y beneficiarse de ella. El movimiento altruista efectivo dirige las energías y compromisos emocionales de sus miembros hacia los otros miembros, no hacia las personas que apuntan ayudar. Singer se centra en perfilar al altruista eficaz que sus lectores pueden emular; no describe a la gente pobre que quiere salir de la pobreza. Del mismo modo,

organizaciones tales como *Give What We Can* anima a sus miembros a establecer compromisos y participar en la construcción de su propia comunidad – no con los pobres. Estas estrategias evitan acertadamente el uso de la piedad como herramienta de motivación, pero también impiden formas de conexión más prometedoras, como la solidaridad política.”

Esta preocupación se ilustra con las recientes tendencias del movimiento de hacer de la evitación de los “eventos de extinción” una prioridad (Matthews 2015). Los eventos de extinción son catástrofes globales a gran escala, como una guerra nuclear global o una colisión masiva de meteoritos, pero los altruistas eficaces también incluyen escenarios más inverosímiles como una inteligencia artificial asesina. En una versión de la apuesta de Pascal, la aniquilación completa de la humanidad por medio de uno de estos eventos hace que la donación hacia los temas mencionados sea de repente más urgente que aliviar la pobreza global. Un ejemplo sería la donación al Instituto de Investigación de Máquinas Inteligentes en Berkeley. En su intrigante artículo de Vox “Pasé un fin de semana en Google hablando con nerds sobre la caridad. Salí... preocupado“, Dylan Matthews (2015) especula que si el movimiento continúa por este camino de inteligencia auto-congratulatoria, fácilmente llegará al altruismo efectivo sin alivio de la pobreza. Por lo tanto, abogo encarecidamente por limitar nuestra arrogancia occidental, para que no olvidemos que sólo los pobres mismos pueden salir de la pobreza. Son seres humanos que pueden tomar las riendas de sus vidas en sus propias manos, que saben lo que es bueno para ellos mismos a largo plazo y que quieren actuar responsablemente hacia sus familias, su futuro y su medio ambiente.

Se necesita más investigación para determinar cómo comunicar eficientemente a la hora de captar el interés de los posibles donantes, por ejemplo a través de técnicas narrativas. Una posibilidad podría ser hacer uso de una idea similar a los patrocinios de niños o el mecanismo utilizado por Kiva que permite a los donantes directos de efectivo sentir una

verdadera conexión con el hogar que están apoyando. Aún más importante sería una investigación sobre el papel de diferentes actores multinacionales y nacionales en beneficiar o perjudicar a los pobres del mundo, en la línea del análisis de Nicole Hassoun sobre la industria farmacéutica o, menos extensamente, la de Oxfam “Behind the Brand” sobre las corporaciones alimentarias (Hoffman 2013). Esto serviría de indicador para los ciudadanos y consumidores, así como una base para el cálculo de “quién debe lo que a los pobres del mundo” (Pogge 2007). También significaría que la noción de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa aumentaría en importancia. Un proyecto importante sería determinar cómo es posible mejorar la imagen de los pobres y cómo comunicar las complejidades del desarrollo y la pobreza de una manera que llegue a la población occidental no concernida (cp. Darnton y Kirk 2011 y Kennedy y Hill 2010). Por último, es necesario un análisis detallado y multidisciplinario de las formas de implementar y financiar la red global de seguridad para la pobreza absoluta para que pueda ser efectiva su realización.

Contents

Abstract.....	2
Resumen en español	3
Acknowledgements:.....	15
List of Abbreviations.....	16
List of Figures and Tables.....	18
1. Introduction.....	19
2. The Philosophical Discussion and Ethical Background to Giving.....	33
2.1. The Life You Can Save – Peter Singer's Utilitarian Appeal.....	33
2.2. How Can Singer's Argument Be criticised?.....	38
2.3. Excessive Demand.....	39
2.4. The Permissiveness of Personal Projects.....	42
2.5. The Principle of Reasonable Sacrifice.....	48
2.6. Position, Ability, and Special Responsibilities.....	50
2.7. Our Duties Towards Others.....	56
2.8. The Human Right of Freedom from Poverty.....	58
2.9. Additional Arguments for Libertarians.....	65
2.10. Colonialism and Imperialism and their Aftermaths.....	67
2.11. Exploitation and Harm.....	73
2.12. A Climate Problem.....	86
2.13. Security.....	92
Conclusion.....	94
3. Why and When do Human Beings Help Each Other?.....	96
3.1. Altruism and Cooperation.....	97
3.2. When Are People Most Likely to Help?	103
3.3. Why Do We Give? – Explanatory Approximations.....	106
3.4. The Limits of Altruism.....	113
3.5. How Much Do We Give?.....	118
3.6. Mental Accounting for Charity.....	122
3.7. The Tragedy of the Forgotten Disaster – Limited Attention.....	126
3.8. The Identifiable Victim-Effect.....	133
3.9. The Geo-Cultural Bias.....	136
3.10. Victim Blame.....	138
3.11. Dispersion of Responsibility.....	142
3.12. “Moneying Around”.....	145
3.13. The Elephant in the Room – Racism and Donations.....	150
3.14. Convincing the Unconvinced – Reason versus Emotion.....	156
3.15. Convincing the Unconvinced – Situationism.....	161
3.16. Convincing the Unconvinced – Hearts before Minds.....	164
3.17. Evaluating Fundraising Methods.....	171
3.18. The Internet – A Brave New World of Activism?.....	176
3.19. KONY 2012 – A Humanitarian Plea Goes Viral.....	186
3.20. How to Appeal Successfully in the Digital Area and How to Do so Sustainably.....	194
Conclusion: Why an Exclusively Emotional Approach Alone Cannot Solve the Problem.....	204
4. Aid in Practise or How Effective is our Aid?.....	208
4.1. From Humanitarian Aid to Development Aid.....	210
4.2. Aid Effectiveness.....	212
4.3. The Millennium Development Goals.....	216
4.4. The Philosophy of Effectiveness.....	224
4.5. Should We Not Help At All? – The Position of Thomas Robert Malthus.....	228

4.6. Obstacles towards Aid Efficacy in the Short Run – Humanitarian Aid.....	235
4.7. Misuse of Development Aid and Corruption.....	237
4.8. Setting Yourself up for Failure – Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages.....	241
4.9. Fair Trade – Ethical Consumption?.....	248
4.10. Why Official Development Aid is No Solution.....	257
4.11. Microcredits – Banking for the Poor.....	262
4.12. Direct Giving to the Poor.....	271
5. Conclusion – Beyond Charity.....	281
6. Bibliography.....	290

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank my family, especially my parents who supported me through the arduous journey of this doctoral thesis. Without them, this would not have been possible. It would also not have been possible without my girlfriend Julia, who gave good counsel and helped with her impeccable planning and a shoulder to cry on if necessary. I would also like to thank Jürgen Grenz, for allowing me to work half-time to finish the work. My doctoral supervisors Agustín Vicente and Daniel Innerarity Grau for help and good and kind advice. Henning Hahn, Robert Lepenies and Jorge Galindo González for inspiring conversations. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the people suffering from poverty and injustice.

List of Abbreviations

CAF	–	Charities Aid Foundation
CEO	–	Chief Executive Officer
DREF	–	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund of The Red Cross and the Red Crescent
DZI	–	Deutschen Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen e.V.
EU	–	European Union
FAO	–	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
IAT	–	Implicit Association Test
ICA	–	International Coffee Agreement
IFAD	–	International Fund for Agricultural Development
INGO	–	International Non-Governmental Organisation
ILO	–	International Labour Organisation
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
INE	–	Instituto Nacional de Estadística
LRA	–	Lord Resistance Army
MDG	–	Millennium Development Goals
MSF	–	Médecins Sans Frontières International
NATO	–	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO / NGOs	–	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
ODA	–	Official Development Aid
ODI	–	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	–	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OXFAM	–	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PSI	–	Population Service International
TRIPS	–	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UN	–	United Nations
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	–	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	–	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
US / USA	–	United States of America
VENRO	–	Verband Entwicklungspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe
VSO	–	Voluntary Service Overseas
WFB	–	World Food Programme
WHO	–	World Health Organisation
WTO	–	World Trade Organisation
QALY	–	Quality Adjusted Life Years

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Annual Overview of Total Donations in Germany	118
Figure 2: International Comparison of Charitable Giving	121
Figure 3: Overview of Resources Needed and Resources Pledged per Country	127
Figure 4: Development of Aid from 2000 to 2015	132
Figure 5: Fundraising Message from the UK Disaster Emergency Committee	165
Figure 6: Advertisement from the German INGO <i>Welthungerhilfe</i>	167
Table 1: Overview and Development of Invisible Children's Income	195

1. Introduction

The struggle against global poverty continues to be one of mankind's greatest challenges. According to a conservative estimate by the World Bank (2016), 767 million people are estimated to have been living below the updated international poverty line of US \$1.90 per person per day. This is 10.7 per cent of the global population. The financial aspect of having a purchase parity adjusted income below the just the very top of the iceberg.¹ According to the 2015 Human Development Report slightly more than 1 billion people are not able to meet their basic needs, which means constant risk of under- and malnutrition, lack of access to sanitation or safe drinking water (UNDP 2015, 4). The consequence are typical diseases such as cholera or intestinal worms (Deaton 2013, Sachs 2005, 58ff. and Shiffman 2006). Added to this, many people in developing countries suffer from preventable (tropical) illnesses such as malaria, tuberculosis, different forms of hepatitis, dengue fever, or sleeping sickness (WHO 2013 and 2014). Especially cruel are diseases such as the one caused by the chigoe flea (Latin denomination *Tunga penetrans*) that burrows into the underside of the foot to hatch its young and may cause crippling pain (Cestari, Pessato, and Ramos-e-Silva 2007). It means a lack of access to contraceptives and other means of family planning, leading to young women becoming mothers and having far more children than financially or physically safe. It means that these births will not take place in a hospital or be accompanied by skilled health staff, resulting in a high risk of maternal mortality. New research points out the crippling psychological effects of poverty, which are chronic stress, addiction, reduction of cognitive capabilities and unhappiness (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013 and World Bank 2015, ch. 4 and 5).

An estimated 18 million human beings die every year around the world from avoidable, poverty-related causes, with ten of these 18 million are children under five years

¹ For a discussion on the problems and exactness of the poverty line see Alkire and Foster 2007 and 2009 and Pogge and Reddy 2010.

of age (Singer 2009a, 4f, and UNDP 2015, 5). This means approximately 16.000 to 30.000 children die every day from malnutrition and preventable diseases. The faces and effects of poverty are manifold (Narayan et al. 2000, ch. 2 and World Bank 2016, 5ff.). A constant however, remains that poverty shortens life and causes much suffering. Although there has been progress in several countries, most notably China, the return of hunger crisis in East Africa in 2011 and again this year (2017), putting over 12 million humans in danger of starving, shows quite clearly that the problem of poverty and the resulting human suffering will not disappear by itself (cp. Carstens 2011, Perry 2011, and Conrad 2017). The “call to arms” against poverty is not something new.² There have been many such calls throughout the 20th century, often accompanied by heavy media attention, at least for a short while.³ However, poverty, even if somewhat reduced, is still looming over humanity in the 21st century. Why a problem so universally recognised has yet to find a solution will be discussed in this work. A main reason for the unsatisfactory current situation is that the world-wide poor do not have sufficient buying and political power to change their situation by themselves. It seems a terrible paradox that in theory the planet earth seems to be able to yield enough to feed and clothe all its children (Pogge 2010a 21ff. and Sen 2001, 160ff.). But far too many are not reached by this food and clothing, e.g. due to problems of redistribution and priorities. William Easterly (2007b, 4) illustrates this with an uncomfortable example: We live in a world, where it was possible to deliver nine million copies of the sixth volume of the Harry Potter series to bookstores in several countries on

July 16th 2005. All of these were available on a single day and many actually were even

² For example, in 1982 James P. Grant, head of UNICEF from 1980 until his death in 1995, held a lecture in front of the the UN assembly entitled “Why the Other Half Dies” (Bornstein 2007, 242ff and George 1976). Written by child paediatrician Jon Rhode, the lecture stated that each year in the developing world 14 million children under the age of five died of easily and cheaply preventable diseases, such as diarrhoea and immunisable diseases, for example polio, measles or smallpox. Grant called people in the western world to imagine 120 jumbo jets full of children crashing each day to understand the magnitude of preventable child deaths (*ibid.*, 247). His efforts in global child vaccination and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) are estimated to have saved 25 million children worldwide. His efforts in establishing an international Convention on the Rights of Children lead it to become the most widely embraced rights treaty in the history of the UN with only a handful of countries, as for example Somalia and the USA, not being among the ratifiers (*ibid.*, 253).

³ Take for example the “Band Aid” famine relief campaign for Ethiopia in 1984, accompanied by the “Do they know it’s Christmas?” song by Bob Geldof and Midge Ure (Ellis-Petersen 2014). Or more recently the 2005 campaign by British NGOs to “Make Poverty History” (Sireau 2009).

sent directly to customers. Easterly makes the valid point that it remains a mystery why simple and affordable solutions such as malaria bed-nets or de-worming programmes for children, both costing only a few cents per unit, are not distributed globally. The explanation is partly that the poor simply lack the income and the buying power to afford even these simple health interventions. Additionally, the lack of a local infrastructure and functioning markets adds to the cost of providing these goods, meaning that these solutions are left to be provided, or not, by international charitable institutions. However, Easterly raises some scepticism whether these solutions can and should be provided. Ethically, the valid question can be asked, why Western citizens should compensate for the lack of political will of local extractive elites, as most developing countries are rich in natural resources and could easily afford a limited health system.

From the point of view of several philosophers, most notably among them Peter Singer (2009a and 2015), it is difficult to explain and even more difficult to tolerate, that the Western public can ignore this huge amount of suffering. While dying from starvation and illness has been a sad constant in human history, it seems obvious that we now would have the resources, medical and otherwise, to prevent this in many cases from happening day in, day out (Deaton 2013, 59ff. and Sachs 2005, 244ff.). Yet, we seem to have no problem in living our everyday life while this occurs. Seen from a moral maximalist, as utilitarian Peter Singer does, but also from an everyday ethics point of view, there is something strange about societies that care more about the birth of a prince in England, about soccer matches, about the newest movie blockbuster, their pets, or the newest celebrity extravagances. And these are just some of the topics that completely dominate global poverty in the media.

This dissertation uses and integrates results from several disciplines: most notably philosophy (ethics), psychology, sociology, and economics to gain an understanding of this puzzle (philanthropic studies as necessarily a multi-disciplinary field). This monograph

begins with a philosophical deliberation of what we owe to distant needy strangers. Starting point will be the ethical claims made by the Australian philosopher and ethicist Peter Singer. Singer (2009a, 3ff.) adopts a moral maximalist point of view, arguing that saving a distant stranger is as much a requirement as saving a drowning child in a shallow pond you encounter on your way to work. He proposes that costs incurred by the saving of the drowning child have to be borne by the individual who has the ability and thus the responsibility to help and proposes the hypothesis that this case is analogous to the case of the typical member of a Western society, who compared to the global situation, is well-off (cp. MacAskill 2015a, ch. 1). He concludes that we therefore have a duty not only to donate a large part of our income, but we should take the appropriate steps to limit our expenses and increase our income, for example by choosing to work as a Wall Street broker, so that we may donate more (MacAskill 2015b and Singer 2015, 3f. and 39ff.).

In the first part, this proposal will be discussed in depth. Singer's argument in its original form does ask too much of us as individuals confronted with poverty on a global scale, this excessive demand of others leaves little to no room for personal projects, such as family and friendships, choosing a fulfilling career or dedications such as arts and sports. In a *reductio ad absurdum* it will be argued, that dedicating your life completely to others' means giving their lives more importance than your own (Cullity 2003 and 2004, 90ff., Williams 1972 and 1985, and Sinnott-Armstrong 2014, ch. 6). Neither is the situation of the drowning child an exact analogy. In the case of the child a shared situation, time and space, among other factors, place the would-be rescuer in a situation of special responsibility, this is not necessarily analogous to supplying several children in Kenya with malaria nets.

However, this rebuttal of the extreme individual responsibility does not mean that we owe the global poor nothing at all. Singer captures a convincing intuition that the ravages of absolute poverty should be avoidable in the face of global affluence and should

be a higher priority, if not necessarily for individuals but the collective nation-states. Additionally, there are many historical, economical and political connections that link different societies to each other, some of them have been and continue to be harmful for the population of poor countries, from colonialism to the current practise of illicit financial flows, which siphon capital from developing countries or trade with illegitimate regimes, which pose a case for cessation and reparation (Kar and Leblanc 2013, Kohn 2014, and Wenar 2008 and 2011a). But this does not mean that the responsibility for supporting the global poor rests solely or even primarily on the affluent citizens of developed countries. Rather, corrupt and inefficient local government structures, sometimes combined by local conflict, are primarily responsible for a lack of development, just distribution of natural resources and the resulting inability to make simple medical care and financial support available, as human rights and decency would demand. Another important part of the responsibility lies in international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multinational companies who, through trade regulations, red tape and support of corrupt elites limit economic participation of large part of developing countries populations (Pogge 2007, 2010a and 2011 and Wenar 2011a and 2105).

Effective altruism relies on the paradigm of charity in the fight against global poverty, not global justice. Each citizen in affluent countries should dedicate between one and five per cent of his or her income to eradicating poverty. Singer (2009a, 63ff.) is of the opinion that findings on donor behaviour allow us to establish a “culture of giving” that will finally overcome poverty. However, an overview of the state of psychological research on donor behaviour presented in part 3 offers a sceptical view on the effectiveness of donations. The study of charity, donor behaviour and motivation is a very recent domain of the social sciences that will turn out to be highly relevant in the future.⁴ While understanding the psychological basis of charitable behaviour is important, the research

⁴ As argue Oppenheimer and Olivola in their 2011 book *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*.

also points towards one basic problem: As the results for example compiled by Oppenheimer and Olivola in their 2011 book *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity* clearly indicate, donating behaviour largely depends on our emotions. To resume the main results: Our limited cognitive (and emotional) abilities prevent us from correctly perceiving the suffering caused by global poverty. As the victims are dispersed over several continents and different moments in time, we are unable to really understand the extent of the suffering. There is no clear cause for us to identify. Moreover, our emotional system is bounded by simple decision algorithms and near-altruism.

Therefore our intuitions, our emotions, and our compassion are not adequate tools to solve such a complex and large-scale problem as world poverty. It can be shown that the voluntariness to aid depends heavily on morally and economically irrelevant features, such as geographical distance, attractiveness of person asking for a donation, and the perceived cause of the disaster, and are notoriously fickle. Donors on average give in a way that strengthens their self-image and if they have a personal connection to the cause. A fundraising industry has risen that favours larger NGOs that are able and willing to spend considerable amounts on acquiring donations (Andreoni and Payne 2011, Stern 2013a and Plewes and Stuart 2006).

Moreover, everything points towards an upper limit to the possible amount of donations a society is willing to muster, as the total amount of donations per society grows only very slowly. It has to be noted, that only a minor part of total spending will be targeted towards global poverty. In this context, it is important to scrutinize the relationship between public perception of and opinion on development aid. Both private and official development aid remain a fringe topic in the public debate, and surveys in different societies reveals that the public remains uninformed about use and extent of spending on aid, let alone its effectiveness (Bølstad 2011, CARMA 2006, Darnton and Kirk 2011, and

Riddell 2008, 107ff.).

The charitable approach alone cannot be a solution to the problem. Recent literature in moral psychology⁵, in tradition of the Humean view of human nature, shows that altruism and compassion do exist, but tend to be near-sighted and group-focused in their extent. It also seems that they are quite easily distractable and manipulable. Using our compassion to solve global problems therefore is an over-extension of our *emotional space* (Innerarity 2011). This is reflected in the media and marketing campaigns by a growing number of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs). As Daniel Innerarity (2011, transl. by the author) writes:

“Compassion, which is a sign of humanity, has its quirks. Our emotional space, as our attention to the world, is often selective, arbitrary and inconsistent. The care agenda tends to be fickle and to prioritize what is most sensational. Our emotional space also has a bad memory. The most intense emotions often are the most quickly forgotten. In any case, there are dramas before the media's arrival and often they continue after their leave.”⁶

Development aid motivated only by charity is necessarily short-term and thus inefficient in the long run. The charitable approach tends to promote a way of giving that is motivated by feelings such as culpability or sympathy, which results in an aid that is not focused on the specific local needs of the recipient, but on the ideas or feelings of the donor. Furthermore, media and donor attention is fickle and easily seduced by attractive campaigns and fads. The influence of the Internet and social media seems to increase this tendency, as the case

⁵ I refer to the results of moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt (2001) and Joshua Greene (2007).

⁶ “[L]a compasión, que es un signo de humanidad, también tiene sus caprichos. Nuestros espacios emocionales, como nuestra atención hacia el mundo, es frecuentemente selectiva, arbitraria e inconstante. La agenda de la atención está configurada de manera bastante caprichosa y tiende a priorizar lo que resulta más sensacional. También tiene mala memoria. Las emociones más intensas suelen ser las más rápidamente olvidadas. En cualquier caso, los dramas existen antes de que los medios se fijen en ellos y persisten también cuando éstos dejan de atenderlos.” (Innerarity 2011).

study of the KONY 2012 campaign reveals. The considerable cost of fundraising campaigns means that larger organisations able to spend more have an advantage, not necessarily the most effective ones (Dogra 2012, 27ff. and Stern 2013a, 183ff. and 190f.). Overcoming these problems sustainably could be difficult enough to warrant a different approach towards global poverty. Before we donate blindly, it is our duty to define our ethical requirements in full view of all consequences. The next step is recognizing that saving a human being from starvation today makes little sense, if all his or her future has to offer is dependence and insecurity.

Singer's analogy relies heavily on the existence of efficient International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), that actually save human lives in a sustainable way. Findings indicate that there are indeed projects that save the equivalent of a human life for between \$3.500 to \$6.000, while not literally, but for example by reducing the burden of the diseased mentioned at the very beginning or by giving a poor household a stipend that enables them to invest into education, housing and medical care, increasing quality and length of life (MacAskill 2015a, 63ff.). However, only a handful of the proposed interventions actually benefit the intended recipients, most misguided attempts of helping are maladapted to local conditions and needs and in some cases outright fraud and embezzlement of resources (Polman 2008, chp. 6, MacAskill 2015a, 1ff. and Stern 2013a, 105ff.). This is further complicated by possible non-intentional (perverse) effects such as *crowding out* or *dependency*. The unfortunate result is that well-intended measures against poverty remain ineffective and may even be counterproductive. Crowding out (Kiely and Marfleet 1998 and O'Neill 1986) in this context refers to the fact that aid supplants and actually damages the local economy, for example it is no longer worth while for a local farmer to produce rice or corn if the population receives them for free. This is indicated for example by Kenyan Professor James Shikwati (2006) or Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda (2006). Their critical opinion is that all forms of development aid are paternalistic

and keep especially their countries in a situation of perpetual dependence on aid money and regimes from undertaking necessary reforms. If this thesis holds water, it is necessary to propose alternative concepts of and approaches to foreign help. A similar thesis is advocated by Dambisa Moyo in “Dead Aid” (2009) and by William Easterly in his book “The White Man's Burden” (2007b).⁷ The capacity of both private and official development aid as a tool to solve internal problems, such as corruption or conflict, are limited. Thus many projects do not bring any demonstrative improvement or may even be pernicious. From a practical perspective, the question raised should be whether in view of the complexity of economic development and poverty any long-term results can be sustained by external actors (Ramalingam 2013).

On the other hand, the elimination of smallpox was a success of international aid that continues to save several million people annually (Fenner et al. 1988 and MacAskill 2015a, 10ff.). So at least in some cases sustainable benefits are possible, especially if aid is directly targetted towards the poor. The greatest contribution by the effective altruism movement is therefore the call to focus donations on effective organisations and projects, by establishing organisations such as “GiveWell” that monitor, evaluate and publish INGO results. Helping effectively is both a rational and, confronted with the challenge of limited resources dedicated towards supporting the global poor, an ethical requirement. While the trend towards scrutinizing INGOs and aid institutions predates their work, both Singer's (2009a and 2015) and MacAskill's (2015a) contribution to this field are noteworthy and impressive. In addition to their academic work, the philosophers were active in the creation of the website “Giving What We Can”⁸ and “The Life You Can Save”⁹ thus informing many people not only of the need to donate, but crucially, how to do so effectively. Unfortunately, besides epistemological problems, the central problem of the paradigm of charity remains, with donations being influenced by fads in the media and a lack of respect

⁷ These critics of development aid refer to the groundbreaking work of Peter Bauer “Dissent of Development” (1971).

⁸ www.givingwhatwecan.org.

⁹ www.thelifeyoucansave.org.

and inclusion of the poor themselves in the development and implementation of solutions, due to them being donor-centred (cp. Anik et al. 2011, Baaz 2005 and Ratner, Zhao, and Clarke 2011). Even the very concept of measuring effectiveness has been misunderstood, as the debate on “overhead costs” reveals (Bowman 2006).¹⁰ Making things even more difficult, psychological research reveals that appeals to rationality may actually diminish willingness to donate (Oppenheimer and Olivola 2011 and Slovic and Västfjäll 2010).

Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how efficiency could be marketed in the view of donor psychology. This may be called the *Machiavellian problem*, as for fundraising – as well as for the *Principe* – appearance seems to matter more than actual efficacy (Stern 2013a, 17ff.).¹¹ Some NGOs act like show-offs (Gharib 2015, Dogra 2012, Cameron and Haanstra 2008, Plewes and Stuart 2006 and Westhead 2013). This is fuelled by the tendency of many donors to give to charity for the sake of their reputation and/or to calm their bad conscience. In such a case, donating is not primarily efficiency-oriented. Similar tendencies can be observed in Corporate Social Responsibility-campaigns (cp. Baines 2014).

Additionally, the problem of self-servingness, in this case of national interests not only dictates private donations, but also global trade and official development aid (ODA). This limits calls to simply increase governmental spending on aid and thus taking away the voluntariness to aid, where it would seem ethically appropriate. Here several ideas will be presented on what could be done better.

It is thus important when communicating with the public to frame donations in a specific way (Darnton and Kirk 2011). That donating to development aid projects is futile remains, a widespread position in Western public (Bølstad 2011, 79ff.). This is not surprising, as many of the projects are actually wanting in efficiency. Additionally, biases

¹⁰ “Overhead” refers to the general costs that an organisation spends on management, evaluation, fundraising, and transfers, i.e. money that is not directly invested in projects or the target group. It has unfortunately become popular in recent years to use overhead costs as a overly simple rule of thumb to determine the efficiency of an NGO (Bowman 2006).

¹¹ Charles Baudelaire illustrates this in the story “La Fausse Monnaie” (1868), where he observes a wealthy friend self-congratulating himself on his generosity. In fact he gave the beggar a false coin.

and ideological constructions such as (N)eo-Malthusianism continue to influence the Western public (Abramitzky and Braggio 2005 and Ross 1998). Thomas Robert Malthus will be presented as an early critic of charity. He probably is the first one to advance the position that charity can create harm in the long run. However, his thesis has been disproven, as there has been considerable success in alleviating global suffering related to poverty, most notably the rapid rise of the Chinese economy, that has allowed a large part of the population to lift themselves out of poverty by finding work (even if many of them are in so-called “sweat-shops”) in budding industrial centres and thus support their families (Blattman and Dercon 2016, Li et al. 2009, and MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8). Additionally, health interventions, family planning and increased incomes are a good way to limit family sizes (The Economist 2009).

The problems of donor-centricity plague aid projects in several other ways, as will be demonstrated by case studies of several approaches to combat global poverty. Central problems such as distrust towards the poor (microcredits), self-image and pressure to succeed from donor community (Millennium Village Project), focus on donor life-style (Fair Trade), result in a lack of effectiveness and continuation of programmes, even if they have no demonstrative effect on poverty relief. Positive examples tend to be not very spectacular and attractive, for example de-worming and malaria nets. One of the most effective ways to support the poor is by providing them with direct financial support (Aker et al. 2014, Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013, Glassman 2014, Melo 2007, and Standing 2008). This reflects what is largely absent, unfortunately both from most development aid projects and effective altruism, the poor themselves. It will be argued, that taking human lives as intrinsically valuable should entail that we do not simply strive to save as many as them as possible, but actually listen to their needs and wants (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012 and Wenar 2006 and 2011b). While providing them with basic health, and even better with financial support, is an important first step, the long-term focus should be on avoiding

harm by partaking in exploitative international structures, to allow them to lift themselves out of poverty by becoming active members of the world economy, and even more important, by supporting their protest and changing of the global and local political system that excludes them. Without this focus on the poor, the effective altruism movement itself is at risk of becoming another fad, as the worrisome new tendency to focus on “extinction events” within the movement and the focus on philanthrocapitalism reveals (McGoey 2015). To assure that global poverty is reduced in a sustainable way, effective altruist should therefore not only fight for more donations to effective organisations, but towards the establishment of a global wealth or speculation tax, that targets especially the super-wealthy and multinational corporations, that have been avoiding their fair share so far. The income thus created should finance a global minimal income for the poorest of the planet.

New insights or findings from this thesis:

This thesis falls into the wider field of ethics of philanthropy, necessarily a multidisciplinary field, uniting sociology, ethics, economics, and psychology (Illingworth, Pogge and Wenar 2011, 4f), as seen by Peruvian economist Javier Iguñiz in his 2009 “Invitation to Multidisciplinary” in the combat against poverty and for democracy (also cp. Narayan et al. 2000). This thesis will indicate the possible ways ahead in the global combat against poverty and show the difficult relationship between fundraising and poverty relief. Combining different approaches, an overview of different fields concerning both willingness and possibilities of global poverty assistance will be given. The goal is the establishment of a moral duty to act against poverty, but also defining the limits of international poverty relief on the example of charitable donations.

The thesis offers an in-depth discussion on the ethical basis of the “effective altruism”-movement, as developed by Peter Singer (2009a and 2015) and William

MacAskill (2015a), namely that we should base our life path on how much we can do to alleviate global suffering. While rejecting the principle as to demanding and an inadequate allocation of responsibility for most citizens, it can nevertheless be shown, that there is a certain duty to help to support the global poor as fellow human beings and as reparation for damages suffered from the global political and economic order. However, it has to be noted that most of these duties are collective in nature, and thus cannot easily fulfilled by private donations. As Miller (2004, 376) describes

“If so, the critique of Singer's argument should be a preliminary to a better, more political argument in the interest of those he seeks to help. As an effort to base a fairly radical conclusion about giving on ordinary moral convictions, this further project pays homage to Singer's pathbreaking work.”

The second part of the thesis provides an overview over the state of literature on the research on donor behaviour. It is shown that increasing donations is very difficult and that donors often behave paradoxically and self-centeredly. This determines the limits, but also the possibilities of the charitable paradigm. The hypothesis, that charity is a scarce resource and therefore the total amount of donations per society is limited, will be reinforced.

Combined with the findings on the difference of effectiveness of different forms of aid in the last part, this results in the conclusion that establishing a quality standard for INGOs and to support and communicate the work of charity evaluators was an important contribution by both Peter Singer and William MacAskill. It should however still remain clear that charity has it's limits and cannot do the work of justice. As Richard Rorty puts it (1994, 182)

“We *resent* the idea that we shall have to wait for the strong to turn their piggy little eyes to the suffering of the weak, slowly open their dried-up little hearts. We desperately hope there is something stronger and more powerful that will *hurt* the strong if they do not do these things – if not a vengeful God, then a vengeful aroused proletariat or, at least, a vengeful superego or, at the very least, the offended majesty of Kant's tribunal of pure practical reason.”

2. The Philosophical Discussion and Ethical Background to Giving

2.1. *The Life You Can Save* – Peter Singer's Utilitarian Appeal

“UNICEF, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, estimates that about 24,000 children die every day from preventable, poverty-related causes. Yet at the same time almost a billion people live very comfortable lives, with money to spare for many things that are not at all necessary. (You are not sure if you are in that category? When did you last spend money on something to drink, when drinkable water was available for nothing? If the answer is “within the past week” then you are spending money on luxuries while children die from malnutrition or diseases that we know how to prevent or cure.)

The *Life You Can Save* seeks to change this. If everyone who can afford to contribute to reducing extreme poverty were to give a modest proportion of their income to effective organizations fighting extreme poverty, the problem could be solved. It wouldn't take a huge sacrifice.”

From the *A Life you can Save*-website.¹²

In his two books “*The Life You Can Save*” (2009) and “*The Most Good You Can Do*” (2015), Peter Singer, perhaps today's most prominent utilitarian, picks up a debate he started in 1972 when publishing the influential essay “Famine, Affluence and Morality”.¹³ His argumentation in essence has not changed during the last forty years, with the challenge of world poverty remaining to this day. Singer's argumentation is important in this context as it is straightforward and consequent. However, I do not fully share his point of view. I will present his position as an introduction to the problem and then specify where I differ.

Singer's basic position is utilitarian in nature. According to utilitarianism, it is our

¹² www.thelifeyoucansave.org.

¹³ A preliminary version of this chapter has been developed in Lauer (2011).

duty to alleviate suffering and promote good living conditions (i.e. *utility, happiness* or in the more complicated version of preference utilitarianism, which Singer favours, *individual choices and interests*).¹⁴ In the consequentialist tradition, he argues that a just ethical system has to apply the *principle of equality*. This means that every human being's suffering or well-being counts the same, regardless of differences such as gender, age, nationality, or geographical distance.¹⁵ These differences should be considered morally irrelevant and therefore have no influence on our actions.

In ethics we can find what Matravers (2007, 77) calls the “Kantian aspiration to purge luck from the determination of what we deserve”. When determining what a person is to receive in goods, we want a choice-sensitive, but endowment-insensitive method of distribution (Matravers 2007 and Rawls 1971). This is connected to the moral argument of the *lottery of birth* (cp. Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 and van Parijs 1995). The argument can be resumed in the following question:

Why am I born into the developed world and can enjoy a life in security and relative comfort, while another person will have to struggle his entire life with malnutrition, disease and insecurity just because of a geographical accident of birth?

We need not be convinced by a veil of ignorance-type argument, to agree that fellow rational and emotional human beings should not suffer undeserving from poverty.¹⁶

According to Singer, in a world where international poverty relief organisations, such as UNICEF or Oxfam, are already “on the ground”, this is not difficult to do. One

¹⁴ I shy away from the common usage of the term “happiness” in this context. Happiness is a very individual notion and notoriously difficult to measure. I am not sure whether promoting happiness could really be an ethical duty.

¹⁵ This understanding of our humanitarian duties including every single member of our species can also be found in many religious world-views. Most notably for Westerners it is an important part of Christian doctrine.

¹⁶ Some people deny the fact of undeserving suffering and adhere to the just world theory, they even maintain this belief contrary to overwhelming evidence. This problem will be discussed in chapter 3.10.

does not need to fly to Somalia or visit the slums of New Delhi and establish a hospital or build a school, this work should be done by experts. What we as normal citizens should and can do is donating money.

Singer illustrates his reasoning with a moral tale from the Confucian scholar Mencius (Shun 2010, also cp. Unger 1996, 9f.):

The drowning child scenario: You see a small child drowning in a shallow pond.

You could wade out and save the child's life, but doing so would ruin your \$200 suit. Would it be acceptable to refuse saving the child?

Our intuitive response in this case is clear: It is unacceptable to let the child drown. Singer thinks that the reason we believe that we ought to save the drowning child can be generalized as the

“Principle of sacrifice: If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do so.” Singer (1972, 241, cp. Miller 2004, 357).

Or in a more abstract formulation:

If by doing X, S's life can be saved, and X entails personal costs of $<c$, then I ought to do X.

Cp. Miller (2004) and Mulgan (2001)

After establishing this principle, he proposes a second scenario:

The letter scenario: You receive a letter from UNICEF, telling you that a donation of \$200 will save a dozen innocent third-world children. Without even considering donating, you throw it away. Is your behaviour morally acceptable?

Singer argues that while we are quite seldom confronted with the first scenario, we are quite frequently challenged by the second one. But, at least in practice, our moral actions are quite different: We permit ourselves to throw the letter away.

Indeed most people will judge this to be a much lesser, if any, moral failing on the part of the agent, contrary to the case of the drowning child. But throwing the letter away, in Singer's view, violates the principle of sacrifice in the same way as not saving the drowning child would, because for a utilitarian, distance is not a morally relevant factor (cp. Singer 2002, 2009a, 7ff., and 2011a). Singer uses these scenarios to point towards one central problem: The incoherence of our ethical intuitions. He demands that we ask ourselves the question: Who has more right to the \$200, the one who is currently in possession of them, or the one who needs them most. Singer sides with the latter, adopting a position of prioritarianism.¹⁷

In view of findings in human moral psychology, we can safely assume that the desire to save the child in this scenario is a *human universal* (cp. Aknin et al. 2013, Brown 1991 and Greene 2007). Here Singer very ingeniously combines an intuitional approach to ethics with utilitarianism. For a utilitarian, saving the child is of course mandatory, as he is bound by the moral importance of each person's well-being (cp. Ashford 2011, 29 and Cullity 2004, 16ff.). But because the example of the drowning child speaks directly to our empathy and our moral intuitions, the example should be convincing for virtue ethicists or deontologists as well. In the first case one can simply argue that among the virtues one should cultivate there are beneficence and compassion (cp. Slote 2007). This is true for all religion-based virtue ethics models such as Islam, Christianity, or Judaism (cp. Beauchamp
¹⁷ See Arneson (2000) for a defence and Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) for a critique of the position of prioritarianism.

2013 and Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006).

Ashford (2011, 29) analyses that Singer's premise is convincing for a deontological position that has the “most minimal concern for persons' well-being or respect for their dignity as rational autonomous agents.” Applying the categorical imperative to the situation results in a clear duty to save the child (cp. O'Neill 1986).

Singer wants to convince as many people as possible with his example, and with the first step of his argumentation he does this quite successfully. In the following I will consider the duty to save the child as established. Some people will still refrain from saving the child, but they do something morally reprehensible and in some countries illegal, for example in German law, the duty to rescue is codified in the *Strafgesetzbuch* section 26 § 323c. *Unterlassene Hilfeleistung* (failure to provide assistance) is considered an offence against public safety and punishable by imprisonment up to a year.

Singer's argument is quite powerful. By combining the *principle of sacrifice* with the *moral irrelevance of distance*, derived from the principle of equality, Singer postulates a moral duty to donate for development aid, adding the *principle of priority* – there are people in the Third World who – by buying food and essential healthcare for their families – can make better use of our money than we ourselves. His premise is that the institutions that can save lives and provide people in the poorest countries with food, shelter, and medical care are already in place (be it UNICEF, Oxfam, or some other agency), and we have information and the possibility to help. All you have to do is give a certain amount of money to save someone instead of spending it on non-essential luxuries.¹⁸

¹⁸ Such as expensive clothing, cars, cinema visits. Singer himself seems particularly offended by the luxurious use of drinking bottled water in countries where drinking water is available from the tap. He points out that by simply donating the money for bottled water for charity and drinking tap water, one could do the right thing (Singer 2009a, 142). While his examples may sometimes seem a little far fetched, his point is a valid one: For reasonably affluent person it is always possible to make some relatively unimportant sacrifice, say a daily Starbucks coffee, and donate the money saved. The question that arises though is how much am I obliged to sacrifice to be a good human being. This will be discussed further on.

2.2. How Can Singer's Argument Be criticised?

Singer's starting point, the ethical requirement of saving the child, is very solid. A world where it would be acceptable for people to disregard other human beings' interests in such a way as to decline saving the child does not seem attractive. Indeed there seems to be little room for argumentation here that does not resort to crude and philosophically uninteresting egoism.¹⁹ Singer successfully shifts the burden of proof. Weighing the need of the poor against the small cost of a donation for the well-off individual results in such a disproportion of interests that the well-off will have to justify why not donating. Convincing criticism will therefore not focus on Singer's moral example, but on the generalising step, denying that the case of the child suffering from poverty is analogous to the case of the drowning child and that therefore the consequences Singer draws are the correct ones.²⁰ As Sias (2005) asks:

“Why suppose that the conflict in this circumstance lies in the *intuitions* rather than the *principles* we are supposed to derive *from* those intuitions?”

To illustrate his point, Sias (2005) proposes the following example of *moral blackmail*:

“**The hostage scenario:** You receive another letter from UNICEF. This time, however, you read that UNICEF is holding your neighbours hostage in their home, and that, unless you reply with a 200 € donation by a certain deadline, they will be killed.”

¹⁹ For a discussion and rejection of egoism see Feinberg (2012).

²⁰ For example Leif Wenar (2011b) titles an article arguing “poverty is no pond”, although he writes with great sympathy for Singer's approach.

A similar thought experiment has been forwarded by the University of York's Christian Piller.²¹ Imagine a man who thrusts a collection box in front of you and asks you to give him €5 or he will kill himself in front of you. Should you give him the money?

In both thought experiments the principles of reasonable sacrifice and equality apply. However, we reject any moral obligation in both cases, as they both constitute a felony, and giving in to blackmail will probably lead to a vicious circle with continuous extortion. These would be the consequentialist arguments against giving in these cases. A deontological position would be that we simply cannot give in to blackmail, even out of beneficence, without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance (cp. Arneson 2009, 268). Garrett Cullity (2003, 406) formulates the limits of our obligations to others thus: “If a gangster's gun jams, I ought not to help him fix it.”

2.3. Excessive Demand

“And finally — this is the cardinal point — for the seeker after goodness there must be no close friendships and no exclusive loves whatever. Close friendships, Gandhi says, are dangerous, because “friends react on one another” and through loyalty to a friend one can be led into wrong-doing. This is unquestionably true. Moreover, if one is to love God, or to love humanity as a whole, one cannot give one's preference to any individual person. This again is true, and it marks the point at which the humanistic and the religious attitude cease to be reconcilable. To an ordinary human being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people more than others. The autobiography leaves it uncertain whether Gandhi behaved in an inconsiderate way to his wife and children, but at any rate it makes clear that on three occasions he was willing to let his wife or a child die rather than administer

²¹ During a 2010 module in *Social Choice* for the Master in *Philosophy, Politics and Economics* at the University of York, England.

the animal food prescribed by the doctor. It is true that the threatened death never actually occurred, and also that Gandhi — with, one gathers, a good deal of moral pressure in the opposite direction — always gave the patient the choice of staying alive at the price of committing a sin: still, if the decision had been solely his own, he would have forbidden the animal food, whatever the risks might be. There must, he says, be some limit to what we will do in order to remain alive, and the limit is well on this side of chicken broth. This attitude is perhaps a noble one, but, in the sense which — I think — most people would give to the word, it is inhuman. The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals.”

George Orwell [1949] (1998, 6f.)

Utilitarian positions such as Singer's are often criticised for not respecting interpersonal boundaries, or special personal relationships, and for demanding too much in terms of self-sacrifice (Cullity 2003 and 2004, 90ff., Williams 1972 and 1985, Scheffler 1982, Sinnott-Armstrong 2014, ch. 6, and Vallentyne 2006). Taken seriously, the principle of sacrifice combined with the dire need of absolute poverty could mean that an individual would be morally required to forsake any income that is not necessary for his survival and donate it to help the world's worst off. This is reinforced when we consider positions of utility maximization: Faced with the dire need present in the world, I would be obliged to donate until the expected marginal value of my donation equals the marginal costs to myself. Miller (2004, 357) calls this the *radical conclusion*:

Everyone has a duty not to spend money on luxuries or frills, and to use the savings due to abstinence to help those in dire need.

This would be deeply counter-intuitive, and Garrett Cullity (2003 and 2004, ch. 5 and 6) accuses Singer of “asking too much”.²² But simply pointing out that the *extreme demand* (Cullity 2004, 70) is counter-intuitive is not sufficient to discredit the argument. Indeed, Peter Unger (1996) agrees that the results of the argument are counter-intuitive, but that we would still have to accept the argument and its consequences if they cannot be disproven in a valid way. Indeed, both Unger and Singer (2007) are sceptical about our moral intuitions, which often consist in nothing more than “biological residue of our evolutionary history”. They are often conflicting and contradictory, and an important part of philosophical reflection is weighing them against each other, to finally (hopefully) come up with a judgement.²³ The authors' conclusion would be that we simply have to accept these high moral demands and act accordingly.²⁴

While I do have the greatest sympathy for the above authors, as their position is a deeply humanist, even humanitarian one, I cannot agree with them. In the following chapter I will argue that there are limits to altruistic demands of others on my person. Indeed, *extreme demand* is *excessive demand*. But fortunately, it seems as the conflicting feelings that we have a duty to help, while rejecting the *extreme demand*, can be reconciled.

²² This is the title of his 2003 essay in *The Monist*. He further elaborated his position in the book *The Moral Demands of Affluence* (2004).

²³ Philosopher Peter Unger (1996, 14ff.) refers to this as the liberationist approach.

²⁴ A reader may of course point out now that Singer relies on a moral intuition when he asks whether we would rescue the child. It is therefore important to point out that he uses this as a way of illustrating that his utilitarian starting point is the right one.

2.4. The Permissiveness of Personal Projects

This leads us to the question of legitimate limits to obligations towards the poor on the giver's side. The first constraint is simply one of prudence. Even if you accept the most extreme interpretation, you will only have to give until you and your family are left with a reasonable amount so that in the foreseeable future none of you will experience dire need. Prudence also dictates a second constraint: In a Rawlsian interpretation, we have to allow for expense and investment that will benefit the worst off. The logic being that if we can use our given resources to increase our income so that the increased total amount of donations can then save more people, this is a sort of twist on “invest today so that you can save more tomorrow”. Singer (1972, 242 and 1977, 49) himself gives the example of purchasing an expensive suit to succeed in gaining a well-paid job at a New York law firm.²⁵ This will lead to more income which can then be donated, an approach supported by the charitable organisation “80.000 hours”.²⁶ Singer explicitly praises such behaviour in both 2014 and 2015 articles in the Boston Review and his book “The Most Good You Can Do” (2015, 3f):

“Recent Princeton graduate Matt Wage, for example, was offered a place for postgraduate studies at the University of Oxford but instead went to Wall Street, where within a year he had earned enough to donate \$100.000 to organizations helping people in extreme poverty.”²⁷

²⁵ Similar examples would be investing into a good business idea or a good education.

²⁶ Co-founded by William MacAskill (cp. MacAskill 2015a and 2015b and www.80000hours.org).

²⁷ Unfortunately, the activities on Wall Street are in themselves not neutral, indeed no job position is. If part of the donated money is earned by speculating on food and resources gained through slave-like work such as coltan, bananas, or cocoa, and financing arms sales and corporations that profit from lack of functioning justice systems in the third world, for example by not paying taxes or not compensating for created environmental damage, Mr. Wage may not perform an altruistic action at all, he may simply repay some of the damage he has done. There are many ways in which a career in finance, and just being a consuming Western citizen can hurt the poor, which will be discussed in chapter 2.11. Singer ignores these difficulties, which is difficult as in any but the strictest utilitarian interpretation, the “do no harm”-principle has priority over supporting others.

Both Singer and MacAskill (2015a, 181ff.) argue that we should not “follow our passions” but consider choosing a career path that ensures we make a lot of money to donate more. Naturally, a person who acts in this altruistic way must be very strongly motivated. As human beings have a tendency to act in their self-interest, many people would probably not be motivated to work extremely hard if they had to donate all their benefits. So some luxury could be allowed, if people are thereby motivated to work harder or in a less appreciated, but better paid job, earning – and finally donating – more. Singer (2015, 47) conceding that an opponent arguing that “earning to give is not for everyone”, would be on “solid ground”.

Finally, why limit our altruism to monetary donations? After all, there is much more you can – and according to extreme demand – need to do to save other people. Donating blood will be the easiest way (Singer 1973 and Campbell, Tan, and Boujaoude 2012). But more parts of your body may be needed and expendable, notably bone marrow, and in most people one of their kidneys (Drakulić 2008 and Singer 2015, ch. 6). But can we really say that someone who does not willingly undergo surgery and donate one of his kidneys to a complete stranger behaves egoistically and unethically? How far does the requirement go?

This illustrates the problem with extreme demand. If you fully accept it, you will be denied the possibility to lead an autonomous life and make individual decisions. *All* your decisions would have to be weighed against the need of the many poor, therefore limiting one's life-choices to altruistic-oriented ones (Cullity 2004, 137ff., Lichtenberg 2014, 47ff. and Miller 2004). We would no longer be allowed to choose to conduct our expenses in a way we see as right, as the majority of them would be destined towards others. Unger argues we should accept this claim on us if we want to be good human beings. But he here commits a typical error some radical ethicists or moralists may be quite prone to: reducing the value of human existence to the moral (Cp. Badhwar 2006, 73ff., Cullity 2004, 137ff.

and Miller 2004).²⁸ While moral aspects are highly important, there is much more to human existence than taking care of humanity. There is art, science, literature, sports, a satisfying job, and there are human relationships, friends, and family.²⁹ Those are all valuable things that increase happiness, and some of them, such as aesthetic pleasures and human relationships, may be intrinsically valuable. Cullity shows that the extremist demand results in a very limiting view on what constitutes a good life and – most importantly – can be lead *ad absurdum*.

When subscribing to the principle of sacrifice in the extreme interpretation, I sacrifice income so that others may have more. I do so as I recognise that they are rational human beings who have needs similar to mine and suffer the same as I would. I am obliged to help them get things they see as worthwhile. However, to do this I myself must sacrifice things I see as worthwhile. Cullity (2004, ch. 8, esp. 133ff. and 147ff.) concludes that therefore it must be permissible for me to get things I see as worthwhile for myself. In Cullity's own words (2004, 144):

“[As] I am morally required to treat other people's interests in getting a certain good as a good reason for helping them to get it, it must be defensible for me to take that good for myself.”

Unfortunately, this implies that in some cases goods or personal pursuits are worth more than a human life. I argue however that we can accept this bitter pill here. A good and fulfilled life necessarily is more than mere survival, as for example the capability approach shows clearly. It is therefore justifiable that the mere survival of other humans is not the only focus of our lives. Additionally, the pill is a lot less bitter than it would appear at first

²⁸ Badhwar goes even further in her criticism, accusing Singer and Unger of “moral monomania”, as such an excessive demand would reduce the good life to moral aspects, but moral worth is reduced to beneficence.

²⁹ Nussbaum (2011) gives a very extensive list of worthwhile aspects of life in her *eudaimonia*-influenced capability approach.

taste, because even if living an altruism-oriented life cannot be required of all of us, this does not mean that I am nevertheless obliged to treat all human beings fairly in my interaction with them. Neither does it mean that not helping at all can be justified. It just means that there are limits to the claims others have on me (Arneson 2009, Cullity 2004, and Temkin 2004).

Another problem for radical altruists would be the situation where the cost of saving the drowning child right in front of me surpasses the cost of saving a child with a donation. An act-utilitarian would then have to refrain from saving the child, as Kwame Anthony Appiah elaborates (2007, ch. 10). To paraphrase Bernard Williams (1981), the one who first has to calculate whether he can afford to save the child has one thought too many.

Of course this does not mean that a radically altruism-oriented life would not be worth-while. It could indeed be an ethically praiseworthy life, as the examples of Mahatma Gandhi or Mother Teresa illustrate. It will probably be a very fulfilling and also a happy life, as happiness is one of the effects of donating time and money (cp. Smith and Davidson 2014, this will be presented in the next part of the thesis). However, it cannot be maintained that the sacrifice of personal projects and plans to become a “moral saint” is the only possible life-plan. Susan Wolf (1982, 421), goes as far as denying that this live is worth aspiring to, labelling as “strangely barren”. This is echoed by the opening quotation by George Orwell in the preceding chapter. In an interesting approach, journalist Larissa MacFarquhar (2015) in “Strangers Drowning: Impossible Idealism, Drastic Choices, and the Urge to Help”, approaches the problem from an investigative angle and examines the life of examples that could be considered “moral saints”. The examples of people fighting against injustice, providing medical care to the disenfranchised and forgotten victims to civil conflict or just donate a majority of their income to charitable causes, demonstrate that the sacrifices come at a high personal costs, often a lack of family, personal happiness,

and safety. MacFarquhar (2015) shows that, while the lives of what she calls them “do-gooders” are not “barren”, indeed their lives are more than filled with strife and conflict, these people are not what we would consider normal from a societal or often even from a psychological perspective.

As Cullity (2004) shows for the special case of global poverty relief, and Williams (1981 and 1985) shows for utilitarianism in general, the demands of an altruism-oriented life will severely impede other important personal projects, thus not taking into account the *moral separateness of persons*. It will dictate your choice of job and severely limit the time and resources you can spend on family and friendships. The point has been made frequently that this extreme interpretation of impartiality is not only counter-intuitive, but in danger of contradicting utilitarianism itself (Arneson 2003, Scheffler 1982, and Vallentyne 2006, 30). As normatively separate individuals, we have the right to make our own choices and pursue our own interests. These include personal projects and ties such as friendships and family (cp. Arneson 2003 and Nagel 1991 and 2005). But while these are intrinsically valuable, they need time and resources that we cannot dedicate to the saving of others. Additionally, as a simple requirement of prudence, individuals are justified in creating financial security for themselves and to a certain degree for their children to avoid becoming themselves candidates for charity. An ethical model that undermines these moral intuitions and liberties probably would create unhappiness. This would be especially difficult for utilitarianism whose goal is the creation of happiness for the greatest possible number. A worthwhile life is more than just survival. It consists in taking meaningful and responsible decisions and creating and following your very own personal path in life (Sen 2001 and Nussbaum 2011). This personal freedom is intrinsically valuable and instrumentally the basis for a flourishing society (Fleurbaey 2007, Miller 2004, Popper 1945, Williams and Smart 1973, and Williams 1981). This means that there are limits to demands others can have on you. I argue that your obligations depend on the impact of

your actions on the other person. Meaning that for example a parent have strong obligations towards their children, and vice versa, or the employer towards his employee. The connection to the anonymous poor person rescued by your donation definitely is a real, although it is a very distant one. Therefore your obligations are limited. As will be shown in chapter 2.11., there are many ways in which our lives as Western consumers and citizens impact people in developing countries negatively. Limiting harm here should be our first priority.

As for any prioritarian, it is difficult for me to say “this is sufficient” and to draw a line which does not appear arbitrary and would not create several problems (cp. Arneson 2013). Arguably, establishing such a line would be committing the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness*.³⁰ Rather I want to argue that the moral urgency of addressing the problems of poverty diminishes, as poor people's welfare increases. We would then gradually be moving out of the realm of the morally necessary into the ideal, from the obligatory into the realm of the supererogatory.

Singer rightly recognises extreme poverty as a moral evil (cp. Pogge 2007 and 2010). Accordingly the more poverty is reduced, the less it is an evil that needs to be addressed. The moral urgency of the problem diminishes, and so does our responsibility for it. Allow me to present an illustrating example, say I am a Saudi-Arabian prince and I want to buy a 180 metre yacht, including a 3D-cinema and concert hall, for €500 million.³¹ Now in a world where 1.2 billion people do not have enough to, in which children starve, and contracting malaria is a long drawn-out but sure death sentence because you cannot afford the medicine, this crass indulgence in prestige and luxury is morally reprehensible. Simple concern for other human beings would oblige you to buy a less grandiose yacht and donate the difference. Now imagine a world where everybody is adequately fed and housed and

³⁰ A notion of Aristotle's (NE I 1094b11, NE 1094b23, and NE 1098a26), further refined by Anagnostopoulos 1994 and Whitehead 1925. In this context I take it to mean that neither is it possible nor important in the context of this thesis to work out an exact amount of donations needed to end world poverty.

³¹ The yacht is called Azzam (Der Spiegel Online 2013). To be fair it should be mentioned that Alwaleed bin Talal prince now actually promised to donate part of his fortune of \$32 billion to charity (Hubbard 2015).

with free clinics within reasonable distance, but the poorest lack a second pair of shoes. Having only one pair of shoes is inconvenient, it can cause unpleasant odour and athlete's foot. However, while the need for a second pair of shoes may still be more important than the need for a 180 metre yacht, I argue that in this world the prince's purchase is much less reprehensible. The moral urgency of the donation of shoes, especially second pairs, is much less important.

2.5. The Principle of Reasonable Sacrifice

The rejection of extreme demand may leave us with conflicting feelings. On the one hand one may feel relieved that one can continue to live one's life without having to devote the larger share of one's resources to the welfare of others. On the other hand, there is a certain uneasiness that in spite of the severe inequality of wealth and the suffering caused by poverty there really would be no reason for ethical action.

In the following, I will show that while we should reject the extreme demand, it does not mean that we owe nothing to the poor. As Lichtenberg (2014, 21) distils Singer's position marvellously, “rich should help poor because poor needs his help and because he can.” Or making the *humanitarian argument* explicit:

- Poor is a fellow human being, with feelings, life-plans, and rational awareness.
- His need is dire, his life will be significantly shortened, he will lose loved ones to easily preventable illness, and he will suffer.
- Unjust distribution of global resources and luck of birth have contributed to the plight of the poor, meaning that their poverty and resulting suffering are unmerited.

We need not value the interests of others as high and important as our own ones and that of our families. What is important, is that we value them minimally and act according to this valuation. Singer (2009a, 160ff.) provides a good rule of thumb, calculating that we should donate between one and five per cent of our income, based on how much we earn. But it is important to note that he settles more for practicality's sake than from conviction, recognising that asking too much would be psychologically self-defeating. I want to argue here that between one and five per cent are actually quite OK considering our obligations to the poor, the current state of the world and the effectiveness of INGOs in combatting poverty (discussed in part 4 of the thesis).

Asking too much may be detrimental, and this is just one of the psychological barriers we will have to confront when it comes to increasing the amount of donations. In the final part of this thesis will be tried to show that simply injecting more and more money into the global humanitarian system has only limited potential to eliminate poverty. Nevertheless, I would conclude that it is not only inconvenient reality which forces us to accept these limits to the demands of others on our lives, it also makes philosophically good sense to to raise the argument of demandingness objection in favour of a more liberal requirement of individuals to be beneficent.

Miller (2004, 358) allows for a more reasonable, one might say humane, principle of sacrifice that allows for some indulgence while “condemning callous indifference”. Minimal consideration of other people's interests results in the *principle of beneficence*, demanding *reasonable sacrifice* (Cullity 2004, 16ff. and 102f.).

“**The principle of sympathy or beneficence:** One's underlying disposition to respond to neediness as such ought to be sufficiently demanding, and it need not be any more demanding than this. A form of giving which would express greater underlying concern could impose a significant risk of worsening one's life, if one fulfilled all further responsibilities.”

Another appellation is the *principle of benevolence* (Mulgan 2001, 8) or *principle of humanity* (Fishkin 1982). As shown above, such principles have considerable moral force on their own. It will be difficult for us to reject the principle without losing something morally valuable and negating our common humanity and need for solidarity. Indeed it will be difficult to argue against this principle without resorting to crude and philosophically uninteresting egoism, i.e. that all of our actions are undertaken to benefit ourselves (Feinberg 2012). The most plausible position here is libertarianism, which will be discussed further on (cp. Hassoun 2012, ch. 3). What remains then is the question whether the consequence Singer draws from this intuition, namely that we should donate, is the right one. I need to postpone this question for now, as it is one of the essential questions of this thesis, it will be treated and attempted to explain more fully later.

The question “How much am I obliged to give?” has still not been answered finally. I think that this is a very individual decision, and consequently it varies according to one's *position, ability, and special responsibilities*.

2.6. Position, Ability, and Special Responsibilities

To introduce the concept of position, let us consider a possible objection to Singer's argument arising from fairness. In a nutshell the question raised by this objection is “Why me?” What if someone else has pushed the child into the pond? What if a lazy bystander is much closer to the victim and wearing much cheaper clothes (Temkin 2004, 421f)? Is not he supposed to do the rescuing?

These objections are easily defeated. To start with, it has to be emphasized that of course the pusher's ethical failing would be much greater than the bystander's. But that does not absolve the bystander from his responsibility to rescue the child (cp. Cullity 2004, 18ff. and Temkin 2004, 421f.). Analogously, as a person who is able to help, you still have

a responsibility to do so, even if you are not the only person on site. This argument is similar to the *tu quoque*-fallacy: Other people's moral failings are in this case irrelevant to your own. Moreover: You and the child, respectively his or her parents, can ask for reparation from the pusher. Accordingly the (as Temkin calls him) “lazy” bystander will have to justify himself for his inaction. This question is very important in the context of development aid, as the following thought experiment may illustrate (cp. Badhwar 2006, 81ff. for a similar argument):

The constant rescuer: After having just rescued a small child from drowning in a shallow pond, which ruined your € 200 suit, you go home and put on some new clothes. As you leave your home, you see that the same child has fallen into the same pond again. At the same time you see several other children drowning in other ponds, so that you will only be able to save some of these children. Even worse, some of the children actually were pushed into the ponds by bullies. How many and which children should you or can you save?

In fact, the situation of the donor (of development aid) is much closer to that of a constant rescuer than to that of the person confronted with a single drowning child. He or she is confronted with a constant moral dilemma of being able to help people who are endangered through no fault of their own but by catastrophes, conflicts, and unjust economic structures both on the local and global level. One has to be aware that the essential difference between saving a child from drowning and saving a child from poverty and famine is that the first child – once it is saved – is secure, whereas the second one goes on living in a region where, due to environmental, political, and economic reasons, it is continuously confronted with insecurity, lack of adequate nutrition and healthcare (cp. Appiah 2007, 200 and Wenar 2011b). The analogy of saving a drowning child to saving a

starving child is therefore problematic. It seems obvious that just saving the poverty-stricken child once would be rather futile. Even worse, as will be shown in part 4, some charities do more harm than good in the long term, for example by creating dependency (Easterly 2007b, Moyo 2009 and Mwenda 2006) or unintentionally supporting corrupt local politicians or guerillas (Polman 2008 and de Waal 2011).

While our spontaneous emotional reaction would be to try to save as many children as possible, wading out again and again until becoming exhausted or crazy, our rationality tells us that we should do something different, for example putting up fences around the ponds or prevent the bullies from pushing the children in. Analogically, when confronting world poverty, maybe we should rely less on our moral intuitions and emotional reactions but confront the problem with scientific rigour and reflection (cp. Bloom 2014 and Singer 2014). Perhaps even more important, we should not approach the problem on our own, but include all who are involved, especially the recipients of aid themselves (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012).

This is not a counterargument against Singer's position, but rather a refinement. The situation of eliminating poverty has more to do with “putting up fences around the pond” – i.e. establishing advantageous conditions towards beneficial economic growth – than with the one-time action of saving a drowning child in the above example. So besides donating for food aid and malaria nets, we need to think ahead and try to find ways to establish fair institutions and economic and political structures that benefit the poor (Wenar 2011b and Pogge 2010a). This refinement is to a certain degree recognised by MacAskill, who argues for voting according to priorities of global justice (2015a, ch. 6).

Temkin (2004) analyses convincingly that *a priori* another person's failing in his or her responsibilities does not change my obligation to help. It rather places an additional moral requirement on the perpetrator. Singer's “moral vice” (Arneson 2009, 267) varies in its intensity, if we take into account that there is the necessity of indirect measures and that

there are unjust actors and institutions.

This leads us to the argument of position and ability (cp. Hassoun 2012, Miller 2004, Temkin 2004, and Wenar 2011b). What you are obliged to do against poverty depends on your position in society and your abilities (NE 1106a36-b7). Singer plausibly points out that if you are able to afford donations without suffering restrictions, you should donate. However, this is only the financial aspect. Assuming that you are not just a simple consumer, but the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a major pharmaceutical company or of a bank, or an influential politician, you are under a duty that goes further. It is the duty to take into account the interests of people who are affected by your decisions. This responsibility is even more important than the “positive” humanitarian duty to donate, as it includes “negative” duties of avoiding harm. Hassoun (2012, 90ff.) works out very carefully what those duties mean in the respective case. As a consumer, you can be partly responsible for child labour on Ghanaian chocolate plantations (Berlan 2004), slave labour in coltan mines in the Republic of Congo (Nest 2011 and van Reybrouck 2012, 537ff.), or the working conditions in garment factories in Bangladesh (Mahr 2013). Although the influence of the individual consumer is minimal, his choices can help to securing minimal workers' rights and security standards. As concerns phenomena as different as Bangladesh working conditions, the Ethiopian famine, or the Haiti earthquake, correct information is crucial. This is not easily obtained, as journalism has a tendency to search for good stories that shock the audience. But sensational journalism may also reinforce stereotypes, e.g. on dark-skinned people or on Africa (Bølstad 2011, CARMA 2006, Dogra 2012, and Kennedy and Hill 2010).

A CEO of a pharmaceutical corporation may be uniquely placed in a situation where he could be able to influence both the research of and the pricing of medicine against common developing world diseases such as malaria and health problems such as HIV/AIDS (Hassoun 2012, 179ff., Pogge 2010a, 21ff., 73f. and 127ff.). A politician in a

developing country is responsible for fighting – if not eliminating – corruption and establishing functioning and just institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Easterly 2007b, 112ff., Mwenda and Tangri 2006, and Sen 2001, 51ff.). His counterpart in the developed world has to refrain from imposing trade restrictions that benefit his industry at the cost of the developing countries' welfare, a responsibility he shares with his elective body (cp. Goodin 1988 and Hassoun 2012, 169ff.).

Singer's strong moral requirement actually interchanges willingness to help with the responsibility to help, by placing harsh moral constraints on everyone. But if a western citizen is as responsible for letting the poor die, as for example the corrupt president minister of health, who has spend a majority of the budget on luxuries and the military and police force to ensure continuing repression, responsibility means little any more. Although Singer would surely disagree, this is a result that he probably would have to accept, when taking his moral maximalist position to the end.

Whenever an individual is in a position to significantly improve welfare or when he or she has a special responsibility, e.g. as a company executive towards employees of sub-contractors, the bell tolls for him or her. This includes negligence, for example when poor working conditions result in a horrible accident. In a globalized world, these causal chains of establishing responsibility have become increasingly complex (cp. Culp 2014). Additionally, it is often difficult to weigh up special responsibilities against each other. Just as discussed before in the context of donating, there are limits to how far this responsibility goes. It cannot be expected of the pharmaceutical company to act in the same ways as a non-profit organisation, as they have a special responsibility to their shareholders and employees. How much should you donate when you have family members relying on you? What responsibility do politicians have towards their electorate and their compatriots, compared to people in developing nations? The question of the Western world's responsibility for poverty will be discussed later on by reference to the examples of David

Miller and Thomas Pogge. Their positions focus on the history of colonisation (cp. Miller 2007) and the political and economic power of the industrialised countries, which “stack the game in their favour” (Pogge 2010a, 34ff.).

Singer's idea in this context seems to be that, as it is difficult to establish an overall individual responsibility and as there is a high risk of moral defection, we should establish a culture of giving as insurance against damages caused by global injustices or compensation for bad luck (e.g. natural disasters such as earthquakes).

Unfortunately there are two major problems with Singers position which will take up some part of this thesis. Singer thinks we can realise the utilitarian principle of beneficence by establishing a culture of giving to distant strangers and by changing the way society perceives far-away poverty. However, it has to be asked whether this does not constitute an “overextension” of our capabilities for solidarity – or even sympathy (Innerarity 2011). Distance and indirectness might make it psychologically impossible for our limited cognitive, moral, and intellectual capacities to follow through with the project of donating our fair share. The capacity of human beings for altruism seems to be limited (Andreoni 1990, Arrow 1972, Rutherford 2010, and Schroeder et al. 1995). Moreover, in public interest, global poverty is only a fringe phenomenon. (Bølstad 2011, Olson 2000, and Darnton and Kirk 2011). Finally, as Singer (2009, ch. 4) himself recognises, in the context of donating effectively, we are confronted with a multitude of psychological biases. This will be discussed in part 3 of this thesis.

Finally, the poor are no children. As argued above, from an ethical, epistemological, and economical point of view, the individual is in the best position to take care of its own interests. Consequentially, the preferable – and presumably the only sustainable – way to combat poverty is to trust, to listen and to empower the poor. But how can this be accomplished? An important aspect of this personal responsibility is not harming other people and taking care of the people entrusted to one. Due to their position, family

members, spouse and children have a special claim on oneself, bringing with it special responsibilities. Contrary to what Singer and MacAskill's position entails, one may not be “forced” into a position of special responsibility. Choosing to live as a hermit, harming no-one, with no obligations cannot be a morally despicable act. However, most of us would not choose this life, as we would not choose the altruism-focused life that moral maximalists demand. We choose a normal life and the ensuing responsibilities, this includes family, friends, co-workers and subordinates. It also, to a much lesser degree, includes fellow countrymen and finally the whole of humanity (cp. Goodin 1988, Hurka 1997, and Lichtenberg 2014, ch. 7). If one has the ability to help them, one certainly should, but one's main motivation should be to avoid causing them any harm. Are donations as reparation an effective and efficient means here? Or does charity, distributed through Western NGOs, widen the gap and extend the differences between rich and poor, especially concerning power? This will be discussed in the fourth part of this thesis.

2.7. Our Duties Towards Others

The establishment of a duty to help distant strangers on the basis of a moral intuition is not without its problems, as we have seen. Nevertheless, there are certain responsibilities to be met. You certainly cannot save all of the poor, but this does not mean you should save none. What you should (and could) do is to budget, to assess how much you should give and can afford according to position, ability, and responsibility. Singer (2009, 152 and 2011) proposes a similar – simplified – version of this when he – as already mentioned above – calculates that one should donate between one and five per cent of one's income, perhaps more if one is part of mankind's “one percent” super-rich. This however contradicts his former moral maximalist claim and seems to be more a result out of practicality than a moral argument. It is important that one donates rationally and

efficiently, keeping the interests of the people concerned in mind. Humanitarian duties are “by their nature indeterminate and require judgement in their application” (Culp 2014, 4). They are not only about giving, as argued before, but they demand more of us, namely first and foremost that we abstain from harming or exploiting others.

In the following I will attempt to show that there are some good additional arguments that reinforce the duty to act against global poverty. I will begin with contractual arguments. The representatives of most nations have signed the Charter of Human Rights, which include the right of freedom from poverty and the right to decent living conditions in accordance with human dignity. As the interactions of nations and people increase due to globalisation, we would be obliged to interact only with states that respect human rights, and support these states when it is needed. Additionally, the existence of and cooperation with international institutions are coercive (Hassoun 2012, 45 and 49ff.). It seems self-explaining (or even trivial) that we can only bargain and trade with people who are at least theoretically able to consent (or dissent).

More straightforward is Singer's argumentation targeted at libertarians. When establishing a duty or a responsibility to help, we encounter a difficult problem. Duties seem only feasible in cases of direct causation. Strong duties are *duties of avoiding harm* to others, for example the commandment *Thou shalt not kill*. in the Old Testament. Whenever Western societies did or still do benefit from unjust, exploitative international structures, this establishes a responsibility for compensation (Miller 2007). Advocates of development aid, instead of focusing on moral maximalist positions, can therefore focus on harms done to poor people, claiming that reparations and support are a matter of justice and not of charity.

2.8. The Human Right of Freedom from Poverty

Article 22.

- Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

- (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
- (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
- (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

We can appeal to arguments from contractualism to further reinforce the humanitarian argument. Every nation state that has signed and ratified the Human Rights Charter has accepted the obligation to uphold and protect Human Rights. In articles 22 and 23 of the Declaration of Human Rights and in a separate treaty signed in 1966, the “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (sometimes also called the “Social

Covenant”)³², are codified the right to social security, the right to work, and to receive a fair remuneration for this work that allows every human being and his family a dignified existence. Taken as a whole, we are invited to the interpretation that the treaties entail that every human being should be able to live his or her life in dignity, and with at least the basic necessities provided for (cp. Buchanan 1987 and 1996, and Nickel 2014). However, this human right of freedom from poverty is denied to and does not exist for one sixth of humanity, making it the human right globally most frequently violated and withheld (Alston 2005, 786 and Pogge 2002 and 2007).

Additionally, as Hassoun (2012, 46ff.) points out, contracts between nations are only ethically justifiable if all parties affected are – at least theoretically – able to give consent. This does not mean that they all do actually consent, as this would be unfeasible, but it requires just democratic institutional structures on the national and the global level with the basic requirement that all citizens have a minimal level of autonomy (*ibid.*, 26ff.). This entails a minimal level of welfare, so that basic reasoning and planning capacities remain intact for every human being, respectively for every citizen (*ibid.*, 28). Only if this minimal level is secured, the individual has a realistic possibility to make plans, engage politically, and access information to meaningfully partake in political life (cp. Nussbaum 2011).

As trade agreements, national debt, and economic and monetary reforms partly depend on coercion through international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, or the International Monetary Fund, this is especially important. Interactions between states or actors within the states are, among others, contracting debts, granting credit agreements on terms of trade, or providing humanitarian, military, or development aid. These treaties of trade, financial exchange, and cooperation

³² As Nickel (2014) summarises “[t]he Social Covenant’s list of rights includes non-discrimination and equality for women in economic and social life (Articles 2 and 3), freedom to work and opportunities to work (Article 4), fair pay and decent conditions of work (Article 7), the right to form trade unions and to strike (Article 8), social security (Article 9), special protections for mothers and children (Article 10), the right to adequate food, clothing, and housing (Article 11), the right to basic health services (Article 12), the right to education (Article 13), and the right to participate in cultural life and scientific progress (Article 15).”

influence the personal lives of citizens sometimes beneficially, sometimes negatively (Hassoun 2012 and Pogge 2010a). Accordingly, any decisions taken and enforced, for example through trade sanctions, by these organisations and actors are justified if and only if all countries and international bodies concerned respect and uphold the Human Rights. This interpretation is put forward by advocates of global discursive or procedural justice in the Habermasian tradition, referring to the German philosopher and sociologist in the tradition of critical theory and pragmatism Jürgen Habermas well known for his theory of communicative rationality and fair discourse. Notable examples are Forst (2007), Hassoun (2012), and Culp (2014). Discourse in this context means the finding of solutions or compromises exclusively by discussion, exchange of ideas and opinions, and consensus, in absolute absence of force or violence.

Due to this interpretation of the Declaration of Human Rights, providing basic necessities to the world's poorest people is no longer a matter of charity, but of justice. In a world, in which there is enough for all to meet their basic needs, everybody should have a claim to the basic necessities. This translates into a right of freedom from dire poverty (Pogge 2002 and 2007, van Parijs 1995 and Hahn 2009, 46, 52ff., and 120f.).

However, there are several problems related to the Human Rights approach. Many capable and competent philosophers have attempted to provide a solid, culture-independent foundation of Human Rights (Buchanan 1987 and 1996 and Nickel 2014).³³ One promising approach is the interpretation of Human Rights as a contract between all human beings, in the form of a globally acceptable minimal compromise solution of how human beings are to be treated and how they can live together peacefully (Appiah 2007 and Peña 2010).

³³ Richard Rorty's pragmatic approach to Human Rights brings us full circle to the principle of beneficence. He argues that, as living a safe and dignified life is simply good for all humans, we should forgo any foundationalism of Human Rights and instead "concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education" (Rorty 1994, 176). This means expanding the circle of our moral concern and sympathy to include all of humanity. The similarities to Singer are apparent. The problem here is that Rorty relies on the previously presented principle of beneficence, only reinforcing it with the notion of Human Rights as a contract of solidarity between different peoples or nations. This vision of Human Rights as humanitarian ideal and "valuable goals" is certainly convincing and has considerable moral force behind it. However, the problem remains, especially in a situation of non-enforceability of an agreed norm, how we can move from a morally desirable outcome to a moral duty.

Another justificatory attempt would be legal positivism combined with moral emergentism (cp. Matravers 2007 and Nussbaum 2000c). This attempt states that Human Rights have emerged as moral values in the course of the last century and have been agreed upon and signed by the member countries of the United Nations. This, so defenders stipulate, gives it the nature of a moral fact and shifts the burden of proof to the critics.

But especially social human rights have been the source of much controversy (cp. Beetham 1995 and Nickel 2014). Social rights are often seen as mere statements of desirable goals and not as true rights, and thus not comparable to civil and political rights. Nickel (2014) resumes the criticisms as follows:

1. they do not serve truly fundamental interests;
2. they are too burdensome on governments and taxpayers, and
3. they are not feasible in less-developed countries.

An in-depth discussion of these issues would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Allow me therefore just to sketch out a possible reply.

The first argument seems not very convincing, as absolute poverty endangers lives in a way that certainly seems “particularly moral urgent and basic” (Ashford 2007, 184ff. and 189f.). The lives of the poor are drastically shortened, and malnutrition leads to cognitive and physical stunting (Keneally 2011, 143ff., Trentmann and Weingärtner 2011, 42ff., and WHO 2014). Without a secure basic level of survival, it seems improbable that any other fundamental interests could be safeguarded and maintained.

The second argument – of affordability – and the third argument – of feasibility – are more difficult to refute, as indeed the implementation of a minimal welfare system depends on the wealth and technical and institutional development of the nation concerned. However, while there is of course an absolute minimal level of national wealth necessary

to establish a welfare programme, surprisingly, most developing countries would have little problems here. Many emerging countries and even some developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and Ethiopia, have been able to implement some kind of welfare system (Melo 2007 and Mogue, Ayele, and Paulos 2008). Even comparatively small sums can have a very significant positive impact on the quality of life of poor families, as will be shown in part 4. Therefore the sums redistributed through welfare need not be particularly large. On the other hand, developing countries are usually characterised by high inequality and may actually be quite rich in natural resources, the sale of which could finance a minimal security net if the profits were not diverted due to mismanagement and corruption (Moss 2011). To conclude, the problem of establishing a functioning welfare programme is less one of affordability but one of surmounting the current unjust political and economic system.

This leads us to a final and very definite problem of Human Rights and especially Social Human Rights: Who is responsible for their protection? A world government seems neither feasible nor desirable (cp. Culp 2014, 42f, Kant 1970[1795], and Peña 2010). It is not what people want and carries the potential of brutal infighting in a global civil war. As centralisation of power increases, it could become easier for power groups to influence law-making procedures to further their interests. This could lead to a situation far worse than today's dominance of the United States of America. Finally, it could reduce interstate competition and thus exit options for citizens, and it would very likely suffer from a democratic deficit due to bureaucratisation, leading to less possibilities for normal citizens to influence politics or economy, even carrying the danger of tyranny. But contrary to Kant, who advocates for the important goal of fair and equal treatment of all global citizens, there does not seem to be little probability that any extra-state authority could serve as Hobbesian – referring to the English 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes – enforcer of fairness, law, and order. But as long as there is no guarantor, the role of Human Rights in

general and Social Human Rights in particular remains more one of an ideal than of a claimable law.

An inviting answer could be that the international community itself takes over this role, with United Nations peacekeeping forces or the NATO providing military support for the moral authority of Human Rights. Paul Collier (2008, 161ff.) thinks that there the Western nations have the responsibility to enforce protection from poverty through military intervention.³⁴ But there is only a very limited chance that Western nations will act adequately, as there are diverging national interests, there is an unwillingness to risk their own soldier's lives, and there are bad experiences, e.g. the lack of true improvements in countries such as Somalia, and to a lesser degree Afghanistan and Iraq (Clarke and Herbst 1996). Even if these obstacles could be overcome, the question remains whether military interventions can be justified at all (Orend 2008 and Walzer 1977). Consequently, the decisive question is no longer “Who is responsible?”, but “Who could be effective?” The examples given raise doubts if this could be the West alone.

Advocates of Human Rights in consequence often argue for a “soft power approach”, preferring to use the state of these rights as a benchmark, an ideal that serves to test the quality and justice of existing social institutions (Ashford 2007). These advocates denounce their violation and rely on the moral force of Human Rights to hold leaders accountable, while at the same time supporting peaceful opposition and reform (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 and Easterly 2007b, 115 and 323ff.). This should be done by individual citizens, and more likely through political representation, using advocacy and giving financial support to INGOs such as Amnesty International, Transparency International, or Oxfam, so that these can effectively help the poor to claim their rights.

As a very first step it should be taken care that there is neither violation of Human Rights, nor contribution to violation through unfair international treaties. In this context,

³⁴ This is a more extreme version of John Rawls' argument in *Law of Peoples* (1999, 90ff.). Rawls argues for a military intervention in “outlaw states” in case of human rights violations, but he reserves this right for situations of extreme direct violations such as genocide.

the constitution of an interactional account is promising (cp. Pogge 2002 and 2007, Ashford 2007, 185f, and Hassoun 2012). In a globalized economy, citizens of different countries often interact indirectly, sometimes unknowingly through exchanges of goods and to a lesser degree of services. Take for example the battery and microprocessor (“chip”) of the laptop I am using to write these very words, which contain materials that have been extracted under exploitative labour conditions and in some cases outright slavery in central Africa at high cost to the environment (Batstone 2010, Belser, de Cock, and Mehran 2005, Berlan 2004, and Montague 2002). The components are then manufactured and assembled in emerging countries, for example in China, again under dubious working conditions and at a high cost for the environment. They are then transported and sold to relatively wealthy consumers in the global North by companies that make use of lobbying, tax loopholes, complicated accounting procedures, and global tax havens to contribute as little to societal welfare as possible (Bräutigam 2008 and Kar and Leblanc 2013).

As a consumer, I am indirectly involved in acts of exploitation and human rights violations. I cannot claim ignorance, as the information on these violations is accessible through the global media; and while I certainly did not wish for these violations, by purchasing a certain product I unwillingly contribute to them (Ferguson 2016). We are globally interconnected by “causal chains that involve additive and multiplicative harms”, as Ashford (2007, 194) outlines. This will be discussed more thoroughly and in depth in the following chapters. International justice and Human Rights are only guaranteed if negotiations between the different parties affected happen on equal terms (Culp 2014 and Forst 2007). Unfortunately, the reality of globalisation is often that the poor, those with the weakest political influence and bargaining power, are easily taken advantage of. A global system of ethics therefore requires to strengthen and empower the poor so that they can

make their voices heard. This entails that there is a move from passive receivers of charity towards active claimants of justice.

2.9. Additional Arguments for Libertarians

In this chapter I will further strengthen the established responsibility of supporting the needy by including the notion of reparation for caused harm (cp. Hassoun 2012, ch. 3 for a more elaborate version of this project). In this context, special attention will be paid to the libertarian position, as it is much more interesting than egoism, which can be revoked quite easily (for a complete revocation see Feinberg 2012, Cullity 2004, 16ff. and 119ff., and Lichtenberg 2014, 214ff.). Libertarianism is defined here as a strong form of individualism with absolute, inviolable property rights that negates responsibility for other human beings unless by choice or under contractual obligation (cp. Mulgan 2001, 11). This position has some attraction, as individual responsibility can improve the wealth of societies through markets, as demonstrated by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* (1976 [1776]), and besides, individual freedom as a moral value is a good starting point for argumentation (Hayek 1945, Nozick 1974, Williams and Smart 1973, and Williams 1972, 1981 and 1985). However, personal freedom and individual choice as moral goods can enter into conflict with utilitarian notions of aggregate welfare improvement, as White (2008, also cp. Nozick, 1974, 28ff.) writes:

“Individuals are “inviolable”: they have rights, and these rights may not be violated even for the sake of increasing aggregate welfare – indeed, even for the sake of preventing the wider violation of rights.”

Libertarians may recognise the desirability of donating money, but they deny that there can

be an obligation to donate, thus denying the principle of enforceability (Mulgan 2001, 12). But how successful can it be to establish a duty without enforceability? Actions to change the current global income distribution towards more equality and more fairness will be even more problematic for a libertarian, as in his way of thinking or patterns of thought, property and contract rights are highly valued.

There are two ways to justify enforced positive duties in this context. The first one is over negative duties: If an individual harms another one, the harmed one can demand compensation. Second, libertarians rely on the *principle of self-ownership*, meaning that an individual exclusively owns himself, his knowledge, and the fruits of his labour. But people own more than that, they also own land, resources, and goods, which are finite.

According to Nozick (1974, 151 and 174ff.), a libertarian therefore must balance his or her account of *justice in acquisition*. This means that exclusive ownership of finite resources, for example cultivable land, has to be justified against a fictional state of nature. A strict interpretation of this principle results in what Nozick calls the *Lockean proviso*:

“An acquisition is just if and only if it leaves other people *no worse off* than they would have been if the acquisition had not taken place.”

Mulgan (2001, 12)

As this is difficult to implement and enact in practise, this idea opens the door for arguments against an exclusive right to property in the face of dire need and a lack of international justice, resulting in the libertarian having to agree to use personal resources to act on behalf of the world's poorest. Even Nozick (1974, 152f.) accordingly argues that we should establish a minimal welfare programme to alleviate the worst of injustices. Now we are no longer talking about benevolence, but of justice, as we have left the realm of positive duties. In a less strict interpretation this means that justified reparatory claims or

claims for compensation can arise out of previous and current injustices, such as theft, exploitation, slavery, political or military pressure.

In the following chapters of this thesis, many such injustices throughout history will be used to illustrate how they have contributed to today's high imbalances in income and living standards. It will be attempted to demonstrate that it is possible to speak of at least a partial responsibility of the people in the developed world, as they have profited – and still do – from power imbalances in the world – historical and present (Pogge 2010a, 34ff.).

People in developing countries deserve support because

- of the damages suffered during the period of imperialism and colonisation,
- of the damages resulting from the current organisation of international trade, institutions, and contracts,
- of the damages resulting from environmental and climate degradation.

All three arguments rely on the principle of reparation, according to which a party is deserving of restitution if another one has caused it harm, especially if the latter has profited from it (cp. Cullity 2004, 65ff.). The three arguments for partial responsibility given above, in connection with the principle of sympathy, result in a very strong moral basis for acting against global poverty.

2.10. Colonialism and Imperialism and their Aftermaths

The historic event of colonisation is often used as an argument for reparations (Glennie 2013, Miller 2007, and Riddell 2008, 136). The violent military intrusion of European forces into foreign countries was accompanied by an exploitation of human beings and of resources. As harms done in the past echo in the present, this results in a current

responsibility for poor living-standards in former colonies. The inheritance of colonisation has had a strong negative influence on the economic productivity and institutional quality of many of the countries concerned (van Reybrouck 2012, ch. 3). With the exception of the very special cases of the United States of America, Canada, and Australia, even today, the economy of former colonies is significantly less successful, and they are more unequal in their income distribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Diamond 1999, and Landes 2010).

The reasons for this are manifold. The economic system of most colonies was focused on providing primary resources for the benefit of colonial powers, such as the mining of silver and gold in South America and the growing of cash crops such as cotton, tea, natural rubber, sugar, tobacco, or coffee in India and the Caribbean (*ibid.*). This forged an economic tradition and prevented investment in manufacturing and in technologically advanced and intensive branches of production. This is especially problematic, as the current system of global patent rights makes it difficult for newcomers to catch up (Chang 2002b and 2008). Most of these branches of production focused on low-wage and low-skill work, formerly often performed by slaves. Consequences of this are e.g. underdeveloped institutions, inherited inequality, and racial discrimination. Additionally, in many cases the colonised population, while being treated as second class citizens, had to pay direct or indirect special taxes for the “homeland”, for example the infamous salt tax in India or – at its worst – the forced British sale of opium in China (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 118f). After giving up their colonies, the former colonial power often left behind a politically precarious state with a difficult heritage of ethnic tensions arising out of the colonizers arbitrary state creation, and high inequality (Fearon and Laitin 2013, Landes 2010, Marshall 2015, and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2011). This contributed to an unfortunate tradition of political instability and even dictatorships. Finally, many former colonies still suffered from meddling even long after their formal independence, as former

and new colonial powers made their influence felt to secure their access to resources or a strategic advantage (Baaz 2005, David 1986, and Kohn 2014).³⁵

But the period of colonisation ended more than half a century ago. Since then, many former colonies had time and possibility to shape themselves into prosperous nations and some, such as China or India (and some parts of Latin America), have done so, although they still suffer from high economic and institutional inequality (cp. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).³⁶ It may be oversimplifying to say that as China and India (and some parts of Latin America) are doing more or less well, colonialism can be considered only one factor (among others) of the current situation in many former colonies. It certainly is the most influential one. A decisive factor certainly is how, and how recently, colonisation took place.

But claiming that colonisation is responsible for all the former colonies' current problems is the analogue to explaining a criminal's career alone by his bad childhood. This has explanatory value, but reducing the problem to this one single fact is an oversimplification and fails to give the individual adequate responsibility. It implies that the people in the country concerned are similar to children who squabble and neglect their work when the parents are away. An analogy to children was exactly the argument that defendants of colonisation used to put forward (cp. Baaz 2005). It can be estimated that reducing the poverty problem to colonisation is in itself a certain form of colonisation.

What I am trying to put forward is the moderate position that their colonial history,

³⁵ Especially during the cold war, there was a continuous monetary and military support of dictatorships by both sides, often disguised as foreign aid. This was a huge impediment for the development of democratic institutions in developing countries (David 1986). The USA primarily made their influence felt in Asia, South, and Middle America, while the former colonial powers France, Great Britain, and Belgium tried to maintain their influence over their former colonies. Western-backed coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Congo (1961), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Chile (1973), and Burkina Faso (1987) deposed democratically elected leaders with pro-poor platforms to install dictators (Hickel 2014). The Soviet Union occupied the reluctant Eastern Europeans to keep them on the right side of the iron curtain. Both sides financed and supported military groups in foreign countries with weapons, intelligence, and often direct intervention. The Soviet Union most notably in Egypt (1952), Cuba (1959), Iraq (1958), Peru (1968), Syria (1966), Somalia (1969), Libya (1969), Sudan (1969), Ethiopia (1974 and 1977), and Afghanistan (1978).

³⁶ Although it could be argued that these countries have done better because colonisation did only little damage to them. For example China was already a unified country with a rich bureaucratic and cultural heritage, and Indian native rulers cooperated with the British Empire, thus ensuring relative stability.

combined with current unfair structures of international institutions and trade, has led to an extremely unequal worldwide distribution of resources, which severely impedes developing nations from reaching their full economic potential, and that this results in a special responsibility of former colonizers, nations such as Britain, France, or Spain,³⁷ towards their former colonies, in which both parties have to come to an agreement of what constitutes just recompense. The degree of recompense is debatable. As the damages happened in the past, the question is not easily solved, to what degree the present population of a former colonial power is responsible for past wrong-doings (cp. Miller 2007). Going into this in detail for every developing country would result in a doctoral thesis of its own.

The views on the legitimacy of colonialism has changed dramatically in the course of the last century. While it was seen as legitimate and necessary roughly until the end of the Second World War, public and academic views on colonialism now are overwhelmingly negative (Kohn 2014). The Western public and academia generally see colonialism as irreconcilable with civil rights, democratic institutions, and self-determination. Political (and economical) power at first sight agrees and follows the rhetoric of civil rights and democracy.

The historical period of colonisation is hardly something Europe can look back on with pride. The accompanying rhetoric of benevolence did not make the violent intrusion of European forces into foreign countries acceptable. On the contrary, this rhetoric was cynical. It was at its most cynical at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference, where was claimed to act against slavery and for the “betterment of the Negro condition” in the Congo.³⁸ The

³⁷ This is also true for Germany, which has a special responsibility towards the countries it invaded during World War II, and towards Israel. Germany has paid over 80 million Euros in reparations to Israel. In total, Germany has paid over 65 billion Euros in reparation to countries and individuals that suffered under the “Third Reich” (Miller 2007, 112).

³⁸ The Berlin Conference: The General Act of Feb. 26, 1885 chapter II article IX. “[...] the Powers which do or shall exercise sovereign rights or influence in the territories forming the basin of the Congo declare that these territories may not serve as a market or means of transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever race they may be. Each of the Powers binds itself to employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to this trade and for punishing those who engage in it.” As Pogge (2010) points out, this use of pro-poor rhetoric to hide personal or political profit is still very much in use today. We will find evidence of this further on when discussing exploitation and the reasons behind foreign aid.

truth, however, was a division of central Africa into spheres of interest for the colonial powers and the economic exploitation of the native population as cheap labourers, especially to obtain caoutchouc to privately enrich Belgium's king Leopold II. A multitude of atrocities were committed in the Belgian Congo, killings and mutilations lead to the death of an estimated 10 million people (van Reybrouck 2012, 77ff.). Another such sad example is Imperial Germany's South-West Africa war in which 65.000 Herero and 10.000 Nama were killed or starved to death in concentration camps (Erichsen and Olusoga 2011, 229f.).

The denial of rights, exploitation, slavery, and massacres, were unfortunately commonplace during colonisation. Landes (2010, 187ff.) estimates that 90 percent of the Mexican Native population was wiped out by the brutal Spanish conquerors and the even more deadly illnesses they brought with them (cp. Diamond 1999, chp. 3). A similar fate awaited the North American and Australian native populations. "Homeland first"-policies meant that often colonies, although suffering famines themselves, had to export large parts of their agricultural produce to their colonizing countries (De Waal 2011, 27ff. and Keneally 2011). This treatment of the colonised population was facilitated by perceiving them not only as culturally and technologically backwards, but as somewhat less than human. The issue of racism is intimately related to the history of colonialism. Especially the persistence of racist and social Darwinist attitudes plays an important part in the justification of current global inequality and as rationalisation of inaction in the face of suffering of human beings from poverty.

The Oxford Dictionary of English (2010, 1461) defines racism as the "belief that all members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races." Racism has shaped the previous centuries. It served as pseudo-scientific foundation for political decisions and as rationalisation for wars and genocides (Allison 2009, 448ff. and Michael

2012). Racism caused terrible suffering in human history. The belief in racial superiority has facilitated the military dominance of some countries, serving their strategic and economic interests. If the native population is regarded as somewhat less human, their suffering does not count as much.

Racism played an integral role in the conquest and subsequent colonisation of Middle and South America by Spain and Portugal. It was used to justify the slave trade that supplied North America and the Caribbean Islands with cheap labour.³⁹ Finally, in the 20th century, pseudo-scientific racial theories lead to laws such as the *Nürnberger Rassengesetze* and the subsequent racially motivated Holocaust. Since then, positive developments such as the civil rights movement in America or the abolition of apartheid in South Africa give hope that social progress will overcome institutional racism some day. Yet racism continues to be an impediment for development and peace within and between nations.

Another fundamental error of scientific racism consists in the misconception that evolution favours strength and competition, while it actually favours adaption and in-group cooperation (Bauer 2008). With cooperation being a forte of the human “social animal”, who takes long to develop as a child, but is capable of long-term learning and communication.

In conclusion, countries who suffered from historic injustices – caused by colonialism based on and justified by racism – are entitled to reparations. The extent will be difficult to ascertain, as we do not have the counterfactual situation of how the countries would have developed without outside intervention. This entitlement is more of a collective than an individual nature. However, as long as official reparations are lacking,

³⁹ It is often overlooked by Western scholars that Europeans do not have the exclusive privilege of being racist. There are the Arab countries with their long history of slavery. There are racially motivated ethnic conflicts, e.g. the sad example of the Tutsi genocide committed by the Hutu majority in 1994 Rwanda. Similarly, white visitors to central Africa will be called *mzungu* (“white”) and be confronted with preconceived stereotypes (Baaz 2005).

private initiative to repair these injustices seems an adequate first step into the right direction (Glennie 2013 and Miller 2007).

2.11. Exploitation and Harm

Exploitation can occur in different circumstances and on different levels. One feature, however, is common in all cases of exploitation: The unequal distribution of (bargaining) power and consequently the dependency of the weaker party on the stronger one. The outcome of any negotiated contract will therefore be more profitable for the stronger party, while the weaker one gains much less, or may even lose in the long-term. As was attempted to illustrate in the chapter on colonialism, in former centuries exploitation used to be facilitated through military power and pressure. Today's exploitative structures are more a feature of economic inequality. Critics of the international institutional order, among them Erik Reinert (2008), Ha-Joon Chang (2008 and 2012), Nicole Hassoun (2012), and Thomas Pogge (2007, 2010a and 2011), argue that developing countries are forced to adopt neo-liberal policies and open their markets for Western firms and products through the intervention of global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or the World Bank, e.g. by means of aid conditionalities (World Bank 2005). This severely limits the decision autonomy of developing countries concerned and negatively influences the lives of the poor, for example in the following ways (cp. Pogge 2002, 214 and 2010b, 534 and Riddell 2008, 136ff.):

- They impede the creation of manufacturing industries in developing countries. Poor nations have an insufficiently developed economy, often focused on the production of primary goods. Budding infant industries in these countries have to compete

with the already fully developed, established, and often well-subsidised Western industry. While in theory, mostly due to competitive labour prices, the country could establish a functioning clothing or manufacturing industry, in reality individual entrepreneurs have enormous difficulties raising funds, develop, and then compete in face of a strong competition profiting from effects of scale, a global distribution network, political influence, and large cash reserves. In some cases, unwanted products are disposed of in developing countries take the camouflage of trade goods or even donations. As European poultry consumers become more discriminate in their taste and only consume the breast and legs of the animal, the heavily subsidised producers freeze and transport their surplus to Africa (Buntzel and Mari 2007). As local producers cannot compete with the dumping prices for these chicken leftovers, local jobs and markets are destroyed. A method to overcome this problem would be government grants and industry protection measures such as tariffs (Chang 2005, 2002b and 2008). However, the dominance of rich countries and neo-liberal guidelines in the IMF and WTO, as well as conditions attached to foreign aid make such an approach very costly for a developing country, which would face trade sanctions and fines.

- The IMF, WTO, and World Bank have counselled and often even forced the privatization of government services and companies in developing countries, following the neo-liberal ideological creed that private markets are more effective than government interventions in every single case (Klein 2007, 49ff.). Unfortunately, this has been both a theoretical mistake as well as an implementation failure (Chang 2002a, 2008 and Müllerson 2008, 2f. and 24f.). Obtaining a company – or a mandate – in emerging and developing countries has more often than not been enabled by bribery and good connections to local political leaders and not on a basis of competence and a fair call for tenders. As many of these

companies were monopolies, they could reserve either the exclusive rights to exploit a natural resource or be the unique provider of a service or an essential good, such as the distribution of drinking water or energy. The result has often been a loss of government income, while citizens are faced with a reduction in quality of services and rising prices, often accompanied by social spending cuts and wage deregulations, in this process enriching few at the expense of many, (Klein 2007 and Munk 2013, 9ff.).

- Western multinational companies have often profited from unfair deals, either with non-representative governments, such as dictatorships who rule by force and suppress at least part of their population, or through corruption. Pogge (2002, 265 and 2010a 18ff. and 47ff.) refers to this as the resource privilege. Due to the purchasability of political influence in some countries, Western companies could secure valuable resources and commodities for themselves (Pogge 2002, 19 and 176), among them fuel and other natural resources, and mines. Local leaders can quite easily abstract money from their very country itself by taking up national debts which are then transferred into private accounts (Pogge 2010a, 18ff. and 49ff.), while developing countries lose \$600 billion each year in debt service mostly to first world banks (Hickel 2014).⁴⁰ This paradox of natural resource rich countries, suffering from lack of development, inequality and a democratic deficit is referred to as “resource curse” or “Dutch disease” (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011, Gylfason 2001, and Wenar 2008 and 2011a). Recently, arable land has become increasingly valuable and lead to the phenomenon of land-grabbing. In this context, countries that are often unable to effectively feed their population lend arable land, although it is often already in use by subsistence farmers, to foreign agro-industrial ventures (Borras et al. 2011). Consequently, national resources that should benefit the whole population are privatised.

⁴⁰ For the purpose of this thesis I will be referring to the number 1.000.000.000 as “billion” using the modern British and American English denomination.

- This form of privatisation is further encouraged by the possibility of illicit financial flows to tax havens (Bräutigam 2008, Sharples, Jones, and Martin 2014, and Kar and LeBlanc 2013). Kar and Brian LeBlanc (2013, ix) estimate that nominal illicit outflows from developing countries amounted to \$832.4 in 2010 and \$946.7 billion in 2011, an increase by 13.7 percent. While some individuals just want to escape monetary and political instability, the larger part of this enormous sum of money is a result of tax evasion, fraud, corruption, and other illegal activities. This money would be needed to finance the budgets of developing countries and contribute to their economic growth. As Western countries often welcome these capital flows themselves and permit the persistence of tax havens such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, or the Cayman Islands, they share the responsibility for this effective money laundering.
- While the above exploitation is worse enough on its own right, this multinational system of bribery, combined with the lack of accountability of national leaders in weak democracies, reinforces clientelism, corrupt structures, and may facilitate conflicts and military coups (Bates 2008, Gibson 2005, and North et al. 2013). Developing societies typically have a weak economic performance and are characterised by high unemployment. Due to a lack of alternatives, there is a high economic incentive in these countries to gain political or military power, thus securing resources which guarantee a high income for oneself and one's entourage. In the worst case, foreign aid can become such a coveted resource (Anderson 1999, Gibson 2005, and Polman 2008, 107ff.).
- The WTO's international rule of patent rights and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are sometimes criticised for being unfair to developing nations, especially in the fields of information technology (Darch 2004) and medicine (Hassoun 2012, 171f. and Pogge et al. 2014). Critics

claim that the patent holders, usually wealthy Western companies, have extended their patent rights and raised their prices far beyond of what the developing nations can afford. In some cases they are even said to profit from diseases while not providing adequate care. This problem is further exacerbated by the need of developing countries to acquire foreign currency to finance the purchase of machinery, medicine, new technology, and in case of a famine, the food needed, as these are produced in the West and in emerging countries. To acquire this currency, the only way for a developing country with an unstable currency is to sell its natural resources, to try to compete with the subsidised agro-industry in the West, or to get into debt (Chang 2002b and 2005 and Moyo 2009, 115ff.).⁴¹

- Environmental destruction and depletion of natural resources are frequent problems that confront developing countries (Pogge 2005, 48ff.). As will be illustrated in the following chapter, the proceedings from exploitation usually go towards the richer countries, while the developing countries are left with the environmental backlash.
- Moreover, there is the direct exploitation of individual labourers in developing countries, be it in so-called “sweat-shops”, in mines, or on plantations (Adams 2002, Andrees and Belser 2010, Batstone 2010, Belser, de Cock, and Mehran 2005, and Wertheimer and Zwolinski 2013). These labourers work more than twelve hours a day for wages that do not allow a minimal standard of living (McMullen et al. 2014). In consequence, they often go hungry, and their children have only limited access to education, as they, too, need to earn money to support their families. Sometimes these activities support rebel groups or organised crime, such as in the case of blood diamonds (Baker 2015). Other examples are human trafficking and sex tourism (Carter and Clift 2000 and Kempadoo 1999). As

⁴¹ Subsidies paid for agriculture in OECD countries amounted to \$311 billion in 2001, or about \$850 million per day (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003). This practise is a wastage of public resources and contributes in no small manner to the sinking global prices for “cash crops”. Even while benefiting from lower wages and perhaps better suited climate, it is difficult for developing countries to compete with this violation of liberalism by its most avid proponents.

consumers and corporations make use of the products, partake and profit in this exploitation, they are partly responsible for it.⁴²

- There are also indirect ways in which the richer countries harm the poor, due to the high inequality of income distribution and the globalisation of food markets. The average household in developed countries spends only a fraction of its income on food, for example in Germany and Spain between 14 and 15 per cent (INE 2011, 22 and Statistisches Bundesamt 2014, 171), but poor people in the developing world have to dedicate a large part of their – already quite low – income to victuals. As a consequence of this, middle and upper class Westerners give little weight to food, and price fluctuations are barely registered. Well-off people can also afford high amounts of wastage, which increases food prices, as more is bought than needed. For example in Germany, almost 11 million tons of food are thrown away each year (Kranert et al. 2012). Additionally, Western – and increasingly emerging – countries have high levels of meat consumption, meaning that much agricultural land is dedicated to the growing of forage crops, thus again putting pressure on food prices (World Bank 2013, 93). In 2007, due to droughts in several grain-exporting nations and due to high oil prices, food prices nearly doubled, and they reached a peak in 2008. The situation was exacerbated by speculation and the increased use of biofuel in developed countries (Runge and Senauer 2007 and World Bank 2013, x and 93). Many poor people were therefore unable to afford enough food. In theory, developing countries with an agriculture-based economy should benefit from high food prices. In reality – as urbanization increases and small farmholds are more and more disenfranchised in favour of big agribusiness – it is not be the poor that profit. The situation is rather that food is exported to wealthy consumers in the West, even though there is shortage in the country of origin (Drèze and Sen 1991, De Waal

⁴² It should however be noted that, as for example Baker (2015, 32f) and MacAskill (2015a, ch. 8) argue, the case of “sweat-shop” labour is much less difficult to evaluate than the one of outright slavery. In many cases even the punishing and from our perspective badly paid jobs are preferable to the alternative of unemployment and subsistence farming.

2011, and Keneally 2011, 61ff.).

According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO)⁴³, there are at least 12.3 million people in forced labour worldwide (Andrees and Belser 2010 and Belser, de Cock, and Mehran 2005, 1). These cases are clear occurrences of exploitation. People are held captive against their will, forced to work, to prostitute themselves, or to become conscripts who are threatened with violence (Carter and Clift 2000 and Kempadoo 1999). Often, the exploited persons are migrants with little rights or security in their host country (Cingano 2014). Partaking in this in any way, for example by buying products of forced labour, or by practising sex tourism, is of course morally wrong.

But apart from these clear-cut cases, it is notoriously difficult to define exploitation (cp. Steiner 1984 and 2013 and Wertheimer and Zwolinski 2013). Defendants of “sweat-shop” labour (MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8, Maitland 1997, and Moyo 2009, ch. 8) often argue that while the working conditions and salaries are deplorable, “sweat-shop” labour is necessary as it attracts foreign investment and leads to economic growth. Hopefully, once the growth is there, working conditions will improve. Another argument is that the workers are paid according to their productivity. This idea of the priority of economic growth and the possibilities of development through trade will be discussed further on, but its record of actually achieving success is doubtful, as it goes along with a limited understanding of development (Sen 2001), an overestimation of the trickle down effect (Stiglitz 2012),⁴⁴ and a certain economic naivety towards the possible negative effects of trade (Tonelson 2002). But this discussion illustrates the difficulties of defining exploitation. In some cases, the poor may profit from “sweat-shop” labour, if increased national wealth and income opportunities transform into improved opportunities for the next generation. So how to define exploitation exactly, when there are no clear delimitations?

⁴³ Cp. <http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang-en/index.htm>.

⁴⁴ The trickle down-effect refers to the claim that created wealth, even if it primarily benefits the a societies most wealthy, will eventually trickle down to the lower classes through upper class consumption. For criticism see Lansley 2011, Stiglitz 2012, and Piketty 2014.

In the words of Wertheimer and Zwolinski (2013), exploitation is a form of injustice where person “*A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B*” (cp. Feinberg 1988, 178). In a Kantian formulation, Buchanan (1985, 87 emphasis in the original) defines exploitation like this:

[T]o exploit a person involves the *harmful, merely instrumental utilization* of him or his capacities, for one's own advantage or for the sake of one's own ends.

Although this definition in principle is convincing, it is very difficult to use it to identify occurrences of exploitation, therefore an additional or enlarged definition is necessary.

In the classical Marxist view, the working class is always exploited. The logic is straightforward: The capitalist owner of an enterprise will only employ a worker if he can make a profit from him.⁴⁵ This logically entails that the worker will have to produce more wealth for the firm than he takes home as wages (cp. Holmstrom 1997, 357ff., Heyden 1983, 176, and Marx 1867, I, 16). According to this definition, almost any work that is not self-employed is exploitative.

However, this way of looking at things is not very helpful and probably ignores some realities of modern economics. There is the widely held view that entrepreneur “capitalists” shoulder the financial risks of an enterprise, for which they arguably deserve a bigger share of the surplus, and it is often their creativity that drives the enterprise.⁴⁶ The definition also ignores the possibility of unionisation and political support of workers, which leads to increasing wages and better working conditions. Nor does it apply for workers with scarce valuable skills, for which firms will have to compete. The relationship between employer and employee is probably better characterised as *mutually*

⁴⁵ “Ausbeutung ist allgemein durch die Tatsache gegeben, daß sich die Eigentümer der Produktionsmittel unentgeltlich fremde Arbeit [...] aneignen.” Heyden 1983, 176. Translation by the author: “Exploitation is generally given by the fact that the owners of production means gratuitously acquire the work of somebody else.”

⁴⁶ The late Steve Jobs who invented the iphone and the ipad for Apple may be seen as an example for this.

advantageous exploitation (Wertheimer and Zwolinski 2013), when they both profit from their contract.

Liberalism has apparently no use for the concept of exploitation at all, as it relies on the individual freedom to enter contracts. This could be taken to mean that unless an individual is physically forced into a labour contract, exploitation is not possible, and as Maitland (1997) argues, the work offered by the aforementioned “sweat-shops” is gladly accepted and highly competed for by citizens of developing countries (cp. Adams 2002). Even Marxist theorist David Harvey (2003, 164) admits that it is “complicated” and that “[f]aced with the choice of sticking with industrial labour or returning to rural impoverishment, many within the new proletariat seem to express a strong preference for the former.” Taking the economic principle of revealed preference into account, which states that your taking a job means that you actually prefer it to the alternatives, liberal theorists tend to neglect or disregard the topic of exploitation (cp. Steiner 1984).

Yet, as for example McMullen et al. 2014 point out, there remains some discomfort about the gap between workers' wages and the overall profits of many companies. When wages amount to only less than one per cent of the price of a T-shirt (McMullen et al. 2014, 13), with larger sums going into marketing, transport, and profit, it is clear that something is not right.

How can a definition of exploitation take this into account? The crux for a liberal theory of exploitation lies in the notion of the alternative, as for example Meyers (2004, 324ff.) illustrates quite drastically.⁴⁷ In many emerging and developing countries, the alternative to taking up an underpaid, insecure, and often hazardous job is simply to die of hunger. Many people have to accept even indecent wages as long as it keeps them from starving. When workers receive only so little money that they can scarcely maintain the lives of themselves and their families, this is very close to slavery.

⁴⁷ In Meyers' thought experiment, Carol is lost in a desert. Jason comes by on his jeep and offers to save her if she agrees to have anal intercourse with him. She consents and is rescued. Meyers argues that this case shows that – while no coercion occurred and Jason has only added to Carol's set of options – Jason still acts immorally, as he exploits Carol's dire situation.

With their lack of alternatives, the poor are the very weakest link in a global chains of decreasing bargaining power. This can be illustrated with an example of the clothing industry, referring to calculations made by the “Clean Clothes Campaign” (McMullen et al. 2014, 13). The customer in Western or emerging countries is in a comfortable situation, as many retailers compete for his purchase. They do so by reducing the price, increasing the quality, and using marketing strategies to catch and maintain a potential customers' attention. The customer will usually tend to choose the cheapest product and will have to be convinced – e.g. by expensive advertisements – to do otherwise. A large part of the price the final customer pays for a product is claimed by the retailer, who in a situation of competition can simply decline to sell certain branded (or labelled) articles in his stores, be they online or offline, if the brand name (or label) company claims too high a price for its products. The company, for example “Nike”, does usually not contract the labourers itself. Rather this task is sub-contracted, often again over several steps, to local entrepreneurs in countries with low labour costs. Brand name (or label) companies claim on average twelve per cent of the final selling price for themselves. The competition among “sweat-shop” producers allows the brand name (or label) company's intermediaries or sub-contractors to negotiate for the lowest price. Additionally, parts of the price go towards transportation and, in case of fashionable brands or labels, a majority of the price goes into marketing and advertisement of the brand name (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012, 206ff).

The labourers in Bangladesh or elsewhere have to contend with pittances, which make up for the smallest part of the final price of a product. because they are at the very end of a non-transparent chain of bargainers with ever decreasing bargaining powers. As Glennie (2009) convincingly points out, the one thing emerging and developing countries have in abundance is manual labour.⁴⁸ Labour protection laws, in case they exist, can easily be avoided, e.g. by bribery. An often used tool of exploitation is the artificial restriction of bargaining power by denying labour rights, especially unionisation and freedom of

⁴⁸ What they lack is financial capital, good infrastructure, institutions, and human capital (cp. Guisan and Exposito 2008).

movement, to individuals (Steiner 1984 and 2013).⁴⁹ This leads to a crucial problem of poverty: The lack of power – be it political or economical – and consequently the lack of influence on decisions made (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Baaz 2005, Culp 2014, and Meyers 2004). Exploitation is therefore *taking advantage of an individual who, due to a lack of feasible alternatives and subsequently bargaining power, is forced to agree to someone else's demands*. In this way, it is close to blackmailing.

From the individual account of exploitation, a communal account can be developed. If the livelihood of people is negatively affected, if their interests are not recognized and accepted and there is no just compensation, we can say that they are exploited. While the contracts between exploitative elites and firms on the one side and poor (and maybe unskilled) workers on the other side may actually be legal, nevertheless they are often unethical, as they take something away without adequate compensation, to which the local population has a right (Pogge 2002, 2010 and 2011).⁵⁰ In a similar way, global trade, patents, and policy negotiations influence the everyday lives of people, but as democracy is lacking both in their own country and in the global institutions, this happens without an ethical basis (Culp 2014, 133ff., Hassoun 2012, 92ff., and Pogge 2010a, 10ff.). So far, the richest high-income countries which constitute the Group of Seven (G 7) control more than 60 percent of the voting power at the World Bank, but are home to less than 15 percent of the world's population (Hickel 2014). Similar problems arise in connection with the WTO and the IMF (Pogge 2010a, 22f. , 40f. and 50ff. and Stiglitz 2002).

Globalisation essentially means a world where goods and capital can move freely. However, labour, for psychological – but mostly for legal reasons – may not do so (Stiglitz 2012). Employment opportunities are limited in a way that capital and goods are not,

⁴⁹ Steiner proposes the denying of options on the an individual's decision matrix as a liberal definition of exploitation. This allows for an approximate calculation of the cost of exploitation and underlines the international problem of restricted freedom of labour (cp. Stiglitz 2012). It does, however, not capture the uneasiness we feel at the disproportionateness of labour wages, product prices, and company profits, neither does it take into account Meyers' (2004, 324f.) thought experiment on mutually beneficial, but immoral exploitation.

⁵⁰ I base my argument on the collective national ownership of national resources and rights of the land after living there for generations.

which contributes to a global devaluation of labour and an inequality of wealth (Rajan 2011). While quite fiercely rejecting immigrants, several nations actually welcome illegal capital from corrupt politicians as well as from tax-evading multinationals (Kar and Leblanc 2013). This means that the new possibilities of globalisation are distributed unevenly, leading to a global system by the rich and for the rich.

Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian notion of collective exploitation is worth mentioning here. Pogge (2010b, 528f) argues that today's poverty could be abolished, were it not for the enormous inequality of wealth. Indeed the wealth is very unequally distributed: 60 per cent of the world's population hold less than two per cent of global wealth, while the richest one per cent hold 40 per cent (Hardoon 2016, Piketty 2014, and World Bank 2016). This inequality can be partly explained by morally neutral occurrences such as economic growth, globalisation, and technological change, by which new wealth is created. People with rare talents, innovative ideas, and high endowment of capital do profit disproportionately (Rajan 2011). Moral claims are limited to the humanitarian principle. But part of this wealth is created by *regulatory capture*, meaning that interest groups use political influence to ensure that they profit disproportionately, or that such groups even take away wealth and earning opportunities from others, for example by curtailing labour standards or facilitating tax breaks for the super-rich (Pogge 2010b, 536f). Pogge's bleak vision is one of self-aggravating regulatory capture: As the rich get richer, it becomes easier and easier to purchase political and medial influence, thus ensuring that large parts of nationally and internationally created wealth lands in their pockets. While we as consumers profit somewhat from products which are cheap due to exploitation, main profiteers are the owners of the multinational companies.

Pogge (2002, 176) maintains that if an institutional order that improves the position of the poor is possible, we are harming them by not bringing this improved order about. This seems to be too high a claim on us, actually going into the direction of the extreme

demand, as well as it is difficult to achieve practically (Culp 2014, Hassoun 2012, and Risse 2005). However, this does not mean that we should not engage for a more just institutional order. It could be well in our self-interest that no one is influenced negatively without compensation. Arguably the best situation we can hope to bring about is one in which both the poor, as well as we (middle-class) citizens of the privileged nations, can engage in a meaningful dialogue on what international justice means. To enter on this path, it is clearly necessary to strengthen the position of the poorest through empowerment, as well as to improve institutional quality and justice, both at home as in the international sphere (Culp 2014, 153ff.).

What does this mean for us as individuals? We may believe that this is not our responsibility. Indeed, this type of argument is often advanced by Western corporations who reject the responsibility for the working conditions their sub-contractors are accountable for (Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 2004 and Segal, Sobczak, and Triomphe 2003). I do agree with this position in so far as it is not only the responsibility of the West – be it as consumer or as a company – to ensure safe working conditions, adequate pay, and standards of environmental protection. With regard to the argument about position and ability, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the local government to protect its citizens from gross exploitation and insecurity, and local employers should have the minimal decency to put their employee's or worker's lives before their profits. But as long as the situation persists in its current imperfect form, we still share the responsibility, especially if we profit from it with cheap goods. In the the age of Internet and global media, we cannot claim ignorance of these facts. Singer is probably right when maintaining that we are partly able to reach improvements via donations, but political action is at least as important.

All these arguments may read as a severe critique of globalisation, as the emphasis is on the negative side of this world-spanning process. However, there is also a positive side, as globalisation has led to rapid economic growth in some countries, notably China

and South Korea, thus improving the lives of millions of people (Chang 2010, 25ff. and Li et al. 2009). Globalisation has not only provided new and cheaper products, but also quickened technological change through the rapid diffusion of information via the Internet (Janus and Paulo 2013). Freedom of movement and capital meant increased productivity (cp. Stiglitz 2012). Yet the problem remains that due to a lack of just and democratic international structures, some are left behind and others have to pay quite a hefty price for globalisation.

2.12. A Climate Problem

In rich countries, people profit from a comfortable lifestyle and a high level of consumption. Insofar as this lifestyle and consumption are based on overuse of fossil fuel, they contribute to climate change. This is accompanied by environmental degradation, due to exploitation of natural resources. In this way, too, the rich countries could be said to cause harm to the poor. (Ahmed and Suphachalasai 2014). The question, to what degree climate change is caused by human influence, remains difficult to answer, although there is more and more proof available (Arendt et al. 2002, National Research Council 2010, and Parmesan and Yohe 2003). What cannot be doubted is the reduction of rainfall and subsequently the increase of desertification, together with a degradation of fertile soil, in some regions of the world (Ziegler et al. 2011, 338ff.).⁵¹

A 2007 report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), for example, on the situation in Sudan (meanwhile separated into a Northern state and the state of South Sudan) describes the continuing expansion of the Sahel desert zone since rainfall and vegetation records were begun in the 1930s. Due to declining precipitation, this trend is expected to continue. As the report estimates (2007, 9):

⁵¹ “In particular, there have been huge increases in hydrometeorological disasters such as floods and windstorms, while the frequency of other categories of natural disaster has not changed markedly, though there is a small but perceptible increase in droughts.” Chhibber and Laajaj (2013, 28).

“The remaining semi-desert and low rainfall savannah on sand, which represent some 25 percent of Sudan's agricultural land, are at considerable risk of further desertification. This is forecast to lead to a significant drop (approximately 20 percent) in food production. In addition, there is mounting evidence that the decline in precipitation due to regional climate change has been a significant stress factor on pastoralist societies – particularly in Darfur and Kordofan – and has thereby contributed to conflict.”

The advancing desertification – and accompanying general water scarcity – will increase poverty, causing further conflicts in the regions affected, and finally lead to migration to developing nations (Chhibber and Laajaj 2013, Nkonya et al. 2011, and Schubert, Schellhuber, and Buchmann 2007). Sharples, Jones, and Martin (2014, 6) estimate that it will cost Africa \$10.6 billion to adapt to the effects of climate change that it did not cause, and a further \$26 billion will be needed to promote low carbon economic growth.

Of course it is difficult to say to what extent desertification and reduced rainfall since 1930 are man-made or just natural variations of the climate. It is equally difficult to differentiate between the impact of local influences such as overgrazing by cattle and global ones such as greenhouse gas emissions by developed nations. But as the science of climate change advances, it becomes more and more obvious that the developing nations will have to pick up large parts of the tab accumulated by the developed nations both in exploitation of natural resources and CO₂ exhaust (National Research Council 2010 and UNEP 2007).

While some regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are stricken with drought and desertification, other regions – primarily in South Asia – are threatened by flooding, as the ocean level rises. A recent report by the Asian Development Bank (Ahmed and

Suphachalasai 2014, XV) estimates that the region of South Asia “could lose an equivalent 1.8% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) by 2050, which will progressively increase to 8.8% by 2100.” This is especially problematic, as the region's long coastal strips are densely populated with 1.43 billion people. One-third of the current population lives on less than \$1.25 a day, leaving both families and governments little room to manoeuvre for the evacuation of the threatened areas and other disaster prevention (cp. Lauer 2011).⁵²

An additional problem for some developing countries is that they are used as dumping grounds for our waste (Mattioli and Palladio 2012). Once broken or supplanted by a newer, better product, many of our everyday electrical appliances, or other waste, are smuggled into countries such as Ghana or Nigeria. There people live among toxic smoke of garbage fires, trying under dangerous conditions to pry valuable parts from former high-tech instruments. They take up this work because they lack alternative income possibilities, even if they are not ignorant of the danger to their health.

Moreover, waste is simply dumped close to the African coast of developing nations such as Senegal to avoid recycling fees. There is strong evidence that toxic and even nuclear waste was dumped illegally near the Somalian coast, killing the fish and endangering the people that live in these parts. The UNEP (2005, 134) reported that the 2004 tsunami had washed up rusting containers of toxic waste on the shores of the Somali state of Puntland.

Another example of environmental destruction (and a form of robbery) is illegal fishing. In poorly controlled areas, e.g. off the coast of Senegal, vast flotilla of industrial

⁵² Additionally, the extend of the damage a natural disaster causes in human casualties and property damage depends on preventive procedures such as early warning systems and disaster resistant buildings (such as the earthquake secure building techniques used in Japan). Afterwards the damage reduction depends on factors such as the government's ability to implement humanitarian measures, for example to send in professional rescue teams and medical equipment. A wealthy and well-organised nation is much better equipped to confront the challenges of natural disaster. Haiti 2010 would be an example of a nation that has failed in implementing preventive measures against earthquakes, and even with international support, the reconstruction efforts are still not satisfactory (Lauer 2010). If a nation is poor and this poverty is partly due to international structures and institutions, the extend of the damages done by a natural disaster can therefore be blamed partially on the developed world (cp. Hahn 2009, 58).

trawlers from the European Union, China, or Russia, but also local “pirate fishing fleets” are scouring the ocean floor (Agnew et al. 2009, LaFraniere 2008, and Lennox 2008, 8). This fishing is either done illegally (this is the case in an estimated 40 per cent of catches), or the fishing rights or quota are sold off by government officials to foreign nations. These sales are in violation of the 1994 United Nations treaty on the seas that acknowledges the right of local governments to sell fishing rights to foreigners only to their surplus stocks. Illegal fishing does not respect regulations such as net size, but tends to completely empty the ocean where it passes.

Here we are confronted again with “criminal globalization”. While freedom of trade has brought wealth to a lot of people, it has severely worsened the quality of life of others. As the above examples show, globalisation offers many opportunities to increase one's income at the expense of others. These examples could go on indefinitely. Bad governance, lack of accountability, and corruption undermine existing protection to people and environment. In some cases, identifying the culprits can be extremely difficult, as the case of illegal waste dumping illustrates. Even if they are identified, prosecuting them is not always easy. One reason for this lies in the lack of local environmental and health protection laws, but even more problematic is the corruption and often the incompetence of local authorities, although this is not necessarily a part of Western responsibility. Another reason is the lack of a transnational agency with true legal and executive power.

Developing countries not only suffer disproportionately from the problems of environmental destruction and climate change. It also seems that they will have to sacrifice disproportionately when it comes to disadvantages from environmental protection measures. They now produce much less CO₂ than developed countries, but with international treaties in place, they will not be able to expel carbon dioxide to the extent as was possible in the early stages of their development. Is it ethically justified that developing nations are not “allowed” to develop in a similar manner as the developed

countries did? It may be argued that a period of extended CO₂-exhaustion is needed as industrialization progresses and production capacities increase, citing the examples of rapid catch up development processes in China and South Korea. Similar problems can arise from a forced liberalisation of trade, as developing countries are severely under-represented and underpowered in global negotiations. This ensures that the field of international competition remains biased in favour of developed countries (cp. Chang 2010 and Pogge 2010a). As Singer and Fei (2013) analyse, the current solutions proposed in the Kyoto Protocol are based on the *grandfathering approach*, which bases emission rights on existing patterns. This scheme requires countries to reduce emissions relative to their levels in 1990, resulting in the paradoxical conclusion that countries that emitted more in 1990 are entitled to emit more in the future than countries that emitted less in 1990.

These institutional problems and inequalities of power are less a question of personal but of collective responsibility (cp. Lichtenberg 2014, 67ff.). Individual actions alone cannot plausibly have a noticeable influence on global climate, this can rather be achieved by a shared one. Change depends on the lifestyle and political decisions of many – perhaps with exceptions such as the CEO of a major multinational company or the President of the United States of America.

The sociologist Ulrich Beck's (1986, 2009 and 2011) concept of *Risikogesellschaft* (German for risk society) is useful in this context of individual versus collective responsibility. Modern societies are under new kinds of global, unforeseeable risks, characterised by three features (Beck 2011):

1. ***De-localisation:*** *Its causes and consequences are not limited to one geographical location or space, they are in principle omnipresent.*

2. ***Incalculableness:*** *Its consequences are in principle incalculable; at bottom it's a matter of "hypothetical" risks, which, not least, are based on science-induced not-knowing and normative dissent.*
3. ***Non-compensability:*** *The security dream of first modernity was based on the scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever more controllable; accidents could occur, as long and because they were considered compensable. If the climate has changed irreversibly, if progress in human genetics makes irreversible interventions in human existence possible, if terrorist groups already have weapons of mass destruction available to them, then it's too late. Given this new quality of "threats to humanity" – argues François Ewald – the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention.*

In view of these new realities of interconnectedness, there is an urgent need for global risk governance and cooperation, both to prevent global risks and to help affected societies to cope. However, so far there has been a notable lack of success in negotiations, because politicians of rich countries who are most responsible for CO₂ exhaustion are also the ones with most negotiation power (Pogge 2010b). Fearing for their domestic support, in case people may have to accept reductions in their standard of living, and pressured by powerful industrial and economical interest groups, in Germany most notably the car industry or in the United States the oil industry, politicians tend to delay actions in this matter (Goldenberg 2015, Jochum 2005, and Pogge 2010b). For developing countries, this comes at a high price. In the long term, a solution can only consist in a democratisation of the international sphere so that countries may negotiate on a level playing field (Stiglitz 2002 and Culp 2014). As privileged citizens, we have a political responsibility to pressure our governments to act, as consumers we should reduce our ecological footprint, and as

individuals, we should donate in cases of natural and environmental disasters as a temporary relief for the people concerned.

2.13. Security

The reader may find one very common argument missing from the canon presented so far: The reference to political security and self-interest. The argument goes as follows: Helping developing countries is in the West's self-interest, as it will reduce the risk of political conflict and radicalisation, thus reducing the threat of terrorism (Sachs 2005, 328ff.). A related argument is that reducing poverty is in the West's self-interest as it will reduce the pressure from illegal immigration (Pritchett 2006, 4 and 90ff.).

While the fate of the victims of the 2001 World Trade Center attack, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the 2005 London bombings were of the most tragic nature, on a statistical level, the number of deaths caused by terrorism are minuscule, compared to the number of victims of global poverty in developing countries (or compared to the number of victims of road accidents, of deaths as consequence of smoking or the abuse of alcohol, or of suicides in rich countries (cp. Horgan 2011, Sachs 2005, 215, and WHO 2014). In the West, the fear of terrorism seems to be much exaggerated by media and politicians, especially in the United States, but the countries suffering most intensely from terrorism are emerging and developing countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, or Pakistan (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014, 2). The reality shows that political decision-makers seem to have only few problems to use large resources on locating and killing (potential) terrorists, for example by drones, or conducting expensive wars, but they seem to be reluctant to agree on aiding the needy without a clear strategic or economic benefit

for themselves or for their countries.⁵³ All the expenses for warfare mentioned above dwarf official and private aid taken together. For example US official development aid (ODA) in 2013 was \$30.46 billion (OECD 2014), an previously unknown all-time high, while the defence budget was \$640 billion (Norton-Taylor 2014). But the results of both the Afghanistan as well as the Iraq engagements have proven that wars have limited effectiveness in the reduction of radicalism and terrorist threat (cp. Perry 2011 and Taspinar 2009).

For the prevention of illegal immigration, combating poverty in third world countries at first glance seems much more costly than the more direct solution of border patrols, containment camps, high fences, and deportations. As inequality and poverty, as well as conflicts, force more and more people to seek a better fortune in the global North, it will become increasingly difficult both practically and ethically to keep them out. Better security, a more just distribution of income, and better conditions in the countries of origin would reduce the incentive for many people to try to flee to the developed world.

This argument referring to political security and self-interest has some difficult implications. Ethically, however, it somewhat contradicts the cosmopolitan principle of benevolence, as it relies on the exclusion of others. Development aid would be reduced to the status of a handmaiden of foreign policy and the military, with the resources going mainly to strategic partners or “pacified” regions. In fact, this is very much the reality today (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2003d and Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). To resume, while increased security and stability, as well as a reduction in refugees, are good side-effects of increasing aid and donations, this argumentation should not be mistaken as the primary one for global solidarity.

⁵³ According to the costs of war organisation (Crawford 2014), the Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost the US \$4,4 trillion (including both direct government spending as well as indirect cost, such as forgone income by soldiers). Unfortunately, it is idle speculation to imagine what could have been achieved for human development with this sum.

Conclusion

As was attempted to show in the first part of the thesis, the different arguments to act against global poverty combined have considerable force. While it is unreasonable – and unrealistic – to ask that we follow the principle of benevolence to its extreme demand and dedicate our lives to others entirely, this does not mean that we are not at all obliged to help. Most of Singer's reviewers, with the exception of more ideologically motivated critics such as Badhwar (2006), agree with him on this part (Arneson 2009, Cullity 2004, Lichtenberg 2014, Nagel 2010, and Wenar 2011b). Not helping, when we could easily do so, seems ethically problematic to the point of reprehensibility, revealing a gap between claims of being a morally decent person and one's true behaviour. The reality of globalisation, in a situation which is characterized by high inequality, means that we are intimately connected to distant strangers, for example through our purchases, our driving a car, or our political representatives who negotiate multinational treaties in our name. In many cases, this harm is not a result of malevolence, but of simple negligence or ignorance, and in some cases of laziness, lethargy, or idleness. Not taking other people's interests into account, profiting from or partaking in the exploitation of others seems even worse. Singer (2007 and 2011a) is convincing when he points out that the fact that we cannot see or observe the suffering of fellow human beings does not mean that it is meaningless to us. However, as our cognitive apparatus is not primed for this, we feel less guilty or have less pangs of consciousness when acting against the interests of poor, far away strangers. Yet, donations to eradicate poverty arguably are not as high as they should be, although poverty is one of the biggest moral problems of our times, with the consequences of unnecessary deaths and suffering (Sachs 2005, 288ff., Singer 2009a, 23ff., and Pogge 2010a, 11f.).

But apparently there seems to be a problem. From an ethical perspective it is likely

that the supererogatory humanitarian duty of charitable giving is much less pressing than the requirements of justice in international relations – especially between rich and poor countries – and international institutions. Why do eminent philosophers Peter Singer and Peter Unger focus on this issue? Although no explicit evidence, hint, or clue to this can be found in their texts, we can assume that the answer is relatively straightforward: Donating seems much easier. Changing global institutions and economic systems towards more fairness and inclusivity is an arduous task, which necessitates the overcoming of many obstacles, individual and national interests. Moreover, this task can only be accomplished collectively (cp. Lichtenberg 2014, 8f. and 239ff.). Donating between one and five per cent of one's income seems quite simple and is a purely individual decision, thus no coordination problems arise. Additionally, most INGOs that act against poverty, for example Oxfam, also lobby for more just conditions and a change of attitudes towards poor countries. Thus donating may be not only compatible with political action for global justice, it may be complementary.

Yet whether it really is as simple to convince people to increase their donations and channel them towards efficient programmes against global poverty is an empirical question. As societal perception and religious and ethical codes already highly favour and praise altruistic behaviour, it seems difficult to imagine how further increases are possible (Adloff 2010 and Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006). How successful Singer's culture of giving can truly be in convincing significant numbers of people to donate (or to donate more) will therefore be considered in the next part of this thesis.

Besides, it is important to discuss how much good we can do through donations. As Mulgan (1997 and 2001) shows, any obligation to donate depends on how much good can be achieved via this donation. This will be discussed in part 4.

3. Why and When do Human Beings Help Each Other?

At a first glance, a discussion on the realisability of Peter Singer's culture of giving seems to be philosophically irrelevant. As philosophers have argued since Kant ([1793]1970), once a duty to act, in this case against global poverty, has been identified, one is ethically required to behave accordingly. Pointing out that there are always some who do not act according to what is ethically required is of little argumentative value.

On the other hand, as has been indicated in the previous part, “ought implies can” is an important dictum in ethics as well (Kant [1781]1970, A548/B576 and Stern 2004). Only acts that are physically and psychologically possible are reasonable candidates for moral duties. I am unable to provide first aid to the man suffering a heart attack on the other side of the planet, my contribution to reduce climate change is so minuscule, it doesn't even register, I cannot even prevent a car accident happening 100 meters from my flat. In the following chapters, this issue will be discussed in depth with a focus on the psychological feasibility of Peter Singer's culture of giving. While in the previous part the need to go beyond simply donating towards poverty relief was attempted to explain, a step back will be taken in the following part, and the main concern will lie on the realisability of donations, as this is not only Singer's main argument, but it can also serve as a basis to understand the psychology behind Western efforts of poverty relief.⁵⁴

Psychological possibilities are by their very nature more difficult to evaluate than physical ones. What costs can I be expected to incur to act against global injustice and deprivation? Doing the right thing will entail cognitive effort and cost time and money. These factors are limited, even though Singer (2009, 160ff.) rightly argues that most people in the developed countries are much better off than the world's poorest. Still, the question remains, how much can the individual person be expected to donate of his or her

⁵⁴ The psychological limits and possibilities of ethical consumption and political activism will be discussed in the last part of this thesis.

income? It is evident that giving money away is hard and requires an ethical effort, but does that mean that we expect too much when asking for five per cent of someone's income? A virtue ethicist convinced by the Singer-Unger thesis would argue that we only need to cultivate the virtue of generosity. But how do we cultivate this virtue further than it is already developed? Altruism and generosity are values encouraged by all major religions (e.g. “zakat”, the third of the five pillars of Islam, requests believers to give 2.5 per cent of their savings to the poor and needy) and within most societies (cp. Farah 2000 and Roberts 2008). This is a main reason why governments make donations tax deductible and provide financial support to many charitable organizations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). The question “How much is donated already, and if and how can this amount be raised further?” is therefore highly relevant. A psychological assessment will be used to try to show how we are to proceed if we want to implement a culture of giving. It may indicate that we have to look for alternative solutions, for example substituting lacking donations by involuntary contributions such as a Tobin tax (on speculation with currencies), a global resource dividend, or some other form of global welfare provision, as exists on the national level, especially in Europe (Buchanan 1996 and Pogge 2002, 197 and 205ff.). As a start, the following question has to be dealt with: How feasible is Peter Singer's idea to establish a culture of giving?

3.1. Altruism and Cooperation

The need for human beings to cooperate and to help one another is probably at the origin of mankind as a species. There is ample evidence that a certain type of *altruism* and thus *charitable behaviour* has been hardwired into our emotional-cognitive system (cp. Bauer 2008, de Waal 2012, Greene 2013, Haidt 2012, Klein 2011, and Nowak and Sigmund 2005; for a classical view cp. Hume [1751]1977 and Smith [1759]2010). This does not

only apply to humans. Authors such as Rowlands (2008), Klein (2011), and Suchak and de Waal (2012) demonstrate that higher mammals such as chimpanzees and elephants help members of their group or herd in certain conditions.⁵⁵ They apparently recognize suffering in other members of their species and try to alleviate it. They cooperate and even, as van Wolkenten, Brosnan, and de Waal (2007) show in an experiment, have a rudimentary understanding of fairness, which plays a part in the distribution of food.⁵⁶

As Suchak and de Waal (2012) demonstrate, reciprocity and altruism in capuchin monkeys is “without the cognitive burden.” There is a fast instinctive reaction, probably wired into the behaviour on a genetic level. This behaviour is very advantageous to the group, as it minimizes conflicts between members and allows the group to successfully compete with other groups. Capuchin monkeys also cooperate within groups when it comes to warning about predators and defending against them. This entails costs for the individual, as the warning shout attracts attention to him or her, as does defending his kin instead of fleeing.

Cooperation is even more important for us human beings (Klein 2011 and Pagel 2013). On the one hand, we tend to be weaker than our ape cousins and lack their formidable jaws. Our children stay dependent for a long time, even compared to other higher mammals (Pinker 2011 263). On the other hand, we have evolved the capability of language far beyond anything possible for them, and we have a more sophisticated approach to learning. For the great apes, learning consists in imitating the behaviour of others (Chomsky 1968). Humans actively teach their offspring, thus enabling the

⁵⁵ Rowlands (2008) cites the example of a dying elephant cow that is supported by the members of her herd in her last hours. They surround her, try to lift her up and offer her food, showing signs of distress. After her death, they remain several hours at her corpse and defend it from scavengers. This could be seen as a precursor to the human tradition of burial ceremonies.

⁵⁶ In this experiment, two capuchin monkeys receive a reward for performing the task of handing the experimenter a token. If the reward is perceived as unfair, i.e. if one monkey receives a grape while the other only receives a cucumber, the unequally treated monkey showed very negative reactions and in fact became quite agitated. Van Wolkenten, Brosnan, and de Waal (2007) prove that the negative reaction cannot be attributed to the mere visibility of better rewards (greed hypothesis) nor to having received such rewards in the immediate past (frustration hypothesis). It must therefore have been caused by seeing their partner obtain the better reward. Interestingly, the negative reaction is less pronounced, if the tasks are of different difficulty. This suggests that even primates value fairness and dislike inequality, which is of course also the case for humans.

transference of very complex skills and the construction of elaborated tools (Boyd and Richerson 2009 and Sloan 2010). Oral tradition and – later in the history of mankind – writing enable each generation to build upon the wisdom of the previous one. The early survival and success of the human species thus relies on cooperation, for example the coordination of the group and selection of adequate ambush tactics in hunting (Boyd and Richerson 2009). The hunters are thus confronted with higher evolutionary pressure concerning intelligence and communication. At the same time, this will be further reinforced by the availability of protein-rich meat to successful hunters, which allows for improved brain development. With increasing coordination and communication, comes the necessity to establish a system of fairness and norms, which is required to guarantee an efficient and just distribution of the spoils of the hunt. Once a large animal has been caught, there is much more meat available than a single individual can consume. This means that it is beneficial to distribute the meat among the group, ensuring reciprocity in the future, improving the hunter's individual standing in the group hierarchy and improving the survivability of members of the extended family, thus indirectly propagating one's own genes (cp. Tomasello 2009). Bauer (2008) argues that cooperation is at the core of humanity's success as a species. He goes as far as to argue that cooperation is at the very root of our genetics, and he vehemently criticises *social Darwinism*, a position which he sees as unscientific and even morally dangerous. While this goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the neurobiologist position towards the human as a *social animal* is very interesting, as it mirrors the Aristotelian position on why humans live together in a society. What seems to be certainly true is that the capacity to help others may be characterized as a *human universal*.⁵⁷ Indeed a human being that lacks this capacity is considered emotionally

⁵⁷ “Human universals” is a term used in anthropology and evolutionary psychology to refer to behavioural or cognitive traits common to all neurologically normal humans. The notion of human universals was partially formulated as a challenge to cultural relativism, a predominant view of human nature in the late 20th century, which some psychologists and anthropologists see as greatly exaggerating the variance among members of the human species (Aknin et al. 2013, Brown 1991, and Haidt 2012).

or mentally disturbed.⁵⁸

Mechanisms for conflict resolution had to be developed to prevent in-group infighting. It is very probable that in this context the advent of language played a crucial part. Language and the improved communication possibilities were certainly of strategic use in hunting. Arguably, the social use of language was even more important, with talking partly taking over the function of grooming, helping to maintain social peace, and thus strengthening group cohesion (Chomsky 1968). Steven Pinker (2011, 266) points out that there is an obvious connection between language, culture, and technological know-how. Language as a vehicle of thought between persons allows interpersonal communication, and especially teaching of the next generation on a level that is impossible for animals. New complexities in interaction arise, as speech makes long-term promises of reciprocity as well as punishment of defection possible (Origg and Sperber 2000).⁵⁹ But it also allows for deception, we can use language to trick one another and gain unfair advantages (Dunbar 1998).

However, evolution has also allowed for the development of tools or means to deal with “cheaters” (Boehm 2012 and Nelson and Greene 2003). An example is the anger reaction of people when detecting such a lie or deception, another one the punishing of free riders and liars, often viciously, and even at a cost to ourselves (Axelrod 1984). It does therefore not come as a surprise that we have a certain ability of detecting lies based on our comprehension of facial expression or body-language and our capacity to detect inconsistencies in a person's story, although we are less good at this than most of us like to think (Etcoff et al. 2000). To deceive, we need to be able to understand another person's

⁵⁸ In a 2001 article in *Nature*, Abbott points out that neurological research into psychopathy suggests that the condition should be considered a mental illness with an underlying biological condition, as they lack the ability of empathy. “Psychopaths are not necessarily the sadistic killers of popular fiction. But they lack empathy, and are unable to experience guilt or remorse. They are assertive and egocentric, may be highly manipulative, and are unconcerned by the negative consequences of their actions. When they kill, the crimes are usually well planned and committed for personal gain. But engage in conversation with a psychopath, and he or she might seem perfectly normal.” (Abbott 2001, 296, cp. also Baron-Cohen 2012, Haidt 2007, and Mealey 1995) .

⁵⁹ Just imagine the success of the first hominid who found out that by using the term “honey” he could indicate that a female was sweet.

position and to a degree predict their thoughts and reactions (Kidd and Castano 2013). But just as empathy and understanding another person's mind is necessary for a successful deception, it also means that we comprehend our fellow human beings, and their pain can be imagined and thereby in part felt by ourselves. This is arguably the basis for the evolution of morality (cp. Boehm 2012).

Finally, language can serve as quite an effective tool to expose free riders, as we “gossip” about the moral behaviour of others (Nelson and Greene 2003, 26f). The moral transgressions of an individual, once exposed, are likely to be spread around in society, making further infringements more difficult and limiting the cheater's chances to participate in future cooperative projects. This has the disadvantage that sometimes an individual can get alienated from society because of a minor mistake or some baseless rumour. *The Scarlet Letter* by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1850) and the *The Crucible* by Arthur Miller (1953) are literary example of such cases. However, in our large and anonymous modern societies the effectiveness of this strategy of ostracising is limited.

In “Signalling Goodness” (2003), Nelson and Greene theorise that many instances of altruism, among them donations, serve to advertise that a person is a “good guy”, i.e. a reliable partner for social interaction. The selection of the cause can serve as a demonstration of group membership, for example when wealthy conservative Christians join an organisation such as the Lions Club. The fact that many charitable donations – just take gala events, the naming of University scholarships or of museum and hospital wings – are very public can be taken as evidence for this (Grace and Griffin 2006 and West 2004). Additionally, some people are so reputation-conscious about their donations that they tend to overstate or even lie about their charitable contributions (Nelson and Greene 2003, 28ff).⁶⁰ This is referred to as *conspicuous compassion*, mirroring the term “conspicuous

⁶⁰ Nelson and Greene (2003, 28ff.) quote a 1950 social experiment by Parry and Crosley. The researchers obtained data on their donors from a charitable organisation (Community Chest) and asked 920 individuals in the area whether or not they had contributed to the charity. A staggering 34 per cent said they had given to Community Chest, but were not listed as donors in the files. On the other hand, 31 per cent admitted that they had not donated, and 35 per cent did both donate and tell the truth.

consumption” for money spend on publicly visible luxuries (such as large cars or shiny jewels) to signal economic power (Grace and Griffin 2006, Harbaugh 1998, Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012, 207ff., West 2004, and Veblen 1899).

As the possibility of deception always exists, external controlling mechanisms alone – without an intrinsic motivation or desire to cooperate – would be quite ineffective. Indeed, game theory predicts that such external measures tend to reduce cooperation to instances of direct reciprocity (Axelrod 1984 and Schmidt 2001). Cooperation is the norm, for example we pay instead of shoplifting, even if there is little chance of reprisal (cp. Rose 2014). Human beings need to maintain a positive self-image, and there are not only psychological costs associated with lying, but also physical ones, as it tends to produce feelings of discomfort (Nelson and Greene 2003, 29f). Internal “moral chains” are at work here. David Hume famously noted that altruist behaviour translates into personal utility (cp. Anik et al 2011, Ratner, Zhao, and Clarke 2011, and Strahilevitz 2011).

“It appears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: ... [I]t is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, levity, mercy and moderation.”

David Hume [1751] (1977, 324).

However, as has been indicated and will be further supported by evidence from moral psychologists and researchers of donor behaviour, while a charitable impulse is part of human psychology, this impulse tends to be near-sighted and emotional rather than intellectual in character. What this means for possible solutions of the problem of international poverty and for development aid remains yet to be explored.

3.2. When Are People Most Likely to Help?

In his 2011 book “The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress”, essentially an update of “The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology” (1981), Peter Singer argues that altruism began as a genetically based drive to protect one's kin and community members. Our inherited *tribalism* is therefore the underlying reason for our moral incoherence when it comes to caring about friends, family, and compatriots in contrast to (unknown) strangers from other countries (Singer 1981, 2009a, and 2011a, and Greene 2013). Our capacity for sympathy seems to depend to a large degree on perceived social and geographical distance. This is referred to as the geo-cultural bias (Small 2011). This means that we care less and are less motivated to help a distant stranger.

Cooperation also has a darker side to it. Chimpanzees hunt smaller monkeys in groups, and fighting between groups over territories is frequent (Wrangham, Wilson, and Muller 2006 and Mitani et al. 2010). This insider-outsider dilemma has implications for the topic of the thesis (cp. Axelrod and Hammond 2006 and Haidt 2012). Similarly to their ape cousins, humans are capable of great altruism when their kin and friends are concerned. But the willingness of altruism generally decreases dramatically when it comes to far-away strangers with whom no social connection is shared (cp. Hume [1751]1977 and Singer 2011a). In this case, cooperation within the group can turn against outsiders, when people unite to defend and preserve advantages over others. This tendency for inter-group competition means that hominid groups unite when they feel a common threat. From an evolutionary point of view, attacking competing groups while striving for relative cohesion within the group may have its benefits (Hamilton 1963 and Greene 2013).

Research on the hormone oxytocin indicates that this tendency is deeply ingrained in our biology. Paradoxically, while oxytocin alleviates anxiety in interactions with known persons, thereby indirectly promoting trust and cooperation within a group, it promotes

ethnocentrism and distrust towards unknown people, thereby promoting defensive up to even aggressive behaviour towards perceived out-group members (Bethlehem et al. 2014, Grillon et al. 2013, and De Dreu et al. 2011). While Bauer and others may be right in proclaiming that cooperation is key to success and happiness, it may very well turn out to inadvertently entail cooperation against others.

It seems that not only perceived social distance is important, but causal distance plays a role as well. Greene (2007) presented participants with several variants of the well-known footbridge dilemma and recorded their answers. The footbridge dilemma is about the saving of a group of people by sacrificing a single person. He found that people distinguished between “close-up and personal” violations and indirect violations. People asked to directly themselves push a stranger off a footbridge showed increased activity in areas of the brain associated with emotions and generally decided against the action. Moreover, the minority of subjects who did consider that it would be right to push the stranger off the footbridge took longer to reach this judgement than those who said that doing so would be wrong, thereby indicating that a emotional barrier had to be surpassed. In the relatively “impersonal” alternative case of throwing a switch to push a stranger off (and not intervening directly and personally), brain areas that are linked to cognition and contemplation lit up on the screen.

Why do our judgements, as well as our emotions, vary in this way? A convincing hypothesis is that because for most of our evolutionary history, human beings – and our primate ancestors – have lived in small groups, in which violence could be inflicted only in an up-close and personal way, “hitting each other with a club” as Singer (2007) puts it. As the footbridge dilemma shows, moral imagination has trouble with abstraction. This could be one reason why donations to a beggar on the street corner are easier than supporting a far away child.

This does not bode well for the global poor, as they are geographically, socially, and

causally remote from us. They live in far-away places the names of which we have problems to pronounce, they mostly have a different skin colour and speak a different language. Their culture and customs seem strange to us. Even more importantly, their lives are completely remote from our own life. In the introduction I tried to give an impression of what it means to be poor, but in truth it is quite unimaginable for us in the Western world. The poorest people in this world have a standard of living and quality of life that may appear closer to the middle-ages than our own days. It is difficult to imagine not having enough to eat and that quite normal occurrences such as a broken leg or childbirth can bear a deathly risk in ten to twenty per cent of cases. We do not see them, nor their suffering or the harm we cause to them. We do not see traces of exploitation in our clothes or mobile phones. We do not see how rising food prices kill.

Of course there are the international media and the Internet, but their reporting tends to focus on catastrophes and not everyday suffering (Benthall 2010, Brown and Minty 2008, and Moeller 1999). In case of natural catastrophes and suffering we get some news reports, but as they cover things that happened very far away, they fail to touch us as deeply as suffering compatriots. Why should we care about those people? We don't know them, and from what we know, they could be suffering every day (De Botton 2014). Still, there are people willing to donate to suffering strangers. This will be explained in the following chapters.

3.3. Why Do We Give? – Explanatory Approximations

“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.“

Adam Smith [1759] (2010, 3).

An anecdote is told about Thomas Hobbes, who was observed by a cleric while giving alms to an old beggar (retold by Singer 2011a, 15). The English philosopher's stand on human beings acting out of self-interest, and potentially quite ruthlessly, of course was well known, and there were even rumours about his being an atheist. The surprised cleric, anxious to make a point and perhaps save a lost soul, asked Hobbes why he would commit such an act of altruism, be it not for the divine great commandment to “love thy neighbour” (Matthew 22:36-40). Hobbes replied that seeing the beggar's misery made him miserable, and he therefore gave to alleviate his own pain.

As Singer notes, a wide definition of egoism may end up being tautological, i.e. not very much use for anyone. If an egoist's circle of empathy includes family members and friends, then acquaintances, and finally people he is aware of, his actions become quite indistinguishable from an altruist's, and the discussion is reduced to the very theoretical “does he help individuals because it helps them and brings them pleasure”, i.e. for their own sake, or because it “brings him pleasure to see them doing better.”

Explanations of internal motivations are necessarily difficult and prone to controversy. Why people show benevolent behaviour in some cases and can behave indifferently, even hostile, in others has puzzled social scientists for a long time. Human behaviour is complicated and depends on individual traits, environment, culture, and

education. It is in large parts situational, meaning that the same person can act quite distinctly in different situations.

Economists and social scientist have renewed their interest in the motives for charitable behaviour since the 1970s (Rutherford 2010 and Adloff 2010). Becker (1974, 1083) notes that charitable behaviour very often is partly motivated by social pressure, “to avoid scorn of others or to receive social acclaim”. To remain within Humean terminology, we would call these the “external chains” that bind our charitable behaviour. Radley and Kennedy (1995), basing their work on the analysis of French sociologist Marcel Mauss in “*Essai sur le don – Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques*” (1924), examine reasons for giving and whether explanations of charity are based upon an individual motive, social norms, or the setting in which the solicitation of gifts occurs.⁶¹ They identify three features which appear to be important in the determination of whether people will act in a charitable or helpful way. A. The person's individual or personal motive, i.e. to “feel good” or wanting to be seen as a philanthropist. B. Social norms, expected charitable behaviour, or “moral chains”. C. Situational conditions that apply at the time help or funds are being solicited, especially media attention to a particular humanitarian emergency at the time.

A more in-depth analysis was performed by Bekkers and Wiepking (2011), who in a comprehensive literature review identify eight key mechanisms of philanthropy: (1) need awareness; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values, and finally (8) efficiency of donations (cp. Elster 2011). These categories can be roughly divided into internal and external motivations. For example need awareness, solicitation, costs and benefits, efficiency, and reputation are

⁶¹ The French sociologist Marcel Mauss analyses the tradition of social gifts in different archaic societies, developing a thesis of social reciprocity. According to him, the dichotomic view of self-interest and altruism is misleading, as these categories are highly permeable or transcendent. The example of the social gift showcases this, as material possessions and capital translate into social, political, and even reproductive capital (Adloff 2010, 34ff.). Mauss writings were extremely influential in anthropology and are still relevant today. As has been tried to explain so far, evolutionary pressure has favoured altruism in small communities, leading to the positive emotional feedback mechanisms and reputational effects that have been demonstrated to be an integral part of donor motivation.

external, whereas altruism, values and psychological benefits are considered internal.

That individuals and even companies, today often in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility, use charity to improve their reputation has already been outlined. Awareness of need is essentially an external factor, outside of the donor. It is the basic precondition of donations as well as of other forms of activism. To make people aware of a problem is the aim of fundraising campaigns and sometimes the intention of the media (cp. Beckett 2012). What needs to be stressed here is that what motivates individuals to act is not the objective need, but the subjectively perceived one (Wagner and Wheeler 1969). These perceptions are heavily influenced by media attention and personal experience, such as knowing a (potential) beneficiary personally or having visited the country concerned (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 and Radley and Kennedy 1995).

Solicitation will be discussed in depth in the chapter on fundraising methods. The essential findings are that solicitation increases donations through social pressure (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2011). However, as Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2011) show people will also try to avoid being subjected to this pressure.

For the amount an individual is willing to donate, the personal costs play an important role. Bill Gates simply can afford more than most of us. If Governments want to increase the level of generosity, they lower these costs by making donations tax deductible (Okten and Weisbrod 2000, Stern 2013a, 60ff. and 102f.). Benefits, too, are a tricky case. By definition, if the remuneration reaches a certain level, an act can no longer be seen as altruistic or charitable. It is then simply in one's self-interest and costly for any society or organisation making use of benefits. As Sargeant and Jay (2004, 100) formulate it generally “donors will always be better off not making a donation and keeping their money”. I can hardly claim that my paying into my retirement fund or for my health insurance is altruistic, although others benefit from it as well. A certain level of reciprocity is however common in donations. Usually, these benefits are designed to reinforce the

reputational gains from the gift, for example by setting up a plate with the donor's name or company logo on it (Olson 1965).⁶² Another way in which a possible benefit is used successfully to encourage giving, both by charitable organisations and by the state, is via lotteries (Lange, List, and Price 2007).

Efficiency, unfortunately, plays a far too little role in our decisions to give. It could even be said to be the least important mechanism of the ones discussed previously (Harbaugh 1998 and van Iwaarden et al. 2009). Other factors, such as the area of activity or the location of the charity that endorses it, the religious and political affiliation, or how well-known a charity is, are more important in donor decisions (Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006 and Stern 2013a). While donors of course prefer their money to go towards an efficient organisation, they generally make very little effort to gain the information necessary to identify such an organisation (van Iwaarden et al. 2009 and Stern 2013a). When donors are interested in efficiency, they tend to focus on relatively irrelevant, but easy to measure factors, such as “overhead” (Bowman 2006). Overhead, as an indicator, refers to the administrative and the fundraising costs of an organisation. Conversely, the remainder of the donations directly benefits the project work. While this may appear as a good indicator for efficiency at a first glance the focus on overhead has a lot of problems. As an indicator, it tends to favour large, established, government supported NGOs that do effective fundraising. This, however, is no indicator whether the organisation truly improves the lives of the target groups. Additionally, the focus on overhead has led many organisations to be especially cautious with administrative spending, leading to many organisations being undermanaged, lacking evaluation of their intervention and further preventing effective knowledge management, which, as will be shown in part 4, is essential for success in development work (Bowman 2006, MacAskill 2015a, ch. 7, Palotta 2008, 162ff., and Stern 2013a, 9f.). Overhead should thus be only used as one indicator

⁶² Clever fundraisers make use of the psychological mechanism of reciprocity by including small, inexpensive gifts in their donation appeals. While efficient, this is frowned upon as it puts pressure on the donor and raises fundraising costs without a benefit to the programme (DZI 2012, Haibach 2012, 44f, and VENRO 2011).

among many, for example to determine fraud. Conversely, not all organisations even attempt to communicate their efficacy (Stern 2013a). Fortunately, this lack of transparency seems to be waning with the increase of charity evaluation mechanisms, such as “Charity Navigator” or “GiveWell”, and the advent of social reporting standards (cp. MacAskill 2015a, 5ff., Singer 2009a, 82ff., and Stern 2013a, 28f.). Here the positive influence of both Singer's and MacAskill's work should be noted.

In the context presented, values are in-between internal and external factors. Personal values are, of course, internal convictions. They have proved to be difficult to influence and can influence donations positively or negatively, depending on the situation (see previous chapters). Donors will likely support an organisation that shares their values, for example religious people donate more extensively, but of course with a focus on religious organisations (Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006). People who self-report as being committed to humanitarian and egalitarian goals are more likely to donate than those who do not share such convictions (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Other values and beliefs at least occasionally decrease the likelihood of charitable giving, such as the belief in a fundamentally just world (Zagefka et al. 2011).

In the context of this thesis, personal motivations or “internal moral chains” are of particular interest. On the surface, charitable giving seems to contradict the theory of personal utility maximization. But in fact it does not do so, as altruism seems primarily to occur impure or near altruism (Andreoni 1989 and 1990). The “warm glow”-model indicates that donors receive a psychological benefit from their donations. It has been frequently demonstrated that when helping others or when giving away money and presents, we feel good about ourselves, experiencing a warm glow inside (Andreoni 1989 and 1990, Anik et al. 2011, Elster 2011, Frey 1997, and Strahilevitz 2011, 16f). This is corroborated by neurophysiology research on the reward centre of the brain (Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart 2007 and Zahn et al. 2009). In human evolution, a tendency towards

this “warm glow” was favourable. As attempted to show in the previous chapter, it seems that while acting altruistically requires some effort, the psycho-physical reward is immediate and requires no effort (De Waal and Suchak 2012 and Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart 2007). Acts of altruism provide happiness for the individual, whereas to fail one's fellow human beings leads to feelings of culpability or guilt (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 and Smith and Davidson 2014).⁶³ So evolution may have adapted us for altruism and benevolence, at least for impure or near altruism. Research done by psychologists of the University of British Columbia even suggests that increasing pro-social behaviour and being more charitable can create a positive feedback-loop that makes the “helpers” permanently happier, actually more so than spending money on oneself (Anik et al. 2011, Dunn, Gibert, and Wilson 2011, and Smith and Davidson 2014). This is surprising, as happiness research generally indicates that we have a basic level of happiness to which we try to return after positive or negative shocks (Lucas 2007).

Unfortunately, there are several caveats. As the experimental results and the theory of impure altruism indicate, it is the act of helping that produces happiness, not a socially beneficial outcome (Bowman 2006, Frumkin and Kim 2001, and Rutherford 2010). This means that people will focus on the pro-social act, tending towards what is either spectacular or easily achieved, for example dousing themselves with ice water or “liking” a video which protests against bad labour standards in Bangladesh, while continuing to buy the products manufactured there. I am alluding to the Ice Bucket Challenge to promote awareness and gain donations for the disease amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that was popular in the social media in 2014 (Bordelon 2014). Collecting donations of over 220 million, the campaign was very effective in the short run, as it combined celebrity

⁶³ Guilt is a very powerful motivator. It is disparaged by most progressive charities, but it is used, often blatantly, in some of the most effective fundraising campaigns. It motivates the giver, but it also motivates the asker. “I felt impelled to do it out of a sense of rage and shame,” as Bob Geldof (a musician active in the “Feed the children” and the “Band Aid” initiatives) describes his fundraising efforts that started the mid-1980s. “Shame was the over-riding thing. I was ashamed that we allowed these things to happen to others.” (Smillie 1995, 27). Lindsey 2005 and O’Keefe 2002 argue that guilt is primarily felt due to a perceived violation of justice. This negative emotional state needs to be purged by acting to restore justice.

publicity, a certain frisson of suffering, and group belonging. While it lead to much reporting, a considerable increase in one-time donations and “likes”, this campaign neither transformed into long-term support, nor did it address the globally most dangerous diseases. Olivola and Shafir (2013) find evidence for the so-called ”matyrdom”-effect, meaning that other people's suffering and effort for a cause seem to translate into a subjective feeling of meaningfulness in donors (also cp. Olivola 2011). It should be noted that this is again completely irrelevant to any notions of efficiency or outcome for the intended recipients. Rather, these and similar campaigns are characteristic for self-centred online “clicktivism”, that will be discussed further on with the example of the KONY 2012-campaign. A true rational evaluation of the outcome, however, would require a considerable and sustained effort, which is much harder. As will be presented in the next part of this thesis, many donations or other actions aimed at the global poor are quite ineffective. This is very bad news for the poor, who could be not only exploited by corrupt politicians and unscrupulous entrepreneurs, but also used for a quick feel-good without accountability by the very people that claim to help them.

Another problem is that, while doing the right thing may increase our happiness, this does not mean it comes easy. Just as eating healthily or doing sports is difficult, there are psychological barriers in place that make it difficult for us not to act selfishly, even if it may contribute to our happiness and overall well-being. An overview over these barriers and biases will be given in chapters 3.8.-3.13.

Finally, a wish to help and donate is more an emotional reaction, taking us back to the capuchin monkeys, whose sharing was without the cognitive burden. The pure rational wish to help others probably motivates some, but as Hume already noted, it is very improbable that the intellectual decision to help is the prevailing motivation for most of the donors.⁶⁴ It is much more probable that the emotions are the stronger and more effective

motivators. While it may be good news that donating makes us happy, we also have to

⁶⁴ Cp. Small and Loewenstein (2007) for a discussion, under which conditions donors may behave more reflectively.

realize that donating is subject to the economic law of *diminishing marginal utility* (cp. Becker 1974 and Strahilevitz 2011). This law states that the marginal utility of each (homogenous) unit decreases, as the supply of units increases (and vice versa). A consumer maximizes his individual utility by purchasing a certain good until the point of satisfaction is reached. The existence of this point of satisfaction means that only a limited amount of donations is available in a society. This is apparent from theoretical economics. International statistical comparisons, too, are good evidence that donations are a very slowly growing resource, as will be shown further on (Priller and Sommerfeld 2005 and Radtke 2007).

3.4. The Limits of Altruism

The economical approach to charitable giving reveals a fundamental problem. It may seem surprising that a science that heavily relies on the model of the *homo oeconomicus*, a rational self-interested decision maker, has anything to contribute to the field of altruistic behaviour. But charitable giving has interested scholars of economy precisely because of its apparently paradoxical character (List 2011 and Rutherford 2010). Economics can contribute to the understanding of charity in one way particularly: It can point out that altruism in a way functions like a limited resource. Donating can be seen as a scarce resource which needs to be carefully managed (Andreoni 1990 and Becker 1976). As Roberts (2008) puts it:

“As long as people do not have infinite amounts of time and money, economics will have something to say about how they behave in settings involving love and compassion, duty and honour. The essence of economics is remembering that few virtues are absolute – when they get more expensive, harder to do, or less pleasant,

people will do less of them.”

That financial altruism is a limited resource is evidenced by the following facts:

- Overall donations per year and society are relatively stable. For example Germans donate around €4 billion annually to global poverty relief organisations (Haibach 2012, 170 and Keller 2008, 23).
- The phenomenon of *mental accounting* (Andreoni, Rao and Trachtman 2011 and Thaler 1999) implies that individuals remember their charitable giving and refuse additional donations when they have already donated within a certain time span.
- The phenomenon of the tragedy of the forgotten disaster discussed further on, referring to the phenomenon that when a humanitarian catastrophe claims no Western lives, when it occurs shortly after another one, or even worse, becomes a protracted disaster with no end in sight (as happens with many civil conflicts), relief agencies find it difficult to generate the donations needed (The Economist 2003).

The modern debate on the economic aspects of altruism (or the altruistic aspects of economics) can be said to have started with Richard Titmuss' influential book *The Gift Relationship* and the subsequent reactions to it by Kenneth Arrow (1972) and Peter Singer (1973).⁶⁵ Titmuss examines the role of altruism in society by the example of voluntary blood donations. He stresses the voluntary character of the act of donating blood that differs from monetary forms of exchange that are typical of our market-oriented society

⁶⁵ Previous research on the social phenomenon of the gift was conducted by the French sociologist Marcel Mauss in his 1925 *Essai sur le don*. Mauss analyses the tradition of social gifts in different *archaic* societies, developing a thesis of social reciprocity. According to him, the dichotomic view of self-interest and altruism is misleading, as these categories are highly permeable or transcendent. The example of the social gift showcases this, as material possessions and capital translate into social, political, and even reproductive capital (Adloff 2010, 34ff.). Mauss writings were extremely influential in anthropology and are still relevant today. As has been tried to explain so far, evolutionary pressure has favoured altruism in small communities, leading to the positive emotional feedback mechanisms and reputational effects that have been demonstrated to be an integral part of donor motivation.

(cp. McLean 2010 and Rutherford 2010, 1035ff.). The economic intuition would be that providing payment for blood leads to an increase in donations. Titmuss disagrees, his argument being that there is already an intrinsic reward present in donating that will be crowded out by offering a monetary reward.

“In the gift of blood [...] there is the absence of tangible immediate rewards in monetary or non-monetary forms; the absence of penalties, financial or otherwise, and the knowledge among donors that their donations are for unnamed strangers without distinctions of age, sex, medical condition, income, class, religion, or ethnic group [...]. How can they and do they learn to give to unnamed strangers?”

Richard Titmuss 1970, 212.

Donating blood takes time, and the procedure is certainly inconvenient, if not outright painful. Donating money reduces one's budget. In both cases we are giving without the expectation of reciprocity and direct extrinsic rewards. We have already encountered the explanation why people incur these costs: There is an intrinsic reward of doing the right thing. As the theory of impure altruism explained above says, we receive an emotional reward, the so-called “warm glow”, if we do something for someone else.

Arrow (1972, 354f.), while agreeing on the “warm glow” principle still criticised Titmuss' study. Voluntary blood donations, he warned, would end using up “recklessly the scarce resources of altruistic motivation”. He assumed that altruism was a scarce resource and that it should only be used when absolutely necessary. As blood is a valuable resource, it is easily possible to pay donors in affluent societies with functioning health systems, thus transforming them into sellers and supplanting the charitable enterprise into a supposedly more efficient market.

Peter Singer (1973) defended Titmuss' argumentation: There is a tendency that

financial reward will crowd out voluntary donations and replace them with self-interestingly calculated ones.⁶⁶ If a financial reward is offered, the individual will perceive the action of giving blood more as a financial transaction than an act of altruism, which lessens his moral euphoria or warm glow. Additionally, if the amount paid per donation is low, this will be no incentive for well-off people but especially attract low-income individuals. As low income is positively correlated with poorer health, as well as with drug addiction, financial rewards could disproportionately attract lower quality blood. As Titmuss mentions, there is a special need for high quality blood, so the fact that primarily the middle class will be motivated to donate is an asset.

Titmuss' and Singer's view has become the dominant position and influenced the WHO guidelines on blood donations (Campbell, Tan, and Boujaoude 2012, Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber, and Becker 2014, and WHO 2010). The two ethicists rightly pointed out that human beings are not motivated by self-interest alone, but also by reciprocity, altruism, and other intrinsic motives. This has been verified by extensive experimental and field research supporting Titmuss' thesis that extrinsic financial incentives tend to crowd out intrinsic motives, although small non-financial favours seem to have no influence, it is quite usual for donors to receive a free meal and a small gift (Fehr and Schmidt 2001, Frey 1997, and Meier and Stutzer 2008). A well-known social experiment is the example of the Israeli kindergarten which introduced a fine to punish delayed pick-ups of children (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a and 2000b). Before the introduction of the fine, parents at least tried to be punctual to meet the requirements of the social convention of punctuality (intrinsic motivation). After the introduction of the fine, they changed their perception and behaviour, and delays increased drastically. The fine became the price for being late, which was now deemed an acceptable behaviour. As it was no longer perceived as impolite, parents were late whenever paying the fine seemed worth it. Frey (1997) contributes another example where extrinsic financial incentives tend to crowd out other intrinsic

⁶⁶ Probably laying a second cornerstone for his culture of giving, together with his 1972 "Famine, Affluence, and Morality".

motives by showing that it may be a bad idea to offer direct financial rewards to teenagers who are already helpful. Paying adolescents to undertake household duties leads them to neglect other duties they previously fulfilled gratuitously, and to expect payment for additional chores.⁶⁷

Donating blood can also be seen as a communal activity reinforcing group membership, meeting other like-minded people (common values), and chatting with the nurses while donating is frequently mentioned in surveys on donor motives (Misje et al. 2005). Counter-intuitively, the fact that donating blood is a little painful can raise volition to participate (Olivola and Shafir 2013).

However, newer research indicates that overall blood donations increase when remuneration is sufficient, for example commercial blood banks in Germany offer between €25 and €60 (Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber, and Becker 2014, 4). The researchers found that especially the reliability of donations increases when sufficient payment is offered (cp. Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b). As the problem is not easily solved, one has to look at each problem individually and ask, if it is solved better by markets, charity, or national redistribution, and should companies, civil society, the state, or a cooperation of these be used to address this problem.

But along the way, Arrow's fundamental point that altruism is a scarce resource has been forgotten. Blood is a valuable commodity and that blood banks, hospitals, and health insurances can afford to pay for it, and the important question remains whether this will set altruistic resources free for other undertakings. It is difficult to estimate whether the freed altruistic resource will be transferred into other areas. If they do not donate blood, will people extend their charitable impulse to other opportunities, such as helping strangers, donating to charity, or lobbying for better trade conditions for the developing countries? So far there has been no research directed towards this question (cp. Andreoni and Payne

⁶⁷ The philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) therefore worries about the increasing monetarisation and marketisation of society.

2011). But the theory of *mental accounting*, that will be discussed further on, would suggest so.

3.5. How Much Do We Give?

The question that serves as title for this chapter can be answered when we look at national patterns of donations. As in most countries donations to charities are tax deductible, the statistics on giving are quite reliable, although there is a tendency to underestimate the amounts given, as not all donations are actually declared (Piff et al. 2010, CAF 2006, 11, and Stern 2013a).

Declining volume of donations by -5.8% in comparison with 2010 – a small increase (+2%) in the middle-term view

Revenues from private donations: Total market




Figure 1: Annual Overview of Total Donations in Germany (Source: Deutscher Spendenrat 2012, 10, transl. by the author).

As figure 1 from the annual overview of the *Deutscher Spendenrat* [German Donations Council] (2012) shows, the total yearly amount of donations in Germany is relatively

stable around €4 billion, with peaks occurring in years of large natural disasters. Depending on the year, only between 82 and 74 per cent of the amounts donated are destined towards poverty relief, with the rest going to animal and environmental protection, as well as to culture funding. Additionally, the category “humanitarian aid” also includes poverty relief within developed nations, most notably of course within Germany itself. On a positive note, the averaged amount of donations is increasing slightly from year to year, with a total average growth of 2 per cent per year. This could be taken as evidence for a small increase in donations, but may also simply reflect economic growth. Radtke's (2007, 12ff), analysis of data from the Deutscher Spendenmonitor [German Donations Monitor] and the income development of 16 major INGOs in Germany, such as the International Red Cross or *Terre des Hommes*, shows that an increasing proportion of donations goes to international poverty relief. Indeed, some organisations, such as *Terre des Hommes*, were able to nearly double their revenues from private donations between 1990 and 2005.⁶⁸ While the total amount of donations, especially for international poverty relief, is increasing, the number of donors is declining (Deutscher Spendenrat 2012 and Priller und Sommerfeld 2005). This can be partly explained with the rising income inequality (Cingano 2014, also cp. Stiglitz 2012 and Piketty 2014) and partly by the results of research on the so called *civic core*. This term denominates the members of society who disproportionately contribute to charity, as well as take part in civic activities such as volunteering. A 2011 study in the United Kingdom by the Third Sector Research Centre showed that around seven per cent of the population are responsible for two-thirds of volunteering; 87 per cent of all donations are given by 31 per cent (Mohan 2011, 9). The civic core is mostly composed of well-educated, well-off, middle-aged, and often female professionals.⁶⁹ As a rule, the core groups are overrepresented in wealthier areas (Mohan

⁶⁸ This raises the question whether this positive result is due to a change in general public perception or increased professionalisation of the organisation's fundraising. This will be discussed towards the end of this part of this thesis.

⁶⁹ The research on (disproportionate) civic engagement is a relatively recent area of study. It originated in a 2001 paper by Reed and Selbee on *Patterns of Citizen Participation and the Civic Core in Canada*. A comparable analysis in Spain or Germany to the author's knowledge yet remains to be done.

2011, 7ff.). The author John Mohan warns that with these groups approaching “altruistic saturation”, a wider range of people would need to be drawn into voluntary action. He is sceptical of efforts by INGOs or the government to increase the level of donations and volunteering, as his evidence points to its stability. To increase donations, he thinks, one would have to increase the amount of well-educated and (economically) well-off middle-class citizens.

An international comparison of donation levels is useful, as a comparison between different societies reveals the potential for increasing giving. As countries differ in their culture, religion, and attitudes, levels of donations will differ, and the comparison may give an estimate of how much they can be increased by changing the conditions and *culture of giving*.

The USA are often cited as country with a particularly developed civic society and willingness to donate (Adloff 2010, 83ff. and Anheier 2010). According to data collected by Smith and Davidson (2014, 101ff.), in the year 2010 13.9 per cent of US citizens gave away two per cent or more of their income, with most giving two to five per cent, the amount Singer advises. 41.3 per cent gave less than two per cent and 44.9 per cent gave nothing. It should be noted that while financially less well off people tend to give more proportionately, the reasons for this will be examined in chapter 3.12., when it comes to total amounts donated, a small group of Americans is responsible for the majority of donations. This list includes such prestigious names as Bill Gates or Warren Buffett and if we follow Singer's most recent books it should be our aspiration in life to become a member. However, this concentration of philanthropic power in the hands of few people also means that they can exert a lot of influence, both in civic society at home and development aid abroad (McGoey 2015 and Wilson 2015).

Figure 2 is taken from the annual report of the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF 2016, 7) compares national levels of donations, based on the General Domestic Product

(GDP). Quite astonishing is the particular situation of the English-speaking countries, especially the United States, where significantly more is donated. With 1.67 per cent of the national GDP donated, the US-American society actually approaches the two per cent envisioned by Singer. However, this has to be taken with a grain of salt. As we are mainly concerned with donations towards international poverty relief and development, it is necessary to adjust the statistics accordingly.




Figure 2: International Comparison of Charitable Giving (Source CAF 2016, 7).

A majority of donations in the US goes to religious organisations, which inflates the statistics for this country. In the US, there are no church taxes as e.g. in Germany, where they are collected with the income tax (CAF 2016, 8). These church taxes are partly used by the churches or religious organisations to maintain their services and buildings, but partly also for poverty relief in the country or abroad. This is why religious donations present a difficulty. While per se they cannot be included in a comparison concerning global poverty relief, not including them at all is difficult as well, as at least the great Christian churches, as well as the Muslim and Jewish communities dedicate part of their resources towards combating poverty. A typical example for this is the international *Caritas* organisation of the Catholic Church. Thus contributing to many religious

organisations is indirectly contributing to international poverty relief, too.

To get closer to the actual sums, we will also have to exclude donations that are destined towards cultural purposes, scientific research, environmental protection, and (arguably) domestic poverty, although the categorisation here is difficult. However, many projects that implement environmental protection in developing countries also help the local population, for example by providing jobs. A model for this is Caritas International. This organisation relies on local organisations and their teams in the field. Additionally, non-interest-driven official development aid should be counted into the statistic. This aspect will be dealt with later on in this thesis.⁷⁰

Once we take into account all these factors, a characterization of the United States as most charitable nation does not hold water, at least in the context of international solidarity (cp. CAF 2006, 9f.). What remains is evidence for a comparably higher level of the professionalisation of fundraising, combined with some cultural variables in the US (Adloff 2010, 83ff. and Haibach 2012, 91ff.).

3.6. Mental Accounting for Charity

Psychological research suggests that our moral conscience functions comparably to an accounting ledger. We (subconsciously) keep in mind our budget for good deeds and tend to limit our pro-social spending to this budget (Liu 2011, 202ff. and Thaler 1985 and 1999). The accounting system provides the inputs for *ex ante* and *ex post* benefit analyses. This means that once we have donated to a good cause, we will not immediately give to another one, which seems quite intuitive. We seem to have a specific mental account for

⁷⁰ Official development aid will be discussed at the beginning of the last part of this thesis. With the term interest-driven aid, I refer to aid the aim and result of which is primarily the establishment and maintenance of strategic and commercial interests and which does not really benefit the poor. The United States are especially prone to the strategic use of development aid as military and financial support of a friendly regimes. Israel, for example, is difficult to characterise as a poor country, yet received \$6.180 million in aid in 2012, making it the second largest recipient after Afghanistan (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD>).

altruist actions such as charitable donations, just as for housing, food, or leisure, which, once exhausted, takes time to replenish. As Thaler (1985 and 1999) observes, this behaviour is quite irrational and violates the economic premise of fungibility. We bracket our spending according to episodes and categories, which makes little sense, as we should be more concerned with overall budget restraints and utility maximisation. But as the school of bounded rationality indicates, this behaviour may very well make sense for individuals with limited cognitive capacities and time (Elster 1979 and Simon 1957). The behaviour even seems to have some similarity to the Catholic Church's tradition of indulgences, as we tend to “balance the books”: People acting in a pro-social way see this as kind of dispensation and are more likely to act selfishly immediately afterwards, for example people are less helpful and more likely to cheat and steal after purchasing organic and environment-friendly products (Mazar and Zhong 2010). As Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2011) show, to avoid straining their altruism budget, people will actually stay clear of situations in which they may be asked for donations, even incurring costs to do so. The researchers stationed two solicitors for the Salvation Army at two different entrances of the same supermarket, making the appeal either easy or difficult to avoid. Additionally, the solicitors varied their technique, either asking for a donation or just remaining silent. Results were that asking for donations, i.e. social pressure, increased donations by 75 per cent, but also led to a dramatic level of avoidance (cp. Diamond and Noble 2001). Conversely, people feeling guilty for having violated a norm are more generous (Basil, Ridgway, and Basil 2006).

It can thus be quite safely assumed that our social budget is limited. We focus on spending and not on the good that has been achieved by it, as results are generally unobservable and not relevant for our own well-being. Finally, it seems that the budget is more influenced by absolute than by relative figures, meaning that amounts donated will not increase proportionately with rising income (Piff et al. 2010).

Whatever the reasons for this behaviour, it constitutes a severe problem for Peter Singer's project. If the amount of donations per persons is limited in this way, a sharp increase in donations seems impossible. Singer (2009a, ch. 4) as well as several other advocates of the idea of a culture of giving, such as Peter Unger (1996) or New York Times journalist Nicholas Kristof (2007), argue that we can make use of the results of the research on donor behaviour and fundraising to increase donations. And indeed, as will be attempted to show in the following chapters, there are some ways in which a gentle nudge can make giving easier. For example Liu (2011) proposes that we reframe calls for donations by also asking for time and not only for money. An example would be to donate the results of one hour of work per month or week. Liu shows that individuals tend to be more optimistic about the amount of time they will have available in the future than about the amount of money. Campaigns reframing their donations in terms of donating working hours, as the British non-profit "80,000 hours", could therefore increase the total amount of donations.

But other psychological barriers to giving are not so easily overcome. Singer (2009a, 64ff.) advises the use of social pressure as a tool to increase donations. But as the already mentioned natural experiment by Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2011) from above and our intuition indicates, people react to social pressure not automatically with increasing their donations, but rather with avoidance. The well-meaning idealist, who takes Singer's advice to heart and speaks openly about giving and tries to motivate his friends to act accordingly, may very well find himself ostracised for his efforts.

However, if done rightly, campaigning seems to pay off in the long run (cp. Radtke 2007). Without the serious effort to inform and convince people, activism will decay and donating will decrease. The right way to inform and motivate people has therefore to be found. Additionally, it is important that the effort is not limited to donating or increasing development aid. This is the easiest way to help, and it can be very effective. But as has

been indicated in part I and will be tried to show in part 4, only the establishing of just and inclusive national and international political and economic institutions will lead to a long term solution.

Other findings about altruist behaviour are quite easily applicable in fundraising (Andresen, McKee, and Rovner 2010 and 2011). For it has become more and more apparent that convincing donors has less to do with proof of efficiency and statistics, but rather with good storytelling and presenting a single, identifiable, and relatable victim. However, in the light of the stability of total donations and of mental accounting, this will not necessarily increase the total of revenues gained, but rather increase competition for existing donations among organisations.

NGOs thus find themselves in a situation of competing for limited donations, a competition in which not the most effective one wins, but rather the one that is best at presenting and pushing emotional buttons, and who is willing and able to supply large resources to win this competition. This may be called the *Machiavellian problem*, as for fundraising – as well as for the *Principe* – appearance seems to matter more than actual efficacy. It pays for INGOs to act like show-offs, spending a lot of resources on securing resources with diverse fundraising methods, making use of all the mechanisms described above, for example by showing a single hungry named baby (Cameron and Haanstra 2008, Dogra 2012, Gharib 2015, Kennedy and Hill 2010, and Plewes and Stuart 2006). This is fuelled by the tendency of many donors to give to charity for the sake of their reputation or to calm their bad conscience. But donors do only care little about demonstrated efficiency (Bowman 2006, Sargeant and Hudson 2008, and van Iwaarden et al. 2009). Similar instances have been observed when it comes to corporate giving. The tobacco giant Philip Morris infamously spend more on advertising its charitable giving than actually donating (Baines 2014, ch. 1). Additionally, there are instances of corporations using donations to secure only public goodwill and ensure their access to developing countries' market and

influence regulations in their favours (McGoey 2015, 226ff.).

While presenting great difficulties to the feasibility of Peter Singer's solution to world poverty, this problem – of the doubtful orientation of many donors – might be surpassable. What Arneson (2009, 267) calls Singer's “moral vice” is still binding, because Singer addresses us as individuals who are responsible for other individuals in need of help. In doing so, he sets up the normative “rule” or “requirement” that there is an individual obligation to save as many human lives as possible. As noted in chapter 3.2., the mechanisms that govern our donating behaviour are currently being researched and the results might allow to reach larger portions of the population and motivate them to donate.

After all, this is exactly the Machiavellian plan that underlies Singer's publication of the book *The Life you can Save* and creation of the website “Giving What You Can”. But, the fickleness of donors shows that this is not necessarily the main solution. If the discussed normative claims hold, an international solidarity taxation system might imposed to contribute to the fight against poverty, may be the way forward.⁷¹

3.7. The Tragedy of the Forgotten Disaster – Limited Attention

“Common sense would dictate that the larger the disaster, the greater the media attention and the more generous the response. That was certainly the case with the tsunami. But it is not, unfortunately, a universal rule. Research across a range of disasters reveals that there is no clear link between death tolls and media interest. Rather Western self-interest gives journalists a stronger steer.”

International Federation of the Red Cross (2006, 8).

⁷¹ “Western self-interest is the pre-condition for significant coverage of a humanitarian For example through a Tobin tax, which would be an international financial transaction tax.

Humanitarian catastrophes can touch the public emotionally and increase annual donations above the usual. But unfortunately, this benevolence is very unreliable. The phenomenon




Figure 3: Overview of Resources Needed and Resources Pledged per Country (Source World Disaster Report of the Red Cross 2006, 179).

of the *tragedy of the forgotten disaster* refers to the unequal distribution of both media attention and donations to different humanitarian catastrophes (The Economist 2003, International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, and CARMA 2006). While some catastrophes can generate high public and media interest and subsequently donations, often

even surpassing what is effectively needed, others remain severely under-reported and underfunded. Figure 3, taken from the World Disaster Report of the Red Cross (2006, 179), illustrates this for the year 2005, contrasting estimation of needed funds per affected individual with actual donations. The calculation includes both private and government contributions. Some disasters, most notably the Indian Ocean Tsunami with nearly five times the amount required, have been able to generate far more donations than needed. Contrary to this, other disasters, such as the war in the Sudan region of Darfur or the flooding in the Central African Republic, were neglected.

Both the International Federation of the Red Cross (2006) as well as the CARMA-report (2006) evaluate that there appears to be no link between media interest and the scale of people affected or victimized by a natural disaster. What they rather identify as the crucial variable is the threat perceived to Western lives or economic interests. It appears quite understandable that disasters in Western countries such as the 2005 hurricane Katrina in Louisiana (USA), or the 1997 “Oderflut” – the high flood of the Oder River in Poland and in Eastern Germany – generate more interest within the country, even if there is comparatively little loss of lives. Yet the sheer disproportion is quite shocking. Analysing media reports in eight different countries, CARMA found 1.035 articles dealing with Katrina, with only half of that number (508 articles) dealing with the Indian Ocean Tsunami, and even less with the Darfur crisis (312 articles), although the latter both claimed one hundred times as many human lives as the Atlantic cyclone. Similar results are found for TV airtime covering catastrophes (MSF 2006 and International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 14).⁷²

This can be partly explained with the geo-cultural bias (which will be discussed later in this chapter). Volition to donate depends on sympathy for the victims, and sympathy increases when a connection to the victim is established, for example by

⁷² Sheer spectacularity of the disaster may also play a part (cp. Lauer 2010 and Sundby and Pawar 2008). Floods or droughts do not appear very threatening and do not provide the highly dramatic imagery that tsunamis, earthquakes, or volcano eruptions do.

nationality (The Economist 2003). When a catastrophe claims Western lives, media attention is high and the Western public especially generous. The perception of reality in some media is quite self-absorbed. For example in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, 175,000 were dead and 2.4 million displaced, but 40 per cent of Western media coverage focused on affected Western tourists (CARMA 2006, 7). From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the presence of these tourists was a blessing for the native people affected, as it ensured a steady flow of both sympathy and donations.⁷³

A likewise forgotten, or at least underfunded, disaster – due to competition from other catastrophes and geo-cultural bias – were the 2010 Pakistan floods. The victims had the bad luck of their fate being overshadowed by the horrifying Haiti earthquake, through which the charitable impulse was already sated. Moreover, many donors were quite reluctant to donate to a Muslim country because of the image-problem of Muslims and Islam after terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (Der Spiegel Online 2010 and Tisdall and Rahman 2010). Muslim communities gave quite generously, for example those in Germany, as did Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, but overall donations still fell short of the needs estimated (Retterath 2010 and Rogers 2010).

Media attention can have a dramatic effect on giving, as it visualises the suffering of the victims and is often coupled with a direct or indirect appeal to donate (Brown and Minty 2008).⁷⁴ As Brown and Minty (2008) show by using data of online donations, an additional minute of news coverage increases average daily donations for a typical relief agency by 13.2 per cent. Comparably, a 700-word story in the *New York Times* or *Wall Street Journal* raises donations by 18.2 per cent of the daily average. Unfortunately, the attention span of both the public as well as the media that depend on it is short-lived (Benthall 2010). After a certain time span, articles and reports, and subsequently donations,

⁷³ A more recent example is the disproportionate attention for the 17 victims of Islamic terrorism in France (Paris) in comparison to the more than 2,000 murdered by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Shearlaw 2015).

⁷⁴ The importance of visualising the victims and reporting individual tragedies to induce charitable giving will be further discussed when presenting the identified victim effect, the geo-cultural bias, and storytelling as a fundraising technique.

trickle out, sometimes even before sufficient resources have been accumulated to address the crisis (CARMA 2006, 6). This short attention span is cut even shorter when a second disaster occurs, and this new disaster will have serious trouble securing resources, as the altruistic initiative is depleted, and with it the volition to donate. Consequently, protracted conflicts, slow-onset catastrophes, and chronically vulnerable populations – for example in drought-prone regions such as South Sudan or North Ethiopia – are especially unlikely to mobilise aid (International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 21ff., 34ff., and 189f.).

There are several additional reasons why a disaster may be forgotten (International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 13ff.). People tend to donate less in politically difficult situations. Particularly victims of conflicts and civil wars, such as the conflict in Darfur, which has lasted over several years, or the current crisis in the Ukraine, will receive less help. In complex political situations, it is not clear who the “good guys” are, which facilitates donor mistrust and victim blame (Fritzen 2014 and Zagefka et al. 2011). Other humanitarian crises, such as the 1973 famine in Ethiopia or the 1994-1998 famine in North Korea, were kept secret by the respective governments, because hunger was used as a political weapon, and foreign influence was not desired (De Waal 2011, 106ff. and 112ff., The Economist 2003, Keneally 2011, 101ff., and Patel and Delwiche 2002).

As the Red Cross report points out, several measures can be taken to help victims of forgotten disasters. A first effort could be to increase their visibility. One can always appeal to the integrity and impartiality of journalists, and some will certainly follow, and NGOs can use publicity stunts to create public attention for a forgotten crisis (International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 15ff. and 19). Yet, media will still be bound by public interest. The danger of attention seeking stunts is that they can become disconnected from their actual goal, which makes them merely self-referential. This phenomenon will be attempted to demonstrate by the example of the KONY 2012 campaign later in this chapter.

A more promising approach would be to focus on disaster prevention and strengthen communal disaster funds, such as the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (*ibid.*, 34ff. and 188f.). While the fund was originally devised to provide fast relief in emergency situations, so that the Red Cross could start helping without having to wait for official and private donors, it has increasingly been used to provide aid in the case of minor and underfunded emergencies. However, while this is a laudable idea, the resources of the DREF are limited. Its endowment is around €10 million, which is far too little to provide adequate relief on its own, especially in years with several large catastrophes, as happened in 2005 or 2010.

A major problem is that most donations, especially in the case of a humanitarian disaster, are tied or dedicated. This means that when an individual or a governmental body donates funds for a particular emergency, the organisation is obliged to use the funds accordingly. While this may reduce misuse, the problem of partiality and inequality in international poverty relief is exacerbated by this practice, especially as most organisations continue to accept donations even after the needed amount has been collected, arguing that this money can always be well used. However, this results in “using up recklessly the scarce resource of altruistic motivation” (Phelps 1975, 22). Not only can this largesse lead to unnecessary spending and misuse, but the funds are also direly missing in other places (Carstens 2011 and *The Economist* 2003). It could also be said that donors are being misled. Only Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is exemplary here, as they stop taking tied donations and actually inform people to stop donating once the necessary funds are reached (Redfield 2013).

A very recent example of this is the reaction of donors and governments to the recent refugee crisis. According to the OECD European countries now spend nine per cent of their foreign aid on hosting refugees (OECD 2016). As the British newspaper “The Guardian” (Jones 2015) analyses, European donor countries spent a net total of \$131.6 billion on aid in 2015, with \$12 billion addressed “in-donor refugee costs”, up from \$6.6




Figure 4: Development of Aid from 2000 to 2015, Including Spending on Refugees (Source OECD 2016).

billion in 2014. This means that a large share of aid money is spend within these very countries. Unfortunately, foreign aid depends largely on political and economic interests or country ties, as will be discussed in chapter 3.9. and part 4. As the newspaper “Die Zeit” shows, the German donors follow suit, with a large part of private donations being redirected towards refugees, while other projects and causes receive less attention and donations (Rehage 2015). This points towards a worrying conclusion: If willing donors are easily distracted not by need and more importantly, good solutions, but by media attention and psychological biases, the attempt of establishing a culture of giving will be much more difficult than sketched out by Singer. In the following chapters, more barriers to giving and biases will be presented. A worrying tendency of self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling prophecies will become apparent, which results in poverty becoming perceived as a perpetual feature of some regions of the world, and especially of Africa (Darnton and Kirk

2011).⁷⁵ Combined with a lack of media attention, this can easily lead to donor fatigue and a general lassitude in the fight against poverty.

3.8. The Identifiable Victim-Effect

“Without individuals we see only numbers, a thousand dead, a hundred thousand dead, “casualties may rise to a million”. With individual stories, the statistics become people – but even that is a lie, for the people continue to suffer in numbers that themselves are numbing and meaningless. Look, see the child's swollen, swollen belly and the flies that crawl at the corners of his eyes, this skeletal limbs: will it make it easier for you to know his name, his age, his dreams, his fears? To see him from the inside? And if it does, are we not doing a disservice to his sister, who lies in the searing dust beside him, a distorted distended caricature of a human child? And there, if we feel for them, are they now more important to us than a thousand other children touched by the same famine, a thousand other young lives who will soon be food for the flies' own myriad squirming children? We draw our lines around these moments of pain, remain upon our islands, and they cannot hurt us. They are covered with a smooth, safe, nacreous layer to let them slip, pearl-like, from our souls without real pain. Fiction allows us to slide into these other heads, these other places, and look out through other eyes. And then in the tale we stop before we die, or we die vicariously and unharmed, and in the world beyond the tale we turn the page or close the book, and we resume our lives. A life that is, like any other, unlike any other.”

Neil Gaiman (2001, 345).

⁷⁵ A poignant analysis of this “danger of a single story” has been made by the author Chimamanda Ngozie Adichie in a TED-talk (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9Ihs241zeg>).

“There is a distinction between an individual life and a statistical life. Let a 6-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong her life until Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths — not many will drop a tear or reach for their check-books.”

Thomas Schelling (1968, 144).

We are much more likely to help an unknown, but identifiable individual than to donate to help a group of people. This is referred to as the *identifiable victim-effect* (Greene and Haidt 2002, Greene 2007, 43ff, Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b, 2007, and 2011, Slovic 2007, Small and Loewenstein 2003, and Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). Identifiable victims seem to produce a stronger empathic response, accompanied by a higher willingness to make personal sacrifices to provide aid (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997, 236). The idea that human beings, against all economic rationality, differentiate between individual and statistical lives is quite self-evident and has been proven empirically several times.⁷⁶

Our minds generally are not good at statistics, but at recognising human faces and emotions (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). An identifiable victim increases the emotional reaction, thus increasing donations (Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b, and 2007). It seems

⁷⁶ An often cited example in this context is the then eighteen-month old Jessica McClure, who in 1987 spent 58 hours trapped in a well. Americans responded with sympathy, a tremendous rescue effort, and money. Even after Jessica was rescued, the McClures received over \$700,000 in donations. At the time, there was no question that everything possible should and would be done to rescue the child. Cost was no object. If similar resources were spent on preventative health care for children, hundreds of lives could be saved (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997, 235). A more recent example is the bullying of 68-year-old bus driver Karen Klein, who was verbally harassed by a group of middle schoolers on their way home from Athena Middle School in Greece, New York. After the video of this scene was uploaded to YouTube by a student who had filmed it on the bus, people started to donate. The amount given far exceeded the expectations of Max Sidorov, who had started the drive with the goal of raising \$5,000 to send Klein on vacation. A campaign raised \$700,000, which was handed to Klein, enabling her to retire from her job (Huffington Post 2012). While we do not begrudge Mrs. Klein her good fortune, this money could have improved a lot more lives if donated to Oxfam or used to implement an anti-bullying campaign.

that our empathic capacities are limited, as Paul Slovic (2007) demonstrates in his article *Psychic Numbing and Genocide*. The ability of people to realize and discriminate a change in a physical stimulus diminishes, as the magnitude of the stimulus increases.⁷⁷ People also exhibit a diminished sensitivity in valuing lifesaving interventions against a background of increasing numbers of lives at risk. These findings suggest that the cause of the identifiable victim-effect is the relative size of the reference group compared to the number of people at risk. Identified victims constitute their own reference group, 100 per cent of whom will die if steps are not taken to save them. If I know about one and a half year-old Jessica McClure's almost certain death, I am more compelled to act than when I hear about malaria annually killing half a million African children in a population of 1.2 billion (WHO 2012, xiv and 59ff.).

This psychological oddity is known and (ab-)used by INGOs and the media. I am referring to the presentation of individual children and young mothers by name and with their history on INGO posters and in media coverage, often referred to as “human interest” stories.

Already presenting two children instead of only one makes a difference (Kogut and Ritov 2011, 135). When the number of children presented was increased and a whole group was shown, the rate of donations fell even further. Singer himself uses this effect in his *drowning child*-example. The normative problem arising here is, of course, whether or not we can be taught to value lives consistently, as Singer wants us to.⁷⁸ But how high is the possibility that we can surpass our emotional apparatus and our evolutionary programming? We have to ask ourselves if we really can subscribe to the principle of equality in such a way.

This bias is particularly perfidious, as – contrary to the other biases presented – there is a negative effect of enlightening education. In a series of field experiments, Small,

⁷⁷ “[T]he statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action” Slovic (2007, 2).

⁷⁸ This question intensely preoccupies Kogut and Ritov (2011, 143).

Loewenstein, and Slovic 2005a; 2005b showed that elucidating people about this bias had perverse effects: “[I]ndividuals gave less to identifiable victims but did not increase giving to statistical victims, resulting in an overall reduction in caring and giving. Thus, it appears that, when thinking analytically, people discount sympathy towards identifiable victims but fail to generate sympathy toward statistical victims.” (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2005a and 2005b)

The identifiable victim effect helps to understand why in the field of third world poverty relief, child-sponsorship agencies are the most successful in eliciting funds from the public (Plewes and Stuart 2007, 30, Stern 2013a, and Westhead 2013). This points towards possibilities of actually using the effect to the benefit of INGOs: They need to present a single person in a donation plea and tell his or her story as exemplary. However, this solution can also give rise to misuse, and child-sponsorship agencies may not necessarily be the most effective organisations in respect of poverty relief in developing countries. An over-reliance on images of children in fundraising easily becomes “poverty porn”, and if too many organisations make use of this imagery, it could easily lead to overstimulation and donor fatigue (Moeller 1999, Suski 2009, and Plewes and Stuart 2006). The problem is, however, that drastic images still work best, because they target emotions and are easily recognised. They are an already accepted “branding”.

3.9. The Geo-Cultural Bias

Research by Alesina and Dollar (2000) shows that nations, as well as individuals (cp. chapter 2.2.), give preferential treatment to geographically and culturally close countries. For example, their research indicates that most donor countries give more aid to recipient countries with whom they have a long shared, often colonial, experience, as well as to

countries that share political positions with Western countries as measured by their voting behaviour in the United Nations. Neumayer (2003b) confirms the finding with respect to former colonial status.

Donors – as well as their nations – empathize more and show more willingness to give to people they see as culturally or geographically close, i.e. if they perceive to have some kind of connection with the victim (Small 2011, 150ff.). This is a *sympathy bias*, meaning that we feel more sympathetic and relate easier to people that we perceive as “close to us”. This applies to geographical, cultural, and social closeness (Small 2011).

A study by the Max Planck Institute observing donations to beggars in Moscow trains showed that ethnic Russians were more likely to receive alms from their compatriots, despite the demanding behaviour of Russian beggars in comparison to other ethnic groups (Butovskaya et al. 2000). Baron and Szymanska (2011, 225f) present further evidence for this. An interesting observation can be made by just switching on the television: After reporting a disaster or catastrophe in a foreign country, most media pay special attention to whether citizens of their own country are involved in the tragedy. This also relies to the fact that we empathise more with our fellow countrymen.

The geo-cultural bias is further confirmed by moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt (2001) and Joshua Greene (2007). Experiments, in which test subjects were presented with moral dilemmas, show that the moral response towards cases that were perceived as close up and personal was a lot stronger than with cases perceived as distant or impersonal.

On the aggregate level, Neumayer (2003b and 2003c) finds that the positive effect that colonial experience has on the receipt of aid by individual donors holds true for aggregate bilateral and multilateral aid flows as well. As already mentioned, there is evidence that most donors give more if the recipients' countries were former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Angulo 2004 and Neumayer 2003a). The same is true of recipients from countries that share political positions with Western countries, as measured

by their voting behaviour in the United Nations (Bølstad 2011 and Olson 2000). Additionally, Neumayer (2003a) also found that some donors give more aid to recipients in countries that are geographically close, and practically all donors give more aid to recipients in countries that import a high share of the donor country's exports.

Closeness – geographical, political or cultural – can still be positive and has a positive impact related to the votes received by politicians involved in aid policy. This line of reasoning can be found in a series of publications on aid, including McDonnell et al. (2003) and the work of Gloria Angulo (2004) and Marc Stern (1998), expressing the opinion that there is a positive relationship between a government and its spending of aid. A similar belief is found in the report “The Reality of Aid” (ROA 2010).

As well as any other biases, the geo-cultural bias leads to a distortion of attention and subsequently of donation away from real need and good possibility to aid. It is based on morally insignificant factors. We have already seen that addressing these biases can be a two-edged sword, as it reduces overall sympathy and helping behaviour. In the case of sympathy biases, research indicates that social relations rather than geographical proximity are most important in increasing helping behaviour after natural disasters. According to Allport's (1979) contact hypothesis, a social connection can simply be formed through meeting people. This means that popular spots among Western tourists, such as Thailand or Indonesia, can hope for or even rely on the support of international donors, while other regions will be ignored and forgotten (Levine and Thompson 2004). Importantly, though, this sympathy is again neither led by concerns of fellow humanity nor efficiency.

3.10. Victim Blame

When faced with disasters that we perceive to have a human cause, we tend to negate responsibility to help. This bias is a variant of the *attribution bias*, which leads us to assign

other people's problems and misfortunes to their bad choices, whereas in similar situations claiming bad luck for ourselves (Kelley 1967). Zagefka et al. (2011) show that decisions of whether or not to donate to victims of disasters are influenced by the perceived cause of a disaster. Donors were systematically more reluctant to donate to victims of disasters which they thought to have a human cause rather than a natural one. This was to no small extent due to the fact that donors tended to perceive victims of humanly caused disasters as being more blameworthy and less pro-active in helping themselves.

People form less positive impressions of victims of humanly caused events than of victims of natural disasters. These findings are troubling. People seem to systematically and quite comfortably making moral judgements and attributing blame and inability or unwillingness of self-help, due to irrelevant or unreliable information. One may call this *blaming the victim*. But victims of government corruption or of a genocide⁷⁹ do not suffer less and are not less innocent than victims of a natural disaster. The problem is worse when these judgements are made on very sparse information. There seems to be a heuristic in place that quickly distinguishes between “good” and “bad” victims.⁸⁰

Zagefka et al. (2011, 361f) propose an interesting explanation for this phenomenon: the “just world belief”-hypothesis (cp. Lerner 1980). According to this hypothesis, people tend to believe in a just world, in which “everything happens for a reason”. Therefore it is opportune to blame victims whenever possible, and humanly caused events present more opportunities for victim blame, which can then be stretched to include additional aspects such as passivity (cp. Boltanski 2007, 201). Appelbaum (2002) shows that belief in a “just world”, in which pains and blessings are the results of previous bad or good individual behaviour or actions, reduces readiness in German students to aid out-group members and leads to judging them more harshly.

These insights can help to explain the difference in donor and media attention to

⁷⁹ Two of the examples used in the studies.

⁸⁰ *People perceive victims of humanly caused events in more negative terms even when there is no information available about the victims' blameworthiness or self-helping efforts* (Zagefka et al 2011, 361).

various humanitarian catastrophes.⁸¹ The researchers themselves (Zagefka et al. 2011, 362) see the utility of their research primarily in the informing of charities and NGOs on how to target their relief appeals more effectively and to avoid “forgotten” victims by addressing and counteracting biases, for example by stressing the victims' effort to help themselves and by explaining the innocence of the civilian victims of an armed conflict.⁸² But it is doubtful whether this strong and very general tendency to blame the victims can be fully overcome this way.

This bias can be particularly problematic, as victims of disasters and civil war may actually display passive behaviour, combined with lack of energy and activity, due to their psychological trauma (Hausmann 2006, chp. 4 and 10). Similarly, hunger may lead to passive behaviour, as the body shuts down to conserve energy (Keneally 2011, 12ff.).

Additionally, Mani et al. (2013) find that financial stress may impair cognitive function, leading to bad choices. In a series of experiments, the researchers tested 464 sugarcane farmers in India and found that a person preoccupied with money problems exhibited a drop in cognitive function similar to a 13-point dip in IQ, or the loss of an entire night's sleep. The explanation put forward is that the cognitive “bandwidth” is occupied by the constant and all-consuming effort of coping with the immediate effects of having too little money, such as scrounging to pay bills and cutting costs.⁸³ This may explain why poor people sometimes exhibit lack of judgement, which further perpetuates poverty and serves the affluent as rationale for not helping them (e.g. by donating).

A 2014 survey by the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung” on German donor behaviour among NGOs illustrates this and the previous geo-cultural sympathy bias

⁸¹ This is inexplicable by the number of people suffering, e.g. if we compare the aforementioned sparse donor reaction to the 2009 Pakistani flood with the much more significant donor effort to the South Asian Tsunami of 2004 (Baker 2005). It can also explain why Peter Singer quite deliberately uses the innocent *child* in his appeal.

⁸² This, however, can be difficult. Polman (2008, 120) explains that the *refugee warrior* is one of the new realities of the modern civil war. She estimates that between 15 and 20 per cent of refugee camp inhabitants today may be militia or army members that use the camps to obtain free food and shelter. They use the civilian refugees as human shields and often extort money from them and/or from the resident aid organizations.

⁸³ For a detailed analysis of the negative effects of poverty on cognitive capabilities see Mullainathan and Shafir 2013.

(Fritzen 2014). The survey found that volition to donate in a conflict was especially powerful if there was an identifiable “bad guy”, such as the Islamic State (IS), or if there were evidently victims of natural disasters, such as the previously discussed Indian Ocean Tsunami or the 2014 typhoon Haiyan. For more complex situations, such as the Syrian civil war or the Ukraine conflict, volition to donate is comparatively low. The “Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe”, a German Protestant relief organisation, received three million Euro for Iraq, but only €400.000 for Ukraine. Relief for victims of Ebola was surprisingly low with €41.000. As the article explains, this was probably a result of lacking images of the victims due to the danger of infection. But pictures of victims are essential to fundraising, due to the aforementioned identified victim effect (cp. Fritzen 2014 and Regev and St John 2014).

Additionally, the tragedy of the outbreak was overshadowed by other events. Some good news came from the German Red Cross which collected €30.000 Euro within two weeks after opening a donations account. Similar results apply for the German chapter of Caritas International which collected five million Euro for its work in northern Iraq, but only €100.000 for Ukraine, and €11.000 for the fight against Ebola. The alliance of several German relief organisations “Aktion Deutschland hilft” (German for “Campaign Germany helps”) was able to collect €4.2 million for northern Iraq in less than two months, more than they were able to collect in a two-year time span for Syria (€3.8 million). For the victims of the typhoon Haiyan, donors entrusted 33 million Euro to the organisation “Aktion Deutschland hilft”.

The survey shows how difficult it is to predict the outcome of a fundraising campaign. For example Ukraine should have profited more from the geo-cultural bias, and it is surprising how little the media attention for Ebola translated into donations, even though several campaigns were started to increase awareness and reach donors, among them a re-release of the “Do They Know It's Christmas?” song, which had raised £8

million for famine relief in Ethiopia in 1984 (Ellis-Petersen 2014). Even NGOs specialising on medical care such as MSF received only \$5.5 million in donations globally by October 2014 (Regev and St John 2014).

However, that the ability to predict donations is still extremely low only further increases the problem of not being able to react adequately. If INGOs were capable to somewhat accurately predict the outcome of a fundraising campaign, they could adapt their strategies accordingly, for example by asking for more government support or by transferring resources from popular to less popular causes. As it is, governments are subject to sympathy and media pressure as well, which aggravates the problem.

3.11. Dispersion of Responsibility

If there are others around who are able to help, the so-called *dispersion of responsibility* makes it less likely that we will help, especially if we do not see the others helping, which seems paradoxical (Latané and Darley 1968, 1969, and 1970, 58ff and 101ff, Latané and Rodin 1969, Boos, Kolbe, and Kappeler 2011, and Levine and Thompson 2004). Conversely, a single person is much more likely to help (e.g. rescue the child in Singer's well known example) as it is clear that he or she should do something (concept of personal responsibility). This bias is also called the Kitty Genovese- or bystander-effect, due to the case of a New York murder, when 37 people heard the cries of the murder victim, but no one called the police (Singer 2009a, 53f.). Cambridge psychologist John M. Doris explains the effect as follows (2012, 538): “The presence of others meant that no individual was forced to bear the full responsibility for intervention.” He adds that “mild social pressures can result in neglect of apparently serious ethical demands.” Thus a feedback loop of social inaction is created.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ It would be interesting to compare this effect with results gained by the Milgram experiment on deference to authority (Milgram 1963, also cp. Zimbardo 2007).

Boos et al. (2011, 5f.) define the bystander-effect as a problem of group coordination. Hominid evolution required groups to maintain cohesion and act collectively in order to achieve common goals. This led to the emergence of mechanisms of collective decision-making. Unfortunately, these mechanisms may fail in ethically important cases. If nobody helps, we presume that a group consensus has been established not to help, especially in cases in which the situation is interpreted as ambiguous (Clark and Word 1972). This mechanism of collective decision-making can also explain the rush of helpers which often occurs, once a first person has started to help (Levine and Crowther 2008).

Singer's (2009a, 64ff.) interpretation is that people are more likely to give if they know that others are giving, too. Very probably, this is related to the human desire for social acceptance and fairness. People will withhold their donations until others have given, signalling that donating is the socially adequate way to behave (Nelson and Greene 2003). In the worst case, this waiting and watching what others do before taking initiative themselves can lead to a vicious circle of inaction, just as in the case of Kitty Genovese.

Experimental designs using game theory show that once a social norm to participate has been established, for example if a critical number of people declare that donating is the right thing to do, social pressure will increase overall donations (cp. Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2011). For example the *dictator game*, as well as games analysing *public goods allocation*, show that individuals care about fairness and are angry at non-contributors or shirkers, whom they punish, even if it entails private costs (Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter 2007). This is probably explainable with the evolutionary need for co-operation and mutual assistance. If the perception is that others are “playing their part”, donations will be given more freely.⁸⁵ Singer (2009a, 88ff.) therefore wants us to be “upfront about our giving”. For this goal he created the website “*The Life you can save*” already mentioned, on which he urges people to give what they can, in effect to join a club and to sign up to donate a

⁸⁵ We find this knowledge applied in several everyday situations. e.g. during charity marathons on television, donation clocks record the amount given by donors, and beggars always put some coins and banknotes in their basket to ensure that no one has the perception of being the only giver.

specified amount of their income. Additionally, the website provides prospective donors with suggestions of especially effective organisations that can demonstrate their effectiveness in combating poverty.⁸⁶

Research on this topic is still in its infancy, but a field experiment by Khadjavi (2014) conducted in a barber shop shows that social pressure actually seems to work. People are more likely to act pro-socially when they have just seen that someone else does so, too, e.g. by tipping the barber. As Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011) demonstrate, matching grants, meaning that my personal donation will be matched by an enterprise or by the public purse, can function as such a signal and increase donations. This is very good news, especially in combination with the positive impact of donating on personal happiness. Notably, “persuaded” donations increase happiness to the same extent as voluntary ones (Anik et al. 2011 and Smith and Davidson 2014).

Unfortunately, there are certain caveats here. First of all, as both Khadjavi (2014) and Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011) show, this effect primarily applies to people who are disposed to act pro-socially. Some people will neither donate, nor, in the case of the barber shop, give a tip. This can have several reasons. They just may be in a bad mood. As will be tried to show further on, situationism is an important factor in determining pro-social behaviour. People may have exhausted their mentally allocated funds destined towards pro-social activity (see chapter 3.6.), or they may just belong to the part of the population which simply is not disposed towards altruistic actions.

As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, people may also avoid pressure by overstating or simply lying about their contributions, as they are liable to do (Nelson and Greene 2003, 28ff.). Social pressure might also increase the tendency to give to spectacular causes, instead of the most efficient and important ones. Social pressure, as Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2011) demonstrated, can also have the effect that people simply try to avoid petitioners (also cp. Diamond and Noble 2001 and Landry et al. 2006).

⁸⁶ A similar website is “Giving what we can”, an organisation founded by Oxford philosopher Toby Ord. (cp. www.givingwhatwecan.org).

However, Singer is probably on to something. Social pressure and appealing to people's honour and responsibility has been effective in slowly changing social norms several times throughout the history of mankind (Appiah 2011).

3.12. “Moneying Around”

“Perché s'appuntano i vostri disiri
dove per compagnia parte si scema,
invidia move il mantaco a' sospiri.”

Dante Alighieri (*Divina Commedia* Purgatorio: Canto XV, 49-51.)

Psychological effects associated with money are highly relevant in the context of this thesis. Georg Simmel (1900) pointed out the increasing influence of money on society, politics, and the individual. Simmel highlights that in the modern society, which is shaped by markets, money plays a central role in determining our self-esteem and attitudes towards life. So far, not enough philosophical or psychological research has been directed towards the effects of money on our thinking and behaviour. Fortunately, this seems to be about to change (cp. Sandel 2012).

In good Aristotelian tradition, research seems to indicate that while having money is good for you, preoccupation with the subject tends to decrease your happiness and to make you less sociable (Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2006). Financial problems are accompanied by a heightened risk of depression, increased stress levels, and a lower life expectancy (Adler and Snibbe 2003, Fiske 2010, and Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). People who are greedy (i.e. “value money highly”) tend to have poorer relationships and experience more social anxiety (Fiske 2010). As mentioned above, Mani et. al (2013) find that financial stress may impair cognitive function, leading to bad choices.

Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006 and 2008) conducted an enlightening series of studies on the effects thinking about money can have on individual behaviour. The results showed that even subtle reminders of money changed behaviour significantly, leading to reduced sociability, helpfulness, and volition to donate.⁸⁷

In one experiment, the participants received two US dollars. Then, a questionnaire unobtrusively confronted them with the concept of money. They were given the opportunity to donate part of their proceedings to a University Student Fund. Whereas the participants in the control group gave on average 67 per cent of those two dollars, the “money-minded students” only donated 39 per cent.

In another series of experiments, the participants who had been reminded of money preferred more physical distance in seating arrangements between themselves and other participants than those who were not reminded of money. Thinking about money also leads people on average to prefer solitary leisure activities over activities with friends or family members. Helpfulness, measured by disposition and willingness to assist an experimenter posing as a confused or clumsy participant, also decreased when participants were confronted with money-related cues. At the same time, being reminded of money lead participants to work harder and longer.

The experimenters systematically varied whether and to what extent the concept of money was activated in participants' minds, using different cues, for example textual ones or visual ones such as posters and screen savers with bank notes. To resume:

“On the one hand, participants reminded of money were less helpful than were participants not reminded of money, and they also preferred solitary activities and less physical intimacy. On the other hand, reminders of money prompted participants to work harder on challenging tasks and led to desires to take on more

⁸⁷ Studying economics seems to have a similar effect, making the students on average less cooperative and more likely to defect in moral dilemma situations, such as the prisoners dilemma (Frank, Gilovich, and Reagan 1993 and 1996, also cp. Schüssler 1991).

work as compared to participants not reminded of money. In short, even subtle reminders of money elicit big changes in human behaviour.”

Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2008, 208.

A series of experiments have been performed by Falk and Szech (2013) on the influence of markets and monetary rewards on ethical behaviour. The participants were confronted with the dilemma of letting a mouse die and receiving €10 or letting the mouse live and receiving nothing.⁸⁸ More than 40 per cent of participants were willing to engage in this trade. Quite surprisingly, when markets are introduced and participants could barter over the life of the mouse, willingness to let the animal die nearly doubled. Falk and Szech (2013, 708) theorise that both dispersion of responsibility, discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the materialistic framing of market interaction lead to this moral erosion. It primed people to think rationally and self-interestedly, not emotionally and from the heart.

For the context of this thesis, these results indicate two problems: The first one is that thinking about money will make people less likely to donate, and the second one is that fundraisers cannot avoid mentioning it. Likewise, in a context of global markets, dispersed responsibility for far away exploitation will be seen as less emotionally pressing.

This bias is certainly difficult to overcome for fundraisers, as even Peter Singer admits (2009a, 66ff.). A possible solution would be to rely on the force of reciprocity by offering potential donors a gift (cp. Cialdini 2001). But this would probably lead to a cannibalism effect, entail additional costs for NGOs as well as entail certain ethical problems.⁸⁹ Another very popular alternative that circumnavigates the need for money is donating goods such as used clothes. However, donating clothes is obviously much less practical for NGOs and may have negative effects on the clothing industry in developing

⁸⁸ As the mouse is killed painlessly, a true Singerian could argue for accepting the money and donating it.

⁸⁹ This will be discussed further on in chapter 3.17. on fundraising methods.

countries, as will be discussed in chapter 4.7. A plausible alternative would be to reinforce the message that pro-social behaviour such as giving increases happiness, yet it is difficult to estimate whether this could preclude this very problematic bias.

Money is the cause for another problem. It seems that being wealthy and having a high social rank makes people less likely to care and donate for the needy (Piff et al. 2010). While rich people donate more in absolute terms, measured relatively, they donate significantly less. For example in 2011, the wealthiest US citizens, with earnings in the top 20 per cent, on average donated 1,3 per cent of their income to charity. Those in the bottom 20 per cent donated 3,2 per cent of their income (Stern 2013a, 236 and 2013b). This relatively more generous behaviour is maybe underestimated. Unlike wealthy or middle-class donors, people with a lower income do not take as much advantage of the tax deduction for charities, as they pay less taxes and often only profit from itemizing deductions on their income-tax returns.

Additionally, the wealthy tend to give more self-interestedly. They tend to investing in areas such as culture (museum, opera, cultural organisations) or education (elite universities and colleges) whereas people with less income are much more likely to give to social causes (Piff et al. 2010). The rich also donate more prestige oriented, for example in the course of expensive charity galas or with the aim to naming a new hospital or museum wing after themselves (Ostrower 1995).

Piff et al. (2010) put forward the explanatory hypothesis that the poor are more dependent on pro-social behaviour and cooperation, whereas the rich can afford to be more self-reliant and autonomous. An example for this would be getting an au pair versus having to ask your neighbour to babysit. This hypothesis is supported in a follow-up study by Kraus, Côté, and Keltner (2010) who showed that people of higher social status, which is intimately based on and connected to income, have problems showing empathy and recognizing other people's emotions. Interestingly, this does not seem to be a permanent

feature, as manipulating the social class of the study subjects, for example by making them compare themselves to even richer people such as CEOs, film stars, or footballers, led to an increase in their empathic and emotional cognition abilities.

An additional explanation can be inferred from the results of Susan Fiske (2010), who found that people tend to react with envy to those higher up on the social ladder than themselves, and with scorn to those below. These negative feelings accumulate to a point where better-off people tend to see poor people as objects and not as subjects (Fiske and Harris 2006 and Fiske 2010).

A concept that can help to explain these research results is social distance (Hodgetts et al. 2011), derived from a text by Georg Simmel (1908) entitled *Exkurs über den Fremden* (German for *Digression on the stranger*). Lack of contact with the world of the poor leads to negative reactions, such as fear, and the better-off more readily ascribe negative traits such as laziness to them. This aspect will be discussed further on in connection with the perception of far-away poverty. But the important result is that – even in their own society – rich people, to a certain degree, live in a different world than the poor and are unsympathetic to their daily plight. They do not understand it and tend to blame them indifferently for the situation they are in. This can cause serious doubts on the possibility of the rich to charitably support the poor within a society. This may be even more difficult in an international context. For the comfortably well-off individual, it is simply difficult and uncomfortable to breach the gap between themselves and the poor, implying that we cannot rely on the civic core for global poverty relief.

As a way to avoid this effect of thinking about money, some propose to ask not for money, but to frame donations as time (Liu 2011). Another attempt at re-framing is *relationship fundraising*, with new emphasis on creating an emotional rapport with the donor (Haibach 2012, 20f.). Unfortunately, the question of money cannot be avoided completely, as in the end this is what fundraising is all about.

3.13. The Elephant in the Room⁹⁰ – Racism and Donations

Colonialism and Imperialism and their Aftermath – and the role racism plays in this context – has already been treated in chapter 2.10. In the following chapter, distance due to racial stereotypes will be discussed. The influence of racism and nationalism on donations and the willingness to support the population in developing countries needs to be addressed here, although it is a somewhat ugly topic. Maybe due to the sensitive nature of the subject, the literature here is sparse. To the author's knowledge no publication has explicitly addressed the influence of racial stereotypes on fundraising. Even in the context of development aid there are only rare examples: Baaz (2005), Goudge (2003), and Kothari (2006).

The phenomenon of nationalism essentially is another insider-outsider problem (cp. Axelrod and Hammond 2006). Nationalists want to secure an advantage over others by postulating a national community, whose members are to be treated preferentially. Nationalism sometimes goes hand in hand with racism, when the national community is equated with an ethnic community. Members of a nation state arguably have some special responsibilities towards one another, and be it only because the nation state is an effective tool to allocate accountability and organise the political community (Goodin 1988 and Rawls 1999). At its worst, nationalism is the denial that all human beings are of equal moral importance. Consequently, exploiting some of them becomes justifiable. Racists or nationalists are consequently much less likely to donate to foreigners.

As can be extrapolated from the research of Hanna Zagefka (et al. 2011) already mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a strong influence of the attitudes and beliefs of donors on their behaviour. The suggestion is that these attitudes and beliefs are not necessarily subject to rational scrutiny. A racial bias in donations should therefore not come as a surprise. One could of course maintain the position that racist people are immoral and

⁹⁰ Crewe and Fernando 2006 provided inspiration for this title.

thus should not be included into the discussion. I would disagree for two reasons. Firstly, it should be hoped that people with racist attitudes remain accessibly to rational argument. If it is not possible to convince at least some people to overthink their positions, not only this thesis, but the science of philosophy as a whole would be in serious trouble. Secondly, several studies, some of them presented below, indicate that racism also operates subconsciously, acting as a hidden negative bias of people who actually try to be decent (cp. Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Raising this fact into consciousness may be worth while.

Several psychological experiments give evidence that a racial bias influences our perception on the subconscious level.⁹¹ In their famous doll experiment, Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947) observed children's self-perception in relation to race.⁹² The experiment consisted of two hundred fifty-three African-American children aged 3 to 7 each individually being presented with four dolls, identical in every respect save skin colour. Each child was then requested to hand the experimenter the doll they would play with best, which doll was the nicest, had the nicest colour, and which one looked like a bad doll. Additional questions were asked to enquire whether the child had a concept of race (white, coloured, or black, in those days still referred to as "Negro"). A final question determined the self-identification of the child: "Give me the doll that looks like you." (Clark and Clark 1947, 169).

The experiment showed that the children understood the concept of race from a very early age. As skin colour is a very easily distinguishable feature, this does not come as a big surprise. Much more problematic was the clear preference for the white doll among most children in the study (67 per cent), generally identified by them as being "prettier" or "cleaner", together with a rejection of the darker dolls as being "the bad ones" (59 per

⁹¹ Since the 1950s, this experiment has been repeated often and in different countries, for example in Mexico, and with different groups of children. The results with coloured children from different countries reinforce the original findings. Caucasian children exhibit an overwhelming preference for the white doll, and of course they do not suffer from the cognitive dissonance effect when asked about the doll that looks like them (see Milner 1996).

⁹² In the authors' own words "the development of racial identification and preferences in Negro children" (Clark and Clark 1947, 169).

cent). The self-identification question caused some of the children distress and elicited rationalizations or avoidance behaviour such as humour (“I look brown because I got a suntan in the summer”, *ibid.*, 178). Lighter coloured children overwhelmingly chose the white doll as a representation of themselves.

The experiment suggests that racial distinctions, while being unscientific, come quite naturally. It further shows that besides the harmful effect of discrimination, manifesting for example in less job opportunities (cp. Bendick, Jackson, and Reinoso 1994 and Bonilla-Silva 2014, ch. 5), racism can harm the affected person from the inside, resulting in lack of self-confidence and self-esteem (cp. Rist 1970).

A more recent string of experiments on the pervasion of racist attitudes has been done with the Implicit Association Test (IAT), created by psychologist Anthony Greenwald and his colleagues (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). The IAT relies on the theory of cognitive burden, which assumes that it is easier to make word associations if the idea is already present sub-consciously, thus measuring the strength of automatic associations already subconsciously present.⁹³ In the test, the subject is confronted in a two-choice task with two concepts (e.g. flower names vs. insect names), and in a second task with attributes (e.g. pleasant words vs. unpleasant words for an evaluation attribute). In the case of easily associated categories which share a response key, (e.g. flower + pleasant), performance is faster than with less easily associated categories (e.g. insect + pleasant) which do not share a response key (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998, 1464).

The uncomfortable result of several IATs conducted was that people who did not consider themselves racist were considerably slower when they had to respond to positive word pairing with a coloured person's image than to white-positive word pairs (e.g. white + smart vs. black + smart). This would imply that stereotypes tend to function unconsciously.

Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) presented subjects with pairs of letter strings,
⁹³ See Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998 for an in depth explanation of the IAT, also cp. Greenwald and Banaji 1995.

requesting the judgement “yes” if both were words, and “no” otherwise. Using the speed of “yes” responses to measure the strength of existing associations between the two words in a pair, they found that white subjects responded reliably faster. This difference did not emerge on judgements of negative traits (e.g. white + lazy vs. black + lazy). These results occurred similarly for subjects who scored high and for ones who scored low on a direct measure of race prejudice (i.e. standard self-report). These results were interpreted as evidence for aversive racism, which they defined as a conflict “between feelings and beliefs associated with a sincerely egalitarian value system and unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks”. Even worse, Kennedy and Hill (2010, 56) found out that attempts to suppress the activated stereotype actually exaggerate later behaviour and raise the possibility that “viewers of aid advertising who avoid thinking stereotypically may find that their subsequent behaviour is more strongly driven by their stereotypes of people living in poverty than they may have wished, which in some cases can lead to greater negativity and a reduction of support”.

This does not necessarily mean that (sub-conscious) racial biases will be with us forever. Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides (2001) from the Center for Evolutionary Psychology of the University of California point out that racism is relatively recent in human history. Their theory is that “race” is just a proxy for coalition and group membership, something that was very important in our past as hunter-gatherers. Their experiments show that group membership is codified independent from race and can overwrite it as primarily perceived, therefore being more important to our subconscious cognition. Conversely, the researchers found that sex as defining feature is impossible to erase.

The results are reinforced by Hazama (2010), who in a review on the literature on ethnic political tolerance finds that, while on an individual level authoritarian personality types are more vulnerable to racial stereotyping, the societal level of tolerance depends on

various social and political factors, such as education, contact, and threat perception. Thus it is possible for a society to reduce prejudice and increase trust between various ethnic groups. Especially education can reduce racism by “disseminating knowledge and information, empowering cognitive capacities, and introducing universal values and norms” (Hazama 2010, 3 and Coenders and Scheepers 2003, 317). But the effect of these measures is weaker in emerging democracies, as liberal values take time to permeate through the national educational system.

Perceived competition over jobs and scarce resources between the majority and emerging minorities, e.g. through immigration, makes the majority more intolerant, especially in times of economic difficulty.⁹⁴ Similarly, threat perceived, for example because of fear of terrorism, can enhance prejudice against different ethnicities. This points towards the importance of the prevalent tone in media and the political sphere. If the tone is one of scaremongering and crude nationalism, racism will increase.

When it comes to ethnic heterogeneity, the research finds a dual effect. On the one hand, frequent contact between different groups reduces social distance and prejudice (Hazama 2010). Contact improves the empathic relations between individuals from different ethnic and social backgrounds (Allport 1979, Hodgetts et al. 2011, and Rist 1970). This can be crucial in eliminating racial prejudices, provided that Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides (2001) are right with their hypothesis that alliances trump racial biases. One can easily imagine this paradigm shift in perception: The person in front of me is suddenly my good friend Francis from Ghana.

On the other hand, it is well documented that prejudice and aversion will increase, if the majority perceives a minority constantly increasing in numbers and feels endangered of becoming supplanted (Hazama 2010, 6f.). For Germany, Semyonov et al. (2004) found

⁹⁴ Actually, immigration reduces job opportunities a lot less than commonly thought, as immigrants mainly take up jobs that the local workers either cannot or do not want to do (Clemens 2011). They are also overrepresented in creating their own enterprise, thereby creating new jobs instead of taking them. Political opposition, racially or otherwise motivated, to immigration is quite costly for a society, as Clemens 2011 and McKissick and Kane 2011 show.

that, while the actual size of the foreign population in a “land” (one of the 16 federal states Germany consists of) had no influence on either perception of threat or exclusionary attitudes of Germans, the perceived size was the key. The larger this perceived size, the more pronounced are both the sensed threat and the anti-foreigner attitudes. This can help to explain the paradox of the success of right-wing parties in regions with a low density of immigrant population (which is referred to as the *paradox of xenophobia*, Semyonov et al. 2006).

This apparent intra-country effect can influence donations to people living in other countries twofold. First, people will associate a certain ethnic appearance with immigrants in their own country which they perceive as a menace. Second, as has arguably begun to happen in Europe, people will increasingly see Africans as a mass herding towards Europe. In combination with the stereotype of Africans being poor, uncivilised and child-like, this can lead to the denial of donations for them and the rejection of responsibility for global justice (Baaz 2005, Darnton and Kirk 2011, and Dogra 2012).

As already mentioned, research results point towards the possibility of overcoming prejudice by education, positive contact, and dialogue. These measures could also be an important prerequisite to successful donation appeals and political action. Yet, both political action and donating may be uncomfortable, and even if they do not directly go against one's (apparent) self-interest, they may not serve it. The important task would then be to inform, to educate, and to facilitate contact between the first and the third world. This could also help to overcome the perception of people in developing nations as passive victims (Zagefka et al. 2011), and help people in the first or Western world to understand what a little help and better opportunities can accomplish.

However, a further problem presents itself in fundraising if NGOs intentionally use racial stereotypes in their donor appeals. As familiar images are more easily recognized and retained, the use of helpless “donor darlings”, black children with big eyes and swollen

bellies, can be quite successful. This problem will be discussed in depth in chapter 3.9. in relation to the very successful KONY 2012 video.

What if racial stereotypes influence the actual work on the development aid? Perceived incompetence of local populations could then lead to patronising projects and to the sending of white – and therefore more competent – development experts. This would consume resources and could be quite demoralizing for local workers who earn only a fraction of the salary of their white counterparts. Several aid critics, such as Baaz 2005, Easterly 2007b, and Goudge 2003 raise similar criticism. In their opinion, development aid strengthens colonial style power differences, further coining and reinforcing the image of Western competence in contrast to Southern incompetence. This important point will be further discussed in part 4, in which the power differences between the givers and the seekers of foreign aid will be scrutinized.⁹⁵

3.14. Convincing the Unconvinced – Reason versus Emotion

The biases presented are only some of the great and many difficulties in establishing a culture of giving as Singer envisions it. Even more worrying is that at least some of these biases, for example the identified victim effect or the geo-cultural sympathy effect, are not accessible to reason and may, if pointed out to the individual concerned, even diminish his or her propensity for donating. The confirmation bias, often racially laced, can reinforce the perception of the global poor as lazy and undeserving of help. This limits the possible scope for convincing people by rational argumentation. Even worse, in recent years, experimental ethics has given additional evidence for the position that our decision-making

⁹⁵ It speaks volumes that white emigrants from Western countries are usually referred to as “ex-pats”, shortened for expatriate from the Latin *ex patria*, whereas emigrants to the West from Africa, South America, or Asia are called immigrants (Koutonin 2015).

process is largely dominated by our intuitions and emotions (Greene et al. 2001, Greene and Haidt 2002, Greene 2007 and Haidt 2001 and 2007).⁹⁶

Challenging the “rationalist delusion” in the Humean tradition, authors such as Greene and Haidt argue that our rationality is generally not used to question our (moral) intuitions, but to justify them post hoc (Haidt 2007). As Haidt (2007, 998) puts it

“Moral reasoning, when it occurs, is usually a post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction.”

Haidt illustrates this with the image of the mind as a “lawyer” who is employed to defend an already pre-determined position. This echoes Nickerson's description of the *confirmation bias* (Nickerson 1998, 175). This concept refers to the “unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence” (*ibid.*). This leads to an overconfidence in one's own judgement (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). Of course, the line between deliberate and unwitting selectivity is difficult to establish, as researchers are not able to look into a person's head, but confirmation bias seems to occur subconsciously (Nickerson 1998). Taber and Lodge (2006) show that confirmation bias leads to *motivated reasoning*, which poses a problem for democracy, as it limits deliberation and political argumentation, thus leading to the persistence of disconfirmed beliefs and to attitude polarisation, for example in the case of gun control, climate change, or conspiracy theories. Especially conspiracy theories are characterised by a lack of falsifiability, as they are usually vague and often self-contradictory, yet appear convincing to a large portion of the public (Sunstein 2014). This can lead to severe societal problems. For example anti-vaccine conspiracy theories have led to a severe drop in vaccinations, endangering not only the lives of children of the believers in such conspiracies, but – as vaccinations rely on herd immunity – also the lives of others (Jolley and Douglas 2013 and 2014 and Nyhan et al. 2014).

⁹⁶ See Haidt (2007) for a summary of the evidence for intuitive primacy and post-hoc rational justification and Appiah (2008) for a profound discussion of the role of experiments in ethics.

Self-fulfilling prophecies may also very well be examples of confirmation bias (Rist 1970). In chapters 3.4., 3.6. and 3.7., the worrying tendency was discussed to blame the poor for their poverty, especially if they are of a different “race”. Experiments confirm that we perceive and remember information better that affirms low expectations of individuals of low socio-economic status and different ethnicities (Rist 1970). Indeed, the surprising quickness and ease with which prospective donors attribute blame to the victims of humanitarian catastrophes is highly problematic (Zagefka et al. 2011).

In such cases, judgements are based only to a limited degree on reasons, as our perception and evaluation of arguments and facts is heavily biased towards our original position (*belief persistence*; Nickerson 1998, 187f). It seems that our reasoning apparatus has trouble to accept arguments contradicting our original convictions and subsequently to change or adjust them. Thus it is better described as a “machine created to win an argument” than as an impartial judge (Greene and Haidt 2002 and Haidt 2001).

Haidt (2001, 818) finds further proof for his thesis in behaviour he calls “moral dumb-founding”, which he defines as “the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of a moral judgement without supporting reasons”. In several studies, Haidt confronted subjects with situations of “harmless yet offensive taboo violations”, asking them for their moral verdict and the reasoning behind it (Haidt and Hersh 2001, 193, Haidt 2012, and Huppert 2010, 8f). The quite colourful scenarios included a woman cleaning a toilet bowl with the US national banner, a family which decides to cook and eat their recently departed dog, a man who buys a chicken at the butchers', uses it for sexual gratification, and then cooks and eats it. Another question refers to whether or not it is morally acceptable in an emergency to use a urinal for defecation, provided one cleans it up afterwards. Perhaps the most disturbing story is about Mark and Julie, a vacationing adult pair of siblings. During a holiday trip they decide to have sex, using two kinds of contraception. Although it was enjoyable and

did not change their relationship, they afterwards decide never to do it again or talk about it.

In all scenarios, the descriptions explicitly mention that no one is being harmed, and the researchers pointed this fact out to the participants. Nevertheless, many subjects, especially those of low socio-economic status, judged the respective acts to be morally wrong. When asked why, they condemned the act in question and often constructed a narrative about some harm being done, such as contracting a disease from consuming the dog or from having sex with a chicken carcass, or in the case of Mark and Julie a distorted relationship or handicapped children. The phenomenon occurred and persisted, even when the subjects were confronted with their inability to justify their judgement, and even when they acknowledged this. Rather they fell back to the position “such behaviour is simply wrong”. As Huppert (2010, 9) resumes:

“This strongly indicates that moral judgements are often not the result of consciously weighing reasons for and against, but the expression of quick, unconsidered affective attitudes (i.e. moral intuitions).”

Individuals seem have a surprisingly strong capacity of manufacturing *ad hoc explanations* for sources of their actions. These results fit in well with research on the existence of a fast and a slow reflective process (Gigerenzer 2007 and Kahneman 2011). The fast and simple heuristics help us act in everyday situations in which many decisions have to be taken and time, processing power, and attention span are limited (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). To apply moral standards and to avoid violations, as has been tried to show further above, is an integral feature of survival and cooperation. Therefore it makes sense to allocate moral decision processes primarily to intuitive and emotional reactions. Our intuitive heuristics

work fast, effortlessly, and surprisingly well. But there are blind spots in our affective moral make-up that lead us to commit errors.

This raises disturbing problems for the possibility to convince people rationally to donate (cp. Singer 2007 and Slovic and Västfjäll 2010). If reasoning primarily is applied to support whatever judgement has been passed previously, reliance on rational argumentation, such as attempted in the first part, will only get us so far. It will chiefly convince donors who already are ready givers, either because they have a liberal social mindset or because they believe in a religious duty to help (Greene 2013). More conservative or libertarian readers will answer: “It's wrong, I just don't have to share. It is their own responsibility to rise from poverty to affluence.”⁹⁷ As Haidt (2012) and Greene (2013) show, individuals with different political affiliations have differing values, and it is difficult to reach a compromise. This does not mean that such a compromise is *per se* impossible. This illustrates that there are many and high obstacles. To reach a situation in which enough people who can afford it donates in the sense of Singer, we will need time and a very open and public discussion. A hindrance to success is, however, that global poverty – as well as the injustice in international and economical relations between the West and the underdeveloped countries – were and remain fringe topics in public perception (Bølstad 2011 and Darnton and Kirk 2011). In everyday life, other concerns seem much more important.

Both from an empirical as well as from a moral point of view, there is reason for caution, but not for fatalism. There are some examples of social and moral progress throughout history which raise hope (Appiah 2011 and Buchanan 1996). Attitudes and judgements can change and improve, as has happened in the case of slavery in most parts of the world, concerning women's rights in the developed world, and regarding the acceptance of homosexuality in the West. Steven Pinker (2011) for example is especially optimistic about the social development from the 1950s until today, arguing that poverty

⁹⁷ Two examples of conservatively motivated criticism are Badhwar's 2006 and Gordon's 1998 reviews of Unger's “Living High and Letting Die” (1996).

and discrimination as well as war and violence have continually decreased. But, as reason has a doubtful stand versus intuition and emotion, social progress happens very, very slowly and not without opposition and obstacles. There are reasons to believe that such a discussion is hard to implement, even more in the fractured societies that we seem to be developing where partisans of one group simply dismiss or reinterpret in a self-serving way the evidence provided by members of another group, this is called “identity protective cognition” (Kahan et al. 2013).

3.15. Convincing the Unconvinced – Situationism

In the context of altruism and charitable behaviour, another line of experiments illustrates even more limits to rationality and reason. Our behaviour and decisions are highly situational and context dependent (Doris 2012 and Elster 1979). People behave differently in situations that should objectively be assessed as similar. This means that not only are the possibilities of convincing people of changing their attitudes and behaviour towards the global poor limited, but also much of the success of the convincing effort will depend on a priori irrelevant factors. There are two classic studies that are especially relevant in this context of altruism and charitable behaviour.

In 1972, Isen and Levin observed helpful behaviour towards strangers in a shopping mall. When the unwitting participants left a phone booth, an actor went by and dropped a folder, spilling papers. It was then recorded if the participant helped picking up the papers or not. Most people did not prove to be very helpful, only one out of 25 assisted the “clumsy dropper.” However, the situation changed dramatically when the phone booth was prepared so that the unwitting participants found a dime in the change slot of the booth. Then helping behaviour jump-started up to nearly 90 per cent.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ In a less frequently cited study in the same paper, the authors show that receiving a cookie dramatically increases helpful behaviour as well.

Darley and Batson (1973) tested whether intellectually and narratively primed students would behave more pro-socially. Students were asked to participate as subjects in an experiment and hold a lecture on the parable of the Good Samaritan or on some other unrelated topic. Then they were told that they had to move to another building to deliver the talk. While crossing over to the other building, they were confronted with an actor slumped in a doorway in apparent medical distress. If people had just thought, read, or prepared to lecture about the ethical necessity of helping a stranger or not made no difference to their volition to help. What did, however, decrease helping dramatically was hurrying the subjects. Fear of being late apparently makes us quite anti-social, illustrating a worrying tendency to put societal conventions over ethical requirements.

More recent experiments demonstrate that people confronted with moral dilemmas judge others more harshly when these are hungry or sitting at a disorderly or dirty desk (Haidt et al. 2008). It seems that elicited disgust leads us to judge taboo violations and other misbehaviour more harshly. People behave extremely inconsistent here, they even apply double standards. While they judge others more harshly, inducing visions of collective erosion of morality or referring to the tragedy of the commons, they are more permissive towards themselves (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993 and Haidt 2001).

On the other side of the emotional spectrum, people are more likely to help and donate if they are in a pleasant environment, especially if they are surrounded by good smells such as the perfume of a bakery (Baron 1997 and Guéguen 2012). Generally speaking, people in a good mood are more altruistic and also donate more (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 and Strahilevitz 2011). As giving and volunteering also has been shown to improve overall happiness and well-being, this has primed hopes of creating a positive feedback loop.

However, people should not be allowed to think too much about their actions, as an experiment by Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) shows. A group of people who had

previously expressed their willingness to donate to the needy were then involved into conversations either about babies, thus priming their emotional cognition, or about mathematics, thus priming their rational side. Those who were primed for rational thinking afterwards acted more self-interestedly and in the end gave less to charity. In the light of these results, it probably does not surprise that acts of helping are often not reflective, but fast, spontaneous, and following a gut feeling. Studies on motives of the “Righteous Gentiles” that helped Jews persecuted during the Second World War confirm this (Gushee 1993).

The debate on situationism rages wild in modern ethics and behavioural sciences in general (Appiah 2008, Greene and Haidt 2002, Huppert 2010, and Vargas 2013). A tentative result seems to be that we are confronted with “intuitive primacy (but not dictatorship)”. But although environmental conditions have a strong influence, most of us are able to overcome this influence if we make an adequate effort. The experiments do not necessarily demonstrate that we are incapable of reflection and rational thought, but they do show how easily our thinking processes can be misled and erroneous. Situationism constitutes a further barrier to rational convincing people to donate. An appeal may not work because it simply reached the intended target at the wrong time or in the wrong place. As a reaction to this, charitable organisations have learnt a central lesson from marketing: A constant stream of messaging must be kept up to reach people when they are in the right mood.

But this logic, borrowed from the for profit-sector, has its problems. As non-profit agencies, organisations, and institutions cannot counterbalance their fundraising expenditures with the sale of a product or service, they forcibly have to use a part of the money gathered from donations to finance additional fundraising efforts. This, as will be attempted to illustrate in the following chapter, is very costly and takes up a considerable part of the charities organisational capacity.

3.16. Convincing the Unconvinced – Hearts before Minds

Long before Peter Singer, the fundraising industry has recognised the need to convince people to donate by using frequent emotional appeal.⁹⁹ One of the basic tenants of the profession is that one needs “to convince first the heart, then the head” (Andresen, McKee and Rovner 2010, and 2011 and Haibach 2012, 20f.).

The importance of fundraising for non-profits is illustrated by studies conducted by Yörük, (2009) and Bekkers (2005), which demonstrate that around 85 per cent of all donations result of a solicitation. Techniques used include direct approaches such as phoning or mailing, and personal solicitations, for example in a pedestrian area or via door-to-door fundraising (Haibach 2012, 227ff.). But they also include indirect solicitations through a television advertisement, a poster or, increasingly, online by use of the Internet. As Haibach (2012, 148ff.) shows, fundraising has become a more and more relevant, feeding the so-called third sector (cp. Anheier 2010 and 2011). A result of this growing relevance is an increasing professionalisation of fundraising, which started in the United States, where with \$1.5 billion per year it constitutes ten per cent of the GDP (Stern 2013a, 2), but has since reached Europe (Anheier 2010, 91ff. and 445ff.). In Germany, the often underestimated third sector provides 2.6 million jobs, making up for more than four per cent of the annual GDP (Rosenski 2012, 214 and 217). The sector is a little less developed in Spain, with around 1.7 per cent of the GDP and 635.000 people employed (Fundación Luis Vives 2012, 7f). Only a small minority of these organisations focus on global poverty relief. Most of them are providers of hospitals, of social services, or of youth and care institutions within the country. The extent alone indicates that there are many fundraisers and many different causes competing for donor attention.

⁹⁹ There are several definitions of fundraising, but at its most basic, the term “fundraising” refers to the acquiring financial means for a charitable organisation through information and appeal (cp. Haibach 2012, 16). The denomination comes from “raising funds”.

DOUBLE YOUR IMPACT

THE UK GOVERNMENT WILL MATCH YOUR DONATION*

Matching your donations with

UKaid

DON'T DELAY, DONATE

dec.org.uk

DISASTERS EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
EAST AFRICA CRISIS

*The UK Government will match the first £5 million of public donations.

Figure 5 Fundraising Message from the UK Disaster Emergency Committee (Source <https://fundraising.co.uk/2017/03/15/disasters-emergency-committee-launches-east-africa-crisis-appeal/#.WRsIHsakI2w>).

To the professional fundraiser, there is a vast array of techniques available, many of them arising out of previously described psychological mechanisms. First it is necessary to trigger emotions, as those are the activating determinants. Emotional messages motivate us to act and are remembered much easier than rational arguments (Gröppel-Klein and Kroeber-Riel 2013). Examples for emotions that are frequently targeted in fundraising campaigns are pity with the victims or anger or disgust at injustice. A standard technique is using compelling imagery and storytelling (Merchant, Ford, and Sargeant, 2010). Storytelling makes up for our inability to grasp or be touched by statistics, already discussed (cp. Slovic 2007). To circumvent this, fundraisers present a single identifiable victim (cp. chapter 3.8. of this thesis) and tell his or her life story, always trying to establish an emotional connection between the sufferer and the prospective donor. Children are used particularly often in this context, as their age and innocence makes it more difficult to attribute them with blame or responsibility for their fate (Manzo 2008 and Westhead 2013). Of course, while effective, storytelling carries with it the problem of

misrepresenting the truth, especially due to our short attention span and other limitations, such as space in the case of posters or time in television advertisements.

The stories told by INGO fundraisers have changed somewhat during the last thirty years of the profession. Arguably the birth of modern development fundraising was the 1983–1985 Ethiopian famine, which provoked an international outpour of sympathy, among it Bob Geldof's "Live Aid" initiative (Gill 2010, 13ff.).¹⁰⁰ Its beginning (fig. 5) was characterised more by so-called "poverty porn", showing images of starving children with their distended bellies, so-called "hunger babies" or "donor darlings" (Dogra 2012, 33ff., Plewes and Stuart 2006, and Polman 2008, 77ff.).

While we still find this imagery today, it has been recognised as being exploitative both of the victim as well as of the donor. It also carries with it the risks of overstimulation and avoidance, probably leading to donor fatigue. In response to the problem of treating their subjects responsibly and avoiding undue emotional pressure on the donor, fundraising codices have sprung up (DZI 2012, Haibach 2012, 38ff., and VENRO 2011).

¹⁰⁰ Of course fundraising is much older than that. Medieval monks petitioned rich merchants and princes, citing the good example of Saint Martin and warning of hellfire (Burens 2012, 10ff.). After the Second World War, millions of US CARE packages helped starving Europeans survive (Ilgen 2008).




Figure 6: This Advertisement from the German INGO Welthungerhilfe Showcases the Trend of Happiness Fundraising (Source Scholz & Friends Berlin 2007 for Deutsche Welthungerhilfe).

Recent fundraising campaigns focus more on the happiness aspect of giving, communicating the donor that his engagement matters and can accomplish something positive (fig. 6). The goal is to take advantage of the previously explained positive feedback mechanism of giving and well-being.

However, the fundraising profession suffers from the same problems as have plagued the economic discipline of marketing – to which it has been closely related – for a considerable time. The profession is characterised by an over-reliance on “casual acceptance of anecdotal evidence” (Lindahl and Conley 2002), and not by rigorous scientific approach (cp. Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). This entails a deep rift between

practise and theory, which experimental economists have been trying to bridge in their science only recently (Khadjavi 2014, Landry et al. 2006, List 2011, and Oppenheimer and Olivola 2011).

Modern fundraisers try different presentations and formulations in their attempt to increase the attractiveness of their organisation and their concern (and consequently donations). As media attention is a prerequisite to generate public attention, which in turn gives rise to political pressure and secures support, financial or otherwise, for the organisation. The basic intent, however, remains the same: to inform and to appeal through as many channels as possible. For this purpose, fundraisers make use of direct mailing, posters, online information (often making use of the variability of online platforms), and television clips. They apply these media in a way to gain as much attention of the viewer as possible.

Just as with marketing, a high frequency of appeal is important, as giving depends on many circumstances such as the personal mood of the addressee and on a high stimulus environment. It has been shown that even variations in colour can influence donations (Glück 2008, 59f. and Keller 2008). Messages need to be repeated often to be perceived (Bekkers 2010 and Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Unfortunately, this again is very costly and, especially in the case of solicitation via mail, risks to aggravate the prospective donor. Due to data, frequent donors can receive so many solicitations that this irritates them. Although this has not been demonstrated to have a negative effect on giving, this may very well mean that messages from organisations that cannot – or are less willing to – abundantly spend on marketing are crowded out by organisations that do (van Diepen, Donkers, and Franses 2009).

But whether or not an organisation is able to spend much on marketing does not indicate if it does a good job in alleviating poverty. On the contrary, bigger organisations and organisations that re-invest a large part of their funds raised into fundraising can

consequently become more and more self-serving (Glück 2008 and Stern 2013a). This is another instance of the *Machiavellian problem*. As a partial response, fundraisers spend quite some time on developing an easily recognisable brand-name to distinguish themselves from other charities and to build up resilient trust and a durable connection to their supporters. This has led to frequent worries of “over-commercialization of the non-profit sector” and “misappropriation of techniques developed specifically for the commercial environment”, as e.g. uttered by Kylander and Stone (2012, 39). The widely held opinion is that charities should not be primarily revenue creating and self-serving

As was attempted to show in the previous chapters, income from fundraising has been steadily increasing in the passing years, but this increase has been much slower than the exponential growth of NGOs and the third sector in general (Adloff 2010, 84ff., Haibach 2012, 149ff., and Rosenski 2012). As more NGOs compete for the resource altruism, there is considerable pressure to increase fundraising professionalism. This means that especially large organisations have to be ever-present, have to take up every fad that the donor enjoys, and have to dedicate an ever increasing part of their resources to create public attention and fundraising.

The increasing distraction by digital media further exacerbates the problem. It is especially difficult for INGOs to set global poverty into an appropriate relationship to for example homelessness in Germany or Spain. Victims of poverty in developing countries and their specific problems are so removed that people can easily avoid thinking about them or give in to the illusion that all this has nothing to do with them (an illusion which was tried to disperse in the first part of this thesis). The aspect of an undue power of the donor will be discussed further on.

Fundraisers compete for public attention directly through campaigns and ads, but also indirectly by competing for media attention (Hilton et al. 2013, 157). After a catastrophe, a multitude of NGOs arrive to show presence and compete for attention. When

the organisations cooperate insufficiently, this can lead to large wastages of resources. It can occur that different organisations perform the same task worthy of publicity, while other tasks are neglected.¹⁰¹

Another frequently raised criticism is that fundraising efforts are too costly, with not enough of the proceedings benefiting the intended target. The costs of fundraising are indeed not negligible. Especially direct mailing to “cold contacts”, referring to individuals who have no previous connection to a NGO, is highly expensive. There are costs for the envelopes and the materials sent, for the printing and mailing. Most of the appeals get thrown away, only between one and four per cent of appeals result in an actual donation (Crole 2007, 144f. and Haibach 2012, 263ff.). More than half of the initial donations go towards covering the fundraising effort. Similar costs incur for paying fundraisers to directly approach prospective donors, through telephone calls, at a mall or down town, or just door-to-door. Their success depends on the brand of their organisation, but even more on the warmth of the contacts. As Chicago economist John List has found out, when it comes to fundraising in door-to-door solicitations, attractive blondes raise about 100 to 200 per cent more (Landry et al. 2006, List 2011, and Raihani and Smith 2015). The main being that men want to show off to them. This is perhaps the strongest example of charity being motivated by self-interest.

Some authors, such as Palotta (2008), argue that we should not primarily look at the costs of fundraising or payment of the CEO of an organisation. What should count is the problem-solving capability of the organisation, its effectiveness. While this is certainly true to an extent, Palotta over-stretches the analogy towards the economy in general. Firstly, his point of view on the private sector is debatable in itself. Even more important is the difference in easily measurable outcomes, which distinguishes the first from the third

¹⁰¹ An apt example of this is the multitude of wells that have been and are being built by NGOs in Africa. Building wells is good publicity and tangible, therefore good fundraising material. However, educating people to build or maintain their own wells is much less so, though it would be much more efficient. Ruins of aid-built wells are now part of some African landscapes (Glennie 2009 and Easterly 2007b).

sector. The appearance of an NGO could become so relevant that by Palotta's recommendations the Machiavellian problem would be reinforced.

In the first sector, high expenditures in marketing can be justified by increased sales and therefore profit. As concerns high salaries of Chief Executive Officers (CEO), the problem is very complex. Whether an increased performance is due to good CEO performance or other factors is often difficult to evaluate. This situation is even more complex in the case of NGOs whose impact is much more difficult to measure. They do not make a direct financial profit, and especially in the case of global poverty relief, their long-term success can hardly be observed by their donors. Reporting standards in this field are still under-par (van Iwaarden et al. 2009 and Stern 2013a). Meanwhile, the problem of overall efficiency and accountability of charitable organisations towards the beneficiaries is raised more and more often (Stern 2013a) – and will be dealt with in the following chapter.

3.17. Evaluating Fundraising Methods

At its best, the fundraising profession is an intermediary between the non-commercial organisation and prospective donors, between people who can do good with the money and those who have it. Fundraisers direct our attention towards the lives and needs of others and present possible solutions.

At its worst, as has been indicated, fundraising is self-serving, with the generated income primarily benefiting the organisation, not the needy or a worthy cause. Fundraisers may even make use of dubious techniques of moral blackmail and psychological tricks to convince people (Glück 2008). This is aptly depicted by Charles Dickens in his essay *The Begging-Letter Writer* (1850).

“THE amount of money he annually diverts from wholesome and useful purposes in the United Kingdom, would be a set-off against the Window Tax. He is one of the most shameless frauds and impositions of this time. In his idleness, his mendacity, and the immeasurable harm he does to the deserving, – dirtying the stream of true benevolence, and muddling the brains of foolish justices, with inability to distinguish between the base coin of distress, and the true currency we have always among us, – he is more worthy of Norfolk Island than three-fourths of the worst characters who are sent there. Under any rational system, he would have been sent there long ago. That the calling is a successful one, and that large sums of money are gained by it, must be evident to anybody who reads the Police Reports of such cases. But, prosecutions are of rare occurrence, relatively to the extent to which the trade is carried on. The cause of this is to be found (as no one knows better than the Begging–Letter Writer, for it is a part of his speculation) in the aversion people feel to exhibit themselves as having been imposed upon, or as having weakly gratified their consciences with a lazy, flimsy substitute for the noblest of all virtues.”

This Victorian England critique of direct mailing still has some bite today. Dickens deplores that the poor have no voices and communication is left to an arbitrator of questionable intent, as “[t]he poor never write these letters.”

The problem of self-servingness versus public benefit in NGOs is increasingly discussed today (Glück 2008, Magee 2014, Singer 2009b, and Stern 2013a). All registered organisations may collect donations that are then tax exempt. Additionally, revenue created by the organisation is exempt from taxes as well, as in theory the very goal of the organisation already provides a public benefit (Anheier 2010 and 2011). While theoretically, public benefit is the essential pre-condition to gaining NGO status, very few

applications to register as a non-profit organisation are actually denied (Stern 2013a, 76f. and Thieme 2011). This raises the question whether the standards are too lax. As non-profit organisations take money from the public purse, thus removing it from democratic political control, their responsibility should be to not only show that they are serving the public good, but also that they do so in ways that taxes do not (Anheier 2010 and 2011). There is, however, little to no effort of accreditation authorities to assess or control the effectiveness of an NGO. Rather, the focus is on legal formalities.

Once gained, the tax-exemption status may only be lost if there are severe irregularities in the organisation's bookkeeping (Stern 2013a, 77). Just using donations for the organisation itself or to pay spectacular salaries is not necessarily enough to lose this status. There have been several scandals including such renowned organisations as UNICEF, the German chapter of which was proven to divert donation money from its intended use in 2008, paying salaries up to €30.000 to uninvolved fundraisers, and using millions for the construction of a new head-office in Cologne (Thieme 2011). UNICEF did not lose its tax-exemption status, but it could be argued though, that public opinion served as a regulator here. The scandal resulted in UNICEF losing an estimated €7 million in donations and 5.000 regular donors between 2008 and 2009, forcing the originally reluctant CEO of the German chapter of UNICEF to step down (*ibid.*). Unfortunately, as the charitable sector highly relies on good reputation, there was a negative spillover of distrust towards other organisations as well. This is a frequent feature of scandals in the charitable sector, where one organisation's scandal, instead of translating into more donations for more effective and transparent organisations, translates into a loss for the whole community (Stern 2013a, 105ff. and 110ff.).

UNICEF did however lose its accreditation by the *Deutsches Zentralinstitut für Soziale Fragen* (DZI)¹⁰², a foundation that evaluates NGOs in Germany with special attention to the appropriate use of donations, for two years, only regaining it in 2010.

¹⁰² German Central Institute for Social Questions (cp. <http://www.dzi.de/>).

Certification is voluntary and meant as a signal of special trustworthiness and high quality to donors. To become certified with the *DZI Spendensiegel-Logo*¹⁰³, organisations have to comply with accounting standards, must not use more than 30 per cent of their donations for internal administrative purposes and comply with the previously cited DZI ethical fundraising codex (Haibach 2012, 54ff.). The focus on fundraising methods and minimal standards of resource use however give not indication of project efficiency and mean that once again accountability works in one direction only: towards donors and their intended use. The true accountability to society and especially towards the poor can easily get lost on the way.

Use of Celebrities in Fundraising and the Negative Image of the Third World

The role celebrities play in the context of donations is ambivalent. Celebrities are often used as spokespersons for a cause (Cameron and Haanstra 2008, Dogra 2012, and Davis 2010). They can act as role models when they adopt children or give to donations. As research shows, role models can convey positive effects (Khadjavi 2014). However, celebrity activism may be regarded as not adequate for humanitarian causes and, as Sireau (2009, 60ff.), may lead to internal conflict over celebrity involvement in campaigns such as “Make Poverty History”. It also leads the focus away from the global poor towards a self-involved celebrity culture (Davis 2010). Celebrities are only very seldom experts on development aid and thus their support of a certain cause can lead donations away from more sensible investments. For example Oprah Winfrey with her support of the disastrous “play-pump” and the KONY 2012 campaign has a very bad record of supporting efficient NGOs, as will be discussed in the next chapter (cp. MacAskill 2015a, 3).

As Cameron and Haanstra (2008) analyse, this reinforces the Western stereotype of the helpless poor Africans, with the “white saviour” coming to the rescue. As many critics

¹⁰³ German for *donation seal logo*.

plausibly argue, this contributes to the continuing view of the developing world, and particularly of Africa, as poor, passive, inferior, and in need of saving (Dogra 2012, 163ff. and Plewes and Stuart 2006). The press quite subtly contributes to this perception (CARMA 2006, Kennedy and Hill 2010, and Rothmyer 2011). Fortunately, some self-critical journalists recognise this. For example, in 2013 the German newspaper “Die Zeit” published a series of articles on the good news in the world often forgotten, among them the recent growth spurt in seven African countries and what it means for their inhabitants (Albrecht 2013). Unfortunately, these examples remain few and far between, one reason being the already mentioned confirmation bias. It is simply easier for fundraisers and journalists to work with easily recognised and accepted images. Thus it is not surprising that a 2002 report by the British NGO Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) found that “80% of the British public strongly associates the developing world with doom-laden images of famine, disaster and Western aid [...] these images are still top of mind and maintain a powerful grip on the British psyche”. Similar results are echoed by Dogra (2012), Smillie (1995), Stern (2013a), and the CARMA report (2006), confirming that the image of Africa characteristically consists of children not being able to go to school, people dying from diseases or hunger, or of violent conflicts continuing endlessly. As depicted before, this is certainly part of the reality of Africa and poor countries in general. But positive developments are too little or not at all recognised. This confrontation with never-ending problems may lead to donor fatigue (cp. Moeller 1999). Moreover, as it may influence investors and business partners, it can reduce economical (business) opportunities or lead to paternalism, as people do not believe that there are sufficient self-regulation forces in Africa. But this would be an over-simplification, as Africa is a very large continent, comprising over 50 states of varying degrees of development, security, and democracy, from Egypt to South Africa, and containing around one billion of inhabitants.

The image problem of Africa and the continuance of paternalistic attitudes translates into true harm, makes it easier to dismiss the poor wishes and world-views, as well as leading to a loss of investment and trade for developing countries, notably Africa and thus less job creation (Baaz 2005). This image problem and this branding are exactly what the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie deplores in “the danger of a single story”. The poor and undernourished child with a distended belly in a desert-like landscape is the only image many Westerners have of Africa.

This image problem is much more subtle than the consequences arising out of crude racism, of psychological racism, or the aftermath of colonialism depicted and discussed previously. Unfortunately, Singer's efforts may indirectly contribute to this by claiming that it is the citizen of the affluent world that can and thus should save a life, without going further into the complexities arising from global poverty.

3.18. The Internet – A Brave New World of Activism?

“Da es nun mit der unter den Völkern der Erde einmal durchgängig überhand genommenen (engeren oder weiteren Gemeinschaft) so weit gekommen ist, daß die Rechtsverletzung an einem Platz der Erde an allen gefühlt wird: so ist die Idee eines Weltbürgerrechts keine phantastische und überspannte Vorstellungsart des Rechts, sondern eine nothwendige Ergänzung des ungeschriebenen Codex sowohl des Staats– als Völkerrechts zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt und so zum ewigen Frieden, zu dem man sich in der continuirlichen Annäherung zu befinden nur unter dieser Bedingung schmeicheln darf.”¹⁰⁴

Immanuel Kant [1796] (1970, AA VIII, 360).

¹⁰⁴ “The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law-constitutional as well as international law – necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring to fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal.” Kant [1795] 1917, 142.

As is quite frequently noted (for example by Assheuer 2012 and Culp 2014,1f.), Kant's vision of the world growing together, as alluded to in the quotation from *Zum ewigen Frieden*, has been proven as nothing less than prophetic. The phenomenon of globalization is a combination of intensified trade, faster and cheaper transportation, and a planet-spanning media network. Recently, the rise of global social media in the guise of Facebook, YouTube, or Google have supplemented the (by themselves still relatively new) possibilities of airplane travel, radio, and television as symbols of the world growing together. In this digital age, the Internet has become the marketplace of our global village (cp. Silverstone 2008, 15ff.).¹⁰⁵ This could be seen as good news for the creation of a "culture of giving", as the convergence of different lives across the globe and the rapid dissemination of information could lead to an increased knowledge of the "other" and thus to an increased to discuss issues of global justice and thus a willingness to donate to identified effective causes. As will be attempted to show in the following part, this is unfortunately not the case so far. While a positive result was indeed the improved access to information, that facilitates the work of charity evaluators such as GiveWell, who can publish their evaluation results online with free access for all interested donors. Additionally, the Internet is increasingly important in the collection of funds. Even Peter Singer has used the Internet to encourage people to follow his ethical imperative to end poverty via the support of aid organisations with proven efficiency. On his "The Life you can Save"-website, which is part of Singer's programme to create a "culture of giving", individuals can make a pledge to donate part of their income to charity. He accepts that the Internet can be a social sphere where international justice can be discussed and increased. Still, the fight for an increasingly short attention span has the tendency to increase fads in development aid and closing off to other positions.

The success of electronic communication cannot be explained by the technological progress in data transfer alone. Rather, while the technological advancement constitutes a

¹⁰⁵ The term "global village" was coined by Marshall McLuhan in his books "The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man" (1962) and "Understanding Media" (1964).

necessary prerequisite, it is a large literate population with free time on their hands that shaped the Internet into its current form, a manifestation of humanity's hunger for information. The term “information” is used here instead of “knowledge”, because – as was to be expected –, this hunger does not only extend to scientific facts, culture, and rational political discussion. Instead, large parts of the Internet are used for gossiping (about celebrities), hurling insults at one another, and pornography.¹⁰⁶ However, as was mentioned elsewhere gossip may actually be a prerequisite of human culture and community, as of course is sexuality. It is therefore not surprising that this new medium is so intensely dedicated to these subjects.

The Internet now presumably forms part of our public sphere, a term coined by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1962 and Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1964). Habermas defined the public sphere (in German *Öffentlichkeit*) in this way:

“By "the public sphere" we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. [...] In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere.”

Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox (1964, 49).

The Internet is the newest technology that facilitates the transfer of information and opinion, via the means of websites such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, all kinds of blogs,

¹⁰⁶ There is a scientific discussion on pornography (See Williams 2004, Bishop and Hall 2007 and, especially relevant to philosophers, Grebowicz 2013) and on gossip (Solove 2007) on the Internet. For background information on criminal activities on the Internet see Brunton 2013. In an article in the German newspaper *Die Zeit*, Assheuer (2012) argues that the Internet has become the battlefield of a new civil world war (in German *Weltbürgerkrieg*). He refers to the exchange of insults between Muslims, radical adherents of secularism, or agnostics, and Christian fundamentalists that seem to delight in burning each other's holy symbols (e.g. the U. S. flag on the one side, the Koran on the other one) and hurling insults at each other (also cp. Silverstone 2008, 36f.).

etc. While Habermas himself is critical of the Internet, claiming that it leads to a “fragmentation of audiences into isolated publics”. Internet enthusiasts hail the new technology as facilitator of social (ex)change via the democratisation of information.¹⁰⁷

On the one hand, the Internet is much easier accessible to individuals who search for a way to make their voices heard than traditional media, as anyone can write a blog or post a video on YouTube. The possibility to directly comment online content makes it far easier for readers and viewers to interact with the author, although some censorship by private administrators or authoritarian governments may still occur (cp. Silverstone 2008, 211 and Janus and Paulo 2013).

Yet on the other hand, the German philosopher's scepticism is understandable and made even more solemn by his theoretical background. Habermas' idea of global (in his terminology *supranational*) justice relies on his theory of *Diskursethik* (discursive ethics).¹⁰⁸ Just as within a state, worldwide principles of supranational justice have to be established within a process of collective reflection, discussion, and political justification, culminating in what he calls public reason. The legitimacy of decisions in Habermas' view is very much process dependent.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the establishment of a *Weltöffentlichkeit* (supranational public sphere) through media and public dialogue, including as many citizens as possible, is of primary importance. If the Internet leads to a fragmentation of audiences instead of contributing to a collective open dialogue, it actually counters the

¹⁰⁷ “The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers. However, computer-mediated communication in the web can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics.” Habermas 2006, 423.

¹⁰⁸ As Habermas' position on international justice is developed over several books (for example 1998, 2004 and 2006), I rely on Hahn (2009, 127ff.) who consolidates Habermas' position.

¹⁰⁹ Of course, asymmetry of political power and influence poses a problem for Habermas' theory. These asymmetries motivated Rawls to make use of the *veil of ignorance* – a move that Habermas rejects; in his view, principles of justice should not be established by a single abstract reasonable calculation. Rather, they have to be continually established in a deliberative process of dialogue. Trying to circumvent the problem of asymmetry of power, and hereby influencing Silverstone, Habermas argues that in the process of public justification all participants must recognise the position of weaker members in the public sphere, such as inhabitants of developing countries. All participants of the public sphere have to be receptive to moral arguments. Habermas' student Rainer Forst has developed further the theory of discursive ethics to address this issue (Forst 2007).

process of finding mutually agreeable ethical guidelines.

The search engine “Google”, and its acquired video provider “YouTube”, have become one of the world's most valuable and at the stock markets most highly listed companies.¹¹⁰ With Facebook, marketing techniques have entered individual privacy on a new level, with advertisements, being based on private messages about their lives people share with friends, and presented accordingly. Smart phones with satellite connections make it increasingly difficult to escape the digital life and its imperative of accessibility. As the digital world is constantly accessible for us, reversely we have to be constantly accessible to it, be it for work (short messaging service or emails) or in our free time (Facebook).

Assheuer (2012) and Meckel (2011) expresses scepticism concerning the new interconnectedness. They fear that the lack of true contact leads to misunderstandings and – subsequently – aggressiveness. They are among the many “cyber-sceptics” critical of the Internet and digital consumerism who claim that the Internet has made life worse.¹¹¹ It directly takes much free time (leisure time) and substitutes our real-life occupations with consumerist pseudo-occupations. Many of these pseudo-occupations are particularly tempting because they simulate a successful life.¹¹² This simulation includes friendships and connections (through Facebook), as well as illusionary successes by overcoming obstacles and being a hero in online video games. Through a constant flooding with commercials it (at least sometimes) can create an artificial need for a constantly new stream of products with the promise of higher social status and – essentially – happiness

¹¹⁰ According to their 2012 annual record, Google Inc. (now named “Alphabet”) had a revenue of \$50.18 billions, with an effective profit of \$12.76 billions.

¹¹¹ Ulrich Beck in this context coined the term “risk society” (Beck 1986). Miriam Meckel (2011) writes about “Weltkurzsichtigkeit” [global near sightedness]. She claims that digital algorithms lead to a diminished perception of the world and our fellow human beings.

¹¹² Of course it is philosophically difficult to distinguish between a “simulated” online life and a “true” offline one. The naïve view would be that “there simply is something different about a direct conversation”. However, what this “difference” consists in is difficult to ascertain. But there are several differences: In an online conversation, parts of the other's body language and expression are missed, even if the conversation is over Skype. There are several activities and connections one cannot do together over the Internet, such as sports or giving each other a hug. A philosophically interesting aspect would be that in a chat room conversation, I am unable to discern whether I am conversing with a true person or a Turing machine. Another ethical difference pointed out by Silverstone (2008) is the possibility to switch off the machine, thereby ending the conversation unilaterally.

(Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012, 208ff.). Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012) deliver an Aristotelian criticism of modern consumption culture fuelled by advertisement. For them, advertisement leads to a *rat race*, meaning that the individual gets the impression of needing to earn more to buy more to improve his social status. This – of course – contrasts with the Aristotelian notion of the finite utility of money. Once one's comfortable living is assured, one should use the time for leisure and contemplation.

New possibilities of connecting people with each other through the Internet may make donating – and maybe even acting for the poor – easier, but we should be sceptical about this, as also on the Internet there is no one-to-one communication (in the sense of Habermas), and the medium Internet carries a high risk of miscommunication and escapism. It may have its uses as a platform, but it cannot overcome the underlying psychological and political biases and problems.

While these reflections on the possibilities and limitations of the Internet does not concern development aid *per se*, it can point towards new difficulties charitable organisations may face in fundraising and point towards the answer of the puzzle of the persistence of poverty in the face of abundance. In the Internet, too, charitable organisations have to compete for our attention and our resources with the marketing divisions of companies who have more money available, as their publicity is profit-oriented. Also, as the global poor are not part of our social group of reference, we do not compare our relative wealth with their poverty, but rather with the perfect world of advertisement surrounding us in the media, thus finding our own inadequate.

Damning the new media is certainly not the right reaction. Rather, I agree with Roger Silverstone's (2008) thesis, put forward in his book *Mediapolis*, that the digital world should be seen analogously to the environment. Both provide us with necessary and useful resources, but can be polluted by deliberate or imprudent misuse. As the Internet is a relatively new medium, new ethical challenges present themselves to whom we need to

find answers in academia as well as in everyday life.

Silverstone's mediapolis¹¹³ has several differences to Habermas, in which “only reason, and a singular and narrow kind of reason at that, determines the viability of discourse and the possibility of action” (Silverstone 2008, 59). Rather, as Dayan (2007, 114) analyses,

“The mediapolis is a site in which “communication is multiple and multiply inflected. It is open to the circulation of images and narratives.” It is also open to a characteristic combination of moral and dramaturgic concerns. Mediapolis is an Arendtian space of appearance: “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me.””

To be able to live together in this shared mediapolis, ethical guidelines are necessary. For Silverstone, the main virtue that should be cultivated in digital media is *hospitality* (2008, 210ff.). We should allow every citizen the possibility of expressing his opinion and of entering, the Habermasian inspiration is evident, into a global dialogue. The virtue of hospitality addresses the problem of fragmented audiences and tries to overcome it.

Another virtue that should be cultivated in the new media is *proper distance* (*ibid.*, 78). Reversely, improper distance is its vice.¹¹⁴ To have the proper distance we need to avoid getting either too close to the other person (the “immorality of sameness or identity”) or rejecting him or her (the “immorality of difference”), but to find the accurate or correct mean. It is important to note that Silverstone understands distance not only as a geographical or social category, but also as a moral one. In rejecting the “other” persons, we create an “us versus them”-mentality, defining ourselves as a group and excluding the

¹¹³ Silverstone's mediapolis is not a physical location. As an organization of the people acting and speaking together, it transcends geographical boundaries (Dayan 2007, 114 and Silverstone 2008, 54f).

¹¹⁴ Arguably Singer commits this vice with his example of the drowning child.

others, often to the point of dehumanising, even demonising them (*ibid.* 115).¹¹⁵ The “other” person then becomes the “enemy”, often bereft of his or her humanity, and is regarded as something alien and evil: “vermin” that is depicted as to be feared and “exterminated” to protect the community (cp. Steuter and Willis 2009, 13).¹¹⁶ Ultimately, the “us versus them” dichotomy may be used to legitimatise violence against other groups. Silverstone identifies this tendency as inherently dangerous, as it is eliminationist.¹¹⁷

In Silverstone's view, the perceived special moral status of the USA permits them to stylise themselves as the forces for good, while their enemies are regarded as terrorists that should be targeted (Silverstone 2008, 95). Silverstone (*ibid.*, 125) calls this a *rhetoric of violence* and a *rhetoric of pride*. It violates the requirement of hospitality and degrades oneself and the other one. Rather, we should always accept the other one, even in the difficult case of terrorism, as human being and consequently someone accessible to reason, so Silverstone.

On the other end of the scale there is the immorality of identity, which implies that we deny the other a distinct identity to our own. We then see him as part of our group, so close to us that he becomes indistinguishable from ourselves. This phenomenon is quite frequently used in charity appeals by INGOs. We are invited to identify with young Mohammed (12) and his dream of becoming a doctor, and his pain becomes our pain. However, as Silverstone argues, by identifying with the “victims”, we deny them their own identity and their own voices. He or she becomes a part of us and we imagine knowing what he or she will say and what he or she needs, thus patronising him or her. Silverstone's ideas on media and morality will serve as orientation points for the analysis of the KONY 2012 video in the following chapter.

¹¹⁵ As seen in chapter 2, we humans, just as our primate ancestors and cousins, tend towards this behaviour of group building and indifference or in extreme cases even violence towards outsiders.

¹¹⁶ Nazi propaganda prior to the holocaust or the 1994 Tutsi genocide by the Hutu in Rwanda are sad examples here.

¹¹⁷ Phyllis Bernard (2009, 174) discusses the term eliminationism in the context of a conflicted society, tracing it back to Daniel Goldhagen's book “Hitler's willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust” (1996). Bernard's article on conflict and communication is worth reading as she adapts lessons learned from developing countries in Africa to the situation in Oklahoma (USA).

However, some research paints a more positive picture of digital media. A study by the French *Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management* indicates that, unlike television, the Internet can increase personal happiness and life satisfaction (Pénard, Poussing, and Suire 2011). And as the Arab spring and even the German flood of 2013 show, the Internet can serve as rallying point for political and humanitarian causes. The new technology therefore offers new connecting possibilities between the global “North” and “South”, as well as within the countries. The Internet also enables NGOs to denounce injustices worldwide, such as the working conditions in garment factories in Bangladesh (Mahr 2013, 30f.), and donations for poverty relief are increasingly collected online.

On the receiving end of development aid, Internet and mobile phone technology offer new possibilities in reducing poverty. One could argue that the new products needed to use these media will serve as one more way of redistributing money from the (poor) consumer to the rich producer (or telecommunications company). But it seems that there are some rather positive effects in developing communities, e.g. by creating new business opportunities or by improving livelihoods via the use of mobile phones. For example mobile phones with Internet access can provide farmers with more precise weather forecasts and merchants with the prices of their goods in nearby villages (Aker and Mbiti 2010). It might also be argued that Internet and mobile phones can help combat corruption. They do so mainly indirectly by providing a new and relatively independent media platform, where for example bloggers can communicate their suspicions and show their evidence to a larger public. A more direct approach is being tested in Kenya, where mobile phones are used by health care personnel to improve the provision of and to minimize the theft of medical equipment (Chêne 2012).

Although Habermas' criticism basically rings true, the Internet is not only a place of fragmented audiences, but it can also be a place where people from different backgrounds unite. And while the Internet population is indeed fragmented, this may be less the case

than with traditional media, as London School of Economics researcher Charlie Beckett (2012) analyses in tradition of Roger Silverstone. He uses the example of KONY 2012 to consider the two main differences between the Internet as information provider and traditional mass media.

First of all, it is global in a new way. While before it was possible to see certain television channels via satellite in every corner of the world, the channel still had to collect their information through a network of journalists, and the TV channels had a country of origin, meaning that they focused on a certain geographical area and favoured certain political views.

The other difference is that the flow of information is leaving the traditional “linear and hierarchical” field of news media (Beckett 2012, 7f.). Before, Beckett explains, journalists and editors acted as “gatekeepers” to information. This meant, the public had only access to pre-selected and filtered information and opinions. Even if the goal was to provide information as neutral as possible, there were still limits to the quantity of information that could be provided as well as the need to finance the product, mainly through advertisements. News media reached the comfortable situation of a fourth estate that gave the public the facts and the forum where public opinion was formed. Other actors, for example charities, had to learn to function before this background. This means that charities had to learn how to arouse the media's attention so they could get their share of the public sphere.

Due to the Internet, the access to news and opinions is now much more direct. There has been a shift from the individual as merely news consumer to news producer (Beckett 2012, 19). It is now possible to read private opinions on political developments in a far away country in blogs. The Internet provides software that translates these messages into English, the new *lingua franca*, so that the language barrier is minimised. In the case of demonstrations, civil unrest, or war, images uploaded to the net and films on YouTube

can serve as testimony and help denounce the regimes or people responsible for human rights violations.¹¹⁸

Of course, this new medium can be influenced just as the old ones, if the goal is to get maximal attention. Due to the social network character of for example Facebook and YouTube, it is even easier to create a self-propagating message, if this is done with the necessary psychological acuteness. For the remainder of this chapter, one such example will be discussed, where a video from an INGO has “gone viral”: the KONY 2012 video. By this example, the challenges that Internet and social media pose to INGOs active in development aid will be attempted to demonstrate. A particular focus will be on the psychological mechanisms that are behind the success of social media public relations, especially in view of the problem of providing balanced information and good sustainable solutions – in contrast to gaining short term public attention and funds.

3.19. KONY 2012 – A Humanitarian Plea Goes Viral

“It has become much easier for us to be moved to action by sad and sentimental stories.”

Richard Rorty 1994, 134.

The 30-minute KONY 2012 video was released by the small INGO *Invisible Children* in 2012. It was the most successful one in a series of films produced by the organisation, the first being “Rough Cut” in 2004. The video deplores the situation in northern Uganda, where the rebel organisation “Lord Resistance Army” (LRA) had been fighting the Uganda government since the late 1980's, terrorizing the civilian population, and abducting children, using the boys as child soldiers and the girls as sex slaves (Le Sage 2011, 1). The

LRA is responsible for over 30.000 abductions, 100.000 lost lives and has forced 400.000

¹¹⁸ To give testimony in the case of human rights violations is a central concern of the organisation *Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)*. Besides the medical help they supply, the *witnessing*, as it is called by the organisation, is an integral part of this organisation's policy.

people to flee their homes in northern Uganda since 1986. The video is named after the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony.

Meanwhile, the importance of the LRA has been diminishing, as the rebel group had to leave Uganda and then roamed the countryside somewhere in the borderlands of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 17ff.).

In less than a week after its release, the video gained over 105 million views, being shared on Facebook and endorsed by celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey (Beckett 2012, 15 and Kanczula, 2012). Luis Moreno Ocampo, first prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, features prominently in the video, his testimony being used to boost the message's credibility. On the positive side, one can gratify the video with making development aid no longer an elite or leftist topic. The video at least led to an increased awareness of the situation in Uganda, especially in young people who perhaps never even had heard of the country before (cp. Cavanagh 2012 and Gregory 2012). While many commentators voiced their scepticism, one might argue that the mere fact of there being a discussion on the issue is an improvement. It has been targeted by critics for reinforcing stereotypes¹¹⁹ about Africa and Africans (Waldorf 2012 and Drumbl 2012), oversimplifying Uganda's problems, encouraging “clicktivism” or “slacktivism”¹²⁰, and misinforming – to the point of manipulating – the public (Cavanagh 2012). Most importantly, the organisation *Invisible Children* has failed to live up to their own goal, which was capturing Joseph Kony by the end of 2012. Notably, the organisation talks about capturing Kony, while actually meaning:

¹¹⁹ The word “stereotype” originates from the Greek words *stereos* and *typos*, meaning something along the lines of a “solid model”, and was later designating “a metal plate used to print pages” (Schneider 2004, 8). The term is quite difficult to define, as there are positive as well as negative stereotypes which may be more or less accurate. I therefore propose Schneider's (2004, 24) neutral definition of “*qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people*”. In the context of the KONY 2012 video, we find multiple stereotypes of Ugandans. We are presented with the suffering, helpless, and passive majority of the “victims” who are contrasted with the violent, sex-obsessed and evil “perpetrator” Joseph Kony.

¹²⁰ “Slacktivism” is defined by Evgeny Morozov as a “term to describe feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact. It gives those who participate in 'slacktivist' campaigns an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group” (Morozov 2009, also cp. Drumbl 2012). This could be seen in the context of Sartre's *mauvaise foi emotionnelle*. The problem of slacktivism will be discussed later. “Clicktivism” refers to the same effect while focusing on the action of “clicking” the “share” or “like” button when viewing online content.

Enabling the Ugandan military to capture him. Their main tool in this battle is to petition the US government to continue their effort of training the Ugandan military with 100 military advisors. The video continually gives the impression that the USA are on the point of recalling their military advisors, however there was no such indication from an official source before the publication of the video. On the contrary, from a strategical point of view this was unlikely. As this indicates, and as we will see below, the accusations against the INGO *Invisible Children* are at least partly justified.

The first interesting question is, why KONY 2012 was so successful in gaining public attention. Applying the previously presented psychological mechanisms which influence donor behaviour, we can try to analyse and understand the video's success. It is important to note that we can only analyse the success *ex post*. Predicting whether or not a video will become a “hype”, a much viewed and shared phenomenon, is difficult if not impossible beforehand.¹²¹ Marketing departments of companies, as well as fundraisers from the third sector, are constantly trying to create such self-propagating messages. But while there are certain marketing techniques that can make a message successful, it is still impossible, and one might say fortunately so, to predict – and even less to plan – an Internet hype.¹²² In the following part of this chapter, it will be attempted to critically demonstrate that several of the aspects that made the video so successful are connected with the problems and final failure of the campaign.

“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come.” The KONY 2012 video starts with this quotation by Victor Hugo.¹²³ The music sets in and after some flickering images, we see the KONY 2012 logo, an inverted triangle, for the first time. The image fades and we are treated to a view of the earth from outer space.

“Right now, there are more people on Facebook than there were on the earth 200

¹²¹ Cp. Ancu, English, and Sweetser (2011) for one of the few studies on the appeal of viral videos, using Aristotelian rhetoric as theoretical background.

¹²² However, marketing departments are becoming increasingly efficient at mastering the technique, as showed the viral Ellen DeGeneres selfie marketing photo by Samsung at the 2014 Oscar ceremony.

¹²³ From *Histoire d'un Crime* (The History of a Crime) [written 1852, published 1877], Conclusion, ch. X. Transl. T. H. Joyce and A. Locker.

years ago”, the narrator Jason Russell, co-founder of *Invisible Children*, continues. “Humanity's greatest desire is to belong and to connect. And now we see each other, we hear each other.” We are shown messages of love from grandchildren to grandparents, a Haitian child being saved after the devastating 2010 earthquake, a motivational speech by a three-year-old bicycle adept and images of a woman hearing her voice for the first time due to a new medical treatment.

The tone of the video is already very much apparent. We are presented with a view of a beautiful world, a good world that has improved through the Internet, because now Kant's ideal of a world society that has grown so close together that “a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it”.

The video then introduces the topic of political activism and how the Internet has changed the possibilities in this sector, using the *arab spring* as an example. Jason Russell shows us the birth of his son Gavin, who has an important role representing the viewer throughout the video. The logic is simple: If a child can understand the problem of child soldiers in Uganda, so can the viewer, and if a child wants to act against this injustice, so should we (in the form of a *tu quoque* argument).¹²⁴ The use of little Gavin is quite ingenious from a marketing perspective and can help demonstrate several important philosophical arguments. For example, Russell comments the birth of his son with the words: “He didn't choose when or where he was born, but because he's here he matters.” The video contrasts the life of Gavin with the life of Jacob Acaye, a young Ugandan. Jacob's life is quite different from Gavin's, his childhood was marked by constant insecurity. He often did not have enough food, only primitive shelter, and there was the risk of being abducted and used as child soldier. A very emotional part of the video shows him crying when he tells the story of losing his brother to the LRA. Jacob stands as an example for the 30.000 children that have been abducted by the LRA during 25 years. This is further illustrated by a nightmarish collage of images that show an African child being roughly

¹²⁴ A psychologically effective argument, even if philosophically fallacious.

woken up and dragged from his bed by a pair of dark hands.

Behind this rather sensational comparison lies a solid philosophical argument: The egalitarian argument of equal opportunity. The video contrasts the position of Gavin, growing up in a country with good institutions, security, and economic possibilities, with the situation of Jacob, experiencing hunger, violence, and an uncertain future. The question arises: “What has Jacob done to deserve this?”

What distinguishes him from Gavin is simply geography: his place of birth and therefore his luck. The place of luck in morality has been discussed in connection with Rawls. The result was that the argument that luck should not account for basic capabilities and opportunities in life is very solid, and people who do reject it do so at a price. They negate a principle of common humanity in an era of global interconnection and common problems. Illustrating this moral problem with a concrete case, even if the video does this quite dramatically, can therefore be seen as legitimate.

As the example of Jacob is supposed to illustrate that conflicts and the resulting insecurity are a severe problem in developing countries, forcing many people to leave their homes and become refugees (Fearon and Laitin 2013). This in turn makes economic development difficult. Due to insecurity, individuals cannot invest in their future, as profitable farms or businesses can always be stolen or destroyed. Due to constant displacement, the accumulation of physical and human capital is difficult, and the gains from investing in it are unsure (Guisan and Exposito 2008). External capital, for example through development aid, will be difficult to come by, and it is often lost or diverted in conflict. It is therefore legitimate to call this out as a moral evil, against which something should be done. However, the video artfully avoids mentioning Joseph Kony's diminished influence and his fleeing from northern Uganda.

Using Jacob as representative for the 30.000 children abducted leaves the video open to Silverstone's critique of improper closeness. The boy's tragic fate does stir our pity,

and we are encouraged to think about our own family and what it would mean to lose any of them so early in life. We are shocked by young Jacob's statement that he would willingly pay with his life if he could be reunited with his brother. But while this emotional state of dismay motivates us to action, it is less conducive to reasoning and reflection. Ten years later, Jacob will be grown up. As an adult, he will hardly get any attention at all, while one might imagine that an analysis from his perspective would be crucial to understanding the situation in northern Uganda today.

The video continues with the commitment stated of the director Russell that Joseph Kony should be stopped. Jason Russell says that we are now at a stage of human history, when it is possible for individuals to act against injustices, even if they happen in a far away country. And he will tell the viewer “exactly how we can do it”.

From a philosophical viewpoint, Jason Russell claims that Kant's cosmopolitan ideal, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, has been realised by now due to the technical innovation of social media. But his claim goes even further. In analogy to Singer, he postulates that an individual can do something effective against this specific case of far-away injustice right now. However, in a move that would be seen as illegitimate by the two philosophers and judged as morally reprehensible by Silverstone, Russell implicitly constructs an image of Joseph Kony as the ultimate evil. In the simplified world-view of *Invisible Children*, it is evil individuals like Kony that keep the world from being the just and beautiful place shown in the introduction of the video. But this misrepresents the reasons for poverty in Uganda in general, and it ignores the underlying institutional problems.

The video also sets a time limit for a successful intervention (“Expires December 31st 2012”). In hindsight, this may not have been a good decision, as the continuing evasion of Kony up to the time when this thesis is written points towards the limited effectiveness of *Invisible Children's* efforts. From a more short-term view, the setting of a time limit is

psychologically very shrewd. It creates a sense of urgency. Together with the postulation of the individual viewer's capability to intervene, this helps surmount the dispersion of responsibility-effect discussed in chapter 2.5.

The video continues with a presentation of results of *Invisible Children's* efforts. This is the only part of the video in which an adult Ugandan is given a voice, but it is reduced to praising *Invisible Children* for providing education and an early warning radio network. More relevant information is missing in the video – e.g. how much money did *Invisible Children* collect for Uganda altogether, what was it used for in detail, what could be achieved for Ugandan children, especially former child soldiers, etc.¹²⁵ What is not mentioned is that only a very small part of all donations given to *Invisible Children* in 2012 went to aid for projects or programmes in Uganda (Invisible Children 2011).

The film finishes with motivating the audience to share the video with others. The wish is that an army of young people spends time watching the video, cover the night, buy the kit¹²⁶ offered in the video, and pressure the American government to continue with their military support of the Ugandan government by sending 100 military advisors, which – *Invisible Children* claims – will only be stationed there, if the American public is aware of the LRA atrocities. Yet there had been no mention of the US government planning to recall those military advisors before the video was released (Finnström 2012).

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the organisation pressures the US government to send military advisors to Uganda to train the local military and enable them to capture Joseph Kony for the International Criminal Court in Den Hague, as ironically this is an authority that the United States of America do not recognise for themselves.

Another sad irony is that the makers of KONY 2012 call for US military support of

¹²⁵ Some of the information missing in the video can be obtained under <http://invisiblechildren.com/get-involved/fundraise/>. There is a downloadable credsheet.pdf entitled “Proof that our efforts are working” on which Charity Navigator is quoted saying “We give the charity 4 out of a possible 5 stars for its Financial Health. It spends upwards of 80% of its budget on its programmes and services. As such, *Invisible Children* is actually outperforming most charities in our database in terms of how it allocates its expenses.”

¹²⁶ A package consisting of campaign buttons, posters, bracelets and stickers


the Ugandan government, whose quasi-dictatorial President Yoweri Museveni was himself a rebel warlord in the 1980's, allegedly using child soldiers himself (Dodge and Raundalen 1991, 54). In his defence it must be mentioned that he helped overthrow the infamous rulers Idi Amin (1979) and Milton Obote (1985), both guilty of heinous crimes against humanity (cp. The Economist 2013, 60 and Dodge and Raundalen 1991). Museveni, nicknamed the “Gentleman Farmer” due to his frequent and long stays at his south Ugandan cattle farm, has been Uganda's President since 1986 and maintains a strict control of the government (The Economist 2013, 59f.). Corruption and inefficiency run rampant, especially in the military, which goes some way in explaining their inefficiency in capturing rebel groups such as Joseph Kony's (Cavanagh 2012).

Last year, an estimated US \$100 million of government funds were misappropriated in Uganda, and while oil was discovered in 2006, refineries still remain to be built to this day. To ensure his power, Museveni has placed members of his family and loyal supporters in the government, while the “democratic affirmations” of his rule are a farce (*ibid.*). When he came to power, Museveni was hailed as an example of a new generation of African leaders that cared about their countries and democracy. Yet, although he remains popular, he has, as “The Economist” (2013, 60) puts it, overstayed his welcome. So it is difficult to perceive him as a flawless hero. This probably goes some way to explain why he doesn't appear in the KONY 2012 video and why support for his government is thematised indirectly through support for the Ugandan military by US military advisors. A cynic might add that an old African man simply has no appeal to a young Western public, and the video instead concentrates on white attractive Jason Russell and innocent Jacob and Gavin as protagonists.

3.20. How to Appeal Successfully in the Digital Area and How to Do so Sustainably

Why did the KONY 2012 video work so well in capturing viewer's attention? Different analyses of the video tend to focus either on narrative techniques or the expert use of social media (cp. Beckett 2012, Gregory 2012, and Finnström 2012). Yet, the success of the video can be best explained by combining content and context. Concerning content, the video makes expert use of emotional scenes, capturing the viewer's attention and making him charitably disposed (cp. chapter 2). It also provides a strong narrative of “good vs. evil”, with the viewer assuming the role of the hero being called to save the innocent (cp. Gregory 2012 and Waldorf 2012). But the effect was only short-lived, as can be seen in the following statistics. *Invisible Children's* record revenues in 2012 were followed by a drastic decline in 2013 (and most probably the years henceforth). By 2014, the INGO had to drastically reduce its team size and investments with “lasting effects on the many communities and students to whom it committed and whose lived experiences it aims to represent” (Sebastian and Titeca 2014).

Table 1: Overview and Development of Invisible Children's Donation and Overall Income



Total Yearly Income (in \$US million)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
From General Donations	2.08	2.59	4.68	8.69	4.32	2.97	0.90
Overall Net	7.84	8.25	12.92	26.49	4.95	6.22	2.79

(Source: Invisible Children Financial Records 2010-2016, www.invisiblechildren.com/financials/).

It has to be noted that very little of the money raised was actually invested locally in Uganda. According to the organisations annual report, as little as 37 per cent of the money raised went into the construction of schools and a radio early warning system (Invisible Children 2011). Invisible Children justified this by making “raising awareness” their primary mission. It is a dangerous trend in the Non-Profit sector when self-publicity and fundraising masquerades as “raising awareness”.

Concerning context, we are reminded of McLuhan's famous saying that “the medium is the message”. As experts on the use of social media, the makers of KONY 2012 were very much aware of how a video can be shared and viewed easily throughout the Facebook and YouTube community. Therefore their first plea is for the viewer to share the video on those platforms. As Waldorf (2012, 469) shows, KONY 2012 innovatively “repackages humanitarianism as commodity activism, human rights militancy, and clicktivism” (cp. Drumbl 2012).

An essential part of the success of the video is that it gives the audience the feeling

that they matter, that they are powerful, and that they can do something to help. Instead of leaving the viewer with despair, as the traditional marketing techniques of INGOs and many news reports tend to do, it gives the viewer the feeling that his or her engagement matters and that he or she can help improve the world. It provides an easy access to the campaign with barely any entrance barriers. By watching the video and sharing it on Facebook, the viewer has already become a supporter of the campaign. A campaign that, the video claims, will “change the course of human history”. The strategy is simple: The organisation *Invisible Children* will try to reach as large an audience as possible and then use public pressure to get Western governments, specifically that of the United States, to involve in the capture of Joseph Kony. Once a critical mass of followers has been reached, the message goes viral. Both storytelling and social media techniques combine exceptionally well.

The video also offers a concrete description of action. There is no immediate or direct call to donate money. Instead, the video presents the viewer with the possibility “to take action” by buying “kits”, consisting of campaign buttons, posters, bracelets and stickers (as mentioned above). This is known as commodity activism. Psychologically, this makes a difference, as the de facto donor has the impression of receiving something for his money.

The idea of providing a bracelet is not new. Originally used by the AIDS-awareness movement, the selling of bracelets reached development aid during the British “Make Poverty History” movement in 2005. White bands were used by the campaigners and affiliates to show support for this campaign, a strategy that was very successful (Sireau 2009).

Commodity activism is very effective. As we have seen in chapter 2, donating is motivated by a complex mixture of self-interest and altruism. Providing the donor with a consumer good “in exchange” increases the willingness to donate, as it combines the two

motivations. It also allows for the donor to show his support of a campaign publicly, making it possible for him to integrate his humanitarian support in his lifestyle and hereby to receive prestige in his peer group. For a more profound critique of commodity activism, see Darnton and Kirk (2011) and Mukherjee and Banet-Wieser (2012), who regard this as a playful form of consumerism, contrasting to a true and honest involvement with the problem in question.

The narration employed is as effective as it is dangerous. The symbolism of the KONY 2012 video is especially problematic. In chapter 3 of his *Mediapolis*, Silverstone discusses the role of *evil* in the media. He identifies (and criticizes) a tendency in the conservative American rhetoric to invoke the evilness of their enemies. Many European viewers, when they see the inverted triangle and the army of youngsters raising their fists towards the sky in the KONY 2012 video, will be reminded of fascism and the novel “The Wave” by Todd Strasser (1981). Waldorf (2012, 469) refers to this as “military activism”. The problem of these polarising or Manichean world-views is that they simplify a complex reality into a comic book story.¹²⁷ The video does therefore not only present a single identified victim. It makes use of this psychological mechanism in a second way, too: It presents us with a single identified perpetrator.

This does not mean that the world would not be a better place with Joseph Kony in prison. Indeed, it would be, as it would be with many other warlords, dictators, or other “immoral individuals” behind bars. However, believing that simply eliminating these individuals will solve the problem is at best short sighted, at worst in itself immoral. It is short-sighted because it simplifies complex social and economical problems, claiming that the removal of an individual can solve them. Eliminating a warlord or a criminal does in most cases not solve problems, it even may lead to new and bigger ones. In recent cases of removing dictators, the subsequent situation in countries such as Iraq or Libya shows that the situation after a military intervention can, to say the least, be very difficult for a

¹²⁷ *Star Wars* is actually mentioned in the video.

population.¹²⁸ In “Why Nations Fail” (2012), Acemoglu and Robinson note that without previously established democratic and just institutions, countries can easily become trapped in a vicious circle of unjust or even criminal leaders.

Some problems may appear more important than they are in reality, while less spectacular issues like malaria, safe drinking water, or education may suffer. Other problems are much more complex, such as trade justice, development countries' debts and the building of just international institutions (cp. Beckett 2012, 13). Simplifying and reducing the problem to one which is solvable with just a military intervention is no durable solution.

Even more problematic is the use of stereotypes in the video. The young Ugandans are portrayed as passive and helpless (Cottle and Nolan 2007), while the perpetrators are presented in a “colonialist 'Heart-of-Darkness' stereotype of primitiveness and religious fundamentalism” (Finnström 2012). “Images of child soldiers and mutilated faces are used to build sentiment to evoke pity and cause public action” (Chouliaraki 2010). In consequence, the West, supported by a “rhetoric of benevolence” (cp. Pogge 2010a and Smith 2009), comes as a superior saviour. The implication of this portrayal, although aimed at creating proximity, further increases a notion of remoteness by separating the spectator and the sufferer into “us” and “them” categories.

An aspect put forward by Boltanski (2007, 196ff.) is a psychological phenomenon called *pitié sadique* (sadistic pity). This would mean that the spectator may sadistically enjoy watching human beings suffering. This idea is inspired by de Sade's view that humanity's state of nature is characterized by constant violence and suffering – much more so than in the Hobbesian model, in which the “war of all against all” is (arguably) more a threatening potential than a constant reality, and people's conflicts arise from competing for resources and from contrary views. According to de Sade, there are not few people who

¹²⁸ Historical evidence from the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition of several Latin-American countries to democracy shows that reform or revolution from within has a much better chance of creating a stable and peaceful society (Cenoweth and Stephan 2011).

actually enjoy the (contemplation of) suffering of others.¹²⁹

People who enjoy seeing other people suffer do exist, but are the exception.¹³⁰ If it were different, no community would be possible, as states Boltanski (2007, 206ff.). Moreover, sadistic emotions are in contradiction to Silverstone's media ethics. Yet the uncomfortable question remains, to what extent the audience of a report on a humanitarian catastrophe may be driven to action or to donate money by sensationalism or sadistic contemplation.

It would have been useful for the appeal to include more African voices in the video. More interacting with Ugandan youths could have helped to implement a real exchange and a true connection, to build trust and gain a knowledge of their real wants, wishes, and needs. Several African organisations are acting in this way and so trying to combat the prevailing damaging stereotypes of Africa. E.g. the organisation “Mama Hope” has published a video called “African Men. Hollywood stereotypes”, in which they mock Hollywood for presenting African men as obsessed with violence.¹³¹

Invisible Children has tried to act similarly by publishing a follow-up video, which, however, was much less successful. They were certainly overwhelmed by the unexpected success of their KONY 2012 video and all its consequences. Yet, this implies a worrying conclusion: It seems that the goal to gain attention and make money through fundraising and the goal to really help the poor are not connected, and an organisation may very well succeed in the one goal without reaching the other one. The combination of sensationalism and short attention span may mean that we will always be too late to help and too bored to

¹²⁹ To the authors knowledge, knowledge, there has not yet been any research covering these hypotheses, perhaps due to their critical nature.

¹³⁰ Cp. International Handbook of Cognitive and Behavioural Treatments for Psychological Disorders, edited by V. E. Caballo, New York Premium Press 1998

¹³¹ “Africa for Norway” has done something similar in calling Africans to aid their fellow humans living in the unforgiving Scandinavian cold, thereby ironically reversing the rhetoric of aid to depict the problems behind it. (“Africans unite to save Norwegians from dying of frostbite. You too can donate your radiator and spread some warmth!” cp. <http://www.africafornorway.no/>) However, the situation here is unfortunately doubly ironic, as behind Africa for Norway is the Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund, financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the Norwegian Children and Youth Council. A critic could find it deplorable that Norwegian development workers are helping Africans to empower and to develop a better image.

prevent? Ertharin Cousin, head of the United Nations World Food Programme, referred to this problem in a 2013 interview in *Time Magazine*:

“The global community tends to invest during times of crisis and emergency. We saw it in Haiti. What we need is a recognition that in order to change things, we need to give people the ability to feed themselves. But the media don't cover these kinds of stories. They don't cover the opportunity – they cover the crisis.”

To some extent, this is a result of the way fundraising is being done and the way people tend to react – both of which was already discussed before in this thesis. Many NGOs try to act more professionally here. Most NGOs of a certain size now have a public relations office. As Habermas (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1964, 55) put it (already half a century ago):

“The very words “public relations work” (Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit sic.) betray the fact that a public sphere must first be arduously constructed case by case, a public sphere which earlier grew out of the social structure.”

From Habermas' idea about public relations work follows consequently that the NGO step by step should change their ways. They should pay more attention to the way how they construct their own public sphere in the field of fundraising – towards more rational and effective help and away from feeding the sensationalist tendencies of parts of their prospective or anticipated donors.

In his landmark publication, Boltanski (2007, 45ff.) severely and in various ways criticises a strategy used by INGOs he calls “*payer et parler*” (French for “*to pay and to speak (out)*”). Concerning *payer*, he maintains that there is no direct link between the

person one has perceived as suffering and one's donation. Indeed my donation will not be used only for Mohammed (12), whose photo appears in the media or the INGO website, but will be used by the NGO of my choice to try to help people in the region. But this criticism seems void, if we accept that the person seen in the media serves just as an example. In relation to cognitive limits, the impossibility for individuals to see and to be concerned with every single suffering individual's tragedy has been established. To do so would require an impossible amount of time and quite probably cause depression.

A possible simplification is the statistical representation of the suffering. This also has been dealt with before in this thesis. Yet, unfortunately, statistics are too abstract to animate us into action and lack an emotional impact. The “singularity of the victim” (Boltanski 2007, 47) is therefore nothing else but the previously discussed psychological effect of the single identifiable victim. This is why media and INGOs can legitimately present one suffering victim as an example of the many. The choice of the right example is an important responsibility for INGOs and for international media as well. They would be required to show only examples that are typical and representative.

There is a worrying tendency not to live up to this responsibility. Polman (2008) challenges the international media and humanitarian aid agencies in this respect. As discussed above, to increase the emotional impact and therefore the attractiveness of their story, journalists tend to over-dramatise the situation and to use “donor darlings” (or “hunger babies”), often children, who suffer a particularly tragic fate (and not a representative one). INGOs do so because they want to increase donations. This leads to a distorted image of the local reality. The consequence can be an abundance of donations for some parts of the worlds, while – as likewise discussed above – “quiet” disasters that lack media attention (or the “right” pictures or videos) get very little or no help at all. For donor attention is no less fickle than media attention (Chouliaraki 2010).

Not only press photos and videos, but also the arts have a very important role to

play in the combat against poverty and political injustice. Indeed, often artists are better in shaking up the public's conscience than a scientist or a politician and recent studies confirm that reading improves empathy and understanding of others (Kidd and Castano 2013). The writer Victor Hugo for example, who was quoted at the beginning of the KONY 2012 video, was a true fighter against political injustice and poverty (for example *Les Misérables* is a poignant critique of the 19th century French penal system and drastically shows the effects of poverty on individuals), similar things can be said about many painters (Picasso's *Guernica* as one of the most impressive arguments against war) or cinematographers (*City of God*, *About Smith*, *Last King of Scotland* for the history of Uganda). Another example would be Charles Dickens who advocated heavily for the poor and presented their lives in works of fiction that influenced the moral imagination of his large readership, e.g. in his novels "Oliver Twist" (1839) and "Bleak House" (1850).

As we have learnt, among others, from Singer (1981) and Shermer (2008), we are evolutionary programmed to value in-group and family members over distant outsiders. But there seem to be ways art can help us overcome those distances. Shermer (2008) demonstrates this with the example of the 2002 comedy drama *About Smith*. In this film, Jack Nicholson plays a retiree who has to come to terms with his wife's death, his daughter's marriage, and a general feeling of uselessness. After viewing a late night "Plan USA"-plea, he decides to sponsor a foster child in Tanzania.¹³² He then receives an information package, including a photo of his foster child named Ndugu Umbo. Schmidt writes various letters to Ndugu, telling him about his life, his feelings of dissatisfaction and loneliness. In a final letter before driving to his daughter's wedding, Schmidt questions his life, lamenting that he will soon be dead, that his life has made no difference to anyone, and that eventually it will be as if he had never existed at all. As Schmidt returns, there is pile of mail waiting for him. Among many advertisements, there is also a letter from

Tanzania. It is from a nun who writes that Ndugu is still illiterate, but appreciates Schmidt's

¹³² Unfortunately, the form of this plea is very similar to the "poverty pornography" criticised in this thesis.

letters (read to him) and financial support very much. A painting drawn by Ndugu is enclosed, showing two smiling stick figures, one large and one small, holding hands on a sunny day. The film ends with Schmidt weeping in delight.

This emotional ending can to a certain extent explain the success of many child-sponsorship organisations (Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge 2013 and Yuen 2008). That children are especially potent in fundraising was tried to show in several previous parts of this thesis. Shermer admits that the scene – although in a film and therefore fictitious – encouraged himself to take a foster child.

The problem of distance between donor and bestowed (or receiver of the donation) – as well as the problem of the scattering of donations among many receivers (i.e. not benefiting directly the child in the picture) – can be avoided if, as is common practise, donors are made aware that their sponsorship does not only benefit the individual child itself, but partly goes towards the benefit of his surroundings or entourage, e.g. the child's whole village.¹³³ Under these premises, the donor, once he already has made the decision to support it, probably will understand that the child he wants to help needs a functioning surrounding to grow up, including a well for clean water, a school, etc.

Journalism can fulfil a similar role as the arts. It can detect, analyse, and report on and so expose inhuman working conditions, human rights abuse, cases of political injustice and corruption. Reports on human rights abuse can shed public attention on local human rights activists and so help to guarantee their safety. Negative side-effect can be the reinforcement of stereotypes, and the raising of strong emotions, when journalists present the good story that thrills the audience.

¹³³ More on the effect of direct cash transfers in the following part.

Conclusion: Why an Exclusively Emotional Approach Alone Cannot Solve the Problem

Part 3 of this thesis is entitled “Why and when do human beings help each other?” In this context, there was reflection on altruism and cooperation. It has been shown that while human beings are capable of altruism, it is mainly limited to family members, friends and acquaintances. Empathy towards others may be increased by establishing an, even arbitrary connection, but there are limits to these techniques. It seems as though empathy and altruism are finite resources. Finally, it has been shown that donating is a very intuitive and spontaneous act and there are several biases that limit a rational approach here.

In the preceding chapter results of moral psychology were used to situate the concept of charity in the context of development aid. Joshua Greene (2007) and Jonathan Haidt (2001) present evidence that our moral emotions, such as anger, disgust, sympathy, or charity, can be triggered by certain situations, which means that we can be manipulated, and that our rational influence on these emotions is minimal. Moral psychologist Joshua Greene, inspired by David Hume, has proven empirically that our empathy is strongest in cases which we perceive as “up close and personal”. When applying these findings to development aid, the question occurs if we are not trying to solve a complex global problem with unsuitable instruments (cp. Innerarity 2011). As noted by Ainslie (2007), the influence of emotions in the field of economics has been underestimated, with severe consequences. In sub-chapters 3.7.–3.13. several additional biases displayed by donors were identified such as attribution of blame and overemphasising with a single identifiable victim.

The problems of global poverty are constant and on a large scale. In contrast, in chapter 3.2. and 3.5. it has been argued that the amount of resources available to altruistic projects is limited. INGOs then have to compete for limited resources for their projects. In

an economically rational world, a number of disinterested INGOs would compete for these resources via their results. However, this does not happen. Rather, to get the maximum resources possible, INGOs use marketing techniques that exploit our emotional response to suffering.¹³⁴ As was tried to show by several examples, with a focus on the KONY 2012 campaign, INGOs increase their income by the use of shocking pictures of starving children or by getting support from celebrities. Larger and established organisations have a natural advantage here.

In the case that development aid is not financed by INGOs, but by governments, the politicians involved must see how they can “sell” this engagement best to their voters and how they can convince the media that their support of developing countries corresponds to national interests. The charitable nature of development aid (instead of a political or rational basis) is a major problem and may prevent long-term solutions. Olson (2000, 2ff.) notes that in a vicious circle, the persistence of poverty and the lack of perceived outcomes lead to passivity and despair of the donors.

Basing development aid on public opinion carries the risk of short-sighted campaigns that are oriented on thrill and spectacle rather than long-term results. Therefore manipulable public opinion should carry less weight in the distribution of aid. If you want to obtain results that are effective and sustainable, you have to rely on evaluation, reflection, and rationality. Political action towards the creation of fair international institutions is even more important.

Donors care little about efficiency, and if they care, they tend to focus on irrelevant factors such as overhead or a credible spokesperson. So, aid money is at least partly distributed according to unfair and manipulable heuristics and not according to need or efficiency. When no compatriots are touched, it takes “hunger babies” or “donor darlings” to get attention (Polman 2008, 77ff.). Singer recognizes this, but thinks we can surmount these difficulties by creating a “culture of giving”. This possibility will be further discussed

¹³⁴ They also have to compete with other causes, such as national poverty relief, support for the sick, animal rights, and with the efforts made by religious organisations.

below. Distance and nationality do limit the voluntariness to aid distant suffering strangers. I agree with Peter Singer that the scope of human suffering in contrast with Western “affluence” is unacceptable, as the disparity of living conditions is abysmal.¹³⁵ However, I remain highly sceptical of the solution he proposes for world poverty. The quantity and nature of the limitations to our donation would require a complete change of the way we think about charity. And these are not the only problems. In the following I will attempt to highlight the problems of aid guided by donor opinion and interests for recipient countries. Moreover, I will try to discuss the question: What role does efficiency play in donation decision-making?

The idealism of authors such as Singer is admirable. However, the question remains whether this idealism is not based on too much optimism. Both authors' advocacy to increase and improve fundraising techniques, sounds a bit like “we have the technology”. Their optimism is twofold. Firstly, what can be accomplished by professionalising fundraising and making use of psychological research. Secondly, what can be accomplished with the funds thus raised.

Peter Singer (2009a) proposes several solutions to increase donations, the use of identifiable victims (*ibid.*, 46ff. and 69f.), being upfront with our giving (*ibid.*, 64ff.), to use nudging (*ibid.*, 70ff.), and collectively challenging the norm of self-interest (*ibid.*, 73ff.). After the presentation of both the biases and limits of the charitable impulse, as well as the considerable concurrence in the market for charitable donations. For example the attempt to put pressure on people by speaking publicly about donating could simply lead to avoidance or even lying. If therefore the conclusion that more should be done about global poverty, as the ethical discussion in part 2 indicates, alternative options should be taken into account. Singer himself indirectly proposes such a solution, which is to direct as much

¹³⁵ With the approximately €405 monthly financial aid a German unemployed receives, plus free health care and housing support, he nominally has the same resources as a Mexican teacher working full-time. With the same money, in Somalia, where around 3.7 million people were endangered by famine due to a drought in East Africa in 2010 and again in 2016-2017, a family of ten can survive a whole month. It costs 10 € to feed a person in the Kenyan refugee camp Dadaab for a whole month (Carstens 2011 and Perry 2011).

as possible of existing donations towards more effective organisations. But what exactly means effectiveness and how can it be measured? A small glimpse into the comparatively minuscule sector of charity evaluators has already been given with a focus on fundraising techniques. What and how effectiveness can be measured in the context of global poverty will be discussed in the following and final part.

The discussion of effectiveness is important for another reason. Only if a strong enough proof of sustainable improvement of living conditions can be achieved, is it possible to argue for non-voluntary measures such as taxation to benefit the global poor in combination with a strong ethical requirement. Unless eliminating poverty is a problem that actually can be solved by financial means, calls for donations or taxation are not justifiable, if not we have to ask ourselves if we do not owe them something different (Wenar 2011b). For example if the theory of Neo-Malthusianism, which will be presented in the next part, any financial support directed towards developing countries would simply lead to an increase in population growth and thus suffering and environmental problems. It will be shown, that several measures indeed support the poor in a sustainable way, especially by reducing the burden of disease and by increasing the meagre income. To reduce the problem to a merely financial one, however, falls too short. It is more a political one, a question of empowerment.

4. Aid in Practise or How Effective is our Aid?

This final part of the thesis deals with what I consider the outstanding contribution of Peter Singer's and William MacAskill's work in the field of effective altruism. Namely their efforts and arguments directing potential donation towards effective organisations and projects in the context of international development aid.

In the previous part several problem with the concepts of “effective altruism” and “culture of giving” have been identified. It has been shown that determining a duty to donate is much less easy than a simple utilitarian framework may indicate and efforts to alleviate poverty should relate more to our a sense of common humanity and to reparation and avoidance of past, current and future harm. It has been argued that the ethical requirements of living an altruism focused life go to far and do not leave sufficient room for individual development. Additionally, what we would be morally obliged to do against global poverty has been contrasted with our actual and feasible behaviour. The psychological and sociological research on charitable behaviour discussed has shown that the reach of a donating movement as envisioned by Peter Singer is limited. Biases and entrenched attitudes limit the volition to donate, especially for causes of global poverty, which remains a fringe topic in the public debate. Charitable giving is championed by society, philosophy and all major religions and co-financed and supported by the state, but the number of donors remains quite constant over the years. An exponential growth of donors is therefore unlikely.

Even more important is thus the idea proposed by Singer (2009a and 2015) and MacAskill (2015a) to focus donations on effective organisations and projects. That we do not owe everything to the global poor, does not entail we do not owe them anything. Global injustices in which we as Western public and consumers are indirectly participating and simply that we can help, does make a convincing argument that we should dedicate a

certain amount towards helping, and helping effectively is both a rational and an ethical requirement.

A first problem here has been shown in the previous part, donors tend to be self-centred in their giving and fundraising professionals adapt to this situation. It has been shown that media and donor attention is fickle and easily seduced by attractive campaigns and fads. The considerable cost of fundraising campaigns means that larger organisations able to spend more have an advantage, not necessarily the most effective ones (Dogra 2012, 27ff. and Stern 2013a, 183ff. and 190f.).

The next part examines what donations and aid can actually do, both in the best and in the worst case. What can private and official development aid accomplish, which projects and interventions are effective? How much can be accomplished by International Development Organisations, both official and non-governmental, and what role do the different political actors and institutions involved play? An overview in the form of case studies helps develop an understanding of the current state of aid, with a focus on its effectiveness. This supports both Singer's and MacAskill's assessment that there is a huge gap between what our donations can achieve for others when used in a thoughtful manner and with minimal research effort.

Of course there are several difficulties when we talk about focusing donations towards effective organisations. First there are epistemological difficulties in defining what is meant by effectiveness. This translates into the difficulty of evaluating effectiveness in the development context practically due to lack of reliable information (Jerven 2009, 2012 and 2013), lack of local knowledge and unintended and unforeseen consequences (Wenar 2011b and Ramalingam 2013).

While, contrary to Singer and MacAskill hopes, these problems may be not be entirely solvable, it will be shown that a good enough approximation can be given, especially if it would be possible to implement a system of information exchange and

mutual learning on what works in international aid. Unfortunately, we are then confronted with the previously discussed problem of fads in aid and the media and a lack of respect and inclusion of the poor themselves in the development and implementation of solutions, due to them being donor-centred. Additionally, the problem of dependency and national interests not only dictates global trade, but unfortunately also development aid. To illustrate this and the accompanying tendency of development professionals and donors to repeatedly fall for “fads” and “hypes”, several examples will be discussed (cp. Glennie 2009, Hickel 2014, and Lauer and Lepenies 2015). The examples have been chosen because they represent a specific approach such as social engineering (Jeffrey Sachs' Millenium Villages), are very popular (Fair Trade) or have received enormous institutional and academic support (microfinancing). I will then present an idea that actually works and should receive the majority of funding, both from private and official side: direct financial support.

4.1. From Humanitarian Aid to Development Aid

This chapter aims to distinguish between the different forms of international aid. There is a considerable difference between humanitarian and development, as well as private and official aid. Humanitarian aid is targetted towards a specific population to prevent or alleviate a specific crisis, for example in case of natural disasters or war or to prevent famine or the spread of disease (Riddell 2008, 325ff.). Private aid, in the form of individual voluntary donations to INGOs, is distinguished from official development aid, which is paid for by taxes (Lichtenberg 2014, 189ff.). There are transitions, interlocking, and permeability of all these forms of aid. For example humanitarian aid can, and in the case of developing countries should, be followed up by development aid (Riddell 2008, 352ff.). Conversely, an increasingly important factor of development aid is catastrophe and conflict

prevention work. Private and official aid are distinguished by the institution financing, organising and implementing the projects, being either governmental, usually affiliated to the donor-countries ministry of development aid, or non-governmental (INGOs), for example citizen initiatives such as Oxfam or religiously affiliated organisations such as Caritas International. It should be noted that governmental aid is partly distributed through private INGOs, blurring the lines between private and official institutions (Riddell 2008, 259ff.).

It is also important to distinguish between micro and macro projects. Micro-projects, for example support of small farmer cooperatives or the building of a village well, ideally should lead to improvements on the macro-level, such as improved democratic institutions, an improved national life expectancy, or economic growth. Macro projects usually target the countries infrastructure, or finance state institutions directly. A definition of “aid” from Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (Harrison 2009, 8), elaborating the difference between bilateral and multilateral aid, closes this chapter, moving towards the central argumentative point of this part of the thesis: The problem of efficiency of aid.

“**aid:** International aid generally encompasses any transfer of resources between states which is not undertaken on a commercial basis. Normatively, most would exclude military assistance from their definitions of foreign aid, which highlights how the politic of aid is largely conducted through discourses of humanitarianism and economic development. Indeed, aid is closely associated with the notion of development, and this association is in itself structured through a distinction between “developed” and “developing” countries. The vast majority of aid moves from the former to the latter.

Official aid may be handled on a bilateral basis, through intergovernmental transfers from developed states to developing states; or through transfers from

multilateral institutions (e.g. the United Nations Development Programme or aspects of the World Bank's lending) to developing states. Another important multilateral aid institution which has a unique structure is the Global Fund. The European Union has its own aid strategies, focused on the African, Caribbean, and Pacific post-colonies. Other sources of aid include non-governmental organizations, funded through private donations and “home” governments.

Since the mid-1950s, aid has emerged as a key aspect of global politics, and the politics of international aid has become a prominent issue, rising up the agenda of G7/8, OECD, and other intergovernmental meetings. There is concern about the efficacy of aid; after \$2.3 trillion of aid has been disbursed over the last fifty years, it is questionable whether aid makes much of a difference to development. Aid can also be seen to influence the relationship between donors and recipients. Questions have been raised about the motivations of aid givers, especially in respect to donor states, whose geopolitical and economic interests may affect how aid is allocated. In terms of aid strategy, forms of aid differ widely and donor institutions always attach projects, plans and preferences to aid, commonly known as conditionality and tied aid. Aid can be seen to lead to dependence, establishing a hierarchy of giver and receiver and allowing for intervention in developing states by developed states.”

4.2. Aid Effectiveness

As the definition from the previous chapter indicates, a heated discussion on the efficiency of development aid has accompanied the field since its beginning in the 1950s (cp. McGillivray et al. 2006, 1032). Many economists have argued that aid does only little good and may even be pernicious (Bauer 1971, De Waal 2011, Easterly 2001, 2007b and 2014,

Erler 1985, Glennie 2009, Maren 1997, Moyo 2009, Mwenda 2006, Polman 2008 and 2010, and Shikwati 2006). These authors mainly criticise that aid distorts markets and leads to crowding out of local efforts, that it weakens government accountability by providing a tax-independent source of income, and thus leads to dependency. Former World Bank economist William Easterly raises scepticism on the possibility of aid achieving long-term economic improvements in poor countries, pointing towards the problematic state of evidence for development aid so far. His credo is that the \$2.3 trillion¹³⁶ (Easterly 2007b, 4, Harrison 2009, 8, also cp. Riddell 2008, ch. 4 and 5) spend on aid so far have largely been for naught. In his opinion this is largely due to progress and growth are not being plannable by a external actors, and that economic growth is rather a result of markets working in a stable environment which is guaranteed by good institutions, than governmental spending (cp. De Soto 2000, Hayek 1948, and Ramalingam 2013).

The critics' proposals go from radical calls to dismantle all forms of aid to more modest proposals of reform. Reformists, such as Riddell (2008), Glennie (2009), or Ramalingam (2013), usually target the way aid is implemented. The main thrust is the move from direct budget support of, unfortunately often corrupt and inefficient, and quite often undemocratic, governments or economic subsidies to infrastructure to trying to implement institutional reforms and a focus on projects that directly target the poor improving education, health or simply provide support directly to the poor. The focus should therefore be less on increasing economic performance, but improving individual living conditions and life expectancy (Glennie 2009, 78ff.). As growth may simply mean increased inequality, which may actually result in the poorest people being worse off. For example, the Nigerian economical growth over the last ten years was exceptional, with a growth rate of around seven per cent. In 2013, with a BNP of \$510 billion, Nigeria surpassed South Africa as biggest economy on the African continent (Rybak 2014). The boom is mainly due to high resource prices, especially for crude oil, and to construction.

¹³⁶ This number is of course not undisputed. Due to different methodologies, estimates range between a careful estimate of \$1 trillion (Moyo 2009, xix), the mentioned \$2.3 trillion and \$4.6 trillion (Harvey 2012).

Unfortunately, both sectors are very susceptible to corruption and misdirection of funds. With reference to a long tradition of corrupt practices International 2013, 3). The result is that after a decade of growth, inequality and poverty have in Nigeria's economy, *Transparency International* ranks the country in corruption 144th of altogether 177 countries worldwide, attesting “scant or no” government budget openness increased, so that now 61 per cent of Nigerians live on less than a dollar, whereas in 2004 it was 52 per cent (Rybak 2014 and Transparency International 2010).

On the other side of the discussion we find supporters of aid who, generally accompanied by a few reformatory ideas of their own, are convinced by aid's effectiveness and insist on an important increase (up to a doubling) of aid (f. ex. Collier 2008 and Sachs 2005). An argument often brought by the defendants of this view is the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), most, if not all of them have been reached, particularly the number of people defined as living in extreme poverty has been halved since 1990 (UN 2015, 14f.).

How are these quite contrary assessments able to coexist? A first explanation is that there is no simple narrative of how a countries wealth is created and how it converts into individual living standards of its citizens. For many countries geographical situation has a considerable influence on it's wealth, it's (colonial) history, government system and institutional quality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Diamond 1999, Landes 2010, Marshall 2015, and Riddell 2008, 136ff.). Adding to this is the fact that from a macro-perspective, the influence of aid on economic growth and improving (or worsening) living conditions is difficult to determine statistically. Each country has to be viewed separately, as many other influences compete with the effect of aid. It should also be noted that even a country that stagnates economically or where living conditions do not improve the effect of aid need not necessarily be negative or neutral, as the researcher does not have access to the counterfactual situation (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 14f. and Deaton and Cartwright

2016). Simply put, the situation without aid could have been much worse than the actual result.

Further exacerbating this situation is the poor quality of statistical data in developing countries. The results of Morten Jerven's (2009, 2012, and 2013) research make the possibility of a correct or even meaningful estimation of the impact of aid on the macro-level even more doubtful. In his 2012 paper "For Richer, for Poorer: GDP Revisions and Africa's Statistical Tragedy", he comes to the conclusion that the GDP estimates for many African countries are unreliable and may be off by between 50 and 150 per cent (also cp. Jerven 2009 and 2013). For example Ghana's GDP estimate was corrected upwards by over 60 percent on November 5th 2010. This meant that from one day to the next, Ghana changed from being a low-income to a lower-middle-income country. It also reveals that in previous GDP estimates, Ghana's Statistical Services had missed economic activities worth about US\$13 billion. Jerven argues that while this may be the most spectacular case, GDP misestimations abound in developing countries.

Reasons for this "statistical tragedy" (Jerven 2012) include poor data quality and control, the lack of adequately qualified staff, a focus less on inland taxation than on border taxation, and large parts of the economy being extra-legal or even illegal (cp. Neuwirth 2011). There may be a political interest of appearing poorer than one is to secure better lending conditions, to receive foreign aid and to qualify for debt cancellation. Statisticians in developing countries have the additional problems of high incidences of illicit financial flows (Kar and Leblanc 2013). Together with large sections of the economy being informal, the real data are almost impossible to obtain, especially when there are actually efforts made to occult these economic activities. Furthermore, in remote areas, much of the economic activity is extra-monetary, with people small farmholders and self-supporters and relying on bartering for many of their commodities. Consequently, it is very difficult to provide a reliable and comprehensive database. This said about simple economic data, one

can imagine how difficult it is to compile sound data on living conditions, life expectancy, health and education, which would be what would really interest effective altruists, with economic performance only being a useful proxy.

This problem of incomplete data is further complicated by the need to measure long-term achievements. Short-term boosts facilitated by development aid that are not sustainable would not be a meaningful use of the donors and the developing countries resources. In simple words, financing the construction of a dam to create electricity will create jobs and increase income in the short term, yet if there is no qualified personal around to maintain it, it is likely to break down and no further benefit can be derived from it (cp. Chakravarty 2011). Similarly, a newly constructed hospital will not be of any use if the nurses and doctors all left because they haven't been paid for months. The term often used for these, unfortunately quite frequent, failures in foreign aid projects is “white elephants”. This means that we have to adopt a long-term perspective when examining the impact of aid on growth.

Finally, the discourse on development aid is characterized by ideological differences of the authors, for example William Easterly and Angus Deaton are defendants of the a conservative-liberal view, with a strong focus on individual responsibility and high scepticism of any interventions by the nation state. Apart from problems of measurement, problems of implementation keep aid from reaching its potential. An overview of the most frequent problems of development aid will be presented in the following chapters as a background to discuss implementation of efficient projects.

4.3. The Millennium Development Goals

Defendants of development aid can point towards a specific project that at first sight promises to fulfil many of these criteria and make quite a convincing case for aid. The

United Nation's eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had been established following the United Nations Millennium Summit in the year 2000, after the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN 2015). The following goals were to be achieved by the end of 2015

1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, notably to halve the proportion of people living on less than \$1.25 a day by 2015 and halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger.
2. To achieve universal primary education, namely enrolment in primary education and completion thereof.
3. To promote gender equality and empower women.
4. To reduce child mortality, specifically to reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the infant under-five mortality rate Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles.
5. To improve maternal health, besides a reduction in maternal mortality ratio, this includes contraceptive prevalence.
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, most notably tuberculosis.
7. To ensure environmental sustainability.
8. To develop a global partnership for development.

At least part of these goals are clear and measurable. This was a highly important step for development aid, as being able to measure results of development interventions means that we are able to evaluate the results of aid invested over a period of 15 years. Just as important is the fact that measuring and keeping track of results creates responsibility. As has been shown previously aid, both from the donor, as well as from the recipient governments, has unfortunately not always been directed towards those who would

ethically be entitled to it and need it most. If results are publicly tracked, at least part of the resources will have to be dedicated towards the achievement of the proclaimed goal, lest the countries concerned want to face international embarrassment (and perhaps a reduction in future aid).

The results of the MDG-initiative are quite impressive and are a convincing argument towards the effectiveness of aid. The initiative itself confidently calls itself “the most successful anti-poverty movement in history” (UN 2015, 3). But the claim that they have been realised to a large degree has not gone unchallenged. This warrants a closer look at the, from a humanitarian point of view, most important results: the reduction of extreme poverty, and the improvements in the areas of health and of education.

The final Millennium Goals Development Report (UN 2015, 4 and 14ff.) indicates that extreme poverty has declined significantly over the last two decades. In 1990, nearly half of the population in the developing world, 1.9 billion people, lived on less than \$1.25 a day. That proportion dropped to 14 per cent, 836 million, in 2015. At the same time, the proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3 per cent in 1990 to 1992 to 12.9 per cent.

Several authors have raised issues with these optimistic numbers. Pogge and Reddy (2010) and Hickel (2016) maintain that this decrease of the number of global poor was simply a sleight of hand. A close reading of the report reveals the important role of the Chinese economic growth in this progress. The proportion of Chinese living on less than \$1.25 a day has been reduced by a staggering 94 per cent between 1990 and 2015 (UN 2015, 14 and UNDP 2015). Coupled with the enormous population of an estimated 1.37 billion,¹³⁷ the influence of China's staggering success in decreasing (food) poverty is difficult to overestimate. Indeed according to a Communication for Discussion with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) by 17 scientists and activists, the progress of China (ca. 96 million) and Vietnam (ca. 24 million) amounts to

¹³⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

91 per cent of the net numerical reduction in undernourished people since 1990 (Lappé, Clapp, and Wise 2013, 3 and 6ff.). In fact, China has recently gone from being a recipient of development aid to a provider (Li, Wang, and Wang 2009 and Moyo 2009, 103ff.).

This might not appear worrisome in itself, after all a reduction in global poverty is good news wherever it occurs and the report admits quite frankly the role of the world's most populous countries of China and India and that poverty-reduction, while an overall success, has still to reach some regions and populations, namely sub-Saharan Africa and specifically women (UN 2015, 15ff.). But the fact that the positive results are relying on the economic performance of one country poses some difficulty, especially as the Chinese governments success in the 1990's in combatting poverty, is estimated by several experts to be unrelated to receiving development aid, and more to land reforms that have improved small farmers access to land, strong governments investment in creating (partially) state-owned enterprises and protecting own industries through tariffs (Chang 2002b and 2008, 28f., FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2012, 30, and Lappé, Clapp, and Wise 2013, 7). These measures are difficult to duplicate by any other developing country, as they are possible only for large countries with a strong central government and enough international acumen to run against what the World Trade Organisation and other international institutions prescribe as economic policies.

Another problem that critics have with the numbers quoted is that, while not manipulated per se, the data most certainly has been altered to present the situation in an optimistic light. As Hickel (2016) and Pogge and Reddy (2010) show, there has at least been some embellishment. Instead of halving the absolute number poor, the goal centred on halving the *proportion* of very poor people, which with the background of a growing world population actually means that the absolute number of people living in poverty may increase and the goal still be met.

Even more problematic, that the measurement of poverty and hunger relies on an

arbitrary international poverty line that is “not adequately anchored in any specification of the real requirements of human beings” (Pogge and Reddy 2010). After all, the absolute poverty line being defined as living on less than \$1 a day already strikes one as arbitrary. In their defence it has to be said that this number was increased to \$1.25 a day by the World Bank. Yet, as Pogge and Reddy (2010) point out, as the income-threshold is still too low and is calculated under a concept of purchasing power equivalence that this means, that many people are actually classified as “middle class” who still suffer from severe deprivations.

Hickel (2016) points out that similar embellishments have occurred when it comes to the measurement of calories. In 2009 the FAO changed the methodology of their 25-year longitudinal study just three years before its conclusion, effectively lowering the minimal caloric intake to 1.800 per day (cp. FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2012, 12). This may be sufficient for most poor people to barely survive, but is not enough for farmers, manufacturers and other physical labourers. Additionally, it neglects that undernourishment also includes symptoms of serious deficiencies of basic vitamins and nutrients are not counted as undernourished, although this can lead to dramatic illnesses, particularly in children (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2012, 23ff.). This methodology also excludes people who suffer from parasites, which inhibit food absorption rates, and people that frequently are going hungry for periods of less than a year, as many farmers do just before harvest season (cp. Mullainathan and Shafir 2013, ch. 8).

Another problem of measuring effectiveness is shown when having a closer look at the reported success in the area of education, namely what I would like to call the “bare minimum”-effect. As the MDG report shows, primary school net enrolment rate in the developing regions has reached 91 per cent in 2015, up from 83 per cent in 2000. As Easterly (2007b, 165) points out, school attendance is a “good observable”, it is sufficient that schools submit their attendance rate and that these submissions are randomly

controlled (which does not necessarily happen in developing countries, but let us leave this issue beside). What unfortunately cannot be so readily observed is the quality of the education, which unfortunately seems to be deplorable (Pritchett 2013). Not only do few of the teachers receive any pedagogical training, there are also high instances of bribery and teacher absenteeism (cp. Chaudhury et al. 2006 and Easterly 2007b). Pritchett concludes that for many children, it may actually have been a better idea to have stayed at home being taught useful skills by their parents, with the funds invested in a national education system being issued to the parents in the form of money or a voucher.

These examples illustrate what can go wrong once the notion of measuring effectiveness. It is difficult to do in the best of times and unfortunately open to manipulation by donors and recipient countries. Certain important criteria, such as a strong civil society, political representation and equal rights are even more difficult to measure and notably as absent from the Millennium agenda, as they are from reflections of Peter Singer. At a first glance, this may appear justified. After all, having enough food for one's family and decent access to health care seems to be a more urgent priority than voting. This development pragmatism however ignores the complexity of poverty. There are many reasons for absolute poverty. Complete absence of national resources is however, not a frequent one. On the contrary, many developing countries are rich in resources that they export to the more developed world. "Purchasing" developmental progress with an eschewal of democracy and human rights is therefore myopic, as these positive results are of questionable reliability and sustainability, and this is playing into the hands of "African Strong Men" (Easterly 2007b, 117ff. and Matfess 2015). Notable examples would be Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, that can present themselves as beneficiaries of their respective nations, while their government is characterized by authoritarianism and, sometimes violent, suppression of political opposition and freedom of the press (Davison 2016).

To put priority on civil rights and political empowerment seem to be more important for a healthy development of a country that actually benefits the poor in the long term. As Easterly (2007b, 36f. and 120ff.) puts it, it is highly important that the impulses for development come from the inside of a country, that the need for political and economic reforms is understood, and that action is taken.

Going more into the details about the effectiveness of aid on the macro-level would go beyond the scope of this thesis. As was explained, the issue is complex and heavily depends on the country receiving the support, especially institutional quality, and the donor policies. Even careful meta-studies for example Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008 and 2011) and Riddell (2008, 253ff.) can only provide answer a very tentative “in some cases yes”. In the following, a case study approach will therefore be adopted to differentiate between several interventions, from humanitarian aid to government support, to specific interventions that have proven attractive with private donors, such as addressed by Peter Singer. A closer analysis of microfinance and fair trade, the more holistic approach Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages will be undertaken, closing with an appeal for direct giving to the poor. As has been a reiterated several times, there is a problematic tendency to overestimate the possibilities to lift the poor out of poverty via external aid. This myth of the white saviour or white man's are Western hubris, that leads to paternalism and a disregard towards the life-plans and abilities of the poor themselves (Dogra 2012, Easterly 2007b, 237ff. and Goudge 2003). There is however one way in which aid, coupled with today's health technologies, has been extraordinarily successful, which Singer (2009a, 85ff. and 2015, 154ff.) and MacAskill (2015a, 59ff.) rightly point out: Providing simple health interventions that either save or considerably improving the quality of life. With the most successful result so far being the elimination of smallpox. Killing an estimated 300 to 500 million people during the 20th century, smallpox continued to be responsible for two million deaths per year. A global vaccination campaign, with a focus on developing

countries, resulted in the disease being finally declared as eliminated in 1979 (Fenner et al. 1988, 1227 and MacAskill 2015a, 54f. and 81ff.). MacAskill (2015a, 54f.) takes this as a powerful argument for the efficiency of aid.

“Prior to its eradication, smallpox killed 1.5 to 3 million people every year, so by preventing these deaths for over forty years, its eradication has effectively saved somewhere between 60 and 120 million lives. The eradication of smallpox is one success story from aid, saving five times as many lives as world peace would have done. Just for the sake of argument, let's be generous to the aid sceptics. Let's suppose that, over the last six decades, foreign aid achieved absolutely nothing except eradicating smallpox. A simple calculation shows that even if this were true, foreign aid would still be a bargain. The total aid spending of all countries over the last five decades is \$ 2.3 trillion [...]. That means that, using the low estimate of the benefits of eradicating smallpox, at 60 million lives saved, foreign aid has saved a life with every \$ 40,000 spent. In comparison, government departments in the US will pay for infrastructure to improve safety if doing so costs less than about \$ 7 million per life saved [...].”

This is indeed a powerful argument, as the life-saving revolution of smallpox eradication is often forgotten because it was so unspectacular. This sets the theme, as actually effective and life-saving interventions are often small and unspectacular. Besides vaccinations, such as polio, other powerful measures are the free provision of insecticide treated malaria nets and de-worming, providing a considerable rise in quality of life, while the cost-per-unit are more than reasonable (Gallup and Sachs 2001, Miguel and Kremer 2004, and WHO 2012, 2013 and 2015).¹³⁸ While none of these actually have the power to lift people out of

¹³⁸ Malaria nets cost around \$10 per unit, while vaccinations and de-worming preparations often cost under a dollar.

poverty, they actually take away worries and provide people with time and resources , meaning they can help themselves better.

4.4. The Philosophy of Effectiveness

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the question, whether foreign aid benefits the recipient countries – and if yes, in what ways – is a highly disputed one, but one that a philosopher concerned with the attempt to fight poverty cannot avoid, as it has direct influence on the ethical requirement of giving aid, as the philosophers and economists Lichtenberg (2014, 189ff.), MacAskill (2015, ch. 3), Wenar (2011b) and most certainly Singer (2009a, 85ff.) recognise. Efficient use of limited resources is a general requirement of (economic) rationality, but in this case also of ethics. It has already been mentioned that only a limited amount will be dedicated towards the poorest, both for psychological, as well as for political and economic reasons. Calls for increasing donations, for example by Peter Singer and others, may raise a bit more, and the engagement of welfare organisations such as Oxfam and political campaigns such as “Make Poverty History” may hopefully pressure governments to dedicate more funds towards development aid (Sireau 2009), but the topic will likely remain on the fringe of public attention and receive its ounce of scepticism (Darnton and Kirk 2011). Before this background of limited means, it is therefore even more important to make the most out of the amount that is dedicated towards the poor. As projects and organisations differ widely in their effectiveness, it is crucial to distinguish and to choose the right ones. In development aid, supervision of project effectiveness can also serve as safeguard against corruption and misuse of funds. This aspect of poverty relief had, with the exception of Peter Singer and Leif Wenar, previously found only insufficient attention by philosophers who have focused their efforts and arguments on working out or criticising ethical theories of global poverty, but have

largely left the field – and thus the question of efficiency – to economists.

As Wenar (2011b) analyses, the open question of (or the lack of) effectiveness does not mean that our obligation to help the poor ends. Rather it means that our responsibility is to look for alternative and more powerful ways to support them. Rational giving on the basis of situational analysis and involvement is what the poor need and what the principle of beneficence demands from us. It is neither half-hearted slacktivism or ethical shopping, nor ignorance and deference of responsibility (Davis 2010 and Glück 2008).

Some other ethicists such as Neera Badhwar (2006), Judith Lichtenberg (2014, 177ff.), and Peter Singer (2009a, 81ff. and 2015, 149ff.) do approach the practical angle of the problem. Singer (2009a, 87ff. and 2015, 150) for example relies heavily on the calculation of the organisation Give Well. MacAskill (2015, 10ff.) proposes measuring project effectiveness by using quality adjusted life years (QALY), or their inverse societal counterpart disability-adjusted life years (DALY), per dollar spent as indicator of an efficient NGO (MacAskill 2015a, ch. 2, McKie et al. 1998, and Singer 2015, 130ff.). Originating from medical research, this metric has been developed in order to help health insurances and national health institutions make decisions about how to prioritise among different health programmes (Williams, Evans, and Drummond 1987). It has since translated into development aid (Bendavid et al. 2015 and Shiffman 2006). The advantage of QALY is that it not only captures shortened lifespans as average life expectancy does, but also reduced quality due to a debilitating illness. Using survey data about the trade-offs people are willing to make in order to assess how bad different sorts of illnesses or disabilities are. For example, on average people rate a life with untreated AIDS as 50 per cent as good as life at full health; people on average rate life after a stroke as 75 per cent as good as life at full health; and people on average rate life with moderate depression as only 30 per cent as good as life in full health. Thus curing a thirty year-old man with a life expectancy of 75 years of depression would amount to 45 time 30 per cent 13.5 QALYs,

although one would have to include the resulting reduction in the suicide rate as well.

Measuring quality of life is important in a development context is important, as many of the illnesses that plague people in the developing world, such as malaria, schistosomiasis or tuberculosis, are not necessarily fatal in the short-term, but do significantly reduce an individual's opportunity to learn, work and earn income (Gallup and Sachs 2001, Sachs 2005, 2011, and Shiffman 2006). This is even worse for poor households in developing, as they cannot rely on insurances to help with the costs of medical care or loss of income.

Finding out, how many QALYs an intervention actually saves relies on *randomised controlled trials* (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 14f.). This method taken from clinical evaluations on a treatment effectiveness, rely on separating different individuals, households or communities that share the same conditions into intervention and control groups. The intervention groups receive the treatment, for example insecticide treated malaria bed nets, while the control group remains without them. After a certain amount of time, rate of infection, quality of life and in the long run, even average life years are compared. As Banerjee and Duflo (2011, 14) note that of course a “single experiment does not provide a final answer on whether a program would universally work”. These experiments are meant to be repeated several times in different contexts and different countries. Using this method, GiveWell calculated that it costs around \$1.36 to protect one person from malaria for one year, estimating that the “cost per life saved” is about \$2.300.¹³⁹ Western societies with a national health service are usually willing to spend at least \$50.000 per QALY gained (MacAskill 2015a, 61 and Neumann, Cohen, and Weinstein 2014).

Of course, there are clear limitations to the use of QALYs and randomised controlled trials (Deaton and Cartwright 2016 and Reddy 2013). The quasi-utilitarian calculus pretends that intra-individual comparisons on survey-based assumptions of

¹³⁹ <http://www.givewell.org/charities/against-malaria-foundation>.

individual preferences are possible, which can be disputed (cp. Prieto and Sacristán 2003 and Schlander 2007). For example, how bad the experience of losing an arm versus losing your hearing affects you personally and financially depends very much on you and your job. Determining this via survey will not necessarily yield correct information. Additionally, there is evidence that life satisfaction and quality, even with disability, may return to a personal baseline (Lucas 2007). From a philosophical point of view, weighing different lives is of course difficult, as from a deontological perspective you may dispute the ethicalness of interchanging different persons (Broome 2004, Reddy 2013, and Taurek 1977). There are also doubts from a consequentialist perspective, as you never know whether the life saved is one of the next cruel dictator or someone you finally invents the vaccination for malaria. A life saved may thus result in many additional lives saved or lost.

Finally, even rigorous evaluations of this kind do not necessarily tell us why an intervention worked or did not work. For example, providing free malaria nets may not have worked in some communities, because of they used they used the fine nets as tools for fishing instead of protecting themselves and their children (Gettleman 2015).¹⁴⁰ However, as Broome (2004, 12ff.) and MacAskill (2015a, 46ff.) convincingly argue the numbers should at least factor into our considerations, because we have limited resources available and there are important reasons for saving every single human life. As we want to find what helps many people, not making use of these tools condemns us to inaction or arbitrariness. I therefore side with MacAskill, especially when considering his additional advice, that we should not only look at these numbers. Rather, what should guide my decision is whether my additional donation will provide a special benefit. As Give Well factors into its consideration whether a certain INGO and cause is under- or over-funded, so MacAskill (2015a, 68) asks us to consider the marginal utility added by our donation, this means that efforts are focused not only on effective, but also underfunded issues.

It should be recognised, that, as the methods discussed come from the medical
¹⁴⁰ With, as Gettleman (2015) describes, the consequence that the fine nets actually lead to overfishing, as the infant fish are caught and killed as well.

sciences, health interventions have a natural advantage when being subjected to these evaluations. While this may point out some simple, effective and underfunded treatments that we can provide at very low cost, there are important interventions that are not captured. Precisely because these interventions are so cheap and effective, the question should be “Why do developing countries, who are often rich in natural resources, not already providing them themselves for their population?”. As has been shown in this thesis, a major obstacle here are kleptocratic elites, corruption and lack of democracy. But interventions that strengthen democracy and combat corruption cannot be measured with these methods. For example the INGO Transparency International (Transparency International 2010), provides civil actors and government opposition with reliable and comparative data on the extent of corruption in a country, which is a valuable instrument in forcing regime change and reforms. QALYs can thus not remain the only answer. A solid argument in this context would be that good health is a pre-requisite for empowerment of the global poor. By improving their lot we give them the resources to change things for themselves. This however means that we cannot simply rely on data, but have to actually listen to the poor and interact with them (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Standing 2008, and Toth 2014). With the exclusive orientation on data, the effective altruism movement currently is in danger of losing contact with its original ideals and by focusing on so-called “extinction events”, forgetting about the poor. This will be discussed in the conclusion.

4.5. Should We Not Help At All? – The Position of Thomas Robert Malthus

A great advantage of the QALY and other rigorous evaluations of interventions is that it provides a clear counterargument to an attitude that unfortunately remains pertinent in the public mind when it comes to donations and development aid in general. Namely that they are futile and ineffective, with a common position remaining (Neo-)Malthusianism.

To this day, political economist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) remains a highly controversial author, and many view (Neo-)Malthusianism as inhumane, fatalistic, and unscientific.¹⁴¹ Indeed, Malthus' arguments have at times been used by politicians to turn down pleas for famine relief and as Abramitzky and Braggio (2005) and Ross (1998) show, is still very present in the public debate on poverty.¹⁴² Malthus' work was scientifically highly relevant, influencing others such as Charles Darwin, popularizing the economic theory of rent and arguably founding population studies (cp. Sloan 2010 and Ekelund and Herbert 2005, 140f.). In this chapter, I will try to present basic aspects of Malthusian thinking on charity in his time and to show that, concerning possible ill-effects of well-intended charity, he is still influential in the public imagination. Malthus' basic idea was that, while population growth progresses exponentially, food production can only progress arithmetically.

“Must it not then be acknowledged by an attentive examiner of the histories of mankind, that in every age and in every State in which man has existed, or does now exist that the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence, that population does invariably increase when the means of subsistence increase, and, that the superior power of population is repressed, and the actual population kept equal to the means of subsistence, by misery and vice.”

This means that food shortage and famine are inevitable in the long run, if population growth progresses unchecked. Malthus felt his results vindicated by the frequent

¹⁴¹ For example Charles Dickens ironically refers to Malthusianism in *Bleak House* (1852) as “the gentle politico-economic principle that a surplus of population must and ought to starve.” Chomsky (1999, 59) accuses Malthus together with David Ricardo and “other great figures of classical economics” as negating poor people's right to live: “the best gift we can offer the suffering masses is to free them from the delusion that they have a right to live.”

¹⁴² For example by the administrator of government relief to Ireland Charles Edward Trevelyan during the 1840's potato famine (Keneally 2011, 64), and by the Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery during a debate in the British Parliament on occasion of the Bengali famine in 1944 (*ibid.*, 26).

occurrence of famines throughout history.¹⁴³ To avoid overpopulation, human beings can establish artificial limitation mechanisms of population growth. As in Malthus' times no reliable method of birth control existed, population control essentially meant abstinence.¹⁴⁴ Individuals should “control their urges” before getting married, and when starting a family, make rational decisions on family size based on their expected income. However, it has to be noted that Malthus was sceptical of the capability, especially of the “lower classes”, to control their “passions” in this way (cp. Abramitzky and Braggion 2005 and Ekelund and Herbert 2005, 142).

It now becomes evident why Malthus and people influenced by Malthusianism vehemently oppose charitable giving. Charity, while intuitively judged as altruistic, in the Malthusian model actually is regarded as cruel. Increasing the income of the poor goods them into thinking that they can support a bigger family, resulting in higher population growth. Moreover, immediately after such a transfer, people can afford buying more food, bidding its price up and decreasing real wages through inflation, which hurts poor individuals whose main income is earned by manual labour. The result of financial and food support therefore is a larger population, dependent on charity, but in the same disastrous condition as before (cp. Abramitzky and Braggion 2005). Similarly, when wages increase because of new production possibilities, population growth just eats up the increased wealth per capita in a few years. Malthus therefore argued that it would be better for a family to foresee the incapacity to support additional children before having them, than to have them and to see them starve. John Stuart Mill actually argues in a similar vein in “On Liberty“ (1859, V. 15):

¹⁴³ Diseases and wars are population checks as well, reducing population size and establishing the necessary balance with resources. An example would be the great plague in the middle ages or the thirty years war in Germany 1618 to 1648.

¹⁴⁴ Malthus also considers migration as a possible means to reduce population pressure, but regards this possibility unfeasible, as general conditions were too harsh in possible receiving countries. Today, the objection would be that the receiving countries are unwilling to accept (more) immigrants. This problem will be discussed further on.

“The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility – to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing – unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being.”

Mill, although in more gentle terms than Malthus, argues against a family having more offspring than they can afford. It might well be assumed that the well-off Mill and Malthus perhaps did not understand the dire rationale of the poor: The need to have many children to secure manual labour for the farm or additional income through (low) wages in the cities, thereby gaining a limited security for old age (cp. George 1976, 59 and Kenny 2007). This need was made even more pressing by a high infant mortality among the poor in increasingly industrialising England (Kenny 2007, 291). Yet it is remarkable that Mill proposed a solution for this problem that actually empowers the poor instead of controlling them (or their “urges”). He believed that a combination of education and women's emancipation could reduce this problem (Mill 1859, V. 12).

One could consider Malthusian theory as surpassed, as obviously his prediction of continuous absolute poverty has been disproved, at least in what we call the industrialized countries. The invention of the artificial fertilizer by the German Justus von Liebig (1803–1883), six years after Malthus' death, and the subsequent Green Revolution dramatically increased the agricultural production, thus reducing prices significantly (cp. Wrigley 1987, 52). This went hand in hand with a shift from agricultural to industrialized and then post-industrialised societies, which brings with it a change of incentives concerning fertility. Technological change improved both farmer and worker productivity much more than Malthus could have predicted, and a national welfare system reduced the need for children as provision for old age. Today, the average household in developed countries spends only

a fraction of its income on food, for example in Spain 14.4 per cent (INE 2011, 22). Moreover, as has been shown in part one, food-production is no longer the biggest problem responsible for world hunger. Purchasing power on a worldwide food market means that often countries with parts of the population suffering hunger export agricultural products (Schooley 2010 and Williams 2012).

In addition, the already mentioned invention of improved methods of birth control, together with the emancipation of women after the Second World War, resulted in additional checks to population growth (cp. Wrigley 1987). Indeed, recent changes in fertility rates show that today half of the world's female population only has a birth rate of 2.1 or below (The Economist 2009).¹⁴⁵ This is the *replacement level of fertility*, often reached when the growth of a country's population slows down and eventually stabilises.¹⁴⁶ The countries where this process occurs are not only the Western countries, but emerging countries such as Russia and Brazil, and of course China due to political encouragement of the one child family. The wealth and education of a country's population seem to have a slowing effect on the fertility rate, too. According to United Nations estimates, the world's population will rise from 6.8 billion to 9.2 billion in 2050, at which point it will stabilise (Klingholz 2014).

Paradoxically, many European countries, such as Germany and Spain, now suffer from demographic change, as not enough children are being born to keep the workforce stable, which can be a problem for the social security system (INE 2011, 10f.).¹⁴⁷ It seems that there is an inverse relationship between a society's education and wealth on the one hand and its birth rate on the other hand, with an increase of the former variables reducing

¹⁴⁵ The rate needs to be slightly above 2.0 because of the possibilities of early deaths and childlessness either because of biological reasons or out of choice.

¹⁴⁶ "Fertility starts to drop at an annual income per person of \$1.000 – 2.000 and falls until it hits the replacement level at an income per head of \$4.000 – 10.000 a year." (The Economist 2009).

¹⁴⁷ This is not without adverse side-effects, as the demographic change threatens the possibility of a sustainable generation contract concerning annuity and pension systems. This problem is alleviated by encouraging the immigration of skilled workers (engineers, computer specialists, but also nurses). The negative side of encouraging immigration from the developing countries is the resulting "brain drain", as the developing countries' educated elite emigrates to the developed world, instead of working and creating wealth and paying taxes in their country of origin.

the latter (Klingholz 2014).

Wrigley (1987) in his influential book *People, Cities, and Wealth* shows that the Malthusian problem continually lost its strength and completely disappeared in the last quarter of the 19th century. However, he also outlines that in – and for – his time, Malthus was right. From 1566 to 1871, prices and population in Britain were closely related: When population increased, for instance from 1781 to 1806, the price index also rose. On the other hand, downturns in population corresponded to declines in prices. Moreover, he points out that fertility rather than mortality was the main determinant of population growth during the eighteenth century, and that nuptial changes accounted almost entirely for the movements in fertility. In 19th century England, weddings tended to be celebrated after a careful economic calculus operated by the potential bride and groom, and therefore constituted the main mechanism relating population size with economic conditions. This indicates that Malthusian laws hold some truth, but could be circumvented by people's being aware of them.

Wrigley (1987) and Becker (1960) conclude that Malthus' theory still applies to poor countries that are still struggling to get out of the Malthusian cycle. The poor in the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, continue to have too many children (cp, Sachs 2005, 263f). Daulaire et al. (2002) calculated that about one quarter of the 1.2 billion pregnancies that occurred in the developing world between 1990 and 2000 were unintended.¹⁴⁸ An example would be Nigeria, where the average woman still gives birth to 5.7 children during her lifetime, resulting in an annual population growth of around 7 million. Since reaching independence in 1960, the population nearly quadrupled, reaching 174 million in 2014 (Klingholz 2014, 35). While especially the country's elite currently profit from rapid economic growth and natural resources, namely crude oil, Nigeria's problems may increase in the future. Today, 85 per cent live on less than two dollars a day,

¹⁴⁸ The authors estimate that 40 million of these unintended pregnancies end in abortion because the pregnant woman feels she does not have the physical or economic resources to support the child. As many of these women do not have access to professional health care, these abortions often result in physical trauma or even death.

and around half of the population is less than 15 years old (Klingholz 2014, 35 and World Bank 2012, 42ff.).

Even among richer countries, a Neo-Malthusian relationship between population growth and the environment has been argued for, based on the idea of the overuse of scarce natural resources. But this problem, too, is more severe in poor countries, which usually depend more heavily on their natural resources (Abramitzky and Braggion 2005 and Hansen and Prescott 2002, 1214f). Finally, a direct line can be drawn from Malthus to the *Club of Rome*, which uses the argument of scarcity of resources and limits to growth on a global scale (Meadows et al. 1972). A large part of the rise in world population predicted will actually happen in Africa, but there, too, growth is slowing down (Klingholz 2014). West et al. (2014) show that it will be possible to feed three billion additional people without overusing the environment, if the current system of food production is improved. The recommendations include reducing food wastage and meat consumption in the West, improving yield of the arable land by using better and more sustainable fertilizer, and by installing irrigation systems in dry zones.

What conclusions should be drawn from Malthus' work? Some consequences are important in this context: We should be critical of “blind” altruism, as it can have negative results for the recipient. Malthus saw clearly that good will alone does not condone every charitable action. Examples will be shown in the following chapters. Malthus was among the first to recognize that charitable aid could lead to vicious circles. Additional ethical problems occur, such as dependency or the unintentional support of local militant groups and corrupt politicians.

On a positive note, it has been shown that the laws of population growth and famine are by no means unavoidable. Rather, technological progress, education and empowerment of women are means to overcome these problems. This points towards actions that have to be taken if we want to reduce poverty in the long term. Unfortunately, the view that

poverty is unavoidable is still very much present in Western imagination, and it shows where we need to go with calls for donations towards development aid (Darnton and Kirk 2011). If the importance of education, better financial prospects, women's rights, and contraceptives were unknown, Malthus would perhaps be right. But as it is otherwise, Malthusian fears – while perhaps warranted – these days are now no longer an argument against development aid. On the contrary, effective programmes targeting the above mentioned factors can effectively reduce child-bearing, lead to more individual prosperity, and reduce the stress on the planet's resources. A general criticism of efforts towards alleviating poverty may thus be dismissed, although ideas of general ineffectiveness of aid still hold sway with the Western public (cp. Bølstad 2011, 41ff. and 79ff. and Ross 1998). This means that a successful argumentation for more donations or an increase of official aid would first have to inform, persuade and activate a sufficiently large group (cp. Darnton and Kirk 2011).

4.6. Obstacles towards Aid Efficacy in the Short Run – Humanitarian Aid

A closer look at disaster relief or emergency aid reveals some of the most depressing problems that aid organisations and the poor face. Bringing in food and nourishment in case of a catastrophe is frequently too late, as the problem must first be recognized, political will established and donations collected,¹⁴⁹ the logistics established (DARA 2010, Polman 2010, Riddell 2008, 311ff., and Terry 2002).¹⁵⁰ The bulk of deliveries arrives only when the first people have starved, and afterwards – when the whole machinery of helping is into full motion – delivering food carries on long after being actually needed. Side effects of this can be a negative for the local food production and food markets, up to the

¹⁴⁹ Often donor countries take considerable time in make good their promises of aid payments. See chapter 3.7.

¹⁵⁰ As explained in chapter 3.7., a preventative Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) would be a solution, but governments have already problems committing funds once a catastrophe is in place. Therefore the fund is chronically underfunded.

loss of farms which are no longer economical because of a crowding-out effect. The surplus food – and other things delivered such as tents etc. – can become objects of merchandise or of theft.

The goods delivered can be misused to support allies, or to buy political influence or favours. These negative effects are even more intense in conflict zones, when warring parties compete for the goods brought in, trying to use them exclusively for themselves and to prevent that the rivals profit as well (Anderson 1999, Maren 1997 and Polman 2008). This can further fuel the conflict.

As all these side effects become obvious only after the focus on the area of catastrophe has shifted away, it seems not to be fully realized – at least there seems to be no effective tackling of these problems. A solution could be to move on from food aid to food assistance, as aimed at e.g. by the European Union and Oxfam (Dilley and Boudreau 2001 and Luscombe 2013). Simply put food aid denominates the direct delivery of food to the threatened population, while food assistance focuses on providing the population with means to acquire food for themselves through cash (usually in the local currency) or vouchers. Food assistance is usually flanked by measures to rebuilt and strengthen local agriculture. From an ethical and economic point of view, food assistance is clearly the preferable method, as it does empower the starving people to make their own decisions what and from whom they buy what they need. It also does not result in any crowding out of local farmers and markets, indeed it strengthens them. Vouchers can simply be fitted with a termination date and any money left over will actually benefit the rebuilding effort. While generally cash would be the better alternative, vouchers are the better solution in a background of conflict or high inflation background.

Unfortunately, this solution is far from accepted and food aid remains the norm. In case of private aid, donors simply expect the image of sacks of rice being distributed by helpers and the entrenched distrust towards the poor makes any advocating for direct cash

transfers difficult. On the side of official aid, the situation is even more difficult. As mentioned previously, a major problem of official aid is the entanglement of aid with political, strategic and economic interests. This is unfortunately also the case of food aid, which especially in the USA is a reliable source of income for agro-industrial enterprises, who thus ensure that a considerable part of the US governments expenditure on emergency and development aid is spent at home. For the agricultural industry this is of course a great deal, as it not only is a direct source of income, it also ensures that part of their, already subsidised, production is sold overseas, thus increasing prices on the US market. For the people threatened by starvation, this is a very bad deal, as not only does the imported and freely distributed food lead to crowding-out, it also means that they actually get very little of the promised funds, as the food grown in and transported from the United States is considerably more expensive than what could be bought locally.

It seems as if the problems of humanitarian aid will remain with us, with the occurrences of famines probably increasing in the next years as climate change increases. The question is therefore even more important if we can prevent famines beforehand by ensuring a good level of development. Humanitarian aid alone will not be enough, a majority of deaths caused by poverty result of common diseases and other unspectacular causes, in the long run, developing a country is the best way to prevent catastrophes.

4.7. Misuse of Development Aid and Corruption

Continued foreign aid can actually damage the recipient country's economy by creating dependence through *crowding out* (Kiely and Marfleet 1998 and O'Neill 1986).¹⁵¹ It is no longer worth while for a local farmer to produce rice or corn if the population receives

¹⁵¹ *Crowding out* denominates every occurrence in which an external measure (insufficiently) replaces an intrinsic motivation. Two occurrences of this phenomenon play a role in this thesis. Firstly, it refers to the destruction of local markets by oversupplying them with charitable goods (e.g. food or textiles). Secondly, it denominates the reduction the voluntariness of private individuals to donate, as the government applies itself in the relevant area.

them for free. We do not need to know about the famous *hog cycle* (Harlow 1960) to understand that farms need continuous efforts to produce. If the agricultural sector of a country in need has been dramatically diminished, perhaps due to a natural disaster or a war, and afterwards due to crowding out as a negative side-effect of humanitarian aid, dependence is established, and the international community will find it hard to decide to stop free food supplies.

This might lead to a perverse cycle of poverty and aid, perhaps reinforced by corrupt local leaders, because it enables them to keep their populace fed and therefore complacent. A dictator might actually have an interest in the continued suffering of his population, as it guarantees media attention and consequently donations. Economic problems lead to the conclusion that “blind” charity might actually be ethically reprehensible.

Corruption is a problem for most, if not all, countries that receive international development aid (cp. Cremer 2008). The effects of corruption on development also depends on how income from corruption is spent. It could possibly be an essential source of capital accumulation. However, this argument makes sense only if we assume that the sum of income earned from corruption is not negligible in comparison to the national income, so that corruption constitutes more than just a fringe phenomenon, and if we assume that it is spent at home and not invested in foreign countries or deposited in some (in)famous Swiss bank accounts (Cremer 2008, 23).

Corruption can have several results. It can create inequality in income and opportunities, and it can destroy market allocation mechanisms and thus introduce systemic inefficiencies. By circumventing official laws and practices, it can cause dangerous working and living conditions under insufficient security measures. An example for this is lax building safety in Haiti that lead to a complete breakdown during the 2010 earthquake (cp. Lauer 2010). Many public buildings there are completely unsafe, even in

earthquake hazard areas where building standards should be especially high (Dilley et al 2005, 100ff.).

Contrary to some older economic theories, corruption is no longer seen as a way to circumvent red-tape and overly strict bureaucracy. On the contrary, it rather establishes an incentive for government officials to create a difficult legal jungle situation, so that constant bribery is necessary and assures a steady flow of extra income (Cremer, 2008, 18ff. and Gupta et al. 2000, 24). The rate of misused foreign development aid has been estimated to be between five and 25 per cent. This means that of the \$525 billion the World Bank has given out since 1946, between \$26 and \$130 billion have been misused. Similar results may apply to development projects from INGOs and Western nations (Cremer 2008).

Aid organizations typically remain quiet about the issue of bribery or embezzlement as a hindrance to projects and tend to write them off as additional costs, as they do not want these problems to influence potential donors' decisions. Linda Polman (2008, ch. 6) points out that international organisations involved had no interest in passing this information to donors. An example for this is that only after the United States had declared Al-Shabaab¹⁵² a foreign terrorist organisation in 2008 – which meant that any action thereafter taken by US aid workers which, even indirectly or unknowingly, benefited the extremists was regarded as a criminal act – food deliveries to Somalia were discontinued. The distribution of aid in war-torn regions therefore, while *apparently* the right thing to do, will have to be judged more carefully.

The misuse of aid can further foster corrupt and rent-seeking elites. When those lack accountability to their own people (Mwemba 2006 and Shikwati 2006), this can lead to a delay of necessary economic reforms, which could also help to overcome poverty. Especially humanitarian aid can become a resource that can prolong conflicts, and may even actually cause them.

¹⁵² Cp. for more information http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.

However, information about corruption and possible theft of equipment as well as the misuse of donated goods, sold instead of given to the most needy, is crucial when we have to evaluate the efficiency of donated money. A main line of argument in this thesis is that funds for humanitarian action are severely limited. This makes questions of efficiency especially important. Donors and receivers have a right to know about inefficiencies. Fortunately, there have been improvements in corruption monitoring since the end of the nineties of the last century (Cremer 2008, 4). Transparency International – the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption – was founded in 1993. The World Bank's ninth president James Wolfensohn (1995–2005) made transparency, combating corruption, and good governance the priorities for the World Bank.

Peter Singer is aware of this corruption problem (2009a, 111ff.), but thinks that it can be solved, if we donate only to organisations that can prove that they make good use of the money.¹⁵³ There are now organisations such as GiveWell, founded during the last years, that evaluate the performance of charitable organisations (Singer 2009a, 118). As a positive example, Singer mentions the *Population Service International* (PSI), an initiative that sells insecticide impregnated mosquito nets, condoms, and water filters, in malaria plagued regions of Africa. Again, this certainly is a step in the right direction, and PSI does many things right. Instead of simply distributing the goods, they sell them, thereby ensuring that they are taken better care of,¹⁵⁴ and encouraging a more active and self-reliant attitude. In the following, several projects, among them microcredits and starting with Jeffrey Sachs Millennium Villages project, a social-engineering approach similar to what effective altruism may envision.

¹⁵³ If a donation to a NGO, operating in an affluent country, could save more human lives per Euro than an INGO could in poor countries, Singer's logic dictates that we should give our money to the latter. This is no trouble for his argumentation, as he distinctly proves that more lives can be saved with the same money in poor countries than in rich ones (2009, 118ff.). The only problem might be that donations “near home” may be more easily evaluable. The difficulty is that it is quasi impossible to calculate the precise amount that it takes to save a life (for how long?). According to GiveWell, it costs PSI between €650 and €2.000.

¹⁵⁴ Another surprising human reaction (Singer 2009a, 118).

4.8. Setting Yourself up for Failure – Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages

As attempted to show previously, poverty is a multi-dimensional problem. The poor suffer not only from lack of income, but also political representation, legal rights, and access to health and education. A holistic approach to poverty therefore seems very promising at a first glance. Holistic in this context refers to an approach that does not only address a single facet of poverty, but several or all of them. Such an approach, unfortunately limited to the problems of health, education, and income, was proposed by economist Jeffrey Sachs in his 2005 bestselling book *The End of Poverty – Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, the title being a nod towards Maynard Keynes' seminal essay *Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren* (1930). In his book, Sachs describes the blight of the poor and its results, hunger and malnutrition, lack of access to sanitation and safe drinking water, lack of employment opportunities, low productivity of small farms, high burden of diseases such as river blindness, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, high child and maternal mortality.

His argument is that the poor are trapped in a vicious circle of poverty (Sachs 2005, 56ff.). Overcoming all of the burdens of poverty together is simply impossible, as they reinforce one another through a feedback loop (cp. Collier 2008, 33ff.). To solve these problems he advises for a coordinated „big push“ (Sachs 2005, 233f. and 254f.). Donors should stop investing trifling sums and commit themselves to a stronger comprehensive investment over a limited time period that helps to provide basic health and education services, to increase agricultural productivity, and to ensure access to safe drinking water and to markets. Pointing out several interventions that target these problems, such as increased use of fertilizer and better access to medicine and health care, Sachs' central argument in his book is that addressing these issues does not require a financial investment that surpasses the financial capacities of the West (*ibid.*, 288ff.). On the contrary, with a coordinated approach, absolute global poverty could be eliminated sustainably by 2025

(*ibid.*, 1). Sachs promises that once taken, this investment is enough to eliminate absolute poverty, thus limiting further necessities of aid, supplanting poverty with economic self-determination and sustainability. The sum he estimates necessary to lift a person out of poverty amounts to around \$120 annually (*ibid.*, 290).

To prove that his theory is more than an utopian vision, Sachs proposed a daring experiment: He founded the Millennium Promise Alliance Inc., named after the UN Millennium Goals. 14 different villages in 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were selected to become Millennium Villages, comprising nearly 500.000 people.¹⁵⁵ The aim was to provide these projects with targeted financial support and know-how to create „islands of development“. The original seed money was \$120 million (Munk 2013, 41).

Fundraising possibilities of this project were very good. While most of the interventions proposed were not very innovative in themselves, the holistic approach certainly was new, and Sachs promised to deliver something spectacular, the long awaited „silver bullet“ in the combat against global poverty. Being a well-connected and famous economist with a great capability to motivate people, Sachs was able to secure celebrity endorsement, most notably by Bono¹⁵⁶ who wrote the foreword for “The End of Poverty”, as well as funding for his project from several sides, from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and entrepreneurs such as Tommy Hilfiger¹⁵⁷ and “Diesel” founder Renzo Rosso.¹⁵⁸ Major financial support came from investment magnate George Soros whose Open Society Foundation gave \$50 million to the project. Interestingly, Soros referred to the project as one of „high risk investment with potential high returns“ (Munk 2013, 40). Success was a long shot, but as close academic monitoring was promised, there was the possibility of learning from the approach. This meant that working intervention

¹⁵⁵ www.Millenniumvillages.org/the-villages/.

¹⁵⁶ Irish singer, songwriter, and guitar player, frontman of the world famous band U2, with the real name Paul David Hewson.

¹⁵⁷ www.Millenniumvillages.org/field-notes/tommy-hilfiger-launches-promise-collection-to-support-ruhiira/.

¹⁵⁸ www.Millenniumvillages.org/press-releases/only-the-brave-foundation-launches-partnership-with-Millennium-promise/.

could be scaled up while mistakes would be avoided in the future.

The attitude of many developmental experts was much more pessimistic, after presumed “silver bullet”-approaches had not worked several times in the past (Clemens, Kenny, and Moss 2004, Easterly 2007b, 6ff. and 132f., and Nocera 2013). Unfortunately, time seems to prove Sachs critics right. Even worse, the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership impeded knowledge gains by trying to maintain a strict information control over the progress of the participating villages (Nocera 2013). But without an independent evaluation and comparison to villages that did not benefit from the measures of the foundation, there is no way of knowing whether the project has made a difference (Clemens, Kenny, and Moss 2004 and Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 14f.). This information control does not only seem unethical towards donors and the intended project beneficiaries, it also undermines the project's *raison d'être*, as without confirmed knowledge what works and what does not, it is impossible to identify the scalable interventions, the introduction of which could benefit most regions of sub-Saharan Africa.

Then why did the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership decide on this clearly counterproductive policy? Munk (2013) at least partly credits Sachs arrogance, he just does not want to be proven wrong. But the true reason seems to lie in the necessity of further fundraising. The Millennium Village Project simply has become another victim of the logic of the *Machiavellian problem*¹⁵⁹. Reaching mid-term, the project was confronted with severe funding problems (Munk 2013, 142ff.). The project exceeded projected costs, and the villages did not become financially independent as fast as hoped. In urgent need of new cash, the project hired a new fundraising expert who tried to raise money not only by approaching wealthy individuals (a reluctant Soros contributed another \$47.4 million in 2011), but also by increasingly appealing to the public for donations (*ibid.*). But to maintain funding flows, a successful appearance is indispensable. Indicators of partial or complete failure translate into less donations than are necessary for the survival of the

¹⁵⁹ As mentioned previously, appearance seems to matter more to fundraising success than actual efficacy (Stern 2013a).

foundation. Thus the organisation has become self-serving, putting its own existence before their original mission and the benefit of the poor.

While one has to be critical of the reported progress in the Millennium Villages, it is important to recognise that some progress has been made. Indeed, it seems as if the livelihoods of people in the respective villages have been improved. It would be a surprise had it not, as simply the increased inflow of money should improve the economic situation in these very poor communities (cp. Nocera 2013). The question rather is, whether the money could have been better used to finance less grandiose and more targeted interventions and whether the organisation has diverted from its original mission.

That said, it has to be recognised that at least one of Jeffrey Sachs' ideas was in advance of the global development community. Sachs early on advocated for a free distribution of malaria nets to threatened populations (Gallup and Sachs 2001 and Sachs 2005, 196ff.). The donor community was reluctant here, fearing misuse and the cost of free distribution. Recent evidence shows that Sachs was right all along, even low prices significantly reduce the adaption of malaria nets, excluding the most vulnerable households (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 44ff. and Munk 2013, 215). As already mentioned previously, few interventions are as cost-effective when it comes to improving health and maintain economic productivity, than free distribution of impregnated malaria nets. This however, could have been achieved at far lesser cost.

While not an original idea of the Millennium Promise Alliance, the hiring of community health workers for the villages has proven to be a very efficient measure (Singh and Sachs 2013). Community health workers have evidenced their effectiveness in reaching poor and marginalised populations in developed as well as in developing countries (Viswanathan et al. 2009, 12ff.). Their role is to diffuse medical knowledge and increase basic health literacy, such as hand-washing or taking one's medication as prescribed. They usually are able to diagnose and treat basic illnesses, such as cholera or

influenza (the “flu”), and advise patients as to when a visit to the doctor is necessary. They have been shown to be a cost-effective way to significantly increase the health of a community, particularly the children's well-being (*ibid.*, 37ff.).

Unfortunately, it seems that neither these nor the other measures taken had the desired effect. Michael Clemens and Gabriel Demombynes (2011) from the Centre for Global Development explain that rigorous evaluation of the impact of the Millennium Villages is not possible, as it is difficult to separate the effects of certain interventions from others and to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous effects. They indicate that the Millennium Villages did not show a significant improvement in important indicators such as child mortality, compared to other villages in the area (cp. King 2013). In some categories, the Millennium Villages performed even worse. An article in the famous medical journal *Lancet*, which had originally claimed the contrary, had to be corrected (Bump et al. 2012, Pronyk et al. 2012, and Pronyk 2012).

As Munk (2013, 155ff.) indicates, many of the interventions were fraught with the typical flaws of top-down planning in a complex environment (Easterly 2007b and 2014). One of the features of complex environments is that new problems can arise often out of the very solutions (Ramalingam 2013). An example is the introduction of new crops such as maize¹⁶⁰ with the promise of higher yields and access to international markets. But selling the maize to international markets was problematic due to high transportation costs. A deal with the World Food Programme (WFP) did not succeed due to corruption and high red tape.¹⁶¹ Finally, farmers lost part of their harvest to vermin infestation and had to sell their products at a loss on local markets that were glutted with maize, especially as it was not part of the local traditional cuisine. This may partly explain why research noted that the increase in agricultural productivity did translate into additional available food, but did not translate into additional income (Muradian and Wanjala 2013).

¹⁶⁰ Known in some English-speaking countries as (indian) corn.

¹⁶¹ Officially the maize did not meet the high quality standards of the UN World Food Program (WFP).

Of course, the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership cannot be held responsible for external or environmental factors. Variability of macro-conditions is one of the central problems of evaluating development aid interventions, although the “islands of development” approach makes the Millennium Village Project particularly susceptible to external changes (Clemens and Demombynes 2011). Positive trends in the country, such as increase in political accountability, democracy, and economic growth will translate into improvements on the micro-level, but this can overlap the true effect of an intervention. On the other hand, more corruption, poorer institutional quality, political instability, conflict, or natural disasters can set back developmental efforts and fragile successes for quite some time.

To improve their success figures, the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership can be blamed for abandoning and scaling back its efforts in villages where, due to external circumstances, development stagnated. This has been claimed in least two cases: by Nina Munk (2013, 157ff. and 200) in the case of the village of Dertu in northern Kenya and by Japhy Wilson in the case of the village of Bonsaaso in central Ghana (Wilson 2015).

In Dertu, flooding and then a prolonged drought had the consequence that the local people's main source of income, their livestock, starved, grew sickly, and died. Additionally, increased threat of conflict in the region makes it improbable that the improvements financed with Millennium Village money will sustain.

The village Bonsaaso experienced a “gold rush” due to recent high prices for the commodity (cp. Hirsch 2012). While there used to be a tradition of local ore mining, this is now done either by foreign companies or illegally, in both cases with little respect for the environment and often on land that used to be reserved for local farmers. Some of these have been forced to sell their land for a meagre compensation, or it is now unusable, due to pollution as a result of legal or illegal mining. Access to drinking water is threatened, and because water accumulates in abandoned villages, cases of malaria and drowning have

spiked. Thus the newly generated income does not flow towards the poor, but it vanishes instead. The inflow of legal and illegal mining workers has caused social problems: teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases have increased.

This shows that the Millennium Village Project suffers from the strange and paradox condition of being both too ambitious and not ambitious enough. The project is not ambitious enough, as the approach ignores the underlying roots of poverty and tries instead to overcome poverty with an “engineering approach“ (Easterly 2007b and 2014). The approach does not address the political and socio-economic conditions of the poor (as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter): their being exploited or abandoned by their political representatives to situations of disaster and conflict. The project is too ambitious insofar as it simply wants too much instead of focusing on improving the lives of the poor in one way, for example by providing free malaria nets and training people in their use.

Social engineering approaches such as Jeffrey Sachs' are characterised by top down decision making, bureaucracy, and little and only ex post participation of the poor (Easterly 2007b and 2014, Ramalingam 2013). This leads to a potentially disastrous lack of knowledge of local conditions. As local population – poor as well as elite decision-makers – were not implicated in the process, motivation and political will to implementation were probably low. This is illustrated for the Millennium Villages by Munk (2013) and Nocera (2013). Nocera (2013) also points out that so far, a scaling up of solutions tried out in the Millennium Villages, as was originally planned, has been limited to a \$10 million project financed by the Islamic Development Bank in Uganda. The lack of inclusion of the people concerned in the planning and development of the project is probably to blame here as well.

That said, the final internal evaluation of the project is still pending, with the last annual report dating from 2013, as well as its external evaluation by independent critics. But several points can already be extrapolated for this thesis. A culture of effective giving

will have to centre on realistic goals, not a “silver bullet” or “social engineering”-approach in a chaotic and unforeseeable world (cp. Ramalingam 2013). This is difficult, as it is spectacular causes and disasters that tend to attract public attention. A focus on less spectacular, simple solutions, such as free malaria net distribution or vaccinations, can help ease the burden of poverty, and are thus more than worthy causes. As will be attempted to show further on, the – from a Western donor perspective – much more risky move to simply distribute the calculated \$120 – even more the final \$12.000 that were eventually invested – to each individual household in the time period would have been much more effective (Clemens 2012).

To address the root causes of poverty, however, a donor would have to go beyond the simple treatment of symptoms and reflect on his or her role in the causal chain of poverty. Wilson (2015) does this for one of the big financiers of the Millennium Promise Alliance, when he quite justifiably questions George Soros' involvement in this foundation, while at the same time contributing towards the Bonsaaso gold rush by putting pressure on the price of the mineral by speculation.

4.9. Fair Trade – Ethical Consumption?

Advocates of “effective altruism” argue that it will be possible to change the behaviour of the population towards not only significantly more donations, but also towards giving more rationally. Finding a previous example, where citizens and consumers supported such a societal change, even at a cost to themselves, would give their ideas credibility. At first glance, the success of Fair Trade could be such a case.¹⁶² Fair Trade is a movement to foster a new and fairer way of doing business with the Third World. As there is hardly any

¹⁶² There are many different ways to label the movement from fair trade to Fairtrade. The author decided on the denomination “Fair Trade” used by the movement itself

supermarket chain in Western countries left that does not have at least one counter labelled “Fair Trade”, it can be said that Fair Trade has made – and is still making – a triumphal march.¹⁶³ Leaving behind its humble origins of church sales and specialised shops in the 1970's, Fair Trade has grown dramatically in recent years in many developed countries and has entered mainstream supermarkets, coffee retailing chains, and mail order catalogues (Griffiths 2010 and 2012 and Sylla 2014, 35ff.). Fair Trade is becoming increasingly successful as a brand (or label), especially as part of a new consumer “Lifestyle of Health And Sustainability” (“LOHAS”), intimately connected to the issue of ethical consumption (Brown 2013, Cortese 2003, Emerich 2011, 124ff., and Narlikar and Kim 2013), a general trend towards organic food and (biological) food safety. It would appear that consumers increasingly act on preferences for a juster and more sustainable world by purchasing certified agricultural products. But what exactly is meant by Fair Trade. A definition presented by the organisations themselves would be the following:

“Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalised producers and workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade organisations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade.”¹⁶⁴

The basic idea appears sensible: As shown previously, people in the Third World,

¹⁶³ Although it has to be noted that Fair Trade certification is estimated to account for only 0.01 per cent of global agricultural trade (Brown 2013, Haight 2011, and Sylla 2014).

¹⁶⁴ This is the definition produced by FINE, an informal network that involves the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), the International Federation for Alternative Trade (IFAT), the Network of European Shops (NEWS!), and the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA). For a general description of the Fair Trade movement, see Moore (2004).

especially in rural areas, are still very dependent on agriculture for their income (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2002 and World Bank 2007). Once they are able to move beyond self-sufficiency, it makes sense for them to create some extra income through the cultivation of “cash crops”. A good way for this would appear to be focusing on products that can be exported to the developed and to the wealthier emerging countries, for example coffee, cotton, cacao, or bananas. According to the classical theories of trade, this benefits all actors (Boudreaux 2007, Hassoun 2012, 143ff., and Moyo 2009, 114ff.). But this would entail that poverty would have largely eradicated itself automatically, which it unfortunately didn't. The answers have already been sketched out as conflict, disenfranchisement, exploitation and market failures. For example there are certain conditions under which an exchange, even if agreed upon freely by both parties and beneficial to both, is to be considered unfair. An extremely unequal distribution of power between buyer and producer results in a buyers market (in contrast to a sellers market), leading to a very low price and extremely slim profit margin for small farmers. The micro-level explanation here is that small farmers, especially in remote rural areas, often are confronted with only one or two local buyers of their produce, who then transport the produce to the capital or a port, where it will be sold again and shipped out. This is known in economics as a monopsony. While the seller is dependent on the buyer, the buyer could forgo one seller if he asks too high a price, thereby effectively dictating the market. Additionally, as already discussed, a typical problem of developing countries is the lack of employment opportunities (Easterly 2007b, MacAskill 2015a, ch.8, and World Bank 2007). This means that simply switching to a different occupation while renting out one's land is not a feasible alternative for farmworkers or small farmholders.

Another problem for farmers is the fact that the agricultural commodities market is volatile (characterized by large and frequent price fluctuations) and distorted (ridden with high tariff barriers and subsidies) (cp. Williams 2012). At the same time, small farmers in

developing countries have problems adapting to changing prices. They are confronted with the famous hog cycle-theorem (Harlow 1960), as farmers have to base decision on their production output for this year on last year's prices, they are liable to over- or under-produce collectively, which leads to fluctuations of the prices. Once a field has been sown, the farmer cannot change the output for the entire season.

Price distortions are another major contributor. The distortions are largely the result of policy choices by developed countries. In 2011, OECD governments, especially the EU and US, doled out approximately \$252 billion worth of subsidies to domestic farmers (Paarlberg 2013, ch. 8). These subsidies, along with relatively high tariffs, create a virtually impenetrable trade barrier for developing world farmers. Even producers that are potentially more efficient than those in the West are blocked from entering lucrative Western markets. Meaning that while food prices may rise in the developed world, poor and vulnerable farmers in developing countries are unable to take advantage of them. On the contrary, they are often faced with competition from Western overproduce (cp. Buntzel and Mari 2007).

The global prices of coffee, cotton, and cacao have known high price fluctuations in the last thirty years. For example the price for coffee plummeted since the 1989 abolishment of the International Coffee Agreement from \$1.80 to \$1 (Bates 1997, 25). Apart from the end of the agreement on a fixed price by various countries, the reasons for this fluctuation are climate variability and previously mentioned specificities of the market for agricultural goods.¹⁶⁵ Increased speculation with agricultural commodities also have an influence here (Boudreaux 2007, Burch, Clapp, and Murphy 2012).¹⁶⁶

The Fair Trade movement arose to address some of the failures of the market and

¹⁶⁵ Again I refer to the famous hog cycle-theorem (Harlow 1960), as aforementioned on page 213. As farmers have to base decision for their production output for this year on last year's prices, they are liable to over- or underproduce collectively, which leads to fluctuations of the prices.

¹⁶⁶ In classical economic theory, speculation is actually beneficial in the long-term, as the markets approximate the true price of a commodity. However reality has shown that in the short term speculation can lead to price fluctuation and, especially in the case of agricultural produce, hoarding (Brooks, Prokopczuk, and Wu 2015 and Williams 2012, 8ff.). It also should be noted that with the notable exception of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange founded in 2008, the financial activities takes place in the global North, thus again creating wealth primarily there.

remedy important social issues. As the name implies, Fair Trade has sought not only to protect farmers but also to correct the legacy of the colonial mercantilist system and the kind of crony capitalism where large businesses obtain special privileges from local governments, preventing small businesses from competing and flourishing. The basic idea is simple, consumers should buy their product directly from small farmholders instead of from big agricultural companies and assure their livelihoods by paying a reliable price.¹⁶⁷

This seems to fit well into the aforementioned “Zeitgeist” of a lifestyle of health and sustainability (“LOHAS”) (cp. Brown 2013). In theory, it serves at the same time the farmer or plantation worker in the developing world, as well as the Western conspicuous consumer, thus creating a win-win-situation. This form of conspicuous consumption could also be interpreted as another drain on pro-social resource, some buyers of Fair Trade products may even tend to act less ethically after the purchase due to the mental accounting phenomenon explained earlier in this thesis (cp. Mazar and Zhong 2010 and Thaler 1985 and 1999). For example Carrigan and Attalla (2001) show that ethical considerations only enter into buying decisions, when it is convenient to consumers, which may even be regarded as a somewhat cynical attitude.

Nevertheless there is a lot of public and political support for Fair Trade. For example in February 2013, the British Fairtrade Foundation staged a march on the British Parliament, a campaign featuring various celebrities, such as the Archbishop of York, and more than 13.000 petitioners, urging UK Prime Minister David Cameron to put issues of ethical consumerism at the centre of the G8 summit (Narlikar and Kim 2013, 1).

In view of the quite desperate situation of many of the small farmers, the idea of Fair Trade looks convincing. As the issues of power balance and agricultural subsidies are

¹⁶⁷ Although the concept of ethical trade has existed for a long time, the institutionalization of the Fair Trade movement did not begin in earnest until the late 1980s (cp. Sylla 2014, 35ff.). In 1989, the World Fair Trade Organization was founded, and in the years that followed, various Fair Trade certification and labelling processes emerged. A product is granted a Fair Trade label once its producers have met a list of social, economic, and environmental requirements. The stated purpose of the Fair Trade movement is to give economic security to producers in developing countries – often of unprocessed commodities such as fruits, live animals, and minerals – by requiring companies and consumers to pay a premium on the market price of the certified product. In exchange, the Fair Trade retailer guarantees to take all the produce of the farm for a minimum price.

unlikely to improve his life, take solidarity directly to the farmer. But the final decision should depend on proven facts, how and when did Fair Trade improve livelihoods of the poor? In other words, the moral claim of being a more ethical alternative to other consumer goods depends on the clear proof of a moral superiority of the goods produced under the Fair Trade label (cp. Brown 2013 and Fridell 2004).

Criticism of Fair Trade

Although advocates of Fair Trade often boast with impressive growth figures, it has to be noted that Fair Trade remains a fringe phenomenon. It is estimated to account for only 0.01 per cent of global agricultural trade (Brown 2013, Haight 2011, and Sylla 2014). According to the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, Germans spent €784 million on Fair Trade products, mostly coffee, in 2013 (Rohwetter 2014, 17). But more than 11.000 tons of Fair Trade coffee were ground and brewed in Germany in 2013. The market share, however, is still at a humble two per cent, in the US and Great Britain Fair Trade coffee has a more important market share of 4 per cent (Haight 2011 and Sylla 2014). Consumers still overwhelmingly choose their coffee because of price, quality or marketing, not because they want to do something good for others.

Even more problematic may be that even this relatively small success in terms of market shares, again is by a movement that primarily focuses on improving western consumer's self-image, while the effectiveness of Fair Trade is unclear (Haight 2011 and Sylla 2014). Just as with many cases of donations the consumer may feel that by buying Fair Trade products or by donating to charity he has contributed sufficiently to justice for the world's poor, while he in reality has accomplished very little but gain a "warm-glow". Several studies agree that Fair Trade is the wrong instrument to combat poverty in developing countries (Griffiths 2010 and 2012, Narlikar and Kim 2013, and Cramer et al.

2014).

The movement has faced repeated criticisms, for example, for the relatively expensive fees that producers must pay to get a Fair Trade label, which make it inaccessible for many poor farmers (Griffiths 2010 and 2012 and Sylla 2014, 121ff.). Fair Trade can primarily benefit already better off farmholders and members of a farming cooperative in countries where cash crops are grown. Farmers do own land and therefore are relatively wealthy, certainly if we compare their situation to that of landless workers. Cramer et al. (2014) in a four-year study commissioned by the United Kingdom Department for International Development observed the effects of Fair Trade certification on poverty reduction in Uganda and Ethiopia. The results are quite sobering overall, but especially for small farmholders. The profit goes to medium and larger agricultural producers, although it did have a small positive effect on wage employment, which is very prevalent in rural areas producing agricultural export commodities. The capacity of Fair Trade to create quality jobs is limited, as the focus is on agriculture with much low skilled labour, and a not very high profit margin. There is not much additional profit to be made, as the supplier industry (including manufacture and service), the production of seeds, of fertilizer, and of pesticides is in the safe-keeping of Western companies, for example with Monsanto and Bayer. From a geographical perspective, a problem may indeed be that the Fair Trade-movement has been especially successful in regions that are already quite well-off. It is actually more the emerging countries that profit, such as Mexico or Nicaragua (Valkila, Haaparanta, and Niemi 2010).

Another area of concern is just how lucrative the process is for middlemen and retailers, compared to how little of the premium that consumers pay actually reaches the needy producers (Valkila, Haaparanta, and Niemi 2010 and Sylla 2014). Only one or two percent of the retail price of a more expensive cup of Fair Trade coffee goes directly to poor farmers (Griffiths 2012, 359f.). Both Griffiths (2010 and 2012) and Sylla (2014) are

concerned that Fair Trade is primarily a marketing ploy which primarily profits retailers in the developed world.¹⁶⁸ This would make Fair Trade another example for the Machiavellian problem. Meaning that the “Fair” is primarily targeted at customers seeking an easy way to get a “warm glow”, while financial benefits from the higher prices are essentially captured by the wealthiest groups in the supply chain, e.g. the retailers in the west such as Starbucks. This problem is ironically a result of Fair Trade's rising popularity and the higher selling prices. This very success is accompanied by now many certificates, labels, and logos claim “Fair Trade”, that do not meet the original standards, but only but even laxer conditions and little control on labour standards and distribution of profits (Fridell 2004, Haight 2011, Narlikar and Kim 2013, and Sylla 2014, ch. 2).¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile, there is a sort of impenetrable certificate and logo thicket (cp. Rohwetter 2014).

Griffiths (2012) argues that the premiums charged for Fair Trade products is just another direct farm subsidy. While those subsidies are miniscule in comparison with the ones that OECD governments hand out, he raises the point whether counteracting one subsidy with another one makes economic and moral sense, especially since consumers in developed countries ultimately pay both, either through taxes or at the supermarket. In a perspective similar to Charlton and Stiglitz (2005) and Moyo (2009) he argues for abolishment of trade barriers and subsidies instead.

From a macro-perspective we find that products such as coffee and cacao face high competition globally, as many developing and emerging countries are focussing their efforts in that direction. It might thus be better for citizens of wealthy developed countries to advocate with their politicians for fairer international trade and debt regulations (Pogge 2010a and 2011), for farmers to focus on high quality products instead of Fair Trade (Boudreaux 2007) and for developing countries governments to try to limit their dependency on primary products to an improved manufacturing sector (Jütting and De

¹⁶⁸ As the title of Sylla's book illustrates: “The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich.”

¹⁶⁹ Cp. <http://www.fairtrade-deutschland.de/ueber-fairtrade/ueber-transfair/fairtrade-siegel-logos/>

Laiglesia 2009 and MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8).

Additionally, Fair Trade certificates, just as INGOs, suffer from a problem of overcrowding (Rohwetter 2014 and Stern 2013). So additionally to the “traditional” labels such as GEPA and FairTrade (Transfair), new labels such as the Rainforest Alliance, UTZ certified, and Naturland have been established. This variety can prove confusing to the consumer. Similarly to charities (Stern 2013), an establishment of minimal standards could help (Rohwetter 2014, 18). A problem is the mere number of Fair Trade labels – there are more than 600 of them only in the UK (Sylla 2014, ch. 2). There activists who say that in this case, government intervention is justifiable (Stern 2013a). The German Ministry of Development, while agreeing with the need to act against “greenwashing”, is reluctant to act due to difficulties with the implementation. For an in-depth discussion see Dine 2013.¹⁷⁰

It must be feared that some Fair Trade certificates primarily serve for the maximisation of profits of the food industry, e.g. the Rainforest Alliance (Sylla 2014). The relevant products can be highly contaminated or polluted and of a minor quality. It is also possible that the consumer receives a deceptive package, meaning that only a part of the ingredients really stems from Fair Trade-certified farms, plantations, or artisans.

Fraud may also occur (Rohwetter 2014, 17). As there are no entry barriers to creating a Fair Trade label, this leads to a weakening of principles. For example, the Rainforest Alliance allows the mixing of non-certified produce with certified one (Rohwetter 2014, 18). This means that the customer pays a Fair Trade price for a product, say coffee, that actually has only 30 per cent Fair Trade content. This form of “greenwashing” weakens the trust in Fair Trade labels in general (Dine 2013, 199f.).

An aggravating circumstance is that only few of the logo bearing companies do control the working conditions and wages of their suppliers. It seems that exactly the

¹⁷⁰ In Germany, the problem has been identified and is being addressed in an informational campaign. Cp. <http://www.siegelklarheit.de/kampagne/> (also <https://www.bmz.de/textil/#/> and <http://www.fairtradekleidung.org/>).

scaling up has enormously diminished the benefit of Fair Trade. The consumer is thus trapped in precious illusion of doing a good deed. It can therefore be concluded that Fair Trade detracts attention from the real solution and lulls consumers into a false sense of satisfaction.

4.10. Why Official Development Aid is No Solution

An alternative solution could be a state-organised or official development aid. Most states are already active in this area. There are several advantages to this form of development aid. The institutionalization would allow for a more result-oriented evaluation. This could help avoid negative side-effects such as crowding out and lead to a more effective use of resources for aid. Relying on taxes for funding may be less insecure than depending on public perception, with geographical factors such as distance and emotional aspects such as victim blame (see chapter 3.7. and 3.9.). In the following, some falling back on argumentation already used before will be unavoidable.

In democracies, as was already attempted to illustrate, public opinion can play a crucial role, and it can be influenced, e.g. by television or tabloid press.¹⁷¹ To get public support for development aid, politicians must present results to their voters.¹⁷² It is equally important to note that governments have a motive to publicize their investments in international aid, although this – as also was already tried to explain – can counteract individual motivation to give.

To avoid competition between nations that help (in) developing countries, effective forms of multilateral organisations would be necessary, e.g. under the roof of the United Nations. But big international bodies charged with responsibility for dispensing or

¹⁷¹ After a terrorist attack it could be difficult to give development aid to the home-country of the attackers, although a country cannot be held responsible for the actions of individual citizens. Cp. the discussion on victim blame in the research of Zagefka et al. 2011.

¹⁷² Though INGOs regularly present their yearly reports, these do not seem find too much public interest.

regulating aid to the less-developed countries would hold the risk of a bureaucracy to consume a significant share of the limited aid funds, thus giving citizens the feeling that their tax money, meant to help developing countries, went to bureaucrats in developed countries.

Explanations for the allocation of foreign aid commonly emphasize the strategic concerns of states. This approach generally purports that nations ultimately seek to advance their standing in the international community, relying (even if inadvertently) on the premise that nations are inherently unitary actors in an anarchic self-help system in which no overarching governmental body exists. This means – as was already attempted to make clear – that foreign aid is directed to states based on the strategic interests of the donor (Olson 2000, 19ff.). Nations particularly concerned with the recipient's behaviour may seek to influence its policy through blackmail. This is seen at both the domestic level, where legislators have been found to vote for or against aid depending on the economic benefits to their constituents (Milner and Tingley 2010), and on the international stage, as permanent members of the UN Security Council (especially the United States) give a disproportional amount of aid to the rotating, non-permanent members in order to secure their cooperation

Strategic concerns often outweigh most other concerns, including humanitarian needs. Consequently, environmental disasters can be (mis)used to increase national security. The literature on strategic interests suggests that regime type would have little impact on the allocation of aid, emergency or otherwise (cp. Alesina and Dollar 2000 and Glennie 2009). If donors give aid primarily on the basis of strategic considerations, then their domestic institutions will have only a negligible effect. Since the nation-state is seen as a unitary actor, its democratic governmental structure would have little effect upon its giving of aid, as a different regime type would not necessarily alter what the nation perceives as its best interests. Domestic government would only matter insofar as it would

determine which actors pursue the state's interests and how they go about doing so. Scholars have argued that, in the context of a variety of cases involving democratic donors, greater media coverage led governments to give more aid to disaster-struck nations (Olsen 2000). At the very least, this would indicate that something other than national interest can influence aid allocation. Theoretically, this works for a variety of reasons which have never been tested empirically.

In a democracy, the public is informed about environmental disasters through the news media. This prompts a reaction from government officials, who provide aid in order to appease the electorate and enhance their public image by appearing more compassionate. More intensive news coverage leads to a bigger government response, and therefore more aid, because of its effect upon the populace. However, the ability of the public to lobby the government and the related pressures on elected officials leads to a conclusion beyond merely the amount of media coverage. If the suggested causal mechanism were correct, the amount of aid given by a country would depend upon regime type, at least to a limited extent. Democratic governments would experience more internal pressure in the aftermath of environmental disasters than officials in repressive states, and would correspondingly give more aid.

The postulate that democracy matters relies on several assumptions that deviate from the previous literature. The more liberal international political theory assumes that the state is composed of differentiated interests and that individuals and private groups have a large influence on government actions and therefore on international relations. Domestic politics are derived in a bottom-up process. In other studies on foreign aid, regime type is distinguished in large part by the size of the electorate, or the selection of individuals whose majority support is necessary to govern. (Olson 2000, 5ff.)

However, the current international debate on development aid seems to contain two more or less opposed points of view (Olsen 2000, 2f). On the one side is the argument that

aid is facing a crisis of legitimacy. According to Nick van de Walle, the actual mood in the donor societies is “one of great frustration and growing cynicism” (van de Walle 1999, 339). He argues that “the legitimacy of the aid continues to decline for lack of evidence that aid actually allows countries to progress forward economically” (van de Walle 1999, 352). Roger Riddell (1999, 311) finds “serious and perhaps growing doubts about aid to Africa”.

The World Bank supports the general claim that the “donor fatigue” in the last two decades may explain the decline in aid to Africa. According to it, donor fatigue is “explained in part by the belief that aid to Africa has done little to increase growth and reduce poverty” (World Bank 2000, 236f., also cp. CARMA 2006, 9 and Moeller 1999). Lloyd Thérien and Jean-Philippe Carolyn continue along the same lines that aid “has been undergoing a deep crisis [...]”, and they note that “aid has never been lower in the foreign policy agenda of developed countries” (Thérien and Carolyn 2000, 21ff.). The two authors argue that public opinion in Western countries is perhaps the most decisive factor that will affect the future of aid (Thérien and Carolyn 2000, 35).

Sweden is often seen as the good example of a country giving development aid in a rational, efficient, and effective way (ROA 2010 and Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, 314ff.). In Sweden, there are no tax deductions for charitable donations. Compared to the United States of America, Sweden has a smaller private philanthropic sector and a larger public sector. Yet, in proportion to the size of its national economy, the government of Sweden gives more than three times as much money to help the world's poor as the US do in governmental and private sector aid combined. That contrast should make us question whether the present system of charitable tax deductions in the USA and in most European countries is adequate – and effective.

During the cold war, strategic interests were of primary importance. Consequently, official donors would not hesitate to provide major funding to governments like that of

Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines (Kaufmann 2009). Today, aid effectiveness and accountability have improved, but commercial and strategic interests are still paramount. So Afghanistan is a major recipient of Official Development Aid. The core problems of aid – bad governance, corruption, lack of transparency, control of efficiency – do still play a far too big role. In other words, far too much money meant for the poor goes into the wrong channels, where it does not achieve what would be really necessary and truly help, or end up in the wrong pockets.

Georg Cremer, secretary general of Caritas Germany, in his 2008 book “Corruption and Development Aid: Confronting the Challenges” is very open about the flaws of development aid, especially corruption, due to the rampant corruption in the developing world. But he also has ideas about what could be done about this. Controlling corruption is crucial, but extremely difficult to achieve. At the basis there have to be anti-corruption reforms and laws installed which secure the utmost transparency in the finances of a country – for example by making payment flows public. Politicians and bankers have to increasingly be accountable to their citizens. The legal base for prosecuting corruption ought to be strengthened. One possibility to reducing corruption is through the implementation of an anti-corruption agency (as e.g. was done in Hong-Kong). A must is certainly to secure the freedom of the press.

But all this will only work if a government is really interested in reducing corruption. This cannot be claimed for many developing countries. The problem is that often the incentives go against this. The English proverb “crime does not pay” does not seem applicable here. The fact is that kleptomania and corruption frequently do pay very well for politicians in developing countries. A consequence thereof is bad governance, and this means that national resources in developing countries only profit the elite. As was already attempted to argue, to change this is difficult from the outside. As many developing and emerging countries are actually quite wealthy in terms of natural resources, the

problem would not have to be one of money, but is. But if the problem is not one of wealth, it is illusory and naïve to believe that more money in the form of government aid will solve it.

What could help the world's poor most probably? What could end their receiving bad services? Different solutions have been presented here. It seems that direct support of the poor, even better direct cash, will have the strongest impact on the improvement of their health and education. This can lead to their empowerment. This, again, can help them to engage into laying the political basis for a well-functioning democracy, which will give the poor the power and freedom to take their destiny into their own hands and to “make poverty history” by themselves (Sireau 2009).

4.11. Microcredits – Banking for the Poor

“In teaching economics, I learned about money, and now as head of a bank I lend money. The success of our venture lies in how many crumpled bank bills our once starving members now have in their hands. But the microcredit movement, which is built around, and for, and with money, ironically, is at its heart, at its deepest root not about money at all. It is about helping each person to achieve his or her fullest potential. It is not about cash capital, it is about human capital. Money is merely a tool that unlocks human dreams and helps even the poorest and most unfortunate people on this planet achieve dignity, respect, and meaning in their lives.”

Muhammad Yunus reflecting on the 1997 Microcredit Summit in *Banker to the Poor*, (1999, 1).

After their introduction by economist Muhammad Yunus and their implementation in the Bangladeshi Grameen village bank programme (1974), microcredits (or to use the more

exact term: “microfinancing”) have been hailed by journalists and academics as an innovative and promising approach to reduce poverty in poor areas around the world (cp. Hulme and Moore 2007 and Yunus 1999).¹⁷³ The fame of the concept has since increased extraordinarily. Yunus and his Grameen bank even received the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to create economic and social development from below” that microcredit “must play a major part” in ending global poverty..¹⁷⁴ 2005 was named the Year of Microcredit, by the UN and several large Western financial institutions.¹⁷⁵ The microcredit charity Kiva has over 1.6 million lenders, the highest possible rating from Charity Navigator and promises Western donors a direct contact via the Internet with small entrepreneurs in the developing world (cp. Coleman 2007).¹⁷⁶ The 2006 Nobel Committee boldly claimed that microcredit “must play a major part” in ending global poverty. Attracting considerable public attention, it can safely be assumed that micro-lending was and continues to be a development hype. But what is microfinancing and how effective is it?

Microcredits make use of the inventiveness and industry of individuals, as well as their capacity to evaluate and exploit market niches and business opportunities. The idea of creating and investing into your own enterprise is a foundation of market economics (or “capitalism”). Access to credits increases a society's innovativeness, boosts the rapidity of technological progress, improves social permeability, and finally enhances the welfare of the society as a whole (cp. De Soto 2000). On an individual level, access to financial capital may be an important element in overcoming household poverty, as demonstrated by Sen (2003) and Banerjee et al. (2009) for poor rural households in Bangladesh.

There has been a long tradition of aid agencies and NGOs providing small loans, usually of less than \$100, to poor families (Coleman 2007, 4). These small, often

¹⁷³ Interestingly, Bangladesh, while the most famous example, was not the first region where microcredits were introduced. According to Doran (2008, 2), the movement began in the early 1970s in Latin America with experimental programmes by NGOs such as “Opportunity International”.

¹⁷⁴ Cp. www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.

¹⁷⁵ Cp. www.yearofmicrocredit.org.

¹⁷⁶ Cp. www.kiva.org – motto: *Loans That Change Lives*.

agricultural, loans, normally repayable with a very modest interest rate, have been shown to be able to successfully improve the lot of the poor (Banerjee et al. 2015).

However, several aspects of credit-based investment have to be discussed here to gain an understanding of how microcredits work and which problems they have to confront. First of all, while many ideas and projects will result in a successful creation of an enterprise, some of them will fail. This will often result in a forfeit or bankruptcy of the debtor. The creditors, the bank, and its clients need to insure themselves against this possibility. They do this via interest rate, diversification, and collateral (cp. Garrett 1995). The interest rate is money that banks charge in addition to the sum lent. It allows the bank to cover administrative costs and to gain income which serves as an insurance against forfeits, allowing to pay employees salaries and interest to their shareholders. Diversification refers to the fact that banks do not invest all of their resources in a single project. Rather, they diversify their investments into different projects, thereby minimising their losses in case of credit default. As clients pool their financial resources, they profit from additional diversification possibilities. Collateral is a borrower's pledge of specific assets (for example property) to the lender as insurance for the repayment of a loan (Garrett 1995, 99ff.).

The idea behind microcredits can thus be explained quite easily. The problem of poor families in developing countries is that even if they have a promising investment possibility, their lack of (material) collateral makes it impossible for them to obtain a credit, even if a functioning banking system exists in the country.¹⁷⁷ This means that many good ideas and investment opportunities are never realized. Typical investment possibilities are small businesses or agricultural in nature, typically to buy crops, livestock and material, or to open a small trade or extend an already existing one (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 158ff.). Some families could create a regular income by e.g. by a market stand, a sewing machine, a mobile phone to be rented out to other villagers, or cooking utensils and

¹⁷⁷ Which of course is not necessarily the case, as De Soto (2000) shows.

materials to open a snack bar. Such small business ideas do not need an exuberant starting capital, most micro-loans are between \$50 and \$500. For many poor, this is already a large sum. Here microcredit banking can help by providing small-scale loans. Without access to regular financial institutions or collateral, many good ideas that can improve a families income remain unrealised or the only possibility that remains is to borrow money from a extra-legal (frequently criminal) „loan shark“, although an investment would pay off for the bank as well as for the family.

However, it is naïve to think that micro-lending exists completely without collateral. Rather, microfinancing institutions use “social” instead of “real” capital to assure repayment. “Social capital” is an ancient idea that we can find under different names (such as social community or cohesion) in the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Edmund Burke (Bowles and Gintis 2002, 419). In the microcredit context, the term generally refers to the use of social networks by banking institutions to assure the repayment of (micro)credits.

Alan Doran (2008, 2) underlines that the solidarity lending system is “a key reason why the poorest groups – and women especially – were able to take advantage of it”. He explains the system in simple terms:

“(W)ould-be borrowers form groups (usually between three and six people), within which each member agrees to guarantee the loans of the others. If any one individual member defaults on his or her loan, the other members of the group are required to cover the shortfall.”

Alan Doran (2008, 2).

The inability to pay back one's loan therefore does not only influence one's own “credit rating”, i.e. the possibility to obtain an additional credit and the corresponding interest rate.

Rather, the loans are given to a group of people, often from the same village or with a common family background. If one group member defaults, the whole group has to pay. This assures through social pressure that repayments are guaranteed by the community, and repayment rates are high indeed (Schurmann and Johnston 2009). It also means, as people have to apply collectively, that only people perceived as trustworthy by their group, and therefore with a high social capital, can receive a loan. In the absence of material collateral and credit-rating systems, the group-lending model makes use of local information among a group or village about who is a reliable borrower and hard worker and villagers reveal such information by using their judgement to select fellow debtors for their small groups. In this way, the group-based lending model both uses and builds upon the social capital of its borrowers. This lowers transaction costs and risks for the provider. Women are specifically targeted by banks and NGOs that provide microcredits. This is often presented as a developmental measure, as most of the poorest countries have a traditionally patriarchal culture that severely limits women's possibilities to participate in the marketplace (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996). They are often excluded from political and economic progress and have difficulties acquiring social status and wealth independently from their fathers or husbands. Therefore, women are particularly vulnerable to poverty. As a beneficial side-effect can be seen that increasing a mother's income has a much more positive effect on the children's development (education, health, and nutrition) than increasing that of the father.

But while microcredits may have set out with the intention of women's empowerment, a factor that was underlined in the 2006 microcredit summit (Reed 2011, 4), the political goals are no longer the primary reason why women are the special target of microfinance. It seems that they are “more sensitive to peer pressure and so are more reliable debtors” (Schurmann and Johnston 2009, 519).

As good as it may appear, the approach has considerable disadvantages. Due to the

social capital-approach, people who suffer from social stigma and exclusion are unable to secure a credit (Schurmann and Johnston 2009). Those are often society's worst off. Even when explicitly included in microcredit programmes, some groups, such as landless seasonal labourers, are less able to benefit because they do not have a regular income that would enable them to commit to repayments, including interest. A loan for such borrowers means increased insecurity and risk. It is generally acknowledged that traditional group-lending microcredit programmes are not appropriate for the ultra-poor. These people will continue to have to rely on loan-sharks, which goes some way towards explaining why these continue to grow even in societies where microfinancing has been introduced. By benefiting only the less poor, microcredit can further isolate the ultra-poor by increasing inequality (Doran 2008, 5).

Additionally, the use of peer pressure in some cases can be quite problematic. Especially the Grameen Bank is criticised for enforcing a strong group spirit and thereby “indoctrinating” members of their microcredit-programme (Duflo et. al. 2013 and Bateman and Chang 2009). This pressure is not without its risks, anecdotal reports on suicides of borrowers in India who could not succeed and meet their obligations, due to drought or other natural problems, or due to being cheated out of their money have been further collaborated by a study Ashta, Khan, and Otto (2015), indicating that microfinance penetration among the poor is indeed a causal factor for and increased suicide rate (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 169 and Polgreen and Bajaj 2010).¹⁷⁸ When there are no personal institutions such as advising services for debtors or technical assistance, and if the person involved is illiterate, there is a high risk that the household will be trapped in a circle of unrepayable debt (Duflo et. al. 2013, Bateman 2010, ch. 4, Bateman and Chang 2009, and Hickel 2015).

Finally, the contribution of microfinance to improve household income and empower women has also been questioned, especially when compared with other possible

¹⁷⁸ The enormous stress people in poverty face has already been discussed (cp. Mullainathan and Shafir 2013).

interventions (Duflo et. al. 2013 and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012). Roodman and Morduch 2009 say there is no significant progress of the life-quality of the vast majority of microcredit takers after 30 years. Other studies corroborate this (Bateman 2010 and Roodman and Morduch 2009). Concerning empowerment, Hunt and Kasynathan (2002) provide evidence from interviews conducted in rural Bangladesh and India. The results are worrying. While women are the ones receiving the credit, it seems that most of the time they only have partial control over its usage. “Many women are merely 'postboxes': passing on the full amount of their loans directly to their husbands, sons, or sons-in-law, with little or no access to the income generated, and receiving back only enough money to make weekly loan repayments” (Hunt and Kasynathan 2002, 71). Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) found similar results: On average only 37 per cent of loans provided by four different Bangladeshi credit organisations were significantly controlled by their (female) beneficiaries. The men managed the enterprise, often using their wife and daughters as unpaid labour (also cp. Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012). Several studies found that although receiving a microcredit increases the probability that a small business is started, there is little to no sustainable effect on household income, female empowerment, health or education (Duflo et. al. 2013 and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012). It seems that, especially in poor communities, economic possibilities remain limited, whether families have access to credit or not (cp. Moyo 2009, 129f). Finally, some scientists (Bateman and Chang 2009, Roodman and Morduch 2009, and Chang 2010) criticise microcredits as a “miraculous” approach that basically performs a bootstrap move.¹⁷⁹ According to this view, microcredits are a way for poor people to “pull themselves out of their misery” by their own bootstraps. This resembles an anecdote by the notoriously famous German Baron von Münchhausen, in which he tells how he managed to help himself out of a swamp by pulling at his scalp. These sceptics claim that the idea is as ludicrous and unrealistic as Münchhausen's feat.

¹⁷⁹ Before the success of microcredits, the economic consensus was that poor people are not “bankable” (Hulme and Moore 2007, 105).

In contrast to the myth of the self-made entrepreneur, the success of an individual is largely dependent on his or her environment. Developing countries already have far more self-employed microentrepreneurs than developed countries, simply because people there cannot rely on a safety net and neither are jobs abundant. As already mentioned, in Africa up to 60 per cent of the working population are employed in the agricultural sector, and between 30 and 50 per cent of the rest are self-employed, in some countries even more: 66.9 per cent in Ghana, 75.4 per cent in Bangladesh, and 88.7 per cent in Benin – compared to 7.5 per cent of self-employed in the United States of America (Chang 2010, 213f. and Jütting and De Laiglesia 2009). Microentrepreneurism has only very limited capacity to be scaled up, create additional jobs and one day become a successful national or even international company. A good idea certainly is of high relevance, but also the disposition infrastructure, existing products, technology, knowledge, rule of law and most importantly, the existing market where he can sell his product (Chang 2010, 221ff.). If these are not existent, even Warren Buffet, Steve Jobs, or Bill Gates would have had to limit their idea to a local mobile phone rental shop.

From a macro-perspective, there is a limit when large organisations and companies are needed. They lead to more wealth, as they employ and produce on a larger scale – and they import and export goods. Scaling up microcredits is no alternative to larger industry, capital, and secure political and economic structures. In fact channelling too many resources into, often extra-legal, microenterprises and self-employment, and so not into small and medium businesses that are far more productive and usually pay taxes, may hinder national growth (cp. Auriol and Warlters 2005 and Bateman 2010).

Further criticism aims at the providing institutions, such as the aforementioned Kiva foundation not being fully transparent, especially receivers having to pay high interest but (charitable) donors receiving nothing thereof. Kiva is attractive to donors because not only can you single out an individual on the online-platform to which you

want to give a loan, also as they pay it back, then you can then loan the same sum out again and again, meaning that contrary to a donation, you can keep re-using the same sum. Kiva advertises high repayment rates of 97 per cent, however these are partly due to outstanding loans being counted as repaid and because local Kiva partners ensure the repayments through high interest rates (Roodman 2012, 115ff. and 241). There is a yearly interest rate on microcredits between 40 and 50 per cent in Bangladesh and even between 80 and 100 per cent in Mexico (Bateman 2010, ch. 5, Bateman and Chang 2009, Chang 2010, 218).

To close this chapter, while receiving a lot of attention and financing, microcredits has a poor rate of impact both locally and none so ever from a macro-perspective. The hype around microcredits still persists and leads to further developments such as “radicalised microfinance”, where the poor are supposed to take up credits pay for public goods such as water, health or sanitation (Mader 2011 and Bateman 2010). This extreme position is already set into the very fabric of microfinance, which is settling the poorest with the task of eliminating poverty by themselves. A problem they are neither solely responsible for and which completely ignores the role and of governments and the multinational community have played in the development of the Western world (Chang 2002b, 2008, and 2010b).

In fact the best results obtained by microfinancing, are an actual by-product. As some banks also established affordable saving accounts, it provides a first possibility to save and collect interest, although again this measure does not reach the very poor. It has been demonstrated, that only 5 per cent of microloans are taken with intention of opening an own trade and actually the money is used for *consumption smoothing* (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 161f., Chang 2010, 219, and Rose 1999). Poor families, too, have periods of more and periods of less financial neediness, e.g. small farmers directly after their harvest. This money could be taken during seed-time to buy seeds and fertilizer. If there is no such bank, the money stays under the mattress, where it creates no interest and where it even

may get stolen. Or a credit can be taken to pay for expenditures such as building or school fees, which can then be paid back during less lean times.

Even enthusiasts, affirm that microfinance can only be one contribution to facilitate the access of the poorest to wealth and better capacities (cp. Doran 2008, 8f.). The microfinance community increasingly recognises that their initiatives are not the “silver bullet” that will terminate global poverty (cp. Reed 2011, 1). As Hickel (2015) affirms there is a much better solution, that not only has none of the disadvantages of microcredits and is much, much more efficient at combatting poverty. It even serves the poorest, if instead of loaning it out, we simply give cash to the poor. Unfortunately, this solution still has to reach the popularity of microlending, partly due to entrenched mistrust towards the poor.

4.12. Direct Giving to the Poor

“Despite eight years of successful cash assistance in Somalia, aid agencies and their donors were reluctant to support cash transfers. Many donor countries had enacted anti-terrorism legislation and so aid agency staff feared prosecution should cash be diverted. We fought for cash assistance, writing letters to leaders, calling meetings, and advocating with donors to support cash transfer programming. In the end, we implemented the largest NGO cash transfer programme in history. But this was done despite, rather than with the support of, the humanitarian system. It was a battle, every step of the way, and in the months it took to fight it, many thousands of people died unnecessarily.”

Degan Ali, one of the leaders of the Somali cash response quoted in ODI (2015, 22).

Contrary to intuition, one of the most promising approaches to development aid are direct

cash transfers to the poor, both via governmental agencies in the form of welfare (as for example in Ethiopia, Malawi, Brazil, and Mexico) or private, be it through traditional child sponsorship-programmes or through *GiveDirectly*, which according to the rigorous charity evaluation agencies *The Life you Can Save*¹⁸⁰ and *GiveWell*,¹⁸¹ is among the best INGOs in the world. This chapter serves to demonstrate why distributing money directly to poor households is one of the best development interventions, yet for several reasons, among them donor psychology, this perhaps simplest of solutions remains drastically underfunded.¹⁸²

The success of this form of aid can be inferred from a plethora of recent empirical impact assessments (Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013, Fiszbein, Schady, and Ferreira 2009, Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, Haushofer and Shapiro 2013, Hulme and Moore 2007, and Kabeer, Piza, and Taylor 2012). Direct aid has been shown to be cost-effective, unbureaucratic, easily adaptable to different societies, and crucially, it is exactly what the poor themselves want (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Standing 2008, and Toth 2014). Quite uniquely, it is a measure that works well in the context of humanitarian as well as long term development aid (ODI 2015). In the case of humanitarian aid the money is distributed to the affected population, allowing them to buy food. Contrary to the aforementioned problems of food aid, it strengthens local markets instead of crowding them out, as possible leftover money is simply put to reconstruction.

Research shows that the poor make good investment decisions, especially regarding food, their own and their children's education, accommodation, sanitation and health (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, 53ff., Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013, and Dowling and Yap 2009). Indeed the results of these evaluations demonstrate that fear of the poor investing in “unnecessary luxuries”, such as drugs, alcohol, or cigarettes is misplaced (Evans and Popova 2014). Instead, the poor invest soundly, for example a frequent

¹⁸⁰ Cp. <https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/Where-to-Donate>.

¹⁸¹ Cp. <http://www.givewell.org/international/top-charities/give-directly>.

¹⁸² Part of this chapter is based on the article “The Poor Have No Money – So Just Give It to Them! In Favour of Inclusive Aid and Unconditional Cash Transfers” (Lauer and Lepenies 2015).

expenditure is on a tin roof, which is better equipped to handle rain than the cheaper thatched ones and does not have to be replaced every few years. There is further evidence that direct cash provides an incentive against young males becoming “violence specialists”, a term used by Robert Bates to denote individuals trying to win resources by joining a criminal gang or a rebel group, in ways that other forms of aid do not (Bates 2008 and Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013). Not only does it give people the necessary resources to make political participation even an option, it can also increase accountability. Melo (2007) uses the example of Brazil's *bolsa familia*-programme to show that wide acceptance of the transfer programme to alleviate poverty and especially support elderly and mothers has led the partly oil-financed programme to be adopted by both major political parties. Political competition thus ensures that the programme remains intact, even in the background of currently low oil prices. Todd Moss (2011) argues along this line, citizens naturally have a strong incentives to carefully monitor the incoming revenue. After all, it is much easier to see if the same amount comes in each month, then to read government reports. This fosters a critical attitude towards government management and distribution of resources and aid money, and how it is distributed. Political leaders and parties are thus forced to demonstrate responsible management and prove their accountability. Not surprisingly, it is much more difficult to obscure diversions of financial flows that are distributed directly, compared to for example infrastructure projects.

There are good reasons to believe that direct giving may also reduce some consequences of the resource curse and the Dutch disease¹⁸³ for the poor in developing countries, which are partly responsible for their situation (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011 and Moss 2011). Moreover, it can make their society more inclusive, as it gives poor people a chance to participate economically (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The money dispensation could be done digitally over mobile phone accounts, thus further increasing

¹⁸³ Cp. for these phenomena ch. 2.11. of this thesis.

accountability and minimise risk of theft¹⁸⁴ (Aker and Mbiti 2010, Aker et al. 2014, and ODI 2015). This would give many poor their first banking opportunity (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 190ff.). If possible, households rather than individuals should be the recipients, with a preference for money being distributed primarily to mothers and irrespective of family size. For the first years, the money could be paid by donor country governments and private contributors exclusively. After this period, local governments could ideally take over an increasing share of the contributions, until finally taking over all payments, thus in effect creating a minimal financial support system for their citizens.

Transfers may also reduce instances of (mental) health problems caused by financial distress (Adler and Snibbe 2003 and Patel et al. 2001) and allow people to make sounder financial decisions (Banerjee and Duflo 2011 and Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). Direct transfers enhance the rights of the recipients and reduce discretionary power over them by aid intermediaries, be it local or foreign agencies, bureaucrats, philanthropists, or donors. This discretionary power is often associated with long waiting times (e.g. for deliveries) and other transaction costs for beneficiaries. As attempted to explain in the preceding chapters, distributing the aid money via local governments can create many problems, notably clientelism and misappropriation of funds, which should be avoided (Cerami 2013, Cremer 2008, and Mwenda 2006).

Finally, direct cash transfers have a unique advantage over other interventions. While health interventions such as the distribution of malaria nets or de-worming have been shown to be an invaluable support, their orientation is supply-sided. Supplying the poor with working solutions needs extraordinary creativity, empathy combined with a practical mindset, while at the same time promising very little monetary reward. This

¹⁸⁴ Which is always a risk, but an avoidable one as the case of the French INGO Solidarités International in Mali demonstrates (Banning-Lover 2015). Wanting to help the population recovering from a civil war the INGO set up a cash transfer programme. Due to the lack of both a local banking infrastructure and a telephone network, the management decided on really directly distributing cash. To minimise risk of theft, this was done by local staff via boat, a successful measure, as there were reports of instances of theft. It could even be successfully implemented during the 2011 in one of the world's most dangerous countries: Somalia (ODI 2015).

means that the well-functioning interventions can only be a fraction of the projects, especially if we are confronted with problems in knowledge transfer and cultural and situational adaptability (Lepenies 2013 and Ramalingam 2013). Additionally, each solution needs to be successfully pitched to donors, usually without input from the recipients. This means that for every de-worming campaign, we get several “KONY 2012”s.

It would be much easier to switch to positive demand-side feedback loops. Here the poor themselves can decide what they want, and if they can back up their demands with money, markets have an incentive to provide (cp. Easterly 2007a). This indicates that direct monetary support works especially well because it enables the poor to become customers instead of remaining recipients, leading to incentives for entrepreneurs to implement bottom-up solutions. This would also improve access to health care in the long run – such as vaccination, malaria nets, or de-worming programmes – as well as for measures and means that support sound health, as being provided with healthy and sufficient nutrition is especially important for children. The latter may be delivered by organisations or by private aid if enough affluent people become effective altruists, in the long run a functioning government and good infrastructure are needed to build sustainable distribution and financing mechanisms.¹⁸⁵

Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional, and there is currently an intensive debate within the academic community which alternative is preferable (Fiszbein, Schady, and Ferreira 2009 and Kabeer, Piza, and Taylor 2012). Typical conditions are school attendance of children, attendance to training programmes, or compliance with health interventions, such as government vaccination programmes. Conditionality is justified on various grounds, but most crucially as a political tool to legitimize aid to affluent taxpayers and as a remedy for the fear of improper investment decisions by recipients. What could be bad about requiring aid recipients, say, to send their children to

¹⁸⁵ This not only applies to enough available hospitals, it also includes roads and running electricity on the way to them, as blood, vaccination ampoules and other medicines need to be kept at a certain temperature during transport and storage (cp. Hassoun 2012).

school?

From a theoretical perspective, there are good arguments against even a modest paternalism as a facet of public policy (cp. Standing 2011). In a development context, the point is that paternalism in aid is both inefficient, due to a lack of local government structure or corruption thereof, and difficult to legitimise, as such interventions would ideally hinge on a demonstrated improved benefit to the target group than what the group would invest in by themselves. From a practical perspective, sending children in developing countries to school has long been a priority in development aid, with mixed results as quality of teachers and schools varies. Both Pritchett (2013) and Tooley (2009) state that poor people in developing and emerging countries increasingly choose private education, when it is comparatively affordable, as – most importantly – it has a much better teacher presence and learning results. Additional resources make this option available to more families.

As shown in Lauer and Lepenies 2015, the term “unconditional” in combination with “aid” typically makes representatives of established aid organizations go straight to the barricades. Especially the World Bank argues that conditionality is part of a mutually agreeable contract between donor and recipient (World Bank 2005). Conditions to aid are important when it comes to governments reluctant to implement social reforms, democracy and rule of law. However, external help cannot organize such partnerships, and any attempt to do so is often inefficient, as local conditions – such as teacher absenteeism – are not known. Rather than on binding contracts, the focus should lie on the autonomy of the recipients (Blattman et al. 2013, Mkandawire 2005, and Standing 2011).

Financing cash transfers also is a lot simpler than thought. Because the world's poorest population lives on less than a \$1.25, yearly stipends between \$150 and \$300 can already have a meaningful impact (cp. Glassman 2014 and Standing 2008).¹⁸⁶

Administrative costs of this measure are rather low, with the main focus on distribution and

¹⁸⁶ For example the average recipient in Kenya supported by GiveDirectly lives on just 65 cents (nominal) per day (<https://www.givedirectly.org/operating.model>).

fraud prevention. Margolies and Hoddinott (2015) in a detailed analysis of four countries demonstrate that direct cash is in all cases cheaper than food assistance. Choosing cash in these cases would have extended the reach of these programmes on average by 18 per cent. Other studies estimate the efficiency gains to be even bigger with 25 to 30 per cent (ODI 2015). This is not surprising, recalling the discussion of the practise of food aid essentially being a hidden subsidiary, especially in the case of US aid, meaning that the food has to be purchased and transported to the people in need.

The expenditure should not be financed by aid and donations alone, rather developing countries should have to co-finance the measures through natural resource export revenue as the World Bank proposes, and is indeed the case with several existing programmes (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011 and Moss 2011). Further alternatives would be a global resource dividend (Pogge 2010a and Wenar 2008 and 2011a), a global luxury or wealth tax, such as envisioned by Piketty (2014), or a financial transactions tax or a global minimum corporate tax. Additional funds both for developing and developed countries could come from eliminating illicit financial flows and tax havens (Kar and Leblanc 2013).¹⁸⁷

The only question that remains is asked by the Guardian journalist Paul Harvey (2016)

“... given the strong case for cash, why is it still at only 6% of humanitarian spend? What's the hold– up in getting to 30%, 50% or even 70%?”

It is important to note that these 6 per cent include vouchers, which are more expensive and more difficult to administer, but still a step into the right direction. Unfortunately, giving directly to the poor continues to have to overcome many problems, first of all political and psychological acceptability. Political and institutional opposition or resistance

¹⁸⁷ See Lauer and Lepenies 2015 for a calculation of costs.

are revealed in MacFarquhar (2015, 75f.), where in a discussion on the effectiveness of GiveDirectly an aid professional argues that it would be quite sad if after all the research done the easiest and most effective solution would be to simply give money to the poor. There is a powerful agenda by governments developing countries to keep control of aid money, but also by international institutions such as the World Bank to not only keep control, but also to employ experts who review and implement new solutions (Easterly 2007b, ch. 5). As Harvey (2016) argues

“Part of the answer is the long tradition of governments and organisations deciding what people need, and assuming that they cannot be trusted to make sensible decisions themselves. These priorities often reflect organisational mandates and interests hard-wired into the humanitarian system. Fears that cash will be misused are deep rooted and do not simply fade away on the first sight of evidence to the contrary. Organisational inertia is also an important factor; faced with uncertainty, agencies default to familiar forms of assistance, which largely remain in-kind. Donor governments and aid agencies also fear that western publics will not support cash – seeing it as less visible or more prone to corruption.”

Harvey mentions a crucial problem here both with donations for GiveDirectly as well as national aid programmes when it comes to direct cash distributions that has been discussed extensively in part 2 of this thesis, the deeply entrenched distrust towards the poor, both psychological as well as institutional. Somehow, despite the overwhelming evidence for the efficiency and good use of cash transfers, the illusion persists that in-kind aid will not be diverted by the recipients or misused. Changing this attitude will remain an important but difficult task for the future for effective altruists or simply people who care about good development interventions and increasing the capabilities of the poor. Again, it is at least as

important here to influence politicians and aid administrators, as well as affluent individuals.

From the developing countries perspective, there is good evidence, that times of crisis and hardship, coupled with some democratic structures, increase the likelihood of cash transfer programmes being implemented and financed, partly with the support of multinational institutions and aid money, contribute towards the implementation of cash transfer programmes in developing countries. Examples include the implementation of *bolsa familia* in Brazil, an anti-poverty measure during rising political pressure due to poverty, inequality and unemployment (Melo 2007 and 2009, and World Bank 2016).¹⁸⁸ Political competition and citizen involvement is thus a precondition for the implementation and continuation of such programmes, often against entrenched elite interests. This again underlines the importance for democracy and civil societies in economic participation and welfare. Institutions that are difficult to strengthen by external actors, but who certainly are completely underfunded and ignored by most effective altruists.

On a more conciliatory note, the increasing fundraising success of Give Directly, is probably partly attributable to the attention created by GiveWell¹⁸⁹ and Giving what we can.¹⁹⁰ Donations, including contributions by institutions and foundations, rose from just a few millions in 2012 to over \$45 millions in 2015 (Give Directly 2015). In a promising new step, the charity includes personal profiles of beneficiaries, thus making use of the identifiable victim effect. Maybe family sponsorships could be a way to bypass at least some of the problems. Sponsorships are attractive to donors, due to the possibility to establish personal connection to the child or even the family concerned. Existing sponsorship programmes are quite successful at raising money and at least some of them

¹⁸⁸ Another example would be the Mexican programme *progreso*, which has also obtained very good results (Schultz 2004).

¹⁸⁹ “Directly transferring money to poor individuals allows them to purchase that which they believe will help them most. We believe that Give Directly effectively distributes cash to extremely low-income individuals.” From the GiveWell evaluation of the INGO Give Directly (<http://www.givewell.org/charities/give-directly>).

¹⁹⁰ <https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/top-charities/>.

already demonstrated, that sponsored children will lead healthier and economically more successful lives (Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge 2013).

Direct cash is no “silver bullet”, it cannot by itself reconstruct and ensure security in a failed state and some measures, namely immunisation, are still superior from a purely live-saving perspective. But it should definitely be the “gold standard” of development measures, meaning that any interventions proposed should in future have to demonstrate, that they would be an improvement over simply distributing the needed resources directly to the population in need. The increasing evidence for the efficiency of direct cash in different setting and societies would make this counterfactual check possible and be an important guideline for both official and private development aid. Fortunately, there are increasing calls to implement this (Lauer and Lepenies 2015 and ODI 2015).

5. Conclusion – Beyond Charity

In this thesis the ethical, psychological and practical implications of Peter Singer's culture of giving or effective altruism have been discussed and contrasted to answer the question of what role donations and fundraising should, do and could play in the context of alleviating global extreme poverty. Starting with point have been the ethical considerations of Peter Singer. He adopts a moral maximalist point of view, footed in the individual responsibility to alleviate global poverty through personal investment, especially by limiting expenditures, increasing income through career choices and donating the maximal possible amount over one's lifetime. This position is rejected as too demanding, as it leaves little room for development of the self and other worthwhile, pursuits such as family, friends or, for example, art. An altruism-focused life may be a good and fulfilled life for some. However, the individual consideration of human beings in general, entails that there is a necessary and ethically important reason to be free to consider of one's own life plans and develop one's capabilities. Additionally, attributing the maximal responsibility to each individual that could help by donating a large part of their income, implies the loss of important considerations of justice and responsibility. Depending on individual position, place and ability, people have different levels of responsibility towards others. For example, the head of government of a developing country or the Chief Executive Officer of a company that imports natural resources from the country has a much increased responsibility towards the poor in the country. It was demonstrated, that there are many ways in which global institutions, trade regulations and Western lifestyle harms people in developing countries, thus a responsibility of Western citizens to collectively act seems reasonable. Peter Singer captures an important ethical intuition, which is that it seems irresponsible that global wealth is distributed in such a way, that part of the population lives in overabundance, while approximately one billion are subjected to suffering and

drastically shortened lives, because they are not even provided with basic healthcare and living conditions. This entails a minimal responsibility of each individual that could do something against global poverty by sacrificing a little income, but a much increased responsibility of very wealthy individuals and corporations with investments or suppliers in developing countries.

In addition to the ethical foundation, effective altruism relies on two practical implications. The first being that it is easier to convince people to donate to effective poverty relief than to implement legal or political measures. This warrants an in-depth deliberation of donor psychology, statistical analysis of levels of donations and fundraising methods, as provided in chapter 3 of the thesis. The research of donor behaviour has been gaining much momentum in recent years, partly due to the rise of experimental economics. Moral psychologists in the tradition of David Hume show quite clearly that human beings have altruistic inclinations and feel good about helping others (the so-called “warm glow”). Pro-social behaviour such as donating actually increases personal happiness. But there are several conflicting emotions and intuitions that impede taking concrete actions towards a better world, for example that we tend to identify with single victims towards whom we feel a certain connectedness. As Singer sees quite clearly, the problem is that while we may have altruistic instincts, these instincts only work well in cases in which we feel personally responsible and close to the victim. He proposes several solutions here, notably that individuals should bind themselves to generous behaviour by pledging their donations publicly, thus also encouraging others, and by putting a face on the needy. But he underestimates the degree to which donors are self-centred and that the decision to donate is situationist. Rational argumentation tends to decrease volition to donate. Avoidance behaviour and mental accounting, together with an analysis of societal donation pattern indicate that donations are a slowly growing resource and only a limited amount is dedicated towards the global poor. Media attention is a key factor here, natural disasters in

holiday countries lead to much attention and donations, while other disasters are too often forgotten. Together with a very professionalized fundraising industry, the (social) media is also partly responsible for the continuing negative image of the global poor, especially in Africa, and the prevalence of development fads, as shown in the example of KONY 2012 campaign. As long as donors are stylized as “white saviours” that are the only hope for the child-like poor, the inherent paternalism of the fundraising industry will actually be an obstacle towards increasing global justice.

The second practical premise of effective altruism is that small sums actually sustainably prevent enormous suffering. The question of whether official and private aid benefits developing countries in general is difficult to answer due to difficulties in obtaining and correctly interpreting the relevant data. Many projects demonstrably bring only little sustainable improvement on local living conditions, as projects are selected with a focus on donor countries strategic and economic interests, instead of poverty relief. Corruption and embezzlement are endemic problems, as are unwanted side-effects such as crowding out of local producers. Critics of aid point out, that INGOs and development aid agencies may actually benefit kleptocratic and oppressive regimes, as they help conceal failures of the regime, such as an inability to provide public education, health services and a functioning tax service, thus weakening government accountability. Case studies of the microfinance-, Fair Trade- and Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages-movement indicate, that biases and fads, often coupled with distrust towards and lack of understanding of the poor, translates into failure of aid projects at the implementation level. The twin accountability of organisations towards donors and the target group often appears as a one-way street towards reassuring and strengthening donors public and self-esteem, not actual efficiency.

There are some good news: simple medical interventions, such as vaccinations, deworming and malaria nets, have a considerable effect on individual health and well-being. Projects that trust the poor by simply supporting them with comparatively small cash

endowments, with little or no conditions attached, are also demonstrated to be effective, surprisingly with the positive effects lingering over the period of distribution. The increase in income and health translates into increased capability and ability of the poor to help themselves by investing in their own education, participating economically and politically, and providing with the energy and time to form civil associations. It can also mean less dependence of political party clientelism or clan-structures. Here donations can have a sustainable effect. Unfortunately, these very projects tend to be under-reported, as they are not very spectacular, and thus under-funded. It is doubtful whether the laudable rise of charity evaluators such as GiveWell can change this. The amount of people who are willing to donate may be increased, but not significantly. Donor voluntariness will remain fickle and depend on morally irrelevant factors. Even more importantly, it has been shown that uninformed charity can cause harm in the long-term instead of doing good. As a conclusion I propose three ways in which we should act in front of these psychological and institutional difficulties:

- In agreement with Peter Singer and William MacAskill we should focus our donations on the previously mentioned efficient INGOs and try to convince others to follow suit. Charity evaluators should play an increased role in the public discourse on aid distribution too ensure this is the role of the state and donors, academia and media. A profound and truthful evaluation of results of a charitable project or government can improve performances, and together with the extensive use of knowledge management systems, create knowledge that can be applied in similar development scenarios. Stern (2013a) correctly demands that some philanthropist organizations be excluded at least from the privilege of tax deductibility, if they severely underperform their competitors.
- Contrary to MacAskill's (2015a, 181ff.) recommendation against working in a

charitable organisation and instead focusing on earning to give, I argue that a person should be free to follow his or her own life plan. However, the decision to work for a government institution or INGO includes the responsibility to increase the effective use of existing resources. It has been shown that large and established, and thus well-known organisations bind a large part of existing donations. By working to make these organisations more effective and being willing to listen to the beneficiaries, one can make a notable difference as well. The benchmark for effective development interventions should be providing the target population directly with the funds used for the project (cp. Lauer and Lepenies 2015). If after careful consideration or testing the project does fall behind this benchmark, it should be discarded.

- The development discourse is in urgent need of a paradigm shift. It needs to be re-framed as an issue of justice, not of charity, but not from a moral maximalist point of view, but with clearly established responsibilities. For an effective program against poverty and hunger, developed nations – and in this Europe, because of its history and economic power, has a special place in the world – should focus first on creating the international democratic institutions necessary to allow the population of a country to provide for themselves instead of relying on international goodwill (cp. Crocker 2008). This includes regulations on illicit financial flows and corruption, but also debt forgiveness. Land grabbing should be blocked worldwide, and infant industry protection allowed to a certain degree to give manufacturing in developing nations a fair chance. Moreover, fair climate change regulations should help the worldwide poor to end their plight. But the main responsibility lies within the developing countries themselves. In many cases, corrupt and kleptocratic or even outright oppressive regimes care little about the well-being of parts or all of their population. This thesis supports Leif Wenar's (2011a and 2015) claim that we

should stop trade and banking with regimes that do not adhere to a minimal ethical standard. Thus multinational corporations have a strong responsibility here as well. Nicole Hassoun (2012) addresses the fact that diseases and illnesses frequently occurring in poor countries are insufficiently – if at all – addressed by the pharmaceutical industry, as there are no large profits to be made (cp. Pogge, Rimmer, and Rubenstein 2014). With the result that in 2014 the long neglect of research and development of medicine against Ebola has taken its revenge with the epidemic killing several thousand people (Baker 2014). Other industries that trade, invest and hire personnel in developing countries have similar responsibilities. The investment and creation of jobs with minimal standards should be a focus of development.

- A necessary step could be establishing a targeted Tobin tax on financial speculation to finance a minimal social system that directly supports the people most in need (Lauer and Lepenies 2015). Further alternatives would be a global resource dividend (Pogge 1998 and 2010a), a global luxury or global wealth tax, such as envisioned by Piketty (2014) or a global tax on multinational corporations. While this project will not be easily implemented politically, the findings of chapter 3 indicate that this may actually be easier and certainly more sustainable and reliable than trying to do this via voluntary donations. Two factors could serve to make this proposal more acceptable. For reasons of political acceptability and accountability within the developing country, it is necessary that the developing country itself contributes to the social fund that benefits the poorest citizens. This could be financed on the developing countries' side through natural resource export revenue, as for example the World Bank proposes (Moss 2011). Additionally, the taxes should be targeted in a way that hits the wealthiest or (tax-avoiding) multinational corporations and enterprises, not the working or middle class and small to mid-

sized entrepreneurs in developed countries, that are already subject to a high tax burden.

As was already mentioned in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, inequality is an important problem in developing as well as developed countries (cp. World Bank 2016). This is echoed in a Pew Research Center (2014, 3) survey of the citizens in 44 countries that found that a median of 60 percent – including 46 percent of US Americans – say that inequality is a very big problem in their respective societies. Several important economists (Cingano 2014, Lansley 2011, and Stiglitz 2012) have already warned that the increase of inequality damages economic growth, well-being and social order, and philosophers tend to agree (Nagel 1991, Sandel 2012, Temkin 1993, and van Parijs 1995). But so far the view remains rather limited to a national level. To include the international level, links (maybe even interdependencies) between national and international justice should be established. This re-framing of development as both a question of justice that concerns them as well as us, and the establishment of a dialogue with the people we want to support as real dialogue partners and not as supplicants will help make some important steps towards the reduction and, hopefully one day abolishment of absolute poverty. Singer's and MacAskill's efforts to create a movement of effective altruism are laudable. Yet, unless the movement moves towards inclusion of the poor and international justice, it is in the worrying danger of becoming itself a development fad. As long as the poor are only seen as a number, a life that needs saving, they are easily excluded from the attention of the privileged, predominantly white donor community. Jennifer Rubenstein (2015) in a reply to Peter Singer in the *Boston Review* resumes the situation:

“The problem is that he addresses these challenges via a social movement focused on alleviating poverty that excludes poor people from its ranks. This movement

therefore violates the democratic principle of inclusion, summarized in a slogan used for decades by social movements from Poland to South Africa: “Nothing About Us Without Us.” [...] This orientation overlooks poor people's central role in alleviating their own poverty and rich people's role in contributing to and benefiting from it. The effective altruism movement retains members by directing their emotional energies and commitments toward *each other*, not the people they aim to assist. Singer thus profiles effective altruists for his readers to emulate; he does not depict poor people using assistance to exit poverty. Likewise, organizations such as Giving What We Can encourage their members to make commitments to, and engage in community-building with, each other – not poor people. These strategies rightly avoid using pity as a motivational tool, but they also preclude more promising forms of connection, such as political solidarity.”

This worry is illustrated by the recent tendencies of the movement to make avoiding “extinction events” a priority (Matthews 2015). Extinction events are global catastrophes on a massive scale, such as a global nuclear war or a massive meteor collision, but effective altruists also include more far-fetched scenarios such as a murderous artificial intelligence. In a version of Pascal's wager, the complete annihilation of humanity through one of these events makes donating towards the above issues suddenly more pressing than relieving global poverty. An example would be donating to the Machine Intelligence Research Institute in Berkeley. In his intriguing *Vox*-article “I spent a weekend at Google talking with nerds about charity. I came away ... worried” Dylan Matthews (2015) speculates that if the movement continues on this path of self-congratulatory cleverness, the way is paved towards effective altruism without poverty relief. I therefore strongly advise for a limiting our Western hubris, lest we forget that it is only the poor themselves that can lift themselves out of poverty. They are as human beings who can take their lives

into their own hands, who know what is good for them in the long run and who want to act responsibly towards their families, their future and their environment.

Further research should be directed towards ways to communicate efficiency in a way that captures the interest of prospective donors, for example through narrative techniques. A possibility could be making use of a connection similar to child sponsorships or the mechanism used by Kiva that enables direct cash donors to feel a true connection with the household they are supporting. Even more important would be an investigative research on the role of different multinational and national actors on benefiting or harming the global poor, similar to Nicole Hassoun's analysis of the pharmaceutical industry or, less extensively for food corporations Oxfam's "Behind the Brand"-report (Hoffman 2013). This would serve as an indicator for citizens and consumers, as well as a basis for calculation of "who owes what to the global poor" (Pogge 2007). It would also mean that the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility would increase in importance. An important project would be if and how it is possible to improve the image of the poor and how to communicate the complexities of development and poverty in a way that engages the removed Western public (cp. Darnton and Kirk 2011 and Kennedy and Hill 2010). Finally, a detailed and multi-disciplinary analysis of ways in which to implement and finance the global security net for absolute poverty is the necessary next step towards its implementation.

6. Bibliography

- Abbott, A. (2001). Into the Mind of a Killer. *Nature*, 410, 296-298.
- Abramitzky, R. and Braggio, F. (2005). Malthusian and Neo-Malthusian Theories. In J. Mokyr (ed.). *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012). *Why Nations Fail*. New York: Crown Publishing.
- Adams, R. J. (2002). Retail Profitability and Sweatshops: A Global Dilemma. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 9(3), 147-153.
- Adler, N. E., and Snibbe, A. C. (2003). The Role of Psychosocial Processes in Explaining the Gradient Between Socioeconomic Status and Health. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 12(4), 119-123.
- Adloff, F. (2010). *Philanthropisches Handeln – Eine historische Soziologie des Stiftens in Deutschland und den USA*. Frankfurt, Main: Campus Verlag.
- Ahmed, M. and Suphachalasai, S. (2014). *Assessing the Costs of Climate Change and Adaptation in South Asia*. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
- Agnew, D. J., Pearce, J., Pramod, G., Peatman, T., Watson, R., Beddington, J. R., and Pitcher, T. J. (2009). Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. *PloS one*, 4(2), e4570.
- Ainslie, G. (2007). The Gaping Hole in Economic Theory. In B. Montero and M. D. White (eds.). *Economics of the Mind*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Aker, J. C. (2014). *What Cash Payments Can't Do: Lessons from #BringBackOurGirls*. Center for Global Development. <http://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-cash-payments-cant-do-lessons-bringbackourgirls> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Aker, J. C. and Mbiti, I. M. (2010). Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(3), 207-32.
- Aker, J. C., Boumnijel, R., McClelland, A., and Tierney, N. (2014). Payment Mechanisms and Anti-Poverty Programs: Evidence from a Mobile Money Cash Transfer Experiment in Niger. *CGD Working Paper*, 268.
- Aknin, L. B., Barrington-Leigh, C., Dunn, E. W., Helliwell, J. F., Burns, J., Biswas-Diener, R., and Norton, M. I. (2013). Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a Psychological Universal. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104, 635-652.

- Albrecht, H. (2013). Von wegen Armut. *DIE ZEIT*, 14.
<http://www.zeit.de/2013/14/entwicklungslaender-afrika-uganda> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Alesina, A. and Dollar, B. (2000). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5, 33-63.
- Alesina, A., Di Tella, R., and MacCulloch, R. (2004). Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans different? *Journal of Public Economics*, 88, 2009-2042.
- Alighieri, D. [1321] (2007). *Divina Commedia, Commento a cura di G. Fallani e S.Zennaro*. Rome: Newton Compton.
- Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K. (2010). *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*. London: Zed Books.
- Allison, L. (2009). Race and Politics. In I. McLean & A. McMillan (eds.). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 484-450.
- Allport, G. W. (1966). Traits Revisited. *American Psychologist*, 21, 1-10.
 -(1979). *The Nature of Prejudice*. New York: Basic Books.
- Alkire, S. and Foster, J. (2007). Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measures. *Ophi Working Paper Series*, 32.
 -(2009). Concepts and Measures of Agency. In K. Basu and R. Kanbur (eds). *Arguments and Capabilities*, 10(2), 213-235.
- Alston, P. (2005). Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 27(3), 755-829.
- Anagnostopoulos, G. (1994). *Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ancu, M., English, K., and Sweetser, K. (2011). YouTube-ification of Political Talk: An Examination of Persuasion Appeals in Viral Video. *American Behavioral Scientist* 55(6), 733-748.
- Anderson, M. B. (1999). *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Anderson, M. B., Brown, D., and Jean, I. (2012). *Time to Listen – Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.
- Andrees, B. and Belser, P. (eds.) (2010). *Trabajo Forzoso – Coerción y Explotación en el Mercado Laboral*. Madrid: Plaza y Valdes.
- Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian

- Equivalence. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 97(6), 1447-1458.
- (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving. *Economic Journal*, 100, 464-477.
- (1998). Towards a Theory of Charitable Fundraising. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 106(12), 1186-1213.
- Andreoni, J. and Payne, A. (2011). Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(5), 334-343.
- Andreoni, J., Rao, J. M. and Trachtman, H. (2011). Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving. *NBER Working Paper*, 17648, 1-24.
- Andresen, K., McKee, A. and Rovner, M. (2010). *Homer Simpson for Nonprofits: The Truth about How People Really Think and What It Means for Promoting Your Cause*. Network for Good.
<http://www.event360.com/assets/files/HomerSimpsonforNonprofits.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2011). *Lisa Simpson for Nonprofits - What Science Can Teach You About Fundraising, Marketing, and Making Social Change*. Network for Good.
<http://www.fundraising123.org/files/Lisa%20Simpson%20Final%203.16.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Angulo, G. (2004). La Opinión Pública Española y la Ayuda al Desarrollo. *Instituto Complutense Working papers*.
- Anheier, H. K. (2010). *Zwischen Eigennutz und Gemeinwohl – Neue Formen und Wege der Gemeinnützigkeit*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- (2011). *Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management and Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Anik, L., Aknin, L. B., Norton, M. I., and Dunn, E. W. (2011). Feeling Good About Giving: The Benefits (and Costs) of Self-Interested Charitable Behavior. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 3-13.
- Appelbaum, L. D. (2002). Who Deserves Help? Students' Opinions About the Deservingness of Different Groups Living in Germany to Receive Aid. *Social Justice Research*, 15(3), 201-225.
- Appiah, K. A. (2007). *Der Kosmopolit – Philosophie des Weltbürgertums*. M. Bischoff (transl.). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- (2008). *Experiments in Ethics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (2011). *The Honor Code – How Moral Revolutions Happen*. New York: W. W.

- Norton & Company.
- Arendt, A. A., Echelmeyer, K. A., Harrison, W. D., Lingle, C. S., and Valentine, V. B. (2002). Rapid Wastage of Alaska Glaciers and Their Contribution to Rising Sea Level. *Science*, 297(5580), 382-386.
- Aristotle (transl. 1984). *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Arneson, R. (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. *Ethics*, 110(2), 339-349.
- (2003). Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality. *The Monist*, 86, 382-401.
- (2009). What Do We Owe to Distant Needy Strangers? In J. A. Schaler (ed.). *Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics*. Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 267-293.
- (2013). Egalitarianism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Arrow, K. (1972). Gifts and Exchanges. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1(4), 343-362.
- Ashta, A. and Khan, S. and Otto, P. E. (2015). Does Microfinance Cause or Reduce Suicides? Policy Recommendations for Reducing Borrower Stress. *Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance*, 24(2), 165-190.
- Ashford, E. (2007). Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. In T. Pogge (ed.). *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right – Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 183-218.
- (2011). Obligations of Justice and Beneficence to Aid the Severely Poor. In P. Illingworth, T. Pogge, & L. Wenar (eds.). *Giving Well – The Ethics of Philanthropy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 26-45.
- Assheuer, T. (2012). Der Gott des Gemetzels. *DIE ZEIT*, 40.
<http://www.zeit.de/2012/40/Weltbuergerkrieg-Religion-Mohammed> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Auriol, E. and Warlters, M. (2005). Taxation Base in Developing Countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(4), 625-646.
- Axelrod, R. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Axelrod, R. and Hammond, R. A. (2006). The Evolution of Ethnocentrism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(6), 926-936.
- Baaz, M. E. (2005). *The Paternalism of Partnership: A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Development Aid*. London: Zed Books.
- Badhwar, N. K. (2006). International Aid: When Giving Becomes a Vice. *Social*

- Baines, P. (2014). *Doing Good by Doing Good: Why Creating Shared Value is the Key to Powering Business Growth and Innovation*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Baker, A. (2014). The Race to Stop Ebola in Africa. *Time Magazine*.
<http://time.com/3455648/the-race-to-stop-ebola-in-africa/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2015). Dirty Diamonds – Conflict and Misery in the Global Diamond Trade. *Time Magazine*, 186(9-10), 26-35.
- Baker, D. (2005). Not a Swell Time for Charities. Individual Giving for the Tsunami was Impressive, but other Causes are Suffering as a Result. *Financial Times*.
<http://on.ft.com/2q8hv6z> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E. (2011). *Poor Economics – A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Goldberg, N., Karlan, D., Osei, R., Parienté, W., Shapiro, J., Thuybaert, B. and Udry, C. (2015). A Multifaceted Program Causes Lasting Progress for the Very Poor: Evidence from Six Countries. *Science*, 348(6236), 1260799.
- Banning-Lover, R. (2015). Boatfuls of Cash: How Do You Get Money into Fragile States? <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/feb/19/boatfuls-of-cash-how-do-you-get-money-into-fragile-states>[Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Baron, J. and Szymanska (2011). Heuristics and Biases in Charity. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 215-235.
- Baron, R. A. (1997). The Sweet Smell of... Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambience Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 498-503.
- Baron-Cohen, S. (2012). *The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty*. New York: Basic Books.
- Basil, D. Z., Ridgway, N. M., and Basil, M. D. (2006). Guilt Appeals: The Mediating Effect of Responsibility. *Psychology & Marketing*, 23(12), 1035-1054.
- Bateman, M. (2010). *Why Doesn't Microfinance Work?: The Destructive Rise of local Neoliberalism*. London: Zed Books.
- Bateman, M. and Chang, H-J. (2009). *Microfinance Illusion*.
<http://www.microfinancetransparency.com/evidence/PDF/App.3%20Chang>

- %20Bateman%20article.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Bates, R. H. (1997). *Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- (2008). *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Batson, C. D. (1995). Prosocial Motivation: Why Do We Help Others? In A. Tesser (ed.). *Advanced Social Psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 333-381.
- Batstone, D. (2010). *Not for Sale: The Return of the Global Slave Trade - and How We Can Fight It*. London: Harper One.
- Baudelaire, C.-P. (1868). *Le Spleen de Paris*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Bauer, J. (2008). *Prinzip Menschlichkeit – Warum wir von Natur aus kooperieren*. München: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag.
- (2011). *Schmerzgrenze – Vom Ursprung alltäglicher und globaler Gewalt*. München: Karl Blessing Verlag.
- Bauer, P. T. (ed.) (1971). *Dissent on Development*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Beauchamp, T. (2013). The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/principle-beneficence/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Bebbington, A. and McCourt, W. (eds.) (2007). *Development Success – Statecraft in the South*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beck, U. (1986). *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- (1999). *What is Globalization?* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- (2009). *World at Risk*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- (2011). *Fernliebe: Lebensformen im Globalen Zeitalter*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Becker, G. S. (1960). An Economic Analysis of Fertility. In R. Easterling (ed.). *Demographic and Economic Change in Developing Countries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 209-240.
- (1962). Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 70(5), 9-49.
- (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 82(6), 1063-093.
- (1975). *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- (1976). *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beckett, C. (2012). *Communicating for Change: Media and Agency in the Networked Public Sphere*.
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/POLIS/documents/Communicating-For-Change-.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Beetham, D. (1995). What Future for Economic and Social Rights? *Political Studies*, 43(1), 41-60.
- Bekkers, R. (2010). Who Gives What and When? A Scenario Study of Intentions to Give Time and Money. *Social Science Research*, 39(3), 369-381.
- Bekkers, R. and Wiepking, P. (2011). A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms that Drive Charitable Giving. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 40(5), 924-973.
- Belser, P., de Cock, M., and Mehran, F. (2005). *A Global Alliance against Forced Labour*. Geneva: International Labour Organisation.
- Bendavid, E., Duong, A., Sagan, C., and Raikes, G. (2015). Health Aid is Allocated Efficiently, but not Optimally: Insights From a Review of Cost-Effectiveness Studies. *Health Affairs*, 34(7), 1188-1195.
- Bendick, M., Jackson, C. W., and Reinoso, V. A. (1994). Measuring Employment Discrimination through Controlled Experiments. *The Review of Black Political Economy*, 23(1), 25-48.
- Benson, C. and Clay, E. J. (2004). *Understanding the Economic and Financial Impact of Natural Disasters*. Washington: The World Bank Disaster Risk Management Series, 4.
- Benthall, J. (2010). *Disasters, Relief and the Media*. Canon Pyon: Sean Kingston.
- Berlan, A. (2004). Child Labour, Education and Child Rights Among Cocoa Producers in Ghana. In C. van den Anker (ed.). *The Political Economy of New Slavery*, 158-180.
- Bernard, P. E. (2009). Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society: Lessons for America from Africa? *Marquette Law Review*, 93(12), 173-207.
- Berrueta, V. M., Edwards, R. D., and Masera O. R. (2008). Energy Performance of Wood-Burning Cookstoves in Michoacan, Mexico. *Renewable Energy*, 33, 859-870.
- Bertram, C. (2005). Global Justice, Moral Development, and Democracy. In G. Brock & H. Brighouse. *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 75-91.
- Bethlehem, R. A., Baron-Cohen, S., Van Honk, J., Auyeung, B., and Bos, P. A. (2014). The

- Oxytocin Paradox. *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience*, 8(48).
- Bishop, M. and Green, J. (2008). *Philanthrocapitalism – How the Rich Can Save the World*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- Bishop, M. J. and Hall, A. C. (eds.) (2007). *Pop-Porn: Pornography in American Culture*. Westport: Praeger.
- Blattman, C., Fiala, N., and Martinez, S. (2013). *The Economic and Social Return to Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Ugandan Aid Program*.
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/53/WGAPE_Sp2013_Blattman.pdf
 [Accessed 25th April 2017].
- Blattman, C. and Dercon, S. (2016). Occupational Choice in Early Industrializing Societies: Experimental Evidence on the Income and Health Effects of Industrial and Entrepreneurial Work. *Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper*, 10255.
- Bloom, P. (2014). Against Empathy. *The Boston Review*.
<http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Boehm, C. (2012). *Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bølstad, J. (2011). *Principles, Interests and Beliefs: Public Opinion on International Aid*. EUI Doctoral Thesis. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/18401> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Boltanski, L. (2007). *La Souffrance a Distance – Morale Humanitaire, Médias et Politique*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Boos, M., Kolbe, M., and Kappeler, P. (2011). Coordination in Human and Non-human Primate Groups: Why Compare and How? In M. Boos, M., Kolbe, P. Kappeler & T. Ellwart (eds.). *Coordination in Human and Primate Groups*. Berlin: Springer, 3-10.
- Bordelon, G. (2014). #CharityFad: The long-term Fallout of the Ice Bucket Challenge. http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/08/charityfad_the_long-term_fallout_of_the_ice_bucket_challenge_opinion.html [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Bornstein, D. (2007). *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Borras, S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I., White, B., and Wolford, W. (2011). Towards a Better

- Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(2), 209-216.
- Boudreaux, K. (2007). State Power, Entrepreneurship, and Coffee: The Rwandan Experience. *Mercatus Policy Series*, 15.
- Bowles, S. and Gintis, S. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance. *The Economic Journal*, 112, 419-436.
- Bowman, W. (2006). Should Donors Care About Overhead Costs? Do They Care? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 35(2), 288-310.
- Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the Evolution of Human Cooperation. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 364(1533), 3281-3288.
- Bradford, L. B. and Weber, G. (2012). The Economic Sustainability of Certified Coffee – Recent Evidence from Mexico and Peru. *World Development*, 40(6), 1269-1279.
- Bräutigam, D. (2008). *Development Policy Outlook – Taxation and Governance in Africa*. www.aei.org/publications/pubID.27798/pub_detail.asp. [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Brandt, R. (1979). *A Theory of the Right and the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Breuning, M. (1994). Review: Clouded Vision: The Complexities of Foreign Aid Motivation. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), 357-359.
- Brooks, C., Prokopczuk, M., and Wu, Y. (2015). Booms and Busts in Commodity Markets: Bubbles or Fundamentals? *Journal of Futures Markets*, 35, 916-938.
- Broome, J. (2004). *Weighing Lives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brosnan, S. F., de Waal, F. B. M., and Freeman, C. (2006). Partner's Behavior, not Reward Distribution, Determines Success in an Unequal Cooperative Task in Capuchin Monkeys. *American Journal of Primatology*, 68(7), 713-724.
- Brown, D. (1991). *Human Universals*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Brown, D. K., Deardorff, A., and Stern, R. (2004). The Effects of Multinational Production on Wages and Working Conditions in Developing Countries. In R.E. Baldwin & A. Winters (eds.). *Challenges to Globalization: Analyzing the Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 279-330.
- Brown, K. R. (2013). *Buying into Fair Trade: Culture, Morality, and Consumption*. New York: New York University Press.
- Brown, P. H. and Minty, J. H. (2008). Media Coverage and Charitable Giving after the 2004 Tsunami. *Southern Economic Journal*, 75(1), 9-25.
- Brunton, F. (2013). *Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

- Buchanan, A. (1987). Justice and Charity. *Ethics*, 97(39), 558-575.
- (1996). Charity, Justice and the Idea of Moral Progress. In J. B. Schneewind (ed.). *Giving: Western Ideas of Philanthropy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bump, J. B., Clemens, M. A., Demombynes, G., and Haddad, L. (2012). Concerns about the Millennium Villages Project Report. *Lancet*, 379(9830), 1945.
- Buntzel, R. and Marí, F. (2007). *Das globale Huhn. Hühnerbrust und Chicken Wings – Wer isst den Rest?* Frankfurt, Main: Brandes & Apsel.
- Burch, D., Clapp, J., and Murphy, S. (2012). Cereal Secrets – The World's largest Grain Trade and Global Agriculture. *Oxfam Research Reports*.
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-30082012-en_4.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Burens, P.-C. (2012). *Fundraising: Ein Praxisratgeber mit 50 Tipps*. Berlin: Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen.
- Burman, E. (1994). Innocents Abroad: Western Fantasies of Childhood and the Iconography of Emergencies. *Disasters*, 18, 238-253.
- Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. *The American Economic Review*, 90(4), 847-868.
- (2004). Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence. *World Bank Policy Research Paper*, 2834(0), 1-35.
- Butovskaya, M., Salter, F., Diakonov, I., and Smirnov, A. (2000). Urban Begging and Ethnic Nepotism in Russia. *Human Nature*, 11(2), 157-182.
- Caballo, V. E. (ed.) (1998). *International Handbook of Cognitive and Behavioural Treatments for Psychological Disorders*. New York: Premium Press.
- Cameron, J. and Haanstra, A. (2008). Development Made Sexy: How it Happened and What it Means. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(8), 1475-1489.
- Campbell, A.V., Tan, C., and Boujaoude, E. (2012). The Ethics of Blood Donation: Does Altruism Suffice? *Biologicals*, 40(3), 170-172.
- CARMA International (2006). The CARMA Report on Western Media Coverage of Humanitarian Disasters. Carma International. http://www.imaging-famine.org/images/pdfs/carma_%20report.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Carrigan, M. and Attalla, A. (2001). The Myth of the Ethical Consumer – Do Ethics Matter in Purchase Behaviour? *Journal of Consumer Marketing*, 18(7), 560-578.
- Carter, S. and Clift, S. (2000). *Tourism and Sex – Culture, Commerce and Coercion*. Cambridge, UK: Biddles Ltd, Guildord & King's Lynn.
- Carstens, P. (2011). Drinnen das Nötigste, Draußen fast Alles. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*

- Zeitung*. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/fluechtlingslager-in-kenia-drinnen-das-noetigste-draussen-fast-alles-11124826.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Cavanagh, C. J. (2012). Kony 2012 and the Political Economy of Conflict Representation. *The Nordic Africa Institute*, 9.
- Cerami, A. (2013). *Permanent Emergency Welfare Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa – The Exclusive Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cestari, T. F., Pessato, S., and Ramos-e-Silva, M. (2007). Tungiasis and Myiasis. *Clinics in Dermatology*, 25(2), 158-64.
- Chang, H.-J. (2002a). Breaking the Mould – An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 26(5), 539-559.
- (2002b). *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem Press.
- (2005). *Why Developing Countries Need Tariffs – How WTO NAMA Negotiations Could Deny Developing Countries’ Right to a Future*. <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/why-developing-countries-need-tariffs-how-wto-nama-negotiations-could-deny-devel-112533> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2008). *Bad Samaritans – Rich Nations, Poor Policies, and the Threat to the Developing World*. London: Random House.
- (2010). *Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: How Development has Disappeared from Today’s ‘Development’ Discourse*. In S. Khan & J. Christiansen (eds.). *Towards New Developmentalism: Market as Means rather than Master*. London: Routledge.
- (2012). *23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Bloomsbury Press.
- Chakravarty, A. (2011). Dams and Infant Mortality in Africa. *University College London Working Paper*.
- Charities Aid Foundation (CAF). (2006). International Comparisons of Charitable Giving. *CAF Briefing Paper*. <https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/archive/international-comparisons-of-charitable-giving> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2016). *CAF World Giving Index 2016*. <https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/2016-publications/caf-world-giving-index-2016> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., and Rogers, F. H. (2006). Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(1), 91-116.
- Chêne, M. (2012). Use of Mobile Phones to Detect and Deter Corruption. *U4 Anti-Corruption Centre*, 321, 1-8.
- Chenoweth, E. and Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works – The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chhibber, A. and Laajaj, R. (2013). The Interlinkages between Natural Disasters and Economic Development. In A. Borde, D. Guha-Sapir, & I. Santos (eds.). *The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters*, 28-56.
- Chomsky, N. (1968). *Language and Mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
- (1999). *Profit over People – Neoliberalism and Global Order*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Chouliaraki, L. (2010). Post-Humanitarianism: Humanitarian Communication Beyond a Politics of Pity. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 13(2), 107-126.
- Cialdini, R. B. (2001). *Influence: Science and Practice*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Cingano, F. (2014). Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth. *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, 163.
- Clarke, W. and Herbst, J. (1996). Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(2), 70-75.
- Clark, R. D. and Word, L. E. (1972). Why Don't Bystanders Help? Because of Ambiguity? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 24(3), 392-400.
- Clark, K. B. and Clark, M. P. (1947). Racial Identification and Preference among Negro Children. In E. L. Hartley (ed.) *Readings in Social Psychology*. New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston.
- Clarke, S. (2003). *Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Racism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clavel, D. (2011). *Savoirs et Développement Rural – Le Dialogue au Coeur de l'Innovation*. Montpellier: Éditions Quae.
- Clemens, M. A. (2011). Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk? *Center for Global Development Working Paper*, 264.
- (2012). *New Documents Reveal the Cost of “Ending Poverty” in a Millennium Village: At Least \$12,000 Per Household*. <http://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-documents-reveal-cost-%E2%80%9Cending-poverty%E2%80%9D-millennium-village-least-12000-household> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Clemens, M. A., Kenny, C. J. and Moss, T. J. (2007). The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success. *World Development*, 35(5), 735-751.
- Clemens, M. and Demombynes, G. (2011). When Does Rigorous Impact Evaluation Make a Difference? The Case of the Millennium Villages. *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, 3(3), 305-339.
- (2013). The New Transparency in Development Economics: Lessons from the Millennium Villages Controversy. *Center for Global Development Working Paper*, 342.
- Clemens, M. A., Radelet, S., Bhavnani, R. R., and Bazzi, S. (2012). Counting Chickens when they Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth. *The Economic Journal*, 122, 590-617.
- Coburn, A. W., Spence, R. J., and Pomonis, A. (1991). *Vulnerability and Risk Assessment*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. (2003). The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison. *Political Psychology*, 24(2), 313-343.
- Coleman, R. W. (2007). Is the Future of the Microfinance Movement to Be Found on the Internet. International Trade and Finance Association Working Paper, 1.
- Collier, P. (2008). *Die unterste Milliarde: Warum die ärmsten Länder scheitern und was man dagegen tun kann*. R. Seuß & M. Richter (transl.). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Conrad, S. (2017). Mehr Munition als Nahrung. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/jemen-nigeria-somalia-suedsudan-mehr-munition-als-nahrung-1.3468055> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Cooper, A. (2008). *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Corrigan, J. (ed.) (2008). *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cortese, A. (2003). They Care About the World (and They Shop, Too). *New York Times*.
<http://lib.store.yahoo.net/lib/underthecanopy/NYTLOHAS.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Cottle, S. and Nolan, D. (2007). Global Humanitarianism and the Changing Aid-Media Field: “Everyone was Dyin for Footage”. *Journalism Studies*, 8(6), 862-878.
- Cramer, C, Johnston, D., Oya, C., and Sender, J. (2014). Fairtrade, Employment and Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia and Uganda. *Fair Trade Employment & Poverty Reduction Research Final Report*. London: University of London Press.

- Crawford, N. C. (2014). *U.S. Costs of Wars Through 2014: \$4.4 Trillion and Counting*.
<http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/20/attachments/Costs%20of%20War%20Summary%20Crawford%20June%202014.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Cremer, G. (2008). *Corruption and Development Aid: Confronting the Challenges*.
 London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Crewe, E. and Fernando, P. (2006). The Elephant in the Room: Racism in Representations, Relationships and Rituals. *Progress in Development Studies*, 6(1), 40-54.
- Crocker, D. (2008). *Ethics of Global Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Crole, B. (2007). *Profi-Handbuch Fundraising. Spenden erfolgreich akquirieren für soziale und kulturelle Projekte*. Regensburg: Walhalla Fachverlag.
- Cryder, C. and Loewenstein, G. (2011). The Critical Link Between Tangibility and Generosity. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 237-251.
- Cullity, G. (2003). Asking Too Much. *The Monist*, 86(3), 402-418.
 -(2004). *The Moral Demands of Affluence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Culp, J. (2014). *Global Justice and Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Darch, C. (2004). Digital Divide or Unequal Exchange – How the Northern Intellectual Property Rights Regime Threatens the South. *International Journal of Legal Information*, 32(2), 488-501.
- Darley, J. M. and Batson C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 27, 318-335.
- Darnton, A. and Kirk, M. (2011). *Finding Frames: New Ways to engage the UK Public in Global Poverty*. <http://www.findingframes.org/Finding%20Frames%20New%20ways%20to%20engage%20the%20UK%20public%20in%20global%20poverty%20Bond%202011.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Dasgupta, P. (1986). Positive Freedom, Markets and the Welfare State. *Oxford Review of Economics Policy*, 2(2), 25-36.
- Dasgupta, I. and Kanbur, R. (2011). Does Philanthropy Reduce Inequality? *The Journal of Economic Inequality*, 9, 1-21.
- Daulaire, N., Leidl, P., Mackin, L., Murphy, C., and Stark, L. (2002). *Promises to Keep – The Toll of unintended Pregnancies on Women’s Lives in the Developing World*. New York: Global Health Council.

- David, S. R. (1986). Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups. *International Security*, 11(1), 3-36.
- Davies, I. and Crane, A. (2003). Ethical Decision Making in Fair Trade Companies. *Research Paper Series International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility*. http://www.coc-runder-tisch.de/coc-runder-tisch/news/news_juni_2005/DecisionMaking_FairTrade.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Davies, R. B. and Vadlamannati, K. C. (2013). A Race to the Bottom in Labor Standards? An Empirical Investigation. *Journal of Development Economics*, 103, 1-14.
- Davis, H. L. (2010). Feeding the World a Line? Celebrity Activism and Ethical Consumer Practices From Live Aid to Product Red. *Nordic Journal of English Studies*, 9(3), 89-118.
- Davison, W. (2016). State of Emergency Likely to Ramp up Repression in fractured Ethiopia. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/oct/20/state-of-emergency-likely-ramp-up-repression-fractured-ethiopia> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Dayan, D. (2007). On Morality, Distance and the Other: Roger Silverstone's Media and Morality. *International Journal of Communication*, 1, 113-120.
- Day, J. and Hall, C. (2009). Revisiting the Limits to Growth After Peak Oil. *American Scientist*, 97, 230-237.
- Deaton, A. (2013). *The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2016). Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, w22595.
- De Botton, A. (2014). *The News – A User's Manual*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- De Dreu, C. K., Greer, L. L., Van Kleef, G. A., Shalvi, S., and Handgraaf, M. J. (2011). Oxytocin Promotes Human Ethnocentrism. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 108, 1262-1266.
- Denis, L. (2008). Kant and Hume on Morality. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. In E. N. Zalta (ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/kant-hume-morality/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- De Soto, H. (2000). *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. New York: Basic Books.
- De Waal, A. (2011). *Famine Crimes – Politics & The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. London: African Issues.

- De Waal, F. B. M. (2011). *Primaten und Philosophen*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.
- (2012). The Antiquity of Empathy. *Science*, 336, 874-876.
- De Waal, F. B. M. and Suchak, M. (2012). Monkeys Benefit from Reciprocity without the Cognitive Burden. *Psychological and Cognitive Sciences*, 109(38), 15191-15196.
- Deutscher Spendenrat (2012). *Bilanz des Helfens*.
<http://www.spendenrat.de/spendeninfos/bilanz-des-helfens/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Deutsch, F. M., and Lambert, D. M. (1986). Does Social Approval Increase Helping? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 12, 149-157.
- Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA) (2010). *Humanitarian Response Index 2009*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- De Witt Huberts, J., Evers, C. and De Ridder, D. T. (2012). License to Sin: Self-licensing as a Mechanism underlying Hedonic Consumption. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 42, 490-496.
- Diamond, R. (1999). *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Diamond, W. D. and Noble, S. M. (2001). Defensive Responses to Charitable Direct Mail Solicitations. *Journal of Interactive Marketing*, 15(3), 2-12.
- Diao, X., Diaz-Bonilla, E., and Robinson, S. (2003). How much Does it hurt? The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies on Developing Countries. *International Food Policy Research Institute*. www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC13134.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Dickens, C. [1850] (2014). *The Begging-Letter Writer*. Warsaw: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
- Diener, E., Oishi, S., and Lucas, R. E. (2003). Personality, Culture and Subjective Well-being: Emotional and Cognitive Evaluations of Life. *Annual Review Psychology*, 54, 403–425.
- Diener, E., Lucas, R. E. and Scollon, C. N. (2006). Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill – Revisions to the Adaption Theory of Well-being. *American Psychologist*, 61, 305-314.
- Dilley, M., Chen, R. S., Deichmann, U., Lerner-Lam, A. L., Arnold, M., Agwe, J., Buys, P., Kjevstad, O., Lyon, B., and Yetman, G. (2005). *Natural Disaster Hotspots – A Global Risk Analysis*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Dilley, M. and Boudreau, T. E. (2001). Coming to Terms with Vulnerability: A Critique of the Food Security Definition. *Food Policy*, 26, 229-247.

- Dine, J. (2013). Fairtrade, Trust and Risk. In J. Dine & B. Granville *The Processes and Practices of Fair Trade: Trust, Ethics and Governance*. London: Routledge, 199-231.
- Dodge, C. P. and Raundalen, M. (1991). *Reaching Children in War: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique*. Uppsala: Sigma Forlag.
- Doemeland, D. and Trevino, J. (2014). Which World Bank Reports Are Widely Read? *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, 6851.
- Dogra, N. (2012). *Representations of Global Poverty – Aid, Development and International NGOs*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Dolan, C. (2008). Arbitrating Risk through Moral Values: The Case of Kenyan Fairtrade. *Research in Economic Anthropology*, 28, 271–296.
- Doran, A. (2008). *Private Sector Microfinance*. Oxfam. ^
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/FP2P/FP2P_Priv_Sector_Microfinance_BP_ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Doris, J. M. (2012). A Situationist Theory of Character. In G. Sher (ed.). *Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory*. London: Routledge, 525-540.
- Doucouliafos, H. and Paldam, M. (2008). Aid Effectiveness on Growth: A Meta Study. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 24(1), 1-24.
 -(2011). The Ineffectiveness of Development Aid on Growth: An Update. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(2), 399-404.
- Dowling, J. M. and Yap, C.-F. (2009). *Chronic Poverty in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Policies*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company.
 -(2013). *Happiness and Poverty in Developing Countries – A Global Perspective*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Drakulić, S. (2008). *Leben Spenden – Was Menschen dazu bewegt Gutes zu tun*. Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag.
- Drèze J, and Sen, A. (1991). *Hunger and Public Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drumbl, M. (2012). Child Soldiers and Clicktivism: Justice, Myths, and Prevention. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 4(3), 481-485.
- Dubois, A. (1995). *Cooperación al Desarrollo*. Madrid: Popular.
- Duflo, E., Banerjee, A., Glennerster, R., and Kinnan, C. G. (2013). The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, w18950.
- Dunbar, R. (1998). Theory of Mind and the Evolution of Language. *Approaches to the Evolution of Language*, 92-110.

- Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 590-598.
- Dunn, E. W., Gibert, D. T., and Wilson, T. D. (2011). If Money Doesn't Make you Happy you Probably Aren't Spending it Right. *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 21(2), 115-125.
- Duvendack, M. and Palmer-Jones, R. (2012). High-Noon for Microfinance Impact Evaluations: Re-investigating the Evidence from Bangladesh. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 48(12), 1864-1880.
- Dworkin, R. (1981). What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 185-246.
- (1986). *Law's Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Deutsches Zentralinstitut für Soziale Fragen (DZI) (2012). *DZI Spenden-Siegel Leitfaden*. Berlin: DZI.
- (2013). *DZI Spenden-Almanach*. Berlin: DZI.
- Easterly, W. (2001). *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (2007a). An Ivory Tower Analysis of Real World Poverty. *The Lancet*, 370(9597), 1475-1476.
- (2007b). *The White Man's Burden – Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so much Ill and so little Good*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2014) *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. New York: Basic Books.
- The Economist (2003). A United Nations Appeal – Forgotten Disasters. *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/node/2237863> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2009). Go Forth and Multiply a lot Less - Fertility and Living Standards. *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/node/14743589> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). Uganda and its President – A Leader Who Cannot Bear to Retire. *The Economist*, 409(8857), 59-60.
- Edwards, J. R. (2007). The Costs of Public Income Redistribution and Private Charity. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 21(2), 3-20.
- Edwards, M. (2010). *Small Change – Why Business Won't Save the World*. London: McGraw Hill.
- Ekelund, R. B. and Herbert, R. F. (2005). *Historia de la Teoría Económica y de su Método*.

- J. P. Escutia (transl.). Mexico City: McGraw Hill.
- Ellis-Petersen, H. (2014). Band Aid Song Do They Know It's Christmas? Re-recorded for Ebola Cause. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/10/band-aid-30-do-they-know-its-christmas-bob-geldof-ebola> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Elster, J. (1979): *Ulysses and the Sirens – Studies in Rationality and Irrationality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (2011). The Valmont Effect: The Warm-Glow Theory of Philanthropy. In P. Illingworth, T. Pogge, & L. Wenar (eds.). *Giving Well – The Ethics of Philanthropy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 67-84.
- Emerich, M. M. (2011). *The Gospel of Sustainability: Media, Market, and LOHAS*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
- Engels, S. (2014). The Not-so-Great Aid Debate. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(8), 1374-1389.
- Erichsen, C. and Olusoga, D. (2010). *The Kaiser's Holocaust: Germany's Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Erler, B. (1985). *Tödliche Hilfe – Bericht von meiner letzten Dienstreise in Sachen Entwicklungshilfe*. Freiburg: Dreisam-Verlag.
- Etcoff, N. L., Ekman, P., Magee, J. J., and Frank, M. G. (2000). Lie Detection and Language Comprehension. *Nature*, 405(6783), 139-139.
- Evans, D. and Popova, A. (2014). Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods: A Review of Global Evidence. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, 6886.
- Ewald, F. (2002). The Return of Descartes' Sociology Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution. In T. Baker and J. Simon (eds.). *Embracing Risk*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 273-301.
- Falk, A. and Szech, N. (2013). Morals and Markets. *Science*, 340, 707-711.
- Farah, C. E. (2000). *Islam Beliefs and Observances*. New York: Barren's Educational Series.
- Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2013). How Persistent is Armed Conflict? *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers*, 311.
- Feinberg, J. (1988). *Harmless Wrong-Doing: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2012). Psychological Egoism. In G. Sher (ed.). *Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory*. London: Routledge, 14-22.
- Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (2001). Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications. *Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper*,

- Fenner, F., Henderson, D. A., Arita, I., Jezek, Z., and Ladnyi, I. D (1988). *Smallpox and Its Eradication*. Geneva: World Health Organization.
- Ferguson, B. (2016). The Paradox of Exploitation. *Erkenntnis*, 81(5), 951-972
- Fishkin, J. S. (1982). *The Limits of Obligation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Finnström, S. (2012). “KONY 2012” and the Magic of International Relations. *Africa Spectrum*, 47(2/3), 127-135.
- Fiske, S. T. (2010). Envy up, Scorn down: How Comparison Divides Us. *American Psychology*, 65(8).
- Fiske, S. T. and Harris, L.T. (2006). Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low – Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups. *Association for Psychological Science*, 17(10), 847-853.
- Fiszbein, A., Schady, N. R., and Ferreira, F. H. (2009). Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. *World Bank Publications*.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf [[Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Fleurbaey, M. (2007). Poverty as a Form of Oppression. In T. Pogge (ed.). *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right – Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 133-154.
- Fogg, A. (2010). Why the Rich are Meaner than the Poor. *The Guardian*.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/08/social-status-empathy-philanthropy> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and World Food Program (WFP) (2002). *Reducing Poverty Hunger: the Critical Role of Financing for Food, Agriculture, and Rural Development*. Rome: FAO.
- (2012). *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012 – Economic Growth is Necessary but not Sufficient to Accelerate Reduction of Hunger and Malnutrition*. Rome: FAO.
- Foot, P. (1978). *The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (2001). *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Forst, R. (2007). *Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit*. Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.
- Frank, R. H., Gilovic, T. D., and Regan, D. T. (1993). Does Studying Economics inhibit

- Cooperation? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(1), 159-171.
- (1996). Do Economists make bad Citizens? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(1), 187-192.
- Frey, B. S. (1997). *Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation*. Cheltenham: Elgar.
- Fridell, G. (2004). The University and the Moral Imperative of Fair Trade Coffee. *Journal of Academic Ethics*, 2(1), 141-159.
- Fritzen, F. (2014). Für wen wir am liebsten Spenden – Deutsche geben viel für Irak-Flüchtlinge und wenig für Ebola-Kranke. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 39, 1.
- Frumkin, P. and Kim, M. T. (2001). Strategic Positioning and the Financing of Nonprofit Organizations: Is Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace? *Public Administration Review*, 61, 266-275.
- Fundación Luis Vives (2012). *Yearbook of the Social Action Third Sector in Spain – Executive Summary*. Madrid: Fundación Luis Vives.
- Gaertner, S. L. and McLaughlin, J. P. (1983). Racial Stereotypes: Associations and Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 46(1), 23-30.
- Gaiman, N. (2001). *American Gods*. New York: William Morrow Paperbacks
- Gallup, J. and Sachs, J. (2001). The Economic Burden of Malaria. *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 64(1), 85-96.
- Gardoni, P. and Murphy, C. (2010). Assessing Capability Instead of Achieved Functioning in Risk Analysis. *Journal of Risk Research*, 13(2), 137-147.
- Garrett, J. F. (1995). *Banks and their Customers*. New York: Oceana Publications.
- The General Act of the 1885 Conference of Berlin*.
<http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/misc/berlin.htm> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Gelb, A. and Majerowicz, S. (2011). Oil for Uganda – or Ugandans? Can Cash Transfers Prevent the Resource Curse? *Centre for Global Development Working Paper*, 261.
- George, S. (1976). *How the Other Half Dies*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gettleman, J. (2015). Meant to Keep Malaria Out, Mosquito Nets Are Used to Haul Fish In. *The New York Times*.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/africa/mosquito-nets-for-malaria-spawn-new-epidemic-overfishing.html?_r=1 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Gharib, M. (2015). *At What Point Does A Fundraising Ad Go Too Far?*
<http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/09/30/439162849/at-what-point-does-a-fundraising-ad-go-too-far> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Gibson, C. C. (2005). *The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gigerenzer, G. (2007). *Bauchentscheidungen. Die Intelligenz des Unbewussten und die Macht der Intuition*. München: Bertelsmann.
- Gilbert, P. (2012). *From Global Poverty to Global Equality – A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gill, P. (2010). *Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Glassman, A. (2014). *Can Cash Do Better Than In-Kind Aid? Let's Find Out*.
<http://www.cgdev.org/blog/can-cash-do-better-kind-aid-lets-find-out> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Glennie, J. (2009). *The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for Africa*. London: Zed Books.
- (2013). Slavery Reparations: Should Aid Money be Used to Pay for Past Misdeeds? *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/13/slavery-reparations-development-aid> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Glück, A. (2008). *Der Spendenkomplex – Das kalte Geschäft mit heißen Gefühlen*. Berlin: Transit.
- Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000a). A Fine is a Price. *Journal of Legal Studies*, 29, 1-17.
- (2000b). Pay enough or Don't Pay at All. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3), 791-810.
- Goodin, R. (1988). What is so Special about Our Fellow Countryman? *Ethics*, 98(4), 663-86.
- Goetz, A. M. and Sen Gupta, R. (1996). Who takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh. *World Development*, 24(1), 45-63.
- Goldenberg, S. (2015). ExxonMobil gave millions to climate-denying lawmakers despite pledge. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/15/exxon-mobil-gave-millions-climate-denying-lawmakers#img-1> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Goldhagen, D. (1996) *Hitler's willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Google Inc. (2012). *Annual Record 2012*.
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513028362/d452134d10k.htm> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Gordon, D. (1998). With Charity Towards Too Many. *Mises Review*, 4(1), 1-4.
- Goudge, P. (2003). *The Whiteness of Power: Racism in Third World Development and Aid*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Grace, D. and Griffin, D. (2006). Exploring Conspicuousness in the Context of Donation Behaviour. *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing*, 11, 147-154.
- Grebowicz, M. (2013). *Why Internet Porn Matters*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Greene, J. D., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. D., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgement. *Science*, 293, 2105-2108.
- Greene, J. D. and Baron, J. (2001). Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility. *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making*, 14, 243-255.
- Greene, J. D. and Haidt, J. (2002). How (and Where) Does Moral Judgement Work? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 6(12), 517-523.
- Greene, J. D. (2007). The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.). *Moral Psychology, 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 359-372.
- (2013). *Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Greenwald, A. G. and Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes. *Psychological Review*, 102(1), 4-27.
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., and Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), 1464-1480.
- Gregory, S. (2012). Kony 2012 Through a Prism of Video Advocacy Practices and Trends. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 4(3), 463-468.
- Griffiths, P. (2010). Lack of Rigour in Defending Fair Trade: A Reply to Alastair Smith. *Economic Affairs*, 30(2), 45-49.
- (2012). Ethical Objections to Fairtrade. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 105(3), 357-373.

- Grillon, C., Krinsky, M., Charney, D. R., Vytal, K., Ernst, M., and Cornwell, B. (2013). Oxytocin Increases Anxiety to Unpredictable Threat. *Molecular Psychiatry*, 18(9), 958–960.
- Gröppel-Klein, A. and Kroeber-Riel, W. (2013). *Konsumentenverhalten*. München: Franz Vahlen Verlag.
- Grovogui, S. (2001). Come to Africa: A Hermeneutics of Race in International Theory. *Alternatives*, 26, 425-48.
- Grugel, J. and Piper, N. (2009). Do Rights Promote Development? *Global Social Policy*, 9, 79-98.
- Guéguen, N. (2012). The Sweet Smell of... Implicit Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Spontaneous Help in Shopping Malls. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 152(4), 397-400.
- Güth, W., Schmidt, C., and Sutter, M. (2007). Bargaining Outside the Lab – A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game. *The Economic Journal*, 117, 449-469.
- Guisan, M.-C. and Exposito, P. (2008). Human Capital and Economic Development in Africa: an Econometric Analysis for 1950-2002. *Applied Econometrics and International Development*, 5(1).
- Gushee, D. P. (1993). Righteous Gentiles Helped Jews. *Holocaust Genocide Studies*, 7(3), 372-401.
- Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. R., and Tiongson, E. R. (2000). Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services. *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*, 116, 1-33.
- Gylfason, T (2001). Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development. *European Economic Review*, 45(4-6), 847-859.
- Habermas, J. (1962). *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- (1998). *Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays*. Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.
- (2004). *Der gespaltene Westen. Kleine Politische Schriften*. Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.
- (2006). Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? *Communication Theory*, 16(4), 411-426.
- Habermas, J., Lennox, F., and Lennox, S. (1964). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article. *New German Critique*, 3, 49-55.

- Hahn, H. (2009). *Globale Gerechtigkeit – Eine philosophische Einführung*. Frankfurt, Main: Campus Verlag.
- Haibach, M. (2012). *Handbuch Fundraising – Spenden, Sponsoring, Stiftungen in der Praxis*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement. *Psychological Review*, 108(4), 814-834.
- (2007). The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology. *Science*, 316, 998-1002.
- (2012). *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon House.
- Haidt, J. and Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 31(1), 191-221.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S., and Dias, M. (1993). Affect, Culture, and Morality, or is it Wrong to Eat your Dog? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65, 613-628.
- Haidt J., Clore G. L., Jordan, A. H., and Schnall, S. (2008). Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(8), 1096-1109.
- Haight, C. (2011). The Problem with Fair Trade Coffee. *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 2, 74-79.
- Hamilton, W. D. (1963). The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior. *The American Naturalist*, 97(896), 354-356.
- Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A., and Hulme, D. (2010). *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Boulder: Kumarian Press.
- Hansen, G. D and Prescott, E. C. (2002). Malthus to Solow. *American Economic Review*, 92(4), 1205-1217.
- Harbaugh, W. T. (1998). What Do Donations Buy?: A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow. *Journal of Public Economics*, 67(2), 269-284.
- Harbaugh, W. T., Mayr, U., and Burghart, D. R. (2007). Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations. *Science*, 316(5831), 1622-1625.
- Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science*, 162, 1243-1248.
- Hardoon, D. (2016). An Economy For the 1%: How Privilege and Power in the Economy Drive Extreme Inequality and How This Can Be Stopped. *Oxfam Briefing Paper*, 210.
- Harlow, A. (1960). The Hog Cycle and the Cobweb Theorem. *Journal of Farm Economics*, 42(4), 842-853.
- Harrison, G. (2009). Aid. In I. McLean & A. McMillan (eds.). *The Concise Oxford*

- Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 484-450.
- Harvey, D. (2003). *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, P. D. (2012). \$4.6 Trillion Later, Foreign Aid Remains An Economic Somnolent. *Forbes* <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/09/25/4-6-trillion-later-foreign-aid-remains-an-economic-somnolent/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2016). Cash transfers: Only 6% of Humanitarian Spending – What’s the Hold Up? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/jan/22/cash-transfers-only-6-of-humanitarian-spending-whats-the-hold-up> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hassoun, N. (2012). *Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Haushofer, J. and Shapiro, J. (2013). *Policy Brief: Impacts of Unconditional Cash Transfers*. http://www.princeton.edu/~joha/publications/Haushofer_Shapiro_Policy_Brief_2013.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hausmann, C. (2006). *Einführung in die Psychotraumatologie*. Wien: Facultas.
- Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. *The American Economic Review*, 35(4), 519-530.
- Hazama, Y. (2010). Determinants of Political Tolerance: A Literature Review. *Institute of Developing Economics Discussion Paper*, 288.
- Heyden, G. (1983). Ausbeutung. In G. Klaus & M. Buhr (eds.). *Marxistisch-Leninistisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag.
- Hibbert, S. and Horne, S. (1995). To Give Or Not to Give: Is That the Question? *European Advances in Consumer Research*, 2, 179-182.
- Hickel, J. (2014). The Death of International Development. *Al Jazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/death-international-developmen-2014111991426652285.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2015). The Microfinance Delusion: Who Really Wins? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/10/the-microfinance-delusion-who-really-wins> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2016). The True Extent of Global Poverty and Hunger: Questioning the Good News Narrative of the Millennium Development Goals. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(5), 749-767.
- (2017). Aid in Reverse: How Poor Countries Develop Rich Countries. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals->

- network/2017/jan/14/aid-in-reverse-how-poor-countries-develop-rich-countries [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hilton, M., McKay, J., Crowson, N., and Mouhot, J.-F. (2013). *The Politics of Expertise – How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Himmelfarb, G. (1991). *Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians*. New York: Random House.
- Hirsch, A. (2012). What's Life like at Ghana's Millennium Village Project? *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jun/25/ghana-millennium-village-project> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hodgetts, D. J., Stolte, O. E., Radley, A., Leggatt-Cook, C., Groot, S., and Chamberlain, K. (2011). Near and Far: Social Distancing in Domiciled Characterisations of Homeless People. *Urban Studies*, 48(8), 1739-1753.
- Hoffman, B. (2013). Behind the Brands – Food Justice and the “Big 10” Food and Beverage Companies. *Oxfam Briefing Paper*, 166, 1-52.
- Holstrom, N. (1997). Exploitation. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 7(2), 353-369.
- The Holy Bible: New International Version* (1984). Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
- Horgan, J. (2011). Did the U.S. Overreact to the 9/11 Attacks? Undoubtedly. *Scientific American*. <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/2011/09/07/did-the-u-s-overreact-to-the-911-attacks-undoubtedly/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hubbard, B. (2015). Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Vows to Donate \$32 Billion to Charity. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/middleeast/saudi-prince-vows-to-give-away-32-billion.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Huffington Post (2012). Karen Klein, Bullied New York Bus Monitor, Gets \$700,000 From Canadian. *Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/12/bullied-ny-bus-monitor-ge_0_n_1876039.html [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Hugo, V. [1877] (2003). *The History of a Crime*. T. H. Joyce & A. Locker (transl.). <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10381/pg10381-images.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- [1886]. *Les Misérables*. Paris: Gallica.
- Hulme, D. and Moore, K. (2007). Why has Microfinance been a Policy Success in Bangladesh? In A. Bebbinton & W. McCourt. *Development Success – Statecraft in the South*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 105-139.
- Hume, D. [1751] (1977). *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.

- Hunt, J. and Kasynathan, N. (2002). Reflections on Microfinance and Women's Empowerment. *Development Bulletin*, 57, 71-75.
- Huppert, B. (2010). Sources of Moral Significance – How Emotions Inevitably Shape Moral Judgement. *Diskussionspapier Universität Bayreuth*, 16(7).
- Hurka, T. (1997). The Justification of National Partiality. In R. McKim & J. MacMahan (eds.). *The Morality of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hursthouse, R. (2012). Virtue Ethics. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/ethics-virtue/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Iguñiz, J. M. (2009). *Desarrollo como Libertad: Invitación a la Interdisciplinaridad*. <http://departamento.pucp.edu.pe/economia/images/documentos/DDD275.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Ilgen, V. (2008). *CARE-Paket & Co. Von der Liebesgabe zum Westpaket*. Darmstadt: Primus.
- Illingworth, P., Pogge, T., and Wenar, L. (2011). *Giving Well – The Ethics of Philanthropy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Institute for Economics and Peace (2014). *Global Terrorism Index – Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace.
- Innerarity, D. (1994). Poética de la Compasión. *Comunicación y Sociedad*, 7(2), 40-47.
- (2011). *El Espacio Emocional*. <http://www.comunidadesignia.org.ar/especiales/item/3521-el-espacio-emocional.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2011). *España en Cifras*. Madrid: INE.
- Invisible Children (2010). *2010 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2011). *2011 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2011). *Annual Report*. <https://invisiblechildren.com/wp-content/themes/invisiblechildren2.0/images/financials/forms/2011/annual-report.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2012). *2012 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). *2013 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- (2014). *2014 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2015). *2015 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2016). *2016 Financial Statement*. <http://invisiblechildren.com/financials/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Isen, A. M. and Levin, P. F. (1972). Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 21, 384-388.
- International Federation of Red Cross (2006). *World Disaster Report – Focus on Neglected Crises*. Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
- Iweala, U. (2007). Stop Trying to “Save” Africa. *Washington Post*.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/dyn/content/article/2007/07/13/AR2007071301714.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Janus, H. and Paulo, S. (2013). The Internet – Uncharted Territory for Development Policy? *German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)* http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3_e.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/MPHG-9C2APH?Open&nav=expand%3APress\The%20Current%20Column\Zusatzdokumente%3Bactive%3APress\The%20Current%20Column\Zusatzdokumente\MPHG-9C2APH [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). Aid on the Edge of Chaos – Review. *The Guardian*.
<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/dec/24/book-review-aid-edge-of-chaos> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Jenni, K. E. and Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect”. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 14, 235-257.
- Jerven, M. (2009). The Relativity of Poverty and Income: How Reliable Are African Economic Statistics? *African Affairs*, 109(434), 77-96.
- (2012). For Richer, for Poorer: GDP Revisions and Africa’s Statistical Tragedy. *African Affairs*, 112(446), 138-147.
- (2013). *Poor Numbers - How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It*. Ithaca, US: Cornell University Press.
- Jochum, K. (2005). Car Industry Accused of "Predatory Lobbyism". *Deutsche Welle*.
<http://p.dw.com/p/67DW> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Johnson, S. L., Leedom, L. J., and Muhtadie, L. (2012). The Dominance Behavioral System and Psychopathology: Evidence from Self-Report, Observational, and Biological Studies. *Psychological Bulletin*, 138(4), 692-743.
- Jolley, D. and Douglas, K. M. (2013). The Social Consequences of Conspiracism: Exposure to Conspiracy Theories Decreases the Intention to Engage in Politics and to Reduce One's Carbon Footprint. *British Journal of Psychology*, 105(1), 35-56.
- (2014). The Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions. *PLoS ONE*, 9(2), e89177.
- Jones, O. (2015). Refugees are Human. This Simple Fact Seems to Have Been Forgotten. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/migrants-humans-drowning-suffocating-safety-statistics> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Joyce, R. (2001). *The Myth of Morality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Jütting, J. P. and De Laiglesia, J. R. (eds.) (2009). Is Informal Normal? Towards more and better Jobs in Developing Countries. *OECD*. <http://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/Is%20Informal%20Normal%20Towards%20More%20and%20Better%20Jobs%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kabeer, N., Piza, C. and Taylor, L. (2012). *What are the Economic Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes?* <http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/systematicreviews/CCTprogrammes2012Kabeer.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Dawson, E. C., and Slovic, P. (2013). Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government. *Public Law Working Paper*, 307.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking Fast and Slow*. London: Penguin Books.
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. *Science*, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
- Kallscheuer, O. (1995). And Who is My Neighbor? Moral Sentiments, Proximity, Humanity. *Social Research*, 62(1), 99-127.
- Kant, I. (1970). *Gesammelte Schriften*. Königliche Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
- Kant, I. [1795] (1917). *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. M. C. Smith (transl.). London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Kanczula, A. (2012). Kony 2012 in Numbers. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/apr/20/kony-2012-facts-numbers> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kaufmann, D. (2009). Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the

- Ugly. *Development Outreach Special Report*. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
- Kar, D. and Leblanc, B. (2013). Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011. *Global Financial Integrity*.
http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2013/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries_2002-2011-HighRes.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Karlan, D., List, J. A., and Shafir, E. (2011). Small Matches and Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 95, 344-350.
- Kasper, W. (2003). The Haves and Have Nots. *Policy*, 18(4), 26-33.
- Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution Theory in Social Psychology. In D. Levine (ed.). *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 192-238.
- Keller, R. (2008). *Wann wirken Spendenaufrufe? Der Einfluss von Bildauswahl und Argumentationsstruktur*. München: Fischer.
- Kelly, D. and Roedder, E. (2008). Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias. *Philosophy Compass*, 3(3), 522-540.
- Kempadoo, K. (1999). *Sun, Sex, and Gold – Tourism and Sex Work in the Caribbean*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Keneally, T. (2011). *Three Famines – Starvation and Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Kennedy, S. and Hill, S. (2010). Global Poverty, Aid Advertisements, and Cognition: Do Media Images of the Developing World Lead to Positive or Negative Responses in Viewers. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*, 39(2), 56-66.
- Kenny, C. (2007). Were People in the Past Poor and Miserable? *Kyklos*, 59(2), 275-306.
- Keynes, J. M. [1930] (2010). Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren. In *Essays in Persuasion*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 321-332.
- Khadjavi, M. (2014). Indirect Reciprocity and Charitable Giving – Evidence from a Field Experiment. *University of Kiel Working Papers*.
<https://sites.google.com/a/philosophy-economics.de/khadjavi/papers> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kiely, R. and Marfleet, P. (eds.) (1998). *Globalisation and the Third World*. London: Routledge.
- Kidd, D. C. and Castano, E. (2013). Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind, *Science*, 342(6156), 377-380.
- King, E. (2013). Can Development Interventions Help Post-Conflict Communities Build

- Social Cohesion? The Case of the Liberia Millennium Villages. *Centre for International Governance Innovation Africa Initiative Working Papers*, 9.
- Klein, N. (2007). *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. London: Penguin Books.
- Klein, S. (2011). *Der Sinn des Gebens – Warum Selbstlosigkeit in der Evolution siegt und wir mit Egoismus nicht weiterkommen*. Frankfurt, Main: S. Fischer.
- Klingholz, R. (2014). Absage an den Untergang – Warum noch in diesem Jahrhundert die Weltbevölkerung zu schrumpfen beginnt. *Die Zeit*, 7, 33-35.
- Kogut, T. and Ritov, I. (2005a). The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Individual Group or Just a Single Individual. *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making*, 18(3), 157-167.
- (2005b). The Singularity Effect of Identified Victims in Separate and Joint Evaluation. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 97(2), 106-116.
- (2007). One of us: Outstanding Willingness to Help Save a Single Identified Compatriot. *Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 104, 150-157.
- (2011). The Identifiable Victim Effect: Causes and Boundary Conditions. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 133-145.
- Kohn, M. (2014). Colonialism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/colonialism/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kothari, U. (2006). An Agenda for Thinking about ‘Race’ in Development. *Progress in Development Studies*, 6(1), 9-23.
- Koutonin, M. R. (2015). Why Are White People Expats When the Rest of Us Are Immigrants? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/mar/13/white-people-expats-immigrants-migration> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kraay, A. and McKenzie D. (2014). Do Poverty Traps Exist? Assessing the Evidence. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(3), 127-48.
- Kranert, M., Hafner, G., Barabosz, J., Schuller, H., Leverenz, D., Kölbig, A., Schneider, F., Lebersorger, S., and Scherhauser, S. (2012). *Ermittlung der weggeworfenen Lebensmittelmengen und Vorschläge zur Verminderung der Wegwerfrate bei Lebensmitteln in Deutschland*. Stuttgart: Institut für Wassergüte und Abfallwirtschaft.

- Kraus, M. W., Côté, S., and Keltner, D. (2010). Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathic Accuracy. *Psychological Science*, 21(11), 1716-1723.
- Kraut, R. Aristotle's Ethics. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/aristotle-ethics/>. [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Krishna, A. (2010). *One Illness Away – Why People Become Poor and How They Escape Poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kristof, N. D. (2007). Save the Darfur Puppy. *The New York Times*.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/opinion/10kristof.html?_r=0 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Kurzban, R., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L. (2001). Can Race be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social Categorization. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 98(26), 15387-15392.
- Kylander, N. and Stone, C. (2012). The Role of Brand in the Nonprofit Sector. *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, 10(2), 35-41.
- LaFraniere, S. (2008). Europe Takes Africa's Fish, and Boatloads of Migrants Follow. *The New York Times*, 14, A1.
- Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Landes, D. (2010). *Wohlstand und Armut der Nationen – Warum die einen Reich und die anderen Arm sind*. U. Enderwitz, M. Noll, and R. Schubert (transl.). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Landry, C. E., Lange, A., List, J. A., Price, M. K., and Rupp, N. G. (2006). Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(2), 747-782.
- Lange, A., List, J. A., and Price, M. K. (2007). Using Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence. *International Economic Review*, 48(3), 901-927.
- Lal, D. (2002). *The Poverty of “Development Economics”*. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Landry, C. E., Lange, A., List, J. A., Price, M. K., and Rupp, N. G. (2010). Is a Donor in Hand Better Than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. *American Economic Review*, 100(3), 958-983.
- Lansley, S. (2011). *The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality is Essential for Recovery*. London: Gibson Square Books.

- Lappé, F. M., Clapp, J., and Wise, T. (2013). *Framing Hunger: A Response to the State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012*.
www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubs/rp/framinghunger.pdf [Accessed 25 April 2017].
- Latané, B. and Darley, J. M. (1968). Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 10, 202-214.
- (1969). Bystander Apathy. *American Scientist*, 57, 244-268.
- (1970). *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Latané, B. and Rodin, J. (1969). A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 5, 189-202.
- Lauer, L. (2010). The Ethics of Natural Disasters. *University of York Master Thesis*.
 Unpublished.
- (2011). Public Perception and Motivation of Development Aid: Near-Altruism and Cognitive Limits. *Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU) Master Thesis*.
 Unpublished.
- Lauer, L. and Lepenies, R. (2015). The Poor Have No Money – So Just Give it to Them! In Favour of Inclusive Aid and Unconditional Cash Transfers. *EUI Department of Law Research Paper MWP*, 2.
- Larrú, J. M. (2011). ¿Más es mejor? Reflexiones en Torno a la Calidad de la Ayuda al Desarrollo Española. *Revista de Economía Mundial*, 28, 205-245.
- Lennox, P. (2008). Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa. *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*. <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Contemporary%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Lepenies, P. (2013). *Die Macht der einen Zahl - Eine politische Geschichte des Bruttoinlandsprodukts*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The Belief in a Just World: A fundamental Delusion*. New York: Plenum.
- Le Sage, A. (2011). Countering the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa. *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, 270, 1-16.
- Levine, M. and Crowther, S. (2008). The Responsive Bystander: How Social Group Membership and Group Size Can Encourage as Well as Inhibit Bystander Intervention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(6), 1429-1439.
- Levine, M. and Thompson, K. (2004). Identity, Place, and Bystander Intervention: Social Categories and Helping After Natural Disasters. *The Journal of Social Psychology*,

144(3), 229-245.

- Lichtenberg, J. (2014). *Distant Strangers – Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindahl, W. E. and Conley, A. T. (2002). Literature Review: Philanthropic Fundraising. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, 13(1), 91-112.
- Lindsey, L. (2005). Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation An Examination of Appeals to Help Unknown Others Through Bone Marrow Donation. *Human Communication Research*, 31(4), 453-481.
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2014). Justice and Bad Luck. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/justice-bad-luck/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Li, S., Wang, Li, S., Wang, S., and Wang, X. (2009). *Eliminating Poverty through Development in China*. London: Routledge.
- Li, S. and Wu, J. (2010). Why Some Countries Thrive Despite Corruption: The Role of Trust in the Corruption-Efficiency Relationship. *Review of International Political Economy*, 17(1), 129-154.
- List, J. (2011). The Market for Charitable Giving. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25(2), 157-180.
- Liu, W. (2011). The Benefits of Asking for Time. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 201-214.
- Li, W., Moallem, I., Paller, K. A., and Gottfried, J. A. (2007). Subliminal Smells Can Guide Social Preferences. *Psychological Science*, 18(12), 1044-1049.
- Lucas, R. A. (2007). Adaption and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-being: Does Happiness Change after Major Life Events? *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16(2), 275-279.
- Luscombe, B. (2013). 10 Questions – Head of the World Food Programme Ertharin Cousin on Feeding Millions, Food Security and Foul-tasting Cookies. *Time Magazine*, 182(9), 92.
- Lyncan, W. G. (1986). Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 79-94.
- MacAskill, W. (2015a). *Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference*. New York: Gotham.
- (2015b). Don't Get a Job at a Charity: Work on Wall Street. In R. Carey (ed.). *The Effective Altruism Handbook*. Warsaw: CreateSpace Independent Publishing

Platform.

- MacFarquhar, L. (2015). *Strangers Drowning: Impossible Idealism, Drastic Choices, and the Urge to Help*. New York: Penguin Books.
- MacLachlan, M., Carr, S. C., and McAuliffe, E. (2010). *The Aid Triangle – Recognizing the Human Dynamics of Dominance, Justice and Identity*. London: Zed Books.
- Mader, P. (2011). Making the Poor Pay for Public Goods via Microfinance: Economic and Political Pitfalls in the Case of Water and Sanitation. *Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG) Discussion Paper*, 11(14).
- Mahr, K. (2013). Portraits of Pain: What the Victims of the Rana Plaza Collapse Tell us About the Price Bangladesh is Paying for a better Future. *Time Magazine*, 182(4), 28-35.
- Maitland, I.(1997). The Great Non-debate Over International Sweatshops. *British Academy of Management Annual Conference Proceedings*, 240-265.
- Malthus T. R. [1798] (1980). *An Essay on the Principle of Population*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E., and Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function. *Science*, 341(6149), 976-980.
- Manzo, K. (2008). Imaging Humanitarianism: NGO Identity and the Iconography of Childhood. *Antipode*, 40: 632-657.
- Maren, M. (1997). *The Road to Hell – The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity*. New York: Times Books.
- Margolies, A. and Hoddinott, J. (2015). Costing Alternative Transfer Modalities. *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, 7(1), 1-16.
- Marshall, T. (2015). *Prisoners of Geography*. New York: Scribner.
- Martín, M. G. (2006). Gobernanza, Desarrollo y Ayuda Internacional. *Revista de Formento Social*, 241, 25-50.
- Martínez, I. and Santander, G. (2011). La Cooperación Descentralizada: Aportaciones para la Eficacia de la Ayuda. *Sistema. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 220, 79-98.
- Martin, R. and Reidy, D. A. (2006). *Rawls' Law of Peoples – A realistic Utopia?* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Marx, K. [1867] (1962). *Das Kapital I – Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
- [1875] (1978). Critique of the Gotha Program. In R. C. Tucker (ed.). *The Marx-Engels Reader*. New York: Norton & Company .
- Maskrey, A. (1989). *Disaster Mitigation: A Community Based Approach*. Oxford: Oxfam.

- Matfess, H. (2015). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong Men. *African Studies Review*, 58(2), 181-204.
- Matravers, M. (2000). *Justice and Punishment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005). *Managing Modernity: Politics and the Culture of Control*. London: Routledge
- (2007). *Responsibility and Justice*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Matthews, D. (2015). I Spent a Weekend at Google Talking with Nerds about Charity. I Came away ... Worried. *Vox*. <http://www.vox.com/2015/8/10/9124145/effective-altruism-global-ai> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Mattioli, S. and Palladio, A. (2012). *Die Müllmafia: Das kriminelle Netzwerk in Europa*. Langen: Müller Herbig.
- Mauss, M. (1968) [1923-1924]. *Essai sur le don. Forme et Raison de l'Échange dans les Sociétés Archaiques*. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France.
- Mazar, N. and Zhong, C.-B. (2010). Do Green Products Make Us Better People? *Psychological Science*, 21(4), 494-498.
- McDonnell, I., Solignac Lecomte, H.-B., and Wegimont, L. (eds.) (2003). *Public Opinion and the Fight Against Poverty*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., Hermes, N., and Lensink, R. (2006). Controversies Over the Impact of Development Aid: It Works; It Doesn't; It Can, But That Depends.... *Journal of International Development*, 18(7), 1031-1050.
- McGoey, L. (2015). *No Such Thing as a Free Gift – The Gates Foundation and the Price of Philanthropy*. London: Verso.
- McKie, J., Richardson, J., Singer, P., and Kuhse, H. (1998). *The Allocation of Health Care Resources: An Ethical Evaluation of the "QALY" Approach*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
- McKissick, J. C. and Kane, S. P. (2011). An Evaluation of Direct and Indirect Economic Losses Incurred by Georgia Fruit and Vegetable Producers in Spring 2011. *Journal of Agribusiness*, 29(2), 267.
- McLean, I. and McMillan, A. (2009). *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McLean, I. (2010). The Gift Relationship. *The Policy Network*. http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=3872&title=The+Gift+Relationship [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- McLuhan, M. (1962). *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man*. Toronto:

- University of Toronto Press.
- (1964). *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- (1967). *The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects*. London: Penguin Books.
- McMullen, A., Luginbühl, C., Nolan, K., Crabbé, C., and Ajaltouni, N. (2014). *Tailored Wages – Are the Big Brands Paying the People Who Make Our Clothes Enough to Live On?* Brussels: The Clean Clothes Campaign Network.
- Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., and Behrens, W. W. (1972). *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Universe Books.
- Mealey, L. (1995). The Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18, 523-599.
- Meckel, M. (2011). Weltkurzsichtigkeit: Wie der Zufall aus unserem digitalen Leben verschwindet. *Der Spiegel*, 38, 120-121.
- Melo, M. A. (2007). Political Competition Can Be Positive: Embedding Cash Transfer Programmes in Brazil. In A. Bebbinton and W. McCourt. *Development Success – Statecraft in the South*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 30-51.
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2006). *Top 10 Most Under-Reported Humanitarian Stories of 2006*. <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/special-report/top-ten-most-underreported-humanitarian-stories-2006> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Meier, S. and Stutzer, A. (2008). Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself? *Economica*, 75, 39-59.
- Merchant, A., Ford, J. B., and Sargeant, A. (2010). Charitable Organizations' Storytelling Influence on Donors' Emotions and Intentions. *Journal of Business Research*, 63(7), 754-762.
- Mercier, H. (2011). What Good is Moral Reasoning? *Mind & Society*, 10(2), 131-148.
- Mercier, H. and Sperber, D. (2011). Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 34(2), 57-74.
- Meyers, C. (2004). Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 35(3), 319-333.
- Michael, J. (2012). Race. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/race/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2011). The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for

- Africa. *National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers*, 17620.
- Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities. *Econometrica*, 72(1), 159-217.
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 371-378.
- Mill, J. S. [1859] (1980). *On Liberty*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Millennium Promise Foundation (2013). *Millennium Promise Annual Report on the Millennium Villages Project*. <http://millenniumvillages.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2013-MP-AnnualReport-FINAL-3Feb2015.pdf> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Miller, D. (1988). The Ethical Significance of Nationality. *Ethics*, 98(4), 647-662.
- (1995). *On Nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2007). *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, R. W. (2004). Beneficence, Duty and Distance. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32(4), 357-383.
- Milner, D. (1996). Children and Racism: Beyond the Value of Dolls. In W. P. Robinson (ed.) *Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel*. Oxford: International Series in Social Psychology.
- Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D. H. (2010). Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy. *International Organization*, 65, 37-68.
- Misje, A. H., Bosnes, V., Gåsdal, O., and Heier, H. E. (2005). Motivation, Recruitment and Retention of Voluntary Non-Remunerated Blood Donors: A Survey-Based Questionnaire Study. *Vox Saguinis*, 89, 236-244.
- Mitani, J. C., Watts, D. P., and Amstler, S. J. (2010). Lethal Intergroup Aggression Leads to Territorial Expansion in Wild Chimpanzees. *Current Biology*, 20(12), R507-R508.
- Mkandawire, T. (2005). Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction. *Social Policy and Development Programme Paper*, 23.
- Moeller, S. (1999). *Compassion Fatigue – How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*. New York: Routledge.
- Mogues, T., Ayele, G., and Paulos, Z. (2008). *The Bang for the Birr – Public Expenditures and Rural Welfare in Ethiopia*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Mohan, J. (2011). Mapping the Big Society: Perspectives from the Third Sector Research

- Centre. *Third Sector Research Centre Working Paper*, 62.
- Montague, D. (2002). Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *SAIS Review*, 22(1), 103-118.
- Moore, R. (2010). That Morality Overrides the Profit Motive to Improve Efficiency. *The Transatlantic Journal of Economics and Philosophy*, 1, 20-23.
- Morley, S. and Coady, D. (2003). *From Social Assistance to Social Development: A Review of targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: International Food Research Institute.
- Moss, T. J. (2011). Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse Through Cash Transfers. *Center for Global Development Working Paper*, 237.
- Morozov, E. (2009). The Brave New World of Slacktivism. *Foreign Policy*.
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/19/the-brave-new-world-of-slacktivism/>
 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead Aid – Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mukherjee, R. and Banet-Weiser, S. (eds.). (2012). *Commodity Activism: Cultural Resistance in Neoliberal Times*. New York: New York University Press.
- Müllerson, R. (2008). Promoting Democracy Without Starting a New Cold War? *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 7(1), 1-31.
- Mulgan, T. (1997). A Non-proportional Hybrid Moral Theory. *Utilitas*, 9, 291-306.
 -(2001). *The Demands of Consequentialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mullainathan, S. and Shafir, E. (2013). *Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much*. New York: Times Books.
- Munk, N. (2013). *The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and the Quest to End Poverty*. New York: Doubleday.
- Muradian, R. and Wanjala, B. M. (2013). Can Big Push Interventions Take Small-Scale Farmers Out of Poverty? Insights from the Sauri Millennium Village in Kenya. *World Development*, 45, 147-160.
- Music, G. (2014). *The Good Life: Well-Being and the New Science of Altruism, Selfishness and Immorality*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Mwenda, A. M. (2006). Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda. *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing*, 88.
- Mwenda, A. M. and Tangri, R. (2006). Politics, Donors, and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Uganda. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(1), 101-124.

- Nagel, T. (1978). *The Possibility of Altruism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- (1991). *Equality and Partiality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005). *The Problem of Global Justice*.
www.kyoolee.net/Problem_of_Global_Justice_Thomas_Nagel.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2010). What Peter Singer Wants of You. *The New York Review of Books*.
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/mar/25/what-peter-singer-wants-of-you/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). *You Can't Learn About Morality from Brain Scans - The Problem with Moral Psychology*. <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115279/joshua-greenes-moral-tribes-reviewed-thomas-nagel> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Naicker, S., Plange-Rhule, J., Tutt, R. C., and Eastwood, J. B. (2009). Shortage of Healthcare Workers in Developing Countries – Africa. *Ethnicity and Disease*, 19(1), 60-64.
- Narayan, D., Patel, R., Schafft, K., Rademacher, A., and Koch-Schulte, S. (2000). *Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices of the Poor*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Narlikar, A. and Kim, D. (2013). Unfair Trade. *Foreign Affairs*.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139127/amrita-narlikar-and-dan-kim/unfair-trade>. [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- National Research Council (2010). *Advancing the Science of Climate Change*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Nelson, P. J. and Greene, K. V. (2003). *Signalling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Nest, M. (2011) *Coltan*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Neumann, P. J., Cohen, J. T., and Weinstein, M. C. (2014). Updating Cost-Effectiveness — The Curious Resilience of the \$50,000-per-QALY Threshold. *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 371, 796-797.
- Neumayer, E. (2003a). Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries. *Social Science Quarterly*, 84.
- (2003b). *The Pattern of Aid Giving*. London: Routledge.
- (2003c) Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 25.
- (2003d). The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and United Nation Agencies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(1), 101-122.

- Neuwirth, R. (2012). *Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy*. New York: Random House.
- Nickel, J. (2014). Human Rights. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/rights-human/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation Bias: An Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(2), 175-220.
- Niessen-Ruenzi, A., Weber, M., and Becker, D. M. (2014). *To Pay or Not to Pay - Evidence from Whole Blood Donations in Germany*.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381901> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Nkonya, E., Gerber, N., Baumgartner, P., von Braun, J., de Pinto, A., Graw, V., Kato, E., Kloos, J., and Walter, T. (2011). The Economics of Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought – Toward an Integrated Global Assessment. *International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Discussion Paper*, 01086.
- Nocera, J. (2013). Fighting Poverty, and Critics. *New York Times*.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/opinion/nocera-fighting-poverty-and-critics.html?_r=4 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., and Weingast, B. R. (eds.) (2013). *In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Norton-Taylor, R. (2014). Russia Spends More of its Wealth on Arms than US in 2013. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/russia-spends-more-wealth-arms-us-2013> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity. *Nature*, 437, 1291-1298.
- Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
 - (1989). *The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Nussbaum, M. (1990). Aristotelian Social Democracy. In *Liberalism and the Good*, R. B. Douglas, G. M. Mara, and H. Richardson (eds.). New York: Routledge, 203-252.
 -(1996). Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism. In M. Nussbaum. *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, Boston: Bacon Press, 2-20.
 -(2000a). *Women and Human Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 -(2000b). The Cost of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis.

- Journal of Legal Studies*, 29(2), 1005-1036.
- (2000c). Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8(2), 176-206.
- (2011). *Creating Capabilities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., Richey, S., and Freed, G. L. (2014). Effective Messages in Vaccine Promotion: A Randomized Trial. *Pediatrics*, 133(4), e835-e842.
- Ohr, R. (2014). *Heimtierstudie “Wirtschaftsfaktor Heimtierhaltung”*. <http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/aktuelles/65380.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Oishi, S., Kesebir, S., and Diener, E. (2011). Income Inequality and Happiness. *Psychological Science*, 22, 1095-1100.
- O’Keefe, D. J. (2002). Guilt as a Mechanism of Persuasion. In J. P. Dillard & L. Shen (eds.). *The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion: Developments in Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 329-344.
- Okten, C. and Weisbrod, B. A. (2000). Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets. *Journal of Public Economics*, 75, 255-272.
- Olivola, C. Y. (2011). When Noble Means Hinder Noble Ends: The Benefits and Costs of a Preference for Martyrdom in Atruism. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 49-62.
- Olivola, C. Y. and Shafir, E. (2013). The Martyrdom Effect: When Pain and Effort Increase Prosocial Contributions. *Journal of Behavioural Decision Making*, 26(1), 91–105.
- Olson, G. R. (2000). Public Opinion and Development Aid: Is there a Link? *Centre for Development Research Working Papers*, 9.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- O’Neill, O. (1975). Lifeboat Earth. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 4(3), 273-292.
- (1986). *Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Development and Justice*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Oosterhof, L., Heuvelman, A., and Peters, O. (2009). Donation to Disaster Relief Campaigns: Underlying Social Cognitive Factors Exposed. *Evaluation and Program Planning*, 32(2), 148-157.
- Oppenheimer, D. M. and Olivola, C. Y. (eds.) (2011). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis.
- Orend, B. (2008). War. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/> [Accessed 25th of April

2017].

- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2014). *Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High*.
<http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2016). *Development Aid Rises Again in 2015, Spending on Refugees Doubles*.
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-aid-rises-again-in-2015-spending-on-refugees-doubles.htm> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Origg, G. and Sperber, D. (2000). Evolution, Communication and the Proper Function of Language. *Evolution and the Human Mind: Language, Modularity and Social Cognition*, 140-169.
- Orwell, G. [1949] (1998). Reflections on Gandhi. In P. Davison (ed.). *The Complete Works of George Orwell*. London: Secker & Warburg.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrower, F. (1995). *Why the Wealthy Give*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Otsuka, M. and Voorhoeve, A. (2009). Why it Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument Against the Priority View. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 37(2), 171-199.
- Ottaway, S. A., Hayden, D. C., and Oakes, M. A. (2001). Implicit Attitudes and Racism: Effects of Word Familiarity and Frequency on the Implicit Association Test. *Social Cognition*, 19(2), 97-144.
- Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2015). *Doing Cash Differently – How Cash Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid: Report of the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Paarlberg, R. (2013). *Food Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pagel, M. (2013). *Wired for Culture: Origins of the Human Social Mind*. New York: Norton & Norton.
- Palotta, D. (2008). *Uncharitable: How Restraints on Nonprofits Undermine Their Potential*. Medford: Tufts University Press.
- Parmesan, C. and Yohe, G. (2003). A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts Across Natural Systems. *Nature*, 421, 37-42.
- Patel, R. and Delwiche, A. (2002). The Profits of Famine: Southern Africa's Long Decade of Hunger. *Food First Backgrounder*, 8(4).

- Patel, V., Abas M., Broadhead, J., Todd, C., and Reeler, A. (2001). Depression in Developing Countries: Lessons from Zimbabwe. *British Medical Journal*, 322, 482-484.
- Peña, J. (2010). *La Ciudad sin Murallas - Política en Clave Cosmopolita*. Barcelona: El Viejo Topo.
- Pénard, T., Poussing, N., and Suire, R. (2011). Does the Internet Make People Happier? *Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management Working Paper*, 6.
- Perry, A. (2011). Collateral Crisis – How a Successful U.S. Campaign to Cripple Islamist Terrorist in Somalia Contributed to a Catastrophic Famine That Could Kill Hundreds of Thousands. *Time Magazine*, 46, 22-29.
- Pettifor, A. E., Levandowski, B. A., MacPhail, C., Padian, N. S., Cohen, M. S., and Rees, H. V. (2008). Keep Them in School: The Importance of Education as a Protective Factor Against HIV Infection Among Young South African Women. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 37(6), 1266-1273.
- Pew Research Center (2014). Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries about the Future. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economies-much-more-optimistic-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Phelps, E. S. (ed.) (1975). *Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. A. Goldhammer (transl.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Piff, P. K., Kraus, M. W., Côté, S., Cheng, B. H., and Keltner, D. (2010). Having Less, Giving More: The Influence of Social Class on Prosocial Behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99(5), 771-784.
- Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Côté, S., Mendoza-Denton, R., and Keltner, D. (2012). Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 109(11), 4086-4091.
- Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking Books.
- Plewes, B. and Stuart, R. (2006). The Pornography of Poverty: A Cautionary Fundraising Tale. In D. A. Bell & J.-M. Coicaud (eds.). *Ethics in Action – The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations*, 23-37.
- Pogge, T. (1994). An Egalitarian Law of Peoples. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 23(3),

- 195-224.
- (1998). A Global Resources Dividend. In D. Crocker & T. Linden (eds.). *Ethics of Consumption. The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 501-536.
- (2002). Can the Capability Approach be Justified? *Philosophical Topics*, 30(2), 167-228.
- (2005). Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 19(1), 55-83.
- (2007) (ed.). *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right – Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2010a). *Politics as Usual – What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- (2010b). Keynote Address: Poverty, Climate Change, and Overpopulation. *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 38(3), 525-542.
- (2011). *Weltarmut und Menschenrechte - Kosmopolitische Verantwortung und Reformen*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Pogge, T. and Reddy, S. G. (2010). How *Not* to Count the Poor. In J. Stiglitz, S. & P. Segal (eds.). *Measuring Global Poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42-114.
- Pogge, T., Rimmer, M., and Rubenstein, K. (eds.) (2014). *Incentives for Global Public Health Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Polak, M. and Warwick, M. (2013). *The Business Solution to Poverty: Designing Products and Services for Three Billion New Customers*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
- Polgreen, L. and Bajaj, V. (2010). India Microcredit faces Collapse from Defaults. *New York Times*, 17, A5.
- Polman, L. (2008). *Die Mitleidsindustrie – Hinter den Kulissen internationaler Hilfsorganisationen*. Frankfurt, Main: Campus Verlag.
- (2010). *The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?* New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Prahalad, C. K. (2006): *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid – Eradicating Poverty through Profits*. Upper Saddle River: Wharton School Publishing.
- Prieto, L. and Sacristán, J. A. (2003). Problems and Solutions in Calculating Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). *Health and Quality of Life Outcomes*, 1(80).
- Priller, E. and Sommerfeld, J. (2005). Wer spendet in Deutschland? Eine sozialstrukturelle Analyse. *Discussion Papers Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung*, 202.

- Pritchett, L. (2006). *Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on International Labor Mobility*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
- (2013). *The Rebirth of Education: Schooling Ain't Learning*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
- Pronyk, P. M., Muniz, M., Nemser, B., Somers, M. A., McClellan, L., Palm, C. A., Huynh, U. K., Ben Amor, Y., Begashaw, B., McArthur, J. W., Niang, A., Sachs, S. E., Singh, P., Teklehaimanot, A., and Sachs J. (2012). The Effect of an Integrated Multisector Model for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and Improving Child Survival in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa: A Non-Randomised Controlled Assessment. *The Lancet*, 379(9832), 2179-2188.
- Pronyk, P. M. (2012). Errors in a Paper on the Millennium Villages Project. *The Lancet*, 379(9830), 1946-1947.
- Radley, A. and Kennedy, M. (1995). Charitable Giving by Individuals: A Study of Attitudes. *Human Relations*, 48(6), 685-709.
- Radtke, K. (2007). Ein Trend zur transnationaler Solidarität? Die Entwicklung des Spendenaufkommens in der Not- und Entwicklungshilfe. *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung Discussion Paper*, 304(4).
- Raihani, N. J. and Smith, S. (2015). Competitive Helping in Online Giving. *Current Biology*, 25(9), 1183-1186 .
- Rajan, R. G. (2011). *Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ramalingam, B. (2013). *Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rand, D. G. and Epstein, Z. G. (2014). Risking Your Life Without a Second Thought: Intuitive Decision-Making and Extreme Altruism. *PloS ONE*, 9(10).
- Ratner, R. K., Zhao, M., and Clarke, J. A. (2011). The Norm of Self-Interest: Implications for Charitable Giving. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 113-131.
- Rausser, R. (2010). *On the Immorality of Disproving Peter Unger*.
http://randalrauser.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/On_the_Immorality_of_Disproving_Peter_Unger.pdf
 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1999). *The Law of the Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Rowlands, M. (2008). *The Philosopher and the Wolf: Lessons from the Wild on Love Death and Happiness*. London: Granta Books
- Redfield, P. (2013). *Life in Crisis: The Ethical Journey of Doctors Without Borders*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Reddy, S. G., (2013). Randomise This! On Poor Economics. *Review of Agrarian Studies*, 2(2).
- Reed, L. (2011). *State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report*. Washington, DC: Microcredit Summit Campaign.
- Reed, P. B. and Selbee, L. K. (2000). *Patterns of Citizen Participation and the Civic Core in Canada*. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- Regev, D. and St John, D. (2014). Is Increased Media Attention on Ebola Translating into more Donations? *Deutsche Welle*. <http://dw.de/p/1DVWt> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Regan, C. (ed.) (2012). *80:20: Development in an Unequal World*. Pretoria: Unisa Press.
- Rehage, R. (2015). Die Spendenverlierer. *Die Zeit*, 42, 33.
- Reinert, E. S. (2008). *How Rich Countries Got Rich... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*. New York: Public Affairs Press.
- Reitsma, J. Scheepers, P., and Grotenhuis, T. M. (2006). Dimensions of Individual Religiosity and Charity: Cross-National Effect Differences in European Countries? *Review of Religious Research*, 47(4), 347-362.
- Retterath, L. (2010). German Muslims Empty Pockets for Pakistan Flood Victims. *Deutsche Welle*. <http://www.dw.de/german-muslims-empty-pockets-for-pakistan-flood-victims/a-5919021> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Ricoeur, P. (1995). *Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative and Imagination*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- (1996). *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*. München: Fink.
- Riddell, R. (1999). The End of Foreign Aid to Africa? Concerns about Donor Policies. *African Affairs*, 98, 309-335.
- (2008). *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Risse, M. (2005). How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 33, 349-376.
- Rist, R. C. (1970). Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education. *Harvard Educational Review*, 40, 411-451.
- Roberts, R. (2008). Charity. *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. Library of Economics and Liberty. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Charity.html> [Accessed

- 25th of April 2017].
- Rogers, S. (2010). Pakistan Flood Aid Pledged Country by Country. *The Guardian*.
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/aug/09/pakistan-flood-aid#data>.
 [Accessed 25 April 2017].
- Rohwetter, M. (2014). Märchen zum Kaffee. *Die Zeit*, 34, 17-18.
- Roodman, D. and Morduch, J. (2009). The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting the Evidence. *Center for Global Development (CGD) Working Paper*, 174.
- Roodman, D. (2012). *Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
- Rorty, R. 1994. (1979). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- (1993). *Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum*. J. Schulte (transl.) Stuttgart: Reclam.
- (1994). Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality. In S. Shute & S. L. Hurley (eds.). *On Human Rights: Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 111-134.
- (2000). *Philosophy and Social Hope*. London: Penguin Books.
- Rose, D. C. (2014). *The Moral Foundation of Economic Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rose, E. (1999). Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(1), 41-49.
- Rosenski, N. (2012). Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Dritten Sektors. *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 3, 209-217.
- Ross, E. B. (1998). *The Malthus Factor: Poverty, Politics and Population in Capitalist Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Ross, L. and Nisbett, R. E. (1991). *The Person and the Situation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Rothmyer, K. (2011). They Wanted Journalists to Say “Wow” – How NGOs Affect U.S. Media Coverage of Africa. *Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy Discussion Paper Series*, 61.
- Rothschild, K. W. (1993). *Ethics and Economic Theory*. London: Aldershot/Brookfield.
- Rubenstein, J. (2015). The Logic of Effective Altruism – Forum Response. *Boston Review*.
<http://bostonreview.net/forum/logic-effective-altruism/jennifer-rubenstein-response-effective-altruism> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Runge, C. F., and Senauer, B. (2007). How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor. *Foreign Affairs*,

- Ruskin, J. (2007). *Unto This Last*. Minneapolis: Filiquarian.
- Rutherford, A. (2010). Get by with a Little Help from my Friends: A Recent History of Charitable Organisations in Economic Theory. *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 17(4), 1031-1046.
- Rybak, A. (2014). Den Aufstieg verschenkt. *Die Zeit*, 22, 31.
- Sachs, J. D. (2005). *The End of Poverty – Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. London: Penguin Books.
- Sandel, M. J. (2012). *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Sargeant, A. and Hudson, J. (2008). Donor Retention: An Exploratory Study of Door-to-Door Recruits. *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing*, 13(1), 89-101.
- Sargeant, A. and Jay, E. (2004). *Building Donor Loyalty: The Fundraiser's Guide to Increasing Lifetime Value*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Scanlon, T. M. (1999). *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (2006). Justice Responsibility and the Demands of Equality. In C. Sypnowich (ed.). *The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen*, 70-87.
- Schaler, J. A. (2009) (ed.). *Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics*. Chicago: Open Court Publishers.
- Scheffler, S. (1982). *The Rejection of Consequentialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schelling, T. C. (1968). The Life You Save May Be Your Own. In S. B. Chase (ed.). *Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 127-162.
- [1978] (2005). *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Shiffman, J. (2006). Donor Funding Priorities for Communicable Disease Control in the Developing World. *Health Policy Plan*, 21(6), 411-420.
- Schneider, D. J. (2004). *The Psychology of Stereotyping*. New York and London: Guilford Press.
- Schooley, W. A. (2010). Criminal Negligence – Why is the World Starving with a Surplus of Food. *Human Rights*, 37(1).
- Schraeder, P. J., Hook, S. W., and Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows. *World*

- Politics*, 50(2), 294-323.
- Schroeder, D. A., Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., and Piliavin J. A. (1995). *The Psychology of Helping and Altruism: Problems and Puzzles*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Schüßler, R. (1991). Unterminiert der Markt seine normative Basis? In B. Biervert and M. Held (eds.) *Das Menschenbild der ökonomischen Theorie*. Frankfurt, Main: Campus Verlag, 94-110.
- Schultz, T. P. (2004). School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program. *Journal of Development Economics*, 74(1), 199-250.
- Schurmann, A. T. and Johnston, H. B. (2009). The Group-lending Model and Social Closure: Microcredit, Exclusion, and Health in Bangladesh. *Journal of Health and Popular Nutrition*, 27(4), 518-527.
- Sebastian, M. and Titeca, K. (2014). Why did Invisible Children Dissolve? *The Atlantic*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Segal, J. P., Sobczak, A., and Triomphe, C. E. (2003). *Corporate Social Responsibility and Working Conditions*. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
- Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., Anat Yom, T. and Schmidt, P. (2004). Population Size, Perceived Threat, and Exclusion: A Multiple-Indicators Analysis of Attitudes Toward Foreigners in Germany. *Social Science Research*, 33(4), 681-701.
- Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., and Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). The Rise of Anti-foreigner Sentiment in European Societies 1988-2000. *American Sociological Review*, 71, 426-449.
- Sen, A. (1982). Equality of What? In A. Sen. *Choice, Welfare and Measurement*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 353-369.
- (1985). *Commodities and Capabilities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1987a). *On Ethics and Economics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1987b). *The Standard of Living*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (1995). *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (2001). *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sen, B. (2003). Drivers of Escape and Descent: Changing Household Fortunes in Rural Bangladesh. *World Development*, 31, 513-534.
- Sharples, N., Jones, T., and Martin, C. (2014). Honest Accounts? The True Story of Africa's Billion Dollar Losses. *Health Poverty Action*. <https://www.healthpovertyaction.org/speaking-out/honest-accounts/> [Accessed 25th

- of April 2017].
- Searlaw, M. (2015). Why Did the World Ignore Boko Haram's Baga Attacks? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-boko-haram-attacks-nigeria-baga-ignored-media> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Shermer, M. (2008). *The Mind of the Market – Compassionate Apes, Competitive Humans and Other Tales from Evolution*. New York: Hold Paperbacks.
- Shields, C. (2012). Aristotle. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/aristotle/>. [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Shikwati, J. (2006). *The Future of Africa in the World*. https://irekenya.com/downloads/articles/The_future_of_Africa.pdf [Accessed 25 April 2017].
- Schlander, M. (2007). Lost in Translation? Over-Reliance on QALYs May Lead to Neglect of Relevant Evidence. *iHEA 2007 6th World Congress: Explorations in Health Economics Paper*.
- Schubert, R., Schellnhuber, H. J., and Buchmann, N. (2007). *Climate Change as a Security Risk*. London: Earthscan.
- Shue, H. (1988). Mediating Duties. *Ethics*, 98, 687-704.
- Shun, K. L. (2010). Mencius. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/mencius/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Sias, J. (2005). *On the Reliability of our Moral Intuitions*. <http://commonsensephilosophy.blogspot.com/2005/10/12/on-the-reliability-of-our-moral-intuitions/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Silk, J. (2000). Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation. *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 3(3), 303-322.
- Silverstone, R. (2003). Proper Distance: Towards an Ethics for Cyberspace. In G. Liestol, A. Morrison, & R. Terje (eds.). *Digital Media Revisited*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 469-491.
- (2008). *Mediapolis: Die Moral der Massenmedien*. F. Jakubzik (transl.). Frankfurt, Main: Suhrkamp.
- Simmel, G. [1900] (2008). *Die Philosophie des Geldes*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
- [1908] (2013). *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Simon, H. (1957). *Models of Man*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

- Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence and Morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1(3), 229-243.
- (1973). Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss Against Arrow. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2(3), 312-320.
- (1977) Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument. In P. Brown & H. Shue (eds.). *Food Policy*. New York: Free Press.
- (1981). *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2002). *One World – The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (2007). *Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions*
<http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/200703--.htm> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2009a). *The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty*. New York: Random House.
- (2009b). *When Charity Isn't Charitable*.
<http://www.forward.com/articles/105039/#ixzz1mYej3Fcw> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2011a). *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution and Moral Progress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- (2011b). What Should a Billionaire Give and What Should You? In P. Illingworth, T. Pogge, & L. Wenar (eds.). *Giving Well – The Ethics of Philanthropy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13-25.
- (2014). Against Empathy. *The Boston Review*.
<http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/against-empathy/peter-singer-response-against-empathy-peter-singer> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2015). *The Most Good You Can Do – How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Giving Ethically*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Singer, P. and Fei, T. (2013). Fairness and Climate Change. *Project Syndicate*.
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fair-distribution-of-rights-to-carbon-emissions-by-peter-singer-and-teng-fei#Pr08kL0Y412W2CK8.99> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Singh, P. and Sachs, J. D. (2013). 1 Million Community Health Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015. *The Lancet*, 382(9889), 363-365.
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2014). Consequentialism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consequentialism/>

[Accessed 25th of April 2017].

- Sireau, N. (2009). *Make Poverty History – Political Communication in Action*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Skidelsky, R and Skidelsky, E. (2012). *How Much is Enough? Money and the Good Life*. New York: Other Press.
- Slair, L. (2002). *Globalization – Capitalism & its Alternatives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sloan, P. (2010). Evolution. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/evolution/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Slote, M. (2007). *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*. London: Routledge.
- Slovic, P. (2007). If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act – Psychic Numbing and Genocide. *Judgement and Decision-Making*, 2(2), 1-17.
- Slovic, P. and Västfjäll (2010). Affect, Moral Intuition and Risk. *Psychological Inquiry*, 21, 387-398.
- Small, D. A. (2011). Sympathy Biases and Sympathy Appeals: Reducing Social Distance to Boost Charitable Contributions. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 149-160.
- Small, D. A. and Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 26(1), 5-16.
- (2007). The Scarecrow and the Tinman: The Vicissitudes of Human Sympathy and Caring. *Review of General Psychology*, 60(1), 5-23.
- Small, D. A. and Loewenstein, G. and Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims. *Organizational Behaviour and Decision Processes*, 102(2), 145-153.
- Smillie, I. (1995). *The Alms Bazaar – Altruism under Fire*. Ottawa: Dorwyn.
- (1997). NGOs and Development Assistance: A Change in Mind-Set? *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), 563-577.
- Smith, A. [1759] (2010). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. London: Penguin.
- [1776] (1976). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, C. and Davidson, H. (2014). *The Paradox of Generosity – Giving We Receive, Grasping We Lose*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, D. J. (2009). Big-Eyed, Wide-Eyed, Sad-Eyed Children: Constructing the

- Humanitarian Space in Social Justice Documentaries. *Studies in Documentary Film*, 3(2), 159.
- Solove, D. J. (2007). *The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumour, and Privacy on the Internet*. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Spencer, S. (2006). *Race and Ethnicity: Culture, Identity, and Representation*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Der Spiegel Online (2010). *The Problem with Pakistan. Why Europe Has Been Slow to Help Flood Victims*. www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,712874,00.html [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). Saudische "Azzam": Das ist die längste Yacht der Welt. <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/neue-megayacht-azzam-die-laengste-motoryacht-der-welt-a-892821.html> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Der Spiegel International (2005). "For God's Sake, Please Stop the Aid!" – Interview with African Economics Expert James Shikwati. [http://www.Der Spiegel.de/international/Der Spiegel/0,1518,363663,00.html](http://www.DerSpiegel.de/international/DerSpiegel/0,1518,363663,00.html) [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Standing, G. (2008). How Cash Transfers Promote the Case for Basic Income. *Basic Income Studies*, 3(1).
- (2011). Behavioural Conditionality: Why the Nudges Must be Stopped – An Opinion Piece. *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, 19(1), 27-38.
- Statistisches Bundesamt (2014). *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutschland und Internationales*. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Steiner, H. (1984). A Liberal Theory of Exploitation. *Ethics*, 94(2), 225-241.
- (2013). Liberalism, Neutrality and Exploitation. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 12, 335-344.
- Stern, K. (2013a). *With Charity for All – Why Charities Are Failing and a Better Way to Give*. New York: Doubleday.
- (2013b). Why the Rich Don't Give to Charity. *The Atlantic*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/why-the-rich-dont-give/309254/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Stern, M. (1998). *Development Aid: What the Public Thinks*. New York: UNDP.
- Stern, R. (2004). Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can'? And Did Kant Think It Does? *Utilitas*, 16(1), 42-61.
- Steuter, E. and Wills, D. (2009). Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror. *Global Media*

- Journal*, 2(2), 7-24.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: Norton & Norton.
- (2012). *The Price of Inequality*. London: Allen Lane.
- Strahilevitz, M. A. (2011). A Model of the Value of Giving to Others Compared to the Value of Having More for Oneself: Implications for Fundraisers Seeking to Maximise Donor Satisfaction. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (eds.). *The Science of Giving – Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 15-34.
- Strasser, T. (1981). *The Wave*. New York City: Dell.
- Sundby, R. and Pawar, M. (2008). Perception of and Responses to Disasters. *Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development*, 18(2), 72-83.
- Sunstein, C. S. (2014). *Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Suski, L. (2009). *Children, Suffering, and the Humanitarian Appeal*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sylla, N. S. (2014). *The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich*. London: Pluto Press.
- Taber, C. S. and Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50, 755–769.
- Tallon, R. A. M. and McGregor, A. (2014). Pitying the Third World: Towards more Progressive Emotional Responses to Development Education in Schools. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(8), 1406-1422.
- Tan, K.-C. (2004). *Justice without Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Taspinar, Ö. (2009). Fighting Radicalism, not “Terrorism”: Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined. *S AIS Review of International Affairs*, 29(2), 75-86.
- Taurek, J. M. (1977). Should the Numbers Count? *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4), 293-316.
- Temkin, L. (1993). *Inequality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004). Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise. *Journal of Ethics*, 8, 409-458.
- Terry, F. (2002). *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
- Thaler, R. H. (1985). Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. *Marketing Science*, 4, 199-214.
- (1999). Mental Accounting Matters. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 12,

- Thérien, J.-P. and Lloyd, C. (2000). Development Assistance on the Brink. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(1), 21-38.
- The Reality of Aid Report (ROA) (2010). *Aid and Development Effectiveness: Towards Human Rights, Social Justice and Democracy*. <http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/375/Aid-and-Development-Effectiveness-Towards-Human-Rights-Social-Justice-and-Democracy> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Thieme, M. (2011). Der Fall Unicef. In K. Bangert (ed.). *Handbuch Spendenwesen*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 195-210.
- Tisdall, S. and Rahman, M. (2010). Pakistan Flood Toll Rises but International Aid Fails to Flow. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/10/pakistan-flood-international-aid#> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Titmuss, R. (1970). *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy*. London: John Ashton & Ann Oakley.
- Tomasello, M. (2009). *Why We Cooperate*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tomasi, J. (2012). *Free Market Fairness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tonelson, A. (2002). *Race to the Bottom: Why a Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled Free Trade Are Sinking American Living Standards*. New York: Basic Books.
- Tooley, J. (2009). *The Beautiful Tree: A Personal Journey Into How the World's Poorest People Are Educating Themselves*. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
- Toth, C. (2014). Cash, Goods, or Services? The Poor say Cash. *GiveDirectly*. http://www.givedirectly.org/blog_post.php?id=6297262034245147888 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Transparency International (2010). *Annual Report 2010*. http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_report_2010 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2013). *Corruption Perception Index 2013*. http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi2013_brochure_single_pages?E=2496456/5813913 [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Trentmann, C. and Weingärtner, L. (2011). *Handbuch Welternährung*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.
- United Nations (UN) (2015). *The Millennium Development Goals Report*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- United Nations Development Report (UNDP) (2015). *Human Development Report 2015 –*

- Work for Human Development*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2005). *After the Tsunami – Rapid Environmental Assessment*.
http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_report_complete.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- (2007). *Sudan – Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*.
<http://www.unep.org/sudan/post-conflict/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) (2010). *Annual Report 2010*. http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_58840.html [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Unger, P. (1996). *Living High and Letting Die*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Unwin, J. (2013). *Why Fight Poverty?* London: London Publishing Partnership.
- Valkila, J., Haaparanta, P., and Niemi, N. (2010). Empowering Coffee Traders? The Coffee Value Chain from Nicaraguan Fair Trade Farmers to Finnish Consumers. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 97(2), 257-270.
- Vallentyne, P. (2006). Against Maximizing Act Consequentialism. In J. Dreier (ed.). *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 22-32.
- Vallentyne, P. and van der Vossen, B. (2014). Libertarianism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/libertarianism> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- van de Walle, N. (1999). Aid's Crisis of Legitimacy: Current Proposals and Future Prospects. *African Affairs*, 98, 337-352.
- van Diepen, M., Donkers, B., and Franses, P. H. (2009). Does Irritation Induced by Charitable Direct Mailing Reduce Donations? *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 26, 180-188.
- van Iwaarden, J., van der Wiele, T., Williams, R., and Moxham, C. (2009). Charities: How Important is Performance to Donors? *International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management*, 26(1), 5-22.
- van Parijs, P. (1995). *Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Reybrouck, D. (2012). *Kongo – Eine Geschichte*. W. Hüsmert (transl.). Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- van Wolkenten, M., Brosnan, S. F. and de Waal, F. B. M. (2007). Inequity Responses of Monkeys Modified by Effort. *PNAS*, 104 (47), 18854-18859.

- Vargas, M. (2013). Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments. In A. Clark, J. Kiverstein, & T. Vierkant (eds.). *Decomposing the Will*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 325-350.
- Veblen, T. (1899). *Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions*. New York: Macmillan
- Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (VENRO) (2011). *VENRO-Kodex für entwicklungsbezogene Öffentlichkeitsarbeit*. http://www.globaleslernen.de/sites/default/files/files/link-elements/kodex_eboe_v07.pdf [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Vicente, P. C. and Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from Field Experiments in African Elections. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2), 292-305.
- Viswanathan, M., Kraschnewski, J., Nishikawa, B., Morgan, L. C., Thieda, P., Honeycutt, A., Lohr, K. N., and Jonas, D. (2009). Outcomes of Community Health Worker Interventions. *Evidence Reports/Technology Assessments*, 181.
- Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., and Goode, M. R. (2006). The Psychological Consequences of Money. *Science*, 314, 1154-1156.
- (2008). Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes Personal and Interpersonal Behavior. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 17(8), 208-212.
- Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) (2002). *The Live Aid Legacy: The Developing World through British Eyes – A Research Report*. London: Voluntary Service Overseas.
- Wagner, C. and Wheeler, L. (1969). Model, Need, and Cost Effects in Helping Behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 12(2), 111-116.
- Waldorf, L. (2012). White Noise: Hearing the Disaster. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 4(3), 469-474.
- Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books
- Weber, M. [1930] 1993. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. T. Parsons (transl.). New York: Routledge.
- Wenar, L. (2006). Accountability in International Development Aid. *Ethics and International Affairs*. 20(1), 1-23.
- (2008). Property Rights and the Resource Curse. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 36(1), 2-32.
- (2011a). Clean Trade in Natural Resources. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 25(1),

- 27-39.
- (2011b). Poverty is no Pond: Challenges for the Affluent. In P. Illingworth, T. Pogge & L. Wenar (eds.). *Giving Well – The Ethics of Philanthropy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 104-132.
- (2015). *Blood Oil – Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wertheimer, A. and Zwolinski, M. (2013). Exploitation. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/exploitation/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- West, P. (2004). *Conspicuous Compassion: Why Sometimes It Really Is Cruel To Be Kind*. London: Civitas.
- West, P. C., Gerber, J. S., Engstrom, P. M., Mueller, N. D., Brauman, K. A., Carlson, K. M., Cassidy, E. S., Johnston, M., MacDonald, G. K., Ray, D. K., and Siebert, S. (2014). Leverage Points for Improving Global Food Security and the Environment. *Science*, 345(6194), 325-328.
- Westhead, R. (2013) Needy Children: Poverty Porn or just Effective Fundraising? *Toronto Star*: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/03/28/needy_children_poverty_porn_or_just_effective_fundraising.html [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Whitehead, A. N. (1925). *Science and the Modern World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- White, S. (2008). Social Minimum. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/social-minimum/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009). *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*. London: Allen Lane.
- Williams, A., Evans, R., and Drummond, M. (1987). Quality-Adjusted Life-Years. *The Lancet*, 329(8546), 1372-1373.
- Williams, B. (1972). *Morality – An Introduction to Ethics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (1981). *Moral Luck*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (1985). *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana.
- (2012). Persons, Character and Morality. In G. Sher (ed.). *Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory*. London: Routledge, 489-499.
- Williams, B. and Smart, J. J. C. (1973). *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Williams, J. (2012). *Competition and Efficiency in International Food Supply Chain – Improving Food Security*. New York: Earthscan.
- Williams, L. (ed.) (2004). *Porn Studies: Proliferating Pornographies*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Wilson, J. (2008). *Jeffrey Sachs: The Strange Case of Dr. Shock and Mr. Aid*. New York: Verso Books.
- (2015). Counting on Billionaires. *The Jacobin*.
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/george-soros-philanthrocapitalism-millennium-villages/> [Accessed 25th of April 2017].
- Wolf, S. (1982). Moral Saints. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79(8), 419-439.
- World Bank (WB) (2000). *Can Africa claim the 21st Century?* Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- (2005). *The Theory and Practice of Conditionality: A Literature Review. Background Paper for Review of World Bank Conditionality*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- (2007). *World Development Report 2008 – Agriculture for Development*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- (2012). *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- (2013). *The World Bank Group and the Global Food Crisis – An Evaluation of the World Bank Group Response*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- (2016). *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Health Organisation (WHO) (2010). *Towards 100% Voluntary Blood Donation – A Global Framework for Action*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- (2012). *World Malaria Report*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- (2013). *Schistosomiasis: Progress Report 2001-2011, Strategic Plan 2012-2020*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- (2014). *World Health Statistics*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- (2015). *Achieving the Malaria MDG Target – Reversing the Incidence of Malaria 2000-2015*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- Wrangham, R. W., Wilson, M. L., and Muller, M. N. (2006). Comparative Rates of Violence in Chimpanzees and Humans. *Primates*, 47(1), 14-26.
- Wrigley, E. A. (1987). *People, Cities, and Wealth*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wydick, B., Glewwe, P., and Rutledge, L. (2013). Does International Child Sponsorship Work? A Six-Country Study of Impacts on Adult Life Outcomes. *Journal of*

- Political Economy*, 121(2), 393-436.
- Yörük, B. K. (2009). How Responsive Are Charitable Donors to Requests to Give?.
Journal of Public Economics, 93(9), 1111-1117.
- Yuen, P. (2008). Things that Break the Heart of God: Child Sponsorship Programs and World Vision International. *Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology*, 16(1), 40-51.
- Yunus, M. (1999) *Banker to the Poor: Microlending and the Battle Against World Poverty*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Zagefka, H., Noor, M., De Moura, R., Hopthrow, T., and Brown, R. (2011). Donating to Disaster Victims: Responses to Natural and Humanly Caused Events. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 41, 353-363.
- Zahn, R., Moll, J., Paiva, M., Garrido, G., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., and Grafman, J. (2009). The Neural Basis of Human Social Values: Evidence from Functional MRI. *Cerebral Cortex*, 19(2), 276-283.
- Ziegler, J., Golay, C., Mahon, C., and Way, S. (2011). *The Fight for the Right to Food: Lessons Learned*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zimbardo, P. G. (2007). *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*. New York: Random House.