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Universidad
del País Vasco

Euskal Herriko
Unibertsitatea

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Populist Radical Right Parties and European Integration: Reform or Reversion?

AUTHOR: UNAI GÓMEZ-HERNÁNDEZ

DIRECTOR: DR. IGOR FILIBI LÓPEZ

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“The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be!”
Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli
The Ventotene Manifesto

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is born from a genuine interest in the future of the European Union (EU) and the current affairs regarding populist radical right parties (PRRPs) within the Union. The concern about these issues has been emboldened by the recent developments in the political arena of the supranational entity, particularly in the period regarding 2016 until the present day. Electoral victories such the ones of the Brexit referendum, Marine Le Pen's position in the 2017 French Presidential election or the second majority of the FIDESZ party have sent shockwaves throughout the liberal democratic world and have even put into question the very existence of the European project.

The aforementioned political landscape not only reflects the creation of new cleavages and the fulfilment of the voting niches derived from these, but also the factual possibility of a substantial swerve, or even turn in the European integration project. In case this was to happen, it would constitute a considerable variation of the propagation process of liberal democracy in the Old Continent that started after the 2nd World War. In absence of a wide bibliography correlating EU's future and populist radical right parties, the research carried out in this paper is regarded as urgent, due to the upcoming European elections and the success of the radical right in recent elections, and vital, because it considers the basic foundations of modern Western societies, and particularly of the EU institutional framework: liberty, democracy and supranationality.

Notwithstanding the nature and scope of the present work, this paper aims at answering questions such as: Are PRRPs an obstacle for the European integration project? Do PRRPs plan on reversing European integration? Or, on the other hand, can they restructure the Union in accordance with their own principles and values? These questions are deemed to be the most appropriate in order to conjugate the existing void in literature with the personal concerns of the author.

The ideology of the radical right, understood as the combination of both ideas and values, is the object of study of this research. For a matter of practicality, taking into account the range and scope of this work, certain common characteristics to the various definitions of this ideology will be analyzed. Similarly, four radical right parties will be analyzed, which will all fulfill the common features of this ideology. The selected PRRPs are the following: Fidesz governing party in Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) governing party in Poland, Lega Nord (LN) governing coalition party in Italy, and main opposition Front National (FN) party in France. The selection process has been done with the goal of obtaining a varied and significant group of PRRPs, including both governing and opposition parties, which are deemed to be able to shape the future of the EU in the ninth European Parliament (EP).

Thus, a synchronous analysis will be implemented, precisely during the 8th parliamentary session of the European Parliament (EP), which lasts from the 1st of July 2014 to the 18th of April of 2019. This period comprises the timespan in which the selected PRR

parties have risen from outcasts to main electoral preference of several member states. This investigation will be constituted of a slightly quantitative and heavily qualitative approach of the subject. The qualitative analysis will involve the examination of the aims expressed in selected EP resolutions concerning the future of Europe, the principles stated in the electoral programs of these parties, the values present at some of the founding documents of the Union such as the Schumann Declaration or the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. The quantitative part will be focused on the scrutiny of voting patterns regarding the mentioned EP resolutions by these parties. In such a way, the author plans to be able to achieve the following goals:

- *Define* the potential interrelation of selected PRRPs and the future of the EU, particularly the EU integration process.
- *Compare and contrast* the values presented in the electoral programs or other documents of the selected PRRPs with the aims described in the parliamentary resolution referred to the future of the EU, and the ideas expressed at the selected founding documents.

In addition to this introduction, the paper will consist of a methodological section, which will detail the quantitative and qualitative approaches used in this research; a theoretical framework, that will rely in authors such as Mudde, Ignazi or Minkenberg to define what PRRPs are, as well as which are deemed to be the key features about the future of the EU; an analysis of the voting patterns and written explanations of vote by the MEPs; and finally, a conclusion in which the main findings will be summarized, potential research will be proposed related to the issues examined in the paper and concise and careful future predictions will be established.

2. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this research is mainly qualitative. A combination of bibliographical research, content analysis and document interpretation has been carried out in order to get the analysis here presented. Drawing from the specialized bibliography in radical right parties and European integration, a theoretical framework has been constructed which will serve as the bedrock of the investigation. Similarly, a review of selected founding and current EU documents has been carried out (see Annex II), with the aim of elucidating which are the core European features that will determine the future of the EU. The choice of blending both founding and up-to-date documents arises from the will of the researcher to find continuity in the values that are being sought.

Afterwards, the selected European Parliament (EP) approved resolutions have been analysed. This analysis has been double-folded. On the one hand, party positions towards each of the resolutions have been looked at; this way conclusions can be obtained regarding which PRRP voted what, depending on the resolution. On the other hand, written responses from the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) of the selected parties have been qualitatively analysed. Inspired by Krippendorff (2004) and Laver (2003)'s successful content analysis theory, analysis of all written responses of the MEPs belonging to the selected parties has been carried out. These responses have been compared and contrasted to the features that a future EU should have. In order to overcome linguistic problems with these documents, since each MEP writes in his or her own language, the tool *Google Translate* has been used, translating all explanations to English.

Data from the 2014 *Euromanifesto Project* (Project Manifesto, 2019) has also been collected and used for the evaluation of the different stances that the selected PRRPs have regarding the issues present in these EP resolutions. This data is based on the manifestos of these parties. All chosen parties score similar results in the variables related to the characteristics defined in the theoretical framework with the exception of the looser of globalization focus, as it is shown in Annex III. This anomaly is considered to take place due to the absence of theorization and data gathering of this recent phenomenon, as well as the complexity to measure it.

In the case of FN, it has been chosen due to its historical importance in the process of the evolution of the radical right. Its evolution has been seen as a model for other PRRPs (Rydgren, 2005), and therefore is it regarded as very relevant for future developments. LN is not the most electorally powerful of the Western European PRRPs, but its leader's charisma and last actions note that it will also play a major role in the ninth EP. Mateo Salvini's, LN's federal secretary, project of creating a transnational PRRP group in the EP is an evidence of it. PiS and Fidesz are both governing parties, therefore able to influence the European Council as well as the EP, of the largest Eastern European member-states. They both represent territories that after the fall of communism adopted neoliberal governments and policies that very well represent how PRRPs interact with some core

dimensions of the EU, particularly the social one; proving themselves as key actors in the integration process. Finally, it must be clarified that a statistical sample it is not sought by this research, but a set of relevant PRRPs that can, and presumably will, determine the future of the EU for the years to come.

The EP resolutions are directly related to the future of the EU as will be further detailed below. They all share the features that the future of the EU should have, identified in the theoretical framework. In addition, they prove to be particularly worthy of researching due to the broadness of topics covered, which all will determine the future of the EU.

The selected resolutions are the following:

- European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI)).
- European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI)).
- European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate on the future of Europe (2018/2094(INI)).
- European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU- UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP)).

Finally, it must be mentioned that the written explanations of these resolutions can be taken as the official position of the PRRPs, since they are included in official documents and transmitted within the EU institutions. Nevertheless, temporal variations must be considered. Since the time span of this investigation comprises five years, some PRRPs might have adapted their stance towards certain issues. When that has been the case, it has been highlighted.

The working hypothesis is the following: the selected PRRPs do not want to revert the future process of European integration but to reform or adapt it for that it matches their own aspirations. Thus, working towards this hypothesis will contribute to the most recent literature regarding the radical right, in an area that has not been dealt with thoroughly: the future of EU integration in relation with these thriving ideologies.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Theoretical framework of PRRP parties

3.1.1. Discussion about terminology

There has always been a problem when it comes to defining and categorizing extreme right parties. Even the very concept of extreme is not applicable to all parties existing today. Other party families tend to have their family name on their own party name, such as the socialists, communists, greens, Christian Democrats... this does not apply to the extreme right or radical right party family (Mudde, 2013). Similarly, party federations tend to exist, particularly at the European level. Extreme or radical right parties have not been together in an international federation, so it cannot be deduced from this that they constitute a party family *per se*. Nevertheless, there has been recent talk that they might join forces before the European Elections of May 2019, showing a partial convergence of objectives.

In order to properly categorize these parties, one must differentiate between them. Extreme right and radical right are not interchangeable terms since they represent different political ideologies. “The far right refers to a broad range of political parties and social groups whose common core ideological feature is nationalism” (Eatwell 2000; Hainsworth, 2008) whereas “the radical right designates the ‘new’ parties that have emerged in Europe since the 1980s” (Halikipoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2018: 28). In addition, this distinction must be complemented with the stance that these parties have towards democracy. According to Mudde, extreme right parties are the antithesis of democracy defined as a minimal procedural way (2010: 1168). This is to say, these parties do not accept basic democratic rules, even in their simplest forms. In contrast, he defines radical right parties as opposed to liberalism, but accepting the idea of a procedural democracy. In the same vein, one can appreciate that “radicalism challenges both the liberal basis of [democracy], notably the positive value of pluralism, and the constitutional limitations to popular sovereignty. The core of radicalism is monism, i.e. the tendency to treat cleavages and ambivalence as illegitimate.” (Mudde, 2010: 1168-1169).

Following this debate about the terminology, one can identify parties such as Greek *Golden Dawn*, or Spanish *España 2000* as extreme right parties, whereas Fidesz, or LN would be members of the radical right party family. In fact, Fidesz and LN have had the chance to govern in Hungary and Italy and they have not yet dismantled procedural democracy. Reflecting their acceptance of the basis of democracy as a common system to elect societies’ representatives. Nevertheless, the policies offered by these governments tend to challenge the pre-existing liberal agenda. Just to mention two examples, both governments have taken measures to curtail immigration or have directly criticized the EU in a populist way; reflecting two of the five common

characteristics of the radical right that will be explained below. These policies are diametrically opposed to the liberal values of previous Hungarian or Italian governments.

Another illustrative example is the change that FN has experienced since its creation back in the 80s. It started as a clearly extreme right party under Jean Marie Le Pen, opposed to procedural democracy, and it has changed to a radical right party under his daughter Marine Le Pen. This change has proven to be worthy since it has gained considerable momentum in the last elections. In addition, this movement is in tune with similar changes of new parties that have sprung all across the EU. In fact, some have argued (Rydgren, 2005) that the emerging new radical right parties have copied FN's strategy of adaptation to society, more precisely its communicative master frame, in order to appear palatable to the wider society. This fact is the first of many signs that reflect the very existence of a radical right party family. Nonetheless, a communicative master frame is not enough by itself and some common characteristics are required.

3.1.2. Characteristics of the radical right

When it comes to defining the characteristics of the PRRPs, controversies arise among scholars. Due to the variety of parties that can be found under this brand, it is difficult to provide a precise list of features that represent the ideological core of all these parties (Falkner & Plattner, 2018). Thus, the adopted approach has been to review the specific literature on the topic and to select what has been found to be the group of substantive characteristics that define the radical right parties. These include nationalism, their populist stance towards the elites, their partially concealed xenophobia, support for law and order, and their focus on the losers of globalization as their main demographic target.

- Nationalism. This is the most recurring characteristic of all, the majority of scholars analysing radical right parties (Art, 2009; Ignazi, 2009; Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007; Mudde, 2000; Mellón & Torrens, 2016; Halikipoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2018; Mayer 2018; Bustikova & Guasti, 2017; Moffit, 2017; Odmalm & Rydgren, 2018) agree that nationalism is the defining characteristic of these parties. Thus, it can be regarded as the unity of the political community and the cultural community, i.e., the nation spans the whole state (in geographical, cultural, idiomatic terms...).

It must also be noted that several types of nationalism exist. According to some authors, two main types of nationalism can be differentiated: ethnic and civic nationalism. When talking about ethnic nationalism, belonging to a social group that has a common national culture is the most important variable. Only citizens belonging to a certain ethnic group can be part of the nation, and therefore, the state. On the other hand, civic nationalism posits that any foreigner can become part of a certain nation as long as it holds the same ideas of values that are deemed to be central to the identity of that precise nation. Although both types

of nationalistic approaches are possible, the majority of PRRPs tend to adopt exclusionary approaches (Mudde, 2016) and therefore opt for ethnic nationalism rather than the civic one.

- Populist stance towards the elites. This posture is a strategic approach. Directly related to the defence of the losers of globalization, PRRPs tend to position themselves as part of the people in a fight against the elite, in a classic Laclauian approach. Before reaching political power, they tend to attack what they brand as the political establishment, agitating resentments of the supposedly ordinary citizen (Art, 2009: 333). In the same vein, Euroscepticism is a key feature of their electoral mobilisation strategies (Odmalm & Rydgren, 2018: 3; Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002). The European Union epitomizes the political establishment of the Western world. Commonly used as a scapegoat for badly implemented national policies, the EU is often characterised as a group of Eurocrats (European public servants) who run the continent from their offices in Brussels without having any real relationship with the citizens of the continent. This stance has traditionally served as a trampoline for PRRPs since their first big electoral wins tend to appear in European Elections. The fact that these elections are widely considered as second-level elections fuels the protest vote that goes to these parties. If they get into power at the national level, they can still use their populist strategy towards the EU and therefore avoid direct accountability for their national policies.

Finally, it must be noted that many have directly linked the EU-elite categorisation with the globalizing process, as Steven Bannon, strategist and consultant working for PRRPs, did back in 2017 stating that “The beating heart of the globalist project is in Brussels” (The Guardian, 2018). The linkage is coherent with another of the characteristics that define these parties: their focus on the losers of globalization.

- Xenophobia. The xenophobic attribute ranges from partially covered xenophobia to open racist statements from some PRRPs. It is coherent with the nationalistic discourse since the majority of these parties tend to be ethnic nationalists. Thus, they set preference between members of the same society. This hostile attitude or fear towards everything that is considered alien to their people is usually reflected in their policies. As Bustikova, & Guasti (2018) precisely mention “opposition to the EU refugee relocation quotas is usually couched in logistical terms—CEE [Central and Eastern European] countries are not prepared to integrate migrants, it is argued. Others argue that Muslim immigration represents a security threat and a health risk. These arguments persist in spite of the fact that V4 countries have previously integrated migrants without significant difficulties. The Czech Republic integrated thousands of migrants from Bosnia (Muslims) and Ukraine and Moldova in the 1990s. Poland has taken in thousands of Chechen refugees (Muslims) over the last two decades.

Hungary was the second largest recipient of refugees from the Yugoslav wars. None of these actions led to political polarization. The number of refugees seeking asylum in all V4 countries after 2015 seems well within these limits.” As one can deduct from this quote, the policies proposed by PRRPs related to immigration tend to assume logistical constraints when what they are truly proposing is a xenophobic policy based on their belonging to the ethnic nation.

- Pursue of law and order. According to their traditionalist approach to society, PRRPs tend to campaign on increasing the safety of the citizens by implementing strong security measures (Mudde, 2013). This reflects their authoritarianism when dealing with individuals. They prefer to “guide” them strongly, by reducing the individual or collective liberties that they enjoy in favor of the enhancement of legislative and police restrictions (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007; Ignazi, 2009). This is done in order to reinstate the traditional values that have allegedly been lost due to the globalizing process.
- Focus on the losers of globalization. The so-called losers of globalization are the targeted demographic group of PRRPs. They tend to be white middle-aged males who have lost their jobs or have seen their jobs made precarious (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007). The focus on this societal group sublimates all previously mentioned characteristics. They are all nationals belonging to the same ethnic group, they form part of what is considered to be “the common people”, and therefore are likely to fight the elites. Or, they feel highly represented by the PRRP who claims to represent the “common people”. They might not be openly traditionalist or xenophobic, but they represent a pool of potential voters which can be stirred into this direction.

In addition, the blame on the newly arrived immigrant populations is likely to interact in their minds since it represents an easy scapegoat that, although completely unfounded, it has worked before, as it was witnessed in the refugee crisis. Adding on top of that the recent history of their country, they can relate to the mentioned dynamic of winners and losers.

3.1.3. Reasons for the emergence of the radical right

Once the common defining features of these parties have been explained, the following aim is to provide context to this emergence. Aiming at clarifying why PRRPs have emerged in the second decade of the 21st century, and not before, some explanatory factors will be expounded suit. These factors will be differentiated in two categories: structural ones, that reflect the underpinnings of the political system of Western societies that have helped PRRPs to emerge; and particular factors or events of fundamental relevance that have fuelled citizens’ concerns in some areas, indirectly stirring them towards these parties.

The post Second World War socio-economic transformations shifted the productive model from Fordism to Postfordism, depicting societies as post-industrial rather than industrial ones. This process arose, among other causes, from the de-localization of industries to East-Asia and Africa from the West. In this post-industrial society, material interests are no longer the chief concern of citizens and traditional class divides have been blurred, making it more difficult to differentiate between the working class and bourgeoisie (Ignazi, 2009: 560). Hence, class identification has been blurred as well and this has created a sense of alienation in some individuals. This change from clearly sociologically defined industrial society to loosely defined post-industrial one would constitute the first structural factor that has helped the emergence of PRRPs.

The democratic crisis that has been going on since the 1990s must also be noted. Both traditional political parties and citizens have withdrawn from the public sphere, searching for more *ad hoc* forms of political representations when needed (Mair, 2006: 33). Hence, the representative function that political parties used to fulfil is no longer accomplished. No public actor links now, speaking in wide terms, civil society and the state. Therefore, citizens that have seen their lives worsened, i.e., the losers of globalization, tend to look for alternatives to this retired traditional political parties who will represent them (Mayer, 2017: 242). Others have more simply explained this structural factor by posing that it constitutes “a breach in the social contract” (Halikipoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2018: 27-28), referring, once again, to the absence of linkage between governors and governed.

PRRPs have also benefited from the newly created cleavage that is related to the globalizing process. Traditionally, newly created or reformed parties tend to be more adapting with the most recent issues, this is why radical right parties fair better and have an agenda-setting effect when dealing with new issues such as: the refugee crisis or the loss of sovereignty in the EU. Some have referred to this new cleavage as *closure-openness cleavage* (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 30) or *integration-demarcation cleavage* (Kriesi & Grande, 2006: 923). Nevertheless, calling it *pro-globalizing or anti-globalizing cleavage* is the clearest form of presenting it, due to the salience that this issue has in PRRPs. In addition, it clearly divides Western societies into winners and losers according to their socio-economic status derived from the globalizing process. In Europe, the EU clearly represents this process (Minkenberg & Perrineau, 2007: 34) and while it does not echo precisely its totality, by reason of heavy social investment and other divergences by the Union, it can be taken as a proxy of it.

In addition to the structural factors, and at the same time building on them, there have been some particular events that have recently fuelled the PRRPs' rise. Following Mayer (2017), four conjunctural factors can be discerned: firstly, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has constituted a milestone in the popularisation of PRRPs. For these parties, this event represents the great influence that the establishment liberal elites and the EU have over the common citizens through the economy. Due to the mismanagement of finances and

the economic order from institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the EU itself, many citizens in European societies have been badly affected and have seen their socio-economic level reduced. Secondly, the 2015 Migration Crisis that the EU suffered has mimed the 2008 Global Financial Crisis at the cultural level. The arrival of thousands of refugees fleeing the Middle East was utilized by populist radical right parties to advance fear among citizens with the threat that their culture was going to be overcome by Islam. This resort to xenophobia has proved to be useful as an agenda-setting strategy. Thirdly, the series of terrorist attacks that Europe has witnessed since 2015 reinforces PRRPs' claim for more security and protection of the citizens at the expenses of individual liberties, this is coherent with them pursuing law and order. Lastly, the result of the 2016 United States Presidential election and the victory of the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum have bolstered these parties' spirits and serve as an example that they can achieve important electoral successes following a clearly populist strategy.

All in all, the combination of long-term trends and particular events has created fertile ground for the development of PRRPs in Europe. The combination of these factors helps to explain why this emergence has taken place in the second decade of the 21st century and not at any other given time.

3.2. Theoretical framework of the future of the Union

As to analyse how the future of the EU could disclose, a double analysis has been made, taking into account both founding documents of the EU, to distil the essence with which the European project was born, and the most recent papers related to what is the future of the EU going to look like. From here we obtain that the future EU will be comprised of the following features:

- Supranational character: the EU will abide by its distinctive characteristic of supranationality. No other entity in human history has been able to pool its sovereignty and resources into a higher authority that escapes from the control of the nation-states and works for the common good of all its constituents. The supranational character of the EU could clearly be seen since its first proto-conception back in the Ventotene Manifesto (CVCE, 1941), the Schuman declaration (European Union, 1950) and in the founding treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), articles 9 and 10. Even if in the following Euratom and Economic Community treaties supranationality was not given the importance it had had before, it has recurrently come back throughout the history of the Union until the current days. From that point on, this particular distinctiveness of the Union has maintained in time and space. Both the Rome Declaration (European Commission, 2017a) and the White Paper on the Future of Europe (European Commission, 2017b) that preceded it is stated that this supranational character will be part of the future of the EU. In addition, French President Macron (Ouest France, 2017) in his speech at the Sorbonne University

or ALDE leader Mr. Verhofstadt have expressed the clearly interrelated futurity of the terms European Union and supranationality. Finally, another significant aspect that is controversial in the EU spectrum needs to be mentioned: transnational electoral lists. While traditionally member-states have been opposed to this particular loss of sovereignty in time of EU elections, lately, some countries and the EP itself have asked for transnational lists to achieve a proper *European demos* (Die Bundesregierung, 2019); understood as a common European citizenry taking part in equal conditions in EP elections.

All in all, it can be seen that supranationality goes far beyond our Westphalian or traditional understanding of the state, and seeks to build a superior entity that does not simply replicate a federal state at European scale. In this vein, Filibi (2019) notes that among the characteristics of this European model, one can find the limitation of the member-states' sovereignty, great relevance of democratic values, and an overall transcendence of statist federalism; i.e. supranationality.

- An ever-closer union: unity between the peoples of Europe is more than just a motto. In fact, in the so-called "*Five Presidents' Report*", when talking about the EMU, they state that "it is not an end in itself. It is a means to create a better and fairer life for all citizens, to prepare the Union for future global challenges and to enable each of its members to prosper" (European Commission, 2015). The founding fathers of the EU imagined a union of the different European states linked so close that war would be unimaginable (European Union, 1950 & CVCE, 1941). This idea of unity was primarily enforced in the economic and commercial arena. First, with the creation of the ECSC and then with successive expansions to other areas such as EURATOM, the Schengen Area, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), until the eventual creation of the European Union. Currently, the idea of an ever-closer union is very much still alive as the European Commission clearly stated in its White Paper on the Future of Europe when talking about the five scenarios it proposed: "The starting point for each scenario is that the 27 Member States move forward together as a Union" (European Commission, 2017b). In addition, all these member states expressed their idea on the "undivided and indivisible [Union]" in the Rome Declaration (European Commission, 2017a). The ever-closer union in the defense area is also a driving motive behind the union's future development, as it is noted in the Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defense "The future of the European Union as a peace project for generations to come now rests also on the foundation of a security and defense union" (European Commission, 2017d).

All in all, it seems that potential break-ups or divisions within the Union should be discarded when considering the future of the Union. This could be explained by the necessity that member states might come to feel when competing individually with international great powers such as China, the United States, or the Russian Federation.

- Respect for the four freedoms of the EU: although they were not explicitly expressed in the founding documents, these freedoms reflect the core values of openness and tolerance upon which the EU has been built. The very fact that the Brexit negotiations are being particularly harsh in this aspect reflects the commitment of the Union to these four ideas of freedom. Moreover, recent documents by official EU institutions have underpinned their pledge to the freedom of labor (European Commission, 2019b & Ouest France, 2017), capital, goods and services.
- Liberal democracy: this feature is not self-apparent in treaties or speeches but it can be deduced from the previous three. The foundation of the EU lays on the basic liberal principles of freedom and equal opportunity. Firstly, supranationality and the gradual and ascendant tendency of the relegation of the member-states to a second position solved the traditional problem that liberalism has with nationalism. Liberalism is a universalistic ideology while nationalism is one of the most particularistic ones. Through the integration process, one can see how the EU gains competences and power while the member-states lose it. This way, a more universalist form of government over the population is created. Secondly, liberal democracy is based on the idea of some commonly shared values by the citizenry. The EU has this ultimate objective and the ever-closer union is proof of it. Finally, the four freedoms of the EU perfectly reflect the conception of liberty that liberals have. These freedoms guarantee the equality of opportunity of individuals residing within the EU since they are all treated equally from every member-state, regardless of their nationality. In addition, the freedoms of goods, capital and services, allow the economy to thrive within the borders of the Union, converting the long idealized free market into reality. In conclusion, liberal democracy is the cornerstone of the EU and the most important characteristic of all, since the rest derive from it. The EU would lose its core essence without it.

Despite all that has been mentioned, the difference between liberal European and neoliberal values must be pointed out:

- For Neoliberals, all policy areas are subordinated to the market (Freeden, 2015: 109). Conversely, European liberalism tends to have a strong social component which have historically helped in creating the European continental welfare state.
- While neoliberal governments avoid directing public funds to social programs and tend to privatize them, the EU's institutions state that "social values are fundamental to the European project itself" (European Commission, 2017c). In addition, and concerning the economic aspect of social values some have argued that "the single market is closely intertwined with common social standards, just like it is closely intertwined with common environmental and consumer protection

standards” (European Commission, 2017c), whereas under a neoliberal prism, market is only intertwined with market rules. Thus, interactions between market and social aspects or government and social aspect tend to differ from neoliberalism to European liberalism.

- Regarding the private sector, some have argued that “neoliberalism champions a world in which huge multinational corporations and mega-banks increasingly control and dictate the way we live” (Freeden, 2015: 110). The EU instead, has a long tradition of breaking monopolies and oligopolies through the Commission’s Directorate General of Competition and other instruments; trend that has recently been confirmed (European Commission, 2019c & 2019d). Therefore, the European Union truly defends the liberal principles of market economy, not just corporate economy.
- Finally, the EU also reflects its liberal values in the international arena. Being the first world source of aid for development (European Commission, 2018) reflects that search for social justice that liberals always pursue. In other examples as the 2003 Iraq War, or the Libyan intervention in 2011 it can be seen that the EU did not take part as an actor. Consistently with the liberal internationalist perspective of non-direct interference in foreign affairs and not engaging in regime change (Jahn, 2007a & 2007b).

4. ANALYSIS

The selected EP resolutions clearly reflect the characteristics that the future EU would have, coherently with the evaluated founding documents and the latest documents produced by several authorities. Thus, PRRPs' stance towards them, expressed by their votes and the written explanations of these votes, could be taken as their stance towards the future of the European integration process. The analysis will proceed as follows: first, the resolutions themselves will be presented in relation to the features that have theoretically been described as present in the future of the EU. Second, each PRRP's vote towards them will be considered. Finally, the individual written explanations of votes of individual MEPs will be exhibited.

4.1. The future of the EU and the selected EP resolutions

- *European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI))*. This resolution focuses on the institutional developments that may affect the future of the EU.

This resolution clearly argues for further integration in several areas such as the financial one, ending unanimity for certain tax practices; terrorist control, stating that "security would be better ensured if it were not an exclusive competence of the Member States"; foreign policy, establishing a European Defence Union; safeguarding the fundamental rights of the EU, allowing the Commission to "take 'systemic infringement action' against Member States that violate fundamental values"; and further reduction of unanimity votes in the Council, switching them to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (European Union, 2017a).

In addition, it stresses the importance of moving towards an ever-closer union by stating that "all Member States have the obligation to join the currency once they meet all the requisite criteria" but "no timetable has been set for Member States joining the euro after its creation" (European Union, 2017a); it is desirable that the EU reaffirms the ever-closer union "in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the EU" (European Union, 2017a); there is a particular need of creating a European energy union, due to geopolitical, economic and environmental motives; and denoting that the best way of end Europe *à la carte* is to gravitate towards the ever-closer union.

It also remarks that the EU must be supportive of its four fundamental freedoms, especially after the exit process of the United Kingdom from the Union.

Finally, the resolution is filled of references to the need to respect of the fundamental values of the Union, as a reflection of its liberal nature.

- *European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI))*. This piece of legislation is centred around the possibilities

arising from the Lisbon Treaty and how these are interrelated with the future of the EU.

Once again, the support for more supranationality within the institution is clear cut as in can be seen in the following excerpt: “the Commission’s role should be strengthened so that it can play its part as the engine of the Community method fully and effectively” (European Union, 2017b) and “intergovernmental solutions should only be an instrument of ultima ratio” (European Union, 2017b); and “Demands that the Council switch completely to QMV wherever this is possible under the Treaties, and that it abandon[s] the practice of transferring contentious legislative fields to the European Council” (European Union, 2017b). The all refer to the process of transferal of sovereignty from the member-states to the EU thus reinforcing its supranational nature.

A favourable stance towards the ever-closer union is also present by its claims that a common asylum and immigration policy is needed, as the refugee crisis has shown; and the banking union should be completed as soon as possible together with the capital markets union.

The freedom of movement within the EU is particularly highlighted throughout the resolution by declaring that “the right of free movement and the rights of workers should be guaranteed” (European Union, 2017b); or “Stresses that the workers’ rights, particularly when they exercise their right of mobility” (European Union, 2017b).

Once again, it can be clearly detected that liberal values are present in the document as in the point 138 of the resolution: “the EU must guarantee the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and continuing respect for the Copenhagen criteria, and ensure that all Member States respect the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU” (European Union, 2017b).

- *European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate on the future of Europe (2018/2094(INI))*. Evidently, this resolution focuses on the debate on the future of the EU.

This resolution calls for the Community method to overcome the intergovernmental method that has been present in the history of the union; proposes a revision of the Treaties so that the EP can truly initiate legislative procedure taken that it is the only EU institution that is directly elected by the citizens and thus possesses direct legitimacy; and underlines the importance of the *Spitzenkandidaten process* since it is one of the few supranational components present at EP elections.

Further integration in banking or Capital Markets Union is also present, reflecting this way the idea of an ever-closer union; together with the fundamental importance of the movement of goods, services, capital and people.

Eventually, core European values and democratic principles make an appearance in this resolution inviting “the heads of state or government to pursue this path in a renewed spirit of solidarity and collaboration” (European Union (2019)).

- *European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU- UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP))*. Although this resolution mainly focuses on the future EU-UK relationship, it also transmits which is the general path that the EU should follow in the years to come. The text particularly stresses the importance of maintenance of the four freedoms of the EU recalling that adherence to them is essential in order to participate in the internal market; and that the future agreement “should include specific provisions concerning the movement of citizens from the EU to the UK and from the UK to the EU after the transition period” (European Union, 2018b). This way, the EP wants to enhance the fundamental liberal freedoms that underpin the institutional framework of the EU, so that they will remain unaltered after the departure of the UK.

4.2. Voting patterns and explanations of vote

Firstly, *European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI))* commands the most negative votes, being rejected by all analyzed MEPs, without any abstention (see Annex I). This might have been due to the strong pro-European approach the Mr. Verhofstadt, the rapporteur, uses in the text. He proposes to continue the integration process with a clearly supranational approach, as it has been mentioned above, and this directly conflicts with the nationalistic ideology of PRRPs.

All three Fidesz MEPs agree with the core diagnosis of the rapporteur, “that the EU needs change to be able to meet citizens' expectations” (European Union, 2017b), but that is the only point of agreement with him. They then move to comment that the resolution seems to seek the centralization of the EU, mischaracterizing the supranational component. PRRPs tend to criticize the supranational essence of the EU by claiming that it seeks to create a centralist federal state with the capital city in Brussels. This is not what the supranational process seeks (Filibi, 2019). This process aims at creating higher and different forms of governance than the traditional state. A traditional federal Europe would still be a replication, with some nuances, of the Westphalian state model. However, a supranational entity would not rely on this traditional definition.

Polish MEPs follow a similar vein. Poreba agrees with his Hungarian counterparts in that the rapporteur seeks to further the federalization of the EU, once again, misinterpreting what the supranational process means. He also claims that there are “many problematic ideological and practical issues” without stating which are those. (European Union, 2017b) Mr. Ujazdowski opts for a different approach in order to explain his vote. He states that “this report is harmful because it tightens integration at the expense of the desired flexibility, wants to build the EU exclusively around the Euroregion, introduces

majority voting, weakens the EU Council” (European Union, 2017b). Here, he is expressing the strong nationalistic feeling of his party and their fear over losing veto-rights if majority voting is adopted by the Council, since Poland would not be able to stop any process that they deem to be harmful to them. It is interesting to point out the use of the Euroregion because it reflects the strong Eurosceptic populist stance that PiS has. Finally, Ujazdowski expresses that the resolution “does [not] conceal the intention of pushing countries outside the EU that do not agree to dogmatically designed integration” (European Union, 2017b). This makes clear reference to point 43 of the resolution that states that the Commission would be able to “take ‘systemic infringement action’ against Member States that violate fundamental values” (European Union, 2017b). He is worried due to the consequences this would bring to Poland, since she has caught the attention of the EP on several occasions (European Union, 2015; 2017d; & 2018a) regarding its alleged disrespect to law and order. Conversely, and astonishingly, Hungarian MEPs make no reference to this point, although they have also been warned on several occasions about the same issue (European Union 2015; 2016b; 2017c; & 2018c).

Italian MEP Bizzoto, positions herself diametrically opposed to the “più Europa” approach, perhaps directly referencing the Italian pro-European party under the same name. In addition, the only counterargument she offers is the exit of the single currency and the restoration of the national currencies, together with a revision of the treaties “to regain the sovereignty that the EU has us taken out” (European Union, 2017b). It must be noted that Lega Nord no longer holds the Italexit policy proposal. Therefore, this will be addressed as an ancient policy position since the explanation of the vote was written back in 2014 and since then Lega Nord has become a more mainstream PRRP.

Front National MEPs strongly disagree with the resolution. Jalkh and Martin, similarly to the Fidesz MEPs admit that the report asks the right questions but gives wrong answers to them. Mélin and Bay posit that the rapporteur goes directly against the will of the European citizens for more integration. Although this might be the case of their voting niche, it does not necessarily represent the majority of the European population. Nevertheless, when they present this as the will of the people, and here their populist feature becomes evident to the researcher. Others such as Boutonnet, Aliot, and Lebreton reject the creation of a unique financial ministry for the whole EU territory in accordance with their French nationalistic approach to EU politics. Similarly, Lebreton refuses to transfer the seat of the EP to Brussels since “as a Frenchman [he] cannot admit as long as France is in the Union!” (European Union, 2017b). In addition, Briois and Aliot himself claim that this resolution aims at reducing the sovereignty of member-states, in direct opposition of supranationalism. Finally, MEP Bilde offers a remarkable explanation of what the FN is looking for in the wake of Brexit and when rejecting this resolution. He states that “the construction of Europe is at a turning point. She is at a standstill. The signal launched by the British with the Brexit shows that Euroscepticism

is progressing strongly in the European opinion. To stop this spiral, we must rebuild the European project on sound foundations, the opposite of the proposals made in the report. If we want to reconcile Europeans with Europe, we must urgently stop imposing policies to which they have not given their consent!" (European Union, 2017b). Here, apart from clearly opposing further integration in a populist discourse, he is claiming that they seek to rebuild the European project. Therefore, they do not intend to directly reverse integration, but to adapt it to their own "sound foundations" which are "the opposite of the proposals made in the report" (European Union, 2017b). In conclusion, they would prefer an EU that reflect the characteristics of their parties, mentioned above, and they would be willing to work for it.

Secondly, only Fidesz abstained from *European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI))*, the rest voted against it (see Annex I).

Hungarian MEPs abstained from this vote because they agree with some parts of the resolution while disliking others. Deli, Erdős, and Kósa believe that "The merit of the report is that it does not intend to distinguish between the eurozone and non-eurozone Member States" (European Union, 2017b), reflecting a sense of dissatisfaction with previous policies only aimed at the member-states who use the Euro. They also state that "exploiting closer cooperation between Member States in the field of defense and security policy is a forward-looking and supportable one" (European Union, 2017b), reflecting the deep influence of their Russian neighbor when talking about defense. The resolution itself does not call for a defense union, just a closer cooperation in defense and security; thus, being palatable to PRRPs. Nevertheless, they do not vote in favor of the resolution, due to a series of problems that adopting the report would cause: "In many areas, however, the report does not take into account the differences between the levels of economic development in the Member States, and no matter how good, the introduction of uniform EU standards, whether in terms of minimum wage or refugee issues, causes more problems in practice". Issues reflecting the strong nationalistic character of Fidesz and their previous experiences with refugees, which points out their xenophobic characteristic.

As Ujazdowski puts it, PiS MEPs cannot vote in favor of the resolution because "The Brok-Bresso Report violates the institutional balance at the expense of the states, weakening the position of the EU Council" (European Union, 2017b). As it is usual with the Polish party, its members tend to value more the individuality of their states and their Polish nationalism, rather than the construct of the EU. This is why, when a new element of supranationality appears, such as the reduction of power in the Council, where the member states are represented, they are forced to reject it. In addition, Ujazdowski claims that "The problem of Europe is not ill institutions, but the attitudes of elites and bad practices" (European Union, 2017b), once again reflecting the populist attitudes of PRRPs. In this case, the term "elites" refers to the European elites located

in Brussels. Finally, and similarly to MEP Bilde's explanation of vote in 2014/2248(INI), Ujazdowski implies that his party does not have a diametrically opposed view the EU, but to the liberal ideology that the rapporteurs present. He expresses this by saying "After the British referendum, we need a Europe that is preserved on a large scale and internally flexible, and this report does not provide it. [...] . We do not need dogmatism, which proposes this report, but a practical approach to integration" (European Union, 2017b). His calls to preserving Europe on a large scale and internally flexible reflect the importance that PRRPs give to their nations.

MEP Bizzoto, states in a very populist fashion that "the pro-European groups advocate, with the sword, the institutions and governance mechanisms of this Europe, which, we know, are creating an overarching remoteness from the real needs of our citizens and our territories" (European Union, 2017b) reflecting this characteristic in the duality between the remote elites working in Brussels and the real needs of the citizens of, in her case, Italy. She further elaborates her populist explanation by writing that she "[is] not [...] able to support those who want the peoples of Europe to be slaves of Brussels and strong powers, I voted against this text" (European Union, 2017b). This time, she involves "strong powers", presumably liberal powers, that want to enslave the free citizens which she allegedly represents.

FN firmly opposes this resolution and all its present MEPs voted against it. Some of them, such as MEP Martin, concede that "The diagnosis is rather correct, the report mentions among the biggest challenges: the refugee crisis, terrorism, globalization, climate change, unemployment and lack of competitiveness" (European Union, 2017b) but they then disagree on how to tackle these challenges. Others, such as Aliot, Martin, Mélin, and Troszczynski state that trying to allocate refugee quotas goes against the sovereignty of the member-states and that is an "immigrationist" measure; which can be interpreted as a policy proposal that favors foreigners, i.e. that is a detriment for nationals. This clearly reflects the xenophobic character of FN. The French MEPs also show signs of populist discourse when mentioning "among the Eurocrats, what prevails is not the will to reach the common good, but to implement their ideology at all costs" (European Union, 2017b). Identifying the so-called Eurocrats, EU officials who work in Brussels at different EU institutions, with the "elites", where the "people" is represented by themselves. It must be noted that due to the figurative and actual distance between the populist parties' countries and Brussels itself, this populist approach is intensified (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Some mentions against supranationality are also made by the MEPs, particularly against the closer cooperation in defense.

Thirdly, *European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate on the future of Europe (2018/2094(INI))* showed a mixed result: FN and LN voted all against it; Fidesz abstained; and PiS voted mainly against it but three MEPs voted in favour (see Annex I). Unfortunately, these actions are difficult to assess since there is no written explanation of their vote recorded.

Lastly, the resolution that commanded the least negatives votes coming from PRRPs is the *European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2018 on the framework of the future EU- UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP))*. The results were: 23 votes in favor, 19 votes against, and 0 abstentions. Both Fidesz and PiS voted in favor and LN and FN against (see Annex I).

Hungarian MEPs support the motion since it reflects their point of view in how the UK should develop the post-Brexit relationship. They believe that “it is important that they do not enjoy the same benefits or market access as the EU Member States, such as the four freedoms and the financial contribution from the EU budget” (European Union, 2018b). These remarks are particularly interesting since PRRPs tend to put sovereignty before the four freedoms of the EU, as it has been previously signaled with the refugee crisis and immigration policies.

PiS does not offer any written explanation of their vote, but taking into account that they are also the governing party in Poland, as Fidesz in Hungary, it could be deduced that having the responsibility to govern makes the party approach certain crucial issues in a different way. In this case, providing stability to the Brexit process. In addition, they might have been pressured by the rest of the member states (by the governing parties of these member states) to show strength and unity as a bloc, towards the UK.

The other two parties are both Eurosceptic and they clearly position themselves in favor of regaining sovereignty from the EU (Project Manifesto, 2019), meaning curbing EU influence over national affairs; thus, they both voted against the resolution.

The Italian MEPs believe that the EU-UK future relationship resolution will not be fair for the UK. Precisely “the United Kingdom must still remain subordinate to the EU acquis and the jurisprudence of the Union. I do not at all share this anti-democratic will of the EU, which intends to blackmail the United Kingdom for having chosen, giving its people a voice, to leave the Union” (European Union, 2018b); here they expose a point of view that depicts the European process as absent of legitimacy and they deem it of antidemocratic. In fact, both LN and FN used to have the exit of the EU strategy on their agendas (Financial Times, 2016). Therefore, this might help explain why they do depict such an “unfair” scenario for the UK due to the approval of this resolution.

FN’s MEPs position themselves strongly against the resolution. The find particularly “incredible” the proposal of a “level playing field”. Mélin states that as a Frenchman, he would prefer having to compete economically with the UK rather than taking their sovereignty away; reflecting once again the very strong nationalist approach of his party. Loiseau and Briois make clear that this resolution deprives the UK from its sovereignty; and Boutonnet and Bilde state that these resolutions a revenge by the EP against the Brexit referendum (European Union, 2018b). All in all, all these claims point out the aversion that the FN has against the supranational process of integration.

In conclusion, it can clearly be seen that even if PRRPs share similar ideological characteristics, they do not always vote in consonance with them. Divisions according to geographical regions of Europe, or according to the belonging of the PRRP in government or opposition, are decisive variables that influenced their vote in the selected resolutions. Moreover, the volatile political landscape and PRRPs' ability to adapt and reform their political manifestos, has led them to have different stance towards key European issues such as the European Monetary Union or the abandonment of the EU as a whole, as it has been the case of FN and LN. Nevertheless, they represent a united front against the integration process, supranationalism, the ever-closer union, and, above all, liberal democracy and its core values.

5. CONCLUSION

The objective of this research has been to try to contribute to the academic literature about the interrelation between PRRPs and the future of the EU. In this way, clarity could be added to the current international political landscape, which still holds many questions regarding how PRRPs can and will interact with the EU integration. To achieve that a synchronous analysis has been implemented during the 8th parliamentary session of the EP. During that time, selected EP resolutions have been analysed due to their relevance to both the features that have been considered to be able to shape Europe's future and to the characteristics of PRRPs. This has been done through a double analysis of the voting patterns of the MEPs and their written explanations of vote. In addition, results over the analysis of founding EU documents have proven to be consisting with the overall features regarding the future of the EU.

Defining common characteristics of the radical right has been done according to the wider academic literature on the subject. Among them, it has proven particularly salient the ardent defence of the nation that PRRPs carry out, directly opposed to the integration process due to its loss of sovereignty in favour of the bigger project of the Union itself.

Finding future features of the EU has proven more difficult. Firstly, literature has not densely work on them, making the proposed features more reliant on official EU documents rather than academic work. Nevertheless, as both founding and current documents have been investigated, the author has been able to present a more nuanced set of features concerning the future of the EU. Among them, the most relevant one is supranationality, since it deals with the future development of states. Diverging from the Westphalian system has been one of the major achievements of the Union and it is deemed that it will be maintained in the future. It has also been found that this particular future collides with the foundations of PRRPs, making them eager to change the course of the EU to a more traditional federalist approach, which has been the main discovery of the analysis of the resolutions.

The four resolutions reflected the future features of the EU as described in the theoretical framework, making it clear that a working majority of the 8th EP was aiming at further integrating the member-states, getting an ever-closer union and respecting the four freedoms of movement. This was portrayed as an answer to various problems that the EU faces currently by the different rapporteurs. Conversely, PRRPs' MEPs portrayed these alleged solutions as the cause of the problems that the EU was facing. They mostly agreed with the diagnosis about the problems, but offered different solutions basing them on the existing nations representing member-states, law and order, xenophobia and populist arguments.

The results obtained in this analysis have been mixed, regarding the different PRRPs. Several differences have been found among parties in some issues. However, they all

agree that they do not want to further integrate the EU from a supranationalist approach. This is why Mr. Verhofstadt's resolution is the one that commands more rejections; because it clearly goes against the exclusionist nationalist sentiment that PRRPs have.

Nevertheless, many MEPs pointed out that his assessment was correct and that the problems signalled by him were the most important ones within the Union. MEPs have offered in their written explanations alternative solutions based on national sovereignty and a more intergovernmentalist approach. In a similar vein, they have repeatedly stated that they want to rebuild the European project alluding to their particular view of Europe. This gives an answer to the working hypothesis of the methodological section, proving it to be true: they do not want to revert European integration, but to reform it based on their own characteristics that have been described throughout this work.

All in all, this research has shown the clear opposition between the values in which PRRPs believe in and the values that have traditionally been present at the EU and are deemed to be present in its future. In the same vein, after analyzing the written explanations of vote of several resolutions, it is clear that these parties do not seek to break apart the EU but to reform it to their own characteristics. As we can see, PRRPs have evolved since their origin as anti-EU protest parties (Italexit, Frexit, exit of the Euro...) to the alternative option to traditional mainstream parties that they constitute nowadays. It is not clear how the future of the EU will develop, but it will certainly follow the path that has been described here. However, it seems very likely that PRRPs will take part in that future and therefore they will need to adapt to overcome their current role as protests, anti-establishment populist parties. It is possible that if after the next EP elections, they get enough MEPs to become a significant force, they will be able to exert influence and try to act together with conservative MEPs in certain issues.

It would be desirable to follow the research paths suggested in this investigation such as the internal cohesion of PRRPs, to be able to evaluate the strength of that potential EP group; the interaction of supranationality with member-states which are governed by PRRPs, to elucidate how the next territorial unit that will come after that state will look like; or the perspectives state the ever-closer union in defense due to its significant as a sovereign and yet undisputed arena.

Considering the international and multilingual framework of analysis that has been used in this research, it would also be desirable to establish a robust framework of translation and interpretation of party manifestos and other documents of the wide array of PRRPs available in Europe. This way, researchers would not be dependent on the accuracy of translations and on indexes gathered by others with a more generalist purpose.

In addition, building up on the methodology here described, and considering electoral predictions for the 9th EP, more PRRPs should be taken into account for future researches. Combining the augmentation of the number of analyzed parties with more

ad-hoc quantitative variables directly referencing the characteristics of the PRRPs and the features of the EU, more reliable results could be offered. Thus, building up on this investigation and expanding the narrow pool of knowledge available on these matters.

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ANNEX I - VOTING PATTERNS OF THE SELECTED PRRP IN THE EP RESOLUTIONS

Table 1: Voting Analysis								
MEP	EP Resolution				EP Resolution			
	2014/2248(INI)	2014/2249(INI)	2018/2094(INI)	2018/2573(RSP)	2014/2248(INI)	2014/2249(INI)	2018/2094(INI)	2018/2573(RSP)
Fidesz (Hungary)								
Andrea Bocskor	-	0	0	+				Y
Andor Deli	-	0	0	+	Y	Y		Y
Tamás Deutsch			0	+				
Norbert Erdős	-	0		+	Y	Y		Y
Kinga Gál			0	+				Y
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz					Y	Y		
András Gyürk								
Ádám Kósa	-	0	0	+	Y	Y		
György Schöpflin	-	0		+				
József Szájer				+				Y
László Tókécs	-	0	0	+				
Law and Justice (Poland)								
Ryszard Czarnecki	-	-	+	+				
Edward Czesak	-	-	-	+				
Anna Fotyga	-	-						
Beata Gosiewska	-	-	-	+				
Czesław Hoc	-	-	-	+				
Karol Karski	-	-	+	+				
Sławomir Kłosowski	-	-	-	+				
Zdzisław Krasnodębski	-	-	+	+				
Urszula Krupa	-	-	-	+				
Zbigniew Kuźmiuk	-	-	-	+				
Ryszard Legutko				+				
Stanisław Ożóg	-	-	-	+				
Mirosław Piotrowski	-	-	-	+				
Bolesław Piecha	-	-	-	+				
Tomasz Poręba	-	-	-		Y	Y		
Kazimierz Ujazdowski(Jan 2017)	-	-			Y	Y		
Kosma Złotowski	-	-	-	+				
Lega Nord (Italy)								
Mara Bizzotto	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Mario Borghezio	-	-	-	-				
Angelo Ciocca	-	-	-	-				Y
Danilo Oscar Lancini			-					
Giancarlo Scottà			-					
Marco Zanni (Salvini II - Zanni IV)		-		-				
National Front (France)								
Marie-Christine Arnautu	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Nicolas Bay	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Dominique Bilde	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Marie-Christine Boutonnet	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Steeve Briois	-	-	-	-	Y			Y
Jacques Colombier III- IV(Édouard Ferrand)			-	-				Y
Jean-François Jalkh	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
France Jamet IV (Louis Aliot I-II)	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		
Gilles Lebreton	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Christelle Lechevalier III-IV (Marine Le Pen)			-	-				
Philippe Loiseau	-	-	-	-				Y
Dominique Martin	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Joëlle Mélin	-	-	-	-	Y	Y		Y
Jean-Luc Schaffhauser	-	-	-	-				
Mylène Troszczynski	-	-	-	-		Y		Y
Written explanation of the vote					17	17	0	18
Key: +: vote in favor; -: vote against; 0: abstention; Y: written explanation of vote was provided; blank space: no vote and/or no written explanation of vote could be found								
Source: own elaboration from European Parliament documents								

ANNEX II - SELECTED DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE FUTURE FEATURES OF THE EU

Table 2: EU documents	
Founding documents	
Year	Document
1941	Ventotene Manifesto
1950	The Schuman Declaration
1951	Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
1957	Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
1957	Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
Current documents	
Year	Document
2015	Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union
2017	Rome Declaration
2017	White Paper on the Future of Europe
2017	Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe
2017	Reflection Paper on the Future of European defence
2017	Reflection Paper on Harnessing globalisation
2017	Sorbonne Speech of Emmanuelle Macron
2019	Social Priorities Under the Juncker Commission
2019	The European Commission's contribution to the informal EU27 leaders' meeting in Sibiu
2019	Meseberg Declaration
Source: Own elaboration	

ANNEX III - SELECTED PRRPs REGARDING THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RADICAL RIGHT

Table 3: Future features of the EU in PRRPs					
Party Name	Left (1) - Right (10) scale	Libertarian (1) - Authoritarian (10)	Multicultural (1) - Ethnocentric (10)	Pro-EU integration (1) - Anti-EU integration (10)	Fully in favor of immigration (1) - Fully opposed of immigration (10)
FN	10	10	10	10	10
LN	8	7	8	8	9
Fidesz	7	7	4*	7	8
PiS	10	10	8	7	8
<i>Related PRRP characteristic</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Rule of Law</i>	<i>Nationalism</i>	<i>Populism through euroscepticism</i>	<i>Xenophobia</i>
Source: own elaboration from data from the 2014 Euromanifesto Study Documentation					

***Note:** the stance of Fidesz party on this characteristic has varied since this research was concluded and it has turned away from its slight multicultural approach that can be seen in this annex, to a more ethnocentric position, coherently with its PRRPs characterization as it can be seen here: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-urban-idUSKBN00J0T920150603>.