

FREGEAN SENSE AND THE PROPER FUNCTION OF ASSERTION: COMMENTS ON TEXTOR†

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On behalf of Millian views on the meaning of proper names, Mark Textor offers in 'Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense' a suggestive critical discussion of an argument for Fregean views due to Richard Heck (1995). I myself have supported what I took to be a version of that argument.¹ What exactly Heck's argument is, however, is not very clear, as witnessed by Byrne & Thau's (1996) efforts at reconstructing it -Heck's (1996) reply to which I do not find terribly illuminating. What I will do is, after presenting the form of Fregean view I defend and the Heckian argument for it that I support, to argue that Textor's criticism, as addressed to *that* argument, is unsuccessful.

The debate we are about to rehearse confronts "the Fregean" (the proponent of the view which I support) with "the Millian" (the proponent of the view which I take Textor to support). Both characters in our little drama defend views rather more nuanced than ordinarily assumed (specially in critical discussions by each other of the opponent's claims). Regarding proper names purporting to refer to external objects,² the Fregean claims that: (i) when occurring in a "ground level" utterance (one of a sentential expression of a language L not embedded in an intensional context), they are associated with a property (a sense); (ii) the association is linguistic -it is part of linguistic competence to know it- and should be properly stated in a correct theory of meaning for L; (iii) it is reasonable to believe that the sense is actually satisfied by just one entity, which in that case is the proper name's referent; (iv) when the name occurs embedded in intensional contexts, its ordinary sense (or a further property contextually derived from it) may, depending on further contextual matters, become its truth-conditional import in addition to, or even substituting for, its ordinary referent.³ All this sounds sufficiently Fregean to me to deserve the label. There are, however, important differences with what is sometimes pre-

sumed to be a Fregean view, as I will explain by discussing an illustrative example. Not to beg any question, the example involves indexicals instead of proper names. It comes from Loar (1976), and it will also serve later to illustrate important points regarding my own version of Heck's argument -which in fact was inspired as much by Loar's discussion as by Heck's:

Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in the latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says 'He is a stockbroker', intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith's referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith's utterance. It would seem that, as Frege held, some 'manner of presentation' of the referent is, even on referential uses, essential to what is being communicated. (Loar 1976, p. 357)

Relative to this example, the Fregean of our story would elaborate on the previous four claims as follows. First, when sentences include context-dependent expressions, reference and other semantic properties are ascribed only to utterances thereof and their parts; utterances being event-tokens and their parts with the right properties.⁴ It is the specific token *he* of 'he' produced by Smith which has reference and sense. Hence the sense-property mentioned in claim (i) above is here token-reflexive; it includes the token itself: *whoever is the most salient male when he was produced*. This is essential to satisfy claim (iii). Second, of course no linguistic theory for a language will include singular reference to all tokens of its expressions; but it can include a general rule assigning a sense such as the one just indicated to any entity satisfying certain conditions. This will be enough to satisfy claim (ii) above that senses should be stated by theories of meaning. It is eminently plausible to suppose that the ability to produce tokens of linguistic types and perceive them as such is a constitutive ingredient of linguistic competence.⁵

Third, not only truth-conditional imports should be acknowledged and stated by meaning-theories. Force, for instance, to the extent that it is conventionally associated with some expressions, should also be captured by such a theory. Our Fregean would grant the "direct-reference" thesis that the truth-conditional import of *he* is just its referent. He would say some such thing as that *he* differs from 'the most salient male when *he* was produced', as used with respect to our intended context, in that, unlike the latter, the former merely *connotes* and not *denotes* its sense.⁶ Even though senses are not contributed in ground-level utterances to truth-conditions, a correct meaning theory should ascribe them to referential expressions as their

"connotations".⁷ Fourth, the Fregean would also grant that, also in perfectly literal uses of language and not merely when intending to convey a conversational implicature, speakers might well try to communicate meanings over and above the linguistic meaning of their utterances. In our example, for instance, the speaker unsuccessfully intends that non-linguistic material gathered from context (the visual appearance of the man on television perhaps) fills up the linguistic sense (determining, as it were, the determinable 'salient'), thus helping further the determination of the referent. But this is compatible with the purely linguistic sense described earlier satisfying also the requirement (iii).

Finally, consider utterances including *he* instead embedded inside an intensional context (a belief attribution to Smith, or a statement of what he wanted to say) with respect to an otherwise unchanged context. It might well be in such a case that the indexical cannot be replaced by another expression referring to the same person, without the truth-conditions of the attribution intuitively changing. Our Fregean explains this, as indicated in requirement (iv), by his linguistic theory allowing (relative to extralinguistic contextual matters) the possibility that the truth-conditional import of the expression in that linguistic context be related to the sense we have characterized. As indicated in (iv), it is not required that it be exactly its ordinary linguistic sense, but rather (as Schiffer 1992 would put it) a related kind of sense. It typically will not include the token (which would be out of cognitive reach for the ascriber anyway), but perhaps a reference to a similar token; and it might include the sort of contextual completions described earlier (the visual appearance specifying further 'salient' in Loar's example).

The Millian of our story also holds nuanced views. He defends what Heck calls a "hybrid view", combining a Millian account of the behavior of proper names in ordinary contexts with a non-Millian view of the behavior of proper names "occurring" in the judgments one makes or the beliefs one accepts in accepting the truth of an utterance. Going back to the relatively uncontroversial indexical example, all parties agree that the *beliefs* accepted by Smith and Jones in accepting in that context the utterance 'He is a stockbroker' differ. The need for accepting the possibility of differences like this is typically justified on the basis of considerations having to do with the constitutive relation between belief-contents and the explanation of action. Situations are described where we predict different rational actions (or explain them in rationally differential ways) by one who holds the one belief and by one who holds the latter; the differences at stake be-

ing among those which appear to require corresponding differences in belief-content. Loar's story can be easily developed along those lines.

Consider then a case analogous to Loar's, but involving an utterance including a proper name instead of an indexical; Heck's example concerning 'George Orwell' (quoted by Textor in section 3 of his paper) is such a case. From a strict Millian viewpoint that extends the Millian semantics from language utterances to mental states, the beliefs accepted by Alex and Tony in accepting the truth of the utterance of 'George Orwell wrote 1984' should have the same content. Our nuanced Millianism accepts instead that they might differ, as in the less controversial indexical case. Our Millian thus contemplates something like Fregean senses when propositional attitudes (and even perhaps their linguistic ascriptions) are at stake.

Instead however of resorting to the prediction or explanation of rational action to justify the need for the sophistication involved in a hybrid view, we could have resorted to epistemological considerations to the same effect. This appreciation is the starting point of our reconstruction of the Heckian argument. The differences in the indicated beliefs accepted by Smith and Jones, to return to the indexical example, could be derived from differences in the *justification* which both believers would provide for the states of affairs they believe to obtain, on the assumption that the identity of a belief's content may depend on the subject's epistemically relevant justification. Smith's justification for the belief he expresses might crucially depend on his thinking of the referent of 'he' as the man on television (perhaps the man's visual aspect justifies the belief), and would be lost if thinking of the referent as Jones is lead to think. Likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for Heck's example regarding 'George Orwell'.

The Heckian argument departs from here. The Millian thus agrees with the Fregean that:

- (1) The contents of the beliefs that Alex and Tony accept in accepting the utterance 'George Orwell wrote 1984' differ in point of epistemic justification: Alex's belief is justified, indeed constitutes knowledge, while Tony's belief is unjustified, a lucky hit.

Both parties are also agreed that the beliefs cannot differ in truth-value, because they have the same truth-conditions; for I will assume that the Fregean extends to proper names the views we presented earlier with respect to indexicals, in ways which will be further developed later. In particular, the Fregean agrees that a proper name's *truth-conditional* contribution is its referent.

This premise poses a problem for the enlightened Millian we are considering, given independently justifiable assumptions; for in the example Tony's belief has been acquired by simply accepting at what she took its face value Alex's utterance, and obviously the example only illustrates a perfectly reproducible situation. I will state as follows the further assumptions which, together with (1), pose a *prima facie* difficulty for our Millian:

- (2) The proper function of conventionalized assertions *that p* is the transmission of knowledge *that p*; i.e., that, as a result of the act of assertion, the audience gains the knowledge *that p* already possessed by the speaker.
- (3) If the proper function of an event with the content *that p* is to allow acquisition of the knowledge *that p*, understanding its force (which entails understanding its proper function) and its content is a defeasible good reason to acquire the knowledge *that p* for someone who takes the event at face value in an epistemically responsible way.

For justification of these two premises, I refer the reader to the work of Burge (1993), Evans (1982, ch. 10), Peacocke (1999, ch. 2) and Williamson (1996).⁸

The initial problem for our enlightened Millian is then this. He shares with the Fregean acceptance of (1), that knowledge-transmission has failed in a case like Heck's. We can further assume that Alex's utterance in the example is a conventionalized assertion, without absurdly assuming thereby that any utterance of a declarative sentence has such specific force. Now, compatibly with (2)-(3), the Fregean can describe any situation like the one illustrated by the example as one where transmission of knowledge has failed, simply in that the audience has failed to fully understand the meaning (force and content) of the utterance. The Millian, however, obviously cannot provide an explanation like this; for the audience has correctly identified the name's referent, which according to the Millian exhausts its contribution to linguistic content. For any such situation, thus, the Millian is obliged to provide an alternative explanation of communication failure. Moreover, the proposed explanation should have the relevant generality; for examples relevantly like Heck's are easily reproduced.

Of course, once presented with the argument the Millian can simply reject some of its premises, given their implications. He could relapse into orthodox Millianism, rejecting (1). He could suggest that, although the beliefs of Alex and Tony do not differ in point of content, they differ in their causal ancestry, that difference sufficing for a difference in epistemic

justification. This would be to embrace a fully-fledged reliabilism -to which its semantic externalism already makes orthodox Millianism rather sympathetic. It is an implausible suggestion, to the same extent that fully-fledged reliabilism is implausible: it flouts in the face of a forceful intuition that epistemic justification depends only on facts properly accessible to subjects. Even less plausibly, the Millian can say (on similarly reliabilist bases) that the beliefs do not differ in any aspect relevant for epistemic appraisal, and therefore they are both justified (assuming Alex's is justified). The Fregean strategy against such replies would be to highlight the indicated implausibilities. After all, the debate confronting Fregeans with Millians merely reproduces, for the specific case of linguistic competence, the more general debate confronting radical epistemic externalists with defenders of more internalist views.⁹

The other possibility is to reject (2)-(3); Byrne & Thau (1996) seem to opt for this. They provide (*ibid.*, p. 147) an example like Heck's in that knowledge-transmission has intuitively failed, but such that, according to them, the audience uses the name not only with the same reference as the speaker, but also with the same mode of presentation. The example, according to them, casts doubt on the principle (3) that understanding assertoric utterances might be sufficient for knowledge. Unfortunately, it is not at all obvious that understanding has occurred in their example, as Heck points out in his reply (1996, p. 154).¹⁰ Notice in any case that understanding is *only defeasibly* taken in (3) to be sufficient for acquisition of knowledge. As in other similar cases (perception, for instance), a claim to know based on understanding can be defeated, say, if shown dependent on a "deviant causal chain".¹¹ This also handles Textor's argument on p. 10-1, based on an example involving 'Hesperus' rather similar to Byrne and Thau's, that preservation of reference and sense does not suffice for knowledge-transmission.¹² So I do not take this either as an adequate option for the Millian.

But before we accept that (1)-(3) give indeed an explanatory advantage to the Fregean, thereby provisionally adjudicating in his favor the debate, we must acknowledge a weak spot in what we said on his behalf -which the Millian will undoubtedly rush to pinpoint, as I think Textor does in his introductory remarks. We must recall that the debate concerns *linguistic* meaning. If we now go back to Loar's example, we can immediately see that it is not failure in grasping what the Fregean counts as the linguistic meaning of *he* which explains failure in communication: Smith and Jones share not only the belief *de re*, of the most salient male when *he* is pro-

duced, that he is a stockbroker; they even share a *de dicto* belief in which the man in question is thought of under that mode of presentation. It is only failure by Jones in determining in context the determinable 'salient' as expected by Smith which accounts for failure in knowledge-transmission; for it is on that aspect of Smith's *de dicto* belief, we are assuming, which the differential justification in his belief allowing for knowledge is based. The Fregean has not yet given us his account of the linguistic senses of proper names; but no matter what it is, it seems obvious that exactly the same should have to be said with respect to the 'George Orwell' type of example.

Now, it is part and parcel of an enlightened Millianism the acceptance that *uses* of proper names can be associated with modes of presentation. Enlightened Millians will even accept that the association is somehow "linguistic", in that it could figure in a (as Kaplan (1989) and Stalnaker (1997) would respectively put it) "metasemantical" or "foundational" account of how names have the linguistic meanings (i.e., referents) they do have. They just do not have to figure in an account of the linguistic competence constitutive of knowledge of a given natural language, according to them (i.e., again respectively, in a "semantical" or "descriptive" account); for that, only the referent is relevant. Thus, granting (1)-(3) does not make the Millian worse off relative to the Fregean. Whatever the latter can say to account for the Heckian example, the former can say too. They differ in their respective accounts of the linguistic meaning of proper names; but failure of communication in the cases we are considering does not depend on *that*, on any account. It rather depends on translinguistic (contextual) aspects, which can be equally contemplated by any of the two theoretical proposals.

Well, not quite; there is a relevant difference, and in my view it *gives* the Fregean a sufficient explanatory advantage; put together with more traditional considerations (say, the account of failures of substitutivity in intensional contexts and negative existentials), it adds in my view to a convincing case for the Fregean view. The difference is this: the Fregean account ascribes to the singular terms in our examples (proper names and indexicals) linguistic senses which straightforwardly *guide* the fully-fledged contextualized senses, failure to grasp which accounts for failure of communication in those examples. The Millian does not; in his view, the linguistic meaning of 'George Orwell' consists merely of a relation between its tokens and the referent, which does not involve any aspect of the knowledge (linguistic competence) of speakers. Hence, the Fregean provides an epis-

temically more satisfactory resolution of the prima facie problem posed by acceptance of (1)-(3), as far as we can judge.

Let me elaborate a bit on this, the crucial point in the Heckian considerations as I construe them. According to (1), Alex's and Tony's beliefs have different contents, and this is why they differ in epistemic justification from a sufficiently internalist epistemic perspective; it is not just that they have beliefs with the same content which differ in facts inaccessible to the thinkers, like the reliability of the mechanisms by which both beliefs have been formed. The advantage that the Fregean claims for his way of accommodating (2)-(3) with this is similar to this advantage that the Fregean and the hybrid view share with respect to purely reliabilist alternatives to (1). For the Fregean view provides an account of knowledge-transmission and its failure which essentially appeals to the way Alex and Tony put to use their linguistic competence. Guided by her knowledge of the semantics of names, Alex used a form of words which, using under that guidance contextual information, could allow for her knowledge to be passed on to Tony. To be sure, Tony's mistake was due to her misinterpreting the contextual factors; but, according to the Fregean view, it was under the guidance of her linguistic competence that the error was incurred. It is not just that, at the end of the linguistic exchange, Tony fails to be in the right relation to the referent; it is rather that she used wrongly the accessible, linguistically provided, ways of placing herself in relation to it.

This concludes my own reconstruction of the Heckian argument. To be fully compelling, it should be completed with an account of the linguistic senses of proper names, comparable to the one suggested for indexicals; this is something more not to be found in Heck's paper. My own account ascribes to a token *n* of a proper name *N* a linguistic sense of a metalinguistic sort like this: *whoever or whatever is picked out by the naming-practice on which n contextually depends*.¹³ (The concept of a naming-practice is to be elucidated in such a way that in Heck's example Alex and Tony are unknowingly relying on different such practices.) Metalinguistic accounts like this have to confront forceful criticisms by Kripke (1979 and 1980), among which the most important are perhaps two: the circularity objection (we seem to explain the reference of proper names by helping ourselves to the notion of the reference of names), and the generality objection (if we generalize the proposal to other expressions, we will have to say that not even, say, 'alienist' and 'psychiatrist' have the same sense). I cannot elaborate here on how the outlined proposal handles these and other objections.

Having thus presented my reconstruction of the Heckian argument, I move now to discussing Textor's criticism, which, as I will show, appears to apply to the reconstructed version. The line of reply I am going to develop goes as follows. I will first complain that Textor's suggestion needs elaboration; an important demand should be attended. I will then present what I consider to be the most promising way of satisfying it. Finally, I will argue that, thus elaborated, Textor's proposal is no alternative to the Fregean view, but a version of it which cannot be properly motivated from a Millian perspective.

In what I take to be the main part of his argument, Textor argues that "preservation of reference and sense" is not even "*necessary* for understanding_E an utterance with a proper name" (p. 295). Given that *understanding_E* is stipulated to be that form of understanding, whatever it is, which allows the transmission of knowledge, I think it is correct to interpret the argument as defending that the Fregean story is not needed to account for knowledge-transmission and its failure: there is an alternative account, not involving "preservation of reference and sense", consistent with a Millian view. Such an alleged alternative account is the one appealing to Textor's "knowledge-condition".

Now, the complain we can make is that the knowledge-condition is never properly stated; we are just given its application to Heck's example: knowledge-transmission has failed not because Tony has not ascribed to 'George Orwell' the reference and sense intended by Alex, but instead because Tony fails to know "that Alex referred with her use of 'George Orwell' to the person she calls by that name" (p. 296). However, the knowledge-condition should be stated in a general form; this is the demand I mentioned in outlining the argument earlier. It is not just for perspicuity's sake. The condition should apply generally; for, as indicated before, Heck's example is easily reproduced. Besides, I think that, if it is to serve the purposes to which it is put in Textor's argument, the condition should be made to apply in general to any referential singular term, and indeed to any expression occurring in an utterance with the force of a conventionalized assertion which makes a contribution to its truth-conditions.

The reason is this: we are assuming that the Millian whose views are to be defended by Textor's argument is one who accepts (1)-(3), despite claiming that the linguistic meaning of proper names is exhausted by their referents. (We have already given reasons to think that this is the best line for the Millian to pursue.) Now, the only available strategy for this Millian to take seems to be this: understanding a conventionalized assertion, as

we have seen, is only *defeasibly* sufficient for transmission of knowledge. Even granting that (what the Millian takes to be) the linguistic meaning of all significant expressions in the utterance, and more specifically its proper names, has been understood, failure in fulfilling other, independent conditions, might defeat the claim to know by the audience. Hence, the Millian's strategy should be to state first some such condition, showing then that it is not fulfilled in the 'George Orwell' example and others of a similar kind. I take Textor's idea to be an implementation of this strategy. But, if so, the condition which he appeals to should be a general one, not one *ad hoc* for the case of proper names. For otherwise, it would be difficult (to say the least) to justify that it is a potential defeater of the presumption of knowledge-transmission *compatible with understanding the proper names*, as opposed to an unacknowledged admission that the linguistic meaning of proper names goes over and above what the Millian doctrine claims.

So Textor's "knowledge-condition" should have a general form. Which is it? If we just proceed to generalize from its application to the Alex-Tony exchange quoted earlier, we get this as a general additional condition for transmission of knowledge:

- (KC) For any expression which makes a truth-conditional contribution in a conventionalized assertion, R must know that his own uses of it have the same denotation as S's use.

It is easy to see that, thus stated, the condition does not work; it has to be modified in several directions. I will give two reasons.

Firstly, requiring that KC be satisfied would make it impossible that utterances involving context-dependent expressions allow for the transmission of knowledge. For it is not true that, say, one's own uses of 'he' have in general the same truth-conditional import as any given one, and a falsehood cannot be known. Notice however that, as clearly shown precisely by examples like Heck's, proper names are context-dependent expressions. Consider a variation on Heck's example, where Tony correctly grasps that the naming-practice Alex's is relying on is the one relative to George Orwell *the writer* (instead of the one relative to George Orwell *her patient* -which, for all she knows accidentally, happens to lead also to Orwell the writer). Presumably knowledge would be transmitted here. But we cannot foreclose that Tony's future uses of 'George Orwell' will be related to the other naming-practice, or even to naming-practices which pick out different people; so, again, we cannot demand that she knows in general that she

refers with 'George Orwell' to what Alex referred to in the knowledge-transmitting utterance. Thus (KC) should be modified, requesting only that the expression which is known by R to refer to whatever S referred to in the knowledge-giving utterance be properly related in its context to S's expression, thus abandoning the incorrect requirement that they be the same expression.

Secondly, suppose that S knowingly uttered 'McGregor is an alienist', and that R, although hearing correctly (and fulfilling any other condition for acquiring S's knowledge), shortly afterwards forgets (as most of us do) the specific words that S used, retaining only their content, which, if needed, he would express as 'McGregor is a psychiatrist'. Under the circumstances, R does not even believe (not to say know) that he refers with 'alienist' to what S referred to, because he does not remember the expressions used in the utterance and lacks any reason even to believe that S knows the word 'alienist'. But we do not want to say, I take it, that after forgetting the words used in the exchange R has lost the knowledge he acquired. Nevertheless, his justification still derives from his understanding of the utterance; but KC can be read as entailing in that situation that he has lost it. The knowledge-condition must therefore be stated so as to make it clear that the metalinguistic condition KC imposes does not apply so strictly to expressions like 'alienist', and thus does not have that unwanted consequence.

It is not my concern to propose any acceptable alternative to KC. But I think that the suspicion has been forcefully risen that in fact any such correctly stated condition will not be what was advertised: a condition, independent of the requirement of understanding the meaning of the utterance by means of which the conventionalized assertion was made, whose unfulfillment defeats the claim to know. Once properly formulated, the knowledge-condition will reveal itself to be nothing else than the understanding requirement, as articulated by the Fregean. The reason is that, as the two examples I have given (context-dependent expressions and general terms like 'alienist' and 'psychiatrist') suggest, the knowledge-condition should be formulated, for any semantically distinctive kind of word, by taking proper notice of their semantically significant aspects. The Fregean will then suggest that, properly understood, the knowledge-condition as stated for proper names is nothing else than the condition, specific for those expressions, that they must be understood for communication to occur: understood as the Fregean indicates, in part by understanding a linguistic sense and not merely by placing oneself at the end of the right causal relation.

In brief: the Millian has no right to appeal to a condition requiring knowledge of the referent of the name, unless this results from a general condition for knowledge-transmission distinct from the condition that proper names be understood. For what is distinctive of the Millian position is that it rejects the view that linguistic competence with proper names consists in having knowledge of properties of the referent. But Textor's suggested condition (KC) does not work; and there is a strong suspicion that any acceptable modification will go beyond the Millian's rights. At the very least, I think this places Textor under the obligation of providing an alternative to (KC) which dispels the suspicion.

This is also how Heck reacts to the knowledge-condition (or, as I would prefer to say, to a properly formulated knowledge-condition), as Textor acknowledges (pp. 295-296). In his discussion immediately after this acknowledgement (pp. 295-298), Textor seems to be appealing to the objection to the Fregean claim that his theory provides the best account compatible with (1)-(3) we gave earlier on behalf of the Millian; namely, that in the examples failure of communication depends on failure in grasping the contextual aspects of senses, and not the linguistic senses themselves. Put more positively, this suggests that understanding one and the same proper name could require, in different contexts, understanding any possible contextual way of thinking of the referent, the only commonality in all those possible cases being that the referent is preserved.

I have already responded to this. Consider a given token of 'that jar', produced in a given context. By imagining variations on the perceptual presentation of one and the same jar accompanying the utterance of that very same token, we come to imagine many different ways in which one can be led to think of the same referent (and be given knowledge about it). The presentation does not even need to be perceptual; a demonstrative like 'that jar' can be made to rely on previous discourse, which opens the way for many more contextually given modes of presentation. But, of course, it does not follow from this that there is no purely linguistic mode of presentation associated with the demonstrative, which one has to grasp for proper communication. Understanding (and knowledge-transmission, if the utterance allows for that) clearly involves in this case not merely being in a certain relation with the referent through contextually gathered modes of presentation. It involves knowledgeably putting to use a linguistically given mode of presentation, and then getting through it whatever additional contextual clues might be assumed. *Mutatis mutandis*, the Fregean says the same for proper names. This is what distinguishes his account from

the one given by the Millian, and, for the reasons provided earlier, this is ultimately why, so far as we can judge, we should prefer it.

Notes

- † The present commentary has benefited from discussions over the last few years of Heck's argument with Josep Macià and Ignacio Vicario. Financial support was provided by the research project PB96-1091-C03-03, funded by the DGES, Spanish Department of Education.
- 1 In García-Carpintero 1998a and 2000.
 - 2 The restriction to proper names of external objects hints to the fact that, to avoid vicious regresses (engendered by the requirement that senses themselves be presented by other senses, and so forth), the Fregean should say different things about, say, proper names purporting to refer to non-objective entities -like instances of a qualia that one is conscious of, while one is conscious of them, or any other object whose essence is similarly "response-dependent".
 - 3 The ordinary sense of a proper name which occurs in an intensional context is the property which would be associated with the name if occurring in a ground level utterance in a context otherwise unchanged; the ordinary referent is that determined by the ordinary sense, if any.
 - 4 In García-Carpintero 1998b I defend this view from Kaplan's criticisms.
 - 5 Some people, perhaps in a (Chomskian) reductively mentalistic frame of mind, appear to think that only what we might call its grammar (a specification of the syntactic and semantic properties of types) is constitutive of a natural language. Of course, a set of physical tokens by themselves is not a natural language; only together with other facts, including facts about the grammar represented in the mind/brain of the people producing them, counts as such. But this does not entail the Chomskian view. Facts about the normativity of the fundamental properties of natural languages, which our discussion will highlight, contradict such a reductionist view. I develop these points in García-Carpintero forthcoming.
 - 6 Unless the description were referentially used; but our Fregean would take that to be a non-literal use with which a linguistic theory of meaning has no proper business.
 - 7 In García-Carpintero 2000 I explicate "connotation" in terms of presuppositions.
 - 8 The term 'proper function' comes from Millikan (1984); it is intended to have normative features absent from 'function' as usually understood. But any suggestion that a "naturalistic" reduction of proper functions in causal-historical terms is assumed is hereby disclaimed.
 - 9 Given that philosophical articulations of the outlined options cannot differ very much from the alternative considerations that we will examine later on behalf of the Millian who accepts the hybrid view, what the Fregean should say against them would similarly not depart very much from what we are about to say against the latter. Byrne and Thau (1996) wonder why Heck's argument is addressed to the hybrid view, and not instead to any form of Millianism, orthodox or sophisticated; Ignacio Vicario put a similar complaint in conversation. Heck (1996, p. 155, fn. 7) provides an obscure re-

- ply. I am here acknowledging that an alternative presentation would have made only a small difference of substance. I just think that the Millian view here chosen for presenting the argument in a perspicuous manner is the most plausible version.
- 10 It has not, according to the Fregean view on the senses of names I will sketch later; for in the example, speaker and audience rely contextually on different naming-practices.
 - 11 For instance, a case corresponding to one of "veridical hallucination" in the perceptual case: understanding a sentence uttered by a speaker of a language which happens to sound like another in a different language and mean the same, by a speaker of the second. Such a case could alternatively be described as one where only apparent understanding has occurred.
 - 12 Textor does not put the point directly in terms of knowledge-transmission, but in terms of what he calls 'understanding_E'; but see below, for a justification of why I take this to be just an indirect way of making the same point.
 - 13 There is a brief outline of the account in García-Carpintero 1998a, although the full picture is in 'The Frege-Mill Theory of Proper Names', still unpublished. The notion of a naming practice comes from Evans (1982). Among other "metalinguistic" suggestions in the literature, Recanati (1993) provides the one I find most congenial.

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