Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki; Beitia Ruiz de Mendarozqueta, María Aranzazu

dc.contributor.author	Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki
dc.contributor.author	Beitia Ruiz de Mendarozqueta, María Aranzazu
dc.date.accessioned	2015-03-17T10:23:44Z
dc.date.available	2015-03-17T10:23:44Z
dc.date.issued	2014-12
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/14765
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	The Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2012-31626 and from the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura de Govierno Vasco (IT869-13)	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.publisher	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU	es
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/ECO2012-31626
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Ikerlanak;2014.84
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	adverse selection	es
dc.subject	countervailing incentives	es
dc.title	Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper	es
dc.rights.holder	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International	*
dc.subject.jel	D82	es
dc.subject.jel	L50	es
dc.identifier.repec	RePEc:ehu:ikerla:14765	es
dc.departamentoes	Fundamentos del análisis económico I	es_ES
dc.departamentoeu	Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I	es_ES
dc.subject.categoria	MICROECONOMICS
dc.subject.categoria	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION