Now showing items 1-20 of 50

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      A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies 

      Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor ORCID; García Enríquez, Javier ORCID; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012-11)
      In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). ...
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      A Simple Model of Anticompetitive Vertical Integration 

      Sandonís, Joel; Faulí Oller, Ramón (2003-01)
      The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable ...
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      A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market 

      Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor ORCID; Espinosa Alejos, María Paz ORCID (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2005-10)
      We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant which are to the left of the supply ...
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      Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building 

      Usategui Díaz de Otalora, José María ORCID (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2008-03)
      In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid ...
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      An austerity-driven energy reform 

      Espinosa Alejos, María Paz ORCID (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2013-12)
      In July 2013, the government approved a major overhaul of the Spanish electricity sector to correct existing imbalances that have led to an exponential increase of regulated electricity costs and a huge tariff deficit. The ...
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      Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation 

      Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID (2004-09)
      This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits ...
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      Choice of Product Variety for the Durable Goods Monopolist 

      Casado Izaga, Francisco Javier ORCID; Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel (1999-01)
      This paper analyzes the strategic choice of variety by a monopolist seller of a durable good as a means to mitigate his commitment problem. The monopolist chooses his product variety with a goal of ensuring that a strong ...
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      Commitment Power in a Non-Stationary Durable-Good Market 

      Usategui Díaz de Otalora, José María ORCID (2001-05)
      This paper derives and evaluates the decisions of a durable good monopolist in a context where demand for the services of the durable good changes over time. It shows that, if the size of the market decreases over time, ...
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      Competition, regulation, and pricing behavior in the Spanish retail gasoline market 

      Contín Pilart, Ignacio; Correljé, Aad F.; Palacios, María Blanca (2006)
      The restructuring of the Spanish oil industry produced a highly concentrated oligopoly in the retail gasoline market. In June 1990 the Spanish government introduced a system of ceiling price regulation in order to ensure ...
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      Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis 

      Midjord, Rune (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012)
      We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can ...
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      Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market 

      Martínez Granado, María Teresa ORCID; Siotis, Georges (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2006-07)
      A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged ...
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      Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation 

      Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID (2004-02)
      This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For ...
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      Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis 

      Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki ORCID; Beitia Ruiz de Mendarozqueta, María Aranzazu ORCID (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-12)
      In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. ...
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      Do Mayoritarian Electoral Rules Favour Larger Industries in the Economy 

      Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong; Zuazu Bermejo, Izaskun (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016)
      Electoral rules translate votes into seats on different basis. Politicians respond differently to alternative electoral rules, and consequently, economic performance is expected to vary across rules. This paper empirically ...
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      Economic Integration and Privatization of Publicly-owned Firms 

      Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Garzón San Felipe, María Begoña ORCID (2001-12)
      [EN] We analyse in this paper whether it should be the government of each country that decides whether to privatise a publicly-owned firm (non integration) or whether a supra-national authority should decide whether ...
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      Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition 

      Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Sedano Hoyuelos, Máximo (2011)
      In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public ...
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      Entrada endógena ineficiente 

      Rubio Peña, Jesús Ángel ORCID (2002-07)
      [EN] Stewart (1994) presents a model of endogenous entry. In his article Stewart proposes the following topic for future research: "An important feature of the model is that entry would be inefficient from the producers' ...
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      How much efficiency gains and price reductions for an efficiency defense? 'Quanto Basta' 

      Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen (University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2004)
      Potential efficiency gains due to a merger can be used by competition authorities to judge upon proposed mergers. In a world where agents’ efforts, observable or unobservable, affect the success of a production cost reducing ...
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      Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation 

      Kuipers, Jerome; Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID (2004-12)
      We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several ...
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      International Trade and Strategic Privatization 

      Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Garzón San Felipe, María Begoña ORCID (2001-03)
      The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider that there is strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their public firms. In order to analyze this quetion we consider two countries; ...