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dc.contributor.authorGarcía Encinas, María José
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-29T14:39:29Z
dc.date.available2020-01-29T14:39:29Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.citationTheoria 19(1) : 31-48 (2004)
dc.identifier.issn2171-679X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/39258
dc.description.abstractTransference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this it not possible. First, I show that available accounts of 'transference' ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation it (non-relational) identity.
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherServicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleTransference, or identity theories of causation?
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© 2004, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua


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