dc.contributor.author | García Encinas, María José | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-29T14:39:29Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-29T14:39:29Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Theoria 19(1) : 31-48 (2004) | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2171-679X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39258 | |
dc.description.abstract | Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this it not possible. First, I show that available accounts of 'transference' ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation it (non-relational) identity. | |
dc.language.iso | spa | |
dc.publisher | Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.title | Transference, or identity theories of causation? | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.rights.holder | © 2004, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |