| dc.contributor.author | Pinedo, Manuel de | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-29T14:51:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-29T14:51:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Theoria 19(2) : 137-154 (2004) | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2171-679X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39264 | |
| dc.description.abstract | If language and thougt are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of quietism according to which the very same thing that can be (truly) thought or expressed is the case: "soft facts" as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible rational activity of grasping them. | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.title | Truth matters: normativity in thought and knowledge | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.rights.holder | © 2004, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
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