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dc.contributor.authorSturm, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-30T19:06:54Z
dc.date.available2020-01-30T19:06:54Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationTheoria 34(3) : 321-341 (2019)
dc.identifier.issn2171-679X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/39735
dc.description.abstractI offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly noveland usefulelements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject.In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherServicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleScientific innovation: A conceptual explication and a dilemma
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© 2019 UPV/EHU Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
dc.identifier.doi10.1387/theoria.20652


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© 2019 UPV/EHU Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2019 UPV/EHU Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional