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dc.contributor.authorAnta, Javier
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-29T18:12:07Z
dc.date.available2021-11-29T18:12:07Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationTheoria 36(3) : 399-419 (2021)
dc.identifier.issn0495-4548
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/54187
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel's (1958) symmetry thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherServicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.titleThe epistemic schism of statistical mechanics
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© 2021 UPV/EHU Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.identifier.doi10.1387/theoria.22134


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© 2021 UPV/EHU Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
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