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dc.contributor.authorArin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
dc.contributor.authorFeltkamp, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-25T13:14:13Z
dc.date.available2012-01-25T13:14:13Z
dc.date.issued2007-10
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6480
dc.description.abstractWe characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.es
dc.description.sponsorshipJ. Arín acknowledges financial support provided by Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of the University of the Basque Country and Project SEJ2006-05455 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. This author also thanks the "Salvador de Madariaga" Program of the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain for the financial support provided.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIkerlanak 2007.28
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectmonotonicityes
dc.subjectcorees
dc.subjectTU gameses
dc.subjectnucleolus per capitaes
dc.titleOn monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto playerses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:ikerla:200728es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES


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