Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFabrizi, Simona
dc.contributor.authorWertlen, Bruno
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-06T13:12:51Z
dc.date.available2012-02-06T13:12:51Z
dc.date.issued2003-06
dc.identifier.issn1988-088X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6729
dc.descriptionRevised: 2006-06es
dc.description.abstractWe examine competition in Mobile Internet services, when operators bargain over the coverage sharing and their reciprocal roaming charge. Results show that in equilibrium operators cover the overall territory entirely and no-duplication is chosen, no matter how their bargaining power is distributed: operators have aligned incentives to enjoy roaming revenues extra-rents. Only their relative stand-alone coverage and, therefore, their appropriation of these rents, can be affected by how bargaining power is distributed. We finally discuss the scope for regulatory intervention to reduce these rents in the forms of minimum coverage requirements, or control over the level of reciprocal roaming charges.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherUniversity of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis IIes
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDFAEII 2003.09
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectcoveragees
dc.subjectsharing agreementses
dc.subjectroaming chargees
dc.subjectno duplicationes
dc.subjectminimum coverage requirementes
dc.subjectregulationes
dc.titleRoaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulationes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelD4
dc.subject.jelL5
dc.subject.jelL86
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200309es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico IIes_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak IIes_ES
dc.subject.categoriaINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subject.categoriaECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE
dc.subject.categoriaMICROECONOMICS


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported