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Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis
dc.contributor.author | Midjord, Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-08T17:59:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-08T17:59:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1988-088X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/8770 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | DFAEII 2012.14 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.subject | job contest | es |
dc.subject | cheap talk | |
dc.subject | commitment | |
dc.title | Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | |
dc.subject.jel | L20 | |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:8770 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico II | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak II | es_ES |
dc.subject.categoria | ECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE | |
dc.subject.categoria | INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | |
dc.subject.categoria | MICROECONOMICS |