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dc.contributor.authorMidjord, Rune
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-08T18:03:28Z
dc.date.available2012-10-08T18:03:28Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1988-088X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/8771
dc.description.abstractA manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherUniversity of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis IIes
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDFAEII 2012.15
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.subjectfull implementationes
dc.subjectdirect mechanismes
dc.subjectverifiable informationes
dc.subjectrank order tournamentses
dc.titleFull Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizeses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.subject.jelD82
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:dfaeii:8771es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico IIes_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak IIes_ES
dc.subject.categoriaECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE
dc.subject.categoriaMICROECONOMICS


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