Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
Fecha
2013-10-10Autor
Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
Feltkamp, Vicent
Montero García, María
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This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by
Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players
must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.