dc.contributor.author | Montero García, María | |
dc.contributor.author | Possajennikow, Alex | |
dc.contributor.author | Sefton, Martín | |
dc.contributor.author | Turocy, Theodore L. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-16T20:01:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-01-16T20:01:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-12 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/11222 | |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case
where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share
in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | We thank Subhasish Chowdhury, Judith Avrahami, seminar participants at New York University, Keele University, University of East Anglia, University of the Basque Country, and conference participants at the
Voting Power in Practice Symposium at LSE 2011, M-BEES 2011, SING7 2011, Contest, Mechanisms and Experiments Conference at Exeter 2012, SAET 2012, GAMES 2012 and ESEM-EEA 2013. The equilibrium computations were carried out on the High Performance Computing Cluster supported by the Research and Specialist Computing Support service at the University of East Anglia. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Ikerlanak;2013.76 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Colonel Blotto | es |
dc.subject | majoritarian contests | es |
dc.subject | experiment | es |
dc.title | Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.rights.holder | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | es |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | es |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | es |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:ikerla:11222 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico I | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I | es_ES |
dc.subject.categoria | MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS | |
dc.subject.categoria | MICROECONOMICS | |