Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures

Gallo Fernández, Oihane; Iñarra García, María Elena

dc.contributor.author	Gallo Fernández, Oihane
dc.contributor.author	Iñarra García, María Elena
dc.date.accessioned	2016-10-27T08:21:56Z
dc.date.available	2016-10-27T08:21:56Z
dc.date.issued	2016-10-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/19435
dc.description	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.description.abstract	We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed among their members according to their aspirations and to a rationing rule prevailing in society. The outcome of such a process is a hedonic game. Using monotonicity and consistency we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce core-stable hedonic games.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	acknowledge nancial support from the Spanish Government ECO2015-67519-P and from the Basque Government IT568-13	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.publisher	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU	es
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Ikerlanak;2016.100
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	hedonic	es
dc.subject	games	es
dc.subject	rationing	es
dc.subject	problems	es
dc.subject	core	es
dc.subject	satbility	es
dc.title	Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper	es
dc.rights.holder	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International	*
dc.subject.jel	C71	es
dc.subject.jel	D63	es
dc.subject.jel	D79	es
dc.departamentoes	Fundamentos del análisis económico I	es_ES
dc.departamentoeu	Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I	es_ES
dc.subject.categoria	MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS
dc.subject.categoria	MICROECONOMICS