Browsing Documentos de Trabajo e Informes Técnicos by Author "IÑARRA GARCIA, MARIA ELENA"
Now showing items 1-11 of 11
-
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
Biró, Péter; Iñarra García, María Elena; Molis Bañales, Elena (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ... -
A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules
This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ... -
Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present an approach and a solution for analyzing the stability of coalition structures: We define a coalitional system (a set and a binary relation on that set) that explains ... -
Admissible Hierachic Sets
In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ... -
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ... -
Games with perceptions
Iñarra García, María Elena; Laruelle, Annick
; Zuazo Garín, Peio (Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ... -
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
Gallo Fernández, Oihane; Iñarra García, María Elena(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed ... -
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
Iñarra García, María Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-Ichi (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2019-06)
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus, one of the central single-valued solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This paper is an ... -
The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate ... -
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
Iñarra García, María Elena; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción
; Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel (2003-10)
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ... -
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
Iñarra García, María Elena; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción
; Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...