BackBrowsing Documentos de Trabajo e Informes Técnicos by Author "Zuazo Garín, Peio"
Now showing items 1-4 of 4
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Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-07-16)We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ... -
Games with perceptions
Iñarra García, María Elena
; Laruelle, Annick ; (Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ... -
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
Rocha, André Barreira da Silva; Laruelle, Annick; Zuazo Garín, Peio (2011-12)
We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete ... -
Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-03-25)In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might ...