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Now showing items 11-20 of 78
Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2013-12)
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...
Merging to License: Internal vs. External Patentee
(2003-01)
In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal ...
A Simple Model of Anticompetitive Vertical Integration
(2003-01)
The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable ...
Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature
(2009-08)
This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and oputput when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions -involving straightforward comparisons of ...
Education and the dynamics of family decisions
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2009-04)
This paper investigates the extent to which a biased transmission of educational endowments affects fertility. To this end, we devise a version of Becker’s family decision model that takes preference change into account. ...
Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2003-06)
This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which ...
Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012)
A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money
prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know
the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer-
ences over ...
Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012)
We consider a job contest in which candidates go through
interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how
competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi-
dates - can ...
Consumption and portfolio rules whit stochastic hyperbolic discounting
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-09)
We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce ...
Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-07-16)
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the
assumption of common ...