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Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2003-06)
We examine competition in Mobile Internet services, when operators bargain over the coverage sharing and their reciprocal roaming charge. Results show that in equilibrium operators cover the overall territory entirely and ...
How much efficiency gains and price reductions for an efficiency defense? 'Quanto Basta'
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2004)
Potential efficiency gains due to a merger can be used by competition authorities to judge upon proposed mergers. In a world where agents’ efforts, observable or unobservable, affect the success of a production cost reducing ...
Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian
(2011-10)
Based on a pioneering work by Ippolito (1980) we construct a simple model wich allows the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination to be well understood and explained. The decomposition of the change in welfare ...
Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination
(2009-12)
In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak ...
Merging to License: Internal vs. External Patentee
(2003-01)
In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal ...
A Simple Model of Anticompetitive Vertical Integration
(2003-01)
The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable ...
Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature
(2009-08)
This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and oputput when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions -involving straightforward comparisons of ...
Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2003-06)
This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which ...
Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2012)
We consider a job contest in which candidates go through
interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how
competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi-
dates - can ...
Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-11)
This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity ...