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dc.contributor.authorPonte Azcárate, María
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-12T11:30:06Z
dc.date.available2021-07-12T11:30:06Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationGogoa (22) : 93-119 (2021)
dc.identifier.issn1577-9424
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/52432
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I focus on Saul Kripke’s views about the first-person pronoun “I”. Iaim to show how Kripke’s later views on “I” differ from the views expressed in Naming andNecessity, and to contrast it with John Perry’s explanation, which is closer to Kripke’s earlierclaims. I discuss two of Kripke’s later papers: “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference” and “TheFirst Person”. I first argue that Kripke’s interpretation of Frege is not adequate, and then I showhow Kripke’s own view on the first person derives from this interpretation. I compare Kripke’sviews with those defended by Perry, mostly in his 1977 paper, “Frege on Demonstratives”.Kripke’s proposal includes two basic assumptions: the acceptance of incommunicableThoughts, when it comes to discussing the Fregean view, and the appeal to a Cartesian self toexplain the uses of “I”. These two assumptions are not present in Naming and Necessity andare not needed in a semantic account of the first person pronoun “I”.; Artikulu honetan, lehen pertsonako “ni” izenordainari buruz Kripkek dituenikuskerez ari naiz. Nire asmoa da erakustea Saul Kripkeren geroagoko ikuskera nola urruntzenden Naming and Necessityn esplikatu zituenetatik, eta John Perryren azalpenarekinalderatzea; gertuago dago Perryrena Kripkeren hasierako baieztapenetatik. Kripkeren biartikulu eztabaidatzen ditut, “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference” eta “The First Person”.Hasteko, argudiatzen dut Fregez egiten duen interpretazioa ez dela egokia, eta gero erakustendut Kripkeren beraren ikuskera nola eratortzen den interpretazio horretatik. Kripkerenikuskera Perryrenarekin alderatzen dut, batez ere “Frege erakusleez” (1977 [2018]) laneanaurkezten duenarekin. Kripkeren proposamenak bi suposizio ditu oinarrian: Fregeren ikuskerainterpretatzean, Kripkek ez du arazorik ikusten Pentsamendu komunikaezinetan, eta kartesiarnira jotzen du berak “ni”ren erabilerak esplikatzean. Bi suposizio horiek ez ditu egiten Namingand Necessityn, eta ez dira beharrezkoak “ni” lehen pertsonako izenordainaren azalpensemantikorako.
dc.language.isoeus
dc.publisherServicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleKripke, Perry eta "ni"
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© 2021 UPV/EHU Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional
dc.identifier.doi10.1387/gogoa.22600


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