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dc.contributor.authorCasado Izaga, Francisco Javier
dc.contributor.authorSaracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-31T08:49:54Z
dc.date.available2011-12-31T08:49:54Z
dc.date.issued1999-01
dc.identifier.issn1134-8984
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/5943
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the strategic choice of variety by a monopolist seller of a durable good as a means to mitigate his commitment problem. The monopolist chooses his product variety with a goal of ensuring that a strong reduction in future prices will not be profitable because it allows the firm to attract few additional consumers. The main result that emerges from considering product variety as an endogenous variable is that, contrary to the case in which it is exogenously determined, social welfare is always higher when the monopolist cannot commit that when he can.es
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are grateful to the University of the Basque Country (project 035.321-HB070/96) and DGICYT (project PB97-0603) for financial support.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBiltoki 1999.02
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.subjectdurable goods monopolistes
dc.subjectcommitmentes
dc.subjectproduct varietyes
dc.titleChoice of Product Variety for the Durable Goods Monopolistes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelD42es
dc.subject.jelL12
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:biltok:199902es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoesEconomía aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística)es_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia aplikatua III (ekonometria eta estatistika)es_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES
dc.subject.categoriaINDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subject.categoriaMICROECONOMICS


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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported