In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, ...

We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ...

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...

We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ...

In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We ...

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ...

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme ...

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...