Examinar Ikerlanak por departamento (eus.) "Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I"
Now showing items 120 of 100

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift
(200507)Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of ... 
A Fundamental Contradiction in Standard Rent Theory: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"
(2004)In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, ... 
A GameTheoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies
(Departamento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 201510)This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken ... 
A Marginalist Model of Network Formation
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 20160818)We develop a networkformation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a linkformation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ... 
A Model of Evolutionay Drift
(200302)Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different outofequilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning ... 
A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SDprenucleolus
(Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 20130226)We prove that the SDprenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SDprenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ... 
A new look at Marx's refutation of Ricardo's refutation of the labor theory of value
(2011)In this paper, I would like to bring back to light the forgotten critique of Marx to the widely accepted view that Ricardo succeeded in refuting the universal validity of the labor theory of value in "Principles", chapter ... 
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Qstable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 20140916)The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ... 
A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules
(200607)This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ... 
A Unifying model of strategic network formation
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 20150217)We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ... 
Adam Smith on labour and value: challenging the standard interpretation
(2006)This paper has two parts. In the first I critically analyze Smith’s refutation of the labor theory of value in book I, chapter 6 of his “Wealth of Nations”. My thesis is that Smith’s refutation is unsound and that Ricardo ... 
Admissible Hierachic Sets
(200505)In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ... 
Altruism and Social Integration
(2009)We report on a twostage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We ... 
An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution
(200312)We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for freeriding from such agreements. We ... 
An axiomatization of success
(2011)In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules. 
Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 20120716)We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for nonrational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ... 
Are Labor and Freedom Compatible? Political Economy, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy and the Young Marx
(Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2017)The question discussed in this paper is whether a political society not emancipated from labor can be a free society. In a less abstract way, the question can be posed as follows; can a society with a laboring class and a ... 
Asymmetric flow networks
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPVEHU, 20120622)This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the oneway flow model, and the twoway flow model, and includes both as particular extreme ... 
Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation
(200409)This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits ... 
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 20131010)This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...