Now showing items 1-10 of 10

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      Admissible Hierachic Sets 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción ORCID (2005-05)
      In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...
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      An axiomatization of success 

      Albizuri Irigoyen, Miren Iosune; Laruelle, Annick ORCID (2011)
      In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.
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      Information, stability and dynamics in networks under institutional constraints 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (2010-07)
      In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that ...
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      Majorities with a quorum 

      Laruelle, Annick ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (2010-01)
      Based on a general model of "quaternary" voting rule, sensitive to voters' choices between four different options (abstaining, voting "yes", voting "no" and staying home), we systematically study different types of majority ...
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      Network formation under institutional constraints 

      Olaizola Ortega, María Norma ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (2011-05)
      We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets covering the set of players specifies ...
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      Preferences, actions and voting rules 

      Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz ORCID; Laruelle, Annick ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (2011-01-17)
      In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not ...
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      Quaternary dichotomous voting rules 

      Laruelle, Annick ORCID; Valenciano Llovera, Federico ORCID (2010-01)
      In this paper we provide a general model of "quaternary" dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote profiles in which ...
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      The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción ORCID; Molis Bañales, Elena (2007-09)
      The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate ...
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      The Supercore for Normal Form Games 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción ORCID; Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel (2003-10)
      We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
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      The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games 

      Iñarra García, María Elena ORCID; Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción ORCID; Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
      We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...