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The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited
(2007-09)
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate ...
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
(2003-10)
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
Turnout Intention and Social Networks
(2009-06)
How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös-Renyi random networks. Citizens have ...
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
(2011-02-08)
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
(2011-12)
We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete ...
To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question
(2012)
This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered
a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the
ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can ...
An axiomatization of success
(2011)
In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules
(2006-07)
This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ...