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Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a
dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
(2011-02-08)
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be
distributed ...
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2019-06)
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus, one of the central single-valued solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This paper is an ...