Search
Now showing items 1-7 of 7
Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a
dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...
Admissible Hierachic Sets
(2005-05)
In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
(2003-10)
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
(2011-02-08)
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules
(2006-07)
This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be
distributed ...