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Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-03-25)
In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible
or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might ...
Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2013-12)
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...
Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-07-16)
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the
assumption of common ...
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-10-10)
This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by
Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...
Ghost seats in the Basque Parliament
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2015-04-24)
In elections voters have generally four options: to abstain, to cast a blank vote, to cast a null vote, or to vote for a candidate or party. This last option is a positive expression of support, while the other three options ...
Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-12)
The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be
distributed ...
Learning in Network Games
(Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 2012-11-23)
We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since
on networks (compared to e.g. random ...
The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-02)
We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such
as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We ...
Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-05-28)
We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links ...