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Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion
(2003-01)
The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.
International and Intergenerational Dimensions of Climate Change: North-South Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Framework
(2003-12)
Global environmental problems such as climate change have both an international and an intertemporal dimension. Recently, some papers have used an overlapping generations framework to analyze the climate change problem ...
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
(2003-10)
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution
(2003-12)
We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We ...