Now showing items 1-10 of 10
On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players
We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic ...
Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem
We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility ...
A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus
(Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 2013-02-26)
We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-10-10)
This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...
The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof
In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.
The SD-prenucleolus for TU games
We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several ...
Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion
The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.
Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game
The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a ...
The SD-prekernel for TU games
(Departamento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2016-03-14)
We introduce and analyze a new solution concept for TU games:The Surplus Distributor Prekernel. Like the prekermel, the new solu- tion is based on the an alternative motion of complaint of one player against other with ...
A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules
This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while ...