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The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
Admissible Hierachic Sets
In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ...
The Supercore for Normal Form Games
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of ...
The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate ...