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The SD-prekernel for TU games
(Departamento Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2016-03-14)
We introduce and analyze a new solution concept for TU games:The Surplus Distributor Prekernel. Like the prekermel, the new solu-
tion is based on the an alternative motion of complaint of one player against other with ...
Ghost seats in the Basque Parliament
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2015-04-24)
In elections voters have generally four options: to abstain, to cast a blank vote, to cast a null vote, or to vote for a candidate or party. This last option is a positive expression of support, while the other three options ...
Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-12)
The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: ...
Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a
dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
(2011-02-08)
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be
distributed ...
Learning in Network Games
(Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 2012-11-23)
We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since
on networks (compared to e.g. random ...
The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-02)
We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such
as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We ...
Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-05-28)
We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links ...